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International Journal of Social Inquiry

Volume 6 Number 1 2013 pp. 91-112

Globalization and the Bhopal Disaster:

A Criminogenic Inquiry
M. Raymond Izarali 1
ABSTRACT
Globalization has had progress and despairs, and has also opened the door to heated
debates. The trend has been to globalize property rights. With this comes the sense
that duties to civil society in the way of harm prevention, justice, and protection of
the natural environment are easily side-stepped. The Bhopal Disaster of 1984
remains the worlds worst industrial disaster and worth revisiting so as to
understand the culture of corporate behavior in disclaiming and side-stepping
certain vital social responsibilities. This paper revisits the Bhopal Disaster and
highlights elements that ought to keep us vigilant about the path globalization takes.
Keywords: Bhopal disaster, capitalism, social harm, union carbide
corporation, globalization, corporate crime.

INTRODUCTION
Globalization has come to mean different things to different people,
different countries, and even different disciplines of study. How the
countries of the Third World, for example, conceive of globalization may be
asymmetric to that of developed countries. How the poor reflect on what
they are told to be a process of globalization is unlikely to concur with the
1

Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.

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way the affluent does. The way elements of globalization are taught in a
sociology or political science course is likely to be different from what one
would expect of them in an economics or international finance course. There
is, in other words, a lot to be said about Anthony Giddens observation
when he says that globalization has been very uneven (Giddens, 1999).
Despite the myriad scholarship on the subject-matter (Held, 2004; Singer,
2004; Truillot, 2002; Shiva, 1999; Howard-Hassmann, 2010; Bhalla, 2002;
Stiglitz 2008; Payne 2008; Hill & Rapp 2009; Ezeonu 2008), there is still no
consensus on the value of globalization. There are controversies over how
the benefits and harms of globalization are measured and whether it is
premature to make a conclusive statement on the matter (Singer, 2004;
Howard-Hassmann 2010; Stiglitz 2008).
In the contemporary setting, although the Internet and the technologization
of industries with the aid of computers have revolutionized much of the
world, globalization in social and political debates tends to mean the
economic processes that characterize it and indeed the impact it has on
social life. Specifically, the economic aspects tend to take the form of a
pattern towards a global integration of the economies of the world through a
fundamental liberalization of trade and markets, but its social (and political)
impacts center on whether people are employed or jobless, whether they are
included/excluded or facilitated, harmed or respected and protected,
whether they are made better off or worse off, whether they are dealt with
inequitably or appropriately, whether they are dispossessed of ethical
sovereignty or maintain autonomy, and so on. Hence the idea of, and
movements for, social justice in respect of globalization. So conceived, this
paper revisits the Bhopal Disaster that took place in Bhopal, India in 1984 to
help re-acquaint us with some of the vital variables that must be given
attention in discussions about globalization and the behaviour of corporate
entities and international financial institutions.
Corporate Impunity, IFIs and Power Politics
One of the problem zones for globalization in its current phase has been the
equities available for corporate leverage while social groups and other
constituents in developing as well as developed countries complain about
being undermined both politically and economically. Since developing
countries are by definition not in good economic standing, they are in a
compromised position in addressing issues of foreign investment. On the
one hand, such governments have to demonstrate to their societies that they
are making efforts to keep their people employed and thus be seen by their
people as serving some positive value. On the other hand, they cannot risk

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being viewed as uncooperative in dealing with international financial
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Otherwise they could be black-listed
in the trade market and among the IFIs (Singer, 2004; Stiglitz 2008). The rich
and powerful countries on the world stage tend to approach international
issues not on the basis of what is fair but rather on the basis of how it best
advances their own interests (Stiglitz 2008).
Remarking on his role as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
during the Clinton administration, Joseph Stiglitz (2008, 177) claims that
when it came to international issues: The question was: What is best for the
United States? What is best for American companies? The contradiction this
generates comes through in the kinds of policies adopted. In other words,
international policies are geared towards the benefit of those who have sway
in the real world of power politics and so if developing countries are seen as
uncooperative, they risk consequences both at the level of the IFIs and in the
global corporate arena (Stiglitz 2002, 2008; Singer 2004). There has already
been much evidence of this in respect of trade related intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) where powerful multinational corporations insisted that their
governments discipline poor countries through harsh trade restrictions (Hill
& Rapp, 2009; Singer 2004; Howard Hassmann 2010).
The history of judgements at, and grievances filed with, the WTO suggests
that the WTO has been controlled by the powerful countries on the world
stage (Singer 2004). Therefore, measures taken by the WTO tend to be
slanted in favour of rich, developed countries (Singer, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002;
Izarali, 2011). In such a context, transnational corporations are seen as
having a disproportionate level of power whereas developing countries are
relegated to a despondent state of facilitating lax business conditions
(McMurtry, 1998). Certainly, as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (2010) has
pointed out, one must not lose sight also of the extent to which corruption in
developing countries played a role in perpetuating destitute or unfavourable
conditions for such societies. That said, developed countries are not exempt
from receiving the short end of the stick by corporate entities, only that
developing countries are more vulnerable and suffer a history of
exploitation (McMurtry, 1998). Of course, some such powers are also
enjoyed by non-transnational and family run corporations as well.
Globalization & Criminology
One of the gaps in discussions on globalization is the limited focus on the
issue by criminologists. Although one might plausibly argue that
globalization has been with us since time immemorial ranging from the

