CARLO CELLUCCI Review article, published in Physis, vol. 34 (1967), pp. 418-426.

PENELOPE MADDY, Realism in mathematics, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1990; revised 1992; ix+204 pp.
As a result of the failure of the foundational programs, in the past three decades there has been a revival in the empiricist philosophy of mathematics. In the latter several trends can be distinguished and among them an eminent position is occupied by a Millian one. A distinctive feature of the supporters of such trend is that, while considering the absolute certainty of mathematical propositions as an illusion, they do not intend to suggest skepticism as to the reliability of logical deduction. Like Mill they consider logical inference as absolutely infallible, only axioms are fallible. A significant representative of such trend is Penelope Maddy whose views, first proposed in a series of articles, are systematically presented in this book (RM for short). Classifying Maddy as a Millian may seem peculiar because her scanty remarks about Mill in RM are fairly critical. For example, in rejecting the view that our most basic general set theoretic beliefs are justified by simple enumerative induction, she claims that: t h ei d e at h a t m a t h e m a t i c s i s as i m p l ei n d u c t i v es c i e n c eg o e s b a c kt oMi l l ( R M, p . 6 7 , footnote 77). However, including Maddy in the Millian camp seems justified in view of the following facts. 1) Like Mill, Maddy holds that it is impossible to ascribe any character of necessity to the truths of mathematics and to assum e t h a t t h e y a r e , i n a n y s e n s e , i n f a l l i b l e ( R M, p . 7 1 ) . T h e y d e p e n do nt h e e m p i r i c a l f a c t s o f c u r r e n t s c i e n c e , a n ds oa r e a p o s t e r i o r i a n d f a l l i b l e ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 2 , p . 2 8 5 ) . I n p a r t i c u l a r s e t t h e o r y i s a s f a l l i b l e a s a n y o t h e r s c i e n c e (RM, p. 128, footn o t e6 2 ) . Wh i l es e t t h e o r yi st h ef o u n d a t i o no f m a t h e m a t i c s , s u c ha f o u n d a t i o nd o e sn o t p r o v i d ee p i s t e m i cc e r t a i n t y , o n l yo n t o l o g i c a l u n i t y ( Ma d d y1 9 9 ? ) . T o d a y n o o n e w o u l d e x p e c t e v e n t h e b e s t s c i e n t i f i c a r g u m e n t s t o b e a b s o l u t e l y j u s t i f y i n g and our ep i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n q u i r i e s i nm a t h e m a t i c s m i g h t e v e n b eh a m p e r e di f w es e t a n u n r e a s o n a b l y h i g h s t a n d a r d ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 8 , p . 7 6 1 ) . 2) Like Mill, Maddy claims that the mathematical method must be identified with t h ea x i o m a t i cm e t h o db e c a u s e p r o o f m u s t b e g i nf rom axioms that are not themselves p r o v e d ( R M, p . 1 4 4 ) . S h e m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e o r e m s a r e j u s t i f i e db yd e d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e , a n dt h a tt h i si sar e l i a b l ei n f e r e n t i a lp r o c e s s ( Ma d d y1 9 8 4 ,p .4 9 ) .I n d e e d ,a l lo f mathematics can be developed within a single axiomatic system, i.e. axiomatic set theory. I nc o n t e m p o r a r ym a t h e m a t i c s , aq u e s t i o na b o u t w h a t s o r t so f m a t h e m a t i c a l t h i n g so r
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structures exist is ultimately a question about what sorts of sets exist, and a question about what can be proved is ultimately a question about what can be proved from the axioms of s e t t h e o r y . T h el a t t e r p r o v i d e af r a m e w o r ki nw h i c ha l l c l a s s i c a l m a t h e m a t i c a l o b j e c t s a n d s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e d e f i n e d a n d a l l c l a s s i c a l m a t h e m a t i c a l t h e o r e m s p r o v e d . C o n v e r s e l y , g i v i n g a f o u n d a t i o n i n t h i s s e n s e i s o n e o f t h e g o a l s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y s e t t h e o r y . F o r , o n e o f i t s a i m s i s t op r o v i d e s e t s t h a t w i l l r e a l i z e a l l m a t h e m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s a n dh e n c e t o p r o v i d e a n o n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r m a t h e m a t i c s ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 ? ) . 