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Part 2 Recommendations

The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians submitted its final report to Congress with recommendations for remedial actions. The report summarized the Commission's findings that during WWII, over 120,000 Japanese Americans on the West Coast were forcibly removed from their homes and detained in internment camps, without due process and despite no evidence of disloyalty. The Commission recommended remedies based on its conclusion that this mass exclusion and detention constituted an injustice and violated civil rights.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
53 views18 pages

Part 2 Recommendations

The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians submitted its final report to Congress with recommendations for remedial actions. The report summarized the Commission's findings that during WWII, over 120,000 Japanese Americans on the West Coast were forcibly removed from their homes and detained in internment camps, without due process and despite no evidence of disloyalty. The Commission recommended remedies based on its conclusion that this mass exclusion and detention constituted an injustice and violated civil rights.

Uploaded by

bobbyluig
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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PERSONAL

JUSTI CE
DENI ED
PART 2: RECOMMENDATI ONS
THE COMMISSION
ON WARTIME
RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT
OF CIVILIANS
loan
Z. Bernstein,
Chair
Daniel E. Lungren, Vice-Chair
Edward W. Brooke
Robert F. Drinan
Arthur S. Flemming
Arthur
j.
Goldberg
Ishmael V. Gromoff
William M. Marutani
Hugh B. Mitchell
Angus Macbeth, Special Counsel
I
Pet
Pat
I
I
wAsl
JUNE
yc
r
coul
AND I
I
:ON
Personal Justice
Denied
Part 2: Recommendations
PEPORT
OF rHE
'
cotrrt lvusgoN o N wARnM E R ELocATtoN
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS
NAT13i';,I'.I.
AR:rJi?TS
LIBRARY
' it' Ni- ir 1983
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JUNE 1983
l l l
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number
-
From the C
In accordance with I
bers of the Commiss
Ci vi l i ans, I am subr
Denied, to the Cong
Commi ssi on' s recom
The members o:
special tribute and o
Angus Macbeth. An1
organizing our activi
enthusiasm. His goa
pl ete, accurate and;
He achieved that gc
talent for making th
logical and understa:
and consistently actr
The
job
simply coul<
Again, the Conr
of the staff identifter
beginning. We werr
dedicated people, w
Many others co
tial ways. Several mr
the General Servict
ment and Budget we
as Chair, I personalJ
less assistance of Bet
Finally, I would
for their assistance,
two years. I am hon
colleagues from whr
riched my life and I
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Pri nti ng Offi ce, Washi ngton, D.C. 20402
1V
4
,402
From
the Chair
In accordance wi th Publ i c Law
g6-317
and on behal f of the mem-
bers of the Commi ssi on on Warti me Rel ocati on
and Internment
of
Ci vi l i ans, I am submi tti ng Part II of our report,
personal
Justi ce
Deni ed, to the Congress of the Uni ted States.
part
II contai ns the
Commi ssi on s recommendati ons
for remedi al acti ons.
The members of the Commi ssi on j oi n
me i n extendi ng a very
speci al tri bute and our unendi ng grati tude
to the Speci al Counsel ,
Angus Macbeth. Angus accepted and executed the difffcult role of
organizing our activities and our complex tasks with great
skill and
enthusi asm. Hi s goal was to make sure our reports woul d be com-
pl ete,
accurate and refl ect the vi ews of al l Commi ssi on members.
He achi eved that goal ,
doi ng so wi th hi s usual but trul y unusual
tal ent for maki ng the i mpossi bl e seem possi bl e
and the compl ex,
logical and understandable. Throughout, he insisted on excellence
and consi stentl y acted wi th i ntel l i gence, wi t and great good sense.
The
j ob
si mpl y coul d not have been done wi thout hi m.
Agai n, the Commi ssi on j oi ns
me i n thanki ng other members
of the staff identi{ied in Part I who have worked with us from the
beginning. We were fortunate
to have found these talented and
dedicated people,
who contributed so much to our effort.
Many others contri buted to the Commi ssi on' s tasks i n essen-
ti al ways. Several members of Congress and thei r staffs, the staffof
the General Services Administration and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget were hel pful and supporti ve al ong the way. And,
as Chair, I personally
could not have functioned without the tire-
l ess assi stance of Betsy Bel l ows of Wal d, Harkrader
& Ross.
Fi nal l y, I woul d l i ke to thank the members
of the Commi ssron
for thei r assi stance, support, i nsi ght and wi sdom throughout the
two years.
I am honored to have served wi th these di sti ngui shed
col l eagues from whom I l earned so much. Thei r fri endshi ps
en-
ri ched my l i fe and I wi l l mi ss them.
-Joan
Z. Bernstein
v
In 1980 congress
established
a bipartisan
commission
on wartime
Relocation
and Internment
of Civilians, and directed it to:
l. review
the facts and circumstances
surrounding
Executive
Order Numbered
g066,
i ssued February
l g, 1g42,-and
the i m_
pact
of such Executive
Order on Ameiican
citizens and per_
manent resi dent
al i ens.
