BOOK REVIEW

Cordelia Fine, Delusions of Gender: How our Minds, Society,

and Neurosexism Create Difference
W. W. Norton & Company, New York, NY, 2010, 338 pp, $25.95, ISBN: 978-0393068382
Margery Lucas
Published online: 10 January 2012
#Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
One had hoped that, by now, debates about nature versus
nurture had run their course. Informed scientific discussion
currently is all about interaction: interaction of genes with
environment, of biology with culture. But, when it comes to
gender, feminist values can be a powerful influence on the
side of nurture. Fearing that any evidence for a biological
basis for sex differences in behavior would have deleterious
effects on womens rights, some feminist scientists may lean
towards a cultural determinism on the theory that society
can be changed more easily than the genes. In her book,
Delusions of Gender, academic psychologist Cordelia Fine
talks an interactionist game but her heart belongs to cultural
determinism.
It is not hard to see how the study of sex differences came
to be politically charged. Blame it all on Darwin. The
discovery of natural selection and its role in the evolution
not just of organisms but also their behavior is all well and
good until you get to human beings. Darwins idea can be
satisfying to those who are happy to view humans as part of
the natural world, as just another branch on the phylogenetic
bush. But it can also be discomforting. After all, animals are
hardly egalitarian or fair. For those concerned, in particular,
with gender equality, an examination of animal behavior
suggests a potentially genetic basis for some disturbing
sex-linked behavior. Looking at the primates alone, depend-
ing on the species, one can observe polygyny, rape, little or
no paternal investment in childcare, even infanticide. Better
to deny the role of genes in human behavior than to accept
that any of that might be our legacy. Anatomy is one thing,
aggression, courtship, and parenting something else entirely.
Especially given revulsion towards eugenics and memories
of its malevolent applications in Nazi Germany, some think
it is best not to open the Pandoras box of biologys role in
behavior or mental capacities.
Thinking like this led to the fierce rejection of sociobiol-
ogy in the seventies; the idea that behavior might have a
genetic basis was linked to racism and misogyny. During
that time it was considered unacceptable in the social scien-
ces to argue that cognition or behavior might have a genetic
basis, except, oddly, in the area of linguistics. Just as only
Nixon could go to China, only radical left-wing Noam
Chomsky could propose that a complex psychological pro-
cess like language could be innate and get away with it. But
once Chomsky opened the door it was inevitable that other
mental processes would eventually slip through. Then the
nineties saw the rise of two strains in the sciences that led to
a broader revival of interest in the role of biology in behav-
ior. One strain was research in evolutionary biology and
psychology, the other, the introduction of new techniques
in neuroscience that have led to a greater understanding of
the brain. It is the latter, in particular, that concerns Cordelia
Fine. The explosion of neuroimaging research has helped to
lead to a swing of the pendulum back to a more biological
and genetic focus for the study of behavior. Fine would like
to push that pendulum back in the other direction, as least as
far as the science of sex differences is concerned.
Sex or Gender?
So far in this review I have been using the terms sex and
gender interchangeably. But it would be best to clarify these
terms before proceeding, especially since the choice of term
has in the past been contentious. Some authors, particularly
M. Lucas (*)
Department of Psychology, Wellesley College,
106 Central Street,
Wellesley, MA 02481, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
Soc (2012) 49:199202
DOI 10.1007/s12115-011-9527-3
those with more of a nurture bias, have preferred to use the
term sex to refer to biological differences (physical charac-
teristics, genes, hormones) and gender to refer to psycho-
logical characteristics (cognitive abilities, feelings, beliefs).
This usage of the two terms served to separate those char-
acteristics that might be biologically based from those be-
lieved to be affected primarily by environment and culture.
Recently, more researchers have endorsed a biopsychosocial
model of sex differences in which biology, culture and
environment are highly integrated (e.g. Halpern et al.
2007). Advocates of this model find the distinction between
gender and sex to be no longer useful, but there is as yet no
consensus on terminology.
