Max Weber' s Sociolog y of Intellectual s

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Max Weber' s
Sociology
of Intellectual s
Ahmad Sadr i
With a Foreword by
Arthur J. Vidich

New Yor k Oxfor

d
OXFORD UNIVERSIT Y PRES S

Oxford Universit y Pres s

Oxford Ne w Yor k Toront o
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Sadri, Ahmad.
Max Weber' s sociolog y o f intellectual s / Ahma d Sadri ;
with a forewor d b y Arthu r J . Vidich.
p. cm . Include s bibliographica l references ,
ISBN 0-19-506556-5
ISBN 0-19-509398- 4 (pbk )
1. Intellectuals . 2 . Weber , Max , 1864-1920 . I . Title .
HM213.S22 199 2 305.5'52dc2
0 92-439
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For my mother
Vadjihah Moulai e

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Foreword
Arthur J. Vidich

Ahmad Sadr i begin s with the observatio n tha t neithe r intellectual s

nor anti-intellectual s hav e bee n abl e t o defin e exactl y wha t a n
intellectual is , o r t o distinguis h th e function s o f a n intelligentsi a
from thos e o f intellectuals . I n hi s brie f bu t closel y argue d study ,
Sadri provides a new way of looking a t the intellectual s and intelli gentsia an d a n answe r to question s abou t thei r role s and functions
in society . Ou t o f a vas t rang e o f scholarl y speculation , h e ha s
brought order to a subject that up to now has defied th e best effort s
of socia l theorists .
Sadri assert s that attempt s b y other scholar s t o explai n the role s
and functions of intellectuals and intelligentsi a remain embedded i n
their commitment s t o variou s ideologies . Fo r example , Kar l Mar x
conceives o f th e intellectua l a s a n alienate d membe r o f th e uppe r
classes wh o ca n transcen d th e limit s o f hi s o r he r clas s experience
only a t th e momen t o f impendin g revolution . This actio n enable d
the intellectua l t o a t onc e arriv e a t th e trut h abou t societ y an d t o
become a leade r o f th e proletariat . Sadr i see s thi s positio n a s a
special cas e o f th e revolutionar y intellectual . Kar l Mannheim' s
inversion o f Marx's view defines the intellectua l as someone wh o is
free fro m the blindnes s o f class-bound o r officia l ideology ; thereby,
he o r sh e is able t o se e the trut h an d t o transfor m societ y from th e
perspective o f that truth . Fo r Sadri , however , this does not consti tute a sociologica l explanation , bu t rathe r th e limitin g cas e o f
vii

Viii FOREWOR

intellectual transcendence ; on e tha t lead s t o th e creatio n o f ne w

world images .
In a masterfull y syntheti c revie w o f mos t o f th e literatur e o n
intellectuals, Sadri locates and delimits the perspectives o n intellectuals of such major Europea n author s a s V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxem burg, Geor g Lukacs , Josep h Schumpeter , Hanna h Arendt , Erns t
Bloch, Antoni o Gramsci , Georg e Orwell , Lesze k Kolakowski , and
George Konra d an d Iva n Szelenyi . H e als o examine s th e idea s
about intellectual s to b e found i n such America n author s a s Leste r
Ward, Willai m Graha m Sumner , Talcot t Parsons , Alvi n Gouldner ,
and Russe l Jacoby. Notin g that the term intelligentsia originate d i n
Russia, wher e i t referre d t o th e educate d middl e an d uppe r classe s
whose concern wa s with social, economic, an d politica l philosoph y
and with the arts, literature, an d politics, Sadri goes o n to present a
comprehensive paradig m tha t isolate s thos e characteristic s tha t
distinguish intellectual s fro m a n intelligentsia . Thi s paradig m ap pears i n Chapte r 4 an d provide s a startin g poin t a s wel l a s a
grounding fo r an y futur e scholarl y wor k o n th e subjec t o f a n
intelligentsia o r o n intellectuals.
Sadri's ow n starting point i s Max Weber' s perspective on intellectuals a s i t ca n b e draw n ou t o f th e latter' s sociolog y o f Indian ,
Chinese, Hebrew , an d Wester n religion s an d civilizations . I n hi s
studies o f worl d religions, Webe r aske d suc h question s as : What is
the relatio n o f ideas t o socia l reality? What i s the societa l status o f
the carriers o f ideas? Do suc h carriers create idea s independently or
reflect clas s o r othe r stratum-boun d traditions ? D o the y lea d pro gressive movements in society or do the y observe and follow ? Wha t
are th e rationa l o r irrationa l consequence s tha t flo w fro m a com mitment to a given set of ideas o r values? Keeping in mind Weber' s
questions, Sadr i deconstruct s Weber's analyse s o f religion in orde r
to focu s attentio n o n thos e strat a wh o ar e significan t carrier s o f
a civilization' s religiou s an d secula r values . Suc h carrier s hav e
included th e emissar y an d exemplar y prophet s o f Judaism , th e
priestly clas s o f Brahmins, th e Confucia n literati , an d th e itineran t
Christian missionaries . But , a s Webe r pu t it , thes e carrier s hav e
included apparentl y secularize d representatives :
If one wishes to characterize succinctly, in a formula so to speak, th e
types o f representative s o f th e variou s strat a tha t wer e th e primar y

Foreword i

carriers o r propagator s o f th e so-calle d worl d religions , the y woul d

be the following: In Confucianism, th e world-organizing bureaucrat ;
in Hinduism , th e worl d orderin g magician ; i n Buddhism , th e medi cant monk wanderin g throug h th e world; in Judaism, the wanderin g
trader; an d i n Christianity , th e itineran t journeyman.

Guided by the categories developed by Weber in his studies of world

religions, Sadri notes that Webe r based his sociology of intellectuals
on a "delicate balanc e betwee n two theoretical assumptions" :
First h e postulate d th e "relativ e autonomy " o f th e spher e o f idea s
from socioeconomi c forces . Second, Webe r proceeded wit h a theory
of historical causatio n that we have dubbed "revers e determination, "
whereby th e interes t i s shifted fro m th e origi n t o th e popularizatio n
of a religion accordin g t o th e idea l an d materia l interest s o f variou s
strata an d classes . Th e relativ e significanc e o f thes e assumption s
varies according t o the level of analysis and the empirical characteris tics o f a particula r for m o f intellectualit y unde r investigation .

Citing on e example o f this delicat e balance , Sadr i note s how prob lems abound i n studying the history of ideas and their carriers in the
absence o f th e aforementione d twi n assumptions . T o mak e thi s
point, h e cites a very commo n phenomenon :
The producer s o f idea s whic h ar e inimica l t o th e ideologie s o f th e
intellectual class , o r th e clas s whic h patronize s them , ar e als o intel lectuals.

It i s t o overcom e suc h problem s tha t Sadr i open s an d expand s

Weber's sociolog y o f intellectuals . Similarly , followin g Weber , h e
notes tha t th e disenchantmen t o f the worl d make s a religiou s fligh t
from mundanit y difficult fo r secula r intellectuals. Yet these intellectuals mus t confron t th e irrationalit y o f a world tha t doe s no t allo w
them to escape from it . Intellectual response s to this dilemma, as, for
example, i t is posed b y post-Protestant industrialis m and it s discon tents, ca n lea d t o unexpecte d intellectua l reactions . Amon g thes e is
the reification of instrumental reason in the social sciences. These an d
other observation s mak e i t necessar y fo r Sadr i t o includ e i n hi s
paradigm a variet y o f socia l typesscientists , social critics , this -

X FOREWOR

worldly bureaucrats , researchers , abstrac t theoriststha t migh t no t

otherwise b e identifie d a s intellectuals .
To give coherence t o thi s congeries o f types, Sadri classifie s the m
according, o n the one hand, t o the commitment the y make either to
the discovery of truth o r to a mission they have for the peoplei.e.,
their social engagementand, o n the other, t o their commitment t o
either theoretica l o r practica l reason . Th e fourfol d tabl e derive d
from thes e categorie s ingeniousl y provide s a wa y t o differentiat e
such divers e type s a s scientists , scholars , theorists , theologians ,
priests, bureaucrats , medi a specialists , reformers, lawyers , and re volutionaries b y their attitud e an d socia l function . I t als o evoke s a
set o f idea l type s tha t migh t b e use d b y a researche r engage d i n
further empirica l stud y o f eithe r intellectual s o r a n intelligentsia .
Sadri i s well aware tha t th e creatio n o f idea l type s i n itsel f doe s
not substitut e for empirical research; rather suc h types are heuristic
devices enablin g th e researche r t o conceptualize , analyze , an d re solve a particular problem . Althoug h the pure resolution of conceptual ambiguitie s i s no t th e essentia l tas k o f a socia l science , h e
understands tha t suc h resolution s ar e necessar y whe n ambiguit y
interferes wit h empirica l investigations .
The conceptua l clarificatio n supplie d b y Sadr i woul d no t hav e
been possibl e had h e no t bee n a clos e reade r o f Weber' s methodo logical writings . In hi s first chapter , "Ma x Weber' s Methodology, "
Sadri explain s an d justifie s th e relevanc e o f Weber' s methodolog y
to hi s ow n reconstructio n o f Weber's sociolog y o f intellectuals . A t
issue her e i s th e questio n o f ho w i t i s possibl e t o compar e an d
contrast, fro m th e perspectiv e an d wit h th e language s o f Wester n
civilization, other , nonoccidenta l worl d civilizations . I n th e past ,
such comparisons hav e led to accusation s o f Western epistemologi cal and cultura l imperialis m and t o charge s o f an occidenta l desir e
to monopoliz e th e creatio n o f worl d images . Sadr i explain s hi s
resolution o f thi s problem :
The apparen t "generalizations " o n th e basi s o f whic h ou r mode l i s
based ar e no t inductivel y constructed; concept s such a s intellectuals ,
intelligentsia, me n o f knowledge ar e heuristic devices . Fo r on e thing,
these concept s d o not claim t o represent ontologically significan t an d
universal phenomena . Rathe r the y bea r th e imprin t o f particula r

Foreword x

historical an d geocultura l "valu e relevant interests " of Western civili zation.

Yet whil e recognizin g tha t Weber' s an d hi s ow n concept s ar e

temporally an d geoculturall y grounded, Sadr i does not giv e up th e
task o f comparing an d contrastin g differen t civilizations . T o gras p
Sadri's reaso n fo r beginnin g hi s stud y wit h a n examinatio n o f
Weber's methodology , on e must understand th e logical structur e of
this book, a study which begins and ends in Chapter 4 on the them e
of the relationshi p between the codificatio n o f theory an d a heuristic approach t o theory. The reader wil l find Sadri' s rational e fo r the
defense o f heuristic theory bot h provocativ e an d convincing .
By includin g fiv e appendice s i n hi s study , Sadr i ha s revive d th e
art o f the appendi x a s a device for clarifyin g tangentia l bu t critica l
substantive an d theoretica l issues . I n Appendi x C h e i s le d t o
correct Weber' s interpretation o f Islam a s a warrior religion an d t o
comment o n Brya n S . Turner' s Weber an d Islam, notin g tha t "Is lam's radica l monotheis m (singularit y o f th e divin e i n principle )
would thwar t th e warrior' s characteristi c penchan t fo r polytheism ,
monolatry o r henotheism. " I n thi s appendix , Sadr i provide s a new
starting poin t fo r a reassessmen t an d reinterpretatio n o f Islami c
intellectualism. Appendi x D , "Ideologies an d Counterideologie s of
Intellectuals in Occidental East an d West, " shows the similaritie s in
ideological response s o f intellectual s i n Easter n an d Wester n Eu rope (including the Unite d States) , revealin g that "similar ideologi cal need s ca n generat e simila r ideologies. " Her e Sadr i compare s
two ideologues , Leste r War d an d Lenin , wit h tw o counterideo logues, William G. Sumner an d Ros a Luxemburg . Leni n and War d
opposed th e Spenceria n gospe l o f evolution , arguin g lik e Comt e
that a scientific politics woul d replac e i t and it s irrationalities. Fo r
Ward a stratum o f sociocrats woul d "work fo r al l mankind an d fo r
all time, an d al l they ask is that al l mankind shal l forever benefit by
their wor k . . . the y onl y as k a n opportunit y t o appl y scientifi c
principles to great things. " Lenin call s his elite "a dozen trained an d
talented" person s an d assign s t o the m th e tas k o f shapin g th e
consciousness o f th e proletaria t who m the y woul d als o represent .
Sadri's capacit y t o se e suc h electiv e affinitie s i n th e though t pro cesses o f War d an d Lenin , le t alon e hi s possessio n o f the imagina -

Xll FOREWOR

tion t o ventur e forth i n suc h an enterprise , reveals his capacity fo r

finding intercultural common elements in culturally disparate ideologies.
Treating Sumne r an d Luxembur g a s counterideologues , on e i n
the tradition o f sociology and the other in socialism, Sadr i points to
the affinitie s i n intellectual tactic s that eac h uses . Bot h uphol d th e
value o f evolutio n a s oppose d t o revolutionar y interventio n t o
accomplish socia l change :
the onl y possibl e good mus t com e fro m evolutio n no t revolution .
(Sumner)
Stop th e natura l pulsatio n o f a livin g organis m an d yo u weake n it,
and yo u diminish its resistance and combatativ e spirit. (Luxemburg)

Sumner an d Luxembur g hol d t o a belie f i n th e automaticit y o f

social evolutio n an d oppos e an d criticiz e the interventio n of intellectuals i n th e hop e o f controllin g o r directin g it s trajectory . Th e
reader o f this comparison o f Sumner an d Luxembur g canno t hel p
but b e impresse d b y Sadri' s abilit y t o ente r int o th e intellectua l
world o f the other and to see therein commonalities in thought pat terns tha t cu t acros s nationa l boundarie s an d civilizations.
The autho r o f this book i s himself a product o f two civilizations.
Formed b y a n educatio n i n classica l Persia n scholarship , Sadr i
continued hi s studies in classical and contemporary social theory at
the Graduat e Faculty o f the Ne w School fo r Socia l Research i n the
United States . Hi s willingnes s t o expos e himsel f t o contrastin g
intellectual world views facilitates the originalit y o f his approach t o
his subjectwho before him ha d though t o f comparing Leni n an d
Ward t o Sumne r an d Luxemburg?an d testifies to hi s remarkable
insight int o th e thought-way s an d worl d image s o f a divers e com pany o f th e moder n world' s intellectuals . Hi s reconstructio n o f a
sociology o f intellectuals fro m Weber' s sociology of religion i s itself
a major contribution to Weberian scholarship. Hi s formulation of a
heuristic genera l theor y o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a i s inde pendently significant, a major contribution t o contemporar y socia l
thought.

Contents

1. Methodolog y o f Socia l Sciences , 3

Methodology Again , 3
Escape fro m Methodologica l Nominalism , 5
On Huma n Interes t an d Historica l Causation , 2 2
On Socia l Change , 2 6

2. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Religio n as a Sociolog y

of Intellectuals , 33
Marx an d Webe r o n Intratheoretica l Consistency : Sociologie s
of Knowledg e and Intellectuals , 3 3
Marx an d Webe r o n Sociolog y o f Religion , 37
Religion o f the Masses , 4 3
Religion fo r th e Masses , 4 7
Religion o f th e Warriors , 49
Religion o f th e Civi c Strata , 52
Religion o f th e Intellectuals , 5 8
Intellectuals an d th e Worl d Religions , 61
Religions, Intellectuals , an d th e Rationalizatio n Paradox , 65

3. Ma x Weber' s Sociolog y o f Politics as a Sociolog y o f

Intellectuals, 6 9
Relating to Ideologies : Intellectual s and Intelligentsia , 70
Bases fo r Ideologie s o f Occidenta l Intellectuals :
An Idea l Type , 74
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intellectuals , 8 1
Bases fo r Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia : A n Idea l Type , 8 5
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia , 8 8
xiii

XIV CONTENT

Weber's Politica l Agenda : Democracy , Bureaucracy ,

and Mas s Societies , 9 2
Weber's Politica l Agenda : Th e Varietie s o f Irresponsibility , 95
An Ethi c fo r Politica l Action , 9 7

4. Definitions , 10 5
The Troubl e wit h Definin g Concepts , 10 5
The Horizonta l Differentiation , 111
The Vertica l Differentiation , 116
Columns an d Rows , 11 9

Appendices
A. Webe r o n th e "Positivist-Intuitionist " Controversy , 12 5
B. O n Verificatio n o f th e Idea l Types : Winch , Schutz ,
and Oakes , 12 9
C. Webe r an d Islam , 13 3
D. Ideologie s an d Counter-Ideologie s o f Intellectual s
in Occidenta l Eas t an d West : A n Idea l Typica l Model , 13 5
E. Epistemolog y an d Methodology , 13 9

Notes, 14 3
Bibliography, 15 5
Index, 16 3

Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Intellectual s

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1
Methodology o f Socia l Science s

Methodology Agai n
It i s neither the conventional etiquette of Weberian scholarship no r
a peculia r logica l predilectio n tha t prompt s u s t o begi n a boo k
about intellectual s wit h a chapte r o n methodology . T o consol e
those wit h a distast e for th e forma l an d th e abstract , le t u s recal l
that Webe r himsel f regarde d th e obsessiv e methodologica l discus sions o f his time wit h a sense o f detachment an d eve n irony. Wh y
then di d h e defer pursuin g hi s main interes t in the grand , substan tive sociological and historical questions, to dedicat e a few years of
his lif e t o methodologica l reflections , ultimatel y contributin g t o
what h e ha d dubbe d th e "methodologica l pestilence" ? Ther e ar e
good reason s t o believ e tha t th e prim e motiv e o f Ma x Webe r t o
work o n methodolog y wa s t o provid e a viabl e answe r t o th e
Methodenstreit, th e protracte d controvers y between th e legac y of
Enlightenment a s represente d i n th e theoreticall y abstrac t argu ments of the Austria n school of economics o n the on e side, and th e
Romantic individualis m and historicis m o f the Germa n historica l
school o n th e other. 1 Withou t rejectin g th e prio r suggestion , I
would like to advance the thesis that the purpose of Weber's methodological reflections was to men d a problem tha t was intrinsic t o his
own univers e o f discourse . Weber' s methodolog y represent s a n
immanent attemp t t o bridg e th e ga p that existed betwee n his own
individualistic epistemologica l an d methodologica l premises , o n
one hand, and th e kin d o f intellectual apparatu s h e needed fo r th e
pursuit o f hi s interes t i n substantiv e civilizationa l an d historica l
analyses, o n th e other . I t i s not reasonabl e t o assum e tha t Webe r
3

4 MA

X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

was obliviou s t o thi s tension , no r t o regar d hi s methodolog y a s a

whimsical exercis e in solvin g a conceptua l puzzle .
If th e followin g discussio n ha s an y validity , the n i t migh t b e
stated tha t Webe r succeede d i n closin g th e tremendou s cleavag e
that threatene d th e inne r consistenc y o f hi s intellectua l cosmos .
Thus Webe r coul d remai n tru e t o hi s methodologica l axiom s
throughout hi s substantive work.
The main objec t o f this chapter i s to underscore the inne r consis tency o f Weber's work . Weber' s methodolog y ha d a remedial char acter. H e di d no t inten d t o provid e guideline s fo r th e conduc t o f
research eithe r fo r himsel f or for others. 2 Eve n the mos t celebrate d
outcome o f Weber' s methodology , th e idea l typica l analysis , i s
admittedly no t a n inventio n bu t a rediscovery . Webe r believe d
modern historiograph y (Weber , Objectivity, p . 92 ) a s wel l a s ab stract theoretica l expositions in social science s (Weber, Objectivity,
pp. 88-103 ) t o b e suffuse d wit h idea l types . H e merel y suggeste d
that these constructs b e deployed mor e consciously. I n this chapter
we als o hop e t o highligh t the relevance o f Weber's methodolog y t o
our reconstructio n o f his sociology of intellectuals. Throughou t thi s
book w e will deal wit h question s suc h a s the rol e o f intellectuals in
history, th e interpla y o f idea s an d interests , an d th e rol e o f th e
carriers of ideas in the development of ideologies that serv e various
interests. Th e fina l chapte r aspire s t o functio n a s a taxonomica l
guide to project s in a "Weberian sociolog y of intellectuals." By this
we mea n no t onl y the su m tota l o f Weber's observation s o n sociol ogy of intellectuals, which are organize d throughout th e book , bu t
also a se t o f idea l type s an d epistemologica l an d methodologica l
assumptions abou t th e identit y and function s o f intellectuals. Suc h
general concept s canno t b e proposed withou t firs t establishin g the
metatheoretical groundwor k tha t wil l b e suggeste d i n th e presen t
chapter. Thi s chapte r consist s o f three sections.
In th e firs t sectio n w e wil l tr y t o demonstrat e ho w Weber' s
methodology bot h embrace d an d transcende d hi s epistemological
axioms. Ha d these assumptions not bee n modified an d mediate d by
his methodology , the y would hav e create d a n unfi t framewor k fo r
his substantiv e studies . Th e aim s o f thi s sectio n ar e therefor e t o
establish tha t Weber' s sociology of intellectuals i s compatible wit h
and deepl y roote d i n hi s epistemologica l an d methodologica l as sumptions. O f course , understandin g Weber' s substantiv e studies

Methodology of Social Sciences 5

does not presuppos e an explication o f his theory of concept forma tion. Yet , Weber engaged i n such exploration s i n order t o solv e th e
problems tha t aros e i n th e cours e o f hi s empirica l research . Sinc e
such problem s usuall y result fro m th e uncritica l introductio n o f er roneous metatheoretica l assumptions , Weber's attempts usuall y aim
at weedin g out suc h assumption s rathe r tha n establishin g method ology for th e socia l sciences. Regarding the magnitud e of theoretical
and empirica l problem s involve d i n th e sociolog y o f intellectuals , i t
would b e an error to start such a venture without taking precaution s
against th e intrusio n o f metatheoretical errors .
The secon d section of this chapter focuse s on Weber's conceptio n
of historica l causalit y an d it s interdependenc e wit h th e specifi c
interests o f th e historian . Understandin g Weber' s solutio n o f thi s
problem i s crucial fo r al l historical science s i n genera l an d fo r th e
sociology o f intellectuals in particular. Fo r instance , Weber' s asser tion that intellectuals "influence" the trajectory of history, that they
have been , i n certain instances , th e carrier s of ideas, an d tha t the y
have determined the developmenta l cours e of civilizations can eas ily be misconstrued if it i s not understoo d withi n the contex t o f his
theory o f historical causation .
A sociolog y o f intellectual s woul d b e incomplet e i f i t faile d t o
clarify it s stanc e towar d variou s theorie s o f socia l chang e wit h
regard t o th e rol e the y assig n t o th e intellectual s in sociohistorica l
developments. Th e closin g sectio n o f th e firs t chapte r i s dedicated
to a reexaminatio n o f th e theorie s o f socia l chang e i n relatio n t o
Weber's concept o f "social selection." Weber, however, shrank fro m
highlighting th e significanc e o f hi s theor y o f "socia l selection, "
because h e believe d tha t methodologica l argument s canno t guid e
substantive research. Fo r him such arguments onl y served purposes
of self-clarification . Indeed , self-clarificatio n ha d becom e al l th e
more necessary for Weber and his readers because they moved in an
intellectual atmospher e tha t wa s eve r s o heavil y scente d b y th e
philosophies of history propounded i n the two preceding centuries.
Escape fro m Methodologica l Nominalis m
Weber's interpretiv e sociolog y ha d t o overcom e th e formidabl e
obstacle o f constructing th e apparatu s o f a scienc e fit t o stud y th e

6 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

grand socia l an d historical problems without using the hypostatized

and collectivisti c notions tha t pervade d th e socia l science s o f hi s
time. H e neede d als o t o advanc e beyon d a n abstrac t negatio n o f
collectivism an d t o rehabilitat e som e o f its concepts t o establis h a
conceptual moorin g fo r a noncollectivis t scienc e o f societ y an d
history. I n 1920 , a fe w month s before hi s death, Webe r wrote:
If I hav e becom e a sociologis t i t i s mainl y i n orde r t o exorcis e th e
specter of collective conceptions which will linger among us. In other
words, sociolog y itself ca n onl y procee d fro m th e action s o f on e o r
more separate individual s and must, therefore, adopt strictly individualistic methods. 3

This statemen t an d th e one s tha t follow, 4 betra y a n extrem e

brand o f methodologica l individualism . Thi s coul d hav e bre d a
skeptical kin d o f sociologica l nominalis m i f no t psychologica l re ductionism. Bu t Webe r chose neithe r path . H e eve n di d no t trea d
the "phenomenological, " socia l interactionist, an d generall y speaking "micro-sociological" route , which he certainly paved fo r other s
to explore . Weber' s sociologica l interest s demande d th e large r do main o f socia l an d intercivilizationa l studies. This lef t hi m wit h a
hiatus within his universe of discourse. Weber developed hi s "interpretive sociology " s o a s t o cros s thi s ga p i n thre e majo r strides :
(1) t o expe l th e "actua l existin g meaning " fro m th e domai n o f
sociology, (2 ) to substitut e th e concep t o f probabilit y o f socia l
action fo r th e notio n o f reciprocit y i n socia l relationships , an d
finally, (3 ) to establis h th e idea l typica l analysi s a s th e principa l
vehicle o f interpretiv e sociology, and o f historica l sciences. 5

Step One: Doing Away with "Actual Existing Meaning"

At the outse t o f his best known methodological work, 6 Ma x Webe r
made i t clear tha t sociology , a s he defined it , is concerned wit h th e
interpretive understandin g o f social action . H e spok e o f action , o f
course, whe n the acting individua l attaches meaning t o hi s "behavior." Bu t he wa s quick to add :
"Meaning" ma y b e o f tw o kinds . Th e ter m ma y refe r firs t t o th e
actual existin g meanin g i n th e give n concret e cas e o f a particula r

Methodology of Social Sciences 1

actor, o r t o th e averag e o r approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a
given pluralit y of actors ; o r secondl y to th e theoreticall y conceived
pure type o f subjective meaning attributed to th e hypothetica l acto r
or actor s i n a give n typ e o f action . (Weber , Economy I , p . 4)

It i s of cardinal importanc e for a correc t understandin g o f Web er's "interpretiv e sociology " t o bea r i n min d tha t i t scarcel y deal s
with "actua l existin g meaning." 7 Webe r wa s especiall y avers e t o
making th e firs t subcategor y o f actua l existin g meaning (tha t pos sessed b y a give n concret e actor ) th e subjec t matte r o f sociology .
For starters , th e difficultie s concernin g the attainmen t an d verifica tion o f th e actua l existin g meanin g ar e insurmountable . Webe r
offered n o answe r to thi s polemical question o f the positivists : How
can w e get to th e back o f the min d o f a particular actor ? H e agree d
that there is no guarantee that the best reproduction o f the meanin g
that a particular actor ascribe s to his or her behavior, in the mind of
the mos t sympatheti c o f al l observers , woul d correspon d t o th e
actual meanin g i n the min d o f the acto r i n question (Weber , Knies,
pp. 179 , 180) . Besides , th e intuitiv e inne r understandin g o f th e
totality of the feelings o f a particular individua l produces, at best , a
vague an d unverifiabl e imag e tha t ca n hardl y b e calle d "knowl edge," let alone "scientifi c knowledge." 8 By dismissing actual exist ing meanin g fro m th e real m o f sociologica l interes t Webe r save s
himself th e troubl e o f "verifying " these elusiv e meanings. 9
We can trac e Weber's lac k of interest in actual existin g meaning t o
roots othe r tha n th e mer e difficulties o f attainment an d verification .
Even i f a n observe r coul d properl y obtai n an d verif y th e concret e
subjectivity o f a social actor, this knowledge could not be relied upo n
by a Weberia n social scientis t a s anythin g bu t ra w data . I n othe r
words, the ultimate criterion for the validity of the observer's interpretations i s not it s agreement wit h the so-calle d native' s account . This ,
of course , goe s agains t th e conventiona l pictur e o f Webe r a s th e
father o f Verstehen sociology , fo r whic h h e ha s bee n alternativel y
admired (Ritzer, 1975 , p. 86 ) and censure d (Strauss, 1953 , p. 55) . No.
Weber di d no t trus t th e "understanding " o f th e socia l acto r a s th e
ultimate criterio n o f validity for interpretiv e sociology :
The "conscious motives " may well, even to the actor himself , conceal
the variou s "motives " an d "repressions " whic h constitut e th e rea l

8 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

driving forc e o f hi s action . Thu s i n suc h case s eve n subjectivel y

honest self-analysi s has only a relative value. Then i t is the task o f the
sociologist to be aware o f this motivational situatio n an d t o describ e
and analyz e it, even though i t has not actuall y been concretely part of
the consciou s intentio n o f th e actor ; possibl y no t all , a t leas t no t
fully. (Weber , Economy I , pp . 9 , 10)

Here Webe r is raising th e proble m o f "false consciousness"whic h

until recentl y wa s a popula r moti f i n th e Marxis t literaturet o
undermine th e significanc e o f th e actua l existen t meanin g fo r th e
purposes o f scientific analysis. It i s not onl y the possibilit y of "fals e
consciousness" bu t als o th e prevalenc e o f "semiconsciousness" that
dissuaded Webe r fro m studyin g the intentionalit y o f th e concret e
individual. "Semiconscious " behavio r comprise s al l th e margina l
cases o f meaningful actio n suc h a s affectual, imitative , habitual , o r
traditional actio n (Weber , Economy / , pp . 4-25) . Besides , socia l
actors ofte n act under the influence of a plurality of impulses, which
makes i t difficul t t o arriv e a t a n approximat e estimat e o f th e
relative strengt h o f thei r conflictin g motive s (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 10) . Finally , i t mus t b e mentione d tha t a searc h fo r th e actua l
existing meanin g doe s no t hel p th e caus e o f the science s o f empirical realit y (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft), whic h i s t o overcom e th e
multiplicity o f empirica l reality . I t i s th e tas k o f sociolog y t o firs t
view al l th e meaningfu l phenomen a tha t ar e withi n it s real m an d
then t o fin d a wa y o f scientificall y reducin g th e immensit y o f th e
empirical data . (Weber suggests constructing a model agains t whic h
the relevan t fact s ca n b e measured. ) T o rever t t o th e stud y o f th e
actual existing meanin g blur s the focu s o f sociology an d defeat s the
purpose o f th e selectiv e proces s o f science. 10
The averag e o r approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a give n
plurality of actors i s the secon d variety of actual existing meaning. "
Does thi s constitut e th e subjec t matte r o f interpretiv e sociology ?
Only i n a margina l sense , because :
average types , ca n b e formulated with a relativ e degre e o f precisio n
only wher e they ar e concerne d wit h difference s o f degre e i n respec t
to actio n whic h remains qualitatively the same . Suc h case s d o occur ,
but i n the majorit y of cases o f action importan t t o histor y o r sociol ogy the motive s which determine i t ar e qualitativel y heterogeneous .

