Quadrennial

Defense Review
Report
September 30, 2001
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Table of Contents
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Current Security Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Emerging Operational Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
STATE OF THE U.S. MILITARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
II. DEFENSE STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
DEFENSE POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
STRATEGIC TENETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Managing Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
A Capabilities-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Defending the United States and
Projecting U.S. Military Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities . . . . . . .15
Transforming Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
III. PARADIGM SHIFT IN FORCE PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
DEFEND THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
DETER FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
CURRENT FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
IV. REORIENTING THE U.S. MILITARY GLOBAL POSTURE . . . . . .25
V. CREATING THE U.S. MILITARY OF THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . .29
OPERATIONAL GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
TRANSFORMATION PILLARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
STRENGTHENING JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Joint and Combined Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . .33
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Standing Joint Task Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Joint Presence Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Sustaining the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
EXPERIMENTING IN SUPPORT OF
TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
EXPLOITING INTELLIGENCE ADVANTAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Global Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) . . . . . . .39
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and
Dissemination (TPED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
DEVELOPING TRANSFORMATIONAL CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . .40
Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Transformation Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Recapitalization of the Department's Legacy Forces . . . . . . . .47
VI. REVITALIZING THE DOD ESTABLISHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
ENCOURAGE TALENT TO ENTER AND STAY IN
THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
MODERNIZE DOD BUSINESS PROCESSES
AND INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
VII. MANAGING RISKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
A NEW RISK FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
Force Management Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
Operational Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Future Challenges Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
Institutional Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
MITIGATING RISKS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
APPENDIX A: GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND
RESULTS ACT OF 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
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Review Report
Foreword
O
n September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious,
bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They died
on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as innocent
victims. They died not from traditional armies waging traditional
campaigns, but from the brutal, faceless weapons of terror. They died as
the victims of war - a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror
took America by surprise.
The war the nation fights today is not a war of America's choosing. It is a
war that was brought violently and brutally to America's shores by the evil
forces of terror. It is a war against America and America's way of life. It is
a war against all that America holds dear. It is a war against freedom itself.
The attack on the United States and the war that has been visited upon us
highlights a fundamental condition of our circumstances: we cannot and
will not know precisely where and when America's interests will be
threatened, when America will come under attack, or when Americans
might die as the result of aggression. We can be clear about trends, but
uncertain about events. We can identify threats, but cannot know when
or where America or its friends will be attacked. We should try mightily to
avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it. We must constantly
strive to get better intelligence, but we must also remember that there will
always be gaps in our intelligence. Adapting to surprise - adapting quickly
and decisively - must therefore be a condition of planning.
The Quadrennial Defense Review was undertaken during a crucial time of
transition to a new era. Even before the attack of September 11, 2001, the
senior leaders of the Defense Department set out to establish a new
strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and
contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective
abroad, America must be safe at home. It sought to set the conditions to
extend America's influence and preserve America's security. The strategy
that results is built around four key goals that will guide the development
of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use:
I Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of
purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
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I Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or
operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our
allies and friends;
I Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the
capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for
aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting
infrastructure; and
I Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.
A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning
from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a
"capabilities-based" model for the future. This capabilities-based model
focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically
whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes
that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters.
Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter
and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and
asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.
Adopting this capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the
nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new
areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to
adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new
circumstances, while experimenting with the development of new
military capabilities. In short, it requires the transformation of U.S. forces,
capabilities, and institutions to extend America's asymmetric advantages
well into the future.
Transforming America's defense for the 21st century will require a long-
standing commitment from our country and its leaders. Transformation
is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced in
earnest today. The challenges the Nation faces do not loom in the
distant future, but are here now. They involve protecting our critical
bases of operation - including the most critical base of operation, the
U.S. homeland - and projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-
access environments. They entail assuring U.S. information systems
and providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement
of adversary forces and capabilities. They require enhancing the
capability and survivability of U.S. space systems and leveraging
information technology and new concepts to provide for more
effective joint operations.
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Of necessity, our efforts will begin relatively small, but will grow
significantly in pace and intensity. And over time, the full promise of
transformation will be realized as we divest ourselves of legacy forces and
they move off the stage and resources move into new concepts,
capabilities, and organizations that maximize our warfighting
effectiveness and the combat potential of America's men and women in
uniform. This will not be a simple task. It requires steadfastness of
purpose and the freedom to manage effectively and efficiently. It will
require new tools to manage the Defense Department and an overhaul of
existing approaches.
To support the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and to better
manage the full range of activities of the Defense Department, the
Quadrennial Defense Review identified a new approach to assessing and
managing risk. This new approach will help to ensure that the
Department of Defense is better able to meet near-term threats even as it
invests in capabilities needed to safeguard the nation's future security.
This Quadrennial Defense Review was the product of the senior civilian
and military leadership of the Department of Defense. It benefited from
extensive consultation with the President of the United States. It was truly
"top down" in that the decisions taken on strategy, forces, capabilities, and
risks resulted from months of deliberations and consultation among the
most senior Defense Department leadership. This report outlines the key
changes needed to preserve America's safety and security in the years
to come.
The Quadrennial Defense Review and the accompanying report were
largely completed before the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the
United States. In important ways, these attacks confirm the strategic
direction and planning principles that resulted from this review,
particularly its emphasis on homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing
for asymmetric threats, on the need to develop new concepts of
deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need
to balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk. However, the
attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 will require us to move
forward more rapidly in these directions, even while we are engaged in
the war against terrorism.
The vast array of complex policy, operational, and even constitutional
issues concerning how we organize and prepare to defend the American
people are now receiving unprecedented attention throughout the
United States government. Importantly, since the scope of homeland
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security responsibilities span an array of federal, state, and local
organizations, it also will require enhanced inter-agency processes and
capabilities to effectively defend the United States against attacks. The
recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security will galvanize
this vital effort.
Thus, this report represents not so much an end but a beginning. Even as
this report is concluded, the Department of Defense is engaged in the
process of reviewing and implementing the directions set forth here
through the Defense Department's military planning and resource
allocation processes. These efforts, in turn, will allow the Defense
Department leadership the opportunity to build upon and refine the
decisions taken as the result of this review.
Finally, the loss of life and damage to our economy from the attack of
September 11, 2001 should give us a new perspective on the question of
what this country can afford for its defense. It would be reckless to press
our luck with false economies or gamble with our children's future. This
nation can afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries of
tomorrow and to underpin our prosperity. Those costs do not begin to
compare with the cost in human lives and resources if we fail to do so.
As we contend with the difficult challenges of the war on terrorism, we
must also proceed on the path of transforming America's defense. Our
commitment to the nation will be unwavering and our purpose clear: to
provide for the safety and well being of all Americans and to honor
America's commitments worldwide. As in generations before, the skill of
our armed forces, their devotion to duty, and their willingness to sacrifice
are at the core of our nation's strength. We must provide them with the
resources and support that they need to safeguard peace and security not
only for our generation but for generations to come.
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Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
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I.
America's Security
in the 21st Century
T
he history of the 20th century has proven time and again that
America's security is linked directly to that of other nations, and that
America's prosperity depends on the prosperity of others. America
seeks to use its current political, economic, and military advantages not to
dominate others, but to build a durable framework upon which the United
States and its allies and friends can prosper in freedom now and into
the future.
Yet, as the September 2001 events have made clear, not all accept
America's purposes or share its values. There are many threats against this
Nation, and they will take many forms. They range from the threat of
major war to the faceless threat of terror. America's approach to security
must defend our way of life while protecting the security of all Americans
and that of our allies and friends.
America's Role in the World
America's goals are to promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage
prosperity. U.S. leadership is premised on sustaining an international
system that is respectful of the rule of law. America's political, diplomatic,
and economic leadership contributes directly to global peace, freedom,
and prosperity. U.S. military strength is essential to achieving these goals,
as it assures friends and allies of an unwavering U.S. commitment to
common interests.
America's security role in the world is unique. It provides the basis for a
network of alliances and friendships. It provides a general sense of
stability and confidence, which is crucial to the economic prosperity that
benefits much of the world. And it warns those who would threaten the
Nation's welfare or the welfare of U.S. allies and friends that their efforts at
coercion or aggression will not succeed.
Even now as the Nation mourns the victims of terrorist attacks on the
Pentagon and the World Trade Center, America's purposes remain clear
and its commitment resolute.
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U.S. Interests and Objectives
The purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect and advance U.S.
national interests and, if deterrence fails, to decisively defeat threats to
those interests. The United States has interests, responsibilities, and
commitments that span the world. As a global power with an open society,
the United States is affected by trends, events, and influences that originate
from beyond its borders. The development of the defense posture should
take into account the following enduring national interests:
I Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, including:
I U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom
I Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad
I Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure
I Honoring international commitments, including:
I
Security and well-being of allies and friends
I Precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly
Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral
1
, and the
Middle East and Southwest Asia
I Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere
I Contributing to economic well-being, including:
I Vitality and productivity of the global economy
I Security of international sea, air, and space, and information
lines of communication
I Access to key markets and strategic resources.
Protecting these interests requires vigorous commitment and support. It
entails effective diplomacy, a strong economy, and a watchful and ready
defense. When U.S. interests are protected, America and its friends
prosper from peace and freedom. When U.S. interests are challenged, the
Nation must possess the strength and resolve to provide for their defense.
1
The east Asian littoral is defined as the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and
into the Bay of Bengal.
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A Changed Security Environment
An assessment of the global security environment involves a great deal of
uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of
war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the Nation
will take. History has shown that rapid and unexpected changes, such as
the collapse of the Soviet Union, can transform the geopolitical landscape.
It also has demonstrated that new military technologies can revolutionize
the form of military competition and the nature of armed conflict in ways
that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent.
While contending with such uncertainty is a key challenge for U.S.
defense planning, certain features and trends of the security environment
define not only today's geopolitical and military-technical challenges but
also highlight critical operational challenges that the Nation's armed
forces will need to master in the future.
Current Security Trends
Although U.S. military forces enjoy superiority in many dimensions of
armed conflict, the United States is likely to be challenged by adversaries
who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric
approaches to warfare, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The
United States cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity
of the countries or the actors that may threaten its interests and security.
But it is possible to identify the trends that will give rise to important
threats and opportunities.
Key Geopolitical Trends. The international system, which was
characterized during the Cold War by the division of countries into
enduring and ideologically defined geopolitical blocs, has become more
fluid and unpredictable. America's alliances have remained strong. But
relations with other countries are often characterized both by
competition and cooperation. U.S. strategy must take into account the
important new geopolitical trends shaping the world.
Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance. As the September
2001 events have horrifically demonstrated, the geographic position of the
United States no longer guarantees immunity from direct attack on its
population, territory, and infrastructure. Although the United States and its
overseas forces were vulnerable to Soviet missiles during the Cold War, it is
clear that over time an increasing number of states will acquire ballistic
missiles with steadily increasing effective ranges. Moreover, economic
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globalization and the attendant increase in travel and trade across U.S.
borders has created new vulnerabilities for hostile states and actors to
exploit by perpetrating attacks on the U.S. homeland.
Regional Security Developments. Although the United States will not face
a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional
powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions
critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a
region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc
of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the
region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The
governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by
radical or extremist internal political forces or movements. Many of these
states field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire
weapons of mass destruction.
Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility
exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will
emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral - from the Bay of Bengal to the
Sea of Japan - represents a particularly challenging area. The distances are
vast in the Asian theater. The density of U.S. basing and en route
infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. The United States
also has less assurance of access to facilities in the region. This places a
premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and
on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great distances
with minimal theater-based support.
The United States and its allies and friends will continue to depend on the
energy resources of the Middle East, a region in which several states pose
conventional military challenges and many seek to acquire -- or have
acquired -- chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high
explosive (CBRNE) weapons. These states are developing ballistic missile
capabilities, supporting international terrorism, and expanding their
military means to coerce states friendly to the United States and to deny
U.S. military forces access to the region.
With the notable exception of the Balkans, Europe is largely at peace.
Central European states are becoming increasingly integrated with the
West both politically and economically. An opportunity for cooperation
exists with Russia. It does not pose a large-scale conventional military
threat to NATO. It shares some important security concerns with the
United States, including the problem of vulnerability to attack by ballistic
missiles from regional aggressors, the danger of accidental or
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unauthorized launches of strategic weapons, and the threat of
international terrorism. Yet, at the same time, Russia pursues a number of
policy objectives contrary to U.S. interests.
While the Western Hemisphere remains largely at peace, the danger exists
that crises or insurgencies, particularly within the Andean region, might
spread across borders, destabilize neighboring states, and place U.S.
economic and political interests at risk.
Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak
and failing states. The absence of capable or responsible governments in
many countries in wide areas of Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere
creates a fertile ground for non-state actors engaging in drug trafficking,
terrorism, and other activities that spread across borders.
In several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies,
safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving
as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations can also pose a threat to
stability and place demands on U.S. forces. Conditions in some states,
including some with nuclear weapons, demonstrate that potential threats can
grow out of the weakness of governments as much as out of their strength.
Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. The
attacks against the U.S. homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that
terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct
devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure. Often
these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy sanctuary and
protection of states, but some have the resources and capabilities to
operate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of
CBRNE technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks
might involve such weapons.
