INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS

JOVO BAKIC
February 2013
Right-Wing Extremism in Serbia
During the 1990s the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was the most important promoter
of the far right in Serbia. Slobodan Miloevis regime managed to keep it under
control, thanks to its control over the mass media, although the SRS managed to poll
30 percent of the vote. However, after the political changes of October, 5
th
, 2000
(the fall of the Miloevi regime) and the former SRS leader Vojislav eelj becoming
an indictee before the Hague Tribunal (ICTY), the SRS split in 2008. The majority
of the party and its supporters turned to the duo Tomislav Nikoli and Aleksandar
Vui, who since then have made successful efforts to pragmatically re-profle the
new Serbian Progressive Party (SNP) as a moderately conservative political party.
Following the general elections of 2012 the SNP formed a coalition government to-
gether with the post-Miloevi SPS and Nikoli won last years presidential election.
Currently there is no powerful far-right party in Serbia that would unite the far right
under one umbrella. This signifcantly weakens the action potential of the far right.
After the defeat of the old SRS in the 2012 elections and the SNPs evolution
into a moderate national-conservative party, Serbia today is one of the countries
in Europe with no far-right political party in parliament, for the frst time since the
break-up of former Yugoslavia.
However, there are strong movements at the far right of the political spectrum that
despise parliamentarianism and political parties. They strive to bring Serbs back to
their alleged roots albeit Arian in the case of the neo-Nazis, or Serbian orthodox
ones in the case of the Obraz group. Working-class youths, usually unemployed and
generally not well-educated, serve as their recruiting base, and their activities take
place in stadiums and streets where they can insult black football players and get
into fghts with the fans of opposing teams and the police, knowing full well that
corrupt judges will spare them longer sentences even if they commit grave criminal
offences. This situation is certainly aggravated by mass unemployment, which cur-
rently stands at more than one fourth of the overall population of working age and
about 50 percent of people under 30 years of age.
n
n
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JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2. The Far-Right in Serbia during the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

3. The General State of Affairs and Far-Right Actors in Serbia 2001 2012 . . . . . . . . . .2

4. Action Potential of the Far-Right in Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
5. Measures to Restrain the Far-Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Contents
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
1
1. Introduction
The far right in Serbia, as well as in other post-socialist
societies, came out into the open after the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall in 1989. The wars between the Yugoslav succes-
sor states (19911995) acted as catalysts in the shaping
of the far right, since they brought mainstream national-
ism onto the agenda and hence rendered extreme na-
tionalism, as an underlying tenet of the far right, socially
acceptable. It was during this period that the uncritical
glorifcation of World War II Chetnik traditions was resur-
rected, particularly the Chetnik plans to create an ethni-
cally pure Greater Serbia which had led to the genocidal
massacres of Muslim populations in Sandak and Eastern
Bosnia in 1942 and 1943 (Dedijer, Mileti, 1990).
The broader acceptance of the far right in Serbia was
considerably facilitated by Serbias foreign policy posi-
tion. Following the aggressive foreign policy of the
Miloevi era, which culminated in the wars in post-Yu-
goslavia, the UN imposed harsh economic and cultural
sanctions, which drove Serbia into isolation, thus favour-
ing an increase in xenophobia, a special case that distin-
guishes the country from all other Balkan states. In May
1993, for example, 76 percent of the Serbian population
were found to have xenophobic views, while previously
that fgure had never exceeded 15 percent (Panti, 1998:
68; Goati, 2001: 69). In this context, we should be aware
that it is not only the Serbian far right, and not even ex-
clusively Serbian nationalists, but also the broader public
in Serbia who still believe that the United States and the
European Union have applied double standards with re-
spect to Serbia when dealing with the problems of the
former Yugoslavia.
In the view of many Serbs it was the West that frst
encouraged secessionist nationalism and introduced
the idea of the republics leaving the former Yugoslavia.
