The concept of truth of reason and truth in fact according to Leibniz.

It is a commonplace to speak of Leibniz mention the breadth and depth of their knowledge. His intellectual capacity is evident watching his work and the number of issues that occupied his time, with a very intense public life and often made trips to Europe. However, while we get to list many of its facets as a historian, philosopher, politician, jurist, mathematician, logician, physicist, etc., do not justice to the overwhelming activity of Leibniz. Nevertheless, or precisely motivated by the fact of being immersed in all kinds of companies, Leibniz's philosophical production is particularly because a poorly published numerous small works in which we find an exhibition not too theoretical or systematic their ideas, in what today would consider popular works. It has often been accused Leibniz that this attitude resulted in the inheritance of a work in which we find somewhat fuzzy thinking, and where conclusions are clearly not of the starting points of the discussion in question. But authors like Russell Couturat and especially pointing in the direction of a very different interpretation of the writings leibnicianos. Leibniz intends to develop a unitary but diverse philosophical system, in which any of its parallel branches reflects manifest deductive development of each of its parts. So, logic, metaphysics and physics are connected into a whole that is the reality, and those which are merely manifestations of the same at different levels. One of the basic principles of the philosophy of Leibniz, if not the principle par excellence, is about the nature of propositions. This principle, be capable of giving rise, in union with the claim that there is a plurality of substances, all his philosophical system. This is the beginning of a logical nature, which says essentially two things. Every proposition attributes (or can be replaced with one that attaches) a predicate to a subject. In every affirmative proposition latter class, the predicate is included in the subject except when the predicate is the existence. Hence Leibniz derived a certain concept of substance. Following the Aristotelian tradition, the thinker of substances called Leipzig subjects who are susceptible to non-predicates and other predicates. But it adds, as a corollary of the above principle, that the nature of the substance is to have a

complete idea and a complete notion is defined by him as the one to deduce all its predicates. From this conception of substance is derived whole theory of monads, as these can not be reduced to a set of states, but these are source, thereby resulting essentially a being active. Thus we see how the concept of monad and its activity, under which change their states, turns out to be the metaphysical equivalent of the notion of subject. (Russel, Exhibition criticism of the philosophy of Leibniz, 1900) Leibniz, a parallel in your system between the metaphysical deduction, logical and physical, a fact that characterizes his thought and work. First, God is a necessary being, and to prove Leibniz again raises inter alia the ontological argument. In modern times, Descartes had already employed, stating that perfection must necessarily exist or not be perfect. And God is necessary because it essence and existence coincide. The essence of an idea is something that indicates its particularity, is, from a metaphysical level in the system corresponds to Leibniz's monads, and from a logical plane is replaceable with the subject of a proposition. The existence, for his part, expressed the survival of the idea, its relative independence, their very being. Leibniz says that only God has the prerogative to unite essence and existence: only God can say that it is sufficient to make it possible for you, as limitless perfection, so there is also updated. Leibniz says: "So, only God (or the necessary Being) has this privilege, that may not exist, since it is possible. And nothing can prevent the possibility of that which does not involve any limit, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to know a priori the existence of God. " However, it is a review about the argument as asserting the existence of something it can not belong to the same concept as it does not add anything to it but it just sets a correspondence between a concept and an existing object, anything, therefore say that existence is not a predicate or can not preach a concept and, thus, from the logical to the ontological existence can say that I could not belong to the essence of an idea, as laid down in point starting the ontological argument. Nevertheless, in the discourse of Leibniz, God is the only being necessary that exists, the only being in whom essence and existence coincide. God, in turn, is both the essence and origin of stocks. Essences are all things that are thinkable without contradiction, that is, all possible (possible is that which involves no contradiction), and Leibniz conceived the divine intellect as

"place of the eternal truths and ideas of such truths dependent ". So, is the divine intellect which makes possible these possible, just to think about them, giving them all that is real in this possibility. There are infinite possible. Systems can be organized in different worlds and innumerable, which, however, if taken individually are possible but are not coposibles along with others, in the sense that the realization of one implies the non-realization of another (in insofar as mutually exclusive). Existence is the performance and updating of essences, that is, possible. God thinks infinite possible worlds, but can only carry one's existence. All possible worlds urge toward existence, but the choice of God is the one who decides what should happen in fact to exist. In this overview is well understood Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact and the different nature of the principles that are at the basis of the two kinds of truth. The truths of reason are those whose contrary is impossible. Express the set of truths that are in the mind of God, which are based primarily on the principles of identity (A > A: If A then A), of contradiction [A -> ( A): not be A and not A] and excluded middle (A v A: Or is A or not A). They are truths of reason, for example, all of mathematics and geometry, and some others of a different nature, such as logic. So man, when he meets such necessary truths, is also based on the above principles. But the question lies in the fact that these principles are themselves truths of reason, as is manifest and evident, because their opposites are themselves impossible. The problem lies when trying Leibniz substantiate a type of propositions with a certain quality on the basis of a proposition, or set of them, which in turn share that quality that aims to be explained. I'll leave the discussion of this question for later with the promise to return to it to try to clarify the matter, but now I will focus on continuing to expose the Leibnizian thesis. On the other hand, there are truths of fact, referring to contingent events are those where it is otherwise impossible. For example, I am sitting is true in fact, but it is a necessary truth, because its contradictory not impossible (not impossible that I'm not sitting). Therefore, the truths of fact could also not be, however, as they are, have their specific rationale. Such truths, therefore, are based not on the principle of non-contradiction (because its opposite is possible), but on the principle of "sufficient reason", according to which everything that happens has a reason that fact is sufficient to determine what