Developing and sustaining regional security arrangements. U.S. alliances,
as well as its wide range of bilateral security relationships, are a
centerpiece of American security. The United States has enjoyed
unparalleled success in building regional security arrangements. In
addition, the United States has demonstrated an unmatched ability to
develop coalitions of states to confront particular challenges, including
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This ability will be critically important in
responding to the events of September 11, 2001. These security
arrangements and coalitions constitute a formidable combination of
actual and potential power that enables the United States and its partners
to make common cause to shape the strategic landscape, protect shared
interests, and promote stability.
Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of
conflict. Together, these trends produce a geopolitical setting that is
increasingly complex and unpredictable. Unlike the Cold War period,
where the key geographic regions of competition were well defined, the
current period has already imposed demands for U.S. military intervention
or activity on virtually every continent and against a wide variety of
adversaries. The United States will not be able to develop its military
forces and plans solely to confront a specific adversary in a specific
geographic area. Instead, the United States could be forced to intervene in
unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities.
Moreover, these interventions may take place in distant regions where
urban environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic
conditions present major operational challenges.
Key Military-Technical Trends. Technology in the military sphere is
developing as rapidly as the tremendous changes reshaping the civilian
sector. The combination of scientific advancement and globalization of
commerce and communications have contributed to several trends that
significantly affect U.S. defense strategy.
Rapid advancement of military technologies. The ongoing revolution in
military affairs could change the conduct of military operations.
Technologies for sensors, information processing, precision guidance,
and many other areas are rapidly advancing. This poses the danger that
states hostile to the United States could significantly enhance their
capabilities by integrating widely available off-the-shelf technologies into
their weapon systems and armed forces. For the United States, the
revolution in military affairs holds the potential to confer enormous
advantages and to extend the current period of U.S. military superiority.
Exploiting the revolution in military affairs requires not only technological
innovation but also development of operational concepts, undertaking
organizational adaptations, and training and experimentation to
transform a country's military forces.
Increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles. The
pervasiveness of proliferation in an era of globalization has increased the
availability of technologies and expertise needed to create the military
means to challenge directly the United States and its allies and friends.
This includes the spread of CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery,
as well as advanced conventional weapons. In particular, the pace and
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scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier
intelligence estimates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster
pace than previously expected. Likewise, the biotechnology revolution
holds the probability of increasing threats of biological warfare.
Emergence of new arenas of military competition. Technological advances
create the potential that competitions will develop in space and cyber
space. Space and information operations have become the backbone of
networked, highly distributed commercial civilian and military
capabilities. This opens up the possibility that space control - the
exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries - will
become a key objective in future military competition. Similarly, states
will likely develop offensive information operations and be compelled to
devote resources to protecting critical information infrastructure from
disruption, either physically or through cyber space.
Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise. Together, these
military-technical trends create an increased potential for miscalculation
and surprise. In recent years, the United States has been surprised by the
speed with which other states have progressed in developing weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In the future, it is unlikely that the
United States will be able accurately to predict how successfully other
states will exploit the revolution in military affairs, how rapidly potential
or actual adversaries will acquire CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles, or
how competitions in space and cyber space will develop.
Emerging Operational Challenges
These geopolitical and military-technical trends will profoundly shape the
future security environment. U.S. adversaries will have new capabilities
that previous opponents lacked. U.S. defense strategy must take into
account the need to transform U.S. forces to address several key emerging
operational challenges that are inherent in current security trends. These
challenges and an associated set of operational goals are explored in depth
in Section V of this report.
State of the U.S. Military
To secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future
security environment is the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and
U.S. Armed Forces. While U.S. military forces - comprising a total force of
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Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces - remain the best trained, best
equipped, and most capable in the world, there are significant challenges
that are eroding the advantage the United States currently enjoys. These
challenges affect the readiness and tempo of personnel and units, the major
weapons systems of the Armed Forces, and the defense infrastructure.
While U.S. forward-deployed and "first to fight" forces are trained and
ready, other operational units are less ready. During the past decade, DoD
sustained readiness of "first to fight" forces, but fiscal constraints
prevented other units from achieving desired readiness levels.
For example:
I The degraded readiness of non-deployed carrier airwings has
made it increasingly difficult to return those airwings to desired
readiness levels when they deploy.
I The U.S. military has an existing shortfall in strategic transport
aircraft. This shortfall is aggravated by continuing low readiness
of the C-5 airlifter, which has had an average peacetime mission
capable rate over the last five years of approximately 60 percent.
This readiness level is about eight percent below peacetime
performance objectives for this aircraft.
I The readiness of the Army's highest priority units has been
sustained at the expense of non-divisional and Reserve
Component units and the institutional Army.
I The uniquely American superiority in training is eroding,
particularly as evident in the aging infrastructure and
instrumentation of U.S. training ranges.
Excessive operational demands on the force have taken a toll on military
personnel. Since the end of the Cold War, the Armed Forces experienced
a reduction of total personnel but an increase in the demands placed on
those smaller forces. One indication of this increased operational tempo
has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component. The high
tempo of operations, coupled with continued demand for workers in the
private sector, adversely impacted the ability of the Armed Forces to
recruit and retain quality people for a number of years.
While competition from a strong economy has made retention difficult,
Services face additional personnel challenges as a result of a decade of
downsizing. Because of the reduced accessions during most of the last 10
years, the Services must achieve higher than historic retention rates in
order to properly man the force in the future.
The quality of life in the military is critical to retaining a Service member
and his or her family. Recent surveys conducted by the Department
indicate that the two primary reasons that Service members leave or
consider leaving are basic pay and family separation. The current junior
officer force has a proportionately higher married population than ever
before experienced. Also, a very high proportion of married junior
officers have dual-career marriages. As a result, the Armed Forces must
not only retain the Service member, but also retain his or her family.
Family separation due to extended deployments has a significant impact
on a family's propensity to remain in the military.
The Department of Defense must recruit, train, and retain people with the
broad skills and good judgment needed to address the dynamic challenges
of the 21st century. Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly
motivated military and civilian personnel, at all levels, is the essential
prerequisite for achieving success. Advanced technology and new
operational concepts cannot be fully exploited unless the Department has
highly qualified and motivated enlisted personnel and officers who not
only can operate these highly technical systems, but also can lead
effectively in the highly complex military environment of the future.
DoD's civilian workforce also must be transformed to meet the challenges
of the future. An increasing number of civilian personnel are nearing
retirement age. In addition, as a result of downsizing in recent years, DoD
has not sufficiently emphasized efforts to bring talented young civilian
personnel into the Department to develop them to fill leadership
positions. This has been particularly true with respect to young people
with the skills needed to address emerging science and technology needs.
The pressure to maintain near-term readiness has also limited DoD's ability
to recapitalize the force. At the end of the Cold War, the Department made
a conscious decision to cut its procurement accounts and lived off the
systems procured as a result of investments made in the 1980s. Although
procurement spending has increased in recent years, it remains at
historically low levels. As a result, many major systems are approaching
the end of useful service. This in turn results in reduced mission capable
rates, increased operating costs, and frustration in keeping aged
equipment operational. The effect is to reduce the readiness of the force.
In addition, the defense infrastructure also has suffered from
underfunding and neglect. Defense infrastructure includes facilities such
as the piers, runways, and hangars that support U.S. combat forces, the
buildings where DoD personnel work, and the housing in which military
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personnel and their families live, and training space. These facilities are
supported in two ways: sustainment and recapitalization. In recent years,
facility sustainment was funded at only 75-80 percent of the requirement.
The result is a deterioration of facilities and an accumulating restoration
backlog that has been estimated to cost over $60 billion. Recapitalization
was also significantly underfunded. While the private sector replaces or
modernizes facilities at an average rate of once every 57 years, defense
infrastructure has fallen well short of that standard. For example, in 2001,
the facilities replacement rate is 192 years. The result is a decaying
infrastructure that is less and less capable of supporting current military
needs. This trend must be reversed. If the sustainment of existing
facilities and recapitalization continues to be neglected, the resulting
facilities infrastructure will not be capable of supporting combat
readiness. Also, the difficulty of retaining a workforce, which works and
lives in substandard conditions, will only increase.
The Department of Defense cannot transform the force to deal with
tomorrow's security threats without also addressing today's challenges.
DoD must reverse the readiness decline of many operational units,
selectively recapitalize the force, and arrest the decay of aging
defense infrastructure.
II.
Defense Strategy
T
he defense strategy serves the broad national objectives of peace,
freedom, and prosperity. Diplomatic and economic efforts seek to
promote these objectives globally by encouraging democracy and
free markets. U.S. defense strategy seeks to defend freedom for the United
States and its allies and friends, and it helps to secure an international
environment of peace that makes other goals possible.
Defense Policy Goals
The Department of Defense has developed a new strategic framework to
defend the nation and secure a viable peace. This framework is built
around four defense policy goals:
I Assuring allies and friends;
I Dissuading future military competition;
I Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and
I If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.
Assuring Allies and Friends. The United States cannot retreat from the
world. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most
profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S.
military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the Nation
will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner. Through
its willingness to use force in its own defense and that of others and to
advance common goals, the United States demonstrates its resolve and
steadiness of purpose and the credibility of the U.S. military to meet the
Nation's commitments and responsibilities. Toward these ends, the U.S.
military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly
nations. A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help
allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical
areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation
serves as an important means for linking DoD's strategic direction with
those of U.S. allies and friends.
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Dissuading Future Military Competition. Through its strategy and
actions, the United States influences the nature of future military
competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates
military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted
strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating
future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence
through the conduct of its research, development, test, and
demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or enhancing
advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of
advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will
also require the United States to experiment with revolutionary
operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and
to encourage the development of a culture within the military that
embraces innovation and risk-taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this
combination of technical, experimental, and operational activity has to
have a clear strategic focus. New processes and organizations are needed
within the defense establishment to provide this focus.
Deterring Threats and Coercion Against U.S. Interests. A
multifaceted approach to deterrence is needed. Such an approach
requires forces and capabilities that provide the President with a wider
range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion.
In particular, it places emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in
critical areas of the world. It requires enhancing the future capability of
forward deployed and stationed forces, coupled with global intelligence,
strike,
2
and information assets, in order to deter aggression or coercion
with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater. Improving
intelligence capabilities is particularly important, as these assets provide
U.S. forces with critical information on adversaries' intentions, plans,
strengths, and weaknesses. This new approach to deterrence also
requires non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and
mobile targets throughout the depth of an adversary's territory; active and
passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can
decisively defeat any adversary. A final aspect of deterrence, addressed
not in the QDR but in the Nuclear Posture Review
3
, is related to the
offensive nuclear response capability of the United States.
2
Strike, as used in this report, is meant to represent the nature of the military objectives sought,
not necessarily the weapons used. Strike capabilities may include not only long-range precision
attacks delivered from aircraft and missiles, but also appropriately structured ground force attacks,
naval fires, and other capabilities, depending on the circumstances and particularly combinations
of these capabilities.
3
The Nuclear Posture Review is mandated by the Congress and due in December 2001. It will
describe the size, structure, and posture of the nations nuclear forces and the contribution they can
make to deterrence in the coming decades.
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If Deterrence Fails, Decisively Defeat Any Adversary. U.S. forces
must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the
efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or
friends. U.S. forces must maintain the capability at the direction of the
President to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners
on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities. Such a decisive
defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or
occupation of foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met.
Strategic Tenets
These defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set of
strategic tenets. It is only through careful attention and commitment to
each of these tenets that the defense policy goals will be achieved. These
tenets comprise the essence of U.S. defense strategy.
Managing Risks
The United States faces a world in which change occurs with ever-
increasing speed. New challenges are constantly emerging, while
longstanding threats endure. DoD must prepare for future challenges
over time, while meeting extant threats at any given time. This tension
between preparations for the future and the demands of the present
requires the United States to balance the risks associated with each.
Because resources are always finite, hard choices must be made that take
into account a wider range of risks than was necessary in the past. Some
of these risks are familiar, such as the possibility of a major war. Other
risks - such as the possibilities of mass casualty terrorism, cyber warfare, or
CBRNE warfare - are less well understood. Through the QDR, the
Department has developed a new defense strategy and an associated risk
management framework, and is in the process of building new
performance measures, both to better manage the risks the United States
faces and to meet the defense policy goals.
A Capabilities-Based Approach
The new defense strategy is built around the concept of shifting to a
"capabilities-based" approach to defense. That concept reflects the fact
that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation,
combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S.
interests or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now. It is
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possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might
employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the United States from acting in
defense of its allies and friends, or directly attack the United States or its
deployed forces. A capabilities-based model - one that focuses more on
how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where
a war might occur - broadens the strategic perspective. It requires
identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and
defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric
warfare to achieve their objectives. Moving to a capabilities-based force
also requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities that
certain capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range
precision strike, transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and
systems, to overcome anti-access and area denial threats, can confer on
the U.S. military over time.
Defending the United States and Projecting
U.S. Military Power
Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the
tragic September terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will
seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the United States, its allies, and its
friends. As the U.S. military increased its ability to project power at long-
range, adversaries have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S.
homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the development of
capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter U.S.
operational advantages with their own strategic effects. Therefore, the
defense strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending the
United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to
safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source
of its capacity to project decisive military power overseas. In turn, the
ability to project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United
States and, when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at
a distance.
Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
America's alliances and security relations give assurance to U.S. allies and
friends and pause to U.S. foes. These relationships create a community of
nations committed to common purposes. The defense strategy is
premised on efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships
and to develop new forms of security cooperation. The American
commitment to these security arrangements bolsters the security of U.S.
allies and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist
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attacks on the United States, NATO's invocation of Article V demonstrates
the commitment of America's partners to collective defense, which
bolsters the security of the United States. These mutually reinforcing
security relationships underpin the political stability on which the
prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these arrangements are based
on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and
able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.
The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military
implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and
friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes
enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition
operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as
joint and combined training and experimentation.
Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances
The defense strategy also places emphasis on maintaining favorable
military balances in critical geographic areas. By maintaining such
balances, the United States can secure peace, extend freedom, and assure
its allies and friends. It can create high costs on a decision by potential
adversaries to pursue dangerous forms of military competition. Finally, it
may convince potential adversaries that the benefits of hostile acts against
the interests of the United States are far outweighed by their costs
and consequences.
Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities
Creating substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of
military competition (e.g., power projection, space, and information) will
require developing and sustaining a portfolio of key military capabilities to
prevail over current challenges and to hedge against and dissuade future
threats. Building upon the current superiority of U.S. conventional forces,
this portfolio will include capabilities for conducting information
operations, ensuring U.S. access to distant theaters, defending against
threats to the United States and allied territory, and protecting U.S. assets
in space. It will also require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior
technological innovation; its unmatched space and intelligence
capabilities; its sophisticated military training; and its ability to integrate
highly distributed military forces in synergistic combinations for highly
complex joint military operations.
Transforming Defense
Finally, the defense strategy calls for the transformation of the U.S. military
and Defense establishment over time. Transformation is at the heart of
this new strategic approach. The Department's leadership recognizes that
continuing "business as usual" within the Department is not a viable
option given the new strategic era and the internal and external
challenges facing the U.S. military. Without change, the current defense
program will only become more expensive to maintain over time, and it
will forfeit many of the opportunities available to the United States today.
Without transformation, the U.S. military will not be prepared to meet
emerging challenges. At the same time, it would be imprudent to
transform the entire force all at once. A balance must be struck between
the need to meet current threats while transforming the force over time.
Therefore, the Department is committed to undertaking a sustained
process of transformation - based on clear goals - and strengthening the
spirit of innovation in its people, while remaining prepared to deal with
extant threats.
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III.
Paradigm Shift in Force
Planning
T
he DoD civilian and military leadership approached the force
planning task acutely aware of the need to provide over time a richer
set of military options across the operational spectrum than is
available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the means to adapt in time
to surprise. The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:
I Defend the United States;
I Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
I Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while
preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive
victory in one of those conflicts - including the possibility of
regime change or occupation; and
I Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency
operations.
In doing so, DoD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and a
strategic reserve to mitigate risks. This new construct - which supports
the defense strategy - has four underlying elements.
First, it places new emphasis on the unique operational demands
associated with the defense of the United States and restores the defense
of the United States as the Department's primary mission.
Second, the approach shifts the focus of U.S. force planning from
optimizing for conflicts in two particular regions - Northeast and
Southwest Asia - to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across
the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and
geographical. This approach to planning responds to the capabilities-
based strategy outlined above. It focuses more on how an adversary might
fight than on who the adversary might be and where a war might occur.
The shift is intended to refocus planners on the growing range of
capabilities that adversaries might possess or could develop. It will
require planners to define the military objectives associated with
defeating aggression or coercion in a variety of potential scenarios in
addition to conventional cross-border invasions. It calls for identifying,
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developing, and fielding capabilities that, for a given level of forces, would
accomplish each mission at an acceptable level of risk as established by
the National Command Authorities.
Third, the new construct serves as a bridge from today's force, developed
around the threat-based, two-MTW construct, to a future, transformed
force. The United States will continue to meet its commitments around the
world, including in Southwest and Northeast Asia, by maintaining the
ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping timeframes.
The United States is not abandoning planning for two conflicts to plan for
fewer than two. On the contrary, DoD is changing the concept altogether
by planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict.
Fourth, the new construct for the first time takes into account the number
and nature of the tasks actually assigned to the Armed Forces. Unlike
previous force-sizing constructs, the new construct explicitly calls for the
force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence,
warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency
operations. As a result, the construct should better account for force
requirements driven by forward presence and rotational issues. It will also
better address requirements for low-density/high-demand (LD/HD)
assets, enabling forces (e.g., transport aircraft), and active and reserve
force-mix issues.
Defend the United States
The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all
enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to
protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-
related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders,
as appropriate under U.S. law. U.S. forces will provide strategic
deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold U.S. commitments
under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility, as
specified in U.S. law, to support U.S. civil authorities as directed in
managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and
CBRNE-related events on U.S. territory. Finally, the U.S. military will be
prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism
committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally.
Ensuring the safety of America's citizens at home can only be achieved
through effective cooperation among the many federal departments and
agencies and state and local governments that have homeland security
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responsibilities. It is clear that the roles, missions, and responsibilities of
the many organizations and agencies involved in national preparedness
must be clearly delineated through an integrated interagency process.
The Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for overseeing and
coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the United
States against terrorism and respond to any attacks that may come, will
lead this important process.
Those who respond first to any incident will likely be those closest to the
event - local law enforcement and emergency response personnel. It was
clear from the diverse set of agencies involved in responding to the
September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon that the Department of Defense does not and cannot have the
sole responsibility for homeland security. DoD must institutionalize
definitions of homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support and
address command relationships and responsibilities within the Defense
Department. This will allow the Defense Department to identify and
assign homeland security roles and missions as well as examine resource
implications. DoD must be committed to working through an integrated
inter-agency process, which in turn will provide the means to determine
force requirements and necessary resources to meet our homeland
security requirements. DoD must bolster its ability to work with the
organizations involved in homeland security to prevent, protect against,
and respond to threats to the territorial United States. In particular, the
Defense Department will place new emphasis upon counter terrorism
training across federal, state, and local first responders, drawing on the
capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard.
Preparing forces for homeland security may require changes in force
structure and organization. For example, in conjunction with the ongoing
review of national preparedness requirements undertaken by the Vice
President, DoD will continue to examine the roles and responsibilities of
its Active and Reserve forces to ensure they are properly organized,
trained, equipped, and postured to provide for the effective defense of the
United States. It is clear that U.S. forces, including the United States Coast
Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to
perform these missions. As part of this examination, DoD will review the
establishment of a new unified combatant commander to help address
complex inter-agency issues and provide a single military commander to
focus military support.
Defending the United States, which is the critical base of operations for
U.S. defense activities worldwide, will be a crucial element of DoD's
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transformation efforts. Integration of protection mechanisms (e.g.,
counterintelligence, security, infrastructure protection, and information
assurance) will be a key component. In particular, the United States must
enhance its capabilities to protect its critical infrastructure, especially
infrastructure that supports oil and gas transportation and storage,
information and communications, banking and finance, electrical power,
transportation, water supply, emergency, and government services.
Deter Forward
As a global power, the United States has important geopolitical interests
around the world.
DoD's new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally tailored
forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East
Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and
friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States,
its forces, allies, and friends.
As this strategy and force planning approach are implemented, the
United States will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. Over time,
U.S. forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional
balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of swiftly
defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement and, where necessary,
assuring access for follow-on forces. A key objective of U.S.
transformation efforts over time will be to increase the capability of its
forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect and possibly
allowing for reallocation of forces now dedicated to reinforcement to
other missions.
Security cooperation will serve as an important means for linking DoD's
strategic direction with those of its allies and friends. DoD will focus its
peacetime overseas activities on security cooperation to help create
favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world and to
deter aggression and coercion. A particular aim of DoD's security
cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and
intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of pre-conflict
options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or
favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms.
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Major Combat Operations
U.S. forces will remain capable of undertaking major combat operations
on a global basis and will train to be effective across a wide range of
combat conditions and geographic settings. The focus will be on the
ability to act quickly when challenged and to win decisively at a time and
place and in the manner of the President's choosing.
For planning purposes, U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating
attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in
overlapping timeframes. Combat operations will be structured to
eliminate enemy offensive capability across the depth of its territory,
restore favorable military conditions in the region, and create acceptable
political conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In addition, U.S. forces
will degrade an aggressor's ability to coerce others through conventional
or asymmetric means, including CBRNE weapons. U.S. forces will fight
from a forward deterrent posture with immediately employable forces,
including long-range precision strike capabilities from within and beyond
the theater, and rapidly deployable maneuver capabilities.
At the direction of the President, U.S. forces will be capable of
decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which
U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing
America's will and removing any future threat it could pose. This
capability will include the ability to occupy territory or set the
conditions for a regime change if so directed.
Smaller-Scale Contingencies
The new planning approach requires the United States to maintain and
prepare its forces for smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime,
preferably in concert with allies and friends. This approach recognizes
that such contingencies could vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and
the number of personnel required. DoD will explicitly plan to provide a
rotational base - a larger base of forces from which to provide forward-
deployed forces - to support long-standing contingency commitments in
the critical areas of interest. These long-standing commitments will, in
effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.
Moreover, DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized
forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress elements of the
force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.
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Current Forces
Today's force structure - both Active and Reserve components - is the
baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed force for
the future. The current force structure, shown in the table below, was
assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis of the new
defense strategy and force sizing construct, and the capabilities of this
force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although
certain combinations of warfighting and smaller-scale contingency
scenarios present high risk.
Army
Divisions (Active/National Guard) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10/8
Active Armored Cavalry/Light Cavalry Regiments . . . . . . . .1/1
Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard) . . . . . . . . . . .15
Navy
Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Air Wings (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10/1
Amphibious Ready Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Attack Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108/8
Air Force
Active Fighter Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Reserve Fighter Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Reserve Air Defense Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Bombers (Combat-Coded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
Marine Corps (3 Marine Expeditionary Forces)
Divisions (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/1
Air Wings (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/1
Force Service Support Groups (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . .3/1
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Just as U.S. forces have transformed in the past, the process of
fundamental transformation to sustain U.S. military advantages, meet
critical operational goals, and dominate future military competitions has
begun.
The Department of Defense has embarked on an ambitious transformation
of U.S. military forces to meet such challenges. As this transformation
effort matures - and as it produces significantly higher output of military
value from each element of the force - DoD will explore additional
opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.
To support this strategy, DoD will continue to rely on Reserve Component
forces. To ensure the appropriate use of the Reserve Components, DoD
will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix,
organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This review will
build on recent assessments of Reserve Component issues that highlighted
emerging roles for the Reserve Components in the defense of the United
States, in smaller-scale contingencies, and in major combat operations.
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IV.
Reorienting the
U.S. Military Global Posture
D
uring the latter half of the 20th century, the United States
developed a global system of overseas military bases primarily to
contain aggression by the Soviet Union. U.S. overseas presence
aligned closely with U.S. interests and likely threats to those interests.
However, this overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western
Europe and Northeast Asia, is inadequate for the new strategic
environment, in which U.S. interests are global and potential threats in
other areas of the world are emerging.
A reorientation of the posture must take account of new challenges,
particularly anti-access and area-denial threats. New combinations of
immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; globally
available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets;
information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal
and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations
have the potential to be a significant force multiplier for forward stationed
forces, including forcible entry forces. One of the goals of reorienting the
global posture is to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an
adversary's military and political objectives with only modest
reinforcement. Decisively defeating an adversary would likely require
substantial reinforcement even after transformation.
Transforming the U.S. global military posture begins with the development
of new ways to deter conflict. Deterrence in the future will continue to
depend heavily upon the capability resident in forward stationed and
forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces, including forcible
entry forces, along with the rapidly employable capabilities that the U.S.
military possess throughout the globe. U.S. forces must possess a wide
range of offensive and defensive capabilities that can achieve strategic and
operational objectives in the face of determined adversaries, to include
those armed with asymmetric weapons of war. DoD will pursue new
deterrence tools that not only hold at risk an adversary's military forces and
other valued assets, but also extend greater protection to allies and friends
in crisis through capabilities such as missile defenses, defensive
information operations, and counter-terrorist operations.
Capabilities and forces located in the continental United States and in
space are a critical element of this new global posture. Long-range strike
aircraft and special operations forces provide an immediately employable
supplement to forward forces to achieve a deterrent effect in peacetime.
New forms of deterrence, emphasizing the strategic and operational
effects that U.S. capabilities can impose upon an adversary, can
incorporate globally distributed capabilities and forces to rapidly strike
with precision mobile and fixed targets at various distances.
One of the goals of reorienting the global posture is to render forward
forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political
objectives with only modest reinforcement. Key requirements for this
reorientation include new combinations of immediately employable
forward stationed and deployed forces; expeditionary and forcible entry
capabilities; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and
control assets; information operations; special operations forces; and
rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come
from outside a theater of operations. Decisively defeating an adversary
will require substantial reinforcement even after transformation.
Based on changes in the international security environment, DoD's new
strategic approach, and this transformed concept of deterrence, the U.S.
global military posture will be reoriented to:
I Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S.
forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on
additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and
Northeast Asia.
I Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that
enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the
absence of permanent ranges and bases.
I Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence
requirements.
I Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, pre-
positioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of
debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to
conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters against
adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other
means to deny access to U.S. forces.
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Accordingly, the Department has made the following decisions:
I The Secretary of the Army will accelerate the introduction of
forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to
strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic
responsiveness on a global basis. In consultation with its
European Allies, the United States envisages that an IBCT should
be stationed in the European area by 2007. In addition, the
Secretary of the Army will explore options for enhancing ground
force capabilities in the Arabian Gulf.
I The Secretary of the Navy will increase aircraft carrier
battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific and will explore
options for homeporting an additional three to four surface
combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in
that area.
I The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase
contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as
in the Arabian Gulf. The Secretary of the Air Force will ensure
sufficient en route infrastructure for refueling and logistics to
support operations in the Arabian Gulf or Western Pacific areas.
I The Secretary of the Navy will develop new concepts of
maritime pre-positioning, high-speed sealift, and new
amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps. The Secretary of
the Navy will develop options to shift some of the Marine Corps'
afloat pre-positioned equipment from the Mediterranean toward
the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to be more responsive to
contingencies in the Middle East. In consultation with U.S. allies
and friends, the Secretary of the Navy will explore the feasibility
of conducting training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific
for the Marine Corps.
I DoD will also recommend changes in the worldwide alignment
of special operations forces assets to account for new regional
emphases in the defense strategy.
I The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western
Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional
role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in
other areas of the world.
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V.
Creating the U.S. Military
of the 21st Century
A
chieving the objectives of the defense strategy requires the
transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Transformation results
from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts
and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of
organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging
strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render
previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.
Transformation can involve fundamental change in the form of military
operations, as well as a potential change in their scale. It can encompass
the displacement of one form of war with another, such as fundamental
change in the ways war is waged in the air, on land and at sea. It can also
involve the emergence of new kinds of war, such as armed conflict in new
dimensions of the battlespace.
Transformation has intellectual, social and technological dimensions.
Fundamental changes in the conceptualization of war as well as in
organizational culture and behavior are usually required to bring it about.
During the early phase of transformation, only a small portion of the force
is typically transformed. However, small transformed forces with a critical
mass of spearhead capabilities can produce disproportionate strategic
effects. Because transformation is highly path-dependent, choices made
today may constrain or enhance options tomorrow.
To support the transformation effort, and to foster innovation and
experimentation, the Department will establish a new office reporting
directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The
Director, Force Transformation will evaluate the transformation efforts of
the Military Departments and promote synergy by recommending steps to
integrate ongoing transformation activities.
To further facilitate transformation, the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies will develop transformation roadmaps that specify timelines to
develop Service-unique capabilities necessary to meet the six critical
operational goals described below.
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Operational Goals
Not all change in military capabilities, however desirable for other reasons,
is transformational. The purpose of transformation is to maintain or
improve U.S. military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate
discontinuous changes in the strategic environment. Transformation must
therefore be focused on emerging strategic and operational challenges and
the opportunities created by these challenges. Six critical operational goals
provide the focus for DoD's transformation efforts:
I Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces
abroad, allies, and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and
their means of delivery;
I Assuring information systems in the face of attack and
conducting effective information operations;
I Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or
area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-
denial threats;
I Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance,
tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision
strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground
capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various
ranges and in all weather and terrains;
I Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and
supporting infrastructure; and
I Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to
develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and
capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.
Protecting the American homeland from attack is the foremost responsibility
of the U.S. Armed Forces and a primary mission for the Reserve Components.
Future adversaries will most certainly have a range of new means with which
to threaten the United States. It is possible to identify confidently some of
these means, including new techniques of terror; ballistic and cruise
missiles; weapons of mass destruction, including advanced biological
weapons; and weapons of mass disruption, such as information warfare
attacks on critical information infrastructure. Others, like those used to
attack the United States on September 11, 2001, may be a surprise. Defenses
against known and emerging threats must be developed. New approaches
to achieving early warning of new threats are a high priority.
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The increasing dependence of societies and military forces on advanced
information networks creates new vulnerabilities and opportunities.
Potential adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through means
such as computer network attack and directed energy weapons. The
emergence of these new tools of warfare also provides opportunities for
non-kinetic attack by U.S. forces.
Future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our
current ability to project military power overseas. Saturation attacks with
ballistic and cruise missiles could deny or delay U.S. military access to
overseas bases, airfields, and ports. Advanced air defense systems could
deny access to hostile airspace to all but low-observable aircraft. Military
and commercial space capabilities, over-the-horizon radars, and low-
observable unmanned aerial vehicles could give potential adversaries the
means to conduct wide-area surveillance and track and target American
forces and assets. Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines,
and advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and
amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters. New approaches for
projecting power must be developed to meet these threats.
Adversaries will also likely seek to exploit strategic depth to their
advantage. Mobile ballistic missile systems can be launched from
extended range, exacerbating the anti-access and area-denial challenges.
Space denial capabilities, such as ground-based lasers, can be located deep
within an adversary's territory. Accordingly, a key objective of
transformation is to develop the means to deny sanctuary to potential
adversaries. This will likely require the development and acquisition of
robust capabilities to conduct persistent surveillance, precision strike,
and maneuver at varying depths within denied areas.
In addition to exploiting space for their own purposes, future adversaries
will also likely seek to deny U.S. forces unimpeded access to space. Space
surveillance, ground-based lasers and space jamming capabilities, and
proximity micro satellites are becoming increasingly available. A key
objective for transformation, therefore, is not only to ensure the U.S.
ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny
an adversary's ability to do so.
Finally, new information and communications technologies hold promise
for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces and for
ensuring that such forces have better situational awareness - both about
friendly forces as well as those of adversaries - than in the past.
Information technology holds vast potential for maximizing the
effectiveness of American men and women in uniform.
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Transformation Pillars
Transformation is not an end point. DoD's approach to transformation
rests on four pillars:
I Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force
headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint
training, and an expanded joint forces presence policy;
I Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational
concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as
standing joint forces through wargaming, simulations and field
exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities;
I Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through multiple
intelligence collection assets, global surveillance and
reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination;
and
I
Developing transformational capabilities through increased and
wide-ranging science and technology, selective increases in
procurement, and innovations in DoD processes.
Strengthening Joint Operations
To better meet future warfare challenges, DoD must develop the ability to
integrate combat organizations with forces capable of responding rapidly
to events that occur with little or no warning. These joint forces must be
scalable and task-organized into modular units to allow the combatant
commanders to draw on the appropriate forces to deter or defeat an
adversary. The forces must be highly networked with joint command and
control, and they must be better able to integrate into combined
operations than the forces of today.
These joint forces will be used to manage crises, forestall conflict, and
conduct combat operations. They must be lighter, more lethal and
maneuverable, survivable, and more readily deployed and employed in an
integrated fashion. They must be not only capable of conducting
distributed and dispersed operations, but also able to force entry in anti-
access or area-denial environments.
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Joint and Combined Command and Control
Future military responses will require the rapid movement and integration
of joint and combined forces. To be successful, operations will demand a
flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture
that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain, and protect U.S. forces
across the battlefield in a timely manner.
Such a joint command and control structure must reside not only at the
joint command, but also extend down to the operational service
components. The structure must be networked to ensure shared
battlespace awareness. It must be supported by the appropriate doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as a highly trained operational
force. Most important, it must develop and foster a joint professional
culture, a requirement that presents a significant challenge to service and
joint training and professional education programs. The joint command
and control system - both the information that flows through the network
and the equipment upon which it resides - must be secure and protected
from an adversary's information operations or other attacks.
U.S. forces require the ability to communicate not only with one another,
but also with other government agencies and allies and friends. Such joint
and combined interoperability requires forces that can immediately "plug"
into the joint battlefield operating systems (command and control,
intelligence, fire support, logistics, etc.) and perform effectively. These
forces need compatible systems with interoperable standards, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
To support joint and combined command and control and to enable a
common relevant operational picture of the battlespace, the Department
will enhance end-to-end interoperable communications for secure
planning and operations. These communications will provide shared
situational awareness and integration of joint fires, maneuver, and
intelligence. They must be interoperable across all components and
tailorable for coalition operations with other countries. The capability
provided by this network and its applications will enable rapid response
forces to plan and execute faster than the enemy and to seize tactical
opportunities.
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
To strengthen joint operations, the Department will develop over the next
several months proposals to establish a prototype for Standing Joint Task
Force (SJTF) Headquarters. The goal is to establish a SJTF headquarters in
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each of the regional combatant commands. The headquarters will
provide uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and
technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise
among commands.
SJTF headquarters will have a standardized joint C4ISR architecture that
provides a common relevant operational picture of the battlespace for
joint and combined forces. And it will have mechanisms for a responsive
integrated logistics system that provide warfighters easy access to
necessary support without burdensome lift and infrastructure
requirements. SJTF headquarters will also utilize adaptive mission
planning tools that allow U.S. forces to operate within the adversary's
decision cycle and respond to changing battlespace conditions.
Standing Joint Task Forces
In addition, the Department will examine options for establishing
Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs). SJTF organizations will focus in
particular on the critical operational goals described previously. They will
seek to develop new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military
advantages and joint force synergies. These concepts will be designed to
take into account the potential to achieve significantly greater military
capability at lower total personnel levels.
One option will include a plan for a SJTF for unwarned, extended-range
conventional attack against fixed and mobile targets at varying depths.
Such an SJTF would address one of the critical operational challenges of
the future - developing the capability to continuously locate and track
mobile targets at any range and rapidly attack them with precision.
Overcoming this challenge will require enhanced intelligence
capabilities, including space-based systems, additional human
intelligence, and airborne systems that can locate and track moving
targets and transmit that information to strike assets. It will require the
ability to strike without warning from the air, from the sea, on the ground,
and through space and cyber space. It will also require that these forces
be networked to maximize their combined effects.
Establishing a Standing Joint Task Force for extended-range, unwarned
conventional strike would provide the organizational means to achieve a
networked capability. This Standing Joint Task Force could serve as the
vanguard for the transformed military of the future. It could undertake
experimental exercises as new technologies become available. It would
also offer immediate operational benefits.
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Joint Presence Policy
To strengthen the Secretary of Defense's management of the allocation of
joint deterrent and warfighting assets from all Military Departments, the
QDR calls for the establishment of a joint presence policy. This new policy
would build on the existing Global Naval Forces Presence Policy, but it
would also subsume the rotational overseas presence force of all
military Services.
Establishing a joint presence policy will increase the capability and
flexibility of U.S. forward-stationed forces and aid in managing force
management risks. This policy will establish steady-state levels of air, land,
and naval presence in critical regions around the world. It will
synchronize deployments of U.S. forces and facilitate cross-Service trades
for presence and deterrence. It will also allow for better coordination in
the readiness and tempo of operations of all U.S. forces.
Sustaining the Force
To ensure the Department transforms its logistics capabilities, DoD will
pursue actions to sustain the force more effectively and efficiently.
Specific areas will include a dramatically improved deployment process
and accelerated implementation of logistics decision support tools. DoD
must also accelerate logistics enterprise integration, reduce logistics
demand, and reduce the cost of logistics. In addition, conducting
industrial vulnerability assessments and developing sustainment plans for
the most critical weapons systems and preferred munitions will help
ensure effective sustainment.
Experimenting in Support of
Transformational Change
To identify the best available solutions to emerging operational challenges, the
defense strategy will employ military field exercises and experiments. Over
the last century, military field exercises and experiments oriented toward
addressing emerging challenges and opportunities at the operational level of
war have been important enablers of military innovation and transformation.
These operations reduce uncertainty about the future conflict environment
and future capabilities. Exercises and experiments are a critical phase in
developing new types of forces and operational concepts that can respond to
emerging operational challenges and dominate opponents who effectively
exploit aspects of the changing security environment.
Field exercises that incorporate experimentation - at both the joint and
the service levels - provide an indispensable means for solving emerging
challenges. For instance, with respect to the challenge of projecting
power in an anti-access environment, field exercises and experiments will
enable the military to identify promising operational concepts for
deploying forces into theater and conducting extended-range precision
strikes against mobile targets. Further, these exercises and experiments
will help to determine if secure access to forward bases is possible and to
identify ways to sustain operations for a period sufficient to achieve U.S.
objectives. They will also assist the United States in determining which
new systems and capabilities will be required, which existing systems and
capabilities should be sustained, and what combination of
transformational and legacy systems should be created.
Moreover, field exercises and experiments that enable the U.S. military to
create and maintain options for a variety of emerging capabilities greatly
complicate the planning of would-be adversaries. By enabling the
creation of a range of capabilities and warfighting options, field exercises
and experimentation can compel future competitors into an unenviable
choice. They can seek to develop responses to most or all of the U.S.
capabilities and options and consequently stretch their limited resources
thin, or they can choose the high-risk option of focusing their efforts on
offsetting only one or a few of the new warfighting options, leaving
themselves vulnerable to the others. When confronted with this dilemma,
potential adversaries may find themselves dissuaded from entering into a
military competition in the first place.
