G.R. No.

126780 February 17, 2005

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.

FACTS:
McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist was befriended by Tan who convinced McLoughlin to
transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez s
erved as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxe
s of Tropicana. Everytime he arrive from Australia he registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit
box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trip
s. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit
boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to t
he registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a re
gistered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management w
ho then would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety de
posit box with the two keys. He allegedly placed several envelopes containing certsin amounts therein, only
to find them insufficient when he opened them. During his another visit some time later, he found that som
e of his jewelries were missing inside the box. When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confro
nted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him
.

McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had st
olen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam an
d Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asl
eep. The hotel contended that shall not be hold liable for McLoughlin signed an "Undertaking for the Use of
Safety Deposit Box" with them.

ISSUE:
Whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having
these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such l
oss

RULING:
NO. The "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity pr
esents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appel
late court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Para
graphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they a
llow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety de
posit box forany cause whatsoever.

Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropic
ana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropic
ana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend t
o loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the k
eepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure. It is the
loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no sh
owing that the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to q
ualify the same as force majeure.
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002

which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the
loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would lea
d us to reject petitioners' contention. The justification they raise would render nugatory the public interest
sought to be protected by the provision. What if the negligence of the employer or its employees facilitated
the consummation of a crime committed by the registered guest's relatives or visitor? Should the law excul
pate the hotel from liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of the registered guest of the hot
el? Hence, this provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has no
t contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible for the loss of goo
ds by theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to the loss.
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared not only by the guest hi
mself but also by the management since two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without th
e assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurre
nt negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoug
hlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use his key.
To rule otherwise would result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the mana
gement will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of being a family member or a vis
itor of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without fear of any liability that will attach therea
fter in case such person turns out to be a complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade responsibilit
y for any liability incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the guest's relatives and visitors.



G.R. No. 179096 February 06, 2013
JOSEPH GOYANKO, JR., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr., Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, MANGO AVENUE BRANCH, Respondent.

FACTS:
The late Joseph Goyanko, Sr. (Goyanko) invested Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) with Philippine Asia Le
nding Investors, Inc. His family, represented by the petitioner, and his illegitimate family presented conflicti
ng claims to PALII for the release of the investment. Pending the investigation of the conflicting claims, PA
LII deposited the proceeds of the investment with UCPB under the name "Phil Asia: ITF (In Trust For) The
Heirs of Joseph Goyanko, Sr." (ACCOUNT). The deposit under the ACCOUNT was P1,509,318.76. UCPB allo
wed PALII to withdraw One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the Account, leavin
g a balance of only P9,318.76. Despite petitioner's demand, UCPB refused the demand to restore the amou
nt withdrawn plus legal interest. The petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC. In its answer, UCPB admit
ted the opening of the ACCOUNT under the name "ITF (In Trust For) The Heirs of Joseph Goyanko, Sr.," (I
TF HEIRS) and the withdrawal.

ISSUE:
Whether UCPB should be held liable for the amount withdrawn because a trust agreement existed between
PALII and UCPB, in favor of the HEIRS, when PALII opened the ACCOUNT with UCPB.

HELD:
NO. Express trust does not exist between PALII and UCPB. Contrary to the petitioners position, UCPB did n
ot become a trustee by the mere opening of the ACCOUNT. While this may seem to be the case, by reason
of the fiduciary nature of the banks relationship with its depositors,

this fiduciary relationship does not "con
vert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether ex
press or implied." It simply means that the bank is obliged to observe "high standards of integrity and perf
ormance" in complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan.

Per Article 1980 of the Civil Co
de,
40
a creditor-debtor relationship exists between the bank and its depositor.

The savings deposit agreeme
nt is between the bank and the depositor; by receiving the deposit, the bank impliedly agrees to pay upon
demand and only upon the depositors order.
Since the records and the petitioners own admission showed that the ACCOUNT was opened by PALII, UC
PBs receipt of the deposit signified that it agreed to pay PALII upon its demand and only upon its order. T
hus, when UCPB allowed PALII to withdraw from the ACCOUNT, it was merely performing its contractual o
bligation under their savings deposit agreement. No negligence or bad faith can be imputed to UCPB for thi
s action. As far as UCPB was concerned, PALII is the account holder and not the HEIRS.



G.R. No. 80201 November 20, 1990.
ANTONIO GARCIA, JR., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, LASAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIO
N, Respondents.


FACTS:
The Western Minolco Corporation (WMC) obtained from the Philippine Investments Systems Organization (
PISO) two loans for P2,500,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 for which it issued the corresponding promissory not
es. Antonio Garcia and Ernest Kahn executed a surety agreement binding themselves jointly and severally f
or the payment of the loan of P2,500,000.00 on due date. Upon failure of WMC to pay after repeated dema
nds, demand was made on Garcia pursuant to the surety agreement. Garcia also failed to pay. Hence, Lasa
l Development Corporation (to which the credit had been assigned earlier by PISO) sued Garcia for recover
y of the debt

ISSUE:
Whether Garcia's stand that he should not be held liable as to the surety agreement since no consideration
has been paid to him is meritorious.

HELD:
NO. The petitioners ground that the surety agreement was invalid because no consideration had been paid
to him by PISO for executing the contract and that the amount of the entire loan had been received and en
joyed by WMC is not well taken in view of the nature and purpose of a surety agreement. Suretyship is a c
ontractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby one person, the surety, engages to be answerable
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, known as the principal. The peculiar nature of a surety agre
ement is that it is regarded as valid despite the absence of any direct consideration received by the surety
either from the principal obligor or from the creditor. A contract of surety, like any other contract, must gen
erally be supported by a sufficient consideration. However, the consideration necessary to support a surety
obligation need not pass directly to the surety; a consideration moving to the principal alone will suffice. It
has been held that if the delivery of the original contract is contemporaneous with the delivery of the suret
ys obligation, each contract becomes completed at the same time, and the consideration which supports th
e principal contract likewise supports the subsidiary one. And this is the kind of surety contract to which th
e rule of strict construction applies as opposed to a compensated surety contract undertaken by surety cor
porations which are organized for the purpose of conducting an indemnity business at established rates an
d compensation unlike an ordinary surety agreement where the surety binds his name through motives of f
riendship and accomodation. The suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance o
f his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless,
although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to t
he creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is dire
ctly and equally bound with the principal. The surety therefore becomes liable for the debt or duty of anoth
er although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit
therefrom.