LAMBINO VS COMELEC, G.R. No.

174153

TOPIC: AMENDMENT AND REVISION

FACTS:
- February 2006: petitioners Raul L. Lambino and company (Lambino Group)
gathered signatures for an initiative to change the 1987 Constitution by shifting the
present Bicameral-Presidential System into a Unicameral-Parliamentary System
(through modifications of sections of Art VI (Legislative Dept) and Art VII (Executive
Dept)).
- On August of the same year, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite to ratify their initiative petition under Section 5 (b, c) and Sec. 7 of R.A.
No. 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act)
- Peititioners alleged that the their initiative petition had the support of 6.3 million
individuals, consisting of at least 12% of all registered voters, and each legislative
district represented by at least 3%.
- The proposition in said petition reads as follows: DO YOU APPROVE THE
AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
- The COMELEC denied the petition, citing the decision in Santiago vs COMELEC
wherein RA 6735 was delcared inadequate to implement the initative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution
- CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: Lambino Group alleged that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition and claimed that
Santiago is not a binding precedent binds only the parties to that case. They also
claimed that their petition deserves cognizance because it is the will of the
sovereign people.
- Other groups and individuals sought intervention, with some alleging that the nature
of the changes sought by the petitionerss are revisions and not mere amendements
as provided under Sec. 2, Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of
the Constitution on amendements to the Constitution through a peoples
initative.
2. W/N this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initative clause on proposals to amende the Constitution
3. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition
RULING:
- THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT. The Lambino Group failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution in conducting a peoples initiative. The Court
declared that there is no need to revisit the Santiago decision because the said
failure of the petitioners alone is enough to constitute a ground for dismissal.

1. The Initiative Petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art XVII of the
Constitution

Sec. 2 provides that Amendements to this Constitution may likewise

be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition
o The Court consulted the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the phrase directly propsoed by the people through
initative upon a petition. The deliberations provided that the phrase
means that the draft of the proposed changes must be ready and
shown to the people before they sign.
o The full text must be shown to the people before they affix their
signatures on the petition. Otherwise, this constitutes a form of fraud
or deception.
o NOT A SINGLE WORD, PHRASE, OR SENTENCEOF THE
CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE PETITIONERS APPEARED ON
THE SIGNATURE SHEET. Petitioners alleged that they printed
100,000 copies of the full text for distribution but even so, the amount
is not sufficient to inform the number of people necessary for
ratification.
2. The initiative violates Sec 2, Art XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives.
o Sec. 1 of Art XVII provides that Amendements and revisions may be
proposed by Congress or a constitutional conventions. Sec. 2
provides that amendements may likewise be proposed by the people
through initiative. Thiis reflects a clear intention of the framers to make
a distinction between the modes of amendement and revision, limiting
peoples initiative only to the former.
o The SC took into consideration a two-part test established by
California courts to determine whether a change is a revision or an
amendment the quantitative test (whether the change is so
extensive that it changes the constitution in its entirety) and qualitative
test (whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of the basic government plan). The Court ruled that the
changes propsoed by the Lambino group amounts to a revision
since shifting the form of government from bicameral to unicameral
would radically alter the framework of the government set by the
Constitution. Therefore, the mode peoples initative cannot be
used to enact such changes since said mode is limited only to
amendments.
o

3. A revisit to the Santiago case is not necessary.

o An affirmation or reversal of the Santiago case will not change the
outcome of the present petition.
o Assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement amendments of the
Constitution, this will not change the result because the petitioners
failed to comply with the basic requirements set forth in the
Constitution.
4. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petitioners Inititative.
o The COMELEC en banc merely followed the SCs previous rulings in
Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and

Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC and no grave abuse of discretion is

attributable.
____________________________________________________________________________
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