Western politicians insisted that the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia could only take place if the boundaries of its re-
publics (i. e. the internal borders) were observed i. e.
remained unchanged. Yet, as many Serbs see it, Serbia
subsequently became the only one of the former Yugo-
slav republics to have its boundaries altered when Ko-
sovo, a former autonomous province of Serbia, seceded
under the protection of NATO bombers. Finally, Serbia
would like to annex four municipalities in Northern Ko-
sovo where Serbs are in the vast majority, but many Serbs
see their country as prohibited from changing the bor-
ders of the seceded Kosovo in order to do this. In gen-
eral, the Serbian public considers this policy as unprin-
cipled and unjust, which, along with the dire economic
situation, fosters national frustration and consequently
the broadening and strengthening of Serbian national-
ism and of the far right. Given that many Serbs hold this
perception of the events of the last twenty years, there
is little space for them to admit that the initial aggression
had its origin in the failed policies of Miloevi, which
inevitably led to Yugoslavias dissolution.
2. The Far-Right in Serbia
during the 1990s
During the 1990s the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was the
most important, if not indeed the only, promoter of the
far right in Serbia. It was the party that, thanks to its char-
ismatic leader ,Vojislav eelj
1
the youngest person to
acquire a PhD degree in socialist Yugoslavia and the for-
mer Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sara-
jevo (B-H) and of the Law School in Belgrade and despite
the primitive nature of his views enjoyed considerable
support of the body politic and marginalised other fgures
on the far right. eelj is presently an indictee before the
Hague Tribunal (ICTY). However, Slobodan Miloevis
regime managed to keep this support under control,
thanks to its control over the mass media, its placement
of secret service agents within the SRS, and ultimately its
incarceration of eelj. As early as the May 1992 elections
for the Federal Parliament of the FRY, when the wars bet-
ween the Yugoslav successor states were in full swing
and when the SRS was still cooperating with the SPS, it
managed to poll 30 percent of the vote in Serbia: yet only
one and a half years later, by which time it had become
embroiled in a confict with Miloevis SPS, this support
had fallen to 13.8 percent (Goati, 2001: 52, 72).
Generally, from 1990 until it split in 2008, the SRS was
a planet of the far right with a number of more or
less organised or dispersed far-right satellites orbiting
around it. This tactical cooperation was to continue un-
interrupted until the late 1990s, despite differences over
some issues. It was not until 1999, when skinheads killed
1. In the second round of the 1997 presidential election he managed to
win a victory over Zoran Lili, nominated by Miloevis SPS. However,
since the election law at that time stipulated that more than half of re-
gistered voters must participate in the ballot for it to be valid, he had to
reconcile himself with the fact that he did not become president.
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
2
a boy of Roma ethnicity named Duan Jovanovi that
these links broke. eelj refused to support the killers,
and the neo-Nazi skinheads terminated their coopera-
tion with the SRS.
However, after the political changes of 5 October 2000
and the fall of the Miloevi regime, new far-right organi-
sations began to form in a different social environment.
These established cooperation with the SRS, which, un-
der the leadership of Tomislav Nikoli and Aleksandar
Vui, was by then gradually moving towards a more
moderate position, focusing on social issues and thus
gaining popularity with the voters.
3. The General State of Affairs and Far-
Right Actors in Serbia 2001 2012
At the very beginning of this period the far right was very
much on the defensive, barely managing to stay alive.
The enthusiasm for Europe on the part of much of Ser-
bian society, which cherished the unrealistic hope of
swift social development and accession to the EU, to-
gether with the resolute modernising leadership of the
new prime minister, Zoran ini, created an atmosphere
in society that was not conducive to the development of
far-right ideas. Accordingly, the SRS won only 8.5 per-
cent of the vote in the December elections of 2000.