Methodology of Social Sciences 9

Then it is quite impossible t o spea k o f an "average" in the tru e sense .
(Weber, Economy I , pp . 20-21 )

Thus, the ideal types used in economics an d sociolog y shoul d no t

be confused wit h average types, nor shoul d the y be mistaken fo r th e
laws o f behavior pertainin g t o th e uniformities . The quasi-genera l
aspects of social and economic ideal types do not represen t concret e
meanings in the mind s o f actual individuals . They ar e the result s of
"dogmatically ascribed " maxim s an d prioritie s t o th e "hypotheti cal" socia l actors . Thi s mean s tha t th e us e o f averag e type s i s
practically limite d t o th e sociologica l mas s phenomen a (Weber ,
Economy I, p. 9) . This argumen t als o provide s a partial vindicatio n
for th e quantitativ e method s o f empirica l sociology . Webe r woul d
agree tha t th e hypothese s o f thes e studie s mus t b e "verified "
through empirica l researc h becaus e thei r objec t i s a varian t o f
actual existin g meaning. T o enlarge o n this point woul d necessitat e
an elaboratio n o f Weber' s respons e t o suc h trend s a s positivism ,
which contribute d t o th e ris e o f empirica l sociology . Th e wa y i n
which he moved t o mee t thi s challenge is discussed in Appendi x A .
Step Two: From Interactive Reciprocity to
Probabilistic Action
Weber professe d t o hav e don e hi s bes t t o "exorcis e th e specte r o f
collective concepts " fro m th e real m o f sociology. 12 If , whil e doin g
so, h e als o manage d t o avoi d th e pitfal l o f takin g th e elusiv e
facticity o f the concret e intersubjectivit y of particula r socia l actor s
as th e locu s o f interpretiv e sociology , i t wa s partl y becaus e o f hi s
peculiar interpretatio n o f the concept s o f "reciprocity" an d "proba bility." This crucial theoretical mov e leading to th e development of
the theor y o f idea l type s enable d Webe r t o redefine , analyticall y
work out, and eventuall y rehabilitate an d us e some o f those hypos tatized "collectiv e concepts" tha t onc e offende d hi s epistemologica l
taste s o much .
Although Webe r established th e necessity of the mutual intersub jective orientatio n a s the essential componen t o f "social action, " he
radically undermined i t as a constitutive element o f "social relationships." Meaningfu l actio n ca n b e nonsocial; i t becomes socia l onl y
when i t is oriented towar d th e meaningfu l action o f others . Never -

10 MA

X WEBER'S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

theless, symmetr y an d reciprocit y o f the actua l subjectiv e orienta tion i s not th e locu s o f "social relationships" :
The subjectiv e meaning nee d no t necessaril y be the sam e fo r al l th e
parties who are mutually oriente d in a given social relationship; ther e
need no t i n thi s sens e b e "reciprocity. " "Friendship, " "love, "
"loyalty," "fidelit y to contracts, " "patriotism, " o n one side, may well
be faced with an entirely different attitud e o n the other. I n such case s
the partie s associat e differen t meaning s wit h thei r actions , an d th e
social relationshi p i s insofa r objectivel y "asymmetrical " fro m th e
points o f vie w o f th e tw o parties . (Weber , Economy I , p . 27 )

"Social relationship " i s not base d o n intersubjectiv e meeting s of

the mind s but (especiall y for the observer ) o n the "probabilit y tha t
there will be a meaningful course of action." Note how Weber, using
his interpretatio n o f th e concept s o f probabilit y an d reciprocity ,
provides a ne w basi s fo r th e legitimat e us e o f th e collectiv e con cepts.
That a "friendship" o r a "state" exists o r has existed mean s thi s an d
only this : tha t we , the observers , judge tha t ther e i s o r ha s bee n a
probability tha t o n th e basi s o f certai n kind s o f know n subjective
attitudes of certain individual s there will result in the average sens e a
certain specifi c typ e o f action . (Weber , Economy I , p . 28)

Thus, th e actua l psychi c inne r state s o f th e participant s i n socia l

relationships, eve n when the y ar e contradictory , becom e "immate rial" as long a s "in effec t th e probabilit y o f that orientatio n t o th e
agreement actuall y exist s t o a sociologicall y relevan t degree "
(Weber, Logos, p . 160) . Thi s make s i t possibl e t o trea t certai n
complexes o f social actio n "a s if " a unifor m orientatio n towar d a
given orde r exist s amon g th e participants . Th e marke t i s an idea l
typical complex o f actions o f this kind an d exhibit s the characteris tics introduce d befor e (Weber , Logos, p. 167) .
When a worke r accept s "certai n characteristicall y shape d meta l
disks o r slip s o f paper" as remunerations fo r hi s labor, h e doe s s o
knowing tha t a n unspecifie d an d totall y anonymou s multitud e o f
persons know n a s "others" are willing to exchang e certai n neede d
goods fo r hi s "money." H e also reckon s tha t i f someone shoul d tr y

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

to deprive him of his earned good s "there i s a certain possibility that

people with spiked helmets would respond t o hi s call an d hel p him
get them back" (Weber, Stammler, p. 101) . Mos t sociologica l idea l
types aim at characterizing thes e intersubjectivel y accessible expec tations rather tha n delvin g into the psychic inner states o f the socia l
actors. Weber's specia l treatment o f the concepts of reciprocity and
probability no t onl y moves us farther awa y from th e typ e of inter pretive knowledge of the actua l existin g meaning a t the leve l of the
concrete individual; it also sets the stage for Weber's final statemen t
on the subject of interpretive sociology as he sees it: the ideal typica l
analysis.

Step Three: Interpretive Sociology Based on Ideal Types

Now i t i s reasonabl y clea r tha t th e kin d o f meanin g interpretiv e
sociology i s mainly interested i n is "the theoreticall y conceive d pure
type o f subjectiv e meanin g attribute d t o th e hypothetica l acto r o r
actors" (Weber, Economy I , p. 4). In what remains of this section we
will state fou r o f the mai n characteristics o f ideal types, stressing th e
significance o f each for th e sociolog y of intellectuals. Let u s star t b y
elucidating th e mos t obviou s feature of ideal typica l analysis:
1. Ideal types ar e purely instrumental fo r sociology an d social
sciences. As such they are at once indispensable and insufficient.
There are different kind s of ideal types, 13 but the y all have one thing
in common : the y ar e o f "practical" value fo r sociologica l an d his torical analysi s (Weber , Meaning, p . 42) . The y ar e temporary har bors i n the se a of empirical facts , no t th e fina l destination (Weber ,
Objectivity, p . 104) . T o trea t idea l type s a s anythin g mor e tha n
"instrumental" woul d culminat e i n "reification " o f idea l types. 14
Let us see how Weber recommended th e use of the "rationalistic"
ideal type s o f actio n i n sociology . Realit y i s "messy, " i t i s no t
rational. I n any given course of action, errors in thought o r compu tation can be as consequential for the final outcom e of the action a s
correct thinkin g an d calculation . Nevertheless , Weber suggest s th e
construction o f a rational , thoroughl y "errorless " trajector y fo r
action. Amon g th e varietie s o f collectiv e action , wa r present s a
notoriously jumbled combinatio n o f rational calculation s an d irra tional outcomes . Nevertheles s Weber suggests:

12 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

To understand ho w a war is conducted, i t is necessary t o imagin e a n

ideal commander-in-chie f fo r eac h sideeve n thoug h no t explicitl y
or in detailed form . Eac h o f these commanders mus t kno w th e total
fighting resource s o f each sid e an d al l the possibilitie s arisin g there from o f attainin g th e concretel y unambiguou s goal , namely , th e
destruction o f th e enemy' s militar y power . O n th e basi s o f thi s
knowledge, the y mus t ac t entirel y withou t erro r an d i n a logicall y
"perfect" way . For only then can the consequences o f the fact that the
real commanders neithe r had th e knowledg e nor wer e they free fro m
error, an d tha t the y wer e no t purel y rational thinkin g machines , b e
unambiguously established . (Weber , Meaning, p . 42)

It i s eviden t tha t th e "rationalistic " characte r o f thi s analysi s i s

purely heuristic; it does no t impl y the predominance o f the rationa l
elements i n huma n thought , muc h les s a valuatio n o f rationalism .
The onl y drawback o f these "rationalistic" ideal type s is their "teleological" nature. B y assuming a rational end for action, thi s metho d
cannot hel p bu t impl y a functionalis t attitud e i n sociology : ever y
action mus t be linked to a prefigured goal regardless o f whether i t is
achieved o r not . Webe r frankl y admit s thi s implicatio n an d state s
(as many sociologist s hav e als o done) that the functiona l approac h
could eve n b e usefu l a s a "preliminary step " in sociologica l investi gations (Weber , Economy I, p. 16) . In criticizing Knies's arguments ,
Weber i s even mor e candi d abou t th e "heuristic " value o f this kin d
of ideal type. Here Webe r implies that the assumptio n o f rationalit y
is a cryptographi c device . W e need t o assum e th e coherenc e o f th e
message i f we ar e t o mak e sens e o f it .
"Interpretation" i n our sens e would b e called fo r onl y in cases o f the
following description . Althoug h th e "meaning " o f a n expressio n i s
not immediatel y "understood, " an d i t i s no t possibl e t o reac h a
practical "understanding " concernin g it s meanin g wit h it s author ,
nevertheless a n "understanding " o f it s meanin g i s o f unconditiona l
practical necessity . Conside r a n exampl e whic h remain s withi n th e
domain o f "everyday" rea l life . A n office r leadin g a patrol receive s a
written militar y comman d whic h i s ambiguousl y draw n up . I t i s
necessary fo r hi m t o "interpret " th e "purpose " of the ordertha t is
to say, to consider the motives responsible for the orderin orde r t o
act o n it . (Weber , Knies, p. 154 )

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

Ideal types of social actio n mus t hav e a rational core eve n thoug h
action itsel f may lack rationa l structure . Thus a n interrelate d se t of
statistical correlations about a social phenomenon in isolation fro m
an idea l typical meaning construction doe s no t qualif y as "interpre tive sociology. " A t th e sam e time , a perfectl y rational idea l typ e of
action i s also useles s if some kin d o f proof fo r th e probabl e occur rence of the meaningfu l action i s not provide d (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 12) . Thi s mutua l interdependenc e o f idea l type s an d empirica l
data doe s not impl y that the validity of ideal type must be "verified "
by the empirical data. Weber's phraseology for this interdependenc e
is: determinin g th e "causa l adequacy " o f th e "meaningfull y ade quate" course o f action .
Statistical uniformitie s constitut e understandabl e type s o f action ,
and thu s constitute sociologica l generalizations , onl y when they ca n
be regarde d a s manifestation s o f th e understandabl e subjectiv e
meaning o f a course o f socia l action . Conversely , formulations o f a
rational course of subjectively understandabl e actio n constitut e soci ological type s of empirical process only when they can b e empirically
observed wit h a significan t degre e o f approximation . (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 12)

The intuitive "self-evidence" of any subjectively adequate idea l type

is deceptive. Weber warns against confusin g this image of action with
the empirica l certaint y tha t th e sociologis t mus t achieve 15 (Weber ,
Knies, p . 180 ; Meaning, p . 42) . W e mus t b e awar e tha t withou t a
rigorous methodologica l screenin g o f th e sociologica l concepts , th e
ideal types of rational actio n might come innocentl y to presen t them selves a s the "law s o f human action, " while the historica l idea l types
might appea r a s "logical trend s o f history." Logically speaking , idea l
types ar e bu t stylize d image s obtaine d throug h abstraction s an d
generalizations, elimination s an d exaggerations . Thei r onl y ai m is to
substitute th e "infinit e multiplicit y o f successivel y and co-existentl y
emerging and disappearin g events " (Weber, Objectivity, p . 72). Thes e
ideal types , whe n compare d wit h th e infinit e richnes s o f empirica l
data, ar e relativel y empty o f concret e conten t (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 20) . Weber admits tha t eve n historical ideal type s are i n this sens e
"unhistorical" (Weber, Social, p . 294) .

14 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

Weber furthe r underscore d th e instrumenta l natur e o f the socio logical idea l type s b y pointin g ou t tha t the y ar e neithe r logica l
definitions no r genera l statement s abou t a clas s o f facts ; the y ar e
purely fictitiou s "hypotheses" tha t ar e use d t o mak e a "scientific "
understanding o f th e infinitel y ric h "empirica l reality " humanl y
possible. Wit h numerou s examples , Webe r illustrate d tha t i n thos e
cases wher e idea l typica l construction s see m t o influenc e th e con crete cours e o f action , th e proces s i s alway s mediate d b y actua l
social actors . I n th e cas e o f direc t influenc e o f th e lega l orde r o n
conduct, fo r instance , i t is not th e "law" bu t "th e empiricall y ascertainable maxim o f the concret e conduc t o f human beings " (Weber ,
Stammler, p. 130 ) that influence the actio n o f others. Peopl e orien t
their behavio r according t o the probabilities that certain individuals
(say judges ) woul d tak e th e lega l idea s a s th e maxim s o f thei r
action. Therefore , th e lega l orde r i n fac t exist s a s a se t o f maxim s
(Weber, Stammler, p, 129) : "It i s a norm whic h can be conceived a s
having 'axiologica l validity. ' Therefore, i t i s quit e obviousl y no t a
form o f bein g o r existence , bu t rathe r a standar d o f valu e b y
reference to which empirical existence ca n be evaluated." It is in this
sense tha t Webe r attribute s causa l significanc e to rationality .
Underestimating Weber' s clarit y o f vision regardin g th e differenc e
of idea l type s of generalized actio n an d thos e referrin g to th e histor ical cours e o f action , Talcot t Parson s maintaine d tha t Webe r ha d
confused tw o different kind s of ideal types and thu s attributed histor ical realit y t o th e idea l typica l constructio n o f rationalizatio n (Par sons, 1964) . Thi s i s unlikely. Weber was wel l awar e o f th e fictitiou s
nature of the idea l type of rationality. However , he also believed that
an ideal type, if mediated b y human agent s (i n which case it becomes
a "maxim" for th e concret e actors) , i s capable o f influencing the ac tual course of action and , consequently, of becoming a force in history.
Intellectuals, as we will see in the forthcomin g chapter, ofte n acte d
as such mediators; the y are th e bearer s o f different level s an d mode s
of rationality . Th e rationalizatio n o f th e spher e o f idea s occur s
through intellectual s wh o hav e a stak e i n constructin g eve r mor e
consistent images of the world. This general statement ca n be used as
a guide to study the substantively diverse contents o f various civilizations and the role intellectuals have played in creating and developin g
the mai n thrus t o f idea s o f tha t particula r culture . I t i s alway s
instructive to remembe r that theoretical (o r practical fo r that matter )

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

rationalization i s not a n independent force but a maxim in the minds

of a grou p of individuals. Ideal type s
enable u s to se e if, in particular trait s o r i n their total character , th e
phenomena approximat e on e of our constructions : to determin e the
degree o f approximatio n o f the historica l phenomeno n t o th e theo retically constructed type. To this extent, the construction is merely a
technical ai d whic h facilitates a mor e luci d arrangemen t an d termi nology. Yet , under certai n conditions , a constructio n migh t mea n
more. Fo r th e rationality , i n th e sens e o f logica l o r teleologica l
"consistency," o f a n intellectual-theoretica l o r practical-ethica l atti tude ha s an d alway s has ha d powe r ove r man , howeve r limited an d
unstable this power is and alway s has been in the face o f other forces
of historica l life . Religiou s interpretation s o f th e worl d an d ethic s
of religion s created b y intellectual s an d mean t t o b e rationa l hav e
been strongl y expose d t o th e imperativ e o f consistency . (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 324 )

This is the reason behin d Weber' s suggestion that "the trut h value
of idea s i s the guidin g value in writin g of intellectual history. " The
ideal type s are not b y themselves concrete forces in history, they do
not constitut e a mode o f being (Weber, Objectivity, p . 93), yet their
assumption, lik e that o f the numerica l order , help s one to sor t ou t
and comprehen d th e existing world. When they are taken seriously
as maxim s o f actio n b y certai n strat a (e.g. , intellectuals) , the y
become "real. " Ou r las t chapte r contain s a serie s o f interrelate d
ideal type s of intellectuals. These ar e admittedl y only empty vessels
that ma y o r ma y no t b e fille d i n a give n cas e o f civilizationa l
analysis. The y becom e rea l i n s o far a s th e agent s (intellectual s o r
intelligentsia) embod y them . Bu t i t mus t als o b e emphasize d tha t
this manner o f classification is itself as much a logical conjectur e as
it i s a culturall y specifi c one . I t i s not par t o f realit y bu t rathe r o f
logic and culture . To better understan d thi s we need t o explai n ou r
second statemen t i n relatio n t o idea l types . Her e w e modif y th e
already emphasize d fictitiousnes s of the idea l type s and encourag e
reflection o n th e natur e o f their falseness .

2. Ideal types stylize th e concrete reality, yet their distortions are

by no means arbitrary; their falseness is a reflection of the observer's rootedness in time and space, and not the product of an
artistic falsification. Thi s distortion i s not onl y logicall y necessary .

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

It i s als o indispensabl e fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e "sociolog y o f

knowledge." It is our historica l interest s that determine th e cultura l
significance o f the happenings o f the past . Accordingly , a historica l
ideal typ e i s the resul t o f one-side d accentuatio n an d a systemati c
stylization o f historical fact s (Weber , Objectivity, p . 90) . A histori cal idea l typ e i s warpe d an d lopsided , fo r i t carrie s mor e logica l
consistency an d les s factua l o r historica l detai l tha n th e realit y i t
represents; an d als o becaus e i t favor s certai n element s o f objectiv e
reality as "relevant" and "significant " t o the exclusion o f others. All
ideal type s reduce empirica l realit y t o a Utopia n mode l i n orde r t o
overcome th e overwhelmin g multiplicit y o f th e concret e data .
Weber doe s no t clai m tha t th e chose n fact s ar e i n an y wa y mor e
"essential," but rathe r the y ar e mor e significan t fo r th e observers .
Thus th e selectio n o f dat a organize d i n idea l type s mus t no t b e
regarded a s an instanc e o f arbitrarily simplifyin g th e complexit y of
historical even t (Weber , Social, p . 294) . I f ou r limitednes s in tim e
and space , an d ou r particularit y o f interest s i s a disadvantage ,
Weber turn s i t int o a n advantage : w e com e t o understand , no t i n
spite o f our prejudice s but precisel y because o f them. 16 The liberat ing effec t o f thi s ide a stem s directl y fro m a sens e o f modest y tha t
underlies it. Weber took a bold ste p when h e recognized tha t "our "
history inevitabl y bears th e imprin t o f ou r particula r interes t i n it .
Thus, h e liberate d sociologist s a s well a s other socia l scientist s an d
particularly historian s fro m th e burdensom e pretensio n o f Germa n
idealism, whic h require d the m t o b e selfles s oracle s o f reaso n (o r
revolution). I t als o pulverize d th e puritanica l obsessio n o f Frenc h
positivism wit h cleansin g th e min d o f th e socia l scientis t fro m th e
contagion o f values and interests. 17 The use of ideal type s enables u s
to accep t an d utiliz e rather tha n t o figh t th e fac t tha t w e confront
our societ y an d histor y a s finit e huma n being s whos e interest s
define th e pas t a s muc h a s they ar e define d b y it .
The fac t tha t fo r Webe r th e criterio n o f meaningfulnes s o f idea l
types is not th e abstrac t an d universa l principl e o f logic bu t rathe r
"subjective adequacy"whic h amount s t o agreemen t wit h "com mon sense," 18 also epitomizes th e liberatin g modesty of his meth odology:
The interpretatio n o f a coheren t cours e o f conduc t i s "subjectivel y
adequate" (or "adequat e o n th e leve l o f meaning") , insofa r as , ac -

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

cording to our habitua l mode s of thought an d feeling , it s componen t

parts take n i n thei r mutua l relatio n ar e recognize d t o constitut e a
"typical" complex o f meaning. I t i s more common t o sa y "correct."
(Weber, Economy I , p . 11 )

An idea l type , therefore , i s subjectivel y adequat e a s soo n a s i t i s

constructed an d a s long a s it meet s Weber' s rathe r modes t criteria .
Of course , ther e i s n o guarante e tha t "ou r habitua l mode s o f
thought an d feeling " woul d reflec t th e truth . But , i n Weber' s view ,
embracing th e metaphysica l trut h i s not th e goa l fo r whic h sociol ogy o r an y o f th e socia l science s mus t strive . I n n o case , Webe r
argues, does the "meaning" sociology strives to apprehend (whethe r
"actual existing"concrete or averageor "the pur e type") refer t o
an objectivel y "correct " meanin g o r on e whic h i s "true " i n som e
metaphysical sense . Instea d o f verifying the m w e simply determine
the empirica l validit y o f th e subjectivel y adequat e idea l type s b y
estimating th e odd s o f thei r occurrence , i.e . thei r "causa l ade quacy." I t i s thi s whic h distinguishe s th e empirica l science s o f
action, suc h a s sociolog y an d history , fro m dogmati c discipline s
such a s jurisprudence, logi c an d aesthetic s whic h see k t o ascertai n
the "true" and "valid" meanings associate d wit h the objects o f their
investigation (Weber , Economy I , p . 4).
In th e real m o f comparativ e sociology , whic h i s indispensabl e
for sociolog y o f intellectuals , we nee d t o dea l wit h cultura l con cepts o f alien civilizations . Althoug h the prior distinction seem s t o
relieve th e socia l science s fro m th e tas k o f judging th e validit y o r
legitimacy o f othe r cultures , stil l a nonjudgmenta l understandin g
of alie n culture s remain s problematic. 19 On e migh t as k i f "our
habitual mode s o f thought an d feeling " can legitimatel y constitut e
the criterio n fo r th e subjectiv e validit y o f idea l types ; an d i f th e
guiding ligh t fo r selectio n an d definitio n o f socia l problem s als o
originates i n "our " interests , woul d i t no t b e impossibl e fo r th e
observer t o reac h a n interpretiv e understanding o f culture s othe r
than one' s own ? Ho w ar e w e suppose d t o chec k th e subjectiv e
adequacy o f th e idea l type s w e mak e abou t othe r cultures' ? Ho w
can w e define thei r socia l problems ? How do w e select the "signifi cant" fact s fro m thei r history ? Th e sociologica l stud y o f alie n
cultures thu s ha s t o conten d wit h th e sam e problem s tha t bese t
historical investigations.

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

The strengt h o f Weber' s respons e t o bot h thes e problem s lie s i n

his bol d recognitio n o f the limit s tha t huma n finitud e impose s o n
knowledge. A s a hermeneutical consciousness o f our rootednes s in
time render s destructiv e prejudice int o constructiv e historica l in sight, als o a n awarenes s o f ou r define d presenc e i n geocultura l
space can turn cultural distance int o intellectual leverag e for under standing. I n studyin g th e worl d o f predecessor s o r i n examinin g
different layer s of the worl d o f contemporaries, 20 the huma n inter ests present a Janus face. While denial o r self-righteous assertio n of
these interests greatly impedes understanding, a n awareness of ones
rootedness in time and space turns the blind spot of human particu larity into a lens for scientific , that is , selective an d discriminating ,
study of empirical reality. Hence Weber conceded tha t hi s theory of
concept formatio n wa s "anthropomorphic" (Burger , p. 80). W e can
even cal l i t "ethnocentric. " Bu t here , ethnocentrism , rathe r tha n
being an expression o f the self-righteousness of a dominant culture ,
testifies t o th e consciou s adaptatio n o f th e scienc e o f ma n t o th e
"human condition. " Unles s we have an "Archimedean point, " i.e., a
particular value-relevan t (and scientific ) interest, i t becomes impos sible for u s to "scientifically " stud y any alie n culture. 21 The subjec t
of investigation therefore must be "valuable" for the social scientist .
This also holds true for the realm of history. The observer canno t
help bu t loo k a t histor y fro m hi s o r he r ow n poin t o f view . Th e
concept o f "value relevance," however , transcends narrow utilitarian interest s and individua l biases. Weber rejected Meyer's restric tion o f th e value-relevan t interes t of th e historia n onl y to effective
history; tha t i s to thos e historical elements that hav e been causally
effective i n bringing about th e "present " (Weber , Meyer, p . 157) .
For Weber , even th e mos t historicall y inconsequential facts of a n
alien civilizatio n (e.g., thos e o f th e Inca s an d Aztecs ) ca n becom e
the subjec t o f th e value-relevan t interes t o f th e historia n bot h a s
"heuristic instruments " fo r th e formatio n o f theoretica l concept s
appropriate t o th e stud y o f cultur e a s such, 22 an d a s "historica l
individuals" studie d with respect t o thei r "relevance to values" 23
(Weber, Meyer, p . 156) . Weber' s ow n attempt s to com e t o grip s
with civilizationa l an d historica l complexes neithe r aime d a t cap turing their totality nor claime d to have reproduced th e world view
of thei r "natives." Hi s mai n "interest " wa s to discove r th e rol e o f
the religiousl y grounded economi c ethic s o f thes e civilizations .

Methodology o f Social Sciences 1

He sough t a n answe r t o th e followin g question (an d thi s wa s his

"Archimedean point") : Why did the causa l nexus of events in these
civilizations fail to produce "capitalism," which stood a t the current
end of the European historica l development? Our ai m in the present
study is to examin e th e rol e o f intellectuals i n historically and geo culturally distan t time s an d places . I n orde r to accomplis h thi s we
do no t nee d t o transcen d histor y o r culture , bu t onl y t o erec t a
logically consisten t (i f culturall y specific) structur e fo r containin g
data abou t th e rol e o f intellectual s i n (historicall y an d geocul turally) distan t civilizations . I n th e cas e o f th e so-calle d cultura l
diffusion, intellectual s o f thes e ver y civilization s hav e borrowe d
from eac h other .
In ever y case, fro m th e extraordinar y resistanc e o f Judais m t o
elements o f Egyptian an d Babylonia n neighbors t o th e easy sprea d
of Hinduis m i n the subcontinent , th e intellectual s have considere d
cultural product s availabl e fo r borrowing , i n th e ligh t o f thei r
civilizational prioritie s a s wel l a s i n vie w o f thei r ow n idea l an d
material interests , before optin g t o adop t o r rejec t the m (Weber ,
Judaism, pp . 190 , 203-205; India, pp . 9 , 16) . There i s no reaso n t o
exclude th e Wester n scientifi c proces s fro m thi s practice . Th e las t
important cavea t abou t th e idea l type s i s that:
3. Ideal types d o no t subsume reality. I t i s th e reality that ap proximates th e ideal types. W e hav e alread y mentione d tha t th e
adequacy a t th e leve l of meanin g o f a n idea l typ e must b e comple mented b y measurin g its causa l adequacy :
The interpretatio n o f a sequence of events w i l l . .. be called causally
adequate insofa r as , accordin g t o establishe d generalization s fro m
experience, ther e i s a probability tha t i t will always actuall y occu r in
the sam e way . (Weber , Economy I , p . 11 )

This, however, does no t mea n tha t idea l types must b e "validated"

or "verified " i n th e sam e wa y tha t hypothese s ar e verifie d i n th e
natural sciences. Ideal types are unlike the hypotheses of the natura l
sciences, as conceived by English empiricists since Bacon ; ideal types
are no t prematur e theories . Th e constructio n o f "general theories "
(e.g., the rationalisti c ideal types of typical action) i n the socia l an d
cultural science s i s no t th e ultimat e goa l o f thes e disciplines ; th e
theories ar e mer e instrument s in achievin g "th e knowledg e o f th e

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

concrete reality." 24 The sam e i s true fo r th e historica l idea l types. 25

Obviously bot h historica l an d sociologica l idea l type s ca n assum e
the for m o f lawlike statements. Thi s is only apparent . Sociologica l
ideal type s ar e no t th e resul t o f a n inductiv e verification o f hypoth eses. Indeed , the y ar e nothin g bu t th e elaboratio n o f a se t o f
"teleological" or "dogmatically" ascribe d assumptions . Thos e socia l
scientists wh o insis t o n enthronin g thes e idea l type s a s "law s o f
social an d economi c behavior " no t onl y reject th e centralit y o f th e
concrete realit y a s th e subjec t matte r o f socia l science s bu t als o
delude themselve s abou t th e origi n o f thes e so-calle d laws. 26 I n
summary, ideal types are neither overreachin g laws nor all-embrac ing logica l definitions. 27 Th e mai n functio n o f a n idea l typ e i s t o
provide a basi s fo r comparison :
Its functio n i s th e compariso n wit h empirica l realit y i n orde r t o
establish it s divergence s o r similarities , to describ e the m wit h th e
most unambiguously intelligible concepts, an d t o understan d an d
explain the m causally . (Weber, Meaning, p . 43)

Therefore, th e logica l paralle l o f idea l typica l analysi s i s neithe r

inductive no r deductiv e an d no t eve n analogica l reasoning. 28 Th e
use of ideal type s rather resemble s a simple rhetorical us e of analogies. Excep t tha t her e th e exampl e (idea l type ) i s no t borrowe d
ready made , bu t i s meticulously reconstructed throug h selectio n of
the mos t "relevant " feature s of the reality . I n thi s sens e idea l types
are "exemplary." A n example cannot b e verified or falsified. I t only
can b e judge d a s subtle , relevant , an d appropriat e o r otherwise ,
crude, irrelevant , an d inappropriate. 29
An ideal type is a measuring device, a "precision instrument. " I t is
absurd t o attemp t t o prove or disprove the measuring rod. On e can
only use one in order to determine how the reality "measures up " t o
it (Weber , Stammler, p . 111) . I t i s a heuristi c devic e fo r framin g
hypotheses (Weber , Stammler, p. 113) . The idea l type is a model of
meaning tha t th e observe r associate s (Weber , Stammler, p . I l l )
with th e actio n tha t i s either historicall y observe d o r theoreticall y
possible (Weber , Logos, p. 160). 30
Although actua l researc h i s no t mean t t o confir m o r refut e th e
ideal type, in the course of empirical research we can and constantl y
do judge th e relevanc e an d sensitivit y of ou r idea l types . A searc h

Methodology o f Social Sciences 2

for confirmatio n (o r refutation ) o f the idea l typ e is as meaningles s

as trying to validate the yardstick by seeking objects that ar e exactl y
one yard long. The questio n therefore is not whethe r the idea l typ e
holds bu t t o wha t exten t i t does . I n idea l typica l analysi s we mus t
ask ho w doe s th e actua l dat a approximat e th e meanin g w e hav e
arrived a t eithe r b y historica l stylizatio n o r throug h a one-side d
"rationalistic" an d "teleological " ratiocination . W e d o no t as k
whether o r no t ou r idea l typ e is valid; rathe r th e questio n is , how
must the actio n procee d if the conduct i s to correspon d to th e idea l
type? Thus, Webe r does not clai m to kno w how a particular perso n
"will" o r shoul d ac t bu t onl y ho w h e "must " ac t i n orde r fo r hi s
conduct t o correspond to the respective ideal type of action w e have
constructed (Weber , Stammler, p. 111) .
It i s onl y i n th e ligh t o f thes e consideration s tha t th e followin g
passage of Roscher and Knies, i n which Weber contrasts the hypoth eses o f natural science s to idea l types, can b e properly understood :
A hypothetica l "la w o f nature " whic h i s definitivel y refute d i n a
single cas e collapse s a s a n hypothesi s onc e an d fo r all . I n contrast ,
the idealtypical construction s o f economicsi f the y ar e correctl y
understoodhave no pretensions a t al l to general validity. A "law o f
nature", on the othe r hand , must clai m t o b e generally valid . Other wise i t lose s it s meaning . (Weber , Knies, p. 190 )