TOPIC: STAGES OF AMENDMENT AND REVISION PROPOSAL STAGE

FACTS
- Dec. 6, 1996: private respondent Atty Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by Peoples
Inititative (DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION
8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?). Delfin alleged that
he is a member of the Movement for Peoples Inititative, a group intending to
exercise the power to directly proposed amendments under Sec. 2, Art, XVII of the
Constitution.
- The exercise of peoples initiative shall be conducted under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and on national and local laws)
requires that signature stations shall be established all over the country with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, whi shall verify the signatures.
- According to Delfin, the Petition for Initiative will be first submitted to the people,
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, then formally
submitted to the COMELEC.
- The COMELEC issued an order: (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition (including the proposed amendment) and the publication of the notice of
hearing in three (3) newspapers of general circulation not later than Dec. 9, 1996, (b)
setting the hearing on Dec. 12, 1996, 10 AM.
- During the said hearing, Senator Raul S. Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC
- Dec. 18, 1996: petitioners (Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
Maria Isabel Ongpin) filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the following
arguments:
a. The Constitutional Provision on peoples initiative to amend it requires an
enabling law. No such law has been passed (Senate Bill No. 1290 An
Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative filed by Santiago herself, was still pending at the time)
b. RA 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, on local legislation. But the law fails to provide for any
subtitle on the first one. The deliberate omission indicates that the
matter was left to some future law. It fails to state the proper parties
who may file the peititon, the appropriate agency who may receive
such, the contents of the petition and on its publication, the ways
and means of signature gathering, the role of the COMELEC, etc.
c. RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of a law after publication. This must
mean it does not include constitutional amendments because they take
effect upon ratification and not publication

d. COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires since only Congress is

authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law on initiative
to amend.
e. The proposed change constitutes a revision and peoples initiative is
limited only to amendment (invoked statement of Fr. Joaquin Bernas: it
would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure)
f. No funds have been appropriated or realigned for the purpose
g. ALSO: re-registration of voters would amount to expenses of from the
treasury of at least P180 million. Hence, the issue is of transcendental
importance and the petition should be settled promptly
h. Contention of Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol and Konstitusyon (DIK) and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
(MABINI):
- The private respondents argued
a. All expenses are for the account of respondent Delfin and his volunteers
b. The pending petition before the COMELEC is only on the signature
gathering, which by law, COMELEC is duty-bound to supervise closely
(Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC). The petition is only on
the Initiatory Pleading and not yet for the actual Petition for Initiative
c. RA 6735 is an enabling law that implements the power of peoples
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Subtitles are not
requirements for the validity of a law.
d. COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2300 was upheld in the case of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC. It is not ultra vires because Sec 2,
Art IX-C of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations related to contests, plebiscites,
initative, referendum, and recall. Sec. 20 of RA 6735 also empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
Acts purposes
e. Even Senate Bill No. 1290 contains provisions delegating to the
COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the acts purposes
f. The proposed changes (extension of term limits)are only an amendment
since they change only a few specific provisions.
ISSUES
1) W/N RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution and, if so, whether it is adequate enough
to cover such system.
RULING
- Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution provides that amendmentds may be directly
proposed by the people, but that Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right. Fr. Joaquin Bernas also stated that without
implementing legislation, Section 2 cannot operate. Hence, the provision is not selfexercutory and an enabling law is necessary
- The SC also consultd the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, which
clearly reflected that the framers intended Peoples Initiative to be limited only to
amendments and that the implementation (including its procedure) was left to the
legislature.
- RA 6735 is NOT in compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide
for the implementation of the exercise of Peoples Initiative:

a. Sec. 2 of said act states that the people have the power to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, In whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions. It is clear that Constitution was added only as
an afterthought because the people cannot propose, enact, approve, or
reject the fundamental law, only the last three of the enumeration.
b. Sec. 5(c0 provides for the contents of a petition for a law sought to be
enacted, approved, rejected, amended, repealed. While no similar provision
exists under the initiative on Constitution.
c. The lack of subtitle provided for initiative on the Constitution indicates that the
main thrust of the act is initiative and referendum of national and local laws. If
Congress had intended to include initiative on the Constitution, an
appropriate subtitle would have been included.
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned

____________________________________________________________________________
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