However, as the public came to realise that the promised
rapid social development and EU accession were not fea-
sible and, moreover, faced a wave of privatisation that
threw vast numbers of people out of work, the number
of people who perceived themselves as losers of the
transition increased rapidly and a mood of disappoint-
ment and despair gained the upper hand among large
sectors of society. In addition, the weakness of the po-
litical elite and the close links between parts of it with
tycoons of the Miloevi regime (Lazi, 2011) as well as
the widespread corruption and the power of organised
crime, which ultimately led to Prime Minister inis
assassination, produced major disillusionment with poli-
tics. In the ensuing atmosphere of entrenched national
and social frustrations, the new generation that grew up
during the 1990s and reached adulthood after 2000 be-
came easy prey both for the old and the newly emerging
far-right movements such as Obraz, Nacionalni stroj, Krv
i ast, Srpski narodni pokret 1389, Srpski narodni pokret
Nai, and Srbska akcija.
However, the split in the SRS in 2008 dealt a major blow
to the far-right milieu. At that time the majority of the
party and its supporters turned to the duo Tomislav
Nikoli and Aleksandar Vui, who since then have made
successful efforts to pragmatically re-profle the new
Serbian Progressive Party (SNP) as a moderately conser-
vative political party.
2
This development can be compared
with Gianfranco Finis political project in Italy, which
evolved from a neo-fascist to a normal conservative
party. Following the general elections and presidential
elections of 2012 the SNP formed a coalition govern-
ment together with the post-Miloevi SPS and Tomislav
Nikolic who won the presidential election against the
incumbent Boris Tadic from the Democratic Party (DP).
Given, however, that the focus of this study is the far-
right political scene in Serbia, we should at this point
return to the remainder of the SRS, which in 2008 was
left in a vacuum, having lost its charismatic leader, (by
that time, Seselj was already on trial in The Hague) and
suffered from the political paranoia of an indomitable
leader who perceived everybody as a potential traitor.
3

Thus in the 2012 parliamentary elections, the SRS for the
frst time since its founding failed to pass the 5 percent
threshold required to gain seats in parliament.
It is reasonable to assume that the Serbian Radical Party
lost some of its votes to Dveri,
4
a highly conservative but
not, or at least not yet, a far-right ideological and poli-
tical movement, instead espousing a turn-of-the-twen-
tieth-century conservatism much like Joseph de Mais-
tres. This movement evidently enjoys the support of
the more conservative parts of the Serbian Orthodox
Church (SPC) and expressly rejects the fascist tradition,
anti-Semitism and the use of violence to achieve ideo-
logical aims. It does, however, foster extreme conserva-
tism, promoting the family as the most important social
institution and advocating a religious-moralistic outlook.
As one might expect, this movement fosters an explic-
itly homophobic position, evident in its organisation of
Family Walks on the day before the Pride Parade; but it
2. Some wrong turns have been taken, best illustrated by the signing
of a cooperation agreement with the Austrian Freedom Party of Heinz-
Christian Strache. If it wishes to unburden itself of the legacy of its far-
right past, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNP) would need to sever its ties
with the Serbian Radical Party and with the far-right parties of the EU and
Russia (Baki, 2007).
3. Vojislav eeljs spouse, Jadranka, stood as a presidential candidate for
the SRS in 2012 and received 3.9 percent of the vote.
4. The movement Dveri also failed to pass the 5 percent threshold, so it
has no representation in parliament.
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
3
does not incite its supporters to physically assault the
LGBT population. Following the Russian model, in 2012
it called on the government to ban the Parade for the
next 100 years.
5
Serbian nationalism and anti-globalisa-
tion (expressed in an anti-American orientation and a
reserved attitude to the EU) are clearly important com-
ponents of Dveri ideology so that one can say that it
exhibits certain symptoms of the far right but these are
not suffcient to classify the movement as such.
6

Its leaders, a secondary school teacher of Serbian lit-
erature called Boko Obradovi and a jurist, Vladan
Glii,
7
are civilised people who, unlike Vojislav eelj
or the leader of Obraz, Mladen Obradovi, do not in-
sult their opponents, but direct their sharp criticism at
the illegitimate oligarchic structure of the Serbian social
system. War veterans, religious students, and the more
conservative parts of the Serbian Orthodox Church as
well as the armed forces and the police form Dveris
popular base.