The question , then , i s t o wha t exten t th e actua l conduc t corre sponds t o thi s rationa l scheme . Tak e th e exampl e o f "Gresham' s
law" i n economics . I t i s
a rationall y clea r interpretatio n o f human actio n unde r certai n con ditions an d unde r th e assumptio n tha t it will follow a purely rationa l
course. Ho w far an y actua l cours e o f action correspond s t o thi s ca n
be verifie d onl y b y th e availabl e statistica l evidenc e fo r th e actua l
disappearance o f under-value d monetar y unit s fro m circulation .
(Weber, Economy I , p . 10 )

Weber suggeste d tha t a n unrea l worl d o f idea l type s b e con structed, i n orde r t o orde r scientificall y th e actua l existin g world .
One-sidedly stylized , teleological, an d rationalisti c i n nature, idea l
types are but "utopian" models tha t hav e only instrumental valu e in

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

attaining th e goa l o f cultura l sciences : the knowledg e o f concret e

reality. Idea l type s ar e no t skeleton s aroun d whic h th e realit y
should b e formed; the y are scaffold s tha t ar e discarde d a s soo n a s
they fulfil l thei r function . To do otherwise , e.g., to trea t idea l types
as th e genera l theorie s o f th e natura l sciences , woul d b e t o reif y
(Weber, Stammler, pp. 113-114 ) this fictitious world o f images an d
examples. Thi s is how w e use ideal type s in the presen t study : only
as vessel s whose actua l utilit y must b e examine d i n th e proces s of
actual research. Weber's theory of ideal types enables him to refer t o
such concept s a s "the religio n o f intellectuals, " "rationalizatio n o f
magic i n India, " and "th e Chines e patrimonia l bureaucracy " with out violatin g hi s methodologica l individualism . Th e constitutiv e
role assigned t o th e value-relevant interest of the investigator i n the
construction o f idea l type s justifies difference s o f perspectiv e an d
guarantees th e open-ende d reconstructio n o f th e sociohistorica l
phenomena i n th e socia l sciences . The presen t stud y ha s benefited
from thi s methodologica l argumen t i n suggestin g new idea l type s
such a s "Religio n fo r th e Masses, " a s wel l a s i n recastin g an d
restructuring th e existin g ideal type s i n ne w configurations .
On Huma n Interes t an d Historica l Causatio n
What i s historical causation ? A solid objectiv e chain o f events or a
subjectively reconstructe d affai r mediate d b y subjectiv e considera tions (interests, values, cultural categories, etc.) of the historian ? By
the tur n o f the century, "intuitionism" and "historica l materialism "
had provide d th e mos t distinc t answer s t o thes e question . Th e
famous debat e betwee n the tw o school s ha d s o charged th e atmos phere tha t neutra l historica l researc h coul d no t hav e bee n con ducted withou t takin g a positio n o n thi s debate . Webe r opte d t o
propose hi s own solution . Hi s response i s of central importanc e t o
our projec t becaus e on e o f the mos t tenaciou s problem s o f sociol ogy of intellectuals is to determine their role in creating as well as in
recapitulating th e historica l process.
Weber settle d th e problem s o f "historica l determination " an d
"historical interest " b y linkin g th e tw o togethe r throug h th e cate gory o f "objectiv e possibility. " We hav e alread y pointe d ou t tha t

Methodology o f Social Sciences 2

Weber's notio n of historica l interest was muc h broader than that of

his contemporary , Eduard Meyer, who confine d i t to th e discover y
of th e causa l sequenc e o f historica l events that ha d brough t about
"the present " (Weber , Meyer, pp . 153-156) . Ye t fro m Meyer ,
Weber seem s t o hav e appropriate d th e metho d o f "ascen t fro m
effect t o cause" : "Th e totality o f al l conditions bac k t o whic h th e
causal chai n fro m th e "effect" lead s ha d to "act jointly i n a certai n
way an d i n no othe r fo r the concret e effect t o b e realized" (Weber ,
Meyer, p . 187) . B y definition ever y historica l happening , withou t
exception, i s "necessitated " b y a countles s numbe r o f historica l
"causes." A historia n wh o follow s the cause s dow n t o a certai n
effect i s ap t t o imagin e th e outcom e wa s "necessitated" fro m th e
outset. Suc h a methodolog y wil l lea d t o a n optica l illusion : th e
vision o f a ideologicall y movin g specte r replace s history . Weber' s
reversal o f the directio n of research (fro m effects t o cause s no t th e
other wa y around) togethe r wit h his alternative concep t o f historical determinatio n (adequat e causation ) avoid s th e deterministi c
fallacy. Weber' s notio n o f historica l determination , fo r instance ,
incorporates th e possibilit y of "historical accidents. " Th e proble m
with thi s approac h i s tha t i t i s neithe r possibl e no r desirabl e t o
track "all " of the cause s o f an even t (which are infinitel y multiple) .
Weber's solutio n was to us e the "historica l interest " o f the investigator a s the criterio n of selection o f the relevan t causes. Historica l
interest woul d orien t th e retrospectiv e ques t fo r thos e fe w "rele vant" an d "significant " causa l connection s that la y behin d historical event s (Weber , Meyer, pp . 151-152) . Bu t ho w ca n suc h a
method avoi d anthropomorphizin g the history ? How ca n w e propose tha t th e value s o f th e historia n gover n th e selectio n o f dat a
without turning history into a n ever changing private tale o f histo rians?
The answe r i s t o b e foun d i n th e prope r us e o f th e categorie s o f
"adequate causation " an d "objectiv e possibility " (Weber, Meyer,
p. 186) . It was th e utilizatio n o f these tw o concepts in the process of
ascent fro m effect s t o th e "significant " cause s tha t enable d Webe r
to bypass many dangerous methodological rapids of materialistic or
idealistic historical determination. How?
Historical causatio n fo r Webe r i s no t a separat e typ e o f causa tion, i t is objective causation viewe d from the perspectiv e of huma n
interests. 31 T o facilitate th e conversio n o f "objective" int o "histori -

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

cal" causation, Webe r devise d an d use d th e categorie s o f "objectiv e

possibility" an d "adequat e causation. " The y modif y th e historica l
interest o f th e investigato r a s i t delve s int o th e pas t i n orde r t o
discern and scientificall y arrange a n arra y o f facts and concept s that
are "significant" fro m hi s point of view. I n this manner the "value relevant interest " o f th e investigato r is converted into a tool fo r re creating a scientific image o f th e past .
But firs t th e fetis h o f a n unchangeabl e pas t tha t confront s th e
historian a s an "invincible rock " mus t b e broken. Neithe r th e advo cates o f idea l o r materia l determinis m no r th e practitioner s o f
traditional historiograph y ar e exemp t fro m thi s challenge . Webe r
fought th e tyrann y of the pas t by cutting off the chain o f events that
seem t o hav e "necessitated " a give n historica l happening . T o solv e
this proble m Webe r invente d what i s now know n a s counterfactual
trajectories i n historiograph y i n orde r t o dissolv e th e solidit y of
history,
Starting wit h the question : "What woul d hav e happene d if ? . . ."
the historia n imagine s alternativ e trajectorie s fo r th e history . O f
course i t i s th e historica l interes t o f th e investigato r tha t fill s th e
dotted lin e an d determine s whic h lin k i n th e causa l successio n o f
causes leadin g t o th e even t i n questio n i s t o b e hypotheticall y
removed. Fo r example , a politica l historia n woul d b e intereste d i n
estimating the historica l significance of a voluntaristic decision o f a
political leader . I n th e real m o f th e sociolog y o f knowledg e th e
causal significanc e of ideas and i n the sociolog y of intellectuals th e
role o f th e bearer s o f thes e idea s constitut e th e subjec t o f interest.
Therefore i n the questio n "What woul d hav e happened if ? . . ."i t is
always the subjec t o f "interest" tha t is hypothetically removed fro m
the causa l chai n leadin g to a historical event. Throug h thi s type of
questioning a distanc e i s created betwee n the historica l cause s an d
their effects , allowin g a certai n leewa y for exploratio n o f possibilities an d als o fo r comparativ e historica l analysis.
Now, i f the answe r to th e counterfactua l question i s positive (i.e.,
that th e even t i n questio n woul d stil l hav e happene d withou t "thi s
particular" link) , it i s to b e inferre d tha t th e even t i n questio n ha d
been "objectivel y possible " a t th e tim e i t cam e t o pass . Retrospec tively we refer to suc h a n event as having been "adequately caused. "
Such a n even t canno t b e describe d a s a "historica l accident " eve n
though i t migh t appea r t o hav e bee n objectivel y triggere d b y a

Methodology o f Social Sciences 2

fortuitous event . I n suc h a cas e th e fortuitou s characte r o f th e

proximate caus e is of no significance. Like the proverbial straw that
breaks th e camel' s back , lik e th e "las t tur n o f th e screw, " suc h a n
immediate caus e merel y happen s t o "necessitate " a n even t tha t
would i n al l probabilit y materializ e i n an y case . Suc h a n even t i s
"adequately caused" ; i t i s no t a n instanc e o f "historica l accident. "
From th e poin t o f vie w o f th e presen t time , a futur e developmen t
can b e calle d "objectivel y possible " onl y whe n w e hav e evidenc e
that it is on the verge of happening and a further regula r accumula tion o f event s "i n it s favor " includin g shee r accident s migh t wel l
"necessitate" i t o r haste n it s materialization. 32
The logical opposite of an adequately cause d even t is a "historical
accident." T o subsume a sudden tur n o f events unde r thi s categor y
it is not enoug h for its proximate caus e to b e a "fortuitous" one . A n
event qualifie s a s a historica l acciden t whe n i t coul d b e sai d o f i t
that i t woul d neve r hav e happene d i n an y shap e o r for m ha d th e
immediate fortuitous cause not bee n present. For th e contemporar ies o f th e historica l event i n question , th e objectiv e possibility o f a
historical acciden t i s nil . T o pu t i t i n a mor e anthropomorphi c
language, whe n a n even t happen s withou t havin g a considerabl e
array o f othe r event s weighin g o n it s side , w e sa y i t i s no t "ade quately caused" ; i t i s a "historica l accident." 33
The tas k o f determining the typ e of causation involve d in a given
historical development is entrusted t o the empirical research guide d
by the historical interests of the investigator who weighs the relative
significance o f certai n historica l cause s leadin g u p t o th e even t i n
question.
In dealing with the interface of ideas an d interest s in history (e.g.,
in sociologies o f knowledge and intellectuals ) we are called upo n t o
make judgments of this sort. One cannot answe r this in metatheory.
Each cas e mus t b e decide d o n empirica l grounds . I n certai n case s
Weber refer s t o "concrete " historical o r "accidental " determinant s
(Weber, Judaism, p . 167 ; Economy I , p. 40 ) of a historical configu ration (Weber , India, p . 240) , while o n othe r occasion s h e calls a n
entire historica l developmen t a "historical accident. " Fo r instance ,
the sprea d o f Buddhis m t o Southeas t Asi a i s calle d b y Webe r a
"historical accident " (Weber , India, p . 230) . Thi s obviousl y mean s
that it was not a n objectively possible development for Buddhism t o
spread beyon d it s origina l grounds . Suc h a developmen t coul d

26 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

therefore b e judged t o hav e bee n exclusivel y caused b y the conver sion o f Kin g Ashuka , wh o zealousl y sough t t o internationaliz e hi s
religion. Her e th e proximat e caus e i s th e rea l one . O n th e othe r
hand, Buddhism' s activ e oppositio n t o th e rulin g strata , althoug h
lacking i n ancien t Buddhism , wa s alway s a "laten t possibility " in
view o f it s denunciatio n o f th e India n socia l orde r an d o f cast e
ritualism (Weber , India, p . 240) . Thus , whe n actualized , th e latte r
development cannot b e called a "historical accident, " becaus e i t was
always "objectivel y possible. "
In another example , Webe r deem s i t entirely legitimate (althoug h
he doe s no t tak e side s o n thi s specifi c question ) t o argu e tha t th e
assassination attemp t tha t heralde d th e Firs t Worl d Wa r b e dis carded a s insignificant if it is sufficiently clea r that the internationa l
situation o f th e tim e wa s volatil e enoug h t o b e se t ablaz e b y "any "
spark (Weber , Meyer, p . 166) . Knowin g tha t th e Firs t Worl d Wa r
was starte d b y a Serbia n student' s bulle t tell s u s nothin g abou t
whether i t was a "historical accident. " The sociolog y o f intellectuals
must make these type s of judgments whenever intellectual s advance
a historicall y consequential "ideology." Thes e question s canno t b e
settled ahea d o f tim e i n a metatheoretica l argumen t bu t mus t b e
resolved i n th e proces s o f fiel d research .
On Socia l Chang e
A Weberia n answe r to th e question : "How i s history possible? " ca n
be provide d o n th e basi s o f th e categorie s o f "objective possibility "
and "adequate causation," which integrate human interes t into, and
recognize i t a s a n integra l par t of , th e methodolog y o f historica l
sciences. Wha t woul d b e lef t o f a give n "historica l development " i f
we wer e t o depriv e ourselve s o f th e advantag e o f huma n perspec tive? Weber' s vie w o f th e "objective " directio n o r mechanic s o f
historical chang e a s reflecte d i n hi s theor y o f "socia l selection, "
while resemblin g th e approac h o f socia l Darwinis m o r tha t o f th e
theories o f social conflict , i s devoid o f their melioristi c o r rational izing overtones . Fo r on e thing , Webe r doe s no t assum e tha t th e
outcome o f socia l conflic t o r competitio n i s alway s determine d b y
the intrinsi c superiorit y o f th e survivin g individuals , groups , o r

Methodology o f Social Sciences 2

sociocultural forms . "Survival" ca n b e th e resul t o f quit e concret e

extrinsic historica l circumstance s o r "accidents." The decidin g fac tor i n "social selection " is the "differentia l advantage" of the surviving group s o r forms , which i s not necessaril y indicative o f "fitnes s
to survive " or o f a superior "adaptedness, " but ca n resul t from an y
number o f socia l o r natura l changes . Surviva l ma y als o b e a n
unintended consequenc e o f actions o f any o f the partie s involved in
the "competitiv e struggle " (Weber , Economy I , pp . 38-40) .
Weber considered th e us e of concepts suc h a s "fitness t o survive "
or "adaptedness," which had becom e popula r in the wake of biolog ically imbue d theorie s o f evolution, t o b e beggin g th e questio n an d
charged wit h surreptitious value judgments. H e declared: "The fac t
that a give n specifi c socia l relationshi p ha s bee n eliminate d fo r
reasons peculia r to a particula r situation, prove s nothin g whatever
about it s 'fitness t o survive ' in genera l terms " (Weber, Economy I ,
p. 40) . A close examination o f the belie f that fitness to surviv e alone
accounts fo r surviva l shows that i t is a close relativ e of the determin istic fallacy , whic h Webe r avoide d b y suggestin g tha t th e flo w o f
reasoning b e revise d (fro m effect s t o cause s no t vic e versa) . "Th e
totality o f 'all' the condition s bac k t o whic h the causa l chai n fro m
the 'effect ' lead s had t o 'act jointly' i n a certain way an d in no othe r
for th e concrete effec t t o be realized " (Weber , Meyer, p . 187) . I n the
same vein the survival of a group o r a social for m can b e adequately
or accidentall y cause d b y a numbe r o f intrinsi c qualities, extrinsi c
circumstances, intende d a s wel l a s unintende d consequence s o f
human action . T o convenientl y simplif y thi s comple x proces s b y
stating tha t onl y th e fittes t wil l survive is t o reduc e th e scienc e o f
history t o fallacy : onl y th e fittes t survive ; anythin g tha t survive d
must hav e bee n fit!
In censurin g another aspec t o f socia l Darwinis m an d evolution ism invoke d i n th e ideolog y o f moder n technocrati c elites , Weber' s
critique aim s a t th e logica l foundation s a s wel l a s th e ideologica l
ramifications o f th e concep t o f "adaptedness":
Strictly an d exclusivel y empirica l analysi s ca n provid e a solutio n
only wher e it is a question of a mean s adequat e t o th e realizatio n of
an absolutel y unambiguously given end . Th e proposition : x i s th e
only means by which y ca n b e attained, is in fact merely the revers e of
the proposition : y i s the effec t o f x. Th e ter m "adaptedness" (and al l

28 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

other relate d terms ) d o no t providean d thi s i s th e mai n thing

even the slightes t hint about th e value-judgments which they contain
and whic h they actually obscure. . . . Depending on how one uses the
term, eithe r everything or nothin g i n societ y i s "adapted. " (Weber,
Meaning, p . 26)

Weber was especially weary of value judgments implicit i n major

theories o f socia l change . Th e us e o f th e concep t o f "progress "
characterizing the inevitabl e benignity of the evolutio n of mankin d
could no t b e condone d b y Weber . H e maintaine d tha t th e wor d
"progress" be legitimatel y applied onl y i n a nonevaluative - context
where i t signifie s the "'continuation ' o f som e concret e proces s o f
change viewed in isolation" (Weber, Meaning, p . 27) . For instance ,
progress i n the real m o f art ca n b e discerne d not i n its aestheti c o r
evaluative sense but onl y with regard t o "the technica l means which
a certai n typ e o f artisti c impuls e applie s whe n the en d i s definitely
given" (Weber , Meaning, p . 29) .
In th e realm o f social psychology also, on e could elaborat e on a n
objective proces s o f progressiv e differentiatio n "i n th e 'scope ' o r
'capacity' o f a concret e 'mind,' " but , Webe r added , "whethe r on e
designates progressiv e differentiatio n as 'progress ' i s a matte r o f
terminological convenience " (Weber, Meaning, pp . 27 , 28). In a yet
different leve l o f analysis , Webe r advance d beyon d exposin g th e
fallacies a s wel l a s evaluative undercurrent s in the theorie s o f "progress" and questione d thei r single-minded optimism :
Whoever wishe s t o stat e a value-judgmen t regardin g th e fac t o f
differentiation a s suchwhic h n o empirica l discipline can forbid
and seek s a poin t o f vie w fro m whic h thi s ca n b e done , wil l com e
upon th e questio n a s t o th e pric e whic h i s "paid " for th e process .
(Weber, Meaning, p . 28 )

Compared wit h th e theorie s o f evolutio n (and , i n particular ,

social Darwinism) , Weber' s theor y o f socia l selectio n i s "valu e
neutral" and nonteleological . But it is also true that i t lays no clai m
to hav e explanator y o r predictiv e powers . No r doe s i t presum e t o
scientifically arriv e at practical social policies. Yet it is far from pure
mental exercise. Indeed, Weber' s theory is a parody o f the objective
theories of social change an d a s such it serves pedagogical purposes.

Methodology of Social Sciences 29

It ca n b e perceive d a s a too l fo r weanin g th e socia l science s fro m

prematurely impose d pattern s o f change an d warnin g them agains t
the fals e sens e o f securit y suc h theorie s impart .
It mus t als o b e note d tha t ou r critiqu e o f th e theorie s tha t
subsume Webe r as a "conflict sociologist " is not mean t t o den y th e
universal significanc e o f th e concep t o f conflic t i n Weber' s worl d
view. Webe r perceive d th e worl d a s a n utterl y unrationalizabl e
conglomerate o f contradiction s among , a s wel l a s within , th e
spheres o f life. 34 Onl y when this is accepted a s an ontologica l axio m
would i t follow tha t th e sol e corresponding theological depictio n of
such a worl d mus t b e polytheistic , recognizin g a s inevitabl e th e
irreconcilable an d uncompromisin g deat h struggle s betwee n th e
gods (Weber, Meaning, p. 17 ; Politics, p . 123) . Weber observe d that
attempts a t transcending thes e contradiction s i n thought hav e tim e
and agai n produce d th e revers e effect. B y drawing attentio n t o th e
problems they attemp t t o solve , suc h overl y rationalized image s o f
the worl d are likel y to ro b people o f the onl y protective shield they
wear agains t th e disturbin g influenc e of the contradiction s o f thei r
world: their ignorance of them (Weber, Meaning, p. 18) . The rul e of
thumb here is: The more rationally consistent a theoretical image of
the world , th e mor e useles s i t become s (Weber , Social, p . 275 ;
Economy I , p. 526) . In the religiou s sphere, therefore, the theoreti cal rationalizatio n o f the worl d imag e come s int o conflic t wit h th e
primitive practica l rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s life . A s th e
former increasingl y favor s radica l abnegatio n o f th e worl d fo r it s
recalcitrant refusa l t o evinc e the meanin g i t is supposed t o contain ,
the latter's conciliator y an d piecemea l approac h t o th e problem s of
evil an d meaninglessnes s i n th e worl d i s condemne d an d pushe d
aside (Weber , Economy I , p . 424 ; Rejections, p . 355) .
In th e spher e o f politica l ethics , Webe r rejecte d a s naiv e an d
ultimately dangerou s th e monis m o f th e "cosmi c ethica l 'ratio nalist'" wh o disregard s th e eterna l an d unresolvabl e conflic t o f
ethical maxim s (Weber , Politics, pp . 122-123 ; Meaning, pp . 15 , 16).
Therefore th e intellectualistic , overl y rationalize d imag e o f th e
world i s declared b y Webe r t o b e unfi t fo r practica l an d politica l
action, a s it is bound t o foste r dogmatic adherenc e t o the "ethics of
ultimate" ends an d generat e politica l irresponsibility. 35 Th e logica l
opposite o f this worl d view , which Webe r seem s t o recommen d t o
the politicians , is a warrior's ethi c o f following only one' s own go d

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

or demon, o f heroically confronting one's fate in an irrational worl d

of man y deitie s (Weber , India, p . 27 ; Social, p . 283) .
Despite Weber' s commitmen t t o a philosophy o f eternal conflict,
however, h e neve r hypostatize d i t a s th e "drivin g force " o r th e
"pivot" of objective socia l change . O n th e sociologica l plan e Webe r
deemed conflic t t o b e bot h ineradicabl e an d ubiquitou s (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 39) . Bu t th e fac t tha t conflic t ca n b e properl y de fmed onl y whe n th e intentionalit y o f concret e actor s i s concerne d
(and thi s i s consonant wit h Weber' s methodologica l individualism)
disqualifies conflic t a s th e determinan t o f th e directio n o f socia l
change. Fo r Weber , th e scop e o f socia l conflic t i s rathe r limite d
because it can accoun t fo r socia l change onl y insofar as such chang e
originates i n conflictua l o r competitiv e socia l action . Conflic t i s
only on e amon g man y necessar y component s o f Weber' s theor y of
social change . I n a n exceptionall y revealin g passage , Dahrandor f
uses a n analog y likenin g the socia l conflic t vie w of the societ y to a
hyperbola, while the mode l o f the integratio n o r consensu s theorie s
is said t o b e an elliptica l one (Dahrandorf , Social Conflict, p . 106) .
Weber's image o f society and especiall y his theory of social selection
are fa r to o comple x an d multifoca l t o resembl e an y o f th e afore mentioned geometrica l models . Conflict o f various status groups o r
classes tha t mak e u p th e society , thei r variou s "way s o f life " tha t
constitute th e "culture, " an d thei r competitiv e struggl e fo r socia l
and cultura l predominanc e ar e rightl y depicted b y Bendi x t o char acterize Weber' s anticollectivisti c vie w o f th e subjec t matte r o f
sociology (Bendix , 1977 , p. 261) . But th e theor y o f socia l selectio n
recognizes conflict and competitio n onl y as two spoke s no t th e hu b
of th e turnin g whee l o f history . They ar e indispensabl e t o bu t no t
exclusively constitutiv e o f socia l change . Th e followin g passage ,
often quote d b y th e follower s o f th e conflic t schoo l o f though t
(Coser, 1956 , p . 21) , indicate s onl y th e indispensabilit y o f conflict ,
not it s centralit y to Weber' s theor y o f socia l change .
Conflict canno t b e exclude d fro m socia l life . On e ca n chang e it s
means, it s object, eve n it s fundamental directio n an d it s bearers, bu t
it cannot be eliminated . . . "peace" is nothing more than a change in
the for m o f the conflic t o r i n the antagonist s o r i n the object s o f th e
conflict, o r finall y i n th e chance s o f selection . (Weber , Meaning,
pp. 26-27)

Methodology o f Social Sciences 3

As al l (intentional) action leadin g to change , conflict-oriente d an d

competitive actio n ar e als o liabl e t o b e undon e b y thei r ow n unin tended consequences. Even accidental natura l an d social change s can
intervene t o creat e certai n "differentia l advantages, " whic h may , de spite all rationally directe d conflictua l an d competitiv e action , decid e
which group or class survives. The concept o f conflict, as an insepara ble par t o f th e proces s o f socia l selection , refer s t o actio n oriente d
intentionally t o carryin g ou t th e individua l actor's ow n wil l agains t
the resistanc e o f the othe r part y or parties . A peaceful and regulate d
conflict i s called "competition." As opposed t o conflic t an d competi tion, "social selection" does not requir e the intentional predisposition
of th e social actors : "th e struggle , ofte n latent , whic h take s plac e
between huma n individual s o r socia l types , for advantage s an d fo r
survival, bu t withou t a meaningfu l mutua l orientatio n i n term s o f
conflict wil l b e calle d selection " (Weber , Economy I , p . 38) .
Social "selection " and "socia l conflict" must b e ascribed t o socia l
relationships a s far a s the probabilitie s of meaningful action o n th e
part o f individual actor s (b e it a conscious effor t agains t th e wil l of
others o r mer e struggl e t o achiev e persona l goals ) ar e concerned .
But can w e also conceive of conflict between social relationships (as
most theorist s o f conflic t hav e done) , o r o f social selectio n amon g
them? Webe r reject s thi s formall y but condone s it s metaphorica l
use (Weber , Economy / , p . 39 ) as lon g a s th e followin g i s kep t i n
perspective: "Thi s s o calle d 'selection ' ha s nothin g t o d o wit h th e
selection of types of human individuals " (Weber, Economy I, p. 40) .
Weber favore d th e us e o f th e metapho r o f selectio n instea d o f
that o f conflic t fo r describin g th e "objective " proces s o f socia l
change. Th e lac k o f the axio m o f mutual intentional predispositio n
of th e actor s i n socia l selectio n allow s a certai n leewa y fo r th e
exploration o f individual cases wher e the significanc e o f the inten tionally oriente d actio n varie s greatly . Socia l conflic t ma y o r ma y
not b e decisiv e i n determinin g th e outcom e o f socia l selectio n
depending o n th e individua l cases . Socia l selection , therefore , i s a
blind mechanism ; it has a logic but n o teleology. Whe n understoo d
in huma n terms , i t migh t b e studie d a s a selectiv e fulfillment o f a n
assortment o f objective possibilities. Like overl y rational theodicie s
of evil , th e theor y o f socia l selectio n tha t account s fo r al l o f th e
accidental an d rationa l element s is rendered useless. 36 Weber' s the ory i s such a theory : uselessnes s i s its goal .

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

One ca n thin k o f Weber's theor y o f social selectio n a s a "transi tional object, " a pacifier of sorts that help s one unlearn th e habit o f
seeking pattern s i n th e past . Althoug h i t firs t appear s t o b e a n
objective philosoph y o f history , onc e understoo d i t collapse s int o
itself an d reveal s that i t can no t generat e a theory of social change ,
let alone a philosophy of history. The sterility of the theory of social
selection mirror s th e penur y o f an y "objective " theor y o f socia l
change i f i t i s strippe d o f hidde n valu e judgments an d mystifyin g
circular logic . Th e shadow y presenc e o f the theor y o f socia l selec tion i n Weber' s sociolog y o f intellectual s i s fel t mor e a s a neutra l
ether t o preven t erroneous conjecture s than a s a positive theory of
social change. A s in other field s o f sociology, Weber's methodolog y
helps on e to tur n to empirica l research rathe r tha n t o see k answers
in philosophica l conjecture . I t help s on e t o avoi d pitfall s rathe r
than provid e a guid e t o th e correc t path .