U.S. forces will rely heavily on wargames and simulations to support this
program of field exercises and experiments. These important analytic
tools can greatly enhance the effectiveness of field exercises by
identifying promising capabilities that merit prototyping, new force
elements that should be established, and operational concepts that merit
the detailed evaluation that only field exercises can provide. Thus
wargames and simulations serve as a filter to enhance the focus and value
of field exercises. However, simulations and war games have inherent
limits in terms of how far they can go in identifying new forms of
operation and new military system requirements.
During the latter stages of the Cold War, the Services invested in a number
of high-fidelity training facilities that greatly enhanced the value of their
field training. Yet comparable facilities do not exist to support joint high-
fidelity field exercises and experiments. DoD will explore the need to
establish a joint and interoperability training capability, including a Joint
National Training Center as well as opportunities to build on existing
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capabilities at Service training centers and ranges to enable joint
transformation field exercises and experiments and to inform the Services'
exercises and experiments.
DoD must also undertake high-fidelity transformation exercises and
experiments that address the growing challenge of maintaining space
control or defending against attacks on the U.S. national information
infrastructure. DoD will establish a space test range for this purpose
Enabling these kinds of exercises will be a major challenge for the
Department's transformation effort.
Joint and Service field exercises oriented to military transformation have
suffered from chronic resource shortages. Joint Forces Command must
conduct at least one major joint transformation exercise every other year.
These should build on Service experimentation exercises in the
intervening years. Moreover, the regional CINCs should develop a plan to
rotate assigned forces through a joint training event for regular exercises
and evaluations. To support this effort, DoD will consider the
establishment of a Joint Opposing Force and increasing the Joint Forces
Command exercise budget. To ensure that sufficient forces are available
for experimentation, Joint Forces Command will be authorized to draw up
to 5 percent of U.S.-based forces each year for experimentation activities
within tempo guidelines and acceptable operational risk.
The findings of this program of field exercises and experiments will feed
back directly into the process for determining systems, doctrine, and force
structure requirements. Monitoring this program and providing the
Secretary with policy recommendations based on its findings will be an
important responsibility of the work of the Director, Force Transformation.
Exploiting Intelligence Advantages
U.S. defense strategy and doctrine are increasingly dependent upon
information and decision superiority. Information superiority, in turn,
depends heavily upon timely, relevant, and comprehensive intelligence.
Today, the United States not only possesses unique intelligence
capabilities, unmatched by any potential adversary, but has numerous
efforts underway to improve and expand current intelligence capabilities.
At the same time, U.S. military dependence on information is
unprecedented and growing. This is particularly true in light of the
Department's transition to network-centric warfare.
Demands on intelligence capabilities are certain to grow. Because
potential adversaries recognize the importance of information superiority
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to U.S. strategy and operations, they are seeking to acquire similar
capabilities. To offset U.S. conventional military capabilities, they are also
pursuing asymmetric strategies including information operations, space
warfare, and CBRNE weapons. These asymmetric threats pose daunting
new intelligence challenges. To respond effectively, DoD will vigorously
pursue new processes and procedures to better exploit existing assets
while aggressively developing new technologies that offer great potential
for responding to new threats and requirements. In particular, the
Department will treat information operations, intelligence, and space
assets not simply as enablers of current U.S. forces but rather as core
capabilities of future forces.
Global Intelligence
Throughout the Cold War, the singular nature of the strategic threat from
the Soviet Union provided U.S. intelligence with a remarkably stable
target. Today, intelligence is required to provide political and military
leaders with strategic and operational information on an increasingly
diverse range of political, military, leadership, and scientific and
technological developments worldwide.
Human Intelligence. Performance of HUMINT must be optimized to
gain access and insights into some of the most difficult "targets," e.g.,
terrorist cells, hard and deeply buried targets, closed regimes, and CBRNE
weapons development and deployment plans. The United States needs to
enhance human intelligence capabilities and tools not only to gather
better HUMINT but also to enable better positioning of technical
collection systems. Finally, human intelligence reporting must be
integrated into the situational awareness display that provides joint forces
with battlespace visualization through the Global Command and Control
System Common Operational Picture.
Emerging Technologies. The Department will vigorously pursue the
development and exploitation of technologies that can significantly
increase U.S. advantage in intelligence collection, analysis, and security.
Some of the most promising include:
I Low-observable technologies that may be applied to collection
platforms;
I Nanotechnology that may result in miniature, mobile,
autonomous sensors that could penetrate the secure and remote
facilities of an adversary;
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I Advanced parallel processing and quantum computing to
provide real-time processes, decryption, translation, and
transcription of communications;
I Biometrics for tracking adversaries and providing secure
authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access;
and
I Commercial imagery for remote sensing of the earth.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
DoD is pursuing investment strategies and migration plans for an
integrated, cost-effective mix of unmanned aerial vehicles, manned
platforms, spaceborne, maritime, and terrestrial systems responsive to
future collection needs and challenges. Efforts are underway to accelerate
the procurement of additional Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platforms
and sensors. Enhanced Space-based Radar (SBR) systems are also required
to provide global, long-range ground moving target indicator capability to
augment existing airborne capabilities. Commercial systems, especially
satellite imagery, are being integrated into U.S. ISR capabilities.
Sensors. A wide range of imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) sensors are needed to respond to current and future
requirements. Satellite IMINT sensors need to provide long-dwell
capabilities. SIGINT payloads are needed for UAVs as well as for
specialized shipboard collection sensors to capture modernized radio
frequency signals from state and non-state threats. Extensive airborne
SIGINT modernization efforts are needed to provide low- and high-band
collection capabilities that elude currently deployed systems. MASINT's
multi-disciplinary scope offers great potential. MASINT sensor
development and deployment - particularly for such purposes as sampling
for agents and collection against hard and deeply buried targets - is critical
to maintaining U.S. military advantages.
Collaborative ISR Operations. The ISR community must move toward
a collaborative enterprise to achieve more responsive support for civilian
decision-makers and commanders engaged in planning and executing
operations. Collaborative capabilities are needed to permit agile and
adaptive strategies, plans, and operations, as well as rapid sharing of
analysis and time-sensitive information. A fused information picture must
provide decision-makers and commanders with a near real-time capability
to support operations and visualize the operational space. Decision aids
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and other tools are needed to develop a coherent strategy and plan and
then to enable decision makers to adjust rapidly to emerging situations.
Such systems are essential to establishing an effective, efficient, and
responsive ISR posture in joint and combined operations.
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation,
and Dissemination (TPED)
Future military operations will require TPED approaches that integrate all
collection disciplines, including IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT, and
open sources. Integrated TPED must accommodate new types of multi-
media, multi-spectral, and multi-source information, including
commercial imagery. A capability to incorporate real-time video, integrate
information acquired from non-intelligence sources - such as advanced
aircraft radar or commercial satellite imagery - and efficiently exploit long-
dwell and stare systems is essential to meet future military requirements.
Future TPED will be expected to support multiple echelons, including
tactical and national systems and to operate across diverse security
domains. Migrating to a more integrated architecture that takes advantage
of multiple intelligence disciplines and robust networking will improve
the timeliness and quality of intelligence information needed by defense-
related consumers of intelligence.
As target sets become more diverse and collection sources more varied,
tying this scarce and disparate information together requires trained and
analytical judgment. Investments need to focus on building a workforce
with the required skills, and with the analytical tools and databases
needed to improve support to planning.
Developing Transformational Capabilities
A fundamental challenge confronting DoD is ensuring that U.S. forces
have the capabilities they need to carry out the new defense strategy and
meet the demands of the 21st century. Toward that end, it is imperative
that the United States invests and transforms its forces and capabilities.
The Department's commitment to modernization has three main parts:
I Exploiting research and development to ensure that U.S. forces
maintain a decisive lead in technologies critical to transformation;
I Advancing key transformation initiatives; and
I
Selectively recapitalizing legacy forces to meet near-term
challenges and to provide near-term readiness.
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Research and Development
A robust research and development effort is imperative to achieving the
Department's transformation objectives. DoD must maintain a strong
science and technology (S&T) program that supports evolving military
needs and ensures technological superiority over potential adversaries.
Meeting transformation objectives also will require new information
systems. These must be married with technological advances in other key
areas, including stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart
submunitions. To provide the basic research for these capabilities, the
QDR calls for a significant increase in funding for S&T programs to a level
of three percent of DoD spending per year.
During the Cold War, U.S. government programs were a primary impetus
for research into new technologies, particularly in areas such as
computers and materials. Today and well into the foreseeable future,
however, DoD will rely on the private sector to provide much of the
leadership in developing new technologies. Thus, the Department has
embarked on an effort (a) to turn to private enterprise for new ways to
move ideas from the laboratory to the operating forces, (b) to tap the
results of innovations developed in the private sector, and (c) to blend
government and private research where appropriate. This "quiet
revolution" will take advantage of science and technology and continue to
provide U.S. forces with technological superiority.
In parallel with a new emphasis on research and development, DoD must
give increased priority to maintaining a robust test and evaluation
program, which will require test centers and ranges. While
transformation offers U.S. forces the promise of revolutionary capabilities,
the products of this transformation must be tested thoroughly before they
are deployed. This need for testing - and particularly for testing
capabilities conducted over very long distances - requires the Department
to maintain and modernize highly instrumented ranges and to manage the
challenges of range encroachment. A robust test and evaluation program
will maximize the return on future procurement expenditures, while
strengthening the public's confidence in defense acquisitions.
Transformation Initiatives
In order to advance U.S. transformation efforts, the new defense strategy
identifies key operational goals for deterring conflict and conducting
military operations. To improve the linkage between strategy and
investments, DoD's investment resources will be focused on achieving six
operational goals in the following ways:
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1. Protect bases of operation at home and abroad and defeat the
threat of CBRNE weapons.
DoD maintains many unique capabilities for mitigating and
managing the consequences of terrorist attacks on American
soil. The Department must be prepared to provide support to
state and local authorities, if requested by the lead federal
agency. DoD is enhancing its anti-terrorism and force
protection programs. It is also increasing investment in
chemical and biological countermeasures, including personal
protection for DoD personnel. Moreover, DoD has established
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, composed
of National Guard personnel and the Marine Corps' Chemical-
Biological Incident Response Force. These teams stand ready to
provide support, if directed. To improve DoD's ability to
provide such support, the QDR calls for selected readiness
enhancements to the Army's Reserve Component.
The continued proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles poses
a threat to U.S. territory, to U.S. forces abroad, at sea, and in
space, and to U.S. allies and friends. To counter this threat, the
United States is developing missile defenses as a matter of
priority. Integrating missile defenses with other defensive as
well as offensive means will safeguard the Nation's freedom of
action, enhance deterrence by denial, and mitigate the effects of
attack if deterrence fails. The ability to provide missile defenses
in anti-access and area-denial environments will be essential to
assure friends and allies, protect critical areas of access, and
defeat adversaries. DoD must be prepared to provide near-term
capabilities to defend against rapidly emerging threats and more
robust capabilities that evolve over time.
DoD has refocused and revitalized the missile defense program,
shifting from a single-site "national" missile defense approach to
a broad-based research, development, and testing effort aimed
at deployment of layered missile defenses. These changes in the
missile defense program will permit the exploration of many
previously untested technologies and approaches that will
produce defenses able to intercept missiles of various ranges
and in various phases of flight. These defenses will help protect
U.S. forward-deployed forces. Moreover, they will provide
limited defense against missile threats not only for the American
people, but also for U.S. friends and allies.
2. Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct
effective information operations.
Information operations provide the means to rapidly collect,
process, disseminate, and protect information while denying
these capabilities to adversaries. Such operations provide the
capability to influence perceptions, perform computer
network defense and attack missions, conduct electronic
warfare, and carry out other protective actions. Information
operations represent a critical capability enhancement for
transformed U.S. forces.
The QDR highlights both the imperative for the United States to
maintain an unsurpassed capability to conduct information
operations, as well as the need to strengthen U.S. capabilities in
these areas. DoD must also develop an integrated approach to
developing information system requirements, acquiring
systems, and programming for the force of tomorrow. The
ability to conduct information operations has become a core
competency for the Department.
3. Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-
denial environments.
The defense strategy rests on the assumption that U.S. forces
have the ability to project power worldwide. The United States
must retain the capability to send well-armed and logistically
supported forces to critical points around the globe, even in the
face of enemy opposition, or to locations where the support
infrastructure is lacking or has collapsed. For U.S. forces to gain
the advantage in such situations, they must have the ability to
arrive quickly at non-traditional points of debarkation to mass
fire against an alerted enemy and to mask their own movements
to deceive the enemy and bypass its defenses. Consequently,
DoD must carefully monitor attempts by adversaries to develop
capabilities that could detect and attack U.S. forces as they
approach conflict areas or hold at risk critical ports and airbases
with missiles and CBRNE attacks.
The QDR emphasizes the need for new investments that would
enable U.S. forces to defeat anti-access and area-denial threats
and to operate effectively in critical areas. Such investments
will include: addressing the growing threat posed by
submarines, air defense systems, cruise missiles, and mines;
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accelerating development of the Army Objective Force;
enhancing power projection and forcible entry capabilities;
defeating long-range means of detection; enabling long-range
attack capabilities; enhancing protection measures for strategic
transport aircraft; and ensuring U.S. forces can sustain
operations under chemical or biological attack.
4. Deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance,
tracking, and rapid engagement.