Unlike Dveri, Srpski narodni pokret 1389, founded in
2004, is a movement that can defnitely be classifed as
far right. It is characterised by Serbian nationalism and
takes a particularly demagogic stance on the Kosovo
issue. In addition, it does not shrink from violence to
achieve its goals. The frst primary goal is to liberate
and unite all of Serbian territory into a single Serbian
state; Serbian territories are deemed to be, in addition
to those that the SRS also regards as Greater Serbia,
the FYR of Macedonia and the northern part of Al-
bania. The other primary goal is social justice, i. e.
confscating and nationalising the property of tycoons
and politicians who have got rich by stealing from the
people and who have ruined the Serbian economy,
leaving the workers to starve to death in the streets.
It also insists on the nationalisation of Serbian frms
acquired by foreign companies, which brought them
to ruin and bankrupted them, and on the closure of
foreign banks that rob the people. The third primary
goal is to fght the New World Order, i. e. the EU, the
IMF and NATO. In addition to those already mentioned,
5. Dveri: SPS ima jak gej lobi (SPS has a strong gay lobby); http://www.
vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/257328/Dveri-SPS-ima-jak-gej-lobi (accessed
on 18 October 2012).
6. Dveri: Programska naela (Program Principles); http://www.dverisrpske.
com/sr-CS/nasa-politika/programska-nacela/ (accessed on 28 July 2012).
7. As Dveri presidential candidate, he polled 2.7 percent of the votes at
the 2012 election.
the main enemies listed are drug-addicts, gay and
other deviant movements, sects and the Catholic
Church, which, it is alleged, seeks to convert Orthodox
believers to Catholicism. The movement is led by the
non-charismatic fgure of Mia Vaci,
8
and the belliger-
ent core is made up of fascistoid hooligan groups linked
with organised crime in the guise of supporters of cer-
tain football clubs.
Another organisation that originated during the 2000s
is Srpski nacionalni pokret Nai, under the leadership
of Ivan M. Ivanovi, who is not generally known to the
broader public. He advocates Euro-Asian integration
whereby Belgrade, along with Saint Petersburg, Kyiv and
Alma Ata, would be one of the capitals of the Euro-
Asian Union. Like SNP 1389, SNP Nai also advocates
liberating and uniting all Serbian territories which
were occupied in the 1990s wars, as well as Macedo-
nia and Northern Albania, and it sees its main foes as the
United States, NATO, the EU, the IMF, drug abuse and
the gay movement. Moreover, it uses much the same
language as SNP 1389
9
to advocate the imprisonment of
tycoons and the nationalisation of their property as well
as the property of foreign companies.
10
In addition to these relatively new organisations of the
far-right but not of neo-Nazi or fascist orientation
there are organisations like Otaastveni pokret Obraz,
which was rightfully classifed by the Serbian police as
clerico-fascist, and which may also be termed as clas-
sically fascist, since it builds on the conceptual tradi-
tions of the Serbian fascist movement Zbor from the
1930s and 1940s. These are distinguished primarily by
their ideology of St. Sava nationalism, as formulated
in the interwar period by the Serbian Orthodox Bishop
Nikolaj Velimirovi and also espoused by the leader of
Zbor, Dimitrije Ljoti. It goes without saying that St.
Sava (1175 1236), the founder of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, could not have been a Serbian nationalist, as
the concept of nationalism stems from the nineteenth
8. SNP 1389 intends to grow into a political party, and at the local
election, according to the data on its portal, it received 2.8 percent of
the vote in the municipality of New Belgrade. Mladi protiv reimske
politike (Youth against regime politics); http://www.snp1389.rs/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=712%3A2012-05-31-11-
58-14&catid=36%3Avesti&Itemid=69, accessed on 24 June 2012.
9. The use of the same words is no coincidence, since both movements
were formed after the breakup of what had been a single movement,
SNP 1389.
10. SNP Nai: Program; http://nasisrbija.org/program-3/ (accessed on 24
June 2012).
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
4
century, but this fact is ignored by present-day nation-
alists.
11
Reactionary fascist ideology inspired by St. Sava
envisages a feudal corporate government as a desir-
able form of social order.