3) Like Mill, Maddy believes that, since the mathematical method consists of the a x i o m a t i cm e t h o da n dt h e o r e m sa r ej u s t i f i e db yd e d u c t i v ei n f e r e n c e , a l l t h a t sl e f t i s a c c o u n t i n gf o r o u rk n o w l e d g eo ft h ea x i o m s ( Ma d d y1 9 8 4 , p . 4 9 ) . A c c o r d i n gt ot h e a x i o m a t i c m e t h o d , p r o o f m u s t b e g i n f r o ma x i o m s t h a t a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s p r o v e d ( R M, p . 144). They cannot be proved and must be justified by some non-demonstrative argument. T h e r e f o r e w e m u s t d e s c r i b e w h a t w e t a k e t o b e a r e l i a b l e m e c h a n i s mw h i c h p r o d u c e s o u r belief in the mathematical a x i o m s ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 4 , p . 5 0 ) . A n a c c o u n t o f o u r k n o w l e d g e o f axioms and of the evidential role of non-demonstrative mathematical arguments in general i s c l e a r l y n e e d e d ( R M, p . 1 4 4 ) . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n v i e wo f t h e r o l e o f s e t t h e o r y i n p r o v i d i n g a foundation for mathematics, understanding how the axioms of set theory are justified and t h u s d e v e l o p i n g as u i t a b l em e t h o d o l o g yf o r s e t t h e o r e t i ca x i o m a t i c s , l o o m s a s t h em o s t p r e s s i n g f o u n d a t i o n a l p r o b l e mi n c o n t e m p o r a r y m a t h e m a t i c s ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 1 , p . 1 5 9 ) . 4) Like Mill, Maddy maintains that in order to describe what we take to be a reliable mechanism which produces our belief in at least some mathematical axioms we m u s t u l t i m a t e l yr e l yo ni n t u i t i o n . F o r Mi l l w en e v e r c o u l da r r i v ea t a n yk n o w l e d g eb y reasoning, u n l e s s s o m e t h i n gc o u l db e k n o w na n t e c e d e n t l y t oa l l r e a s o n i n g , s ot h e r e m u s t b e c e r t a i ne l e m e n t a r y b e l i e f s w h i c h a r e k n o w nd i r e c t l y , a n do f t h e m s e l v e s . S u c hb e l i e f s a r et h es u b j e c t o f I n t u i t i o n a n d a r et h eo r i g i n a l p r e m i s e sf r o mw h i c ha l l o t h e r sa r e i n f e r r e d . T h e yc a n n o t b eo b j e c t o fl o g i cb e c a u s e w i t ht h eo r i g i n a l d a t a , o ru l t i m a t e premises of our knowledge; with their number or nature, the mode in which they are o b t a i n e d , o r t h e t e s t s b y w h i c h t h e y m a y b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d , l o g i c h a s n o t h i n g t o d o (Mill 1973-74, pp. 7-8). Similarly for Maddy mathematical knowledge depends on some p r i m i t i v eg e n e r a lb e l i e f sa b o u tp h y s i c a lo b j e c t st h a ta r en o ts u p p o r t e db ys i m p l e e n u m e r a t i v e i n d u c t i o n ( R M, p . 6 8 ) a n d m u s t u l t i m a t e l y r e l y o n i n t u i t i o n . 5) Like Mill, Ma d d ym a i n t a i n st h a t t h eo n l yf o r mo fi n f e r e n t i a lj u s t i f i c a t i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l a x i o m s i s i n d u c t i v e ( Ma d d y1 9 8 4 , p . 5 1 ) . Wh i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t s i m p l ee n u m e r a t i v ei n d u c t i o ni sn o t s u i t a b l ef o r m a t h e m a t i c s , o n em a ya d o p t a more theoretica l f o r mo f i n d u c t i o n w h i c h y i e l d s ap o s i t i o nl i k eQ u i n e s o r P u t n a m s
2