Likely enemies of the United States and its allies will rely on
sanctuaries-such as remote terrain, hidden bunkers, or civilian
"shields" - for protection. The capability to find and strike
protected enemy forces while limiting collateral damage will
improve the deterrent power of the United States and give the
President increased options for response if deterrence fails.
Such a capability would not only reduce the likelihood of
aggression, but would offer the National Command Authorities
the ability to respond immediately in the event of hostilities.
Achieving this objective will require investments in a wide
range of cross-Service programs. Investments in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) initiatives must be
bolstered. Also emphasis must be placed on manned and
unmanned long-range precision strike assets, related initiatives
for new small munitions, and the ability to defeat hard and
deeply buried targets.
DoD will accelerate the conversion of Trident submarines to
guided missile submarines. DoD will procure unmanned combat
aerial vehicles and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk. The Department
will also increase procurement of precision weapons.
Special Operations Forces will need the ability to conduct
covert deep insertions over great distances and will need
enhanced C4ISR capabilities to remain in contact with their
commanders and to ensure access to real-time intelligence in a
number of forms. These capabilities will enable Special
Operations Forces to access additional communication,
intelligence, and firepower assets in support of their missions
deep in hostile environments and to aid in the reduction of
friendly losses and casualties. These capabilities will also
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enhance the strategic and operational agility of Special
Operations Forces.
5. Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems.
Because many activities conducted in space are critical to
America's national security and economic well being, the ability
of the United States to access and utilize space is a vital national
security interest. During crisis or conflict, potential adversaries
may target U.S., allied, and commercial space assets as an
asymmetric means of countering or reducing U.S. military
operational effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic
and societal stability, and national will. Ensuring the freedom of
access to space and protecting U.S. national security interests in
space are priorities for the Department.
The mission of space control is to ensure the freedom of action
in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed,
to deny such freedom of action to adversaries. As the
foundation for space control, space surveillance will receive
increased emphasis. DoD will pursue modernization of the
aging space surveillance infrastructure, enhance the command
and control structure, and evolve the system from a cataloging
and tracking capability to a system providing space situational
awareness.
In recognition of the high-technology force multipliers
provided by space systems, the QDR places increased emphasis
on developing the capabilities to conduct space operations.
Ensuring freedom of access to space and protecting U.S.
national security interests are key priorities that must be
reflected in future investment decisions.
6. Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to
develop interoperable Joint C4ISR.
Information technology will provide a key foundation for the
effort to transform U.S. armed forces for the 21st century. The
recent U.S. experience in Kosovo underscored the need for
high-capacity, interoperable communications systems that can
rapidly transmit information over secure, jam-resistant datalinks
to support joint forces. In the near future, the United States
must also develop alternatives capable of overcoming current
and projected bandwidth constraints. The Department must
stay abreast of the new communications landscape and leverage
it to maximize U.S. advantages in this area.
Future operations will not only be joint, but also include Reserve
Components, civilian specialists, and other federal agencies and
state organizations. Most likely they will involve a coalition effort
with other countries. The effectiveness of these operations will
depend upon the ability of DoD to share information and
collaborate externally as well as internally. Interoperability,
which enables joint and combined operations, is a key element in
all DoD operational and systems architectures. It must include
the ability to overcome language and cultural barriers.
Experience shows that fixing systems after the fact to achieve
interoperability is typically costly and often fails to satisfy mission
requirements and creates security problems. The better
approach is to incorporate interoperability at the outset in
designing new systems. However, the Department will continue
its efforts, where cost effective, to bring its legacy systems up to
interoperability standards.
Based on QDR deliberations, funding will be focused on
achieving end-to-end Command, Control, Communication,
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities. An integrated joint and combined C4ISR
capability is necessary to ensure that accurate and relevant
information can be gathered swiftly from various sources and
then securely transmitted to forces and their commanders.
Improving communications must be a priority for U.S.
conventional, special operations, and strategic forces.
Information technology offers U.S. forces the potential of
conducting joint operations more effectively, with smaller
forces and fewer weapon systems.
To achieve these operational goals, the Defense Department must
transform military training. Three basic tenets describe the changes the
Department will implement to transform training in parallel with the
transformation of its missions and forces:
I Reverse the erosion of DoD's training range infrastructure and
ensure that ranges are sustainable, capable, and available;
I
Revise acquisition and logistics policies and procedures to
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emphasize training and the timeliness of fielding modern, fully
capable training systems; and
I Use distributed learning technologies to reengineer individual
training and job performance.
Recapitalization of the Department's Legacy Forces
The Department of Defense is committed to transforming its forces to
meet future challenges. This transformation will be conducted in a timely
but prudent manner. In particular, prudence dictates that those legacy
forces critical to DoD's ability to defeat current threats must be sustained
as transformation occurs. Consequently, while emphasizing
transformation, DoD will also selectively recapitalize legacy forces. This
effort will be a challenge because recapitalization of all elements of U.S.
forces since the end of the Cold War has been delayed for so long. As the
force aged throughout the 1990s, few replacements were procured.
Without a significant effort to increase resources devoted to
recapitalization of weapons systems, the force structure will not only
continue to age but, perhaps more significantly, become operationally
and technologically obsolete.
The need to recapitalize is evident from the rising age of the current force
structure, particularly tactical aircraft. On average, the age of Air Force air
superiority aircraft now stands at almost 20 years, an unprecedented level.
The multi-role fleet will continue to age as well, with its average age
projected to reach 20 years in the coming decade. The situation with
other platforms, while not as dramatic as that of tactical aircraft, is also
problematic. Overall, there is an imperative need for recapitalization of
legacy systems by replacement, selected upgrade, and life extension.
Recognizing this imperative, the Department plans to pursue selective
upgrades to systems such as Abrams tanks, B-1 bombers, Navy ship self-
defense, and amphibious assault vehicles to sustain capabilities critical to
ensuring success in any near-term conflict.
# # # # #
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DoD must overcome trends of the past to sustain a balanced defense
program that maintains near-term readiness without mortgaging the long-
term capabilities of the force. To support this goal, DoD is committed to
identifying efficiencies and reductions in less relevant capabilities that can
free resources to be reinvested to accelerate the Department's
transformation efforts. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies
will identify significant, auditable savings to be reinvested in high-priority
transformation initiatives.
In light of the markedly increased requirements associated with the
unfolding U.S. war against terrorism, prior estimates of available resources
for defense are no longer accurate. Before the September 2001 attacks,
DoD had planned for gradual increases in defense spending accompanied
by roughly corresponding increases in available resources realized
through internal efficiencies. At this juncture, the Defense Department is
developing new estimates of needed funding, in line with emerging, new
military requirements. At the same time, it is critical that DoD's efforts to
realize internal efficiencies not be relaxed, as any increased funding will
be urgently needed to meet the Nation's new defense demands.
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VI.
Revitalizing the DoD
Establishment
T
he need to transform America's military capability encompasses
more than strategy and force structure. Transformation applies not
just to what DoD does, but how DoD does it. During the same
period that the security environment shifted from a Cold War structure to
one of many and varied threats, the capabilities and productivity of
modern businesses changed fundamentally. The Department of Defense
has not kept pace with the changing business environment.
A transformed U.S. force must be matched by a support structure that is
equally agile, flexible, and innovative. It must be a structure in which each
of DoD's dedicated civilian and military members can apply their talents to
defend America - where they have the resources, information, tools,
training, and freedom to perform.
Transforming DoD's outdated support structure is a key step in achieving
a more capable fighting force.
I DoD maintains between 20 and 25 percent more facility
infrastructure than needed to support its forces - at an annual
excess cost of $3 to $4 billion.
I DoD's financial systems are decades old and not well
interconnected, and accounting and auditing processes would
struggle to meet the standards of generally accepted accounting
principles.
I DoD's business processes and regulations seem to be engineered
to prevent any mistake. By doing so, these regulations often
discourage taking any risk.
An infrastructure that needs to be streamlined to match the new reality,
financial systems that limit the ability to see and manage the enterprise,
and processes that discourage action and reasonable risk at the working
level are hallmarks of a mature enterprise that must be transformed. While
America's business have streamlined and adopted new business models to
react to fast-moving changes in markets and technologies, the Defense
Department has lagged behind without an overarching strategy to
improve its business practices.
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To redress this situation and lead the Defense Department's revitalization
process, the DoD has established the Senior Executive Council (SEC) led
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consisting of the Service
Secretaries, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics. The SEC will steer the Defense Department
through what will be a challenging period of change. The Defense
Department has also created a Defense Business Practices
Implementation Board to tap outside expertise as the Department moves
to improve its business practices.
To focus these efforts, the Defense Department will institute programs to
improve its performance in the following areas:
I
Encourage talent to enter and stay in the military and civilian
service; and
I
Modernize DoD business processes and infrastructure.
Encourage Talent to Enter and Stay in the Military
and Civilian Service
Skilled, talented, and motivated people are the foundation of a leaner,
more flexible support structure. Improving the skills of the existing
workforce and recruiting, retaining, training, and educating new people
must be a top priority. Many of the skills the Department needs are the
same ones most in demand in the private sector. The Department must
forge a new compact with its warfighters and those who support them -
one that honors their service, understands their needs, and encourages
them to make national defense a lifelong career.
Accomplishing this management imperative will require strong
leadership and innovative thinking about how to attract, motivate, and
compensate the workforce. It will require new rules for hiring and
managing personnel. It will also require increased interaction with the
private sector to ensure that the flow of people and knowledge between
both sectors is enhanced.
Toward this end, DoD will develop a strategic human resources plan for
military and civilian personnel. This strategy will identify the tools necessary
to size and shape the military and civilian force to provide adequate numbers
of high-quality, skilled, and professionally developed people.
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In recognition of the changing demographics of DoD's military families
and the changes that will be initiated as a result of this review, DoD will
also review existing quality of life services and policies to guarantee that
they have kept pace with modern requirements. The Government also
needs to ensure that it fulfills its responsibility to fund quality programs
required to sustain the force. Further, the Department will address the
need to manage personnel tempo and improve military housing.
To create a world class health system, DoD has initiated a comprehensive
review of all Defense and Service health agencies, management activities,
and programs; and strengthened the TRICARE system to ensure better
management and accountability. A coordinated, integrated, and
adequately resourced health care system with an improved organizational
structure will ensure the availability of contingency medical capabilities
for active forces. It also will administer medical benefits to dependents
and retirees in order to meet the needs of the force and expectations of the
broader Service family.
The need to attract, develop, and retain civilian personnel is just as
important. Many of the advances in private sector human resources
management have not been incorporated into the DoD civilian
personnel system. For civilian personnel, the human resources
approach will include:
I Modernized recruiting techniques;
I More flexible compensation approaches;
I Enhanced training and knowledge management; and
I Career planning and management tools.
Modernize DoD Business Processes
and Infrastructure
The Department of Defense must transform its business processes and
infrastructure to both enhance the capabilities and creativity of its
employees and free up resources to support warfighting and the
transformation of military capabilities.
To accomplish this, DoD's organizational structure will be streamlined and
flattened to take advantage of the opportunities that the rapid flow of data
and information present. As in business, entire functions need to be
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eliminated. Boundaries must be broken to accelerate change across the
entire organization, promote cooperation, share information and best
practices, and institutionalize change throughout the Department. In
both the organizational structure and the military culture, DoD must find
ways to encourage and reward innovation and risk-taking among fighting
forces as well as support personnel.
On the support side, the task is to remove layers that no longer provide
value added. To accomplish this, the Department will initiate efforts in
the following areas:
I Streamline the overhead structure and flatten the organization;
I Focus DoD "owned" resources on being excellent in those areas
that contribute directly to warfighting;
I
Modernize the DoD-wide approach to business information; and
I Consolidate and modernize base infrastructure.
Streamline the overhead structure and flatten the organization.
The Department of Defense is committed to reducing all of its
headquarters staffs by 15 percent from FY1999 baseline as specified in
section 921(b) of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act. DoD is
currently developing a plan to comply with this goal. In light of emerging,
new requirements associated with the U.S. war on terrorism, any savings
realized from such reductions would assist the Department in meeting
higher-priority needs.
The Department must also align, consolidate, or differentiate overlapping
functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the
Joint Staff. To do this, DoD will develop recommendations to eliminate
redundancy.
The military departments also are evaluating changes in their
headquarters structures to improve their ability to perform executive
functions at lower staffing levels.
Two major institutional processes - the planning, programming and
budgeting system (PPBS) and the acquisition process - create a significant
amount of the self-imposed institutional work in the Department.
Simplifying these processes will support a streamlining of the entire
organization. The Department has already taken the first step by
conducting a concurrent program and budget review. DoD will explore
options to fully redesign the way it plans, programs, and budgets. DoD has
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already begun streamlining the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process,
including reducing funding for acquisition-related studies and analyses by
10 percent and eliminating 31 of 72 acquisition-related advisory boards.
The goal throughout this set of initiatives is to reduce the complexity of
the Department of Defense, which has been driving the increase in the
relative size of the overhead structure. In fact, the goal will be to increase
measurably the tooth-to-tail ratio over the next five years. DoD will
measure success by comparing the headquarters personnel totals to
dollars spent on headquarters and headquarters personnel versus
warfighting forces.