2, review directives
of United
States military forces requiring
the relocation
and, in some
cases, detention
in inter]iment
camps of Ameri can
ci ti zens, i ncl udi ng
Al eut ci vi l i ans,
and
permanent
resident
aliens of the Aleutian
and
pribilofl
Is-
l ands;
and
3. recommend
appropriate
remedies.
'The
commission
fulfilled
the first two mandates
by submitting
to congress
in February
rg83 a unanimous
report,
personar
!ustice
Denied,
which extensively
reviews
the history
and circumstances
of the fateful
decisions
to exclude, remove
and then to detain
Japa-
nese Americans
and
Japanese
resident
aliens from the west
coast,
as well as the treatment
of Aleuts during
World
War
PERSONAL I USTI CE
DENI ED
IL
*
The remedi es whi ch the Commi ssi on recommends i n thi s sec-
ond and final part of its report are based upon the conclusions of
that report as well as upon further studies done for the Commis-
sion, particularly an analysis of the economic impact of exclusion
and detenti on.
In consi deri ng
recommendati ons, the Congress and the nati on
t her ef or e must bear i n mi nd t he Commi ssi on' s basi c f act ual
fi ndi ngs about the warti me treatment of Ameri can ci ti zens of
Japanese
ancestry and resi dent
Japanese
al i ens, as wel l as of the
people of the Aleutian Islands. A brief review of the major {indings
of Personal
Justi.ce
Denied is followed by the Commission's
recom-
mendati ons.
I. AMERICAN CITIZENS OF
JAPANESE
ANCESTRY AND
RESIDENT
JAPANESE
ALIENS
On February 19, 1942, ten weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack,
Presi dent Frankl i n D. Roosevel t si gned Executi ve Order 9066,
empowering the Secretary of War and the military commanders to
whorn he delegated authority to exclude any and all
persons, citi-
zens and aliens, from designated areas in order to secure national
defense objectives against sabotage, espionage and fifth column ac-
tivity. Shortly thereafter, on the alleged basis of military necessity,
all American citizens of
Japanese
descent and all
japanese resident
al i ens wer e excl uded f r qm t he West Coast . A smal l num-
ber-5,000 to 10,000-were
removed from the West Coast and
pl aced i n
"rel ocati on
centers"-bl eak barrack camps i n desol ate
areas of the Western states, guarded by mi l i tary pol i ce.
*Personal
Justice
Denied (467 pp.,
$8.50)
is available from the Super-
i nt endent of Document s, U. S. Government Pri nt i ng Of f i ce, Washi ngt on,
DC 20402; Stock Nurnber 052- 003- 00897- l. Telephone orders may be
placed by calling
(2OZ) 783-3238. The report also discusses the removal
from Hawaii of 1,875 residents of
Japanese
ancestry; the internment of
Germans and Italians from various parts of the country as well as the ex-
clusion of a small number of German American and Italian American citi-
zens from particular areas pursuant to Executive Order 9066.
Japanese
Americans were also excluded from Alaska.
People sent to r
after a loyalty revie
tary, by the War Re
the camps. Duri ng
evacuees were allov
college outside the
ment might be avai
Americans and resi,
December L944, a
custody.
This policy of
out without individ
without adequate r,
Uni ted States, Con
detention, supportt
criminal the violati
der 9066. The Unit
in the context of wa
ican citizens on tht
thority. All this war
of espionage, saboti
been committed b1
ancestry or residen
Officials took f
enemy al i ens of ot
tion, in any part of
zens of German or
unique injustice du
The Commi ssi r
ated this history, er
points in the flow c
The federal go,
ethnic
Japanese
fro
cessi ty." Careful re
vealed any security
Japanese
in 1942. 1
tary necessity
justi
tRecent
press re
sion: this is addresse,
volume, Papers
for
tl
n thi s sec-
:lusions of
r Commi s-
' excl usi on
the nation
i c factual
ritizens of
L as of the
rr findings
n' s recom-
' AND
or attack,
der 9066,
tanders to
sons, ci ti -
e national
ol umn ac-
necessi ty,
e resi dent
. al l num-
l oast and
r desol ate
the Super-
rashington,
ers may be
re removal
:rnment of
I as the ex-
erican citi-
i.
]apanese
RECOMMENDATI ONS
People sent to relocation
centers were permitted
to leave only
after a loyalty review on terms set, in consultation with the mili-
tary, by the War Relocation Authority, the civilian agency that ran
the camps. During the course of the war, approximately
3b,000
evacuees were allowed to leave the camps to
join
the Army, attend
college outside the West Coast or take whatever private
employ-
ment might be available to them. When the exclusion of
Japanese
Americans
and resident aliens frorn the West Coast was ended in
December
1944, about 85,000 people remained in government
custody.