( Ma d d y1 9 8 4 ,p .5 1 ) .T h el a t t e ri ss u m m a r i z e db yt h ef o l l o w i n g i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y a r g u m e n t : We a r e c o m m i t t e dt ot h e e x i s t e n c e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l o b j e c t s b e c a u s e t h e ya r e indispensable too u r b e s t t h e o r yo f t h ew o r l da n dw ea c c e p t t h a t t h e o r y ( R M, p . 3 0 ) . S i m i l a r l y Ma d d y h o l d s t h a t , s i n c e m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d s h a v e e f f e c t i v e l y p r o d u c e da l l o f m a t h e m a t i c s , i n c l u d i n gt h e p a r t s of a r a p p l i e di np h y s i c a l s c i e n c e , i t i s b yt h e mt h a t w e c a n best determine precisely what mathematical things there are and what properties these t h i n g se n j o y ( Ma d d y1 9 9 2 , p p . 2 7 9 -80 ). For example, the fact that the calculus is indispensable in physics and the set-theoretic continuum provides the best account of it, j u s t i f i e s o u r b e l i e f i n t h e s e t -theoretic continuum, and so, in the set-theoretic methods that g e n e r a t e i t ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 2 , p . 2 8 0 ) . T h u s w e a r e e n t i t l e d t o a s s u m e t h a t o u r b e s t t h e o r y o f mathematical ontology is that (at least some) mathematical entitie s a r e s e t s ( R M, p . 5 9 ) . 6) Like Mill, Maddy is aware that, although the only form of inferential justification available for the mathematical axioms is inductive, the indispensability argument does not account for the whole of mathematics. For example, it does not account for unapplied m a t h e m a t i c s w h i c h i s c o m p l e t e l y w i t h o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n o n t h e Q u i n e / P u t n a mm o d e l ( R M, p . 3 0 ) . Mo r e o v e r , a sp o i n t e do u t b yP a r s o n s , i t l e a v e su n a c c o u n t e df o rp r e c i s e l yt h e o b v i o u s n e s s o f e l e m e n t a r y m a t h e m a t i c s ( P a r s o n s 1 979/80, p. 151). In view of this Maddy p r o p o s e s a c o m p r o m i s eb e t w e e nQ u i n e / P u t n a ma n dG d e l i a nP l a t o n i s m , a c c o r d i n gt o w h i c h s u c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n s o f m a t h e m a t i c s g i v e u s r e a s o nt ob e l i e v e t h a t m a t h e m a t i c s i sas c i e n c e a n dj u s t i f y t h ep r a c t i c eo fm a t h e m a t i c s , b u ti no r d e rt oa c c o u n tf o r unapplied mathematics and for the obviousness of elementary . mathematics one must a p p e a l t oi n t u i t i o n . T h i sm e a n st h a t w en e e dt oe x p l a i nw h a t i n t u i t i o ni sa n dh o wi t w o r k s ( R M, p p . 3 4 -35). According to Maddy such a ne x p l a n a t i o ni sg i v e nb yH e b b s analysis of neural operations which suggests that the development of higher-order cell-a s s e m b l i e sr e s p o n s i v et op a r t i c u l a r s e t so fp h y s i c a l o b j e c t s g i v e sr i s et oa ne v e n higher-order assembly corresponding to the general c o n c e p t o f s e t . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s g e n e r a l s e t a s s e m b l yi sr e s p o n s i b l ef o rm a n yo fo u r i n t u i t i v eb e l i e f sa b o u t s e t s , f o r e x a m p l et h a t t h e yh a v ev a r i o u ss u b s e t s , t h a t t h e yc a nb ec o m b i n e d , a n ds oo n . S u c h i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f s u n d e r l i e t h e m o s t b a s i c a x i o m s o f o u r s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r yo f s e t s ( R M, p . 70), for example Pairing. 7) Like Mill, Maddy has a two-tiered conception of scientific knowledge: the most primitive truths are given by intuition while the more theoretical hypotheses are justified by their c o n s e q u e n c e s . A c c o r d i n g t o Mi l l t h e m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h a r e a s s u m e d as premises for the purpose of deducing from them the known laws of concrete p h e n o m e n a ( Mi l l 1 9 7 3 -4 , p . 4 8 3 ) , a r e j u s t i f i e d u n d e r t h e i d e a t h a t i f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s t o