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movement of people to the transmission of knowledge, from the spread of
cuisines to the exchange of goods across oceans there has been a noticeable
gap in the literature from the mainstream criminology quarters when it
comes to globalization and issues of crime and justice. This is the case
despite the myriad cases of social injustices raised by and for globalization in
the times in which we live. There are, for example, issues of the
maltreatment of labour in places like Asia and Latin America, harmful
product quality, inequitable trade arrangements brokered by rich countries
with poor countries, political oppression in trade arrangements and so on.
Yet, surprisingly the bulk of criminologists historically have had a fixed
focus on the more conventional types of crime and few focus on the newer
dimensions of criminality raised by globalization and globalism (Friedrichs
2007).
Professor David Friedrichs, a pioneer in developing the research literature
on crimes of/and globalization, may be quite on the pulse in observing that:
Criminology as a field may well be too wedded to the theories, methods,
and substantive concerns that emerged principally in the mid-20th century
period, a time very different from the present (Friedrichs 2007, 5). In 2007,
he stated that: A number of readings on transnational crime have now been
published, but to date there are no textbooks in the conventional sense on
transnational, international, and global criminology (Friedrichs 2007, 5).
Ifeanyi Ezeonu (2008), in his analysis of crimes of globalization in subSaharan Africa in relation to health, has also observed the reserve of
mainstream criminologists to traverse the newer trajectories raised by
globalization. He gives an account of crimes perpetrated by the rich and
powerful on countries/societies of the weak through the Bretton Woods
institutions. He too has acknowledged the historical paucity of literature
when it comes to social harm. He claims this is partly because the prevailing
schools of thought did not see beyond the hegemony of the criminal/state
law in conceptualizing the idea and instances of crime. He argues that most
laws (including criminal laws) are political instruments embodying the
values of the dominant class, race, gender, and other social groups in
society, but that this characteristic has not generally caught the attention of
traditional criminologists (Ezeonu, 2008). Nevertheless, there has been an
increased focus on globalization by criminologists as something that has
criminogenic (social harm) elements (Ezeonu 2008, 119).
One of the problems, of course, is that raising such issues risks being
branded Left or socialistic or some other label by which it is implied an
unwillingness to value individualism and the free enterprise system (Ezeonu

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2008; Friedrichs 2007). Such labelling, however, does not contribute to taking
the discussion further. Such labelling more reflects the tunnel vision of the
ardent proponents of capitalism who are blind to the harms that accompany
it, an especially sad state of affairs considering that by addressing them a
better, more responsible outcome may emerge (Izarali, 2011). It is no
different from the committed critics of globalization who fail to see or are
unwilling to acknowledge any positive element of it (Izarali, 2011). In such
contexts, ideological commitments drive the intellectual pen, and critical
constructive debate that can augment the global good goes by the wayside,
while at the same time we are said to be involved in scholarly assessments.
Against such blind spots, it must be said that globalization raises a plethora
of issues for law and justice as it does for technology, political economy, and
security, and consequently for criminology to move with the times, it has to
address the relevant issues raised by and for globalization. Issues involving
transnational crime, political and economic oppression, trade treaties
injustices, institutional and institutionalized oppression, etc. cannot simply
be ignored by mainstream criminologists or deferred to political science or
some other when they embody critical criminogenic elements. If they raise
serious issues for the state of public morality to the extent that discussions
focus on drafting binding rules of engagement or criminal law for deterrence
or punishment, then that is at least one basis to engage criminology. In the
current times, there is an international criminal court so there is foundation
for development.
Capitalism has long raised issues of injustices/harm because of its fixation
on monetary value. Given that in many fundamental respects globalization
is a proliferation of capitalism on the world scene, such issues cannot be cast
into oblivion by criminology scholars. The object here is not to slam the
sledge hammer on capitalism but to acknowledge, as the philosopher Leo
Groarke (2000) has delineated, the strengths and weaknesses so that its
weaknesses as they materialize in economic globalization may have some
remedial approach, however difficult or daunting a task that may appear to
be. As we look to deal with issues raised by globalization through
transnational corporate entities, there are events in history that may do well
to set the framework for an equitable and hospitable climate of globalization.
One such case is the Bhopal disaster to which I now turn.
Reflecting on the Bhopal Disaster
The Bhopal Disaster which took place in India in 1984 remains both a
grievous and telling case and worthy of criminogenic inquiry. This event is