Obraz originated in the Orthodox Missionary School
of the temple of Saint Alexander Nevsky in Belgrade in
the mid-1990s. The school was sponsored by the late
Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Budapest, Danilo Krsti,
and assumed the character of a political movement in
1999. The enemies of Obraz are the usual suspects: the
Jews, referred to as Zionists (anti-Christian Jewish rac-
ists), who according to anti-Semitic Serbian Orthodox
Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi
12
encouraged, organised
and fnanced the largest and bloodiest world wars and
revolutions where millions of people died. The other
group cast as the enemy in Obraz ideology is not sur-
prisingly the Croats, whom they refer to as Ustasas.
Obraz leaders tell them that we (i. e. the Serbs) with the
help of God, will take revenge for Bljesak and Oluja
and liberate all the territories of the Serbian Fatherland
that you have, with the support of foreign blackguards,
temporarily taken away and defled. Similar rhetoric is
directed at the Moslems, or in Obrazs words Moslem
extremists, who are promised that Serbian Bosnia
and Herzegovina will also be liberated, and at the
Albanians, referred to as Shiptar terrorists and the
disgrace of Europe who, Obraz claims, are working
together with Euro-Atlantic occupiers and commit-
ting vile crimes against a handful of remaining Serbian
martyrs. Finally, Obraz promises faithfully that Kosovo
will be avenged.
But Obraz has inner enemies too: fake peace-lovers,
who should get out of Serbia; political parties that are
intruders into the Serbhood being and of use for Ser-
11. In his work Rastko Nemanji made little mention of the Serbian
people. Serbian land he generally defned as the territory ruled by the
Nemanji dynasty (Juhas-Georgieska, 2005), a rather fuid concept since
this depended on the balance of power between the Nemanji dynasty
and its rivals at various points in history.
12. Elsewhere it is said that Serbian children should from the very start
feel and understand that they are, in the words of Bishop Saint Nikolaj
Velimirovi, Arians by blood, Slavs by their surnames, Serbs by their
names, and Christians in heart and spirit. Nacionalno vaspitanje (Na-
tional Upbringing); http://www.obraz.rs/ (accessed on 24 June 2012).
In the 1920s Nikolaj Velimirovi founded the Bogomoljaki pokret
Narodnu hriansku zajednicu, which was ideologically connected with
Dimitrije Ljotis Zbor and shared some of the same members. Moreover,
Bishop Nikolaj was the person who gave a eulogy at the funeral service
for Ljoti. More on the anti-Semitism of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi, cano-
nised by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2003, may be found in Jovan
Byfords paper (Byford, 2005).
bian enemies; Protestant religious communities, whom
they call members of sects; the LGBT population, clas-
sifed as. perverts, who are given the message that
they will be punished most severely and eradicated;
drug addicts, who are told that they cannot go about
unhindered tainting the purity of Serbian youth and the
health of the Serbian nation; and, fnally, criminals,
whose conduct is alien to the spirit of St. Sava.
13
The frst leader of Obraz was a sociologist and a theo-
logian, Neboja M. Krsti, who was killed in a traffc ac-
cident in 2001. After his death, the leadership was taken
over by Mladen Obradovi, a much less educated but
plucky theology student who never got his degree. Un-
like the previous, primarily Russophile and anti-Western
far-right organisations that have ties only with Russian
patriotic movements, Obraz fosters relations not only
with similar Russian organisations, but also with similar
far-right organisations from Romania, Slovakia, Poland,
France, Italy and Spain.
Finally, there are also organisations of neo-Nazi charac-
ter, Nacionalni stroj and Krv i ast, and the latest one,
Srbska akcija.
14
They gather skinheads of clearly recog-
nisable neo-Nazi orientation who very often belong to
the wider support and fan groups of football clubs, such
as United Force
15
(FC Rad), Delije (FC Crvena Zvezda
Red Star) and Alcatraz (FC Partizan). Membership in
organised football fan groups serves as a front for far-
right and criminal activities by some fan leaders and
skinheads, who develop a particular subculture within
these groups. Their members are most often recruited
from the ranks of working-class youths who have lost
all prospects for a future in post-socialist Serbia. These
organisations are violent and hierarchical, structured ac-
cording to a military model. Their violence is directed
13. Srbskim neprijateljima (To Enemies of Serbs); http://www.obraz.rs/;
(accessed on 24 June 2012).