This policy
of exclusion, removal and detention was carried
out without individual review, and prolonged
exclusion continued
without adequate regard to evacuees' demonstrated loyalty to the
United States. Congress, fully aware of the policy
of removal and
detention, supported it by enacting a federal statute which made
criminal the violation of orders issued pursuant
to Executive Or-
der 9066. The United States Supreme Court also upheld exclusion
in the context of war, but struck down the detention of loyal Amer-
ican citizens on the ground
that this did not rest on statutory au-
thority. All this was done despite the fact that no documented acts
of espionage, sabotage or ftfth column activity were shown to have
been committed by any identifiable
American citizen of
Japanese
ancestry or resident
Japanese
alien on the West Coast.
*
Officials took far more individualized,
selective action against
enemy aliens of other nationalities.
No mass exclusion or deten-
tion, in any part
of the country, was ordered against American
citi-
zens of German or Italian descent. The ethnic
Japanese
suffered a
unique injustice during these years.
The Commission has examined the central events which cre-
ated this history, especially the decisions that proved
to be turning
points in the flow of events.
The federal government
contended that its decision to exclude
ethnic
Japanese
from the West Coast was
justified
by
"military
ne-
cessity." Careful review
of the facis by the Commission has not re-
vealed any security or military threat from the west coast ethnic
Japanese
in 1942. The record does not support the claim that mili-
tary necessity
justified
the exclusion of the ethnic
Japanese
from
*Recent
press reports take issue with this conclusion by the Commis_
sion; this is addressed separately in an addendum to another commission
volume, Papers
for
the Commissign.
PERSONAL
JUSTI CE
DENI ED
the West Coast, with the consequent loss of property
and personal
liberty.
The decision to detain followed indirectly
from the alleged
military necessity
for exclusion.
No one offered a direct military
justification
for detention;
the war Relocation Authority
adopted
detention primarily
in reaction
to the vocal popular
feeling that
people
whom the government
considered too great
a threat to re-
main at liberty on the west coast should not rive freely
elsewhere.
The wRA contended
that the initial detention in relocation
cen-
ters was necessary
for the evacuees'
safety, and that controls
on
departure
would assure that the ethnic
Japanese
escaped mistreat-
ment by other Americans
when they left the camps. It follows,
however,
from the commission's
conclusion that nL military ne-
cessity justified
the exclusion that there was no basis for this
detenti on.
In early 1943, the government
proposed
to end detention,
but
not exclusion, through a loyalty review program
designed
to open
the gates
of the camps for the loyal, particularly
those who volun-
teered to
join
the Army. This program
represented
a compromise
between those who believed
exclusion was no Ionger necessary
and those who would prolong
it. It gave
some ethnic
Japanese
an
opportunity
to demonstrate
loyalty to the United States most
graphically-on
the battlefield.
particularly
after detention,
such
means of proving
loyalty
should not have been necessary.
yet
dis_
.
tinguished
service of
Japanese
Americans
both in Europe and the
Pacific had a profound
impact in fostering postwar
acceptance
of
the ethnic
Japanese
in America. It opened the gates
of the camps
and began to reestablish
normal life for some people.
But it did
not grant
the presumption
of loyalty
to all American
citizens of
Japanese
descent. With no apparent rationale
or
justification,
the
loyalty review program
failed to end exclusion from the West
Coast of those who were found loyal.
By the spring of 1948, the highest
civilian and military
offi_
cials of the war Department
had concluded that, after the loyalty
review,
military requirements
no longer
justified
excluding Ameri-
can citizens of
Japanese
descent
or resident
aliens from the west
coast. The exclusion was imposed
through
orders based on the
secretary
of war's authority;
nevertheless,
the war Department
did not act to lift the ban. The extent to which these views were
communicated
to the white House is unclear, but twelve months
later, in May Ig44, a recommendation
to end exclusion was put
]
l
before the P
sion ended or
No pl ausi bl e
delay in allo,
j obs
and busi
ter, that mo
camps for an
In sum,
necessi ty, anr
tention, the
were not four
cal causes th
hysteria and r
about Americ
ceived in hasl
Japan.
A grar
zens and resi
vidual review
cl uded, remo
War II.
The exch
both material
nesses and hc
careers and p
come, earninl
in the postwar
uable land an
sustained in I
COnSequence I
Commi ssi on,
large measure
sult of the exc
nese lost betr
$41
and
$206
made after tl
Evacuation
C
flation alone,
$810
mi l l i on a
to calculate tl
training and t
t
t
I
Y
:
rrty
and personal
iom
the
alleged
a direct
military
rthority
adopted
ular
feeling
that
rt a threat
to re-
:eely
elsewhere.
relocation
cen-
that
controls
on
icaped
mistreat-
nps.
It follows,
no
military
ne-
r basis
for
this
l detenti on,
but
rsigned
to open
ose
who volun-
I a compromise
nger
necessary
ric
Japanese an
,d
States
most
letention,
such
l ssary.
Yet di s-
iurope
and
the
acceptance
of
s of the
camps
rl e.
But i t di d
:an citizens
of
stiftcation,
the
'om
the
West
I military
offi-
ler the loyalty
Iuding
Ameri-
rom
the
West
based
on the
: Department
re
views
were
relve
months
rsion
was put
t
J
f
RECOMMENDATI ONS
5
before
the
presi dent
at a Cabi net
meeti ng.