2
Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Religio n
as a Sociolog y o f Intellectual s

Marx an d Webe r o n Intratheoretica l Consistency:

Sociologies o f Knowledg e and Intellectuals
Like th e them e o f rationalit y i n Weber' s works , th e sociolog y o f
intellectuals is a pervasive motif, not a distinct aspec t o f his sociol ogy. Sociolog y o f intellectual s i s nevertheles s a substantivel y ric h
and theoreticall y fecun d regio n o f Weber' s univers e o f discourse ,
and w e hope t o demonstrat e thi s by reconstructin g i t i n this book .
The mos t salien t featur e o f Weber's sociolog y o f intellectual s i s its
extraordinary lucidit y exactl y i n th e area s wher e alternativ e at tempts (namel y thos e o f th e Marxis t school ) hav e produce d onl y
obscure o r obscurantis t formulations .
This chapte r i s based o n th e assumptio n tha t th e consistenc y of
Weber's epistemological stance with his sociology of knowledge and
their join t contributio n t o hi s substantiv e sociologie s o f religio n
and politic s are responsible for th e clarity of pivotal definitions and
explanations upo n whic h a sociolog y o f intellectual s i s built . O f
course, suc h consistency , desired a s it ma y be , i s neither necessar y
nor sufficien t fo r the constitution o f a viable theory of intellectuals.
Indeed, th e stud y o f th e Marxis t theor y o f intellectual s demon strates tha t a degre e o f intratheoretica l ambiguit y betwee n th e
spheres o f epistemology, sociolog y o f knowledge, an d sociolog y of
intellectuals can spark man y intriguing debates amon g the protagonists of various versions of "the rea l intent" of the texts i n question.
This ha s le d t o a shar p delineatio n o f th e tension s an d problem s
33

34 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

that had bee n neglected by Marx. W e intend to star t this chapter by

comparing an d contrastin g Weber' s view s o n sociolog y o f religio n
to thos e o f Mar x an d Marxist s i n orde r t o highligh t th e rol e o f
intratheoretical consistenc y (lac k thereof ) i n th e stud y o f sociolo gies o f religio n an d o f intellectuals . The n w e wil l continu e b y
reconstructing a serie s o f idea l type s fo r th e religion s o f variou s
classes an d strat a an d b y contrastin g thes e religiou s needs to thos e
of intellectuals .
To consider Marxist an d sociologica l text s a s integral parts of the
sociology o f intellectual s require s th e adoptio n o f a broade r per spective than that provided b y the conventiona l standard s o f either
discourse. Transcendin g th e field-specifi c jargo n o f both field s wil l
reveal that the two disciplines constitute parallel universes ; that for
every argumen t an d counterargumen t concernin g th e rol e o f intellectuals in one there is an analogous debat e i n the other. A compar ative stud y i n parallel field s o f sociology an d Marxis m wil l under line th e importanc e o f intratheoretica l consistenc y fo r th e clea r
formulation o f a sociolog y o f intellectuals.
In comparin g th e tw o field s on e wil l als o fin d tha t academi c
sociology's discussio n o f intellectuals , sedat e a s it migh t appea r a t
the outset , doe s not entirel y lack the liveliness and enthusias m wit h
which simila r question s ar e discusse d b y Marxist theorists . I n fact ,
such forerunner s o f sociolog y o f intellectual s a s Kar l Mannhei m
and Emil e Lederer, who contributed t o th e establishmen t o f sociology o f intellectual s a s a n independen t branc h o f sociology , ha d
more tha n dispassionat e academi c interes t i n th e subjec t (Mann heim, 1936 ; Lederer , 1940) . Indeed , lik e som e o f thei r Marxis t
counterparts, the y sough t t o fin d a n ideolog y for , rathe r tha n a
sociology of , intellectuals (Mannheim , 1943) . For man y othe r soci ologists, constructin g a scientifi c theory o f intellectual s ha s pose d
the challeng e o f ultimat e reflexivity ; fo r thos e wit h platoni c com plexes o r ambition s i t ha s becom e a foun t o f profoun d self-doub t
and a sourc e o f legitimation crises .
Weber viewed the questio n o f intellectuals with bot h passio n an d
perspective. Hi s sociology o f religion reflects hi s theoretical interes t
in the matter; hi s political sociology reveals his ideological interests ,
his hopes, fears , an d worrie s regarding the future of his civilization.
Weber dedicate d tw o o f hi s mos t profoun d lecture s t o th e pur e
calling o f a scientis t an d th e politica l missio n o f a citizen/intellec -

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 3

tual (Weber , Science; Politics). Befor e substantivel y discussin g

these themes , however , w e mus t recogniz e tha t i t wa s Weber' s
intratheoretical consistenc y that allowed him to lucidly debate thes e
issues.
The vaguenes s of Marx's sociolog y of knowledge leaves hi s soci ology of intellectuals virtually eclipsed: What i s the relation of ideas
to socia l reality ? Wha t i s the statu s o f th e carrier s o f idea s i n th e
social system? Do the y create ideas independently, or simply reflect
class contradictions ? Mus t the y lea d th e progressiv e movemen t o f
the society, or should the y only observe and follow? The subsequen t
acrimonious debat e regardin g these question s amon g hi s follower s
is indicativ e o f Marx' s fundamenta l ambivalence . However , elimi nating contradiction s an d impartin g theoretica l clarit y hav e rarel y
been the driving force behin d thes e vitriolic debates. Rather , theor ists of the lef t hav e debated th e rol e of intellectuals i n relation t o its
practical valu e fo r socialis t movements . Ros a Luxembur g consid ered th e resolutio n o f th e ideologica l controvers y ove r th e rol e o f
party "intellectual " i n th e workers ' struggl e a s vita l fo r th e ver y
survival o f th e globa l revolutionar y movemen t o f which sh e wa s a
part (Luxemburg , 1990) . Lenin , he r theoretica l opponent , havin g
actually le d the firs t successfu l Bolshevi k revolution di d no t attac h
less importanc e t o th e questio n o f th e rol e o f intellectual s (insid e
and outsid e the party) . Hence , th e famous indirect debat e betwee n
the tw o (Lenin , 1973) .
Only the later academicall y oriente d Marxist s hav e attempte d t o
treat th e questio n o f intellectual s wit h a consideratio n fo r consis tency o f th e axiom s o f sociologie s o f knowledg e and intellectuals .
Among the latter , Alvi n Gouldner, a self-professed lef t Hegelian , is
a majo r cas e i n point .
He too k th e Marxis t axio m o f the socia l determinatio n o f con sciousness an d seriousl y tried to construct a sociology o f intellectuals o n tha t basis . Wha t h e discovere d wa s tha t th e lef t Hegelia n
legacy ha d bee n betraye d b y it s mos t famou s heir : Marx . Th e
Marxist sociolog y o f intellectuals, Gouldne r observed , is based no t
only o n ignoranc e an d fals e consciousnes s bu t als o o n deceptio n
and distortio n (Gouldner , 1979 , pp . 9 , 11 , 57, 85) . Postulatin g a
strictly Marxis t sociolog y o f knowledge endowed Gouldne r wit h a
keen eye for recognizin g "ideologies" of intellectuals masqueradin g
as transcendenta l voice s o f reaso n o r revolution . Th e followin g

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

example wil l illustrate that, indeed , intellectuals' zeal for intratheo retical consistenc y might radically undermine an ideological system
rather tha n furtherin g it s development and refinement . Philosophical Marxis m maintain s tha t th e proletaria t i s the sol e subjec t an d
the "we" o f history. Gouldner doubts tha t Mar x eve r believed this.
He quote s the passag e i n which Mar x seem s to hav e subscribe d t o
the idea : "W e expressly formulate the battl e cry : the emancipatio n
of th e workin g clas s mus t b e conquere d b y th e workin g clas s
themselves"; but , Gouldne r interdicts , "Wh o wa s th e w e wh o for mulated th e battl e cry? " (Gouldner , p . 75) .
Let u s ventur e beyon d recognizin g the contradictio n i n orde r t o
locate it s roots . Th e penur y of Marx' s sociolog y of knowledge has
allowed th e axio m o f th e socia l determinatio n o f knowledg e t o
degenerate int o a kin d o f reductionis m tha t Mar x seeme d mor e
eager t o defen d tha n t o disavow . Th e decisiv e rol e tha t Marxis m
assigns to a n advanced proletaria t i n breaking throug h "the antino mies o f bourgeois thought, " a s reflected upon b y George Lukac s i n
the proble m o f "labor-time, " carrie s th e implicatio n tha t contem plative intellectualization canno t b y itself achieve th e knowledg e of
the socia l totality , le t alon e constitut e a basi s fo r revolutionar y
praxis i n orde r t o chang e i t (Lukacs , 1971 , pp , 167-172) . Th e
knowledge o f the totalit y is held to flo w fro m th e immediat e expe rience o f tim e spen t unde r th e condition s o f exploitatio n no t th e
time spen t o n tome s o f scientifi c analysi s o f it. Coupl e thes e obser vations wit h the aversio n o f "committed thinkers " toward th e irre sponsibility o f pur e "seeker s o f pur e knowledge, " an d tha t o f th e
left towar d inherentl y untrustworthy "bourgeois intellectuals, " an d
one ha s reason s enoug h t o accoun t fo r Marx' s lac k o f interes t i n
elaborating th e rol e o f intellectual s in effectin g th e socialis t trans formation. Marx' s blatan t neglec t o f th e issu e deprive d hi m o f
reflexivity, of , to quot e Gouldner , "being abl e t o accoun t fo r him self."
Marx, preferre d to defe r th e issue indefinitely. But Lenin's histor ical rol e compelle d hi m t o tackl e th e proble m mor e explicitly .
Rather tha n offerin g a theoretical resolution , however , Leni n con centrated o n practical necessitie s such as the fundamental indispensability of the intellectual core of the workers' movement: the party .
Lenin preferre d to dodg e th e clas s analysi s o f ideas an d ideologie s
and t o avoid invokin g the Marxist principl e of the social determina-

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 3

tion o f consciousness . Wit h a n od d mixtur e o f ingeniousnes s an d

political shrewdnes s he als o suspende d th e typica l Marxis t suspi cion abou t th e motive s o f those intellectual s wh o becam e "profes sional revolutionaries. "
What di d al l thi s mean ? Wh y woul d bourgeoi s intellectual s renounce thei r ow n class and no t onl y join but als o lead member s of
an opposin g clas s to victor y against thei r ow n class? Havin g mad e
history, Leni n wa s not to o kee n o n justifying hi s theoretical gam bits. Hi s socialist opponent s coul d fus s ove r these weak theoretica l
links in what appeared to be an enormous practica l success , and the
debate continue d fo r decades . Sociolog y o f ideas (knowledge) an d
their carrier s (intellectuals ) need s a soli d theoretica l standpoint ,
which i s lacking i n Marxism .
The flourishin g o f Weber' s sociolog y o f religion , hi s politica l
sociology, and, o f course, the clarit y o f his sociology of intellectuals
are al l due t o hi s clea r stanc e regardin g th e interpla y o f ideas an d
interests i n the spher e of the sociolog y of knowledge. The postula tion o f relatively autonomous sphere s for ideas and interests, whic h
also led Weber to oppos e th e attempt s o f dogmatic historical mate rialists t o trac e al l idea s (includin g religiou s ones ) bac k t o th e
economic infrastructure , allowe d fo r th e fre e exploratio n o f th e
dialectics of ideas and interests . This is best illustrated, for example,
by the basi c concepts upo n whic h Weber constructed hi s sociology
of religion .
Marx an d Webe r o n Sociolog y o f Religio n
The widespread acceptanc e o f proto-Marxist historica l materialism
among hi s contemporarie s (e.g. , Kautsky ) inspire d Webe r t o at tempt a clandestine refutation of that school. Thi s "debate with the
ghost o f Marx " consist s o f a serie s o f scattere d an d indirec t bu t
persistent refutation s o f historica l materialism . Thus , Webe r re fused t o assum e tha t "th e specifi c natur e o f a religio n i s a simpl e
'function' o f the socia l situatio n o f the stratu m whic h appear s a s its
characteristic bearer , o r that it represents the stratum's ideology, or
that i t i s a 'reflection ' o f a stratum' s materia l o r idea l interes t
situation" (Weber, Social, pp. 269-270) . I n other words, "the natur e
of a stratum' s religiosit y ha s nowher e bee n solel y determine d b y

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economic conditions " (Weber , China, p . 196) . H e maintaine d tha t

even when the influenc e o f economic factors i n the religiou s sphere
is obvious , stil l "th e idiosyncrati c autonom y o f th e religiou s do main" remain s ascendan t (Weber , Economy I , p . 433) . Weber' s
methodological stanc e i s clear: h e espouse d th e relativ e autonom y
of th e spher e of ideas . Th e Weberia n sociolog y o f knowledg e does
contain allusion s t o "affinities " betwee n idea s an d economi c con stellations (Weber , Economy I , p . 480) , th e "wedding " o f certai n
thought product s an d a particula r socia l order , (Weber , India,
p. 131 ) and a t time s allow s for a "co-determination" o f the conten t
of religion by extra religious factors (Weber, Judaism, p . 80 ; China,
p, 249) . Bu t Webe r neve r "explained" religiou s phenomena a s eco nomic product s o r vic e versa .
According t o Weber , th e prohibitio n o f usur y b y th e Catholi c
church wa s no t cause d b y th e absenc e o f interest o n capita l unde r
the natura l economy , a s was claimed b y th e proponent s o f histori cal materialism . H e note d tha t th e church , an d eve n th e Pop e
himself, partoo k i n unscrupulou s usur y durin g th e Middl e Ages .
The prohibitio n o f usury was a later phenomenon : th e resul t o f th e
consummation o f th e proces s o f theoretica l rationalizatio n o f th e
religious domai n (Weber , Economy I , p . 584) . Webe r advance d a
similar argumen t t o refut e th e materialisti c explanatio n o f th e
origin o f Jainism in India. Althoug h Jainis m originate d a t the tim e
of the ris e of the India n cit y and wa s enthusiastically received in th e
new urba n centers , i t wa s no t " a 'product ' o f th e 'bourgeoisie,' "
rather, "i t stemmed fro m Kshatriy a speculation an d la y asceticism "
(Weber, India, p. 202) . Weber also refused to treat Jewish prophec y
in terms of the economic infrastructure. Jewish prophets came from
diverse origin s (Weber , Judaism, p . 277) , h e pointe d out , ye t the y
often conveye d a simila r message , addressin g th e negativel y privileged an d uneducate d strata . Thei r prophec y o f doo m wa s hardl y
marketable, an d thei r intellectua l effort s wen t unremunerate d
(Weber, Economy I , p . 441) . Despit e tie s t o th e traditiona l intelli gentsia, the y fough t agains t th e dominan t culture d strat a an d
prophets o f good fortune , as well as their patrons , th e Jewis h king s
(Weber, Judaism, pp . 109 , 278).
A carefu l readin g o f Webe r wil l reveal tha t h e di d no t inten d t o
"substitute fo r a on e side d materialisti c a n equall y on e side d
spiritualistic causa l interpretatio n o f cultur e an d history " (Weber ,

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 3

Protestant, p . 183) . Webe r maintaine d tha t religio n ca n pla y a

significant rol e i n economi c chang e onl y whe n powerfu l drive s
toward a n economic transformation ar e also present in the existing
constellation o f relationship s an d interest s (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 577) . He expressed hi s position in the well-know n passage: "Not
ideas, but materia l interests, directly govern men's conduct. Ye t very
frequently th e 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have,
like switchmen, determined the tracks alon g whic h actio n ha s bee n
pushed b y th e dynami c o f interest " (Weber , Social, p . 280) . If ,
when, where, and how an idea or its reinterpretation might come t o
determine th e trajector y o f histor y wa s deeme d b y Webe r t o b e a
matter o f empirical research, i t could no t b e deduced fro m an y set
of overreachin g axiomati c o r evolutionar y law s (Weber , Economy I , p . 480).
Although Webe r criticize d thos e theorists wh o wer e in the habi t
of automaticall y assumin g materialisti c base s fo r an y historicall y
significant se t of ideas, he did no t exclude , in the name o f methodo logical principles, the possibility of a "materialistic" explanation o f
an idea . Indeed , Webe r did occasionall y offe r certai n explanation s
that were not far from theorie s of historical materialism. Fo r exam ple, he argued tha t the existence of irrigation system s in Mesopota mia and Arabia wa s probably one source of the notion o f a god who
had create d th e eart h an d ma n ou t o f nothing , rathe r tha n b y
procreating them (Weber, Economy I, p. 449) . Moreover, he attrib uted the religious disinclination of the modern bourgeois and prole tarian classe s t o th e fac t tha t the y ar e no longe r dependen t o n th e
course of natural an d meteorological processe s (Weber, Economy I ,
p. 485) . Finally , Webe r wen t beyond observin g an affinit y betwee n
organismic socia l theories an d thos e socioeconomi c circumstance s
that give rise to various forms o f a "welfare state." Recognizing that
socioeconomic an d consequentl y political structure s ca n determin e
the contour s o f socia l philosophy , h e generalize d abou t variou s
philosophical legitimation s o f th e welfar e state : "Naturall y suc h
ideas sugges t themselve s t o an y politica l welfar e organization "
(Weber, India, p. 143 ; Judaism, pp . 257-258) . I n other words, ideologies o f intelligentsia entrenche d i n patrimonia l bureaucracie s con verged o n th e ide a o f state interventionis m in th e nam e o f materia l
or spiritua l welfar e o f th e masses , regardles s o f thei r civilizationa l
differences (w e will com e bac k t o thi s issu e in Chapte r 3) .

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The Marxis t sociolog y o f religion , i n s o fa r a s i t exists , i s a

sociology of mass religiosity. Even in this area Weber' s observations
are fa r mor e elegan t compare d wit h thos e o f Marx . Thi s i s partly
due t o Marx' s lack o f interest in religion. The youn g Mar x ha d o f
course reflecte d o n th e origi n of religio n an d wha t i t represented,
but tha t h e lacke d interes t (bot h persona l an d philosophical ) i n
religion i s evident i n hi s late r writings . After all , thi s proble m ha d
already bee n obsessivel y explore d b y on e o f hi s predecessors ,
namely, Feuerbach. I n contrast to Feuerbach , Weber , not touchin g
on the questio n of the origi n of religious ideas, pursued a sociology
of religio n that focuse d o n th e interpla y o f religiou s ideas , o n th e
one hand, an d th e interest s of various social strat a an d classes , o n
the other. Hence, the Marxis t sociolog y of religion overlaps certain
aspects o f Weber's, allowin g for th e clai m that Weber' s orientatio n
embraced an d elaborated idea s on the subject that Marx had developed earlier. 1
In vie w o f th e fac t tha t Marx' s sketch y remark s o n th e socia l
implications o f religio n hav e len t themselve s to a variet y of inter pretations, ranging from a Leninist conspiracy theory of religion to
Bloch's Marxis t theology , is it necessar y t o qualif y th e preceding?
We think not, becaus e Weber's sociology of religion is wide enough
to include , an d broa d enoug h t o anticipate , th e man y interpreta tions o f Marx . Conside r th e tw o aforementione d extreme s o f th e
Marxist sociolog y of religion: Lenin's conspiracy theory of religion
versus Bloch' s Marxis t theology .
Lenin's militan t antireligiou s attitud e ha s a dua l root , on e o f
which i s hi s admittedl y eighteenth-centur y atheism ; thi s i s no t a t
issue here . Th e secon d i s hi s reductionis t sociolog y o f religion ,
which is inspired by Marx's statement: "Religion is the opium o f the
people." B y this Leni n mean t tha t i n th e hand s o f th e exploiter s
religion is a mere instrument for stupefying and eventually oppress ing th e masse s (Lenin , 1935 , pp . 7 , 12 , 14 , 45 , 46) . Thi s lin e o f
reasoning, which became ver y prevalent in th e wak e of the success
of th e Russia n Revolution , wa s late r challenge d b y a numbe r o f
heterodox Marxis t interpreters . Erns t Bloc h denounce d th e legac y
of eighteenth-century "bourgeois philistines," holding it to be nothing more than "banal atheism" masquerading a s the Marxist theor y
of religion (Bloch, 1970 , p. 37) . Attempts were also made to demystify Lenin' s sloga n b y restorin g i t withi n th e origina l contex t o f

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 4

Marx's critiqu e o f Hegel' s philosophy of law: "Religious distres s is

at the same time the expression of real distress an d a protest agains t
real distress . Religio n i s the sig h o f the oppressed , th e hear t o f th e
heartless world, just a s it is the spiri t of the spiritles s situation. I t is
the opiu m o f th e people " (Marx , 1967 , p . 250) . Va n Leeuwe n
warned that we must guard agains t distortin g the phrase "opium o f
the people " int o "opiu m fo r th e people " (Va n Leeuwen , 1972 ,
p. 11) .
Weber seem s to hav e been awar e o f the "o f an d for " duality . H e
not onl y put forth the characteristics o f "a religion of the people" i n
historical detai l (in the manner o f Bloch and Van Leeuwen) but als o
elucidated th e formations an d mechanisms tha t are associated wit h
those constructe d "for the people" in each historically specific situation. Weber' s stud y o f mas s religiosity , therefore, cover s bot h ex tremes o f the Marxis t theor y o f religion. This , however , is but on e
aspect o f Weber' s sociolog y o f religion , a s hi s reflection s o n th e
characteristics o f the religiosit y of intellectuals , warriors , an d civi c
strata clearl y demonstrate. The Weberian reflection s on religions of
various socia l classe s an d strat a ar e base d o n a more fundamenta l
concept o f "religious needs. "
Weber's basi c postulatio n o f th e concep t o f religiou s need s i s
related t o hi s thesi s tha t "ideas " d o no t neatl y intermes h wit h
"interests" (Weber , Social, p . 268) . If they do intermesh, the process
is usuall y mediate d b y a secondar y intellectua l activit y calle d th e
"reinterpretation o f ideas. " Religiou s reinterpretations , Webe r ob served, "adjus t th e revelation s t o th e need s o f th e religiou s com munity." I f this (th e reinterpretation s o f the reveale d ideas ) occur s
"then i t is at least usua l that th e religiou s doctrines ar e adjuste d t o
the religious needs" (Weber , Social, p . 270) . Weber' s analysi s o f
religion i s no t onl y base d o n "th e metaphysica l need s o f huma n
mind" bu t als o o n th e ideologica l need s o f variou s strat a an d
classes:
The kin d o f empirica l stat e o f blis s o r experienc e o f rebirt h tha t i s
sought afte r a s th e suprem e valu e b y a religio n ha s obviousl y an d
necessarily varie d accordin g t o th e characte r o f th e stratu m whic h
was foremost i n adoptin g it . The chivalrou s warrio r class , peasants ,
business classes , an d intellectual s wit h literar y educatio n have natu rally pursue d differen t religiou s tendencies . A s wil l become evident ,

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these tendencie s hav e no t b y themselves determine d th e psychologi cal characte r o f religion ; the y have , however , exerte d a ver y lastin g
influence upo n it. The contrast betwee n warrio r an d peasan t classes ,
and intellectua l an d busines s classes , is of special importanc e (Weber ,
Social, p . 279) .

Some Marxis t theorist s have recognized a need to g o beyond pole micizing agains t religio n as a social force and hav e com e t o appre ciate Weber' s accomplishment s i n explorin g th e psychologica l sig nificance o f religio n (Bloch , 1971 , p. 79 ; Birnbaum , pp . 133-34) .
Yet Weber' s treatmen t o f religio n a s a respons e t o th e particula r
ideal an d materia l interest s o f various classe s and socia l strat a stil l
remains undiscovered by Marxist thinkers . Weber's approac h i n his
search fo r th e "religious needs " of different strat a an d classe s could
be instructiv e fo r thos e Marxis t theorist s wh o ar e intereste d i n
studying th e ideologica l natur e o f certai n religiou s phenomena .
Ideas an d ideologica l needs , religion s an d religiou s need s fi t to gether a s a mortise an d teno n joint; the stud y o f one i s inextricably
bound t o th e learnin g o f th e other . Th e followin g examples shal l
demonstrate that when empirical evidence suggested, Weber did not
shrink from offerin g classica l materialistic interpretations abou t th e
origin o f ideas .
Weber maintained, fo r instance, that the dependence of the peas ants o n organi c processe s an d natura l event s an d thei r distanc e
from rationa l systematizatio n o f th e economi c lif e generat e a n
inclination fo r animisti c magic o r ritualism as well as a resistance t o
ethical rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s real m (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 468) . He also concurred wit h Marx tha t th e modern proletariat' s
dependence o n purel y socia l factors account s fo r thei r indifferenc e
to o r rejection of religion (Weber, Economy I , p. 485) . Ideas can be
autonomous fro m th e materia l surroundings , bu t thi s i s not neces sarily th e case .
Weber wen t beyon d th e spher e of mas s religiosity . Fo r instance ,
he considere d th e spher e o f religiou s mythologie s a s a mirro r re flecting socia l conflict s o f variou s strat a i n th e religiou s mytholo gies. Conside r th e followin g examples : for Webe r the inferiorit y of
the eart h divinitie s to persona l god s residin g i n cloud s an d moun tains signifie d the triump h o f knightly ethos ove r peasan t religion s
(Weber, Economy / , p . 410). Also , the Vedi c tensio n betwee n Var-

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 4

una an d Mitra , th e guardian s o f the sacre d order , o n one side, an d

Indra, a formidabl e warrior-god , o n th e other , wa s take n a s a n
indication o f th e conflic t betwee n "th e priesthood , strivin g fo r a
firm regulatio n an d contro l o f life, an d th e powerfu l warlike nobility" (Weber, Economy I, p. 417) . The ascension of celestial or astra l
gods i n the pantheon no t onl y reflected "th e priesthood' s propaga tion o f systematize d sacre d ordinances, " which woul d ensur e th e
fixation o f morality and judicial decisions, it would als o rationaliz e
the subordination o f subjects to their overlords (Weber, Economy I ,
pp. 410 , 417). Weber viewe d the occidenta l religion s wit h a similar
theoretical bent , observin g that the concept of Yahweh had change d
from a war god to a city-dwelling, wise governor o f the univers e in
order t o accommodat e th e religiou s conception s o f th e leadin g
strata i n variou s period s o f Jewis h histor y (Weber , Judaism,
p. 133) .
Despite th e richnes s o f Weber' s observation s regardin g th e reli gious need s o f th e urba n masses , th e peasantry , th e warriors , th e
bureaucrats, an d th e variou s type s o f intellectuals , h e di d no t at tempt a forma l classificatio n o f thes e idea l typica l construction s
because suc h a project would have been of secondary importance i n
view o f hi s particula r interes t i n worl d religions : tha t is , thei r
relative conducivenes s to capitalism . Yet , a rathe r basi c class-or iented categorizatio n o f religious need s is legitimate an d necessar y
for th e purpose s o f the present study : a religion o f intellectuals ca n
be mos t fruitfull y studie d onl y i n contras t t o religion s o f othe r
classes and strata. We will start with the study of mass religiosity. In
order t o brin g t o a clos e th e serie s o f comparisons betwee n Mar x
and Weber , we will couch Weber' s observatio n i n this are a in terms
of th e Marxis t debat e ove r religion s of/fo r th e masses .
Religion o f the Masse s
A clea r paralle l ca n b e discerne d betwee n tw o pair s o f idea l type s
that Webe r use d t o characteriz e th e religiou s inclination s o f th e
masses. O n th e on e hand , mas s religiosit y i s counterpose d t o th e
religion o f th e contemplative , asceti c o r mysti c virtuosos (Weber ,
General, p . 364 ; Judaism, p . 246 ; Social, pp . 287-290 ; Rejections,
p. 343) . O n th e other , religion s o f th e communit y (includin g th e

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cults o f state, tribe , o r kinsmen ) ar e describe d a s distinct fro m an d

generally unresponsiv e t o th e religiou s need s o f the la y individuals
(Weber, Social, p . 272) . Th e similarit y betwee n th e religiou s need s
of th e masse s an d thos e o f the "individual " (e.g. , nee d fo r persona l
explanation o f specifi c misfortune , an d a mechanis m fo r reversin g
it), a s liste d b y Weber , can b e explained i f we conceive o f the mas s
as a n unorganize d aggregat e o f uneducate d an d ofte n "religiousl y
unmusical" individual s (Weber , Rejections, p . 289) .
The individua l need s fo r a persona l theodic y an d fo r concret e
help whil e i n distres s ar e rarel y me t b y th e communa l deitie s wh o
are i n the busines s o f guaranteeing victor y ove r the enemy , contro l
of th e meteorologica l conditions , an d succes s i n boot y an d th e
hunt. Hence , th e immens e popularit y o f th e sorcerer s who catere d
to th e need s o f th e individual s irrespectiv e o f thei r communa l
affiliations; a popularit y tha t coul d potentiall y transcen d loca l
boundaries an d provid e for a transnational communit y o f the devo tees. In this process the sorcerers can develop into mystagogue s and
even prophet s (Weber , Social, p. 277 ; Judaism, p . 166) . It i s in this
sense tha t Webe r claimed : "Th e magicia n ha s bee n th e historica l
precursor o f the prophet , o f the exemplar y a s well a s the emissar y
prophet an d savio r (Weber , Rejections, p . 327). 2
For thi s reason, the natura l allie s o f the prophet s ar e the laity, as
their natura l foe s ar e th e priesthoo d o f the communa l temple . Yet,
irrespective o f th e initia l hostilit y betwee n th e priest s an d th e
prophets, the y have , i n occidenta l religion s a t an y rate , collabo rated i n th e caus e o f th e ethica l rationalizatio n o f th e religiou s
sphere. I n thi s sens e th e messag e o f th e prophet s o f Wester n reli gions ha s bee n th e pola r opposit e o f tha t o f magicians , wh o i n a
genetic an d functiona l sense are held to b e close relatives of proph ecy. "Prophet s an d priest s ar e th e twi n bearer s o f the systematiza tion an d rationalizatio n o f religiou s ethics " (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 439) . In the process of substantive routinization o f the content o f
the propheti c revelations, the priest s often compromise th e unit y of
the origina l messag e an d th e rigo r o f it s "ethic s o f ultimat e ends "
(Weber, Economy I , pp.460 , 465-466) . I n China , th e communa l
religions (th e cul t o f th e stat e an d th e ancestors ' cults) , whil e
preventing the satisfactio n o f the individual' s ques t fo r a mysti c or
ascetic salvation , tolerate d th e recours e o f th e masse s t o magi c a s
long as the magicians kep t their claims moderate an d di d not boas t

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 4

of bein g mystagogue s o r prophet s (Weber , China, pp . 177-178 ,

200).
The uneducate d masse s d o no t usuall y fin d th e intellectua l an d
the virtuos o religiou s promise s palatable . Thus , Webe r assume d
that al l types o f mas s religiosit y res t o n simila r form s o f religiou s
experience. A transcendental god, a n impersona l cosmi c order , o r
attainment o f a stat e o f blis s i n a nirvana d o no t appea l t o th e
religious tastes of the masse s o f peasantry an d urba n lowe r classes.
This aversio n t o abstrac t religio n i s in par t th e resul t o f th e eco nomic situatio n o f thes e groups : withou t th e necessar y persona l
resources o r leisure, they lack means to achiev e such transcendenta l
states of awareness. Furthermore , such abstract conception s ar e not
responsive t o thei r ow n needs fo r a tangibl e emotiona l experienc e
of th e sacre d an d fo r emergenc y suppor t whe n i n distress . Thes e
primarily psychologica l need s hav e bee n behin d th e ubiquitou s
disinclination o f th e masse s towar d thos e rationa l concept s tha t
characterize al l soteriologies propounded b y the intellectua l strat a
(Weber, India, p . 236).
Weber wa s not to o circumspec t abou t venturin g generalization s
about religiou s needs of social classes. He suggested that a universal
propensity for magic, idolatry, hagiolatry , and savior worship characterizes al l mas s religion s o f th e world , an d tha t the y hol d i n
common a n interes t i n a semirationa l "theodicy " of sufferin g tha t
has ofte n take n th e for m o f nee d fo r a just compensatio n i n th e
hereafter (Weber , Economy I , p . 492) . Als o th e interes t i n direc t
(often emotiona l o r sensual ) an d noncontemplativ e experienc e o f
the hol y ha s universall y existe d an d le d t o mas s popularit y o f
orgiasticism, whic h wa s originall y a n exclusiv e trai t o f peasan t
religions (Weber , Social, p. 283) .
Religions bor n amon g othe r socia l strata , a s wel l a s th e grea t
prophetic movements of the "occidental religions, " have come int o
conflict wit h the religiou s tendencie s o f the masses . Sometime s th e
world religion s hav e bee n abl e t o temper , rationalize , o r i n rar e
cases, eve n eliminat e certai n religiou s belief s o f th e masses . A s a
rule, however, the intellectualistic or prophetic religion s themselves
are liabl e t o underg o drasti c modification s t o accommodat e thos e
lay group s tha t ar e no t particularl y o r professionall y concerne d
with th e cultivatio n o f intellectualism . Suc h change s o f characte r
are inevitable , especiall y whe n a religio n o f intellectual s i s t o b e