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which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least i s l i k e l y t ob e , t r u e ( Mi l l 1 9 7 3 -4, p. 490). Similarly for Maddy only the most elementary a x i o m so fs e t t h e o r yc a nb ej u s t i f i e di nt e r m so fi n t u i t i o n , b u t t h em o r etheoretical hypotheses are justified extrinsically, by their consequences, by their ability to systematize and explain lower-l e v e l t h e o r y a n d s o o n ( R M, p . 1 0 7 ) . I n t h e c a s e o f s e t -theoretic axioms such an extrinsic evidence comes in a variety of forms, like having verifiable consequences, providing powerful new methods for solving pre-existing open problems, p r o v i d i n g p r o o f s o f s t a t e m e n t s p r e v i o u s l y c o n j e c t u r e d , i m p l y i n g n a t u r a l r e s u l t s , p r o v i d i n g new proofs of old theorems, filling a gap in a previously conjectured false but natural proof, unifying new results with old so that the old become special cases of the new ones, providing strong intertheoretic connections, extending patterns begun in weaker theories. In p a r t i c u l a r t h e s u p p o r t f o r t h e a s s u m p t ion of an infinite stage is purely extrinsic, following f r o mt h e i m m e n s e s u c c e s s o f m o d e r n i n f i n i t a r y m a t h e m a t i c s ( R M, p . 1 4 1 ) . A l l s u c h f o r m s o f e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e m o r e o r l e s s c o r r e s p o n dt of o r m s o f c o n f i r m a t i o nr e c o g n i z e di nt h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s ( Ma ddy 1988, p. 759). 8) Like Mill, Maddy focuses her attention on the nature of mathematical objects, assuming that they do not exist apart from the material world but only as embodied in it. S h ew a n t st o b r i n gt h e mi n t ot h ew o r l dw ek n o wa n di n t oc o n t a c t with our familiar c o g n i t i v e a p p a r a t u s ( R M, p . 4 8 ) . T h u s h e r p o s i t i o ni s A r i s t o t e l i a ni n s o f a r a s A r i s t o t l e s f o r m s d e p e n do np h y s i c a l i n s t a n t i a t i o n s ( R M, p . 1 5 8 ) . F o r h e r , e v e r yp h y s i c a l t h i n gi s already mathematical, and every mathematical thing is bas e d i n t h e p h y s i c a l ( R M, p . 1 5 7 ) . Ma d d ye n v i s a g e s a s p a t i o -t e m p o r a l r e a l i t y i n s e p a r a b l y p h y s i c a l a n dm a t h e m a t i c a l ( R M, p . 1 5 8 ) . F r o mt h i s v i e w p o i n t s e t s n ol o n g e r c o u n t a s a b s t r a c t ( R M, p . 5 8 ) . T h e y h a v e location in space and time; for example a set o f t h r e e a p p l e s i s l o c a t e d e x a c t l y w h e r e t h e y a r e ( R M, p . 5 9 ) . T h e r e f o r es e t sa r eo b j e c t so f o r d i n a r ys e n s e -perception. Just like we p e r c e i v ep h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , s o w ec a na n dd op e r c e i v es e t s ( R M, p . 5 8 ) . F o r e x a m p l e , when we see three apples in a box we perceive a set of three apples. Of course the world does not consist only of physical objects and sets of physical objects but also of sets of s u c h s e t s a n d s o o n , t h r o u g h t h e t r a n s f i n i t e l e v e l s o f t h e i t e r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y ( R M, p . 1 2 8 ) . Now, a set of h i g h e r o r d e r w i l l a g a i nb el o c a t e dw h e r ei t s m e m b e r s a r e ( R M, p . 5 9 ) . E v e na ne x t r e m e l yc o m p l i c a t e ds e t w i l l h a v es p a t i o -temporal location, as long as it has p h y s i c a l t h i n g s i ni t s t r a n s i t i v e c l o s u r e ( R M, p . 5 9 ) . E a c hs e t , n om a t t e r h o we x a l t e di n rank , i s l o c a t e dw h e r e t h e p h y s i c a l s t u f f i ni t s t r a n s i t i v e c l o s u r e i s l o c a t e d ( R M, p . 1 5 6 ) . T h u s t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f s e t t h e o r yc o n s i s t s o f t h e h i e r a r c h yg e n e r a t e df r o mt h e s e t o f p h y s i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s b y t h e u s u a l p o w e r s e t o p e r a t i o n ( R M, p . 1 5 6 ) .