Focus DoD "owned" resources on excellence in those areas that
contribute directly to warfighting. Only those functions that must be
performed by DoD should be kept by DoD. Any function that can be
provided by the private sector is not a core government function.
Traditionally, "core" has been very loosely and imprecisely defined and too
often used as a way of protecting existing arrangements.
Over the last several decades, most private sector corporations have
moved aggressively away from providing most of their own services.
Instead they have concentrated efforts on core functions and businesses,
while building alliances with suppliers for a vast range of products and
services not considered core to the value they can best add in the
economy. The Department has experimented with this business practice
with some success (e.g., providing vertical replenishment at sea, oilers
manned by civilians, or food and other services in forward deployed
areas). Aggressively pursuing this effort to improve productivity requires
a major change in the culture of the Department.
DoD will assess all its functions to separate core and non-core functions.
The test will be whether a function is directly necessary for warfighting.
The review will divide these functions into three broad categories:
I Functions directly linked to warfighting and best performed by
the federal government. In these areas, DoD will invest in
process and technology to improve performance.
I Functions indirectly linked to warfighting capability that must
be shared by the public and private sectors. In these areas, DoD
will seek to define new models of public-private partnerships to
improve performance.
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I Functions not linked to warfighting and best performed by the
private sector. In these areas, DoD will seek to privatize or
outsource entire functions or define new mechanisms for
partnerships with private firms or other public agencies.
The Department has already taken steps to outsource and shed non-core
responsibilities, including the privatization of military housing and the
privatization of utility services for military installations. In addition, DoD
will create a small team to develop alternatives to the Agency or Field
Activity model that permits the Department to produce cross-DoD
outputs at a significantly lower cost.
Defense Agencies. Over time, the Defense Agencies have served to
consolidate functions common to the Services. This process has resulted
in better, more integrated outputs and has helped to modernize the
Department's business processes. To improve the business practices of
the Defense Agencies, DoD will begin a review of the Agencies to seek
efficiencies. Transformation roadmaps for Defense Agencies will be
developed keyed toward agencies planned contributions to helping DoD
meet the critical operations goals outlined earlier.
Defense Working Capital Fund. DoD will develop a plan for improving the
effectiveness of the Defense Working Capital Fund. The fund was created
as a pricing mechanism for the military services to procure goods and
services from Defense Agencies. The notion of paying for outputs is right
minded. However, the Fund mechanism subsumes a number of elements
in its pricing mechanism (for example, the expected cost of mobilization),
which masks the peacetime cost of outputs.
Modernize the DoD-wide approach to business information.
Today's technology makes the accurate, timely flow of information
possible. Pushing this information down will enable decision-making at
the right level and will, in turn, support the flattening and streamlining of
the organization. DoD must keep its information, communication, and
other management technologies on a par with the best, proven
technologies available.
The Department's business activities include financial as well as non-
financial operations and systems. Non-financial business operations and
systems include those that support the acquisition, medical, maintenance,
transportation, property, inventory, supply, and personnel communities.
However, the Department's financial and non-financial operations and
systems do not work together effectively to produce the most desirable
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business management information. Correcting this deficiency will
require a broad set of initiatives.
DoD will create a Department-wide blueprint (enterprise architecture)
that will prescribe how the Department's financial and non-financial
feeder systems and management processes will interact. This architecture
will guide the development of enterprise-level processes and systems
throughout DoD.
Regular periodic consultation with the U.S. Comptroller General has been
initiated to gain insight and support for improving the Defense
Department's financial processes. DoD will also continue to work with
Congress to better coordinate financial management oversight activities.
Consolidate and modernize DoD facility infrastructure.
Currently, DoD has 20 to 25 percent more facility structure than it needs
to support its forces. Due to budget constraints over the last decade,
much of that infrastructure has begun to age beyond acceptable levels.
Dollars that could be spent on more urgent transformation priorities are
being used to maintain installations that may no longer be needed.
To reduce waste and inefficiencies, facilities must be restructured to
support multi-Service missions. In July 2001, the Department announced
an Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). EFI will enable the U.S. military to
match facilities to forces, meet the threats and challenges of a new
century, and make the wisest use of limited defense dollars. EFI ensures
the primacy of military value in making decisions on facilities and
harnesses the strength and creativity of the private sector by creating
partnerships with local communities. All military installations will be
reviewed, and recommendations will be based on the military value of the
facilities and the structure of the force.
The EFI will encourage a cooperative effort between the President, the
Congress, and the military and local communities to achieve the most
effective and efficient base structure for America's Armed Forces. It will
give local communities a significant role in determining the future use of
facilities in their area by transferring closed installations to local
redevelopers at no cost (provided that proceeds are reinvested) and by
creating partnerships with local communities to own, operate, or
maintain those installations that remain.
Consolidating facilities will focus funds on facilities that are actually
needed and help to reduce the recapitalization rate of those that remain to
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a level closer to DoD's goal of 67 years. Consolidation will also save an
estimated $3.5 billion annually.
Compress the Supply Chain. American businesses have achieved some of
their greatest efficiencies and savings by reforming their supply chain
processes to remove steps, reduce inventories, and cut costs. By
scrubbing their warehousing, distribution, and order fulfillment
processes, they have cut out "non-value-added" steps. The Department
has made some recent advances in reducing inventories of common
consumable items and in promoting practices like direct vendor
deliveries. However, DoD still maintains large inventories that could be
substantially reduced by applying an array of supply chain practices. This
could include use of industrial partners responsible for life cycle support
of a weapon system or commodity item. DoD also incurs significant
overhead costs for functions that vendors could perform. Performance-
Based Logistics and modern business systems with appropriate metrics
can eliminate many of these non-value-added steps. DoD will implement
Performance-Based Logistics to compress the supply chain and improve
readiness for major weapons systems and commodities.
Reduce Cycle Time. Every reduction in cycle time brings improvements in
efficiency and reductions in cost. Industry has figured out how to get their
average delivery time down to 24 to 48 hours; the government customer
should get the same or better from the government supplier. Private
sector benchmarks should set the standard for government providers,
whether the function is processing and paying a bill, moving a part from a
supply center or depot to a field unit, or making the transformation from
concept to employment.
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VII.
Managing Risks
M
anaging risk is a central element of the defense strategy. It
involves balancing the demands of the present against
preparations for the future consistent with the strategy's
priorities. It entails assuring allies and friends, deterring threats of
coercion and aggression, and, when necessary, defeating adversaries. It
involves maintaining military advantages and developing new military
competencies while dissuading future military competitors.
Over the past 60 years, the United States has spent an average of 8 percent
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense; in 2001, 2.9 percent of
GDP was spent on defense. The tendency to reduce spending in periods
with no clear or well-defined threat has the potential effect of creating
risks by avoiding or delaying investment in the force. Consequently, an
assessment of the capabilities needed to counter both current and future
threats - across the spectrum of military challenges - must be included in
the Department's approach to assessing and mitigating risk.
A New Risk Framework
DoD has developed a new, broad approach to risk management. The new
risk framework ensures that the Defense establishment is sized, shaped,
postured, committed, and managed with a view toward accomplishing
the defense policy goals outlined in this report.
This risk framework is made up of four related dimensions:
I Force management - the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip
sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness
of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks;
I Operational - the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-
term conflict or other contingency;
I Future challenges - the ability to invest in new capabilities and
develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat
mid- to long-term military challenges; and
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I Institutional - the ability to develop management practices and
controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective
operation of the Defense establishment.
This framework allows the Department to consider tradeoffs among
fundamental objectives and fundamental resource constraints, and it
reflects DoD's experiences over the last decade in attempting to balance
strategy, force structure, and resources. By assessing the Defense
establishment in these four areas, the Department is directly addressing
the issues associated with developing and assessing the operational force,
key enabling capabilities, and its supporting deployment and industrial
infrastructure.
Force Management Risks
DoD must always be able to meet its missions. It must deploy forces to
assure friends and deter potential adversaries; it must acquire new
capabilities to dissuade potential enemies from challenging U.S. interests;
and, if necessary, it must defeat foes in combat. All of these risks require
members of the military force to risk their lives at home and abroad for
extended periods of time.
However, the Department should not expect its people to tolerate
hardships caused by inequitable or inappropriate workloads within the
force, aging and unreliable equipment, poor operational practices, and
crumbling infrastructure. Consequently, this strategy requires explicit
measurement and control of force management risk.
As an illustration, the figure below depicts the number of active duty
military personnel deployed to various operations from November 1994
through December 2000. The figure shows large variations in the number
of personnel deployed during this period, which coincided with
substantial reductions in active-duty deployable forces. In addition, the use
of reserve forces increased from eight million to 12 million man-days per
year. The bulk of the deployment burden during this time was not spread
among the entire force, due in part to the belief that the deployments were
temporary and that permanent changes in rotational procedures and
forward presence were not required. Prior to the end of 1994, the
Department did not even collect data at the Joint level on the number of
deployed personnel. DoD must better control this turbulence and manage
its effects.
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U.S. military involvement in operations throughout the 1990s revealed
substantial shortages of certain types of forces. In response to these
shortages, the Department instituted force management mechanisms.
These included the Global Naval Forces Presence Policy (GNFPP) to
allocate the peacetime presence of naval assets across warfighting
theaters and the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) to manage demand
for LD/HD assets, such as key surveillance and reconnaissance platforms.
DoD will seek to expand these policies by developing a Joint Presence
Policy.
Mitigating Force Management Risks: Tempo Standards and
Rotational Base. DoD can no longer solely rely on such "lagging"
indicators as retention and recruiting rates to detect personnel problems;
by the time those indicators highlight a problem, it is too late. Nor can
DoD delay necessary action to address growing force management risk
due to high personnel tempo.
Toward these ends, DoD has committed to developing realistic tempo
standards and limitations to control explicitly the amount of time DoD
personnel are deployed away from home station or stationed outside the
United States. These standards will help the Department maintain
personnel tempo at acceptable peacetime levels. More importantly, DoD
has made the overseas posture of U.S. military forces a principal
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component of force design. The QDR analyzed the relationships between
forward-stationed and rotational forces. As a result, DoD is developing
more effective ways to compute the required "rotational base" across
various types of forces to support forward posture. DoD will also
implement a Joint Presence Policy to ensure that all elements of the force
are considered in the development of rotational presence requirements.
Adopting these principles for force design and management should
greatly decrease force management risk.
Operational Risks
DoD's new force planning approach recognizes the need to size U.S.
military forces not only for the most demanding near-term warfighting
tasks, but also for a plausible set of other near-term contingencies,
including small-scale contingencies. Consequently, all measurements of
operational risk will reflect the full range of capabilities U.S. forces must
possess and missions that U.S. forces must perform.
In the past, major elements of the forces were designed and evaluated
against a narrow set of military missions and associated tasks. With a
wider set of missions and tasks, the measurement of operational risk will
consider both the missions that forces were designed to accomplish, and
those that they are currently assigned to conduct.
Mitigating Operational Risks: Force Structure Priorities, Forward
Posture, and New Readiness Measurements. The QDR has developed a
broader approach to operational risk that involves assessing the
Department's ability to perform the following:
I Defend the United States;
I Deter forward in critical areas;
I Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts; and
I Conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies.
Promoting the defense of the United States to the top priority restores its
primacy and better allows the Department to focus and prioritize its
efforts to mitigate operational risk.
This approach requires analysis of a broader range of contingencies to
determine operational risk than the Department has traditionally
analyzed. While instituting such an approach to operational risk
management requires a considerable expansion of DoD's previous
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process, it directly addresses the importance of assessing the force's
adequacy for a wider range of near-term operations. To this end, DoD will
undertake a comprehensive re-engineering of its current readiness
reporting system. The new system will allow measurement of the
adequacy of the force to accomplish all its assigned missions, not just
major combat operations. Such a system will also help the Department
identify - and transform - force elements that are less relevant to the full
spectrum of missions and tasks.
Planning for a wider range of contingencies affects recent assessments
conducted by the Department. In particular, a major study of the size and
shape of the Department's airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned equipment
was completed in FY2000, but was based on the previous defense
strategy. The mix of new threats and missions that DoD will consider in
the near- to mid-term requires the Department to reevaluate this study in
detail and adjust the results as necessary.
Finally, rather than equating risk mitigation with additional force
structure, the new strategy calls for assessing changes in capabilities,
concepts of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.
For instance, contingencies involving adversaries armed with CBRNE
weapons, as well as ballistic missiles and artillery to deliver them, impose
high risks for U.S. and allied militaries regardless of the size of the force
amassed against them. In those instances, risk mitigation is more
dependent on the decisions taken to pursue offensive and defensive
systems and to develop new concepts of operations to deal with those
threats than on increases in force structure.
Future Challenges Risks
Despite the strains on U.S. military forces during the past decade, the U.S.
military has conducted its operations superbly. Nonetheless, the United
States cannot take its recent successes for granted or mistakenly assume
that no other nation or group will seek to challenge the United States in
the future. The attacks of September 2001 demonstrate that the risks of
future challenges are a permanent feature of the international system.
While the United States cannot predict with confidence which adversaries
will pose threats in the future, the types of military capabilities that will be
used to challenge U.S. interests and U.S. military forces can be identified
and understood. As in the September terror attacks in New York and
Washington, future adversaries will seek to avoid U.S. strengths and attack
U.S. vulnerabilities, using asymmetric approaches such as terrorism,
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information operations, and ballistic and cruise missile attacks. The
President has directed the Department to transform to meet such
emerging challenges. As discussed earlier, DoD has identified critical
operational goals to focus the Department's transformation on such
priority areas.