TOPIC: AMENDMENT AND REVISION JUDICIAL REVIEW

FACTS:
- September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 991, calling for a
national referendum on October of the same year for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays to resolve issues of: (a) martial law, (b) the interim assembly and its
replacement, (d) the replacements powers, period of existence, and (e) the length
for the exercise by the President and his present powers.
- September 22, 1976, issuance of P.D. No. 1031, amending the previous Decree,
declaring that the provisions of P.D. No. 229 will be applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite previouslt mentioned
- September 22, 1976: P.D. 1033 was issued, stating the questions to be included in
the referendum-plebiscite (First, whether the people want martial law to be continued
and second, if they approve of the list of amendments attached, replacing the interim
National Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa and declaring the
incumbent President as Prime Minister with legislative powers until martial law
is lifted).
- CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: September 27, 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and
Pablito V. Sanidad (father and son) filed for a Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction
enjoining the COMELEC from holding the referendum-plebiscite. Their contention
was that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
- CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT: The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
COMELEC, maintained that: (a) petitioners have no standing to sue, (b) the
issue is political in nature, and (c) at this stage of the transition period, only
the President can exercise constituent power.
ISSUES
1. W/N the case may be subjected to judicial review/ W/N the issue constitutes a
political question and, therefore is beyond cognizance of the courts
2. W/N Marcos, the incumbent president, can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.

RULING:
- THE PETITIONS ARE DEVOID OF MERIT
a. Jusiciability of the question raised
o The petitioners Sanidad possess legal standing (locus standi).
Statutes may be contested by those who will sustain direct injury as a
result of their enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined. In this
case, P.D. No. 991 appropriates Php5,000,000 for its purposes, while
P.D. No. 1031 appropriates Php8,000,000. The interest of the
petitioners in the lawful expenditure ofpublic money sufficiently clothes
them with personality as litigants.
o The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises
a judicial question, especially in this case where the power normally
exercised by one branch (legislative) is exercised by another
(executive). Under Sec. 15, Art XVI of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments resides in the interim National
Assembly during the period of transition. The fact that the current
circumstances deviate from said provision raises an issue of
constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees, thus making the issue on
that may be recognized by the courts.
b. May the President validly propose amendments to the Constitution
o Concentraion of government powers in the President during times of
national crisis is a valid act. Sec. 3 (pars. 1, 2) of the Transitory
Provisions provide that the President shall continue to exercise the
powers cested in the Presidene tna dht eprime Minister until he calls
upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and
interim Prime Minister.
o In the same article, the discretion of when to call the initial convening
ot the interim National Assembly lies in the President. Also, the people
already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly through
referendums. With only the executive and Judicial branches in
operation, it it imperative of the President to act as an agent of the
people (since the SC does not have the power to legislate).
o The referendum-plebiscite also serves as a resounding call to the
people to exercise their soverign power.

__________________________________________________________________________
OSMENA VS. COMELEC (1998)

TOPIC: REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

FACTS
- Petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of Sec. 11(b) of RA
6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge print space/air time for campaigning and other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC.
- Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmena is a candidate for President of the Philippines and
fellow petitioner, Pablo P. Garcia is a governor of Cebu province, seeking reelection.

Petitioners are questioning the validity of the decision in National Press Club v.
COMELEC (1992)
- NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of the questioned provision against claims that
it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. Petitioners claim that the ruling, in
the five years since the decision, has had undesirable effects and worked to the
disadvantage of the poor candidates who cannot afford other mediums of
campaigning in contrast to the more affluent opponents.
- Petitioners had no empirical data to support their claim.
ISSUES
- W/N there is an actual controversy for the Supreme Court to decide.
RULING
- PETITION DISMISSED. THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO DECIDE,
ONLY AN ACADEMIC DISCUSSION TO HOLD.
- Argumentation was made at the theoretical and not the practical level. They
were unable to show proof on the events that they claimed to have invalidated the
decision in the NPC case. They do not complain that they have been disadvantaged
because of the law.
- The NPC case was, however, revisited by the SC. There is no ad ban. It prohibits
the sale and donation of print space and air time, but also mandates the COMELEC
to procure and itself allocate to the candidates the space and time in the media (this
is in accordance and harmonized with the Omnubus Election Code provisions which
mandate the COMELEC to allocate newspaper space and radio and television time
for candidiates).
___________________________________________________________________________
A. Case Title
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, Petitioner, vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Respondent.
(2010, Nachura, J.)
B. Topic
Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; Proper
Party (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suit requisites
C. Facts of the Case
A petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.
Respondents Contention (through OSG):
The OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:
Whether petitioner has locus standi to file the instant case.
Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a
violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12,
Article VIII of the !987 Constitution.
Petitioners Contention:
In his Reply,7 petitioner maintains that:
1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental
importance of the issues raised therein;