Neverthel ess,
excl u_
sion
ended
only after
the
presidentiar
erection
in
Novem
ber rg44.
No plausible
reason
connected
to wartime
security
supports
this
del ay
i n
al l owi ng
the
ethni c
1"p".r"r.-to return
to thei r
h' rnes,
j obs
and busi nesses_al thoughthe
del ay
meant,
as a practi cal
mat_
ter' that
most
evacuees
continued
to be conffned
in relocation
camps
for
an additional
eighteen
months.
In sum,
Executive
Order
9066
was not justified
by military
necessi ty,
and
the deci si ons
that fol rowed
from
i t-excl usi on,
de-
tention,
the
ending
of detention
and the
ending
"f ;";l;;;""
_
were
not founded
upon
miritary
considerations.
The
broad
histori-
cal causes
that
shaped
these
decisions
were
race prejudice,
war
hysteria
and a failure
of politicar
leadership.
widespread
ignorance
about
Americans
of
Japanese
descent
coniributed
io " poTr"f
"orr_
ceived
in haste
and executed
in an atmosphere
of fear
"riJ ".rg".
"a
Japan'
A grave
personal
injustice
was done
to the American
citi-
zens
and resident
aliens
of
Japanese ancestry
who,
without
indi-
vidual
review
or any probative
evidence
against
them,
were
ex_
cluded,
removed
and detained
by the United
States
during
World
War II.
, .
The
excl uded
peopl e
suffered
enormous
damages
and l osses,
both
materi al
and i ntangi bre.
To the di sastrous
l oss
of farms,
busi -
nesses
and homes
must
be added
the
disruption
for ..r"rry
y"u.,
of
careers
and professi onal
l i ves,
as wel r
as the l ong-term
rorr-oi ,"-
come,
earnings
and
opportunity.
Japanese
American
participation
in the postwar
boom
was delayed
".rd
d"*"g"d
by the losses
of val_
uabl e
l and
and growi ng
enterpri ses
on the West
Coast
whi ch
they
sustai ned
i n
rg42. An
anarysi s
of the
economi c
rosses
suffered
as a
consequence
of the exclusion
and detention
was perfbrmed
for
the
Commi ssi on,
Congress
havi ng
extended
the
Commi ssi on,s
l i fe i n
l arge
measure
to permi t
such
a study.
It i s
esti mated
that,
as a re_
sul t
of the
excl usi on
and
detenti on,
i n tg+i
dol l ars
tt" .i fr"i "
i pu_
nese
l ost
between
$r0g and
$164 mi ti on
i n i ncome
and between
$41 and
$206 million
in property
for
which
no compensation
was
made
after
the
war under
the
'terms
of the
Japanese-American
Evacuation
Claims
Act.
Adjusting
these
figures
to account
for in_
flation
alone,
the total
losses
of ii"o-"
".rd p.op"rty
fall
between
$810 mi l l i on
and
g2
bi l l i on
i n
l gg3 dol l ars.
It has not be""
O"rrri f"
to calculate
the
effects
upon
human
capital
of lost
"a.r""tio.r,
loU
training
and the like.
1
li
PERSONAL
JUSTI CE
DENI ED
Less
tangibly,
-
the
ethnic
Japanese
suffered
the injury
of
unjustified
stigma
that marked
the
excruded.
There
*"."
lrryri""t
illnesses
and injuries
directly
rerated
to detention,
but thJ depri-
vation
of liberty
is no less injurious
because
it wounds
the spirit
rather
than
the
body.
Evacuation
and relocatio.,
bro,rght-fry"fro_
logical pain,
and
the weakening
of a traditionaty
strong
famiry
structure
under
pressure
of separation
and
camp
conditi"orrr.
No
price
can be placed
on these
deprivations.
^
These
facts present
the
Commission
with
a complex
problem
of great
magnitude
to which
there is no ready
or satisfactory
an_
swer.
No amount
of money,can
fully
"o_p".rr"t"
th"
"*"trarj'p"o_
ple
for
their losses
and sufferingr.
i*o
and a half years
behind
the
barbed-wire
of a relocatio.,
""-p,
branded
potentially
airr"y"r
ur-
cause
of one' s
ethni ci ty
al one-these
i nj usti ces
cannot
neatry
be
translated
into
dolrars
and cents.
some
ftnd
such
an "i ",,,n, i" ,,-
sel f
a means
of mi ni mi zi ng
the enormi ty
of these
events
i n a con_
stitutional
republic.
History
cannot
be undone;
anything
*. do
now
must
inevitabry
be an expression
of regret
and an afffrmation
of our better
values
as a nation,
not an accounting
which
balances
or erases
the
events
of the
war. That
is now
beyorrd
anyone,s
power.
It is well
within
our power,
however,
to provide
remedies
for
violations
of our own laws
and principles.
This is
one important
reason
for the several
forms
of ,"dr"ri
recommended
below.