happened and why it happened so and not otherwise. Often, however, the man finds it impossible to find sufficient reason every particular, because it would have to rebuild the infinite series of particular phenomena that collaborate in determining an individual event. In my view, this kind of statements are a less problematic, although not exempt from criticism but this is not internal as e case of truths of reason, it is possible to wonder about the possibility of corroborating the truth or falsity of such statements alluding to the experience, for which previously must have a clear concept of referentiality and truth. On the other hand, the principle of sufficient reason asserts the necessity of a cause to every event, obviating the difficulty that the concept of cause implies (types of cause as Aristotle noted, ability to maintain such a concept as Hume warned). But about Leibniz. To create the world, God was based on the principle of sufficient reason and not the law of contradiction, in God sufficient reason coincides with the choice of the best, with moral obligation. Therefore, as many scholars have recognized the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact has a very specific metaphysical basis, and it is something structural and last character, despite some hesitation to be found in Leibniz, and especially despite widespread criticism from the performers. The same prescience and perfect knowledge that God has with respect to contingent truths does not modify the contingent nature of these and not transformed into truths of reason. The truths of reason are based on logical-metaphysical necessity, while factual truths remain free always linked to divine decree.

The concept of analytic and synthetic judgment judgment Kant. Kant got a pietistic character education until his philosophical training, he received from Martin Knutzen, a disciple of Wolff, who in turn spread and developed the philosophy of Leibniz. Despite a pre-critical period where their ideas vacillate between the development of a character Newtonian physics and metaphysics justification thereof Leibnizian character is precisely in 1781 when, after eleven years of monastic seclusion, published a system that will revolutionize the philosophy on, posing problems still valid. The main motivation of the master at writing his monumental Kritik der Vernunft is to establish a secure foundation of science, indicating the scope and limits of human knowledge.

Part of the distinction Kant Leibniz truths of reason and truths of fact, which called analytic and synthetic judgments judgments, respectively. The first are those statements where the predicate is implicit on the subject, which therefore does not extend any knowledge, staying on the tautology. The second type, synthetic judgments, which correspond to the truths of fact Leibniz, are characterized by Kant as those statements where the predicate is not implicit subject ("the Earth revolves around the Sun") and therefore it added and extend our knowledge. Alongside this we find another parallel distinction, but no less relevant to Kant's theory, which is the a priori judgments and judgments a posteriori. The truth of the former does not depend on experience, thereby being universal and necessary, and its prototype are analytic judgments mentioned above. Subsequent judgments depend on experience and are therefore contingent, indicating the possibility of contradiction.

It seems, then, that Kant made a vain effort to parafraserarse himself performing a second ranking that merely repeats the first from another perspective, but Kningsberg sage goes a step further and definde general scientific knowledge as a system of synthetic judgments a priori, which meets the requirement of universality and necessity as much as adding information. A trial of this kind, for example, is the metaphysical afrimacin "every event has a cause." The principle by which Kant establishes the definition of judgment analytic / synthetic is based on the notion, inherited from Aristotle, subject-predicate. The basis for this justification rests on the idea I had of judgment in general. Kant thought that a judgment is given, or depends on, the semantic content of the concepts that make up the same. In turn, a concept is defined by the set of features associated with it. The discussion about the nature of analytic judgments transcends historical commentary of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and is of paramount importance in regard to the epistemological status of the various sciences. Following Kant, analytic judgments, to not add any information, can not be the prototype of statements that characterizes scientific knowledge, but, in turn, its universal and necessary prerequisite knowledge is genuinely scientific. All the propositions arithmetic or geometry, for example 5 + 7 = 12 or the straight line is the shortest distance between two points, but are not analytical synthetic, because in the first case have the concept of an operation, not its conducting,

while in the second case there is a line information that is contained in its concept, which is simply qualitative, not quantitative. Kant's solution, as we know, is to establish a new type (not without problems) trials, which are synthetic a priori. However, it is possible to leave the aporia kantaiana if we consider another characterization of judgments not based on a semantic understanding of the components of trials. In this line of approach we find the characterization of Gottlob Frege (note), which sought to establish, contrary to the thesis of Kant, the analyticity of the propositions of arithmetic, the basis of analyticity of the propositions of all mathematics. Frege's conception of an analytic judgment is one that can be derived only under logical properties of the definitions of concepts. Thus, attention is abandoned content judgment differentiability heed thereof. In particular, Frege abandons the foundation based on subject-predicate dichotomy to attend the argument and function. From this definition provides that a statement is true if and only if the function is true for any argument. The new orientation is suggested by Frege, however, directed to refute the distinction analtitco / synthetic resultndole following interesting, but rather based on the other base. Will Orman Quine (note) who propose definitely a refutation of the dichotomy be useless for science and confusing for philosophy. Quine suggests that the notion of analyticity can only be based ultimately on the notion of synonymy which, in turn, requires the notion of analyticity, and we ended up committing a vicious circle by attempting to clarify the basis on which distinction is founded. Sinomnimia Neither the concept nor the definition are suitable for the purpose, which leaves us in a difficult situation when it comes to sustaining a criterion of analyticity. Quine's conclusion is that we have always eventually resort to the experience, whether social sense either from a pragmatic perpendicular to understand the meaning of words based on which is possible, a posteriori, self-evident statements.