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From t h i s s u m m a r y o f Ma d d y s p o s i t i o n i t a p p e a r s t h a t i t b r o a d l y a g r e e s w i t h Mi l l s view as regards the nature of the mathematical method, of mathematical objects and of the certainty of mathematical propositions. Does it provide a plausible picture of the nature of mathematics? It raises a number of problems. 1) The indispensability argument. As Maddy has recently acknowledged, one cannot say that, since the calculus is indispensable in physics and the set-theoretic continuum provides the best account of the calculus, our belief in set theory is justified. To s a yt h a t w o u l dm e a nt oo v e r l o o kt h a t i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t yf o r s c i e n t i f i ct h e o r i z i n gd o e s n o t a l w a y s i m p l y t r u t h ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 2 , p . 2 8 9 ) . Ma n y a p p l i c a t i o n s o f m a t h e m a t i c s t op h y s i c a l science depend on assumptions that are literally false. For example, in fluid dynamics we assume that liquids are continuous. Although such a false assumption is indispensable to make the theory workable, we know perfectly well that liquids consist of molecules and that the assumption of continuity is only an approximation. Moreover, while from the viewpoint of the indispensability argument the choice between alternative axioms, say, in s e t t h e o r y , s h o u l d h i n g e o n d e v e l o p m e n t s i n p h y s i c s , s e t t h e o r i s t s d o n o t r e g u l a r l y k e e p a n eye o nd e v e l o p m e n t si nf u n d a m e n t a l p h y s i c s a n dt h e r es e e m st ob e n om a t h e m a t i c a l r e a s o n t o c r i t i c i z e t h i s p r a c t i c e . S o l e g i t i m a t e c h o i c e o f m e t h o d i n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f s e t theory does not seem to depend on physical facts in the way indispensability theory r e q u i r e s ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 2 , p . 2 8 9 ) . Maddy recognizes that, if these objections could be sustained, then one should c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y a r g u m e n t s d o n o t p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y a p p r o a c h t o t h e o n t o l o g yo rt h ee p i s t e m o l o g yo fm a t h e m a t i c s ,a n d that, given the centrality of the i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t yc o n s i d e r a t i o n si nh e rp o s i t i o n ,t h i sw o u l dr e q u i r e as i g n i f i c a n t r e o r i e n t a t i o n i n c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 2 , p . 2 8 9 ) . S h e a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t f r o ma n a t u r a l i s t s p e r s p e c t i v e , the role of mathematics in science and the implications of that role for the foundations of set theory are more complex and subtle t h a n h a s h e r e t o f o r e b e e n a p p r e c i a t e d ( Ma d d y 1 9 9 4 , p . 4 0 7 ) . H o w e v e r Ma d d y p r o v i d e s n o suggestion as to such a reorientation, probably because this would involve a major change in her position, in particular would require giving up the assumption that the axiomatic method is the method of mathematics. 2) The two-tiered conception. The proposed extrinsic criteria about current set-theoretic axiom candidates (verifiable consequences, symplifying and systematizing, etc.) not only do not allow to decide which (if any) of such candidates is true but do not even allow to assert that speaking of their truth makes sense at all. Most people working in set theory think otherwise. They seem resigned to the idea that, because of the impossibility
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of deciding the truth of alternative set-t h e o r e t i ca x i o mc a n d i d a t e s , m a t h e m a t i c si s i n e v i t a b l yg o i n gt of r a g m e n t , a n dp r o t e s t s a b o u t u n i t yo f m a t h e m a t i c s s h o u l db e t r e a t e d w i t h t h e s o r t o f a t t i t u d e w e t a k e t o t h e u n i t y o f s c i e n c e ( D r a k e 1 9 8 5 , p . 3 5 ) . I n a n y c a s e the extrinsic criteria are not sufficient to justify any new set-theoretic axiom candidate because, according to Maddy, in addition to satisfying them, any such candidate would h a v et ob ec o n s i s t e n t w i t ht h ee x i s t i n ga x i o m s . I n d e e d , n o t o n l y o n eo ft h ec e n t r a l motivations behind axiomatization in the first place was to avoid the inconsistencies of n a i v es e t t h e o r y , b u t w em u s t g r a n t that the goal of avoiding inconsistent theories is f u n d a m e n t a lt oc o n t e m p o r a r ys e tt h e o r y ( Ma d d y1 9 9 ? ) .B u tb yG d e l ss e c o n d i n c o m p l e t e n e s s t h e o r e m , i f a n yo f t h e s e a x i o mc a n d i d a t e s i s i nf a c t c o n s i s t e n t , w e s h a l l never have a mathematical proof of that o nt h eb a s i s o f t h em a t h e m a t i c s k n o w nt o d a y (Drake 1985, p. 29). 3) The need for rules of thumb. Maddy agrees that even her two-tiered approach is not sufficient to account for the axioms of set theory. There are various arguments concerning large cardin a l a x i o m s t h a t a r en o t h a p p i l yc l a s s i f i e da se i t h e ri n t u i t i v eo r e x t r i n s i c ( R M, p . 1 4 0 ) . S u c ha r g u m e n t s , w h i c hMa d d yc a l l s r u l e so f t h u m b , d on o t d e p e n do ns i m p l e i n t u i t i o nb e c a u s e t h e ye x t e n db e y o n da n y t h i n gt h a t c o u l dp l a u s i b l yb e traced to an under l y i n g p e r c e p t u a l , n e u r o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e y c a n n o t b ec o u n t e da s e x t r i n s i cb e c a u s et h e ya r eo n l y i n d i r e c t l ys u b j e c t t oe x t r i n s i cs u p p o r t - if they consistently led to ineffective theories, they would eventually be dropped - but this p r o v e s n o t h i n g ( R M, p . 