14. However, Srbska akcija is somewhere between Obraz, of which its
founders were also members, and a neo-Nazi movement. It combines
neo-Nazism with the classical fascism of the 1930s and 1940s, so it ad-
vocates the Orthodox Feudal Estate Monarchy relying on fraternal
Russia, but also on those Western powers who fght for the Europe
of nations, since the more the non-European and Moslem factor is
present in other European nations, the stronger it will be in ours, and vice
versa. Ideoloke osnove (Ideological Basis); http://www.srb-akcija.org/
izdvajamo/198/ideologija/ (accessed on 28 June 2012).
15. A part of the lyrics for their song goes: We are of glorious Duans
Arian blood/We dont like Bolsheviks nor the circumcised / We despise
snitches who yap a lot / Our fsts are hard, cops should know. Sami pro-
tiv svih (Alone against Everybody); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=rnukAwEPxrI&feature=autoplay&list=PLB9BACA6C1F99B6B2&playne
xt=5 (accessed on 28 June 2012).
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
5
against the Roma, rival fans and black men who play
in Serbian football clubs. They are also anti-Semitic and
Islamophobic and regret that they have less opportunity
to attack these groups.
16
Like all the organisations men-
tioned here, they also glorify the ICTY indictees Vojislav
eelj
17
, Radovan Karadi and Ratko Mladi. Nacionalni
stroj, Krv i ast, and Srbska akcija are part of an inter-
national network of similar neo-Nazi movements and
political parties in the EU, the United States and Russia.
18
Obraz and the above-mentioned neo-Nazi organisations
despise parliamentarism and political parties. They strive
to bring Serbs back to their alleged roots Arian in the
case of the neo-Nazis, and St. Sava ones in the case
of Obraz. Working-class youths, usually unemployed
and generally not very educated, serve as their recruit-
ing base, and their activities take place in stadiums and
streets where they can insult black football players and
get into fghts with the fans of opposing teams and the
police, knowing full well that corrupt judges will spare
them longer sentences even if they commit grave crimi-
nal offences.
4. Action Potential of the
Far-Right in Serbia
In discussing the potential of the far-right in Serbia to act
we need to look both at its internal potential and at the
external circumstances affecting this.
Currently the most capable far-right leader, Vojislav
eelj, is not in Serbia at all but has spent the past nine
years in custody, awaiting the conclusion of his trial. His
only successors, Tomislav Nikoli and Aleksandar Vui,
have changed their political colour, leaving in their wake
a complete vacuum and disarray.
16. Islamophobia is expressed when various Serbian football clubs play
matches against FC Novi Pazar, a football club from the town of the
same name which is the centre for Bosniaks in Serbia. On such occasions
the extreme nationalists among Novi Pazar fans carry Turkish fags and
cheer the name of Turkey, which additionally fuels the Islamophobia of
their rivals.
17. In the past, on the international Internet portal of white racists,
Stormfront, one of the activists of Nacionalni stroj called on the Euro-
pean and American neo-Nazi brethren to support Vojislav eelj im-
prisoned by the ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government) in the Hague
(Baki, 2007: 48).
18. Srbski poredak, Glas srbskog nacional-socijalizma, Nacionalni stroj
program i statut (Serbian order, Voice of Serbian national-socialism,
Nacionalni stroj Program and Statute); http://srbskiporedak.blogspot.
com/2009/07/blog-post_21.html (accessed on 24 June 2012).
At present the most active far-right leaders are Mladen
Obradovi (Obraz) and Goran Davidovi, nicknamed
Fhrer (Nacionalni stroj). They are suffciently fanatical
to be prepared to sacrifce themselves, which, should
they do so in any serious way, may endow them with
the charisma of martyrs, which they currently lack. Other
leaders of far-right movements, Mia Vaci and Ivan M.