2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution; and
3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
D.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner has the locus standi to file instant petition?
E.
Ruling
No. On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained
of.9 The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr: 10 "whether the party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult questions."11 Until and unless such actual or threatened
injury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise the
constitutional question.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which
tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure
to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional
acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear
absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts power of judicial
review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Petition dismissed.
F. Note:
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a
generalized interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues.
Paragraph 2 of the petition reads:
2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public
funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioners
humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the
legal standing to file this petition.
But even if his submission is valid, petitioners standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in
the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe,
Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above,
requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. 14 Such
appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity
to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution.

A. Case Title
Blas F. Ople, Petitioner, vs. Ruben D. Torres, et. al, Respondents (1998, Puno, J.)
B. Topic
Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; Proper
Party (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suit requisites
C. Facts of the Case
A petition to review a decision of the Executive Secretary and the Members of the IntroAgency Creating Committee.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12, 1996
entitled Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference System or commonly
known as National ID System.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the said executive issuance on two important grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
D. Issue
Whether or not the petitioner has the locus standi to assail the validity of Administrative
Order 308.
E. Ruling:
YES. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our
sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance
of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner
can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds
to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by
the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for
the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As
early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of
a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents
show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of
the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we
tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
Petition is granted and A.O. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

A. Case Title
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo, Petitioner, vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, Respondent (2010, Mendoza, J.)
B. Topic
Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisites of Judicial Review; Proper
Party (Locus Standi); Taxpayer suit requisites
C. Facts of the Case
At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the
issuance of EO No. 1, two cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and
constitutionality of the said EO.
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo
in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision in
the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission
The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. PetitionersLegislators argue that the said Order is unconstitutional because the creation of a public office
lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the
President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices
created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public offices
within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. According to the OSG, the
Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to
create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated
functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in
line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The OSG concludes
that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
D. Issue
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1
E. Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners-legislators petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to
take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of
their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It emphasizes that the funds
to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds
already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the
commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents
power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his
clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances
in defense of the Constitution.
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters
of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because
the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies
with overreaching significance to society.
Petition is granted.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Nachura, J.
I agree with the ponencia that, given our liberal approach in David v. Arroyo 2 and
subsequent cases, petitioners have locus standi to raise the question of constitutionality of the
Truth Commissions creation.
Dissenting Opinion of Carpio-Morales, J.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, with legal standing as legislators, cannot properly assert
the equal protection claim of the previous administration. While legislators have locus standi in
certain cases, their legal standing as such is recognized only insofar as the assailed issuance
affects their functions as legislators. In the absence of a claim that the issuance in question
violated the rights of petitioner-legislators or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the
Legislature, they have no legal standing to institute the present action in their capacity as
members of Congress.8
No doubt, legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action upon
a claim of usurpation of legislative power.9 That is why, not every time that a Senator or a
Representative invokes the power of judicial review, the Court automatically clothes them
with locus standi.10 The Court examines first, as the ponencia did, if the petitioner raises an
issue pertaining to an injury to Congress as an institution or a derivative injury to members
thereof,11 before proceeding to resolve that particular issue.

The peculiarity of the locus standi of legislators necessarily confines the adjudication of their
petition only on matters that tend to impair the exercise of their official functions
Breach of the equal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-legislators on
behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past administration, has nothing to do with
the impairment of the powers of Congress.
A. Case Title
Francisco Zandueta, petitioner, vs. Sixto De La Costa, respondent (1938, Villa-Real, J.)
B. Topic
Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Requisite of Judicial Review; Earliest
Opportunity
C. Facts of the Case
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against
the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to
be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is
entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with
costs to said respondent.
Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila.
He received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth Act No. 145) to
discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4th Judicial District with the
authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.
The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly.
The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4 th
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.
Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is
unconstitutional.
D. Issue
Whether or not Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by which the
new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside over
the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
E. Ruling
No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the constitutionality of C.A. No.
145. When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a
judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to
preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of
the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of
another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of
his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and
cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he
claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso
jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________________
A. Case Title
Manila Motor Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellee, vs. Manuel T. Flores, defendantappellant (1956, Bengzon, J.)
B. Topic (based on the syllabus)
Introduction; The Constitution and the Courts; Declaration of Unconstitutionality; Effects;
Orthodox View v. Modern View
C. Facts of the Case
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to
recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which
fell due in September 1941.
Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954.
The complaint was dismissed.
On Appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention that
the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting
the time during which said laws were in operation three years and eight months1 the ten
year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954.
Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on
the merits.
Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of
suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional. He cites jurisprudence
holding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never
been passed, and no rights can be built upon it.
D. Issue
Whether or not a statute adjudged as unconstitutional is inoperative as if it had never
been passed and no rights can be built upon it.
E. Ruling
No. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no right,
create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it, there are several
instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation or qualified its effects "since
the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
Judgment affirmed.