1 4 1 ) . N o w , Ma d d yp r o v i d e s n op l a u s i b l ej u s t i f i c a t i o nf o r s u c h a r g u m e n t s , l i m i t i n gh e r s e l f t os a yt h a t a c e n t r a l a s p e c t o f t h ea p p e a l o f t h e s er u l e so f t h u m b i s t h a t t h e y s e e mr i g h t ( R M, p p . 1 4 1 -2). This could hardly be regarded as a satisfactory foundation for them. . 4) The physical reality of sets. It seems implausible to say that we do perceive sets because they exist in the material world. What we perceive are aggregates of physical stuff, not sets. We perceive three apples, not a set of three apples which is a different entity from the aggregate of its members. Moreover, to make plausible the idea that sets exists in the material world, one would have to show that infinite sets are physically real and the only way to do that would be to show that the continuous intervals of points are physically real. Now, this is considered problematical by the physical community. For example, according t oF e y n m a n , t h e t h e o r yt h a t s p a c e i s c o n t i n u o s i s w r o n g , b e c a u s e w e g e t t h e s e i nfinities a n d o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e s i m p l e i d e a s o f g e o m e t r y , e x t e n d e d i n t o i n f i n i t e l y s m a l l s p a c e , a r e w r o n g ( F e y n m a n 1 9 6 7 , p . 1 6 6 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o I s h a m , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a r e a l n u m b e r f r o mi n t e g e r s a n df r a c t i o n s i s a v e r y a b s t r a c t mathematical procedure, and
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there is no a priori reason why it should be reflected in the empirical world. Indeed, from the viewpoint of quantum theory, the idea of spacetime points seems singularly i n a p p r o p r i a t e ( I s h a m1 9 8 9 , p . 7 2 ) . Wh e e l e ra s k s : T h es pacetime continuum? Even continuum existence itself? Except as idealization neither the one entity nor the other can m a k e a n y c l a i mt o b e a p r i m o r d i a l c a t e g o r y i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f n a t u r e ( Wh e e l e r 1 9 9 0 , p . 138). Of course one could always maintain that regarding infinite sets as physically real only means that they are used in the mathematical part of our best confirmed physical theory, in other words, that we must consider as physically real those entities which are presupposed by such a theory. But then the question falls back on the indispensability argument whose plausibility, as we have seen, is dubious. 5) The feeling of infallibility. How does it come about that certain hardly intuitive mathematical statements, such as the Chinese remainder theorem as stated in algebraic number theory, confer such a strong sense of being infallible, of involving notions so clearly understood as to raise no doubt about their certainty? Failing a convincing answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o nMa d d y s s t r e s s o nt h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f mathematics can be challenged, not so much for being unrealistic as for being refuted by straightforward counterexamples. Maddy seems unable to provide an answer to this problem. Her neurologically based picture of the process which produces our basic intuitive beliefs about sets does not j u s t i f yt h e i ri n f a l l i b i l i t y . As o u r c eo fp o t e n t i a le r r o ri s t h eu n c e r t a i nt r a n s i t i o nf r o m i n t u i t i v eb e l i e f t ol i n g u i s t i cf o r m u l a t i o n , a n o t h e r o n ei s t h ed i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t t h e intuitive belief itself is fals e . T h u s , i n s c i e n t i f i c c o n t e x t s , i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f s m u s t b e t e s t e d l i k e a n y o t h e r h y p o t h e s i s , a n dl i k e a n y o t h e r h y p o t h e s i s , t h e y c a nb e o v e r t h r o w n ( R M, p . 7 1 ) . I t i st r u et h a t t h es t r e n g t ho fo u rc o n v i c t i o nt h a t , s a y , t h ea x i o mo f P a i r i n gi s obviously true, along with the prevalence of similar convictions in others, supports the claim that Pairing is a good linguistic rendering of an intuitive belief, and the fact that a b e l i e f i s i n t u i t i v e l e n d s p r i m a f a c i e s u p p o r t t ot h e c l a i mt h a t i t i s t r u e . O u r b elief in the P a i r i n ga x i o mi s c o r r o b o r a t e di f f u r t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l s u p p o r t i s f o r t h c o m i n g , f o r e x a m p l e evidence that the axiom is consistent, that it produces theorems of the sort expected, and so o n ( R M, p . 7 3 ) . H o w e v e r , t h ef a c t r e m a i n s t h a t w em i g h t b e radically mistaken in the c o n c e p t s w e f o r m . F o r e x a m p l e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t s e t s a c t u a l l y d o n t h a v e s u b s e t s , h a r d a s i t i s f o r u s t o i m a g i n e s u c h t h i n g s . I n d e e d s o m e i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f s a b o u t s e t s h a v e i n f a c t been falsified by the progress of science , s u c ha sF r e g e sb e l i e ft h a t e v e r yp r o p e r t y d e t e r m i n e s a s e t o f t h i n g s w i t h t h a t p r o p e r t y ( R M, p . 7 1 ) .