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grievous because it is the worlds worst industrial disaster in which
thousands of people died and over a hundred thousand people continue to
suffer serious injuries including those born to children-survivors of the
tragedy (Eckerman, 2005; ICMR Report, 2010). It is telling because it spans
an era when economic globalization was casting its mold and in which the
corporation, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), and its successor, Dow
Chemical, continued to deny legal liability for the harms to human and
planetary life. Some 30 tons of methyl isocyante (MIC), a lethal gas, was
leaked into the atmosphere due to a range of faulty safety oversights, poor
servicing of equipment, and faulty instrumentations. It stemmed from cost
cutting measures and faulty ethical compliance by the Union Carbide
Corporation, and affected some 40 square kilometers (Eckerman, 2005;
Banerjee, 1986; Robertson and Fadil, 1998). The gas may have also included
other toxic agents such as hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon
monoxide (Banerjee, 1986; Dhara and Dhara, 2002; ICMR Report, 2010). The
groundwater still remains contaminated and survivors continue to be
physically and emotionally traumatized (Dhara and Dhara, 2002, 402;
Srishti, 2002; Eckerman, 2005; Fletcher, Ono, and Roy, 2005, 7; ICMR Report,
2010; Mishra et al., 2009: 196; Sarangi, 2009).
The Union Carbide Corporation entered a settlement with the Indian
Government in 1989 for $470 million as taking moral responsibility
(Eckerman, 2005). At face value, it appears large but realistically it was/is
insufficient to address the magnitude of the harm, the loss of life, and the
rehabilitation needed for human lives and of the environment. It pales when
one considers that settlement in the Exxon Valdez oil spill when the vessel
ran aground in Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska was in excess of
this and involved no loss of human life (Broughton, 2005; Mathur and
Morehouse, 2002, 70).
Union Carbide Corporations History in India
The Union Carbide Corporation had its genesis in 1898 to manufacture
calcium carbide to produce acetylene (Bennett et al., 2005; Agarwal et al.,
1985). By 1917 it was formally established as Union Carbide and Carbon
Corporation through a collaborative venture, but this essentially amounted
to a holding company of autonomous units (Bennett et al., 2005; see also
www.uniocarbide.com/history). In 1919 it filed a patent to process ethylene
for commercial use. It later went on to produce such things as anti-freeze
(Prestone), batteries (Eveready) and ferroalloys (Banerjee 1986; Agarwal et
al., 1985; Bennett et al., 2005). It even engaged in manufacturing uranium
and uranium concentrates at the start of WWII (Bennett et al., 2005; Agarwal

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et al., 1985, 14). Agarwal et al. (1985, 14) state that: Successive world wars
influenced the companys growth. The First World War moved it from a
primarily metals and carbon products company into gases and chemicals.
The Second World War led the company into the atomic energy program.
By 1984 Union Carbide was reporting $9 billion in annual sales. The
company employed approximately 100,000 employees in 40 countries, and
was the 37th largest company in the world (Bennett et al., 2005; Browning,
1993; Broughton, 2005). In other words, the company had built a stature
internationally prior to the Bhopal disaster. The company also identified
itself as one of the leaders in industry safety (Browning, 1993). Union
Carbide existed in India since the mid-1920s producing batteries in Calcutta,
which by 1934 formally gave rise to the Ever Ready Company Ltd. The year
1984 had marked the companys 50th anniversary for Union Carbide India
Limited (UCIL) (Browning, 1993). Jackson B. Browning (1993), retired Vice
President of Health, Safety and Environmental Programs at UCC, stated that
UCIL had sales of about $200 million annually. It operated 14 plants across
India, and was organized into five operating divisions with 9,000
employees.
Operations at the many divisions had been theoretically under the
management of an Indian division called Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL),
which was overseen by Union Carbide Eastern Division in Hong Kong.
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) had 50.9% ownership in UCIL and the
rest were owned by 23,000 Indian shareholders and 24 percent by
government-run insurance companies (Browning, 1993; Trotter et al., 1989).
Although a Hong Kong division was in the picture, the major decisions of
UCIL were approved by UCC headquarters in the U.S. Some thinkers claim
UCC was known for centralized decision making (Eckerman, 2005;
Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986; Banerjee, 1986).
UCC and Pesticides in India
The impetus to produce pesticides in Bhopal has to be understood in the
context of the so-called Green Revolution in India. India had aimed to
become food self-sufficient, particularly given the backdrop of a famine in
1977 (Bowonder, Kasperson, and Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005). Since
agriculture was Indias bedrock, the damage caused by pests and the desire
to optimize its crop yields had to be addressed. Thus the Indian government
undertook policies in the 1970s to attract the investment of foreign
companies in local industries and in this regard Union Carbide is said to
have been asked to set up a plant in Bhopal for the production of a pesticide