Province of Camarines Sur v.s The Court of Appeals

Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase
or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm
for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin
and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.
The Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The
San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss

the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order
dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of
Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not
prosper.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i)
denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990,
denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the
authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General
stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need
for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the SangguniangPanlalawigan
of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the contention and decision of the Court of Appeals to set aside the
trial courts order allowing the Province of Camarines Surs expropriation of private
lands is valid.
2. Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is
subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
implementer of the agrarian reform program.
Held:
1. No, the Court of Appeals decision to set aside the order of the trial that allows the
Province to expropriate private lands is untenable.
2. No, the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs do not require the prior approval of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (of DAR).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the Province is ultimately for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur.Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen
and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution.

What does public use mean? There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation
of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of
the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.
In terms of expropriation and the power of eminent domain: it is the submission of the Province
of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by
the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly
Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a
parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not contend thatthe local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,
there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control
of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

National Housing Authority v.s. Honorable Pastor P. Reyes

Facts:
The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private respondents, for the
expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of
25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Quirino Austria, and
needed for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project.
Thereafter, private respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the
amount of P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed for
taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
42 .
There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section
92 of Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: "Basis for payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings. In determining such compensation when private property is acquired
by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Petitioner's submission is that the owner's
declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just
compensation for the respondents' property, respondents thus being precluded from
withdrawing any amount more than P1,400.00.
Respondent Judge, however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978 which, according to
petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws.
The Court issued the following resolution wherein the Court Resolved without giving due
course to the petition to require the respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. The Court further Resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court. The
comment was thereafter submitted by private respondents Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria.
Private respondents stress that while there may be basis for the allegation that
respondent Judge did not follow Presidential Decree No. 76the matter is still subject to his

final disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his
judicial discretion in the light of the constitutional provisions.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the decision and contention of Justice Reyes incontravening the
petition of NHA regarding their interpretation of just compensation is valid.
Held:
1. No, the decision and contention of Justice Reyes in contravening the petition of the
NHA regarding their interpretation of just compensation is NOT valid.
The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in
subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional
provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of
his property. Whatever is stipulated in the provisions of the presidential decree regarding just
compensation, if couched in clear and unequivocal terms, must be applied and interpreted by
the Court as it is. The function of the judiciary in matters of just compensation should be the
application of the clear provisions. The decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally, calls
for obedience. It is repeating a common place to state that on a matter where the applicable law
speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command.
Therefore, Justice Reyes cannot claim validly that the rule on just compensation has been
grossly taken out of context, for the provision is clear in matters of its definite meaning.
In view of the urgency of the housing problem the various decrees mentioned earlier were
issued for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in a financial position to cope
with such basic human need which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, and
according to the express language of the Constitution, is an obligation cast upon the State.

1.
REPUBLIC vs. CA (Just Compensation)

G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square meters
of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the
Philippines project.

Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable
value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the property and
ordering the plaintiff to pay thedefendants the just compensation for the property.

It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation
with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the court issued a
writ of execution for the implementation thereof.

Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated land
to the Bulacan State University.
Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case
until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount
P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.

The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as
previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the
expropriated property.

The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979 Decision to
be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the
1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioners Motion to Permit
Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property

2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question

HELD:

1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.
Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as
being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the
power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many
respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case
so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or
implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the
property whenever the public interest so requires it.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by
filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use,
and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These
twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by
effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining public
use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public,
and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being
subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the
individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual
may be devoted.