6) The role of set theory in mathematics. For Maddy a question about what sorts of mathematical structures exist is ultimately a question about what sorts of sets exist, and a question about what can be proved in mathematics is ultimately a question about what can be proved from the axioms of set theory. Now, most mathematicians would dispute that. Set theory is generally considered as somewhat remote by the working mathematicians who c o u l d h a r d l y s e e d i r e c t , r e l e v a n t a p p l i c a t i o n s t o t h e i r w o r k o f s e t t h e o r y ( L o n g o 1 9 9 1 , p . 120). Assuming that a question about what can be proved in mathematics is ultimately a question about what can be proved from the axioms of set theory is purely ideological and not useful in practice. For example, when number theory is reduced to set theory we do not change our manner of doing it. Even if there is a sense in which our numerical calculations and number-theoretical proofs could be translated into set theory, doing number theory remains quite different from making calculations and proving number-theoretic results in set theory: it would be ridiculous to make calculations using the encoding of natural numbers by sets. Moreover, there is a good reason for proving number-theoretic results in number-theory instead of deriving them from the axioms of set theory via such an encoding: proofs are significantly less complex, not merely in the sense of containing less symbols but in the more basic sense of being more easily grasped. Mo r e o v e r , Ma d d y s v i e wd o e s n o t e x p l a i nw h y , a m o n ga l l p o s s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the axioms of set theory, one should actually choose those that are used in current mathematical practice, or why we find certain results more interesting than others. A c t u a l l y , f r o m Ma d d y s v i e w p o i n t o n l y t h e a x i o m s o f s e t t h e o r y m a t t e r . A l l m a t h e m a t i c a l theorems are implicitly contained in them because they are ultimately obtained by repeated applications of fairly elementary logical rules. Indeed there is an absolutely trivial mechanical procedure that, given sufficient time and space, would generate all theorems using such rules, the so-called British Museum algorithm. 7) Mathematical discovery. Maddy sharply distinguishes between the context of justification and the context of discovery and considers impossible a logic of mathematical discovery. In her opinion the formation and justification of our most elementary beliefs is an object of neurology rather than of logic, and the formation and justification of our more advanced beliefs about sets is non-l o g i c a l i n s o f a r a s i t i n v o l v e s s o m e n o n d e m o n s t r a t i v e s e t t h e o r e t i c a r g u m e n t s ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 8 , p . 7 6 2 ) . L i k e F r e g e , Ma d d y p u t s o f f t h e q u e s t i o n o f discovery and is only conc e r n e d t h a t n o t e n o u g h a t t e n t i o n i s g i v e n t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e n a n dw h y t h e a s s u m p t i o no f v a r i o u s a x i o m s i s j u s t i f i e d ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 8 , p . 4 8 1 ) . I n h e r v i e w t h i s p r o b l e mi s t h e d e e p e s t t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y m a t h e m a t i c s p r e s e n t s t ot h e c o n t e m p o r a r y
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philosopher o f m a t h e m a t i c s ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 8 , p . 4 8 2 ) . T h e q u e s t i o n o f a x i o mj u s t i f i c a t i o n i s especially pressing in current set theory, where the search is on for new axioms to d e t e r m i n e t h e s i z e o f t h e c o n t i n u u m ( Ma d d y 1 9 8 8 , p . 4 8 2 ) . T h e r e i s a n o b v i o u s s i m i l a r i t y betwe e ns u c hq u e s t i o na n d t h ec e n t r a l b u s i n e s so fp h i l o s o p h e r so fs c i e n c e : g i v i n ga c o n f i r m a t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s ( R M, p . 