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called Sevin, which was commonly applied in Asia (Bowonder, Kasperson,
and Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005).
The Bhopal plant was opened in 1969 (Eckerman, 2005, 24; Banerjee, 1986).
The initial approval of the plant was for the production of pesticides using
MIC and other component chemicals that were imported in small quantities
from the parent company (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam,
1986). MIC is an irritant to the skin, the eyes, and the respiratory mucous
membrane (Banerjee, 1986; ICMR Report, 2010, 66). As the Indian Council
for Medical Research (ICMR) noted in its 2010 report (ICMR Report, 2010,
66): MIC is a strong poison, even on swallowing; the injury that is caused to
the mucosa is because of the exothermic reaction when coming into contact
with moisture of the tissues.
MIC also decomposes to hydrogen cyanide and carbon dioxide when
pyrolized between 427 and 548 degrees Celcius (Dhara and Dhara, 2002, 391;
Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1986; ICMR Report, 2010). Banerjee (1986, 62) tells
us that: MIC is considered so dangerous that any British company using or
storing it would have to file contingency plans to deal with the consequences
of a leakage. Colourless, odourless and highly volatile, its most lethal aspect
in the event of an escape into the atmosphere is that it would probably be
impossible to contain within a plant or storage tank in the factory.
The company made a shift towards what is called backward integration in
which component chemicals like MIC were being manufactured in Bhopal as
opposed to being imported from the United States (Broughton, 2005;
Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005). Eventually the Bhopal plant was operating
below capacity because of natural conditions incurred by farmers through
pervasive crop failures in Asia and a drought in 1977, loss of capital, and
increased indebtedness (Bowonder et al., 1985, 7; Hager, 1985, 35; Banerjee,
1986). Thus, farmers found it unaffordable to buy expensive pesticides and
so substituted cheaper alternatives to Sevin (Broughton, 2005; Bowonder et
al., 1985). This situation negatively impacted the company. The plant, for
example, produced less than 1,000 tons whereas it had expected to produce
5,000 tons and it had suffered a loss nearing $4 million by 1984 (Bowonder et
al., 1985; Hager, 1985, 35). UCC issued notice to UCIL in July 1984 to prepare
the plant for sale (Browning, 1993).
Since no buyer was forthcoming, efforts were geared to migrating its major
production infrastructures to some other developing country (Broughton,
2005). Given the intention to liquidate the plant, UCC undertook a rigid costcutting initiative at the Bhopal plant in the months leading up to the
disaster, especially since the plant was producing below its capacity. This

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initiative would in time tarnish UCCs image in the social landscape, as the
Bhopal plant encountered irregular servicing, improperly trained and
insufficient staff, and malfunctioning and decaying instruments and
equipment (Eckerman 2005; Banerjee 1986; Bowonder, Kasperson, and
Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005).
The Bhopal Disaster: Cause and Circumstances
Notwithstanding the above profile, inquiries must still be made into the
cause of the disaster. The preceding discussion implies some of the
circumstances were leading up to the disaster, i.e., a disaster in waiting.
Union Carbide maintains on its website that the tragedy was the result of
sabotage (see www.uniocarbide.com/history). Jackson B. Browning (1993),
who was involved in the disaster response for the company, claimed that
No balanced analysis of Union Carbides reaction to the Bhopal tragedy is
possible without recognizing the considerable emphasis the company and its
affiliates had placed on safe operations. Certainly, it seems counterintuitive
to think any company or its executives will proclaim their operation as
replete with flaws, particularly as such a claim may open the floodgate to
criminal and civil lawsuits. The history of serious gas leaks (discussed later)
at the Bhopal plant prior to the tragedy and those at the Institute, Virginia
plant after the Bhopal disaster makes a compelling case to refute the idea of
UCC as a champion of safe operations.
According to numerous accounts by commentators (Morehouse and
Subramaniam 1986; Banerjee, 1986; Chouhan, 1994; Eckerman, 2005),
sometime on 2 December 1984 the production superintendent at the factory
had ordered the MIC plant supervisor to flush out a few lines leading from
the phosgene area to the vent gas scrubber (VGS), a unit that neutralizes
toxic gas by spraying caustic soda on it (Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission,
1985, 6). Safety procedures required some preliminary preparation of the
area before line flushing could begin. Specifically, a slip blind (a physical
barrier) must be inserted into a pipe or fitting to prevent material from going
beyond a certain point during the flushing (Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005;
Fink 1986). However, the slip blind was never inserted. This failed task was
the responsibility of the maintenance crew whereas line washing was the
responsibility of an MIC operator (Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005).
As the position of maintenance supervisor on the second shift was
eliminated a few days earlier, there was apparently no supervisor to instruct
the workers to insert the slip blind (Eckerman, 2005). The task of flushing
out the lines involved connecting a water supply line to a certain section of