An_
other
is that
our nation's
ability
to honor
democratic
varues
even in
times
of stress
depends
largely
upon
our collective
memory
of
lapses
from
our constitutionar
commitment
to liberty
and due
process.
Nations
that forget
or ignore
injustices
are more likely
to
repeat
them.
The governmental
decisions
of lg42
were
not the work
of a
few
men
driven
by animus,
but decisions
supported
or accepted
by
public
servants
from
nearly
every part
of th" potiti"ui
,pJ"trir_.
Nor
did
sustained
o? vocal
opporiiion
come
from
the
American
public.
The
wartime
events produced
an unjust
result
that visited
great
suffering
upon
an entire group
ofcitizens,
and upon resident
aliens
whom
the Constitution
also protects.
While
we do not anal_
ogize
these
events
to the
Holocaust_for
the
detention
camps
were
not death
camps-this
is hardly
cause
for
comfort
in a de_
mocracy,
even forty years
later.
The
belief
that
we Americans
are exceptional
often
threatens
our freedom
by allowing
us to look
complacently
at evil_doing
else_
where
and t
events
of exc
of Americans
fection
by thr
gl e.
"It
di d I
not as an exer
ture.
Among
knowledge
in
t y . I t i s i n a s
recommends
In propo
recommendat
al , state
and
dress
the wro
o
In l 94l
tion Claims
A,
clairn from
th
occurred
as a
Act did not al
Approximatell
what
would h
nomi c l osses.
requi red,
and
were
bui l t i nt<
o
In l g72
nese
Ameri can
earned
and co
detenti on.
o
In 1978,
amended
to al l
credit for time
o
In four
cei ved
a measu
enacted
a statu
i n the ci vi l ser
the war becaus
aration.
In late
enacted
a si mi l
i n
1942.
San
passed
statutes
were
excl uded.
irtjury of
e physical
lhe depri-
the spirit
rt psycho-
ng family
i ti ons. No
r problem
rctory an-
uded peo-
,ehind
the
isloyal be-
neatly be
mpt in it-
in a con-
ng we do
,ffirmation
r balances
anyone s
nedies for
important
elow. An-
es even in
temory of
and due
e likely to
work of a
cepted by
spectrum.
American
nt visited
n resi dent
r not anal-
on camps
t i n a d e -
threatens
Loing else-
RECOMMENDATI ONS
where and to i nsi st that
"It
can' t happen here." Recal l i ng the
events of excl usi on and detenti on, ensuri ng that l ater generati ons
of Americans know this history, is critical immunization against in-
fection by the virus of prejudice and the emotion of wartime strug-
gl e.
"It
di d happen here" i s a message that must be transmi tted,
not as an exercise in self-laceration but as an admonition for the fu-
ture. Among our strengths as a nati on i s our wi l l i ngness to ac-
knowledge imperfection as well as to struggle for a more
just
socie-
ty. It i s i n a spi ri t of conti nui ng that struggl e that the Commi ssi on
recommends several forms of redress.
In proposi ng remedi al measures, the Commi ssi on makes i ts
recommendations in light of a history of postwar actions by feder-
al, state and local governments to recognize and partially to re-
dress the wi ongs that were done:
o
In 1948, Congress passed the
Japanese-Ameri can
Evacua-
tion Claims Act; this gave persons of
Japanese
ancestry the right to
claim from the government real and personal property losses that
occurred as a consequence of the exclusion and evacuation. The
Act did not allow claims for lost income or for pain and suffering.
Approximately
$37
million was paid in claims, an amount far below
what would have been full and fair compensation for actual eco-
nomi c l osses. Awards were l ow because el aborate proof
of l oss was
required, and incentives for settling claims below their full value
were bui l t i nto the Act.
o
In 1972, the Social Security Act was amended so that
Japa-
nese Ameri cans over the age of ei ghteen woul d be deemed to have
earned and contri buted to the Soci al Securi ty system duri ng thei r
detenti on.
o
In 1978, the federal ci vi l servi ce reti rement provi si ons
were
amended to al l ow the
Japanese
Ameri cans ci vi l servi ce reti rement
credi t for ti me spent i n detenti on after the age of ei ghteen,
a
In four i nstances, former government empl oyees have re-
cei ved a measure of cornpensati on. In 1982, the State of Cal i forni a
enacted a statute permi tti ng the few thousand
Japanese
Ameri cans
i n the ci vi l servi ce, who wer' e di smi ssed or who resi gned duri ng
the war because of thei r
Japanese
ethni ci ty, to cl ai m
$5,000
as rep-
arati on. In l ate 1982, the Los Angel es County Board of Supervi sors
enacted a similar program for the
Japanese
Americans it employed
i n 1942. San Franci sco and the State of Washi ngton recentl y
passed statutes provi di ng si mi l ar rel i ef to former empl oyees who
were excl uded.
PERSONAL
JUSTI CE
DENI ED
Each measure acknowledges to some degree the wrongs in-
flicted during the war upon the ethnic
Japanese.
None can fully
compensate or, indeed, make the group whole again.