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

introduced t o negativel y privilege d strat a t o who m contemplativ e

religiosity i s bot h economicall y an d sociall y inaccessibl e (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 487) .
The originall y intellectualis t Buddhis m adopte d Tantrism an d
mantrism a s the mos t usabl e source s o f ritualism fo r th e consump tion o f the masses . Shivais t Brahmanhoo d achieve d th e sam e goa l
by incorporating phalli c an d apotropai c ecstas y an d magi c (Weber,
India, p. 302) . Also the transformation o f the impersonal "Brahma "
into a personal deity in orthodox Hinduis m wa s a concession t o lay
needs (Weber , India, p . 173) . To keep bot h th e intellectua l an d la y
groups intereste d an d content , som e religion s hav e develope d a
rigorous dua l organizatio n o f th e lait y an d th e asceti c o r mysti c
virtuosi, an d designate d separat e ethica l obligation s fo r the m
(Weber, Economy I , pp . 505 , 506) . Succes s i n thi s linkag e i s a
matter o f survival for a n originall y elitist religion, a s the alternativ e
fates o f successful Jainism and defeated Buddhis m i n India have s o
clearly demonstrate d (Weber , India, pp , 196 , 233 , 291) .
Besides incorporating element s of mass religiosity and organizin g
the laity , th e intellectualisti c religion s hav e occasionall y opte d t o
live side by side with religious heterodoxie s tha t ar e favored b y th e
masses. A s indicate d earlier , th e Confucia n stat e cul t allowe d th e
plebeian Taois t priest s and Buddhis t monk s t o continu e t o cate r t o
the need s o f th e masse s (Weber , China, p . 201 ; India, p . 327) . I n
Weber's view , thi s parallele d th e toleratio n o f philosophica l meta physics b y th e Hellenisti c popula r religion . I n th e latte r cas e th e
state demande d onl y tha t th e "subjects" observ e thei r culti c dutie s
in orde r t o war d of f collectiv e misfortune , whil e th e philosopher s
were allowe d t o elaborat e o n th e dutie s o f th e "citizens " (Weber,
China, pp . 175 , 176).
The religiou s need s o f the masse s ar e characterize d b y Webe r i n
yet another language , tha t o f Feuerbach an d Nietzsche : "What they
[the underprivileged ] canno t clai m t o be , they replace b y the wort h
of wha t the y wil l on e da y become. " Weber , however , pushe d thi s
argument further . A s th e negativel y privilege d an d th e oppresse d
need psychologica l comfor t i n the fac e o f "unequal distributio n o f
good an d ba d luck, " s o do the privileged. I t is not onl y for the sak e
of expedienc y tha t th e privilege d strat a an d classe s hav e religiou s
pretensions. A s a rule, the fortunate one is not conten t wit h the fac t
that h e is happy; h e desire s a "right" to hi s happiness , an d wil l b e

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 4

inclined t o embrac e an y ideology that assure s hi m that h e deserves

what h e ha s (Weber , Economy I , p . 491).
Religion for th e Masse s
Whatever it s psychologica l valu e fo r variou s strata , religio n ha s
always bee n a concret e politica l forc e i n history . On e o f it s func tions, a s see n by bot h Mar x an d Weber , is its tranquilizing effect ,
allowing i t t o b e use d fo r th e purpose s o f politica l domination .
The subjugate d masse s o f conquered land s wer e frequently sub jected t o thi s kin d o f manipulation. "[It ] was . .. the quite consis tently pursue d polic y o f th e Persia n kings , alway s t o plac e th e
priesthood i n the saddl e a s a usefu l too l fo r tamin g th e dependen t
peoples." Webe r considere d i t "objectively possible " tha t a Persia n
victory in Marathon woul d change the history of the Hellenistic and
ultimately occidenta l civilization s by offerin g th e Delphi c an d Or phic priests and prophets position s comparable t o those hel d by the
Babylonian an d Israelit e priesthood s unde r Persia n king s fro m
Cyrus t o Artaxerxe s (Weber , Economy I , pp . 454-455 ; Judaism,
pp. 348-349) . Evidenc e suggested t o Weber that th e priesthoods tha t
serve a political function unde r grea t empire s generally flourish afte r
the annihilatio n o f thos e politica l entities , shoul d th e conqueror s
choose t o us e the priest s as instrument s o f pacifying th e subjugate d
masses. Th e Islami c conques t o f Indi a brough t abou t th e demis e o f
the prestigiou s rulin g warrior cast e (Kshatriya ) while sustainin g th e
most revered , but no t necessaril y powerful, priestl y caste (Brahman )
as instruments o f socia l contro l (Weber , India, p . 125) .
Religion a s a n "opiu m fo r th e people " ha s als o bee n use d i n
domestic politic s a s a means o f controlling the masses . Th e cas e of
China i s a goo d exampl e o f th e legitimizin g an d thu s stabilizin g
effect o f religious ideas. The Confucia n literat i o f China, asid e fro m
cultivating th e notio n o f filia l piet y a s a basi s fo r legitimizin g th e
political order , als o passivel y tolerate d certai n element s o f mas s
religiosity becaus e i t "guarantee d th e docilit y o f th e masses "
(Weber, China, p . 164) . I n Japan , "Buddhis m wa s imported fro m
India a s a mean s o f .. . tamin g th e masses, " a polic y that appar ently continue d int o th e presen t centur y (Weber , China, p . 195 ;
India, p . 271).

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

In India , th e pacifyin g characte r o f Hinduis m wa s on e o f th e

most important reason s for its successful receptio n by Indian tribes.
Notwithstanding th e relativel y inferio r position s give n t o thes e
communities, Hinduis m perpetuate d th e dominanc e o f th e rulin g
strata withi n these tribes an d therefor e was naturally favore d by all
those wh o had a stake in preserving and perpetuatin g th e socioeco nomic statu s qu o (Weber , India, p . 16) .
During th e restoratio n o f Hinduism , it s legitimizin g aspect s
also playe d a decisive role i n defeating Jainist an d especiall y Bud dhist heterodoxies . I t was perceived as "an irresistibl e social force "
that "coul d provid e a n incomparabl e religiou s suppor t fo r th e
legitimation interes t o f th e rulin g strata " (Weber , India, p . 18) .
Although occidenta l religion s were of an entirel y different cast e
and thei r relatio n t o th e structur e o f dominatio n wa s a t varianc e
with thos e o f Easter n religions , examples o f manipulation o f reli gion fo r politica l end s ar e b y n o mean s scarc e i n the West . I n th e
Byzantine Empire , "Secula r authoritie s wer e intereste d i n usin g
the monk s a s a mean s o f domesticatin g th e masses " (Weber ,
India, p . 245) . Th e politicall y motivate d toleranc e towar d mas s
religiosity ( Volksreligiositat) b y the dominan t group s is best exem plified i n th e contemptuou s indifferenc e o f th e bureaucrati c offi cials o f al l time s towar d th e magical , emotiona l an d irrationa l
expressions o f th e religiosit y o f th e masse s (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 476-477 ) .
In a passionat e passag e Webe r return s t o thi s subjec t whil e dis cussing the attitud e o f the moder n "privilege d strata " whose scorn ful indifferenc e t o religious practices does not preclud e their partici pation i n th e forma l ritual s o f it . Ye t th e possibilit y o f th e
emergence o f a ne w congregationa l religio n b y o r amon g the m i s
considerably lessene d becaus e the y ar e inten t t o preserv e thei r
social distanc e fro m th e masses . Th e elite' s abhorrenc e o f mas s
enlightenment a s a potential threa t t o thei r prestig e is anchored i n
"the possibilit y that some new creed acceptabl e t o large segments of
the population coul d supplan t the traditional creed s (from the texts
of whic h everyon e interpret s somethin g away , orthodox y te n per cent an d liberal s ninet y percent) " (Weber , Economy I , pp . 516 517).
Examples suc h a s these , scattere d throughou t Weber' s substan tive wor k o n th e worl d religions , suppor t a Leninis t sociolog y o f

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 4

religion, but ar e onl y one facet o f Weber's theory of religion. Whil e

allowing fo r bot h categorie s o f "religion o f the masses " an d "reli gion fo r th e masses, " Weber consistentl y oppose d th e reductio n o f
the religiou s phenomen a t o eithe r th e psychologica l need s o f th e
masses o r th e ideologie s o f the rulin g classes .
Weber wa s equall y avers e t o th e glorificatio n o f religio n a s th e
revolutionary ideolog y o f th e oppresse d masses . Bu t h e admitte d
first, tha t the prophetic religion s have often formed a "protectorate
of th e weak, " benefitin g th e sociall y downtrodde n group s an d
strata (Weber , Economy I , p . 582) . Second , h e announce d tha t
although th e prophet s almos t neve r directl y descende d fro m o r
represented th e depresse d classes , "in the grea t majorit y of cases, a
prophetically announce d religio n o f redemptio n ha s ha d it s per manent locu s among th e less-favored socia l strata " (Weber, Social,
p. 274) . Finally , h e pointe d ou t tha t th e practica l ramification s o f
certain religious doctrines, such as the Buddhist indifference towar d
caste ritual , has benefite d the lowe r echelon s of the societ y (Weber,
India, pp . 240 , 256) .
Weber perceived a variety of religious needs among th e masse s of
peasantry an d proletariat , a s wel l a s amon g th e warriors , th e civi c
and bureaucratic strata, and the intellectuals. Given the central rol e
intellectuals hav e playe d i n th e developmen t an d incorporatio n o f
these need s int o th e bod y o f religiou s literature , w e shall focu s o n
the various tensions and compromises that have linked the religios ity o f thes e strat a t o th e theoretica l predilection s an d ideologica l
manipulations o f intellectuals.
Religion o f th e Warrior s
Warriors an d th e masse s hav e i n commo n a n aversio n t o th e ab stract theoretica l conception s o f intellectuals . Fo r instance , i t i s
characteristic o f heroi c religion s tha t instea d o f belie f i n "provi dence," "predestination," o r in regarding salvation a s a gift o f grac e
bestowed b y a transcendenta l an d omnipoten t god , suc h religion s
have gravitate d t o yard th e ide a o f irrational "fate " an d "destiny, "
which i s said t o gover n huma n being s an d divinitie s alik e (Weber ,
Social, p. 283 ; Economy I, p. 572) . This oppositio n is best exempli fied i n th e aforementione d mythologica l conflic t betwee n th e pas -

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

sionate hero-go d Indr a an d Varuna , th e omniscien t functiona l god

of eterna l orde r (Weber , India, p . 27) .
The idea o f an impersonal cosmic and socia l orde r foun d either in
the intellectuals ' speculativ e religion s (such a s Chines e "Tao " an d
Hindu "Rita" ) o r th e bureaucrati c metaphysic s of the intelligentsi a
(e.g., Confucian "Li" ) coul d no t brin g solac e to th e turbulent world
of th e warrior s (Weber , Economy I , p . 431) . Th e basi c psychologi cal experience for th e warrior , Weber emphasized, is as a matte r o f
course t o fac e deat h an d th e irrationalit y o f huma n destiny .
Indeed, the chance s and adventure s o f mundane existenc e fil l hi s lif e
to suc h an extent that h e does not requir e of his religion (and accepts
only reluctantly ) anythin g beyon d protectio n agains t evi l magi c o r
ceremonial rite s congruen t wit h hi s sens e o f status , suc h a s priestl y
prayers fo r victor y o r fo r a blissfu l deat h leadin g directl y int o th e
hero's heaven . (Weber , Economy I, pp . 472-473)

The warriors als o nee d t o kno w that the god whom they implor e
is different fro m that of their enemy . Their nex t bes t alternativ e t o
overt polytheis m i s therefor e monolatr y (th e exclusive worshi p o f
one o f severa l deities ) o r henotheis m (flatterin g onl y on e go d i n
order t o solicit his favor). The martial hero might eve n demand tha t
his go d b e physicall y presen t a t th e battlefiel d (Weber , Judaism,
p. 133) . Unlike the priestl y and bureaucrati c intelligentsia , warrior s
do no t see k t o legitimiz e their victory a s a divine compensatio n fo r
their piety . A s they ten d t o regar d thei r god s "a s being s t o who m
envy i s no t unknown, " thei r heroi c feat s ar e ofte n accomplishe d
despite thei r god s no t becaus e o f the m (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 491-492) . Thi s characteristi c o f heroi c religiosit y set s i t apart
from bot h mas s an d intellectua l religions .
In regar d t o thei r nee d fo r a tangibl e go d tha t respond s t o th e
particular pligh t o f th e individual , th e warriors ' religio n overlap s
the religiosit y o f the masses ; thei r heroi c sens e o f pride lead s awa y
from th e humility of the masse s and fro m plebeian concept s suc h as
sin an d salvatio n (Weber , Economy I, p . 472).
With th e nobilit y an d th e bureaucrati c elite , warrior s shar e a
sense o f superiorit y to , o r a t leas t ar e i n competitio n with , th e
priestly circle s an d therefor e d o no t easil y genuflec t befor e th e
prophet o r pries t (Weber , Economy I , p . 472) . Thus th e highe r

Sociology of Religion as a Sociology of Intellectuals 5

echelons of knightly orders in ancient India felt a t ease with a proud

denial o f an y for m o f belie f i n go d espouse d b y Samkhy a philos ophy (Weber , India, p . 176) . The consolidatio n o f the cast e syste m
in Indi a an d th e organi c divisio n o f labo r betwee n pries t an d
warrior caste s were less than idea l for th e latter , a s the cast e dutie s
(dharma) o f warriors di d no t allo w the m t o transcen d th e monot ony o f everyday life throug h meditatio n an d othe r esoteri c means .
The warriors' unwillingness to accep t a n inferior status generate d a
tension tha t wa s conducive t o th e creatio n o f heterodo x salvatio n
religions i n Indi a (Weber , India, p . 181) . This tensio n ha s every where generated a n oppositio n agains t th e monopol y o f the priest hood ove r th e source s o f knowledge. I n th e case s o f India n Ksha triya an d Japanes e cour t knighthood , warrior s hav e als o emerge d
as a stratum o f independent, literally schooled warrior-intellectual s
(Weber, India, p . 333) .
In an essay dealing wit h the more general aspect s of the theory of
religion ("Religious Rejection s of the Worl d an d thei r Directions") ,
Weber went beyond elaborating on the distinctive religious needs of
warriors an d thei r ideologica l struggl e agains t th e religiou s idea s
propounded b y priestl y groups. Webe r argue d tha t wa r make s fo r
an unconditionally devoted communit y among th e combatants an d
thus "release s a n activ e mas s compassio n an d love " fo r thos e in volved. Thei r feeling s ten d t o brea k dow n al l th e naturall y give n
barriers o f associatio n an d foste r a brotherliness o f war that com petes wit h th e brotherlines s o f th e religiou s communit y (Weber ,
Rejections, pp . 335-336) . Religion s hav e responde d t o thi s chal lenge, abov e all , b y rejecting the worldl y pride o f the her o (Weber ,
Social, p. 291) . Yet Weber believed that the religion s ca n offe r onl y
two consistent solution s for thi s problem: (1 ) a mystic world flight ,
which implie s a radica l antipolitica l attitud e an d seek s an acosmi c
and benevolen t brotherliness, or (2) a puritan inner-worldl y ascetic
solution setting out to impose God's reveale d commandments upo n
the world , withou t excludin g th e us e o f violence .
Finally, referenc e mus t b e mad e t o a classificatio n o f religion s
that Webe r develope d b y associatin g worl d religion s wit h th e spe cific ethos o f the leading strata that emerged a s their majo r bearers :
"as a rul e on e ma y determin e th e strat a whos e style s o f lif e hav e
been a t leas t predominantl y decisiv e for certai n religions " (Weber ,
Social, pp. 268 , 269). I n Economy an d Society h e sums it up thus :

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If on e wishes to characterize succinctly , in a formula s o to speak , th e

types representativ e o f th e variou s strat a tha t wer e th e primar y
carriers o r propagator s o f the so-calle d worl d religions, they would
be following : In Confucianism , th e world-organizin g bureaucrat ; i n
Hinduism, the world ordering magician; i n Buddhism, the mendican t
monk wanderin g throug h th e world; in Islam, th e warrior seeking to
conquer th e world ; in Judaism, th e wanderin g trader ; an d i n Chris tianity, th e itineran t journeyman. (Weber , Economy I, p . 512)

Although thi s classificatio n i s clearly consisten t wit h th e premise s

of hi s sociolog y o f knowledge , Webe r onc e mor e emphasize s tha t
all these types must no t b e taken a s exponents o f their ow n occupa tional o r materia l "clas s interests, " bu t rathe r a s th e ideologica l
carriers o f th e kin d o f ethica l o r salvatio n doctrin e whic h rathe r
readily conforme d t o thei r socia l position . (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 512 )

The point o f contention, however , is an empirical not a methodo logical one . A n empirically plausible case may wel l be made agains t
Weber's clai m tha t Isla m wa s th e religio n o f "worl d conquerin g
warriors," o r " a knigh t orde r o f discipline d crusaders " (Weber ,
Social, p . 269) . Here , w e shal l refrai n fro m launchin g suc h a n
extensive project . However , a brie f argumen t o n th e inconsistenc y
of thi s assertio n wit h Weber' s ow n quasi-genera l law s concernin g
the elective affinities betwee n religious doctrines and the ideologica l
needs o f th e warrior s wil l be presente d i n Appendi x C .

Religion o f th e Civi c Strat a

Max Weber' s generalizin g observation s abou t electiv e affinities be tween th e idea l interest s o f socia l strat a an d th e conten t o f thei r
religiosity ar e leas t conclusiv e i n th e cas e o f plebeia n o r civi c
groups, tha t is , thos e cit y dweller s wh o neithe r shar e i n politica l
power o f a militar y o r corve e stat e no r belon g t o th e influentia l
nobility o f th e citie s (Weber , Judaism, p . 224) . Th e civi c petite bourgeoisie an d artisa n group s see m t o hav e generall y gravitate d
toward a variet y o f diverse, eve n contrastin g religiou s concepts .

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 5

These hav e include d cast e taboo s an d magica l o r mystagogi c reli gions o f both the sacramental or orgiasti c type s in India, animis m i n
China, dervis h religion i n Islam, an d pneumati c enthusiasti c congre gational religio n o f earl y Christianity , practice d particularl y i n th e
eastern hal f o f th e Roma n Empire . Stil l othe r mode s o f religiou s
expression amon g thes e groups ar e deisidaimonia a s well as orgiasti c
worship o f Dionyso s i n ancien t Greece , Pharisai c fidelit y t o th e la w
in ancien t urba n Judaism , a n essentiall y idolatrou s Christianit y a s
well a s al l sort s o f sectaria n faith s i n th e Middl e Ages , an d variou s
types o f Protestantis m i n earl y moder n times . (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 481)

These strikin g disparities led Weber to reasser t the main premise

of hi s sociolog y o f knowledg e concernin g th e autonom y o f th e
sphere o f ideas . I t wa s obviou s tha t variou s form s o f traditiona l
capitalism ha d no t automaticall y produce d unifor m ethical o r religious forms . Ye t he suggeste d tha t "a n affinit y betwee n economi c
rationalism and certain types of rigoristic ethical religion" may have
always existe d (Weber , Economy I , p . 480). Bu t Webe r di d no t
characterize th e natur e o f thi s affinit y i n terms o f class ideologies;
instead, h e explaine d i t i n a wa y tha t conform s t o ou r earlie r
description o f "reverse determination" : onc e a religio n tha t i s po tentially conduciv e to th e need s o f th e civi c strata emerges , i t ca n
easily wi n follower s amon g variou s rank s o f plebeian s (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 484) . I n hi s mos t misunderstoo d book , Th e Protestant Ethic an d th e Spirit o f Capitalism, Webe r attempte d t o
underline exactl y thi s point . Th e intellectuall y autonomou s ye t
historically consequential break with Christian theology introduced
by Reformatio n thinker s facilitate d th e unitin g o f th e idea l an d
material interest s of the occidental bourgeoisie in the form o f Protest ant wor k ethics , providin g a crucia l impetu s fo r th e emergenc e o f
modern capitalism . Th e latte r developments , whic h ha d bee n a n
"objective possibility" at the time of the disintegration o f feudalism in
the West, was "adequately caused" 3 by favorable economic and cultu ral situations. Weber' s comparative studies demonstrated that capital ism may otherwis e hav e remaine d dorman t in Europe , as it did
elsewhere, an d tha t th e introductio n o f the Reformatio n an d it s enthusiastic reception by the Christian civic strata playe d a n indispensable role i n this most decisiv e of the socia l change s i n the Occident .

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The occidenta l pat h toward capitalis m was also alread y paved b y

the successfu l eradicatio n o f magic that wa s achieved b y the Israel ite prophets . Abandonmen t o f the rura l wa y o f lif e an d settlemen t
in th e citie s see m t o hav e universall y encourage d th e proces s o f
"demagification," a s th e nee d fo r magica l manipulatio n o f natur e
was progressivel y replaced b y a nee d fo r ethicall y rationa l regula tion o f urban life . Ye t a total demagification o f the religiou s real m
was thoroughl y consummate d onl y i n th e Wes t (Weber , Social,
p. 284) . Similarly, in general, the weakening of the bloo d grouping s
and clan s i n urba n setting s coul d hav e se t th e stag e fo r th e emer gence o f congregationa l religion s a s wel l a s occupationa l guil d
organizations. Bu t thes e characteristic civi c developments wer e no t
to appea r i n Chines e o r India n civilizations , as they were thwarte d
by th e lingerin g significanc e o f ancestral cul t an d cla n exogam y i n
the forme r an d th e rigo r o f religiou s cast e taboo s i n th e latte r
(Weber, Economy I , p . 482) .
These "exceptions " t o th e "rule " ar e fa r to o significan t t o b e
discarded a s anomalie s o r eve n "exceptions. " I t i s onl y i n vie w of
Weber's value-relevan t interes t i n Wester n capitalis m tha t the y ap pear so . Besides , Webe r wishe d t o demonstrat e tha t th e universa l
penchant o f th e civi c strat a fo r a n ethicall y rationalize d religio n
remained ascendan t b y contrastin g th e religion s o f the civi c strat a
to thos e o f the peasantr y an d th e military . Fo r instance , th e nee d
for calculabilit y and instrumental rationalit y can be perceived in the
inclination o f civic strata towar d a compensator y religiou s mecha nism (Weber , Economy I , p . 483) . The peasants , lik e th e warriors ,
were resistan t t o thi s concept ; i t loomed to o remot e fo r th e forme r
and to o trit e fo r th e latter . Conversely , th e violen t an d heroi c
mythologies o f the warrior-god s coul d no t sooth e th e sentimenta l
and edifyin g inwardnes s o f the urba n strata . Thu s the emergence of
the bourgeoisi e has everywher e changed th e focu s o f the secondar y
sources o f religiou s literature :
This middle-clas s transformatio n o f religio n i n th e directio n o f do mesticity i s illustrate d b y th e emergenc e o f th e god-suffuse d bhakti
piety in all Hindu cults, both in the creation o f the Bodhisattv a figure
as wel l a s i n th e cult s o f Krishna ; an d b y th e popularit y o f th e
edifying myth s o f th e chil d Dionysos , Osiris , th e Chris t child , an d
their numerou s parallels . (Weber , Economy I, p . 488)

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 5

The nee d o f th e urba n strat a fo r a compensator y syste m ha s

compelled eve n th e mos t uncompromisingl y intellectualisti c reli gions t o introduc e change s i n their promise s o f salvation. Thu s a s
the Buddhis t contemplativ e mendican t mon k desire d t o ente r
nirvana ( a state tha t i n the ancien t text s is identified with absolut e
annihilation), th e lait y wer e allowe d t o see k compensatio n i n th e
hereafter an d to develop what Weber called "a n extremel y colorless
'bourgeois' ethic, " whic h aime d a t attainin g presen t reward s o f
riches an d worldl y fame (Weber , India, pp . 215 , 228) . Buddhism ,
however, was originally attractiv e t o th e urba n laity , as it held th e
promise o f liberatio n fro m th e rigi d Hind u socia l bonds , namely ,
that o f restrictin g educatio n t o th e highes t cast e (Weber , India,
pp. 240 , 256).
Although Confucianism stands out as the quintessential exemplification o f the bureaucrati c religion , o r rathe r irreligion , it s sobe r
and optimisti c rationalism , it s inner-worldl y morality, an d it s emphasis o n the cosmi c and socia l orde r see m to hav e als o engrosse d
the attentio n o f la y an d civi c groups (Weber , Economy I , p . 476) .
As a religio n o f bureaucrati c intelligentsi a an d gentee l literati ,
however, i t scorne d th e commo n man' s searc h fo r thi s worldl y or
other worldl y theodicies an d develope d i n the directio n o f a n eso teric belief i n an unfathomable providence (Weber, China, pp. 152 153, 206-207). Thus, Confucian sage bureaucrats share d the Jewish
belief that onl y the fulfillment o f the commandment s o f heaven ca n
safeguard th e destiny of the state. The similarity, however, is merely
incidental, a s th e socia l carrier s o f Judais m wer e not aestheticall y
cultured literat i bu t plebeia n intelligentsi a wh o emerge d a s th e
exponents o f a rationa l religiou s ethi c (Weber , Judaism, p . 224).
The beginning s o f a simila r plebisti c religiosit y can als o b e de tected i n ancient Egyp t and Babylon , where further rationalizatio n
and systematizatio n o f th e workada y ethi c wa s prevente d b y th e
persistence o f magic . Th e continue d significanc e of magica l prac tices i n thes e civilization s ca n b e explaine d b y th e fac t tha t the y
served th e materia l interest s o f the respectiv e priesthoods, wh o no t
only tolerate d bu t als o systematize d an d develope d magi c (Weber ,
Judaism, pp . 222 , 249). I n contrast , th e substantiv e messag e o f the
Israelite prophec y made i t impossible for the priesthoo d t o pande r
to th e religiou s demands o f th e masses . Instead , b y advocatin g a
puritanical, antiorgiastic , anti-idolatrous , an d antimagica l religios -

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ity, the y altered th e countenanc e o f occidental religiosit y decisively

and permanentl y (Weber , Judaism, pp . 223-224) . Th e rabbinica l
priesthood, whic h wa s the mai n instrumen t o f this oppositio n an d
represented institutionalize d Judaism , wa s profoundl y civi c an d
plebistic; mos t o f th e personalitie s recognize d i n th e Talmu d wer e
neither poo r no r predominantl y wealth y bu t gainfull y employe d
artisans (Weber , Judaism, pp . 393-394) . A s a stratu m o f plebeian
intellectuals, "th e rabbi s rejecte d asceticis m a s wel l a s the intellec tual mysticis m o f a salvatio n aristocracy " (Weber , Judaism,
pp. 392-400) . The contras t o f Judaism to th e Chines e cas e is especially striking because the plebeian intelligentsia in China produce d
a clas s o f priest-magician s wh o i n th e guis e o f Taois t heterodox y
indulged th e mas s interes t i n subject s suc h a s achievin g longevity
and ultimatel y rationalize d an d systematicall y incorporated popu lar magi c int o th e originall y intellectualist Taois m (Weber , China,
pp. 199-201 ) .
The discussio n o f plebeia n intellectualit y indicate s tha t Webe r
did no t restric t intellectual manipulation o f symbols to th e socially
and economically privileged groups. It also shows that the diversity
of cultura l idea s an d thei r autonom y fro m th e spher e o f materia l
interests render s an y stric t economicall y deterministi c interpreta tion o f ideologie s impossible . A thoroug h comparativ e stud y o f
Chinese an d Judai c plebeia n intellectuals could provid e a convinc ing cas e fo r th e limit s o f abstrac t clas s analysi s o f religious ideolo gies. O f course , a s w e descen d int o th e lowe r layer s o f th e civi c
strata, th e correspondenc e betwee n idea s an d interest s become s
more evident.
The quasi-proletaria n intellectualis m of th e lowes t urban strat a
and that of the self-taught peasant group s display a radical original ity i n contemplatin g th e meaning s o f th e cosmos , socia l conven tions, and religiou s dogma. Webe r observed that the intensity of the
"pariah intellectualism " o f thos e group s tha t compris e th e lowe r
rungs o f the socia l hierarchy i s due to th e fact that they "stand t o a
certain exten t o n th e poin t o f Archimede s i n relatio n t o socia l
conventions, bot h i n respect to the external orde r an d in respect t o
common opinions " (Weber , Economy I , p . 507) . Relativ e freedo m
from th e bounds o f social conventions an d materia l considerations
accounts fo r th e originalit y an d emotiona l intensit y o f thei r reli gious experiences. In his Ancient Judaism Webe r offer s a n interest-

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 5

ing parallel t o thi s line o f reasoning. I n that study, instead o f being

in th e lowes t strata o f the society , th e denizen s of the geographica l
margins o f a dominan t cultur e occup y th e poin t o f Archimedes :
Rarely hav e entirel y ne w religiou s conception s originate d i n th e
respective center s o f rationa l cultures . Rationa l propheti c o r re formist innovation s wer e firs t conceived , no t i n Babylon , Athens ,
Alexandria, Rome , Paris , London, Cologne , Hamburg , Vienna , bu t
in Jerusale m o f pre-exilic, Galilae a o f late Jewis h times , i n the lat e
Roman provinc e of Africa, in Assisi, in Wittenberg, Zurich, Genev a
and i n th e margina l region s o f th e Dutch , lower-German , an d
English cultura l areas , like Frisia and Ne w England. T o be sure this
never occurre d withou t th e influenc e o f a neighborin g rationa l
civilization. Th e reaso n fo r thi s i s always th e same : prerequisit e t o
new religiou s conception s i s that man mus t no t ye t hav e unlearne d
how t o fac e th e cours e o f th e worl d wit h question s o f hi s own.
Precisely the man distan t fro m th e great culture center s has cause t o
do s o whe n thei r influenc e begin s t o affec t o r threate n hi s centra l
interests. Man livin g in the midst of the culturally satiated area s and
enmeshed i n their technique addresses such questions just as little to
the environmen t as , fo r instance , th e chil d use d t o dail y tramwa y
rides woul d chanc e t o questio n ho w th e tramway actuall y manage s
to star t moving .
The possibilit y o f questionin g th e meanin g o f th e worl d presup poses th e capacit y t o b e astonishe d abou t th e cours e o f events .
(Weber, Judaism, pp. 206-207 )
Between th e "proletariod " and th e middl e civi c strat a on e find s
an intellectualis m representin g th e idea l interest s o f th e journey men. O n th e on e hand , the y wer e influence d b y th e ethicall y ra tional religiosit y of the petit e bourgeoisie , fo r the y aspire d t o joi n
them b y eventuall y settin g u p thei r ow n shop . O n th e other , thei r
constant teeterin g on th e edge s o f the minimu m subsistence , "thei r
workaday deprivations , th e fluctuation s in th e pric e o f thei r dail y
bread, thei r job insecurit y an d thei r dependenc e o n fraterna l assis tance" mad e the m mor e receptiv e t o th e unofficia l heterodoxie s
(Weber, Economy I , pp. 484-486) . Christianity , Webe r argued, was
originally a religio n o f itineran t journeyme n an d artisan s wit h
strong petit e bourgeoisi e an d civi c leaning s (Weber , Economy I ,
pp. 462 , 512 ; Social, p . 269) .