Assessing future challenges risk provides a measure of the ability to meet
the transformational challenges described above in the mid-term and
longer-term. It also recognizes that the desired capabilities and missions
for the Armed Forces will change over time, and it provides a bridge to the
future by institutionalizing the shift from a threat-based to capabilities-
based paradigm. It provides a way to monitor how DoD balances the
needs to preserve long-term military preeminence and address short-
term priorities.
Future challenges risk not only addresses possible future threats, but also
the ability to meet critical transformational challenges. For example, the
decision not to pursue a new technology due to the lack of a current
threat entails risk: introducing it early provides a military advantage for a
time, and it may dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing
similar capabilities.
Mitigating Future Challenge Risks: Experimentation, R&D, and
Selective Procurement. Achieving DoD's strategic goals mandates
embarking on the long-term transformation of U.S. military capabilities. It
requires a substantial investment in explicit searches for new and
improved capabilities. These capabilities may derive from innovative
operational concepts, advanced systems, new organizational
arrangements, and enhanced training. To achieve these ends, DoD will
expand experimentation efforts under the leadership of Joint Forces
Command. The Department will experiment with new forces and
organizations - including new joint task force organizations - to address
those operational challenges identified previously. In particular, the
possible establishment of a Joint National Training Center, a space test
range, and a Joint "opposing force" for training are intended to help
mitigate future challenges risk via expanded experimentation.
Complementing this focus on experimentation will be a new DoD
emphasis on concept development - that is, new ways to use existing and
proposed forces. One advantage of the transition to Standing Joint Task
Force organizations is an ability to provide more opportunities for joint
and combined experiments and exercises, both to discover existing
weaknesses and exploit emerging opportunities.
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The Department also recognizes the value of stable investment in science
and technology to identify new defense technologies. DoD plans to
stabilize investment in science and technology at three percent of the
defense budget for FY03-07.
The Department plans to reduce the time required to introduce new
concepts and systems into the fielded force. The time between design and
deployment for major DoD systems has doubled since 1975. Some of the
delay can be attributed to the custom of making decisions program by
program, rather than mission area by mission area. This practice leads to
mere substitution of new weapons for existing ones, rather than a
broader, system-level transformation. DoD's new approach will serve to
hasten and integrate decision processes, as DoD plans to make selective
procurement decisions within the transformation framework described
by this report. Thus, the Department will reduce future challenges risk by
assessing the contributions of combinations of options in each
transformation area.
The Department has already committed to many transformation
initiatives, as discussed in Section V. Initiatives in counterterrorism,
missile defense, advanced weapons, and information operations are
examples of programs that are underway to reduce future challenges risk.
Institutional Risks
The final dimension of risk is aimed at making the best use of the
Department's resources in the day-to-day operations of the Defense
establishment. By formally addressing institutional risk, the Department
aims to maximize the efficient use of defense expenditures to sustain long-
term public support for the Nation's defense needs. To manage DoD
efficiently, the Defense establishment needs to be transformed - how it
operates internally, how it deals with its industrial suppliers, and how it
interacts with the Congress. Currently, DoD leaders manage under a set of
controls that do not allow them to operate with the freedom necessary to
transform the force. DoD recognizes that it must explicitly reduce these
institutional risks to better manage the Defense establishment.
Mitigating Institutional Risk: Changes in DoD Operating Practices.
One of the primary objectives in reducing institutional risk is the
restoration of vitality in the Defense establishment. In particular, the
military and civilian personnel systems merit serious examination.
Consequently, DoD will develop a strategic human resources plan to help
size and shape the Department's personnel for the new strategy. This plan
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will not only examine ways to ensure that DoD personnel have the
necessary critical skills, but it will also examine the balance of personnel
and work among the active, reserve, and civilian workforces.
DoD will work to achieve a transformation in business practices, with a
particular emphasis on financial management. It will develop a new
financial management architecture to guide the modernization of
these practices.
DoD has also committed to a substantial streamlining and upgrading of its
infrastructure. The Department needs another round of infrastructure
reductions to reduce unneeded facilities. DoD has adopted a goal of
achieving a 67-year recapitalization rate for 80 percent of current
infrastructure by 2010, as specified in the Efficient Facilities Initiative.
Currently, DoD recapitalization rates average 192 years.
In addition to the longer-term initiatives listed above, the Department is
taking steps to reduce institutional risk immediately. An important
managerial change is the establishment of the Senior Executive Council
(SEC), which will conduct a comprehensive review of the Defense
Agencies. In addition, the Department has already begun streamlining the
processes associated with the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), as discussed in
Section VI.
Mitigating Risks Across the Spectrum
These four dimensions of risk cannot be assessed and managed
independently. As noted previously, increasing near-term risk in one area,
such as force management risk, would most likely affect another area,
such as operational risk. Maintaining a strategy-driven balance among the
four dimensions of risk is essential, and that balance must be sustained
and, where necessary, adapted over time.
Adopting this risk framework is not the end but just the beginning of the
Department's effort to assess and manage risk. DoD has practiced risk
management in the past, but by specifying this new strategy-driven risk
management framework, the Department has begun to develop a
management tool that will enable greater focus on the implementation of
the QDR defense program. DoD has already committed to the risk
mitigation steps discussed above to reduce risk in areas that have been
well documented. The broader commitment to measure and balance risk
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using this framework requires extensive revisions to the readiness
measurement system and development of new mechanisms to address the
other risks. When implemented, these mechanisms will provide the
needed assessments across all dimensions of risk.
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VIII.
Statement of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Introduction. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) faced two
challenging tasks. First, it had to address significant concerns regarding
the near-term ability of the force to protect and advance U.S. interests
worldwide in a dangerous and evolving security environment. Second, it
had to implement the President's goal of transforming the Armed Forces to
meet future security challenges. In my view, the defense strategy and
program recommendations contained in the QDR report are a major step
toward accomplishing these two tasks, while balancing the associated
near-, mid-, and long-term risks.
Over the past decade, our response to the strategic environment has
placed a wide range of demands on the U.S. military. Increases in missions
and requirements coupled with decreases in structure and procurement
have stretched elements of the force and resulted in imbalance between
strategy, force structure, and resources. Against this backdrop, on
September 11, 2001, enemies of the U.S. demonstrated the capability to
carry out large-scale, non-conventional attacks against the U.S. homeland;
asymmetric attack against the sovereignty of the U.S. became a reality.
While the QDR sets the broad direction for transforming to meet the
defense demands of the future, there remains a need for a more
comprehensive roadmap that will sustain the tenuous balance between
strategy and resources.
Assessment of the QDR. In my view the defense strategy outlined in the
QDR 2001 - if matched with resources over time - will adequately address
the current and emerging challenges of the strategic environment. The
goals of the strategy recognize that the military will continue to generate
forces to conduct a wide range of missions for the foreseeable future.
Particularly noteworthy, the QDR calls for the capability to respond to
overlapping major crises and defeat adversaries or their efforts in more
than one region. In my view, maintaining a credible military capacity to
respond to multiple crises worldwide is absolutely fundamental to
America's global leadership role.
The broad range of military requirements identified in the QDR lays the
foundation for determining the size and structure of the force. The
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recommendations of the review are the starting point for determining
how best to organize, man, train and equip the Total Force. An initial look
at the force structure indicates the current force is capable of executing
the new defense strategy with moderate risk. Considerably more
warfighting analysis on a range of scenarios must be done, however, to
confirm this initial assessment.
First and foremost, end strength sufficient to meet strategic requirements
at a sustainable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO must be maintained, or our
greatest military asset - quality people - will be placed at risk. I believe that
sustaining an end strength and force structure capable of executing the
new defense strategy at moderate risk will be a significant challenge. The
Services must balance limited resources between the significant QDR
transformation and quality of life priorities and the competing
requirements for operations and maintenance, recapitalization, and
modernization beginning with their FY03 budgets. Of particular concern
are rapidly aging weapon systems. While we have successfully raised
annual procurement spending to the $60 billion level, some estimates
point to spending $100 to $110 billion per year to sustain today's force
structure and arrest the aging problem. If this requirement is met by
diverting resources from current operations accounts, then near-term
and, eventually mid-term, military risk will increase.
The QDR set priorities and identifies major goals for transforming the
Armed Forces of the United States to meet future challenges. It calls for
new operational concepts, advanced technological capabilities, and an
increased emphasis on joint organizations, experimentation, and training.
If truly dramatic improvement in future joint operational effectiveness is
to be achieved; however, more is required. First, a DOD-wide
transformation strategy, a joint organizing vision, and a joint
transformation roadmap are essential to guide, integrate, and synchronize
the efforts of the Services. Second, we need DOD-wide reform of key
institutional planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition
processes. These two requirements are interdependent; no real progress
will be made in one without the other. Further, throughout the
transformation period, we still require forces to meet the needs of the
Nation; for this we will continue to rely on the current force, as we are
today as we begin the campaign against terrorism. We must acknowledge
and plan for the impact that aggressive transformation and
experimentation could have on the near- and mid-term ability of the force
to execute actual peacetime and warfighting missions. Units undergoing
transformation, and those involved in experimentation, may not be
available or ready to respond to crises within required operational
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timelines. None of this is to suggest that transformation should be slowed;
we must not let the demands of today overwhelm the necessity to prepare
for the future.
The QDR states that defense of the U.S. homeland is the highest priority
for the U.S. military; this was painfully reinforced on September 11th. The
U.S. must deter, preempt, and defend against aggression targeted at U.S.
territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure, as
well as manage the consequences of such aggression and other domestic
emergencies. Defending the U.S. homeland requires a comprehensive
strategy beginning with fixing responsibility for integrating all related
activities. President Bush's establishment of the Office of Homeland
Security is being paralleled within DOD. As a start, an integrated DOD
Homeland Security working group can identify HLS roles and mission for
DOD and examine resource implications. Further analysis and interaction
with the Office of Homeland Security is required to strengthen ties
between federal, state and local agencies to combat terrorism in the
United States. This analysis is leading to important changes in the Unified
Command Plan.
Additional work beyond the QDR is required in several areas. First, the
role of the Reserve Components - critical to the execution of the strategy -
demands attention and will lead to decisions on Reserve and Guard
readiness, transformation, and civilian employer support, as well as the
basics of end strength and structure.
Logistics capabilities - including strategic mobility, sustainment, and the
repair and reengineering of our infrastructure - remain immediate
concerns. A comprehensive analysis of all requirements must be
completed and appropriate priority of resources established. As for
strategic lift, we must aggressively achieve the capabilities called for in the
Mobility Requirements Study 2005, as a minimum. Further, we must
accelerate the restoration, modernization, and replacement of our
mission-essential and quality-of-life facilities, even as we seek authority to
eliminate excess infrastructure. These near-, mid-, and long-term logistics
needs have significant implications for all levels of risk and must be given
appropriate attention.
People remain our most critical asset. The QDR is a good starting point for
the transformation of the Department's human resource systems.
Although we have a highly trained professional military and civilian
workforce today, we need to continue to fund quality of life initiatives,
such as health care, pay parity and improved housing, to sustain the
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quality force required in the future. More analysis is required to determine
how we will continue to recruit and retain the force.
Assessment of Risk. Analytical tools such as Dynamic Commitment and
Positive Match wargames indicate that the QDR reduces the strategy-to-
structure imbalance and results in moderate near-term risk for the current
force executing the revised strategy. This assessment includes the most
demanding scenario where U.S. forces respond to two overlapping major
crises in different regions, decisively defeating one adversary while
defeating the efforts of the other.
Over time the full implications of the QDR will emerge. The ability of the
force to field transformed capabilities, while continuing to protect and
advance U.S. world-wide interests in the near- and mid-term, will be more
accurately assessed as joint and Service transformation roadmaps are
developed. Finally, force structure, budget, and infrastructure impacts
will become clearer as the Services complete their FY03 budgets and
Program Objective Memoranda.
Summary. The Services, Combatant Commanders and Joint Staff have
worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that this
QDR is founded on strategic requirements. The QDR provides a vision for
how our forces will be employed now and into the future. Further, the
QDR moves DOD toward balance in two key dimensions: between
strategy and force structure, and between the demands of today and those
of the future. Sustaining this balance is essential to ensuring that U.S.
Armed Forces remain preeminent now and well into the 21st Century.
HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Appendix A:
Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993
T
his QDR Report serves as the overall strategic planning document of
the Department, as required by Public Law 103-62. Section III,
"Defense Strategy," gives the Department's comprehensive mission
statement. General goals are covered in Section II, under "U.S. Interests and
Objectives." The Department's general policy objectives are to (1) assure
allies and friends; (2) dissuade future military competition, (3) deter threats
and coercion against U.S. interests, and (4) if deterrence fails, decisively
defeat any adversary. These goals are also discussed in Section II.
The Department's risk framework of mitigating (1) force management
risk, (2) operational risks, (3) future challenges risk, and (4) institutional
risks, are described in Section VII, along with a variety of management
initiatives for these areas. These risk areas will form the basis for the
Department's annual performance goals under the Government
Performance and Results Act.
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Quadrennial Defense Review Report