The Commi ssi on makes the fol l owi ng recommendati ons for
rernedies in several forms as an act of national apology.
1. fh" Commi ssi on recommends that Congress pass a
j oi nt
resol uti on, to be si gned by the Presi dent, whi ch recogni zes that a
grave injustice was done and offers the apologies of the nation for
the acts of excl usi on. removal and detenti on.
2. fh. Commi ssi on recommends that the Presi dent pardon
those who were convi cted of vi ol ati ng the statutes i mposi ng a cur-
few on American citizens on the basis of their ethnicity and requir-
ing the ethnic
Japanese
to leave designated areas of the West
Coast or to report to assembl y centers. The Commi ssi on further
recommends that the Department of
Justi ce
revi ew other warti me
convi cti ons of the ethni c
Japanese
and recommend to the Presi -
dent that he pardon those whose offenses were grounded in a re-
fusal to accept treatment that discriminated among citizens on the
basi s of race or ethni ci ty. Both recommendati ons are made wi thout
prej udi ce to cases currentl y before the courts.
tt
.J. Th. Commi ssi on recommends that Congress di rect the
Executive agencies to which
Japanese
Americans
*
-"y apply for
the resti tuti on of
posi ti ons, status or enti tl ements l ost i n' whol e or
i n part because of acts or events between December l 94I and
1945 to review such applications with liberality, giving full consid-
erati on to the hi stori cal fi ndi ngs of thi s Commi ssi on. For exampl e,
the responsi bl e di vi si ons of the Department of Defense shoul d be
i nstructed to revi ew cases ofl ess than honorabl e di scharge ofJapa-
nese Ameri cans from the armed servi ces duri ng Worl d War II over
whi ch di sputes remai n, and the Secretary of Heal th and Human
Servi ces shoul d be di rected to i nstruct the Commi ssi oner of Soci al
"This
recommendation and those that follow apply to all ethnic
Japa-
nese excluded or detained during World War II without regard to the ex-
plicit legal authority under which the government acted.
Security to revit
ments due to th
4. th" co
official
recognit
Japanese
ancest
World War, an,
dress for these r
cial foundation.
The Comm
manitarian
purtr
and all agree th
the lives damaS
sioners agree tl
suffered by an t
al deprivations.
Such a fun
activities
so tha
wi l l be rememl
this and similal
tion which wisl
l apses. The re
comparative
stt
upon
particula:
ment acti on i n
publ i c educat
tributing the C
publ i shers, edr
5.
The
r
Lungren,
reco
provi de persol
serve the purl
of
$1. 5
bi l l i on
to be determi r
provi de a one-
each of the ap
thei r
pl aces ol
rCommi ssi t
tary recompensl
'rongs
in-
can fully
-
tions
for
s a j oi nt
ls that
a
rtion
for
pardon
J
a cur-
requir-
r
West
.rurther
artime
Presi-
l a r e -
rn the
i thout
t the
ly for
ile
or
and
nsi d-
rple,
d b e
apa-
)ver
nan
,cial
pa-
ex-
RECOMMENDATI ONS
9
Securi ty
to revi
ments
due
to ,h"_
"rr.remai ni ng
compl ai nts
of i nequi ty
i n enti tl e_
re
wartime
detention.
4. fh.
Commission
recommends
that
Congress
demonstrate
i:fi ilJT"-J.fi
"Jj;[.il.;:::,;'"",";;";;;'",1,"",,,o,
I:l
iln,",,
a. tr, "t
i.
;."
*;,
; :
H"f,,,Tl
iX
-,:T
ff ::l
cial foundatrorr.
,"rar,
by
appropriating
monies
to establish
a spe_
The
Commissioners
all believe
a fund
for
educational
and
hu_
manitarian
purposes
related
t" th"
;;
and
a' "g'""
rh*',.o
rund,"""rj
L:
#ffi;T:i:
TilftTi,? the
lives
damaged
uv t'"
;."#;
"la
a.."r,,ion.
The
commis-
sl oners
agree
that.tu"h,u
runa
upp-fi atery
addresses
an i n;usti ce
;ifi:|":lJi
en ti re'th"i"
;;;;' lf,
'0,,.,,,*uis
h ed rrom
i nii,,id
u
-
such
a fund
shourd
sponsor
research
and. pubri c
educati onal
;:iil:
":#
J,fi:
:|;,
ffi
y,|';l
;;1
t h ",,,
b
i-*
I .i,"ru,,
"
n
" o,,
this
and
similar
"u"ir"*_1".,"^:,:,t,
_:
caus.es
and
circumstances
of
ti on which
*,,h
;',"J
:"
ffi"
::,il.ilili,:o
",, a,,.'
a-""'l,o
J.' o .,u-
rapses.
rhe
recommended
r"""a",""
"ft;lr#:J.T.1""?il:
comparati ve
studi es
of si mi rar
"i ui t
i i r".ti .s
abuses
or of the
effect
upon
particurar
groups
^of
raciar
nr"i,rit"" embodied
by govern-
ment
action
in
times
of "utiorrut
,tr,"rl,
lo.