Fine never explicitly accounts for her choice of terms but
prefers gender for her title and in the text of the book. It
could simply be that Delusions of Sex would have conveyed
an unintended meaning. But her preference for the term
gender may also reflect her position on the old nature versus
nurture controversy. For, although Fine says she supports a
biopsychosocial model, the overwhelming impression one
has after reading her book is that sex differences are really
just all in your mind. In Fines view, there is no biology or
genetics of gender beyond whatever determines the anatomy
and physiology of men and women. As her subtitle indi-
cates, her book is about how our mind, society, and neuro-
sexism create difference (emphasis mine), presumably
where there is none.
Neurscience or Neurosexism?
Fines target is broadsexism in society, psychology, neu-
roscience, the workplace, parenting, and education. She
covers everything from the role of stereotypes in womens
relatively poor performance on tests of mathematics to the
problems with single-sex education. Some of these topics
have been covered before but her critique of what she calls
neurosexism is distinctive. Certainly, she has written a witty
and readable book that justifiably critiques some very bad
neuroscience.
It is important to recognize, however, that Fine is not
attempting to provide a balanced or comprehensive critique
of neuroscientific research on sex differences. Popular sci-
ence books are often extended arguments weighing evi-
dence for and against a position. Authors of such books
typically engage in advocacy as well; writers want to edu-
cate but also to promote a favored theory. In the best books,
they do both and the advocacy does not overwhelm the
balanced consideration of evidence. The excellent Music,
Language and the Brain by Aniruddh Patel comes to mind
as a model of this genre. In other books, the advocacy
agenda comes to the fore and dispassionate evaluation of
the evidence suffers. Delusions of gender falls into the latter
category.
Mindful of the potential for the misuse of research sup-
porting a biological basis for sex differences, particularly in
areas like science or mathematics, Fine argues for taking a
highly skeptical approach to research in this area. The
problem with her approach is not the skepticism per se but
that her description of the research is limited, to the point
that she tends to review just those studies that validate her
nurture bias. Take, for example, her criticism of the litera-
ture on the effects of prenatal testosterone on early brain
development and organization. Her discussion of work in
this area illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of
Fines approach.
According to one theory, exposure to testosterone in the
womb affects the organization of both male and female
brains in ways that lead to sex differences in a number of
behaviors and abilities, from toy preferences to sexual ori-
entation to facility in mathematics and science. Fines alter-
native thesis is that small differences in physiology that are
based on exposure to testosterone (e.g. having a penis or a
vagina) lead to different kinds of interactions between
babies and their caretakers, and these, in turn, affect how
boys and girls think or feel.
In her discussion of this literature, Fine is selective about
the studies she discusses. Chapter 10, for example, is taken
up largely with a discussion of studies mostly by Simon
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues on fetal testosterone.
According to Baron-Cohen, exposure to testosterone in the
womb masculinizes the brain, making individuals who ex-
perienced relatively high levels of prenatal testosterone
(whether male or female) more inclined to systematizing, i.
e., analytical thinking and interest in how systems work.
Those with less exposure to prenatal testosterone are sup-
posedly more adept at empathizing, i.e., discerning what
others are thinking and feeling as well as having a greater
capacity for empathy. Baron-Cohen and colleagues investi-
gated this hypothesis by testing newborn babies of mothers
who had had amniocentesis so that levels of exposure to
hormones in the womb could be assessed. Newborns were
tested in order to limit the influences of potentially sexist
parenting on behavior. Fine criticizes one of these studies in
depth, a study that purported to show that babies who had
been exposed to higher levels of prenatal testosterone pre-
ferred to look at mobiles (therefore, were systematizers)
while babies with lower levels preferred to look at faces
(therefore, were empathizers). Among the problems with
this study that Fine discusses were that the experimenter
knew whether the babies were male or female, possibly
contaminating the results with experimenter expectation
effects. Although this study has been criticized elsewhere,
since it still occasionally turns up in popular accounts of sex
differences, Fines critique of this study is pertinent.