Ivanovi, are not as fanatical and hence less prepared to
make sacrifces. This will make it diffcult for them to at-
tract wider support, even though they have a large mem-
bership, among whom there are many disatisfed young
men ready to engage in violence and make a personal
sacrifce. At any rate, unless Vojislav eelj returns from
The Hague, there currently appears to be no leader with
suffcient charisma to rally authoritarian far-rightists.
If we look at the membership fgures for the different
movements, it becomes clear that the largest is still the
SRS, followed by SNP 1389 and SNP Nai. Neo-Nazi and
classically fascist groups are relatively small in number,
but they compensate for their limited membership by
their fanaticism and resulting willingness to engage in
violence and sacrifce themselves. The most socially dan-
gerous aspect of all the organisations mentioned is that
they foster a culture of youth violence. In this context
the various fan groups and skinheads, who have more or
less close links with far-right organisations and provide
them with the necessary army personnel to engage in
clashes with the police or attacks on the Roma, the LGBT
population, the far left and other potentially vulnerable
social groups, should certainly not be ignored.
One of the chief elements motivating far-rightists to act
is their perception of enemies. All of them perceive the
West (i. e. the EU, NATO, USA, IMF), political parties in
Serbia, the far left, and the LGBT population as their
enemies,
19
while they regard Russia not only as a friend,
but as a Slav brother. However, since they are not pow-
erful enough to infict any harm on what they perceive
as the uniform West, and since the LGBT population is
the smallest and most vulnerable, they choose always to
target the Pride Parade as their main arena for violent
activity.
20
Such an event is ideally suited to showing off
19. The perception of Roma and Jews as enemies varies between differ-
ent far-right groups. The neo- Nazis and fascists inevitably see them as
such and rank them high up the list of their own enemies, while other
far-rightists pay less attention to them, even if they do not object to
having these groups on the list of people to attack.
20. In recent years beating up the few members of the far left has frequently
served simply as a warm up for more serious clashes with the police.
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
6
their strength of numbers, since the very real differen-
ces between them are not evident in this context. More-
over, attacking the Pride Parade also serves to attract
broader popular support, since homophobia is wide-
spread among the Serbian population.
21
Currently there is no powerful far-right party in Serbia
that would unite the far right under one umbrella or at-
tract a larger number of more affuent national or foreign
funders. This signifcantly weakens the action potential of
the far right. Moreover, after the defeat of the SRS in the
2012 elections and the SNPs evolution into a moderate
national-conservative party, Serbia today is one of the
countries in Europe with no far-right political party in par-
liament. While this may seem encouraging, it also poses
the problem of monitoring developments on the far-right
scene, which in times of crisis may slip out of state con-
trol. At this particular moment, however, the far-rightists
lack both money (which they seek mainly in Russia) and a
strong organisation and charismatic leader. It goes with-
out saying that the return of a charismatic martyr from
The Hague might signifcantly change this.
However, although the internal action potential of the
far right at this time is relatively weak, external circum-
stances favour it. Should such circumstances last for a
longer period of time, then the far right internal action
potential may become stronger. For if it were to receive
more internal or foreign funding, or were a strong,
charismatic and demagogical personality to emerge as
leader, this might simultaneously boost membership and
make the organisation more effective.
The main problem may be said to lie with the Serbian ju-
diciary. While the police have been fairly successful in de-
fning and discovering far-right groups and their activists,
the judiciary has contributed to the boom in the far right
and criminals related to it through lengthy court proceed-
ings that often result in acquittals or lenient sentences.