""u_ple,
the
fund,s
liJ,ff
tj1ff
1
"".'';;;;;;f.'i'"i,
"0" prepari
n g
",, J d,,_
p u b I i sh e-,s,
;J""*',".,
:::';,i:"11::s
a b o u t th".
; " ;;;''i""
i"",u
",,.
_
5.
The
Commi ssi oners,
wi th
the
e
Lun gre
n, recom
m end
.r,",
c." g."r;':r:ffi:f
"J
;::Tfl
n, T?,1
provide
personal
redress
..
;;:";;lo'i9r.
excluded,
as well
as
serve
the purposes
set
out i n
Recommendati on
4. Appropri ati ons of
$1.5 biltion
should
U"'oui..;",;?ffJ
to be deterrnined
bv
congress.
rh,;
i;;;:;:nT:';fj5i:Jr::
provi de
a one_t i me
per
capi t a
compensat o
:::l
"{ the
approxi m"t"ty
oo,ooo:;;"
pavment
of
$20,000
to
their
places
of residence
pursuant
..
E"""*rl;:tJ:r::"#*i
TiT
l Commi ssi oner
Wi l
tary
recompenr"
"ittr". li,lT^I'l'
Marutani
formally
renounces
any
mone-
ol r ect
or i ndi r ect .
I O PERSONAL
JUSTI CE
DENI ED
burden shoul d be on the government to l ocate survi vors, wi thout
requiring any application for payment,
and payments
should be
made to the ol dest survi vors fi rst. After per capi ta payments,
the
remainder of the fund should be used for the public
educational
purposes di scussed i n Recommendati on 4 as wel l as for the general
wel fare of the
Japanese
Ameri can communi ty. Thi s shoul d be ac-
compl i shed by grants for purposes
such as ai d to the el derl y and
scholarships for education, weighing, where appropriate, the effect
of the excl usi on and detenti on on the descendants of those who
were detai ned. Indi vi dual payments
i n compensati on for l oss or
damage shoul d not be made.
The fund shoul d be admi ni stered by a Board, the maj ori ty of
whose members are Ameri cans of
Japanese
descent appoi nted by
the Presi dent and confi rmed by the Senate. The compensati on of
members of the Board shoul d be l i mi ted to thei r expenses and per
di em payments at accepted governmental rates.
I I . THE ALEUTS2
When the
Japanese
attacked and captured the two westernmost
Aleutian islands, Kiska and Attu, the military evacuated the Aleuts
from the Pribilofs and from inany islands in the Aleutian chain.
This action was
justified
as a measure to protect
civilians in an ac-
ti ve theatre of war. The Commi ssi on found no persuasi ve
showi ng
that evacuation of the Aleuts was motivated by racism or that it
was undertaken for any reason but their safety. The evacuation of
the Aleuts was a rational wartime measure taken to safeguard
t hem.
Following the evacuation, however, the approximately 900
evacuated Aleuts suffered at the hands of the government in two
di sti nct ways. Fi rst, no pl an had been devel oped to care for them
by the ci vi l i an agenci es i n the Department of the Interi or whi ch
had responsi bi l i ty for Al eut i nterests. As a resul t, they were trans-
ported to southeastern Al aska and housed i n camps set up typi cal l y
at abandoned gol d mi nes or canneri es. Condi ti ons vari ed among
camps, but housi ng, sani tati on and eati ng condi ti ons i n most were
2Commissioner
]oan
Z. Bernstein recuses herself from participation
in recommending remedies for the Aleuts because of a potential
conflict
of interest involving representation by the law firm of which she is a
member.
deplorable
widesprear
approxima
two to thrr
This t
sponsibilit'
Secon,
inany hous
tary. Hour
mi ssi ng, d
Orthodox I
i st Russi a
nificant lor
ment atter
replaced A
never rem
The F
sating for
I
has not be
In adc
Coast Gua
World Wa
wartime d
thi s mater
No eI
Aleut prop
means of
brought tc
claims pro
tion. Ther
mendation
Commi ssi t
dence befi
preci se ba
practical ir
1 . r
senting, re
cial use ol
and i ntere
vi dual pur
RECOMMENDATI ONS
'
11
t
I
depl orabl e.
Medi cal
care was i nadequate;' i l rness
and di sease
were
widespread.
While
exact numbers
are not available,
it appears
that
approximately
ten percent
of the Aleut evacuees
died durins
the
two to three years
they spent in the camps.
This treatment
clearly
failed
to meet
the government,s
re_
sponsi bi l i ty
to those
under i ts care.
Second,
on returni ng
to thei r vi l l ages,
the Al euts found that
i nany houses
and churches
had been vandal i zed
by the U.S. mi l i _
tary. Houses,
churches,
furni ture,
boats and {i shi ng gear
were
mi ssi ng,
damaged
or destroyed.
Devout fol l owers
of the Russi an
orthodox faith,
the Aleuts had treasured
religious
icons from
czar-
i st Russi a and other fami l y hei rl ooms;
now gone,
they were a si g_
nificant
loss spiritually
as welr as materiaily.