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Religion o f th e Intellectuals
As mentioned before, Weber' s numerous allusions to the intellectuality o f th e warriors , the petit e bourgeoisie , the journeymen , and
the proletaria t indicat e tha t h e di d no t confin e th e productio n o f
rational (practical o r theoretical) concepts to any particular stratu m
or class . Indeed, the sociolog y of intellectuals ca n giv e full reig n to
speculative generalization s concerning th e correspondenc e o f ideas
and interests , only when studying the intellectualit y of nonintellectual strata . I n thes e case s th e electiv e affinitie s betwee n idea s an d
interests ar e mor e clearl y delineated . Thi s correspondence , how ever, become s obscured i n the cas e o f intellectuals as they produce
"ideas" that do no t necessarily reinforce their material o r even ideal
interests. T o cop e wit h this problem, Webe r base d hi s sociolog y of
intellectuals o n a delicat e balance o f two theoretica l assumptions .
First, he postulated th e "relativ e autonomy " o f the spher e o f idea s
from socioeconomi c forces . Second , Webe r proceede d wit h a the ory o f historical causation that w e have dubbed "revers e determination," whereby the interest is shifted fro m th e origin to the popularization o f a religion accordin g to th e idea l an d materia l interes t of
various strata an d classes. The relative significance of these assumptions varie s accordin g t o th e leve l o f analysi s an d th e empirica l
characteristics of the particular form of intellectuality under investigation.
While, fo r Weber , intellectuals may compris e a separate stratu m
or clas s wit h it s ow n particula r idea l an d materia l interests , th e
assumption o f the relativ e autonomy o f the spher e of ideas prohibits th e categorica l attributio n o f a n ideologica l characte r t o al l of
the though t product s o f a n intellectua l stratum . Intellectuals , a s
producers o f idea s an d maker s o f ideologies , bot h fo r themselve s
and othe r strat a an d classes , canno t b e understoo d i n term s o f a
monolithic (emanationist o r materialistic) theory of knowledge. An
emanationist theor y woul d b e unabl e t o accoun t fo r eithe r th e
ideological dimensio n o f huma n though t o r fo r it s historicall y
determined character . A materialisti c sociolog y o f knowledge , o n
the othe r extreme, is also unabl e to procee d wit h a consistent clas s
analysis o f ideas produce d b y intellectua l strata . Ho w ca n suc h a n
approach accoun t fo r a very common phenomenon : the producer s
of idea s tha t ar e inimica l to th e ideologie s of the intellectua l class,

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 5

or th e clas s whic h patronize s them , ar e als o intellectuals . Th e

chilling effect o f this irony on theories not equipped with the prope r
intellectual apparatu s t o dea l wit h i t i s eviden t i n th e histor y o f
Marxist thought . Eve n thos e Marxis t theorist s wh o realize d thi s
dilemma an d trie d t o com e t o grip s wit h i t treate d i t a s a mer e
practical questio n o f party politics and stoppe d shor t o f integrating
the solutio n int o thei r theoretica l perspectiv e (Lenin , 1973) . Be sides, in the spher e of religious ideas it is a very common phenom enon that th e proponent s o f both side s of a n orthodox-heterodo x
controversy belon g t o th e sam e clas s o r stratu m o f intellectual s
(Weber, China, pp. 183-185 ; India, pp. 192-193 ; Judaism, pp. 167 168).
According to Weber , although intellectual s do i n most instance s
constitute a separat e stratum , the y d o no t necessaril y pursu e thei r
status "interests " i n thei r ow n intellectua l contemplations . Thi s
leaves onl y intellectuals, not worker s (and eve n som e Marxis t the orists agre e o n thi s wit h Weber) , abl e t o transcen d thei r clas s
interests because they are the bearer s o f various forms and level s of
"rationality" (mainl y substantive-theoretical rationality), which follow thei r ow n relativel y autonomous developmenta l rule s (Kola kowski, 1968 , p . 159). 4
We hav e i n th e cours e o f thi s chapte r allude d t o th e fac t tha t
intellectuals have fel t a profound disdai n fo r irrationa l element s of
mass religiosit y suc h a s orgiasticism , mortificator y practices , an d
magic. Whether this attitude has been translated int o activ e opposi tion to , reconstructio n an d rationalizatio n of , o r a distan t calcu lated toleranc e towar d suc h element s i s a matte r o f individua l
civilizational diversities.
Generally speaking , however , intellectuals have alway s been th e
exponents o f theoretical rationalis m (Weber , Social, p, 279). 5 I t i s
this aspec t o f the idea l interest s o f intellectuals, no t thei r narrowe r
material interests , whic h ha s ha d th e mos t lastin g effec t o n th e
development o f religious though t (Weber , Rejections, p . 352) . Th e
penchant o f intellectual s fo r theoretica l rationalit y i s eve n mor e
pronounced whe n contrasted t o the practical rationality o f the civic
strata, whic h is geared t o th e solutio n o f everyday practical needs .
Although th e tw o type s o f rationalit y ar e bot h genericall y an d
historically related , the y have ha d ver y diverse influences upon th e
development o f religiou s ideas . Ther e is , fo r instance , a n electiv e

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affinity betwee n otherworldl y mysticism or a desire to b e the vesse l

of th e divin e an d th e intellectuals ' ques t fo r salvation . Conversely ,
the inner-worldl y asceti c desir e to b e conceive d a s the "instrumen t
of a god" i n the world has resonated wit h the practical need s of civic
strata (Weber , Social, pp . 285 , 286).
The effect s o f intellectualizatio n o n th e economi c ethic s o f th e
world religion s hav e bee n profoun d an d heterogeneous . Fo r in stance, instea d o f steerin g masse s toward a methodica l wa y o f lif e
(as ha d happene d i n th e occidenta l religions ) th e intellectualisti c
religions of India hav e condoned an d benefite d from th e economi c
irrationality i n regard t o accumulatio n o f property an d th e evalua tion o f capital (Weber , India, p. 328) . As a rule, within the sphere of
religion, intellectuals have universally strived to attain a meaningful
picture o f the worl d precisel y because the y experience d i t a s sense less "thus, the deman d ha s been implied: tha t th e world orde r i n its
totality is , could , an d someho w shoul d b e a meaningfu l 'cosmos. '
This quest , th e cor e o f genuin e religiou s rationalism , ha s bee n
borne precisel y b y strat a o f intellectuals " (Weber , Social, p . 281) .
The creatio n o f a well-organized pantheon o f gods, like the appear ance o f rationalize d magic , i s indicative o f th e presenc e o f system atic thinking and ultimatel y o f an intellectual effor t towar d theoret ical or at least forma l rationality (Weber , Economy I, p. 407 ; India,
p. 152) . Thus, the religions of intellectuals, when unable to promot e
transcendental monotheism , ten d t o exul t th e heavenl y god s an d
the lord s o f th e star s whos e cours e i s regulate d an d fixe d foreve r
(Weber, Judaism, p . 153 ; Economy I , p . 410) . Th e intellectual s
have naturall y welcome d thos e worl d religion s tha t promot e th e
idea o f a n absolutel y transcendental , omnipotent , an d omniscien t
god (Weber , Economy I , pp . 419 , 518). 6
Weber repeatedly emphasized that the prerequisit e for the accep tance o f intellectual s i n organize d religion s i s a "sacrific e o f th e
intellect" (Weber , Economy I , p . 567 ; Science, p . 154 ; Rejections,
p. 351) . The implicatio n i s that a universal skepticis m is also char acteristic o f the intellectuals , whic h h e pronounce s mor e explicitl y
in anothe r context : "Th e skeptica l point o f view has bee n commo n
to th e intellectua l strat a o f ever y period . I t i s evident i n th e Gree k
epitaphs and i n the highes t artistic productions o f the Renaissance ,
such a s th e work s o f Shakespeare ; i t ha s foun d expressio n i n th e

Sociology of Religion as a Sociology of Intellectuals 61

philosophies o f Europe , China , an d India , a s wel l a s i n moder n

intellectualism" (Weber, Economy I , p . 568). 7
Having touched upo n som e characteristic inclination s evince d i n
the religion s of intellectuals, we will now turn to the rol e of intellectuals i n th e developmen t o f the world' s religions .
Intellectuals an d th e Worl d Religion s
A set o f ideas tha t ha s a n electiv e affinit y with , or i s responsive to ,
the need s of intellectuals is likely to b e consolidated int o a religio n
of intellectuals. Such a development has been actualized t o varying
degrees onl y in the religion s o f India an d China , bu t it s nuclei ca n
also be found i n occidental religions. Even when fully realize d (as in
the case of ancient Buddhism) , religions of intellectuals hav e had t o
come int o contac t wit h othe r type s o f religiosity . Tension s an d
compromises tha t hav e resulte d fro m thes e contact s ar e depicte d
throughout Weber' s sociolog y o f religion.
The fact tha t Weber referred t o occidenta l religion s as "plebeian"
not "intellectualistic, " as he called India n an d t o som e extent Chi nese religions , doe s no t mea n tha t i n hi s vie w intellectual s ha d
nothing t o d o wit h th e developmen t o f Judaism an d Christianity .
On th e contrary , thei r anti-intellectualism , a s elsewhere, is usually
connected t o intellectuals . Th e tendenc y towar d theoretica l ra tionalization o f the religiou s sphere, fo r example , i s evident i n th e
development o f thes e religion s (Weber , Rejections, p . 351) . Th e
increasing consistenc y with whic h idolatr y i s condemned an d mo nism i s promote d i n th e Ol d Testament , a s wel l a s th e textur e o f
certain postexili c sections of it (namely, Deuteronomy), illustrates a
"theological zea l for consistency" that is characteristic o f intellectualism (Weber , Judaism, p . 70) . Furthermore , th e fundamenta l
change o f Yahwe h fro m a war go d o r a maste r o f rainfal l int o " a
wise governor o f the Universe, " not t o mentio n th e belie f in divin e
providence, could no t hav e bee n developed withou t the presenc e of
intellectuals an d thei r idea l interest s i n th e proces s o f intellectua l
rationalization (Weber , Judaism, pp . 129 , 311) .
But Judais m neve r became a religio n o f intellectuals becaus e o f
the decisiv e presence o f its unique phenomeno n o f prophecy. Jew -

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ish prophecy exemplifies the autonom y o f the spher e of ideas, as its

nature canno t b e explaine d b y a n analysi s o f th e ideologie s o f
intellectuals or any other social group. Prophet s wage d war agains t
and successfull y obliterate d th e intellectualit y o f royal court s (i.e. ,
the prophec y of good fortune ) and subjugate d the plebeia n intellectuality o f the priests . This prevente d a total monopolizatio n o f the
culture b y th e intellectualis t strata , whic h ha d happene d i n India .
Jewish prophec y als o kille d th e embry o o f cour t intellectuality ,
which could have developed into a Confucian-type cul t of the state .
Christianity carrie d th e anti-intellectualis m o f th e Jewis h
prophets t o it s extreme. Jesus , lik e other Jewis h prophets , clashe d
with th e plebeia n intellectualis m o f the Pharisees . Christianit y i s a
"non-intellectual's proclamatio n directe d t o non-intellectuals , t o
the 'poor in spirit'" (Weber, Economy I, p. 631) . The early Christian
church followe d sui t b y suppressin g autonomou s intellectualisti c
movements, namely , Gnosticism . Thi s battl e wa s continue d b y
priestly intelligentsi a who , throug h proclaimin g "dogmas, " re strained th e irresponsibilit y o f pur e intellectualis m (Weber , Economy I , pp . 462-63) .
The sam e anti-intellectualisti c powe r o f prophec y als o achieve d
unparalleled victorie s in curbin g th e centra l tendencies o f occiden tal mas s religiosity . Th e orgiasti c worshi p o f agricultura l deitie s
(known unde r th e ter m Baal) wa s strictl y condemne d b y th e Ol d
Testament (Weber , Judaism, p. 189) . Judaism an d then Christianity
fought agains t magi c wit h considerabl e success . However , the his tory of Judeo-Christian opposition to mass religiosity is not entirel y
devoid o f compromises . T o mentio n onl y on e example : certai n
modified version s of hagiolatry a s well as savior worship have bee n
tolerated b y the Catholi c church .
Nevertheless, th e fundamenta l anti-intellectualisti c attitud e o f
Christianity remaine d unchanged . Th e belie f survive s still that "th e
intellectual master y o f the worl d lead s awa y fro m god , no t towar d
him," for the charisma o f faith was granted b y God t o childre n an d
minors rathe r tha n t o scholar s (Weber , Economy I , pp . 553 , 568) .
A striking contrast to th e occidenta l religion s is presented b y the
soteriology o f Indian an d Chines e intellectuals . Despit e th e differ ences i n India n an d Chines e civilizations , ther e existe d i n bot h a
status group compose d o f genteel literati whose charisma reste d o n
knowledge. Both groups develope d the same pride in education an d

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 6

a simila r rationalis m t o figh t th e irrationalit y o f mas s religiosit y

(Weber, India, pp . 137 , 139).
Ironically, thes e intellectualisti c religion s wer e les s successfu l
than th e so-calle d "plebeia n religions " in fighting th e tendencies of
mass religiosity . Intrinsicall y dependen t and historicall y bound t o
magical charisma , th e India n Brahmanhoo d wa s unabl e t o figh t
magic. Yet, an attempt wa s made, a s it is expected o f intellectuals to
rationalize an d sublimat e th e magica l hol y state s (Weber , India,
p. 152) . The banning of certain extreme ecstatic and orgiasti c semimagical practice s a s well as the rationalizatio n an d modificatio n of
magically relate d mysticis m ar e th e result s o f thi s Brahmanica l
intellectual influenc e (Weber, India, pp . 148-149) .
In hi s "Religiou s Rejection s O f Th e Worl d An d Thei r Direc tions," Webe r argue d tha t becaus e o f a n irreconcilabl e tensio n
between the religiou s and intellectua l spheres, all religions demand
of religious intelligentsia a n "intellectual sacrifice " that amount s t o
a limitatio n o f thei r untempere d rationalis m (Weber , Rejections,
p. 351) . What happened in India, however, far exceeded this. In the
process of reforming Hinduism, the Brahmanical priesthood, partly
to compet e with the Buddhis t heterodoxy and partl y because o f its
immediate materia l interests , populate d th e relativel y empty pan theon o f the Hind u religio n wit h loca l demigods , agricultura l dei ties, an d deifie d saviors . Hagiolatr y and deificatio n o f live or dea d
gurus as "saviors in need" were also introduced into modern Hindu ism. Th e orgiasti c ecstas y o f Tantrism , however , ha d stil l t o b e
greatly modifie d befor e findin g it s nich e i n late r Hind u practice s
(Weber, India, p . 297) . Bot h Shivais t an d Vishnuis t forms o f late r
Hinduism are, thus, historical altar s on which the most extravagan t
"sacrifice o f intellect " ha s bee n performe d (Weber , India, p . 309) .
As Christianit y carrie d th e anti-intellectualisti c tendencie s o f
Judaism t o th e extreme , so Buddhism carried th e origina l intellectualism o f Hind u religio n t o it s logica l conclusion . "Buddhis m i s
the mos t consisten t o f the salvatio n doctrine s produced befor e an d
after b y th e intellectualis m o f educate d India n strata " (Weber ,
Economy I , p . 628) . I t behoove d thi s "uncompromisingl y consis tent" soteriolog y o f Hind u intellectual s t o announc e tha t neithe r
greed no r lus t bu t stupidit y is the sourc e o f al l evil (Weber, India,
pp. 233 , 252). Yet witness how Buddhism , b y disregardin g th e reli gious need s of the masses , lost the battl e to moder n Hinduis m an d

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

was reincarnated onc e again onl y when it became a "religion for th e

masses" in Chin a an d Japa n an d a "religion o f the masses " in th e
forms o f later Mahayan a Buddhis m and Lamaism . Whe n i t finall y
emerged i n Japan a s Zen Buddhism , it assume d th e characte r o f a
"religion o f warriors" (Weber, India, pp. 256 , 270, 278). Its original
intellectualistic quest fo r nirvana , it s promise o f absolute annihila tion afte r death , a s wel l a s it s prou d renunciatio n o f bot h worl d
and deities , wer e eventuall y drastically modified , i f no t forgotte n
(Weber, India, p . 215).
In China , bot h orthodo x Confucianis m an d heterodo x Taois m
were originall y religion s o f th e intellectuals . The forme r exempli fied th e bureaucrati c indifference towar d religiou s feelings, and th e
latter epitomize d the escapis m o f ivor y tower intellectuals (Weber ,
China, pp . 143-192) . Confucia n mandarin s cultivate d th e inner worldly moralit y o f layme n an d admonishe d th e masse s t o adjus t
themselves to th e imperial socia l syste m said t o directl y mirror th e
cosmic harmony . No t unlik e othe r ideologie s forged t o legitimiz e
patrimonial systems , Confucianis m emphasize d filia l piet y a s th e
ultimate virtue and trie d t o exten d it s domain beyon d the limit s of
family an d clas s organization s t o regulat e als o th e relatio n o f th e
masses t o stat e official s an d ultimatel y t o th e pontifex . Whil e
tolerating certain traits of mass religiosity, such a s ancestor worship
and magic , Confucia n ethic s despise d an d o n occasion s fough t
against Buddhis t as well a s Taoist individualisti c escapism . I t mus t
be mentione d tha t Taois m als o ha d t o reac h som e kin d o f com promise wit h mas s religiosity . This di d no t tak e th e shap e o f ra tionalization o f magic (as in Hinduism) o r a mere distant toleratio n
of i t (as in Confucianism) , but rathe r a coarse coexistenc e with , or
at time s a thoroug h incorporatio n o f i t (Weber , China, pp . 152 153, 191-192) .
The characterizatio n o f idea l typica l electiv e affinitie s betwee n
religious idea s an d spiritua l a s wel l a s materia l interest s i s mor e
problematic i n the cas e o f the intellectua l strata. Thi s is due to tw o
major causes . First, th e substantive rationalization o f the content of
religion b y th e elit e o f a religiou s intelligentsia can produc e unex pected ideologica l results, such a s anticlerical o r anti-intellectualis tic ideologie s dividing the rank s o f consolidated intellectua l strat a
or preventin g suc h consolidation . Second , ideologica l chasm s
deepen betwee n th e rank s o f intellectual s wheneve r some o f the m

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 6

consciously all y themselve s wit h othe r strat a o r classe s promotin g

anti-intellectualism. Furthermore , th e dissimilarit y of the religiou s
needs o f the la y intellectual s an d thos e o f the clerica l intelligentsia
has contribute d t o th e recurren t ris e of heterodoxies a s well a s new
anticlerical orthodoxies .
Religions, Intellectuals , an d the Rationalizatio n Parado x
Intellectuals hav e bee n th e bearer s o f variou s level s an d form s o f
rationality. A s such , the y hav e alway s bee n close r t o th e autono mous core of ideas that develop through intellectual contemplation .
Besides producin g relativel y abstract idea s an d concepts , the y als o
play a rol e i n the reinterpretatio n o f ideas. The y construc t ideolo gies not onl y for themselves but als o for the other strat a and classes .
We have alread y enlarge d o n th e pivota l rol e th e intellectual s hav e
played i n th e systematizatio n an d rationalizatio n o f th e "ethica l
religions" (Judais m unde r Persia n kings , Buddhism in Japan, etc.).
Yet intellectuals leave thei r imprin t o n mas s religiosit y in a variet y
of othe r way s as well.
In thei r searc h fo r th e meanin g o f the universe , especially wherever the process of demagification has been completed, intellectuals
have trie d t o fi t th e worl d int o thei r rationa l schem a (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 350) . In doing so they have also imparted meanin g t o
suffering, whic h otherwis e woul d b e experience d a s unjus t an d
meaningless. Th e formulatio n o f theodicie s i s a n intellectua l by product fo r whic h ther e i s a grea t demand , especiall y amon g th e
masses. O f course , intellectual s to o hav e a nee d fo r theodic y be cause, bot h a s individuals and member s o f a distinct statu s group ,
they als o experienc e th e unequa l distributio n o f goo d an d ba d
fortune (Weber , Social, p. 275) . But they do mor e than provid e for
a rationa l understandin g o f thei r ow n plight . The y als o giv e clue s
for decipherin g th e "meaning " o f th e sufferin g o f th e othe r strat a
and classes. All theodicies are first share d onl y by intellectual strat a
(Weber, Judaism, p . 305) . Thi s i s usuall y no t a servic e bu t a n
"unintended consequence " o f intellectua l activit y o f th e culture d
strata. Bu t n o matte r wh o eventuall y benefit s fro m th e variou s
cultural products o f intellectuals, the fact remain s tha t they ar e the
carriers of a rationalism that itself is not determine d by the materia l

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or idea l interests o f any stratum, includin g their own . By suggesting

this, Webe r rejecte d al l theorie s o f th e materialisti c a s wel l a s
psychologistic determination o f ideas without denying the influence
that suc h "interests " might exer t o n th e proces s o f reinterpretatio n
of idea s an d th e creatio n o f "ideologies."
Although late r Buddhis m catere d t o th e psychologica l an d emo tional need s o f th e masse s a s wel l a s t o th e materia l need s o f
tyrannical ruler s befor e finall y turnin g int o th e gospe l o f "disci pline-seeking warriors," its intellectualism originally addressed "th e
metaphysical need s o f the huma n min d a s i t i s driven to reflec t o n
ethical an d religiou s questions, drive n no t b y material nee d bu t b y
an inne r compulsio n t o understan d th e worl d a s a meaningfu l
cosmos an d tak e u p a positio n towar d it " (Weber , Economy I ,
p. 499). 8
To tak e thi s discussio n beyon d th e spher e o f sociolog y an d th e
study of the interplay of ideas and interests, let us suggest that there
is stil l anothe r sourc e o f tension : th e fundamenta l incongruit y be tween th e rationalizin g processe s an d th e ontologicall y unrational izable "nature" of the world. Intellectuals, Weber argues , expose th e
religious interpretatio n o f th e worl d t o th e imperativ e o f consis tency an d attemp t t o systematiz e an d rationaliz e religiou s ethic s
(Weber, Rejections, p . 324 ; Economy I , p . 439) . Bu t th e "world " as
seen by Weber undermine s them al l by either refusin g to fi t entirely
into thes e rational framework s (we call thi s under-rationalization),
or i f i t i s pushe d int o suc h rationalisti c pigeon-hole s (w e cal l thi s
over-rationalization), i t eventually rebels against them . I n the latter
case, th e apparentl y successfu l rationalizatio n o f a worl d imag e i s
ridiculed, discarded , o r both .
The closes t metaphysic s ha s com e t o capturin g th e trut h o f th e
Weberian worl d i s whe n i t surrender s t o polytheis m wherei n th e
world i s bu t th e battlefiel d o f warrin g god s (Weber , Meaning,
p. 17) . Thos e religion s tha t hav e chose n t o neglec t th e irreconcil ability o f lif e sphere s b y rejectin g polytheism (a s intellectual s ten d
to do ) hav e ha d t o dea l wit h the frustratin g refusa l o f the worl d t o
conform to their rationalisti c demands . Th e result o f this has been a
tendency towar d a n asceti c o r a mysti c fligh t fro m th e worl d
(Weber, Rejections, pp . 332 , 357) .
But th e disenchantmen t o f th e moder n worl d make s a religiou s
flight fro m th e mundan e worl d impossible. Intellectuals , i n moder n

Sociology o f Religion a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 6

times, have had t o confron t the irrationality o f a recalcitrant worl d

without bein g abl e t o resolv e thei r dilemm a b y abnegatin g th e
worldly an d searchin g fo r tranquilit y i n a beyon d o r eve n i n a
worldly stat e o f bliss. Modern intellectual s have no t followe d their
forefathers, who , attemptin g t o concea l th e irrationa l core s o f th e
world, wov e endless layers o f rationalit y aroun d them . The y hav e
chosen instea d t o indulg e i n th e irrationa l core s o f life , refusin g
even to stee r a course around them . Thi s plung e int o th e irrationa l
is encourage d b y th e reificatio n o f instrumenta l reaso n i n post Protestant industrialism . Intellectuals are the first t o shudder a t the
touch o f "th e col d skeleto n hand s o f rationa l orders " an d t o fle e
from "th e banalit y o f everyda y routine " (Weber , Rejections,
p. 347) .
All thes e propositions , however , ar e base d o n a fundamenta l
ontological position : that th e worl d a s it stand s ca n neve r be thoroughly rationalized"the calculation o f consistent rationalis m ha s
not easil y com e ou t eve n wit h nothin g lef t over " (Weber , Social,
p. 281) . The theoretica l implications o f this ontological postulatio n
are far reaching. They led Weber beyond the sociological analysis of
the proces s o f reinterpretatio n o f ideas i n th e contex t o f idea l an d
material interests . In th e philosophica l fram e agains t whic h Weber
examines ideas , th e ineradicabl e an d eterna l contradiction s o f th e
world appea r almos t everywhere . The worl d i s obduratel y irra tional, an d an y attemp t t o subsum e thi s paradoxica l whol e unde r
an overreachin g rational syste m or to introduce mathematica l con sistency into i t is not onl y doomed t o failur e but furthe r intensifies
the existin g contradiction s b y highlightin g th e otherwis e hidde n
tensions in the mundan e world (Weber, Politics, p. 123 ; Rejections,
p. 357) . I n othe r words , th e intellectua l rationalization s o f th e
world image , b y drawin g attentio n t o th e problem s tha t the y at tempt to solve, defeat their purpose . They are likely to rob people of
the only protective shield they wear against th e disturbing influence
of the contradictions o f this world, namely their ignorance o f them .
The existenc e o f irrationa l core s an d th e irreconcilabilit y o f th e
several lif e sphere s result i n a perpetua l "under-rationalization " of
the intellectuals ' worl d image . Bu t intellectual s hav e no t bee n en tirely unsuccessfu l in producin g universalisti c rationa l interpreta tions of the world. Certain eschatologies , for example, hav e create d
fairly consisten t an d meaningfu l interpretations o f the worl d an d of

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its evil and suffering . Yet , in Weber' s view, the mos t perfec t theodi cies ar e ofte n th e mos t useless . The substantiv e rationalizatio n o f
religious worl d image s lead s t o th e irrationalizatio n o f religiou s
behavior a s th e practica l rationalis m aime d a t thi s worl d recede s
and th e mundan e worl d is rejected fo r it s refusal to confor m to th e
meaning that i t is supposed to contain (Weber, Economy I , p. 424) .
The mos t theoreticall y successful account s justifying undeserve d
suffering ar e th e doctrine s o f karma, dualism, an d predestination .
They ca n b e characterize d a s rationall y close d system s (Weber ,
Rejections, p . 358) . Of the three , the dualis m doctrin e "i s the mos t
radical solutio n of the problem of theodicy, and for that very reason
it provide s as little satisfaction for ethica l claim s upon go d a s does
the belie f in predestination" (Weber, Economy I , p . 526). The sam e
is true o f the doctrin e o f karma. N o matte r ho w unambiguousl y it
provides fo r a n ethica l rationalizatio n o f the worl d order , onc e th e
question of the meaning of this gigantic machine of compensation is
raised, i t can be experienced as "dreadful" (Weber , India, p. 132) . A
similar situatio n exist s i n th e cas e o f th e so-calle d occidenta l reli gions: "The mor e the development tends toward the conception o f a
transcendental unitar y go d wh o i s universal, the mor e ther e arise s
the proble m o f how the extraordinar y powe r of such a god ma y b e
reconciled wit h th e imperfectio n of th e worl d that h e ha s created "
(Weber, Economy I , p . 519).
This proces s ha s fuele d th e searc h o f th e masse s fo r thei r ow n
easy solution s (e.g. , mas s religiosity ) o r fo r new , mor e responsiv e
religions. T o brin g thi s poin t close r t o home , tak e th e exampl e o f
Leibnitz's "th e bes t o f al l possibl e worlds. " Whil e thi s ide a wa s
enunciated b y others befor e him, once he attempted to brin g everything togethe r int o a theologicall y close d syste m vindicatin g th e
goodness o f God , the resul t became as "perfectly" irrational an d a s
ludicrous a s th e worl d o f Voltaire' s Candide.

3
Max Weber' s Sociolog y o f Politic s
as a Sociolog y o f Intellectual s

In this chapter we shall draw upon Ma x Weber's politica l sociology

and hi s politica l writing s onl y insofa r a s the y she d ligh t o n th e
relationship betwee n politic s an d intellectuality . Weber' s futur ology, tha t is , hi s assessmen t o f th e objectiv e possibilitie s of occi dental civilizatio n an d th e trajector y o f it s futur e development , is
also relevan t t o th e purpose s o f thi s chapter . Insight s Webe r ha d
gained i n th e cours e o f hi s studie s i n th e fiel d o f comparativ e
historical sociolog y abou t th e developmental trends of the Western
world helped shap e his political ideal s and th e strategie s he favored
for achievin g them. As intellectuals an d intelligentsia appear a s two
of th e majo r protagonist s i n Weber' s gran d scenari o abou t th e
future o f the Occident , a brief taxonomical not e o n the difference s
of th e idea l type s o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a seem s t o b e i n
order. Furthe r elaboratio n o f thi s topic , i n accordanc e wit h th e
Weberian methodologica l tradition , ha s bee n deferre d t o th e las t
chapter o f this book .
When contraste d t o intelligentsiawhom we define a s the aggre gate o f th e educate d member s o f on e particula r stratu m o r som e
strata, possessin g varyin g degrees o f "statu s consciousness"th e
category o f intellectuals comprise s a small group o f highly creativ e
(often individualistic ) individuals. A n often borrowe d analogy fro m
economics portrays intellectuals a s "producers" of those intellectua l
goods tha t ar e late r disseminate d an d "consumed " in th e market place o f idea l an d materia l interest s o f th e intelligentsi a an d
69

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(through thei r mediation ) o f othe r classe s an d strata . Anothe r

useful metapho r describe s th e functio n o f intelligentsi a i n th e
process of dissemination of these ideas a s a "transmission belt " that
constantly an d progressivel y remold s an d simplifie s th e idea s
produced b y the leadin g intellectuals.