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the unit. The MIC operator pumped the water in at high pressure but
noticed that the water was not exiting at the same pace. The matter was
reported to his supervisor, someone who had been transferred from a
different division recently and insufficiently trained for his new post, who
ordered him to resume flushing (Fink,1986, 173; Banerjee, 1986). Some time
shortly after 11 p.m., the operator in the control room of the plant became
concerned when he noticed that the pressure in one of the underground tank
was rising rapidly (Eckerman 2005). It was in fact the liquid MIC changing
into gas, as the temperature had already exceeded the level required for this
transformation (Banerjee, 1986).
The design of the unit was such that it had certain built-in safety
mechanisms. One of them was a safety valve that was blanketed with
nitrogen and located at the neck of the tube that carried fluid to the alpha
napthol plant (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986). This
valve was meant to serve as a cushion to some of the pressure in the tanks. If
the pressure in the tanks were to exceed a certain limit, the safety valve
would be released to allow for an automatic scrubbing operation in what is
called the Vent Gas Scrubber (VGS), essentially releasing caustic soda to
neutralize the gas (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam,1986). The
residue would then pass through a tube and enter another unit called the
flare tower, which stands some 30 feet above ground. The flare tower is a
narrow vertical structure like a chimney with a continuous fire at the top
that incinerates the residue. The flare tower was an end of the line safety
mechanism that treats certain gas/residue with heat (Banerjee 1986).
These safety mechanisms were out of commission at the time, and led to a
systems failure overall (Fink, 1986, 173). Some 30 tons of MIC gas escaped
into the atmosphere (Eckerman, 2005). It caused havoc in the streets of
Bhopal in the dark night, debilitating and incapacitating humans and
animals and destroying the natural environment (Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee,
1986). In commenting on the scientific structure of the plant, Banerjee (1986)
claims that even if these safety devices were operational they could not have
prevented the disaster because they could not handle the capacity of the
chemical that the Bhopal plant was processing, since they were designed to
handle a much smaller volume. Additionally, there was a lack of redundant
alarm systems and indicator instruments at the factory (Banerjee, 1986).
Banerjee (1986) argues that a factory of this nature was supposed to be
equipped with multiple back up systems.

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Previous Leaks
Evidence from previous warnings, workers complaints and safety
inspections underscored the Bhopal plant as a disaster in waiting (see Report
of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission, 1985; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986;
Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1986, 114-115; Chouhan, 1994). For example, there
were minor leaks of MIC in 1980 when the plant was established. On
December 26, 1981, one plant operator died from exposure to a phosgene
leak. In January 1982, a damaged seal in the pipeline resulted in phosgene
leak which affected 25 workers (Banerjee 1986, 112). On February 9, 1982, a
phosgene leak seriously affected 24 people. At midnight on October 5, 1982,
there was a leak of MIC at the plant, which resulted in respiratory problems
and watering of the eyes to those who were affected (Banerjee 1986, 112).
Setting aside these recurring leaks, a safety audit of the Bhopal plant was
carried out some two years prior to the disaster by experts from the UCCs
American division that clearly identified some serious safety concerns, yet
no corrective actions were ever taken (Eckerman 2005). The three-man team
from the U.S. identified, according to the Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission
(1985, 11), 10 major concerns. It was Congressman Henry Waxman in the
U.S. who revealed a UCC internal report before a house of representatives
subcommittee on health and the environment that had warned three months
before the Bhopal Disaster of possible catastrophic failures and runaway
reactions of lethal gas at the Bhopal plant (Eckerman, 2005; Fink, 1985, 176;
Banerjee, 1985, 118). Jackson Browning acknowledged having knowledge
about this but claimed he never forwarded it to the Bhopal plant (Fink, 1985,
176; Banerjee, 1985, 118). Yet despite this acknowledgement UCC continued
to insist that UCIL was more or less independent of the parent company in
terms of safety oversight and operations (Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1985).
It was most striking that despite the companys self-proclamation as a safety
champion in the face of the Bhopal Disaster, the companys Institute (West
Virginia) plant experienced a toxic gas leak eight months and eight days
after the Bhopal tragedy, which resulted in 135 residents from the area
seeking treatment at the hospital (Fink, 1985, 181). This plant was shut down
for some five months after the Bhopal Disaster to ensure that all operations
and safety mechanisms were fit, a task for which $5 million for safety
improvements were to be allocated (Fink, 1985, 181). That plant and the one
at Bhopal were said to be identical but a more lax approach was taken with
the Bhopal plant (Banerjee 1986).

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The Cost Cutting Syndrome
The cost-cutting syndrome prevailed at the expense of safety operations and
public safety. About a year prior to the disaster the company disconnected
the 30-ton refrigeration system designed to keep stored MIC at a
temperature of about zero degrees Celcius; its freon content was extracted
for use elsewhere in the plant (see Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986;
Banerjee, 1986; Fink, 1985; Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission, 1985). The
push to cut cost came from the companys head office in the U.S. As Ingrid
Eckerman (2005, 32) noted:
In 1983, there was great pressure from the Danbury head office in the
U.S.A. to cut expenses. Decisions were made to prolong the time
between certain checks from six to 12 months, and to replace
damaged stainless steel pipes with ordinary [carbon] steel pipes.
Items that should have been replaced every six months were used for
more than two years. Faulty instruments were not replaced.