200 Soc (2012) 49:199202
Fine also discusses some of the literature on girls with
congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), a condition in which
babies produce unusually high levels of androgens in the
womb. Girls with this condition exhibit more typically male
behavior. Fine offers an insightful criticism of conclusions
drawn about these girls when it comes to preferences for
toys that are identified as boy toys. She points out that
toys are typically identified as masculine primarily because
boys like to play with them rather than because there is
anything intrinsically masculine about them.
All this is good as far as it goes. However, there is more
to the prenatal testosterone research than the few Baron-
Cohen studies she mentions and more to the study of clinical
populations affected by early testosterone than CAH girls
and their play preferences. Fines selective approach leaves
the reader with the impression that much of research into the
organizing effects of prenatal testosterone on the brain is
invalid and unreliable. In reality, the research in this area is
extensive, complex and, yes, uncertain, but not, for those
reasons, worthless. The extent of this literature is evident in
a review of this research that incorporated almost 300 stud-
ies (Cohen-Bendahan et al. 2005). Included were investiga-
tions of four different clinical populations, four different
direct measures of prenatal hormones, and six different
indirect measures. The authors acknowledged that much
work remains to be done on the effects of prenatal testos-
terone, for example, on how the timing of hormonal expo-
sure affects brain development, but concluded, contrary to
Fine, that there are reasons to believe that prenatal hormones
can have effects on sex-linked behavior.
To be fair, a popular book like Fines cannot be expected
to cover the same amount of research as a more scholarly
review. But Fines decision to cover so many aspects of
sexism means that she spreads herself pretty thin. As a
result, though she is not necessarily wrong in specific cri-
tiques, she can mislead the reader by omission. In throwing
out the dirty bathwater of poorly controlled studies and false
conclusions, she has also ditched the useful baby of careful
research and converging evidence.
In some parts of the book Fine does a better job,
notably in her review of the neuroimaging literature.
Fines critique of the use of these techniques is a
needed pushback against unquestioning acceptance of
any finding that has a colored picture of brain activity
associated with it. This kind of critique has been
attempted before and in greater depth by William Uttal
in his book, The New Phrenology: The Limits of Local-
izing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. But Fines book
is more accessible and likely to reach a wider audience.
Fine points out that many neuroimaging studies are lim-
ited by extremely small sample sizes, due to the expense of
conducting this research (the cost of running just one par-
ticipant in an fMRI study is about $1000). She also
describes how the colorful pictures weve become accus-
tomed to seeing are the product of a great deal of statistical
data massaging (and certainly dont reflect real color differ-
ences in the brain). Against this background, Fine reviews
work on the bilateralization of language function in women.
According to theory, women show greater involvement of
both right and left hemispheres in language functions while
men have predominantly left hemisphere dominance. Aided
by reference to meta-analyses, i.e., quantitative reviews of
large numbers of studies, Fine covers a substantial body of
data that indicates that findings of sex differences in lan-
guage lateralization are not reliable.
In this section of the book, Fine demonstrates the impor-
tance of critiquing facile interpretations of neuroimaging
literature that might be used in damaging ways. Still, Fine
can come on too strong. She is right to point out that
scientists can be driven by the promise of publication,
publicity, and unconscious motivations to support cherished
stereotypes. They can overinterpret their data or bias their
results. But bad behavior on the part of some scientists does
not mean that an entire body of work or research technique
lacks merit. Readers of Fines book might be left not just
with a healthy skepticism about neuroimaging research but
with deep suspicions about neuropsychological evidence in
general. This would be unfortunate because much neuro-
psychological research is robust and neuroimaging work can
be well-executed and useful. For example, in some clinical
populations, such as dyslexics, neuroimaging has enabled
psychologists to better understand the nature of the deficit
and even helped them develop successful interventions.
In any case, Fines criticisms can be a double-edged
sword since proponents of the importance of cultural influ-
ences on the brain also rely on brain-imaging studies. The
result is some startling, if not ironic, claims. In a recent
article, for example, psychologist Nalini Ambady, identified
in Fines book as someone who agrees with her assessment
of the sex differences research, reports approvingly on stud-
ies that demonstrate that individuals in different cultures
show activation in different brain regions to the same spatial
tasks (Ambady 2011). She interprets this evidence as show-
ing that East Asians and Westerners use different neural
circuitry for fairly simple perceptual tasks. Substitute men
and women for East Asians and Westerners in that sen-
tence and I suspect that Ambady and Fine would balk.