Unfortunately, even the judiciarys recent attempts to
ban organisations such as fan groups like Alcatraz, Obraz,
Nacionalni stroj, and SNP 1389 will probably turn out to
21. At the frst Pride Parade in Serbia in 2001 participants were brutally
beaten while the police looked on in silence. In 2010 the Parade took
place with unprecedented security measures and there were major cla-
shes between the far-rightists, who also included some secondary school
students, and the police. Eventually, in 2011 and 2012, Minister of the
Interior Ivica Dai banned the Pride Parade considering it too great a
security risk. In all instances the Serbian Orthodox Church actively con-
demned the Parade and both indirectly and directly aided those engaging
in violence against the participants.
be counter-productive, because rather than disappearing,
the far right will simply regroup to form new organisa-
tions, such as the recently formed Srbska akcija. More-
over, the police will fnd it more diffcult to carry out sur-
veillance of such groups, while disillusioned Serbian youth
will probably be attracted by the forbidden fruit of or-
ganisations that are illegal. This situation is certainly ag-
gravated by mass unemployment, which currently stands
at 25.5 percent of the overall population of working age
and 50 percent of people under 30 years of age. Hence
there is an enormous potential of rage to be vented.
To make this grim situation even worse, a very special sort
of capitalism reigns in Serbia in which connections with
politicians are all-important for doing business. A class of
oligarchs has evolved in which the wealthiest people have
close links with the leaderships of political parties, and a
career in politics is the most effective shortcut to getting
rich quickly. The best illustration of the nature of Serbian
capitalism is the fact that the anti-monopolies act (Law
on Protection of Competition) was passed only in 2008.
Under such circumstances, justifed bitterness against the
oligarchic economic and political system may easily turn
into support for far-right or far-left political movements.
In addition, hurt national pride suffered after the de-
feats in the 1990s wars between the Yugoslav successor
states, the bombing of the FR Yugoslavia by NATO and
the ipso facto if not formal loss of Kosovo as the mythi-
cal holy land of the Serbs are also a very important
factor. An unemployed young man may easily fall under
the infuence of anti-globalist, anti-Western, and even
anti-pluralistic far-right demagogy which totally neglects
the question of responsibility and guilt for the wars.
Finally, if the far right becomes stronger in the EU as
a whole, then the Serbian far right would increase its
chances of attracting stronger support. Moreover,
should offcial Russia or powerful funders from this
country start to provide more signifcant fnancial back-
ing for such movements,
22
looking for more capable
leaders from their ranks, there could be a very danger-
ous strengthening of the Serbian far right. Thus, the
power of the far right in the EU and the behaviour of of-
fcial Russia are the two factors most likely to strengthen
the action potential of the far right in Serbia.
22. Although there is some evidence that some fnancial assistance has
been provided by various Russian organisations, as far as the author
knows, no signifcant amounts have been donated to date.
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
7
5. Measures to Restrain the Far-Right
An easy and initial countermeasure could be a change in
the election system designed to diminish the infuence
of political leaders and strengthen trust in the political
system. This should consist of legally binding bottom-
up processes for the selection of candidates, giving
party members the right to choose which candidates
should appear on the electoral list.
In terms of economic policy, efforts should be under-
taken to introduce fairer market competition and to re-
duce unemployment in order to build trust in the whole
economic system. Together with a developed, more ef-
fcient judiciary system and appropriate penal policies
sentences are currently too lenient, especially with re-
spect to economic crime this would rebuild trust in the
political system as a whole.
In addition, instead of trying to ban the activities of
far-right movements and political parties (which in the
past has only led to their regrouping), the Serbian state
should try to infltrate them more effciently using Secu-
rity Intelligence Agency (BIA) agents. These efforts could
include measures to divide far-right movements as well
as close cooperation between the security and intelli-
gence services of Serbia with their counterparts in the
EU and Russia, in a bid to uncover the external ties of
Serbian right-wing groups.
Communicating the historical failures of the far right to
Serbian society via the mass media, in schools and to-
gether with NGOs as educational actors would be an-
other way of restraining far-right attitudes. Educational
campaigns to counter homophobia, Islamophobia, and
all forms of racism (particularly anti-Semitism and anti-
Ziganism), as well as to teach people about the use of
scapegoat tactics in history are other measures that
should be taken.
JOVO BAKIC | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
8
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About the author
Jovo Bakic is assistant professor at the Faculty of Philosophy
at Belgrade University
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