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of thefacilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by
petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose
originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment.
The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the
condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use
of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.

2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It
might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which
the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
The grant of the power of eminent domainto local governments under Republic Act No. 7160
cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the
legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must,
by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated
power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior,
domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years
after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount.

Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment
in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold
to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled
to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for
which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises'."

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the
recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was
denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner
was merely given the relief of recoveringcompensation for his property computed at its market
value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides
not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the
property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound.
Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the
property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee
indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment,
thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for
the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the
right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which
the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon
the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same
argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for
payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become
final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein
petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care
of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of
the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and
possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market valueof the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property
as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include

interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position
as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value
of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings
and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to
be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in
case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the
contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a
contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into
account to alter the value of the currency.

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it
being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just
compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at
P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date
of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully
paid.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (Private Property) - 1969

Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual
relations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from the
US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines of
PLDT and vice versa.

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by
renting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the
many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.

Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone
service where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's
station to and from local residents.

PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only
for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT
gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which
PLDT did.

Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use
of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms
and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract to continue the usage of
their private property for government use.

Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices
to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.

However, when the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known
that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature. The
acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff
had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the
defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time
and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at
liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.

Alunan vs MirasolGR No. 108399 July 31, 1997

Facts:
LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7members,
a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections wereto be held 30 days
after the next local elections. The Local Government Code wasenacted January 1, 1992.
The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELECprovided
guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,1992, which also
placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the technical
assistance of COMELEC. After postponements, they wereheld December 4, 1992.
Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21registered,
15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passedthe necessary
appropriations for the elections.
September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolutionexempting Manila
from holding SK elections because the elections previously held onMay 26, 1990 were to
be considered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILGacted on a letter by Santiago,

acting President of the KB (Kabataang Barangay) CityFederation of Manila and a member of the
City Council of Manila, which stated thatelections for the Kabataang Barangay were held
on May 26, 1990. In this resolution,DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt those
barangay chapters whichconducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1,
1992 from theforthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended to
coincidewith the terms of those elected in the SK elections
Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ngKabataan, filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had nopower to amend the
resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs,and that DILG denied them
equal protection of laws.
RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing theorder of
the DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-electionactivities in order to
implement the general elections. The case was reraffled to adifferent branch of the same court,
and the new judge held that DILG had no powerto exempt Manila from holding SK elections,
because that power rests solely inCOMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not
previously heldelections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption of
Manilaviolated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that previouslyheld
elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections
.Issue:Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and
supervisionover the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELECWhether DILG can
exempt an LGU from holding SK electionsHeld:
Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK elections.
oCOMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election forSK officers are
not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same waythat contests involving elections of
SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
o Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that theprovision in the
Omnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC shall haveexclusive appellate jurisdiction
over contest involving elective barangayofficials only refer to elective barangay officials under
the laws in force at thetime the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.
oMoreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to theframework of detailed
and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is argued that no
barangays were named in theresolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because they
merelyused the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating exemptedbarangays.
Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be curative, and thusshould be given retroactive effect, giving the
mayor the authority to callelections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and void
for beingconducted without authority.
o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not bedetermined from the
records of this case. The mere showing that there wereother barangays that held KB elections
during the set period but were notexempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to prove
that violation.An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan did not haveelections
in 1992 because they held elections on January 1, 1988.

____________________________________________________________________________
KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19,
2006 & June 20, 2006
LAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that
we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated
by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in
four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January
24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997,
we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our

sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance
of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
4
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can
also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to
implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by
the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated
cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for
themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres
has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the
rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.

LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSGR NO. L-280892Petioner: BARA

LIDASANRespondent: COMELECFACTS

On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill (HB) 1247, now known as
Republic Act (RA) 4790 An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sury. The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur includes: Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang,Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung.It also includes:
barrios of Togaig and Madalum (both situated inBuldon, Cotabato) and barriosof Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tangabao, Bara Lidasan, resident and
taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementation of RA
4790, questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING

RA 4790 declared a NULL and VOID Constitutional requirement aforestated that no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the billConstitutional provision contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:

1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenoussubjects.