Relating t o Ideologies : Intellectuals and Intelligentsia

We ma y accep t th e previou s definitio n o f th e tw o categories , o f
intellectuals an d intelligentsia , a s consisten t wit h Weberia n con cepts regardin g th e hierarchica l classificatio n o f intellectual s an d
intelligentsia.1 A mor e importan t distinction , however , ca n b e
perceived i f w e examine , fro m th e Weberia n poin t o f view , th e
respective attitude s o f intellectual s an d intelligentsi a towar d th e
sphere o f ideas: intelligentsia will be found more willin g than intel lectuals t o vie w idea s instrumentally . Th e intelligentsi a ar e bette r
disposed t o "han g on " to the solidifie d idea s (ideologies ) that serve
their interests.
By contrast , th e intellectuals ' attitud e towar d idea s i s less deter mined b y practical considerations . This is not mean t t o impl y that
intellectuals ar e mor e ap t t o disregar d thei r ow n interest s fo r th e
sake of ideas. Rather , i t means that their "ideal interests" (in tracing
the immanen t proces s o f rationalization ) counterbalances , occa sionally precedes, and ma y even contradict) thei r material interests.
Practical consequence s o f ideas , therefore , eve n whe n the y adver sely affec t intellectuals ' materia l interests , cannot solel y dictate th e
contents o f intellectuals' beliefs and thoughts . The pus h and pul l of
ideal an d materia l interest s of intellectuals hav e greatl y influenced
the developmen t o f knowledg e an d th e statu s o f it s carrier s i n a
variety o f civilizational contexts . Thus i t i s of cardina l importanc e
to th e sociologie s o f intellectuals an d knowledg e to appreciat e th e
centrality o f thi s immanen t tension . Althoug h th e locu s o f thi s
tension i s not betwee n the genera l sphere s o f ideas an d interests
but i n the balance o f ideal an d material interest s of intellectualsin
explaining th e natur e o f thi s built-i n strain , w e migh t us e th e
paradigm o f separate sphere s of "ideas" and "interests " as a heuristic device .

Sociology of Politics as a Sociology of Intellectuals 71

Intellectuals ma y be thought o f as carriers of the substantiv e an d

theoretical rationalizatio n o f ideas. If we assume, as Weber did, tha t
the spher e o f ideas is relatively autonomous fro m tha t o f econom ics, then intellectual s a s the soundin g boar d o f the spher e o f idea s
represent a n anomaly : the y d o no t necessaril y advocat e idea s tha t
are conduciv e t o thei r materia l interests . Wha t ha s appeare d t o
some philosophers of history as the teleologica l movemen t o f idea s
toward increasin g logica l consistenc y i s indeed bot h mediate d an d
fueled b y intellectuals ' idea l interest s i n impartin g meanin g t o th e
world an d perfecting such meanings. I n any case, however, the logic
of the development of ideas is independent fro m tha t o f the materia l
interestsof bot h intellectual s an d othe r classe s an d strata .
The socia l consequence s o f indulging in the spher e of pure idea s
for intellectual s are twofold. First , the very irrelevance of the spher e
of idea s t o practica l aspect s o f socia l life , especiall y when couple d
with the characteristic indifferenc e o f intellectuals toward th e socia l
implications o f thei r contemplativ e questionings , invite s accusa tions of "irresponsibility" no t onl y from th e general public but als o
from thos e intellectual s who ar e primarily concerned wit h materia l
(ideological) interests , their own , those o f other classe s an d strata ,
and occasionall y th e interest s o f th e societ y a s a whole . Second ,
pure though t i s not merel y indifferen t t o materia l interests ; i t ca n
positively subver t th e mai n vehicl e o f thes e interest s withi n th e
realm o f ideas , i.e. , "ideologies. " Pur e intellectualit y i s avers e t o
ideologies in general and t o ideologie s o f intellectuals in particular .
Of course , intellectual s ar e a s likel y a s an y othe r clas s t o attemp t
legitimizing their material interest s by creating their own ideologies.
However, ideologies, as a set of relatively simple an d fixe d idea s i n
the servic e of a constellation of fixed materia l interests , are vulnera ble t o intellectualization ; the y wil l no t las t lon g i f thei r centra l
assumptions ar e constantly questioned , developed , pushed t o thei r
logical conclusions , o r i n shor t "rationalized. " Rationalization ,
however, happens t o be the essence of intellectuality; i t is so centra l
to intellectuals ' idea l interest s tha t the y ar e expecte d t o resis t it s
adulteration fo r the sake of their materia l interests or in the name of
ideological contingencie s o f anyone includin g thei r own . I n arrest ing th e evolutio n o f ideas , al l ideologie s ar e boun d eventuall y t o
appear t o intellectual s a s unwieldy impediments blockin g th e flo w
of idea s an d thei r continuin g rationalization .

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The result s o f this tension appear o n tw o levels:

1. O n th e persona l level, this tension generate s profound ambiv alence. Intellectual s ofte n fac e th e dilemm a o f havin g t o choos e
between intellectua l integrit y an d extraintellectua l contingencies ,
between rationalizin g flo w o f ideas an d dogmati c stagnation . An y
decision in favor o f the latte r involve s a "sacrifice o f intellect." The
concept o f sacrifice of intellect is developed by Weber in the contex t
of hi s sociolog y o f religio n (Weber , Rejections, p . 352 ; India,
pp. 297-309) . I t characterize s a n attemp t b y intellectual s t o self manage thei r unbridle d ques t for th e sociall y destructive and ideo logically deconstructiv e "truths." I n th e presen t context , i t seem s
reasonable t o assum e tha t a sacrific e o f intellec t i s calle d fo r no t
only whe n accommodatin g t o extraneou s circumstancessuc h a s
the demand s o f mas s religiosit y i n Indi a an d thos e o f orthodo x
Christianity i n Europebu t als o whe n intellectual s choos e thei r
own materia l interest s ove r their idea l ones .
2. O n the social level, the dilemma appears a s a universal schism
between ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f intellectuals . Intellec tuals ar e a t onc e th e ables t o f al l group s t o construc t self-serving
ideologies an d th e leas t likel y t o preserv e the m agains t interna l
strife. A Weberian sociology of intellectuals postulates a n unrelenting strai n betwee n intellectuals' ideal an d materia l interests , which
is translate d int o th e tensio n betwee n intellectuals ' "ideas " an d
"ideologies." Thos e "idealist " observer s wh o ignor e th e materia l
interests an d ideologica l aspect s o f intellectuality , transcendin g
them abov e th e spher e o f particula r interest s (e.g. , Plato , Ward ,
Comte, an d Mannheim) , ar e a s ap t t o mis s the critica l conflic t of
ideal an d materia l interest s a s those o f th e "clas s analytic " schoo l
who b y drawing o n the thesi s of social determination o f consciousness ascrib e ideological character t o al l o f intellectuals' idea s (e.g. ,
Bakunin, Machajski , Luxemburg , an d Gouldner) . Abov e all ,
neither o f the two perspectives can accoun t fo r the universal schism
within the ranks of intellectuals, the perpetual debat e betwee n their
ideologies an d counterideologies . If the foregoin g is valid, it would
seem to follo w tha t a radical asymmetr y separates ideologie s o f all
classes an d strata , includin g thos e o f a n intelligentsia , fro m th e
ideologies o f intellectuals : ideologies o f intellectuals ar e inherently
unstable.

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7

By contrast, th e intelligentsia' s relationshi p to thei r ideologie s is

less fraught wit h tensions. A s members o f a less reflective stratum ,
one that i s more geared to practical, rather tha n theoretical reason ,
the intelligentsi a ar e mor e ap t t o build , preserve , an d populariz e
ideologies. Th e intelligentsi a ha s therefor e exerte d a n enormou s
influence o n th e cours e o f histor y throug h "reinterpreting " idea s
generated b y intellectuals , b y accommodatin g the m t o commo n
(social) o r particula r (class ) interests . B y virtue o f being educated ,
the intelligentsia ca n think rigorously about ideas; because they are
more distan t fro m th e flu x o f ideas, the y can maintai n thei r focu s
on the practica l ramification s o f ideas. Th e affinit y o f intelligentsi a
for ideologies , however , is not merel y opportunistic. Becaus e the y
are les s reflective, member s o f the intelligentsi a ar e mor e pron e t o
internalize ideologica l construction s an d les s abl e t o questio n o r
transcend thei r sociall y an d culturall y determine d consciousness .
As a result, the intelligentsi a are more "a t home " in any particula r
culture tha n ar e th e intellectuals , whos e very universa l aspiration s
and sociall y irrelevant, deconstructive , o r outrigh t destructive mus ings rende r the m untrustworthy : intellectuals ar e inherently a uni versally alie n an d alienate d caste .
Having briefl y delineate d th e conceptua l difference s betwee n intellectuals an d intelligentsi a an d thei r differentia l relationship s t o
the spher e o f idea s an d ideologies , le t u s examin e th e historica l
significance o f this theory for Weber' s prognosis of Western civilization's objective possibilities. Studying past civilizations and observ ing the trend s o f his times, Weber grew pessimistic about the futur e
of occidenta l individuality , which h e cherishe d a s on e o f the mos t
valued achievement s o f Wester n civilization . H e though t tha t th e
fate o f individualit y woul d b e decided , amon g othe r things , b y a
decisive confrontatio n betwee n intellectual s an d intelligentsia .
Weber ha d alread y observe d tha t th e consolidatio n o f th e intelli gentsia i n th e vas t stat e bureaucracie s o f Mesopotami a an d th e
Orient ha d led to mass enslavement of their inhabitants. Th e auton omy o f th e individua l i n moder n Wester n societies , a s a uniqu e
product o f the dawn o f capitalism, wa s in the sam e vein threatene d
by the development of corporate capita l as well as by the emergenc e
of socialism . Th e latte r represente d th e logica l conclusion , rathe r
than th e antithesi s o f the former . Webe r wa s persuaded tha t bot h

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capitalism an d socialis m carry the germs of a modern "Orientosis,"

that is, they are to varying degrees detrimental t o individuality. This
sociological insigh t informed Weber's hars h criticis m of the bureau cratization o f politics an d fuele d hi s resentment o f the ideologie s of
the intelligentsia . T o counterbalanc e th e hegemon y o f th e intelli gentsia, Webe r turned t o the intellectuals. Neither his epistemological view s regarding separatio n o f fact s an d value s tha t undermin e
those intellectua l ideologie s tha t lin k scholasti c knowledg e an d
public good , no r hi s critiqu e o f th e irresponsibilit y and naivet e of
intellectuals dabblin g i n politics, inhibited Weber' s endorsemen t of
intellectuals as champions o f individuality. He encourage d the m t o
enter politic s not a s a group o f complacent "savants" or politically
naive visionarie s bu t a s individual s keenl y awar e o f th e uniqu e
challenge o f thei r politica l calling . Thi s endorsement , occurre d i n
spite o f al l th e aforementione d misgiving s not because o f Weber' s
interest i n seein g intellectuals empowered. I t i s appropriate t o pro vide at this juncture a historical ideal type for th e ideologies as well
as counterideologie s o f th e occidenta l intellectual s i n orde r t o un derline Weber's unique reformulation o f the missio n o f intellectuals
in th e politica l horizo n o f the moder n world.

Bases fo r Ideologie s of Occidenta l Intellectuals :

An Idea l Typ e
Alvin Gouldne r attribute d a "Platonic complex" (ubiquitous unre quited yearnin g t o becom e philosopher-kings ) t o occidenta l intel lectuals (Gouldner , 1979 , pp . 65-81) . Thi s clai m i s incorrec t no t
only because it glosses over the traditio n o f Western anti-intellectualism bu t als o becaus e i t overlook s th e theoretica l difference s be tween classica l and moder n ideologie s o f intellectuals. Nonetheles s
it migh t b e worthwhil e t o provid e a n alternativ e answe r t o th e
problem tha t lie s a t th e roo t o f Gouldner' s question : "What , i f
anything, i s the commo n denominato r o f the Wester n ideologies of
intellectuals?"
The commo n presupposition s of Western ideologies o f intellectuals fro m Plat o t o Lukac s ca n b e reduce d t o th e followin g thre e
propositions.

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7

1. Ther e mus t exis t a basi c agreemen t o n wha t w e ma y cal l a n

ontological an d epistemologica l monism. Th e belie f tha t behin d
contradictory opinion s an d fals e (o r chaotic ) appearance s lie s th e
universally valid "truth " (or pattern ) an d tha t thi s trut h i s accessibl e
to huma n reason .
2. I t mus t b e deeme d tha t th e trut h i s sociall y relevant . Knowl edge o f trut h the n become s positivel y amelioratin g i f no t categori cally indispensabl e fo r th e socia l an d politica l lif e o f human beings .
3. A belie f mus t prevai l tha t th e intellectual s a s carrier s o f thi s
truth, havin g becom e it s "vessels," must an d wil l naturally aspir e t o
act a s it s selfles s "instruments. "

Ideologies o f intellectuals , however , hav e neve r gon e unchal lenged. Th e two-pronge d challeng e i s typicall y launche d b y th e
intellectuals themselves . Among th e rank s o f intellectuals on e ca n
always fin d agnostic s an d skeptic s wh o utterl y rejec t al l o f th e
aforementioned premises . I n thi s sens e agnosticis m i s th e mos t
unfertile groun d for ideologies in general. The sophistic rejection of
"justice" a s a universa l an d self-legitimizin g principl e mus t b e firs t
rejected i f a "Republic" of intellectuals is to be envisioned. Yet wha t
we hav e terme d "counterideologie s of intellectuals, " i.e., those set s
of organized arguments designed to counter the claims of intellectuals t o sovereignty , are rarel y agnostic . Thi s sor t <5 f cynicis m doe s
not usually generate a zeal to counter the ideologies of intellectuals;
the agen t o f thi s kin d o f "nihilism " migh t withdra w fro m th e
political aren a altogethe r o r remai n i n i t wit h th e intentio n o f
exploiting i t al l th e mor e viciousl y i n th e absenc e o f normativ e
compunctions, fo r realizin g persona l o r ideologica l goals . Thi s i s
true o f bot h ancien t an d postmoder n discourse s o f intellectuals .
Rather tha n denyin g the existenc e o f truth o r it s accessibilit y (th e
first premise) , counterideologie s o f intellectual s cas t doub t o n th e
problem of practical relevanc e of this knowledg e (the secon d prem ise), an d the y especiall y relis h exposin g th e taci t assumption s o f
selflessness o f intellectual s a s agent s o f collectiv e goo d (th e thir d
premise).
By "ideologies o f intellectuals" w e mean those claim s that ai m t o
secure absolut e sovereignt y fo r intellectual s excludin g fro m thi s
category wha t might be called "weake r claims " tha t cal l for limite d
empowerment o f thos e intellectual s wh o "naturally " ris e t o posi -

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tions of power in a meritocratic environment. Althoug h th e weaker

claims shar e somethin g o f the basi c optimis m o f th e ideologie s o f
intellectuals abou t th e selflessnes s o f intellectual elites , such socia l
thinkers as, for example, John Stuart Mil l (1986, pp. 123-125 , 182187), Jame s Madiso n (1961) , and Kar l Mannhei m (1936 , pp . 153 164), mus t b e differentiate d fro m th e advocate s o f absolut e sover eignty o f intellectuals. Onl y the latte r fit s ou r idea l type of "ideologies o f intellectuals. " Indeed , amon g thos e wh o merel y prais e th e
intellectual elit e a s th e forerunner s an d th e star s o f th e politica l
arena an d encourag e thei r participatio n i n a n ope n proces s o f
political representation , on e find s suc h socia l thinker s a s Willia m
Graham Sumner , Kar l Popper , and , o f course, Ma x Weber , al l of
whom passionatel y campaigne d agains t th e despotis m o f th e en lightened elites .
The classica l clai m t o sovereignt y of intellectual s foun d it s firs t
and mos t eloquent expressio n in th e platonic dialogues, especially
in "Th e Republic, " "Gorgias" an d "Statesman. " Th e styl e of So cratic an d platoni c discourse allows a glimpse of th e radica l skepticism o f suc h sophist s an d orator s a s Thrasymachus, Gorgias , an d
Callicles, wh o denied that beyond opinio n lies the universal, philosophically accessible , an d sociall y relevant truth ; an d tha t th e al legedly jus t an d enlightene d philosopher s wh o clai m t o posses s
truth woul d b e best suite d to rule .
In eac h step , while explaining the basi c identit y of truth, knowl edge, and th e "good" to establish th e wisdom of the rule of the wise
against th e claim s o f th e stron g (tyranny ) and th e man y (democ racy), Plato' s Socrate s encountere d hi s interlocutor s b y puttin g
forth a series of analogies. H e argued, for instance , that the ide a of
good generates , make s possible, and shares a common identit y with
truth an d knowledge in the same way that the sun generates, make s
possible, an d share s a basi c identit y wit h ligh t an d sigh t (Plato ,
1968, Boo k 6 , Par . 509a) . Als o th e philosophicall y attainabl e
knowledge o f justic e i s equate d t o th e scienc e o f medicine , an d
society to a living organism in crisis, thus elevating the philosopher king to th e statu s of a physician who administer s bitter bu t benefi cial potions . Thi s positio n relegate s orator s (professiona l politi cians) wh o vi e fo r publi c approva l t o th e statu s o f cook s an d
confectioners wh o pande r t o th e bas e desire s o f the feeble-minded
masses wh o prefe r delectabl e morsel s t o health y an d medicina l

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7

nourishment (Plato, 1968 , Book 3, Par. 389b.c ; 1971, Par. 460-463 ,

504, 521-522) . T o allo w th e ignoran t masse s t o rul e themselves
through these politician s would lead t o a republic of licentiousness
and laxit y tha t dispense s " a certai n equalit y t o equal s an d non equals alike " an d ultimatel y to "Democracy, " i.e. , the dictatorship
of th e poo r an d th e uneducate d (Plato , 1968 , Boo k 8 , Par . 557 558). Thi s antidemocrati c vie w o f th e firs t Wester n ideolog y o f
intellectuals i s best summarized b y Le o Strauss :
Wisdom appeare d t o the classics as that title which is highest accord ing to nature . I t would b e absurd t o hampe r th e free flow of wisdom
by an y regulations ; henc e th e rul e o f the wis e must b e absolut e rule .
It woul d b e equall y absur d t o hampe r th e fre e flo w o f wisdo m b y
consideration o f th e unwis e wishe s o f th e unwise ; henc e th e wis e
rulers ough t no t t o b e responsible t o thei r unwis e subjects . To mak e
the rule of the wise dependent o n election by the unwise or consent o f
the unwise would mean t o subject what is by nature higher t o control
by what i s by nature lower , i.e., to ac t against nature. (Strauss, 1953 ,
pp. 140-141 )

Having establishe d th e attainabilit y an d socia l relevanc e o f th e

"truth," Plato turned to the question of agency. His rejection of the
possibility o f abusing political power for persona l gain rathe r tha n
using it in the servic e of the social order is tautological. He assumed
that " a ma n wh o ha s learn t abou t righ t wil l b e righteous" (Plato ,
1971, Par. 460), and that genuine arts such as those possessed by the
philosopher-king, pilot , physician , an d shepher d (unlik e spuriou s
arts suc h a s cookin g an d oratory ) ar e b y definitio n "unabusable"
(Plato, 1968 , Book 1 Par. 340-345) . I n the famous platonic parabl e
of th e cave , the philosophe r alon e break s away fro m th e worl d of
false shadow s to catc h a glimpse of "realities." It i s this privileged
access to the gnosis (Sophia), no t a claim to expertise and practica l
knowledge (phrenosis), tha t enable s him to lea d the denizens of the
cave awa y from thei r illusion s an d cur e thei r spiritua l a s wel l as
social ills.
In contrast, Aristotle classified th e science of politics under prac tical wisdo m (phrenosis) togethe r wit h ethic s an d technology ,
rather tha n associatin g it with the pur e philosophic reasoning tha t
generates mathematics , natura l science , an d theolog y (Aristotle ,

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1979, Boo k 6 , Par . 5) . Yet the implementatio n o f practical wisdo m

presupposed tha t the ai m o f politics is to lea d th e societ y of men in
order t o promot e what inhere d i n human natur e an d to provid e the
"good life " for it s citizen s (Aristotle , 1982 , Par . 1252b27-1253al) .
But a s the knowledg e o f thi s presuppose s considerable intellectua l
preparation, Aristotl e could als o be said t o tacitl y propose the rul e
of the virtuous intellectuals. The "genuine" state concerns itsel f with
promoting "virtue " o r els e i t i s nothin g bu t a militar y allianc e i n
which "law " become s a mer e agreemen t (o r a socia l contract )
(Aristotle, 1982 , Par . 1280a34-1281a7) .
The classic s viewe d history as either the recor d o f social entrop y
and increasin g chao s o r a haphazar d jumbl e o f happening s tha t
lacked rhym e o r reason . Consequentl y th e axi s o f th e ideologica l
debates betwee n ideologica l an d politica l intellectual s an d thei r
opponents revolve d aroun d a decisionis t an d historica l choic e be tween idea l an d actua l regimes .
As th e modern s introduce d reaso n an d telo s t o history , th e
debate aroun d th e ide a o f socia l evolutio n becam e centra l t o th e
ideologies and counterideologie s of intellectuals. The assumption o f
social evolutio n i n th e moder n debat e (tha t continue d withi n th e
traditions o f sociology and socialism ) performed the sam e functio n
that th e idea s o f trut h an d goodnes s onc e ha d i n classica l times .
Also entirel y irrationa l view s o f histor y i n whic h th e absolut e
leaders wer e entruste d wit h th e tas k o f arbitrarily shapin g th e fat e
of nation s als o continue d t o exis t an d eve n flourish , attractin g
groups of antirational intellectuals . Rejectio n of substantive reaso n
reproduced a replic a o f the ancien t sophisti c praise o f power. 2
Notwithstanding it s historica l importance , thi s tren d faile d t o
capture the imagination o f more than a few isolated intellectual s o r
to significantl y alter the modern rationa l vie w of history commonly
shared b y ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f intellectuals . Sinc e
the existenc e o f socia l evolutio n wa s taken fo r grante d b y all , th e
crucial faul t lin e dividin g th e ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f
intellectuals occurre d primaril y alon g th e ide a o f "automaticity" of
social evolution . A full y automate d socia l evolutio n woul d under mine th e legitimac y o f claims t o leadershi p b y the knowledg e elit e
in th e nam e o f correctiv e intervention . A semiautomati c process ,
however, woul d introduc e enoug h irrationalit y int o th e otherwis e
rational progressio n o f histor y t o legitimiz e politica l ambition s o f

Sociology o f Politics as a Sociology o f Intellectuals 7

the professin g "midwive s o f socia l change, " "socia l engineers, "

"ameliorating experts, " "savants, " and "sociocrats."
In th e moder n occidenta l West , ideologists o f intellectual s hav e
broadcast thei r views usin g a variety o f sounding board s includin g
French communa l though t and , later , throug h Frenc h sociology .
Counterideologists o f intellectuals, on the othe r hand , hav e mainly
used the intellectual arsena l o f British political liberalism and, t o a
lesser degree, that of social Darwinism. The debate between the two
sides continued in early American sociology. In the occidental East ,
the ideologies of intellectuals were reflected in Marxism and late r in
Bolshevism an d Leninis m whil e counterideologie s o f intellectual s
borrowed fro m anarchism , a s wel l a s academi c Marxism . High lights o f this debat e ar e outline d i n Appendi x D .
In short , th e locu s of legitimizing claims of modern ideologie s of
intellectuals ha s shifte d t o ne w areas . Instea d o f claimin g t o hav e
access to "absolute truths " and the putative relevance of such truths
to "public good," the ideologists of intellectuals hav e vaunted radi cal social engineering in the caus e o f hastening the pac e o r correct ing the direction of social evolution. On certain occasion s the y have
even claime d t o b e th e ver y agent s o f socia l evolutio n i n it s fina l
stage. Th e moder n claim s ma y appea r les s ambitiou s tha n thos e
made b y classica l ideologie s o f intellectual s excep t i n on e respect :
whereas th e classic s maintaine d tha t th e relationshi p betwee n
philosophy and sovereignt y was a contingent and coincidenta l one,
the moder n "sociocrats " (Lester Fran k Ward),"savants " (Auguste
Comte), an d "vanguards " (Lenin) dee m th e connectio n o f knowl edge an d powe r a s necessary (Bloom , 1968 , p. 460) . Moder n anti intellectual though t ha s decrie d th e perceive d subjugatio n o f th e
citizens under the despotic rule of the intellectual elites. John Stuar t
Mill's critiqu e o f th e Comtea n syste m o f positiv e politic s an d
Bakunin's critica l vie w o f Marxis t elitis m reflec t thi s resentmen t
(John Stuar t Mill , 1986 , p . 73 , Bakunin, 1972 , p. 318).
Let u s recal l tha t th e practica l ramification s o f thi s immanen t
tension betwee n the idea l an d materia l interest s of intellectuals ca n
be called upo n to explain two historical phenomena : (1) a subjective
ambivalence towar d commitmen t t o idea s or ideologies, an d (2 ) an
objective controvers y betwee n ideologie s an d counterideologie s of
intellectuals. In the absenc e of a hegemonic ideology o f an intellec tual elite , th e moder n occidenta l Wes t (Wester n Europ e an d th e

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

United States ) ha s give n rise to th e subjectiv e ambivalence o f intellectuals. Western intellectuals have expressed this state of mind i n a
prolonged soliloqu y o n th e relationshi p betwee n powe r an d intel lect, with alternating undertones of optimistic enthusiasm, nostalgi c
distance, o r ironi c cynicism . Intellectual s i n th e occidenta l East ,
however, hav e bee n objectivel y spli t betwee n th e camp s o f rulin g
elites an d th e oppresse d counterelites . Th e development s o f a
Marxist traditio n i n the geocultura l spher e o f Eastern Europ e ca n
provide u s with generalizing insights int o th e objectificatio n o f the
split between ideal an d material interest s of intellectuals. Th e mate rial interes t of the hegemoni c circles o f intellectual leaders reflected
in th e ideologie s o f sovereig n intellectual s ar e easil y expropriate d
by intelligentsia, transforming what started ou t as a civil war within
the rank s o f intellectuals int o a class conflic t betwee n intelligentsia
fortified i n the machiner y o f the moder n stat e an d th e increasingly
disenfranchised intellectual s (possibly in alliance wit h other classes ,
namely, th e proletariat) . Raymon d Aro n observed : "Under a com munist regim e the intellectuals , sophist s rather tha n philosophers ,
rule th e roost " (Aron , 1962 , p. 290).
Another interestin g aspec t o f the objectiv e split o f intellectualit y
in Easter n Europ e i s the fac t that th e counterideologie s o f intellec tuals continue d t o adhere to the core ideas of the ruling elites (ideas
such a s social determinatio n o f consciousness an d socia l evolutio n
through clas s conflict) rather than rejecting them. Havin g recovered
these ideas fro m thei r ideological contexts, th e intellectual counter elite attempte d t o restor e th e dogmatize d concept s b y revitalizin g
their intrinsi c rationalizin g tendencies , hopin g tha t th e mer e lif e
and movemen t o f cor e idea s woul d implod e hardene d ideologica l
shells built aroun d them . As a heterodoxy they found a reliable ally
in cor e idea s o f thei r tradition ; the y discovere d tha t advocatin g a
new orthodox y migh t b e safe r a s wel l a s a mor e efficien t wa y o f
fighting th e "dogma " and it s defenders.
We have n o reaso n t o believ e that th e subjectiv e ambivalence of
intellectuals i n respect to thei r idea l an d materia l interests an d th e
objectified versio n o f it (i.e. , th e acrimon y betwee n ideologies an d
counterideologies o f intellectuals) wil l subside o r disappear. O n th e
contrary, w e believe that th e rif t i s bound t o exis t becaus e intellec tuals' mastery o f the worl d (the ultimate en d o f ideologies o f intellectuals) i s achieve d a t th e expens e o f intellectua l master y o f th e

Sociology of Politics as a Sociology of Intellectuals 8

world (th e unhampered substantiv e and theoretica l rationalizatio n

of th e image s o f the world) .
Weber an d Ideologie s of Intellectual s
Max Weber' s philosophica l predilection s were unconduciv e t o th e
ideal typical occidental ideology of intellectuals. Firs t an d foremost,
Weber rejecte d ontologica l an d epistemologica l monis m tha t ha d
long been accepted a s staple presuppositions of most Wester n intellectual traditions. Second, b y separating th e spheres of intellectuality, morality , an d politics , Weber severe d th e ideologicall y signifi cant lin k betwee n rationall y discovere d (o r revealed ) trut h (o r
moral right ) an d politica l power . Nevertheless , Webe r di d no t in veigh agains t intellectuals ' aspirations fo r publi c life . Afte r all , h e
left ope n (especiall y for intellectuals ) the possibilit y of transcending
individual an d sectaria n interests . Webe r wa s keenl y awar e o f th e
problems tha t coul d aris e whe n intellectual s decid e t o dabbl e i n
politics. Ye t his ver y attemp t t o rectif y intellectuals ' attitude s to ward politics , for instance , i n "Politics as a Vocation," presuppose s
an assumption o f basic corrigibility of intellectuals' naiv e encounte r
with politics . I n hi s politica l writings , Webe r sneere d a t thos e
intellectuals wh o woul d tr y t o monopoliz e stat e powe r a s a class ,
but h e als o haile d the m a s potentiall y powerfu l individua l politi cians. I t is to suc h leaders tha t Webe r entrusted th e task o f defending th e dignit y o f th e individua l i n wha t h e perceive d t o b e th e
coming crisi s o f Wester n civilization .
This endorsement , however , can hardl y lan d Webe r in the cam p
of th e ideologist s o f th e intellectuals . H e coul d no t belon g ther e
because o f his "ontological" opposition t o th e monis m o f the occi dental intellectuality . Weber' s metatheoretica l assumption s ar e
inspired by John Stuar t Mill's axiom: "If one proceeds from pur e experience on e arrive s a t polytheism " (Weber , Science, p . 147 ;
Meanings, p. 17) . Weber had observe d that in the sphere of religion,
the rationalizin g propensitie s o f intellectual s promote d transcen dental monotheism . Wher e thi s wa s no t possible , intellectual s le d
efforts t o organiz e the autonomou s functiona l or local demigods i n
a hierarchicall y ordere d pantheon . Agains t th e backdro p o f hi s

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polytheistic socia l ontology , Webe r judged thes e effort s t o b e ulti mately self-defeatin g (se e Chapte r 2 ) (Weber, Economy I , pp . 407 ,
410, 419 , 518 ; India, p . 152 ; Judaism, pp . 153 , 154).
Max Weber' s socia l polytheis m wa s absolute ; i t coul d no t b e
compromised, a t leas t no t i n th e tru e sens e o f th e wor d (Weber ,
Meaning, pp . 17 , 18) . Futil e attempt s t o wis h awa y th e utterl y
irreconcilable "sphere s o f value " coul d onl y aggravat e th e inne r
struggle o f thes e sphere s (Weber , Rejections, p . 328) . Universalis t
religions undertook to dissolve the local an d tribal religiou s bound aries an d ultimatel y collapse d th e sphere s o f politics , morality ,
religion, etc . W e have alread y allude d t o th e Weberia n parado x o f
"over-rationalization" i n th e religiou s sphere : th e mos t rationall y
consistent theodicie s are the mos t useless , as in their flawless consis tency the y ceas e t o correspon d t o a worl d tha t i s commonly expe rienced a s suffuse d wit h contradiction s an d inequities . Th e dualit y
between the orde r pervading the rational spher e of abstract though t
and th e chao s o f "reality " tha t resist s logica l orde r ma y als o b e
found i n th e worl d o f politics . Attempt s t o rationaliz e th e socia l
world an d t o brin g unde r contro l th e huma n conduc t ar e als o
doomed: "I n politics , as in economics, the more rationa l th e politi cal orde r becam e th e sharpe r th e problem s o f thes e tension s be came" (Weber , Politics, p . 333) . I t wa s Weber' s convictio n tha t
intellectuals wh o enter politics had bette r honestly admi t tha t mos t
of th e radica l problem s tha t aris e i n politica l lif e ar e ultimatel y
unresolvable b y huma n reason , o r tha t ther e i s mor e tha n on e
rational solution .
Weber's assumptio n o f separat e valu e sphere s woul d als o chal lenge the secon d premis e of the ideologies of intellectuals (commensurability o f "truth" into socia l policy) . Mor e tha n th e contradic tions withi n valu e spheres , th e abysma l voi d tha t separate s the m
would undermin e intellectuals ' claim t o "know " the commo n goo d
or to represen t it . In a Weberian universe , where unity and meanin g
are onl y subjective and wher e spheres of life contradic t on e anothe r
in every possible way, questions o f social polic y can b e settle d onl y
by th e democrati c selectio n o f prerational choices , no t b y recourse
to a universall y applicable"science. " I n hi s critiqu e o f Roscher ,
Weber criticize d a version of platonic medica l allegor y that likene d
social polic y t o a for m o f "therapy " aime d a t curin g th e "ailin g
society." Webe r argue d tha t t o trea t economi c polic y a s therap y