The plant was experiencing a period of weak demand for its pesticides in the
Indian market (Banerjee, 1986, 126). In fact it was producing at one third of
its capacity, which was at variance with its projected 47% break-even point
(Banerjee, 1986, 126). As a consequence, between 1983 and 1984, it laid off
300 temporary workers (Eckerman 2005). On November 26, 1984, the
maintenance supervisor position on the second shift was eliminated and the
responsibilities were passed on to the production supervisor who was
transferred from a battery plant one month prior to the accident (Banerjee,
1986). The production supervisor was not qualified for the position to which
he was assigned, nor was he aware of the dangers associated with the
chemicals. The same applied to other employees (Chouhan, 1994).
The Result: Medical and Morbidity Then and Now
The preceding findings are contrary to Jackson Brownings claim about
UCCs safety dedication. The tragedy resulted in thousands of preventable
deaths and suffering. The exact number of people who died is not certain
because many people were buried and cremated en masse due to concerns
over corpse decomposition and the gravity of the tragedy, not to mention
the wholesale confusion and pandemonium, and so official counts do not
have a record for everyone (Eckerman 2005). Estimates vary, as offered by
different organizations and authorities, but all put the death toll in the
thousands. Eckerman estimates between 3000 and 10,000 people died in the
first weeks (Eckerman, 2005). Banerjee claims there were some 15,000
corpses, 50,000 cripple or maimed persons and 250,000 persons badly

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affected (Banerjee, 1986, 114). Amnesty International (2004) claims that 7000
people died in the first two to three days of the accident and that in the 20
years that followed over 15,000 died from related illnesses.
At the time of the disaster, Bhopal had a population of roughly 800,000 of
which 38% were in the age group of 0-14 (Eckerman, 2005, 13). Those who
continue to suffer serious long term injuries are estimated to be in excess of
100,000 and include those who were children at the time of the disaster and
their offspring (Eckerman 2005). Later toxicological studies carried out by
the Indian Council for Medical Research confirmed the presence of
hydrogen cyanide in the tissue samples kept from autopsies carried out at
the time of the disaster. Indeed the ICMR has clearly said that the disaster is
not due to MIC alone but its pyrolyzed products as well (ICMR Report, 2010,
7).
The scope and degree of the disaster is not fully captured when we say that
victims of the disaster suffered/suffer terribly. Ingrid Eckerman (2005, 97), a
Swedish medical doctor who sat on the International Medical Commission
of Bhopal, gives some insight when she writes:
The patients who invaded Hamidia hospital had spasms and
convulsions. They gasped for breath, their nostrils were quivering,
the lips were cyanoptic. They had foetid breath and blood-streaked
froth. When the doctors listened with their stethoscopes, they heard
gurgling rattles from the lungs and faint heart sounds. Other
symptoms were spasms in the oesophagus and intestines, attacks of
blindness and sweating. The patients were bewildered and had
amnesia.

Her account above of course does not identify those who were not fortunate
to make it to the hospital including children below two years of age and the
elderly, both of whom she claims were the hardest hit (Eckerman, 2005, 99).
The gas leak was likewise hard on women in more ways than one, affecting
not just their immediate features but also their reproductive health, and
caused an immediate rise in still birth at the time of 300 percent and 200
percent increase in perinatal and neonatal mortality. According to the
Bhopal Group for Information and Action (2000, 3):
Young women who were exposed at infancy have chaotic and
painful menstrual cycles on attaining puberty. Many have three to
four cycles in a month and there are those as old as 17 or 18 who
have yet to have their periods. Young people between 15 and 18
years look like they are 10 or 11 because of exposure-induced growth
problems documented by ICMR.

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Thus, the scars live on not just at a psychological level but also in their
procreative capacity. Victims of the disaster suffered pulmonary odema,
conjunctivitis, collapsed lungs, among numerous other ailments (Dhara and
Dhara, 2002; Eckerman, 2005). Human corpse were littered all over in the
vicinity of the accident. Long term studies carried out by the ICMR sourced
damage to the respiratory, ocular, gastro-intestinal, and reproductive
systems to toxins that were found in the blood stream of victims
(Sambhavna Report, 2000; Mishra et al., 2009). At least 125,000 people are
still chronically ill (Sambhavna Report, 2000). The long term report of the
ICMR (2010, 3) entitled Health Effects of the Toxic Gas Leak From Union Carbide
Methyl Isocyanate Plant in Bhopal: Technical Report on Pathology and Toxicology
(1984-1992) emphasizes:
It must be recognized that while the eyes and respiratory system
showed striking disturbances from the beginning, wide-spread
multi-organ involvement in the exposed population was also
observed. There were cases of coma, a striking feature in the acute
phase; gastrointestinal disturbances were common; there were
significant lesions in the central nervous system; above all
psychological trauma and behavioural disturbances continued to be
a dominant feature without abatement to this day for a long time.