2.The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify thelegislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. It violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.
It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover,
It did not inform thecitizens of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato that part of their territory is being
taken awayfrom their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of
Lanaodel Sur.o
The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the titlemisleading
and deceptive
Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of Dianaton, itis still
unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion.
Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its
totality

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
Topic: POLICE POWER

FACTS:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in
CA G.R. SP No. 39193, which nullified the write of the write of preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Bramch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931.
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of
land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located
in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot:
a. Be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one singlefamily residential building will be constructed thereon.
b. The BUYER shall not erect any sign or billboard on the roof for advertising
purposes.
c. No single-family residential building shall be erected until the building plans,
specification have been approved by the seller.
d. Restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until
December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate
These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of
title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive
Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial
area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia
Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp. The lease contract did not specify the
purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story
commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29,
1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the
motion.
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01
classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance
must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police
power.

Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot
were duly annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must
prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before
the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.

ISSUE/S:
W/N the CA properly exercised police power
RULING:
Yes, the Court held that, in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the trial
court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning
ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since private
respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said
ordinance should be given prospective application only citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 162 SCRA 390 (1988).
Laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power.
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
those already in existence. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
court held that, MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
The trial courts reliance on the Co vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was
agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not specifically provide that it shall have
retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within
the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature, and stated with respect
to agricultural areas covered that the zoning ordinance should be given prospective
operation only. The area in this case involves not agricultural but urban residential land.
Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in
Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.
The instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No.
39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Term:
Lex prospicit, non respicit- The law looks forward, not backward.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC. vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

G.R. No. L- 59234 September 30, 1982
Topic: Test of Valid Exercise
Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of
the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
convenience.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum

Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable
units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated
taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience,
and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter
believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of
his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car
beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby
promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1.

As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn
from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In
the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted
for registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public
service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for
registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a sixyear lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 Model 1974
1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from
public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates
shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
Transportation Commission. For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the
rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside MetroManila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and
only after the date has been determined by the
Board.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as
well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

ISSUES:
1. W/N, petitioners rights to equal protection of the law was violated
2. W/N, the BOT has valid exercise of power
RULINGS:
On equal protection of laws
No, the petitioners rights to equal protection of laws was not violated. The court held
that, As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". The Board's reason for
enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of
other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a
substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.
On valid exercise of power
Yes, the BOT validly exercised their power.
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise
of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section,
the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. Apart from its own
investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and
assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the
Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be
able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or
program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board
gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of
any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require
the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be
affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural
due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of
other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public
conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired
by the BOT.
The Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
Term:
Equal protection of laws - the right of all persons to have the same access to the law and
courts and to be treated equally by the law and courts, both in procedures and in the substance
of the law.

US vs LYNAH (1903)

TOPIC: ELEMENTS OF POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: TAKING

When the United States government appropriates property which it does not claim as its
own, it does so under an implied contract that it will pay the value of the property it so
appropriates.
FACTS
- Congress constructed a dam on the Savannah river, which led to the flooding of
private lends, severely depreciating said lands value. Congress agreed that said
land did not belong to the government but denied that the workd produced the
alleged industry and destruction.
- Said construction was lawful and aimed at a public purpose improvement of the
harbors of the Savanahh and making the river a more navigable channel for vessels
- Said land was used a rise plantation. Its location immediately adjacent to the river
served as a convenient irrigation system.With the construction of the dam, the area
was flooded and rendered useless (value prior to flooding: 10,000 dollars)
ISSUES
- W/N the flooding of land so as to render it completely valueless constitutes an
appropriation on the part of the government?
RULING
- YES, it constitutes taking. It is not limited to the adjudication of the land to the
government. It is sufficient that the acts of the government (related to public use)
lead to the owner of the private property not being able to use the land to the same
extent as before (diminished use and value results).
- THE PRIVATE OWNERS OF SAID PROPERTY ARE ENTITLED TO
COMPENSATION.

When the government of the United States, by the construction of a dam or

other public works, so floods lands belonging to an individual as to ttotally
destroy its value, there is taking of private property
If the US appropriates to a public land which they admit was private property, it is
necessary that, by implied contract, the government must pay value to the owner