Insofar
", th"
qovern-
ment attempted
to make good
some of these l osses,
i t typi cal l y
repl aced
Al eut possessi ons
wi th i nferi or goods,
and the l orr",
*.r"
never remedi ed
adequatel y.
The Fi fth
Amendment
commi ts
the governrnent
to compen_
sating
for property
it takes.
Appropriate,
fr'rll
"o-p.nsation
"l""rly
has not been made i n the case
of the Al euts.
In addition,
the island
of Attu, now used at least in part
by the
Coast Guard,
was never
returned
to the Aleuts
"ft.,
ti" Secorrd
world
war.
There
also remain
in the Aleutians
large quantities
of
wartime
debris,
much
of it hazardous.
A great
deal,
but not all, of
this material
rests
on federally-owned
Iand.
,
No effective
system
of records
exists
by which
to estimate
Aleut property
losses
exactly;
certainry
there
is no readiry
availabre
means
of putting
a dollar
value
upon
the suffering
and death
brought
to Al euts i n the camps.
The
Commi ssi oners
agree that
a
claims procedure
would
not be an effective
method
of "o-pr.rr"-
ti on' Therefore'
the sums i ncruded
i n the commi ssi on' .
*"u*-
mendati ons
were chosen
to recogni ze
fundamental j usti ce
as the
commi ssi oners
percei ve
i t on the basi s
of the testi mo.ry
".rJ
"rri -
dence
before
them. The recommended
amounts
do not refl ect
a
precise
balancing
of actual losses;
this is now, after
many years,
a
practi cal
i mpossi bi l i ty.
1. th" Commi ssi oners,
wi th
Congressman
Lungren
di s_
senti ng,
recommend
that congress
establ i sh
a fund for the benefi _
ci al use of the Al euts
i n the amount
of
$5
mi l l i on.
The pri nci pal
and i nterest
of the fund
shoul d
be spent for
communi ty
and i ndi _
vi dual purposes
that woul d
be cornpensatory
for the l osses
and i n-
12 PERSONAL I USTI CE DENI ED
j uri es
Al euts suffered as a resul t of the evacuati on. These i nj uri es,
as Personal
Justi ce
Deni ed descri bes, i ncl ude l asti ng di srupti on of
tradi ti onal Al eut means of subsi stence and, wi th i t, the weakeni ng
of their cultural tradition. The Commissioners therefore foresee
entirely appropriate expenditures from the proposed fund for com-
munity educational, cultural or historical rebuilding in addition to
medi cal or soci al servi ces.
2. fh. Commi ssi oners, wi th Congressman Lungren di s-
senting, recommend that Congress appropriate funds and direct a
payment of
$5,000
per capita to each of the few hundred surviving
Aleuts who were evacuated from the Aleutian or Pribilof Islands
by the federal government during World War II.
3. fh" Commi ssi on recommends that Congress appropri ate
funds and direct the relevant government agency to rebuild and
restore the churches damaged or destroyed in the Aleutian Islands
in the course of World War II; preference in employment should
be gi ven t o Al eut s i n per f or mi ng t he wor k of r ebui l di ng and
restori ng these bui l di ngs, whi ch were communi ty centers as wel l
as houses of worshi p.
4. fh" Commi ssi on recommends that Congress appropri ate
adequate funds through the public works budget for the Army
Corps of Engineers to clear away the debris that remains from
Wor l d War I I i n and ar ound popul at ed ar eas of t he Al eut i an
Isl ands.
5. thr Commi ssi on recommends that Congress decl are Attu
to be native land and that Attu be conveyed to the Aleuts through
their native corporation upon condition that the native corporation
is able to negotiate an agreement with the Coast Guard which will
allow that service to continue essential functions on the island.
Fi nal l y, the Commi ssi on recommends that a permanent col -
lection be established and funded in the National Archives to
house and make available for research the collection of govern-
ment and pri vate documents, personal testi mony and other mate-
ri al s whi ch the Commi ssi on amassed duri ng i ts i nqui ry.
The Con
personal i nj u
i en
Japanese
preservi ng a
can learn fro
the Congress
press our pr
We are I
May say
It i s our bel i
within our p<
b,
i.df
Fg
be
n.t-
;to
{s-
b':a
ng
dls
: "
\ :
ftc
M
ds
ild
d
)ll
RECOMMENDATIONS
13
The Commission believes that, for reasons of redressing the
.personal
injustice done to thousands of Americans
and resident al-
ien
Japanese,
and to the Aleuts-and for compelling reasons
of
preserving
a truthful sense of our own history and the lessons we
can learn from it-these recommendations
should be enacted by
the Congress. In the late lg30's W. H. Auden wrote lines thbt ex-.
press
our present
need to acknowledge and to make amends:
We are left alone with our day, and the time is short and
History
to the defeated
May say Alas but cannot help
or pardon.
It ii our belief that, though hiitory
cannot be unmade, it is
.well
within our power
to offer help, and to acknowledge
error.
l _ .

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