The bottom line is that those who died as a result of the leaked gas in Bhopal
died a terrible death, and those who have survived are badly affected by
what in essence was an unprecedented disaster produced by a rich
multinational corporation. Yet the survivors continue to be deprived of vital
support to help them alleviate the strains that characterize their daily
struggles.
Legal Issues
After much legal denial of fault and claims by UCC that the Bhopal plant
operated under UCIL and so was not the responsibility of UCC, the UCC
and the Indian government entered a settlement in 1989 of $US 470 million
dollars, but the company denied legal responsibility. The Government of
India had passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act that made it the sole
representative of the victims so as to expedite legal matters. The amount in
the settlement was/is paltry because it is insufficient to address the harms
and fatalities as well as rehabilitation issues of survivors, many of whom for
the rest of their lives will be unable to work for a living because of their
injuries.

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In the beginning the Indian government endeavoured to have the case tried
in New York since it was an American multinational corporation, on the
basis that Indian laws were not adequate for a tort litigation of this
magnititude (Pillay, 2006). But the matter was sent back for trial in India by
Justice Keenan of New York on the basis of forum non conveniens, the ground
upon which Union Carbide had contested the idea of trial in the U.S. (Pillay,
2006; Sharma, 2009; Rogge, 2001). Sukanya Pillay argues that the UCC
employed a racist strategy in arguing that:
[t]he [sic] practical impossibility for American courts and juries,
imbued with US cultural values, living standards and expectations,
to determine living standards for people living in the slums or
hutments surrounding the UCIL, Bhopal, India, by itself confirms
that the Indian forum is overwhelmingly the most appropriate. Such
abject poverty and the vastly different values, standards and
expectations which accompany it are commonplace in India and the
Third World. They are incomprehensible to Americans living in the
United States (cited in Pillay 2006, 486-487).

In delivering his judgement it is interesting that Justice Keenan noted that

India had more interest in the outcome and therefore the American judiciary
should not be pushed beyond capacity (Pillay, 2006, 487; Sharma, 2009).
The victims of Bhopal are still without adequate care and provisions
(Eckerman, 2005; Pillay, 2006). They still suffer birth defects, vision
problems, stomach problems and lung problems among a slate of others
(Pillay, 2006; ICMR Report, 2010; Sarangi, 2009). Union Carbide was later
sold to Dow Chemical in 2001, which made Dow the largest chemical
corporation in the world, but Dow claimed that it did not acquire UCCs
liabilities (Eckerman, 2005; Pillay, 2006). Energies are still devoted to raising
the concerns of victims and the community in legal proceedings, some of
which have results and some of which are yet to be determined (Pillay, 2006;
see Zavetoski 2009 on social justice movements). In 2010, seven Indian
citizens who served with UCIL were convicted in a Bhopal court of causing
death by negligence (Amnesty International News, 2010). They got the
maximum penalty of two years prison sentence. At the moment there is a
curative petition (No. 345-347 of 2011, Union of India vs. Union Carbide
Corporation & Anr.) filed with the civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of India for enhancement of compensation to victims. It must be said
that in earlier years some critical matters were processed in court, requiring
Union Carbides then CEO and others to appear before the Court in Bhopal
but no one did. Thus, they have been deemed by the Courts in India as
fugitives of justice.

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Why Revisit the Bhopal Disaster?
One may understandably ask: why revisit the Bhopal disaster, since it is
something that took place in 1984? The Bhopal Disaster underscores the
culture and behavior of reckless transnational corporations. Both legally and
morally there is a strong case that crimes were perpetrated on account of the
preventable social harms caused, the neglect for occupational safety, the
reckless approach to handling toxic chemicals, the failure of the company to
act responsibly, putting workers to work with harmful substances for which
they were neither trained to handle nor had knowledge about, etc.
(Robertson and Fadil, 1998). At bottom, the company has culpability,
particularly since just two years prior to the tragedy a safety audit by its U.S.
experts indicated serious safety concerns at the Bhopal plant. Even if it were
a case of sabotage, the circumstances leading up to the tragedy underscored
gross disregard by the company that incubated a disaster. However, it must
be said that the Indian authorities are not without blame (Pillay, 2006;
Sharma, 2009; Sarangi, 2009). They were both a stakeholder and an oversight
body and had wanted to see the Bhopal plant operated by locals. They were,
and arguably still are, derelict in their duty to ensure the human rights of the
people of Bhopal were reasonably protected.
Even though the government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act to
empower itself as the sole representative of the victims in court so as to
expedite the legal process, it was nevertheless slothful in processing victims
compensation. Today, the survivors see themselves as abandoned by the
state and local government in their search for support to carry on their lives
and treatment. The Indian government has responsibilities for having
facilitated lax business conditions for the firm to operate (Sarangi, 2002;
Sarangi, 2009; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986, 3; Bennett et al., 2005, 3).
Moreover, the Indian government took control of the plant after the disaster,
but the clean-up is still to be completed. The laboratory, for example, still
contains chemicals, a further reason why residents of Bhopal feel abandoned
by the state. For those who died, the disaster was the gravest assault on their
right to life. For victim-survivors, the disaster violated in perpetuity their
right to self determination in practically every way.
If globalization is to be augmented as indeed it is through a proliferation of
free trade agreements on the world stage and the liberalization markets,
then matters of life and death cannot be ignored. Lawrence Summers
(Economist, 1992) while serving as chief economist at the World Bank once
wrote in an internal memo:

107
Shouldnt the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the
dirty industries to the less developed countries? The measurement of
the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the forgone
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of
view, a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done
in the country with the lowest wages. I think the logic behind
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is
impeccable and we should face up to that.

Summers line of reasoning no doubt reflects an apartheid psychology. It

would appear that Union Carbide Corporation had already been a
practitioner of this logic. Certainly it was not the only one. Summers leaked
memo has cemented the fact that international financial institutions and
transnational corporate entities do not necessarily act according to what is
just but what is efficient within a narrow conspectus of progress. If
globalization is to augment the cause of human happiness and flourishing
on a global scale, then it has to be carried out within at least some minimum
framework of social justice (Izarali, 2011). In this way, those who are not
agents of the market or those who participate in the market through labour
but lack the monetary wherewithal to protect against violations or seek
recourse may be protected.
The problem with globalization thus far is that it has been narrow in
proliferating property rights when in fact it should be accompanied by the
globalization of a more substantive set of basic rights (see Izarali, 2011;
Monshipouri, Welch and Kennedy, 2003). When peoples basic rights are
trampled on in the name of the market and economic efficiency, it ought to
be considered some form of a crime (Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002;
Ezeonu, 2009; Anderson, 2010). Thus, one ought to be able to talk about
crimes and globalization.
There are already international treaties in place as points of reference such as
the twin covenants of human rights. There are merits to Professor Peter
Singers (2004) claim that we need an extension of the criminal law at the
global level. Moreover, as Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) and Ifeanyi
Ezeonu (2009) have compellingly argued in making the case for crimes of
globalization, we need to look beyond the rubric of seeing the idea of crime
in criminology as a violation of some state law, so that we can talk about
social harm. Globalization is still evolving and it is natural to think that the
law has to likewise evolve on the global level. But criminologists likewise
have to evolve to see globalization as something that is within the scope of
criminology proper; in this way, crime and criminality relating to
globalization will be more deeply addressed in the literature (Friedrichs,
2007).

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Conclusion
The Bhopal Disaster took place in the formative years of economic
globalization in contemporary times. The attempt to try the case in New
York represents the first time liability was raised by a Third World country
against trans/multi-national corporation for violation of fundamental rights
(Pillay, 2006, 485). The reception was/is sobering. The actions and
consequences of the disaster were haunting then, but they reverberate up to
the present time. It is fair to say that the culture of corporations is largely the
same now as it was then, although in recent years there have been notable
cases in the US where major companies have been investigated and CEOs
have been prosecuted. Moreover, there are some corporate entities that try to
operate within certain parameters to avoid causing social harm and to be
reasonably equitable to labour, and so one ought not to turn a blind eye to
them. As globalization expands we can learn from the Bhopal tragedy,
especially since justice still has not yet been delivered to Bhopal for those
deceased, those surviving, and the environment upon which all depend.
When one looks at the case of gas flaring by transnational corporations in
Nigeria and the health hazards they pose (Environmental Rights Action,
2005), the toxic cyanide spill by the Omai goldmine company in the
Essequibo River of Guyana, and the degradation of the Pak Mun Dam in
Thailand, all in which no substantive positive net return value to the host
societies appear to be evident, one cannot help but to ponder on the
examples of the past such as the Bhopal Disaster. Reece Walters captures the
salience of the Bhopal tragedy when he writes, Bhopal provides lessons
about, and challenges for, environmental justice; globalized trade and
corporate power; corporate criminality and victim justice; regulation of
transnational corporations, and the dangers associated with the tradeoriented self-regulations within TNCs (Walters, 2009, 325). There are good
reasons for thinking that globalization can yield positive benefits to human
society, but this cannot happen if a tunnel vision psychology steers
international financial institutions, transnational corporate activities, ethics,
and the administration of justice. Against all prevailing adversities, we must
be hopeful for, and persevering toward, a mitigated globalization one
where justice and benefits are available to, and accessible by, the global
society and not just a section of it.

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