Apparently, neuroimaging studies look more reliable when
the topic of discussion is brain differences in ethnic groups
than when it is about sex differences.
Sex or Gender: Its Not All in Your Mind
Although Fine acknowledges that biology puts constraints
on the influence of culture one will search in vain for any
Soc (2012) 49:199202 201
indication in this book that she believes that these con-
straints might lie in anything other than gross anatomical
differences. Fine keeps saying that the truth about the ori-
gins of sex differences is complicated but she promotes
cultural influences to the point of sidelining, if not eliminat-
ing, the role of biology. This is evident in her assertion that,
Our minds, society, and neurosexism create difference.
Together, they wire gender. Prominently missing from her
list of what creates differences is mention of genes or brains.
Fine worries about the ethical consequences of accepting
the possibility that there are sex differences in cognitive
abilities especially those related to mathematics and science.
She is concerned that evidence for biological underpinnings
for these kinds of differences will be construed by the public
as support for biological determinism; as a consequence, the
cause of equal rights for women will be undermined. Cer-
tainly, it would be undesirable to see policy prescriptions
potentially detrimental to women coming out of what is still
very new and unsettled research. To the extent that Fines
book makes everyone think twice about how to interpret
scientific data in this area before making changes to schools,
the workplace, or the daycare center, she has made a signif-
icant contribution to the cause of equal rights.
However, research into sex differences in science and
mathematics, as important as these areas are for women
seeking parity with men at work, was unlikely to be associ-
ated with innate biological differences anyway; there was
not much use for calculus in the ancestral environments in
which natural selection did its work. But it is also hard to
believe that hundreds of millions of years of mammalian
evolution has not affected men and womens behavior or
mental capacities beyond an overall greater cognitive flex-
ibility in homo sapiens compared to other species, which is
all Fine seems willing to allow. It is more likely that what-
ever human sex differences there might be involve the same
aspects of social behavior that affect sex differences in other
animals: who we find attractive, how readily we bond with
our children, who we cooperate with, how and when we
express aggression. Of course, this is not to say that culture
does not also have the profound influence that Fine argues it
does. More than any neuropsychological study could ever
do, societies with commitments to democracy and to equal
protections under the law have helped women to achieve the
political and economic standing that has freed them from at
least some of the oppression imposed not just by societies
but by nature.
In the end, my greatest worry about Fines response to the
ethical concerns raised by neurosexism involves her sugges-
tion that neuroscientists need to work under a heavier
burden of caution when working on sex differences than
when working in other areas. Fine defines this heavier
burden to be greater care in the interpretation of data and
in speaking out against irresponsible journalism in the
reporting of research. But surely careful interpretation of
results, not generalizing beyond what is warranted by the
data, and challenging journalistic misrepresentations of neu-
roscience are good practices whatever area of research is in
question. So, my fear is that the heavier burden will
constitute a bar to inquiry. Calls to greater skepticism in
science and journalism, generally, are beneficial and appro-
priate. But when it comes to the issue of whether or not there
are neurobiological constraints underlying sex differences, I
hope that Fines exhortations wont cause good scientists to
be hesitant to merely ask the question.
Further Reading
Ambady, N. 2011. The mind in the world: Culture in the brain. The
American Psychological Society Observer, 24(5), May/June.
Cohen-Bendahan, C. C. C., van de Beek, C., & Berenbaum, S. H.
2005. Prenatal sex-hormone effects on child and adult sex-typed
behavior: Methods and findings. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews, 29, 353384.
Halpern, D. F., Benbow, C. P., Geary, D. C., Gur, R. C., Hyde, J. S., &
Gernsbacher, M. A. 2007. The science of sex differences in
science and mathematics. Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 8(1), 151.
Margery Lucas is a Professor of Psychology and Director of the
Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences Program at Wellesley College. She
does research in the areas of decision-making, body image, and mate
preference.
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