1 4 6 ) . According to Maddy, the similarity is particularly clear in the case of the axioms of set theory, where it is apparent from t h ev e r yd e s c r i p t i o no ft h es t y l e so fe x t r i n s i c justification - verifiable consequences, simplifying and systematizing theory, strong i n t e r t h e o r e t i c c o n n e c t i o n s ( R M, p1 4 6 ) . Wh a t i s n e e d e di s n o t j u s t a d e s c r i p t i o no f s u c h s t y l e s b u t a na c c o u n t o f w h y and when they are reliable, an account that should help set t h e o r i s t s m a k e a r a t i o n a l c h o i c e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g a x i o mc a n d i d a t e s ( R M, p . 1 4 8 ) . N o w , s u c ha na c c o u n ti sn o tp r o v i d e db y Ma d d y : F i l l i n gi nt h ed e t a i l so fs t r u c t u r eo f non-demonstrative, non-intuitive arguments and evaluating their cogency is a subject for a n o t h e r b o o k , a b o o k I u n f o r t u n a t e l y d o n t k n o wh o wt o w r i t e ( R M, p . 1 4 6 ) . S h e d o e s n o t seem aware that clarifying the structure of non-demonstrative, non-intuitive arguments requires a logic of mathematical discovery. F r o m t h ea b o v ep r o b l e m sw i t h Ma d d y sp o s i t i o ni ta p p e a r st h a t ,w h i l e mathematical empiricism has brought a breath of fresh air in the otherwise somewhat stagnating atmophere of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the problems it raises are so serious as to suggest that we must make a fresh start. Maddy criticizes Gdel for presenting a two-t i e r e d a c c o u n t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n m a t h e m a t i c s w h i c h f a i l s t o s u p p o r t the scientific status of mathematics as a whole and rests its account of elementary k n o w l e d g e o na nu n p e r s u a s i v e n o t i o no f m a t h e m a t i c a l i n t u i t i o n ( R M, p p . 1 7 7 -178). I am afraid that much the same can be said of her own approach. Nevertheless her book deserves credit for exploring the potentialities of mathematical empiricism and showing its limitations.

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L o n g o , G . ( 1 9 9 1 ) , N o t e s o nt h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f m a t h e m a t i c s a n do f c o m p u t e r s c i e n c e , i n G. Corsi and G. Sambin (eds.), Nuovi problemi della logica e della filosofia della scienza, vol. II, Bologna: Clueb, pp. 117-127. Ma d d y , P . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , P e r c e p t i o n a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l i n t u i t i o n , The Philosophical Review, vol. 89, pp. 163-96. Ma d d y , P . ( 1 9 8 4 ) , Ma t h e m a t i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g y : w h a t i s t h e q u e s t i o n , The Monist, vol. 67, pp. 46-55. Ma d d y , P . ( 1 9 8 8 ) , B e l i e v i n gt h ea x i o m s , The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 53, pp. 481-511, 736-54. Ma d d y , P . ( 1 9 9 1 ) , P h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s : p r o s p e c t s f o r t h e 1 9 9 0 s , Synthese, vol. 88, pp. 155-64. Ma d d y , P . ( 1 9 9 2 ) , I n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y a n dp r a c t i c e , The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 89, pp. 275-89. Ma d d y ,P .( 1 9 9 4 ) , T a k i n gn a t u r a l i s ms e r i o u s l y ,i nD .P r a w i t z ,B .S k y r m sa n dD . Westerstl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 383-407. Ma d d y ,P .( 1 9 9 ? ) , Ma t h e m a t i c a lp r o g r e s s ,t oa p p e a ri nt h eP r o c e e d i n g so ft h e Conference: The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge, Penn State 1995. Mill, J.S. (1973-74), A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive, in Collected works (J.M. Robson), vol. 7, Toronto (University of Toronto Press). P a r s o n s , C . ( 1 9 7 9 / 8 0 ) , Ma t h e m a t i c a l i n t u i t i o n , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 80, pp. 145-168. Wh e e l e r , J . ( 1 9 9 0 ) , C a nw ee v e r e x p e c t t ou n d e r s t a n de x i s t e n c e ? , Nuova Civilt delle Macchine, vol. 8 (4), pp. 131-44.

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