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 8

would require the definition of normal social state o f health an d th e

demonstration o f th e conducivenes s o f th e ostensibl y self-evident
social policie s t o th e caus e o f socia l well-bein g (Weber , Roscher,
p. 87 , 88). According to Weber, economic theories ar e merely useful
ideal typica l construction s base d o n presupposition s whose decep tive "self-evidence" mus t b e taken wit h a grain o f salt (se e Chapte r
1). Th e "meanin g adequacy " o f a n idea l typ e (a s w e hav e alread y
argued i n the firs t chapter ) mus t no t replac e empirica l researc h t o
ascertain it s "causa l adequacy. " Onl y a t th e expens e o f profoun d
self-deception coul d on e assume that economi c theories portra y a n
adequate pictur e o f innately goo d an d bad policie s or that they can
spare on e th e difficult y o f makin g a choic e (Weber , Meaning,
pp. 19 , 36, 44) . Webe r attempte d t o demonstrat e th e ideologica l
nature o f "scientific socia l planning" by tracing it s academic popu larity t o th e increasin g encroachmen t o f the stat e i n th e economi c
sphere an d it s concomitan t influenc e on th e characte r o f universities, whic h had starte d t o becom e mer e trainin g ground s fo r stat e
officials (Weber , Meaning, p . 45) . I t i s obviou s tha t fo r Webe r
empirical science s coul d no t dictat e wha t on e "should " do , no r
could universitie s pretend to impart such knowledge: "An empirica l
science canno t tel l anyon e wha t h e should dobu t rathe r wha t h e
can doand unde r certai n circumstanceswha t h e wishes to do "
(Weber, Objectivity, p . 54) . The universitie s can onl y "sharpen th e
student's capacit y t o .. . thin k clearl y an d 't o kno w wha t on e
wants.'. . . Everything elsethe entire substance o f his aspiration s
and goalsth e individua l mus t achiev e fo r himself. " (Weber ,
Freedom, p . 21) .
Now tha t w e have underline d Weber' s rejectio n o f the monisti c
assumption commo n t o mos t ideologie s o f intellectual s a s wel l a s
his profound doubt s regardin g the commensurabilit y o f a scientific
"truth" t o a scientifi c socia l polic y (th e firs t an d secon d assump tions o f ideologies of intellectuals), le t us concentrat e o n th e ques tion o f agency. Although Weber's separation o f facts and values an d
his assumptio n o f separat e an d potentiall y antagonisti c sphere s of
intellectuality, morality , an d politic s militat e agains t ideologie s of
intellectuals, h e did no t shar e th e pessimis m o f ancient sophist s o r
that o f moder n anarchist s abou t th e intellectuals ' willingnes s or
ability t o transcen d thei r self-interes t an d prejudices . Eve n whe n
considering suc h phenomen a a s th e facilit y wit h whic h formerl y

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radical intellectual s tur n int o authoritaria n official s o f the rightis t

and leftis t movements , Webe r appeale d t o thei r socia l psycholog y
rather tha n tracin g thi s metamorphosi s t o th e intellectuals ' sinister
will to powe r or their desir e to realiz e their material interests . This
apparently radica l transmutatio n o f the intellectuals' socia l character did no t signif y fo r Weber any "innate disposition or ignoble self seeking o n thei r part. " Rathe r i t indicate d thei r "pragmati c ra tionalism," thei r "yearnin g fo r 'action ' i n th e servic e o f absolut e
social an d ethica l values. " Suc h romanti c yearnin g coul d the n b e
translated int o reactionar y o r revolutionar y authoritarianis m de pending o n whethe r i t starte d fro m abov e o r fro m belo w (Weber,
Russia, p. 271). Weber' s motivationa l analysi s o f revolutionar y o r
reactionary intellectual s als o foun d expressio n i n hi s essa y o n so cialism. H e di d no t vie w socialis m a s a n ominou s plo t tha t moti vates intellectual s t o seiz e control o f the politica l machin e i n orde r
to realiz e clas s interests . Rather , intellectual s joi n th e socialis t
movement becaus e o f "th e romance o f th e genera l strik e an d th e
romance o f th e hop e o f revolutio n a s suc h whic h fascinates them .
One ca n tel l b y lookin g a t the m tha t the y ar e romantics " (Weber,
Socialism, p . 215) . Thes e instance s indicat e tha t Webe r wa s mor e
concerned wit h intellectuals ' naivet e an d emotiona l immaturit y
than thei r hidde n agend a t o usur p powe r an d rul e a s self-seekin g
despots.
Of course , Ma x Webe r share d wit h th e sophisti c an d agnosti c
anti-intellectual traditio n a basi c rejectio n o f th e possibilit y o f
intellectuals' achieving and applyin g the politicall y relevan t truths .
This, a s w e hav e alread y mentioned , i s contrar y t o th e cred o o f
counterideologies o f intellectual s a s wel l (the y accep t mos t o f th e
philosophical premise s o f intellectua l ideologies preferrin g to cas t
doubt o n th e questio n o f "agency") . Webe r i s fa r fro m bein g a
champion o f the agnostics ' anti-intellectualism , no r i s he a n advo cate o f the traditiona l Wester n counterideologies of intellectuals. I t
is tru e tha t h e rejecte d th e philosophica l premise s o f intellectuals '
collective ideologie s an d repudiate d thei r ideologica l claims . Yet,
notwithstanding hi s reservations , Webe r encourage d participatio n
of intellectual s in politics as individuals and individualists ; he even
appeared eage r t o entrus t the future o f individuality to them . Wh o
could bette r represen t th e caus e o f individualit y tha n th e mos t
reflective member s of th e society ? Intellectuals com e closes t to th e

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 8

conscious lif e o f a n individua l t o th e exten t tha t the y distanc e

themselves from th e realm s o f "habitual" and "traditional " action .
But Weber also had a major qualm abou t this: if intellectuals ar e to
carry th e torc h o f individualit y in th e impendin g "pola r night " o f
Western civilization , the y nee d t o men d thei r ways . Th e endemi c
problem fo r politicall y activ e intellectual s wa s their politica l dilet tantism an d their "irresponsibility." Thu s Weber attempted t o war n
them against the dangers that awaited the m i n the arena o f politics.
We will come back to this topic later in this chapter to underline the
substance o f Weber's advic e to intellectuals .
Bases for Ideologie s o f Intelligentsia : A n Idea l Typ e
The clai m tha t practica l wisdo m imparted throug h forma l educa tion is indispensable for th e smoot h functioning of the governmen t
is a necessary component of the ideologies of intelligentsia. In orde r
to secur e claim s t o politica l power , however , the intelligentsi a is
bound t o develo p o r adop t substantiv e argument s concernin g th e
nature o f the stat e and it s apparatus. A s vehicles of modern ideologies o f intelligentsia, socialism an d th e welfar e stat e clai m t o serv e
the individua l an d promot e th e commonwea l through performin g
rational redistributiv e functions . Ma x Webe r ha d seriou s misgiv ings abou t bot h o f these form s o f government.
Weber's negativ e attitud e towar d th e claim s o f the welfar e stat e
were informe d b y hi s comparativ e historica l stud y o f th e Indian ,
Chinese, an d nea r Easter n empire s i n whos e vast stat e bureaucra cies th e intelligentsi a ros e t o ascendancy . Th e roo t o f the moder n
welfare state , in Weber's view, bifurcates into two separat e idea s of
material an d spiritual welfare . Th e forme r was a constant compo nent o f patrimonial bureaucracie s o f China, India , an d Mesopota mia. The two basic ideas of "kingly charity" and "appeal to heaven "
were closely related t o th e idea l of a welfare state a s a protectorat e
of th e dispossesse d masses . Th e possibilit y o f direc t "appea l t o
heaven" b y the downtrodde n an d th e destitute , i.e. , the ruler' s fea r
of the "curse o f the poor," was supposed t o check the absolutis m of
the king and ensure a modicum o f justice for the masses. Bu t it also
served th e kingl y interes t by protectin g hi s taxpayer s agains t th e
brutality o f hi s official s (Weber , Judaism, pp . 256-257). 3

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In Indi a an d China , w e als o encounte r th e genera l ide a o f a

welfare stat e a s th e guaranto r o f th e materia l welfar e o f th e sub jects. However , i t wa s i n Indi a tha t fo r th e firs t tim e th e kin g
undertook t o provid e no t onl y materia l bu t als o spiritua l welfare
for hi s subjects . I t wa s no t th e goa l o f Kin g Ashuka' s welfar e
policies merel y t o "augmen t th e numbe r o f ta x payer s an d th e
capacity t o pa y taxes" but t o car e fo r peopl e i n orde r tha t the y be
"happy" an d "attai n heaven " a s wel l (Weber , India, p . 242) . I n
China, th e cleavag e betwee n welfar e ideologie s base d o n purel y
material ground s an d thos e promotin g both materia l an d spiritual
welfare o f the subject s remained unbridge d (Weber, China, p. 137) .
This cleavag e wa s partl y du e t o th e oppositio n o f tw o Chines e
intellectual traditions. On on e side, a powerful allianc e wa s formed
between ruling intellectuals who advised the pontiff an d the bureau cratic intelligentsia who ran th e empire. Having had a t their dispo sal a n officia l philosoph y (Confucianism) a s wel l as culturall y ste reotyped mold s fo r th e carrier s o f thi s philosoph y (th e literati) ,
Chinese imperia l bureaucracy sought t o expan d th e real m o f legitimate interventio n o f th e state . Th e Taois t tradition , however , re mained skeptica l of the literati's efforts t o manage th e materia l an d
spiritual lives of the masses. The Taoists charge d that the Confucia n
literati ha d no t take n th e "naturally" unequal intellectua l an d spir itual endowment s o f the subject s seriously. Th e literat i ha d main tained tha t throug h "education " the rabble could b e elevated to the
highest possibl e level s o f sophistication . Agains t thi s belie f th e
Taoists held that the state must not interfere with what is unchangeable i n th e cosmi c an d socia l orde r an d tha t th e levelin g o f th e
unequal charismati c endowment s that legitimize d the "aristocrac y
of grace" was wrong. "The ruler s may fil l thei r subjects ' bellies no t
their minds ; they ma y strengthe n thei r limb s bu t no t thei r charac ter" (Weber , China, pp . 187-88) .
The more recent avatars of the warring gods of state interventionism, th e radica l mora l equalitarianis m (fro m Roussea u t o Ba kunin), o n th e on e side , an d th e meritocrati c syste m o f respectin g
and cultivatin g natural difference s (Britis h liberal philosophers and
economists), o n th e other , ar e a s little incline d t o ceas e fighting in
modern times as they were in ancient China (Weber, China, p. 137 ;
Meaning, p . 15) .

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 8

One o f th e function s o f a welfar e stat e i s t o formaliz e an d

legitimize the statu s oppositio n between cultured elite s and uncul tured masse s b y developin g a n organi c imag e fo r socia l order .
"Such ideas, " Webe r stated , "sugges t themselve s t o an y politica l
welfare organization " (Weber , India, p . 143) . Henc e th e similarit y
of ideologies of all welfare states. Althoug h the objectiv e possibility
of the developmen t of an organismi c social order did not material ize i n th e Chines e welfar e stat e (du e t o th e strengt h o f Chines e
guilds and sibs) , Weber perceived elective affinities betwee n the tw o
and cautione d agains t th e developmen t o f suc h ideologie s i n th e
future. A n organismi c socia l orde r woul d se t th e stag e fo r mas s
enslavement by fettering the individual to his job, class and occupa tion (Weber, Economy II , p . 1402) . At this juncture the bureaucra t
is i n a paradoxica l position : h e i s harnesse d int o th e huma n ma chine a s a "cog" an d "chained " to hi s activity , ye t he has a vested
interest i n seein g th e mechanis m an d it s authorit y perpetuate d
(Weber, Bureaucracy, p . 228) . A s such , th e bureaucra t i s the firs t
inmate i n th e hous e o f bondage tha t h e i s building.
Weber wa s not enthusiasti c abou t th e moder n welfar e stat e an d
its proponents . Thei r apparen t concer n fo r th e well-bein g o f indi viduals appeare d t o hi m a s anachronisti c i f not merel y ideological
(Weber, Rejections, p . 334) . Suc h "concerns " appeare d t o hi m
either a s reflecting th e specia l interests of entrenched redistributiv e
bureaucracies, o r a s concealin g justifications fo r expansionis m o f
the stat e pe r s e (Weber , Bureaucracy, p . 213) . Webe r repeatedl y
warned agains t the apparently impartia l and objective bureaucrati c
elites a s harbinger s o f a n "indestructible " dictatorshi p o f th e offi cials of the "Oriental-Egyptian type " (Weber, Economy II, p. 1402) .
If Weber's critique of the capitalis t welfar e stat e was based o n th e
study of the past, hi s rejection of socialism was based o n an analysi s
of th e present : "Th e 'socialis m o f th e future ' i s a phras e fo r th e
rationalization o f economic lif e b y combinin g further bureaucrati zation and interest-group administration" (Weber , Meaning, p . 47).
In othe r words , socialis m represente d a furthe r rationalizatio n o f
the capitalis t syste m i n whic h th e wors t aspect s o f th e presen t
system o f capitalism, i.e. , bureaucratization, woul d b e augmented .
Even if it were possible to brin g about th e tota l collapse o f capital ism overnight , n o doub t a swee t drea m o f man y socialists , th e

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question would remain: "Who would then take control of and direct
this new economy?" (Weber, Socialism, p. 262) . The dictatorship of
the official , no t tha t o f the worker, would be the result of socialism.
This woul d entrenc h th e intelligentsi a i n power , dashin g foreve r
the hope s o f rekindlin g th e light s o f freedo m an d individualit y
in the Occident . Th e configurations o f the alliance s a t the momen t
of th e collaps e o f Easter n Europea n socialis m vindicat e no t onl y
Weber's prognoses of the inheren t weaknesses of socialism bu t als o
of th e respectiv e relationships o f intellectuals an d intelligentsi a t o
the centralize d state .
Weber an d Ideologie s o f Intelligentsi a
Weber's cas e agains t ideologie s of intelligentsi a i s base d o n thre e
arguments: th e impossibilit y o f usin g exper t knowledg e t o resolv e
socioeconomic problems , th e narro w an d ofte n unmediate d clas s
interests o f th e carrier s o f thi s "knowledge, " an d th e impendin g
peril o f bureaucrati c dominatio n unde r postlibera l capitalist 4 o r
socialist regimes .
Weber's critiqu e o f th e technocrati c elite s professin g t o hav e
reduced question s of socioeconomic polic y to a "science" overlaps
his basi c antipath y t o th e ideologie s o f intellectuals . W e have al ready observe d tha t Weber' s neo-Kantia n epistemolog y an d hi s
polytheistic social ontology exclude logical ratiocination a s a means
of solving socioeconomic and ultimately political problems. On this
basis, Weber argued tha t what purported to be the newly discovered
"laws" of economics coul d arrive at unambiguou s "socia l policies "
only at the expense of treating a number of their presuppositions as
self-evident (Weber, Meaning, pp . 36-38) . We have also pointed out
that Webe r wa s awar e of , an d warne d agains t th e spuriou s "self evidence" of ideal types . The law s of economics, bein g nothin g bu t
another se t o f idea l types , might als o giv e the appearanc e o f self evidence. Thi s i s why Webe r preferred that th e question s o f socia l
policy b e "disputed " publicl y rathe r tha n "solved " a s technica l
problems.
The adulatio n of a sacralized, scientific approac h t o socia l prob lems woul d als o ten d t o hid e th e ideologica l bia s o f th e so-calle d
scientific economists . Accordin g to Weber , eve n i f a scientifi c ap -

Sociology o f Politics as a Sociology o f Intellectuals 8

proach coul d arriv e a t undisputabl e socia l policies , th e narrow ,

unmediated clas s interes t o f the intelligentsi a wh o woul d clai m t o
represent i t woul d almos t certainl y contou r i t t o serv e thei r ow n
narrow interests . Her e Webe r appears t o full y endors e th e Marxis t
axiom o f social determinatio n o f consciousness as well as the ideo logical natur e o f socia l sciences . Ma x Weber' s radica l theor y o f
social conflic t a t onc e emphasize s an d goe s beyon d th e Marxia n
scheme o f clas s conflict :
The conflic t occur s no t merel y . . . betwee n "clas s interests " bu t
between genera l view s o n lif e an d th e univers e a s well . Thi s latte r
point, however, doe s not lesse n th e truth that the particular ultimate
value judgment s whic h th e individua l espouse s i s decide d amon g
other factors an d certainly t o a quite significant degre e by the degree
of affinit y betwee n i t an d clas s interests . (Weber , Objectivity, p . 56 )

It goe s withou t saying, however, that Webe r applie s th e Marxis t

class analysis more readily to the intelligentsia than t o intellectuals.
It woul d b e no t onl y philosophicall y naiv e bu t als o sociologicall y
ingenuous t o assum e tha t a stratu m o f technocrat s ca n an d wil l
resolve and implemen t al l social, economic , an d political question s
impartially an d scientifically . Of course, i t mus t b e emphasized tha t
unlike Marx , Webe r subscribed to the liberal ideal o f a transcenden tal politics, i.e. , a political real m leas t manipulate d fo r particularisti c
economic interests o f the politicians. Instea d o f postulating thi s kind
of politic s a s th e natura l stat e o f affair s i n al l libera l democracies ,
however, Weber treated i t as problematic an d aske d abou t th e condi tions of its actualization. H e asked : Wha t kin d o f agency would bes t
achieve the autonom y o f the politica l realm ? For instance , classe s o r
strata that were on the decline (Junkers) or on the rise (entrepreneurs)
were leas t abl e o r willin g t o transcen d thei r economi c interest s i n
favor o f genuin e politica l solutions . Certai n professional s amon g
intellectuals (e.g. , lawyers), however, were better fitte d sociologicall y
and economicall y t o ente r politics , a s they could affor d t o liv e "for "
politics no t "off " o f it (Weber , Politics, pp. 84-85) .
Intellectuals "can " formulat e politica l agenda s an d defen d the m
with (measured) conviction. By contrast, th e intelligentsia woul d b e
least likel y t o engag e i n "true " (transcendental ) politics . Webe r
deemed th e careeris m o f th e bureaucrat s t o b e antithetica l t o th e

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qualities o f commitmen t t o ideal s an d politica l responsibilit y tha t

were, from hi s point o f view, indispensable for th e politica l calling .
In applyin g what amounte d t o a sobe r Marxis t clas s analysi s t o
bureaucracy, Webe r disenchanted th e future Utopia s o f both liberal
and socialis t "literati." To dispel the liberal "Pollyannaish" praise of
bureaucratization, Webe r pointed ou t that the growth of capitalis m
and bureaucrac y neithe r promote s no r parallel s democratization .
On th e contrary : suc h growt h amon g othe r "weathe r signs " point s
in th e directio n o f "increasin g unfreedom. " Webe r hel d i t t o b e
"utterly ridiculous " to equat e th e developmen t o f moder n capital ism wit h "freedom, " "democracy, " o r individualism . Indeed , h e
asked himself , "How ar e al l these thing s [i.e., freedom , democrac y
and individualism ] in general and i n the long term possible where it
(i.e., moder n capitalism ) prevails? " (Weber, Russia, p. 282) . To the
extent tha t moder n bureaucracy, a s a "power instrumen t of the firs t
order" is increasingly rationalized an d rendere d more indispensabl e
and mor e "unshatterable, " i t become s antithetica l t o libera l ideal s
(Weber, Bureaucracy, pp . 228-231 ; Economy II , p . 1401) . The dy namics o f developing capitalism an d bureaucrac y d o no t promot e
freedom. I f anything , i t i s the voluntaristi c "will o f a natio n no t t o
allow itsel f t o b e le d lik e a floc k o f sheep " tha t ma y guarante e
freedom an d individualit y (Weber, Russia, p. 282) .
Weber brough t th e gif t o f Marxis t clas s analysi s no t onl y t o th e
bourgeois flatterers o f bureaucracy but also to the Marxist ideologist s
of th e proletaria n state . I n hi s essay on socialism, Webe r focused o n
the blind spot o f Marxist movement s of his time; he proffered a class
analysis of the bureaucratizatio n o f the Marxis t movemen t an d o f its
consequences. H e maintaine d tha t thos e wh o live d "off " Socia l
Democracy, fro m innkeeper s whose establishments are patronized b y
radicals, t o universit y professors, editors , party officials , etc. , woul d
not abando n thei r veste d interest s fo r th e sak e o f revolutionar y
believers an d thei r belief s (Beetham , 1985 , p . 162) . "Nothin g i s
further fro m th e thoughts o f this class than solidarit y with the prolet ariat, they are much more concerned wit h increasing the gap between
the proletaria t an d themselves " (Weber, Socialism, p . 261) .
The ultimate naivet e of both the liberal and radical panegyrists of
bureaucratization consiste d i n that the y were applauding th e inevitable proces s o f bureaucratization, no t realizin g tha t thei r applaus e
was itself a part of that process: "The futur e belongs t o bureaucrati -

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 9

zation, an d i t is evident that i n this regar d th e literat i pursu e thei r

callingto provide a salvo of applause to the up-and-coming powersjust a s they did i n the ag e of laissez-faire, both time s with th e
same naivete" (Weber, Economy II, p. 1401) . Max Weber' s political
views wer e a s profoundl y influenced by hi s visio n o f th e futur e a s
they wer e informe d by hi s stud y o f th e past .
To describe Weber's critique of the future o f the Occiden t we have
coined th e wor d "Orientosis." It woul d b e consistent wit h Weber' s
views o n cross-cultura l understanding t o asser t that h e confronted
non-Western civilization s with question s that wer e primarily rele vant t o th e Wester n societies. Bu t the revers e was also true : Weber
used th e insight s he had gaine d throug h hi s comparative historica l
studies a s a n integra l part o f his politica l sociology . B y fusing th e
objective possibilitie s o f th e presen t wit h certai n historica l idea l
types, Weber arrived a t a prognosis o f the trends of his time, which
became centra l t o hi s politica l ideals . Webe r identifie d wit h th e
Jewish prophets of doom partly because he felt that he had see n the
future o f the Occiden t i n the pas t o f the Orien t an d Mesopotamia .
This helpe d Webe r replac e th e vagu e pessimisti c futurolog y o f
Toqueville and Mil l with his vivid prophecy of doom: "Everywhere,
the casing of th e new serfdom i s ready" (Weber, Socialism, p. 281).
Socialism, far from bein g an alternative destination, was a shortcut
to the "iron cage." The subjugation of the individual would becom e
complete soone r i f the machiner y o f private capitalis m wer e t o b e
dismantled an d replaced by the central management o f nationalize d
and socialize d enterprises. Monopolization o f the bureaucratic ma chine woul d create a latter-day versio n of mass enslavement i n th e
style o f ancien t Egypt , excep t "i t woul d occu r i n a muc h mor e
rationaland henc e unbreakableform " (Weber , Economy II ,
p. 1402) . Bureaucrats ar e particularly earmarke d t o kee p the gate s
of th e "hous e o f bondage" o f the future . Th e animate d machin e o f
bureaucracy," togethe r wit h th e inanimat e machin e . . . i s bus y
fabricating th e shel l of bondage whic h men wil l perhaps b e force d
to inhabi t someday , a s powerles s a s th e fellah s o f ancien t Egypt "
(Weber, Economy II, p. 1402) . The socialists were mistaken to think
that thei r stat e bureaucrac y was any better tha n it s capitalist (pri vate o r public ) counterparts . O n th e on e hand , socialis m woul d
inevitably proliferat e bureaucracies i n orde r t o tak e ove r nationalized corporations . O n the other , it would eliminate the competition

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of privat e bureaucracies , an d tha t betwee n privat e an d publi c bu reaucracies, leavin g th e wa y ope n fo r tota l contro l o f th e civi l
society b y a centralize d stat e machine .
Weber credited America n worker s for seeing through th e bureau cratic peril , rejectin g "civi l servic e reform." The y "preferre d t o b e
governed b y parvenus o f doubtful moralit y rathe r tha n a formall y
qualified mandarinate " (Weber, Russia, p. 282) . I n th e impendin g
orientalization o f th e Occident , a ne w bureaucrac y woul d b e
created mor e powerful and stiflin g tha n thos e o f Egypt an d China .
The questio n was : Wha t coul d b e don e t o preven t this?
Weber's Politica l Agenda :
Democracy, Bureaucracy , an d Mas s Societie s
Like Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill , Weber revered the
autonomy o f th e individua l an d dreade d th e impendin g demis e o f
individuality an d freedo m in the flowin g tide o f mass equalitarian ism an d tota l bureaucratizatio n (Mill , 1986 , pp . 59-63 , 121-123 ;
Tocqueville, 1969 , pp. 250-262) . Unlik e them, however , Weber ha d
a clear vision of the natur e o f this threat. Weber' s theory of increas ing orientalizatio n o f the Occiden t integrate s his comparative soci ology wit h a form o f futurology based o n a n estimat e o f objective
possibilities fo r occidenta l civilization . Thi s blea k premonitio n
went a long way to temper Weber's liberal convictions an d affec t hi s
political agenda . Hi s vie w o f liberal democracy an d it s institution s
was an instrumental one; the whole system could b e used t o protec t
individuality an d th e hegemon y o f th e stat e throug h it s bureau cratic machine . Despit e apparent electiv e affinities betwee n democratization an d th e growt h o f bureaucracy , Webe r maintaine d tha t
they ar e fundamentall y incompatible :
We must remembe r the fact which we have encountered several times
and whic h w e shall hav e t o discus s repeatedly: tha t "democracy " as
such i s oppose d t o th e "rule " of bureaucracy , i n spit e an d perhap s
because o f its unavoidable ye t unintended promotio n o f bureaucrati zation. Unde r certain conditions , democrac y creates palpable break s
in the bureaucratic patter n an d impediments to bureaucratic organi zation. (Weber , Economy II, p . 991)

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 9

People i n a mass society are confronted with the colossal human

machine of bureaucracy, which functions a s an instrument of power
for th e stat e whil e furtherin g the interest s o f its members throug h
the contro l o f informatio n (officia l secrecy ) and practica l knowl edge. Even the masters of bureaucracy, be they "the people, " oligarchies, or tyrants, find themselve s as powerless as clumsy dilettantes
trying t o us e a sophisticate d machin e t o furthe r thei r ow n causes .
Under libera l democrati c regimes , however , the contro l an d con tainment o f bureaucracy seem to b e better institutionalized: reason
enough t o prefe r suc h socia l system s to an y for m o f centralize d
control.
Before elaboratin g o n th e superiorit y of democrati c institution s
in checkin g th e powe r o f bureaucracies , i t mus t b e state d tha t
Weber's emphasis on the problems of bureaucratic control doe s not
mean that he was solely concerned with the threat o f a bureaucratic
intelligentsia, but that he feared them as a more immediate threat to
the ideal s o f freedo m an d individualit y i n th e West . Centralis m
either unde r the intellectuals (e.g., Jacobism o r Marxism ) o r under
the intelligentsi a (e.g., state bureaucracie s o f socialism and capital ism) wer e see n b y Webe r a s equall y inimical to th e growt h o f th e
autonomous individua l (Weber, Russia, p. 281).
As we suggested earlier, Weber's abhorrence of centralism b y o r
in th e nam e o f the peopl e links him t o th e romanti c liberalis m of
John Stuar t Mil l (Mill , 1986 , pp. 184-185) . Whil e hi s critical dis tance from suc h concepts as "the inalienabl e rights of man" sets him
apart fro m classica l liberalism, there is no doubt tha t Webe r nonetheless jealously treasure d thes e "inalienable huma n rights"ap parently as useful mythsan d was adamant tha t the private sphere
be protecte d fro m th e incursion s o f th e stat e (Weber , Russia,
p. 283) . It als o i s true that like classical liberals Webe r deemed th e
goal o f democratic contro l o f the stat e t o b e the protectio n o f th e
inchoate seed s of individuality in the West . Yet, probably the mos t
important aspec t o f Weber' s liberalis m i s tha t h e di d no t sto p a t
expounding his idealsor portending his prophecies of doombut
proceeded to offe r concret e political guidelines in order to reconcile
them wit h th e realitie s o f mass societ y an d it s increasin g bureau cratization. Webe r als o attempte d t o integrat e hi s ow n theor y o f
social conflic t (betwee n and withi n social classe s as well a s amon g
value spheres) with his liberal ideals. The result is a particular blend

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of ideas an d ideal s tha t initiated a new era i n liberal thought o f the

twentieth century .
As Socrate s i s credited wit h callin g philosoph y fro m heave n an d
bringing i t t o earth , s o shoul d Webe r b e recognize d a s th e thinke r
who brough t th e ideal s o f individualis m an d freedo m fro m th e
heaven o f classical an d romanti c liberalis m t o th e mundan e worl d of
mass democracies. Webe r was not th e onl y liberal for who m individ uality an d freedo m cam e befor e equalit y an d politica l participation ,
but h e certainly is among th e first t o boldl y formulate his ideas in the
form o f a n elitis t traditio n withi n liberalism . Neglectin g Weber , this
trend i s nowaday s usuall y identifie d wit h a lin e o f thinker s rangin g
from Schumpete r t o Dah l (Macpherson , 1977 , pp. 76-92) .
Weber openl y doubte d th e valu e o f mas s participatio n i n th e
democratic proces s (Weber , Economy II , pp . 1459-1460 ) an d en dorsed th e so-calle d principl e o f smal l numbers :
The broa d mas s o f deputie s function s onl y a s a followin g fo r th e
leader o r th e fe w leader s wh o for m th e government , an d i t blindl y
follows the m as long as they ar e successful . This i s the wa y i t should
be. Politica l actio n i s alway s determine d b y th e "principl e o f smal l
numbers," tha t means , th e superio r politica l maneuverabilit y o f
small leading groups. In mass states, this caesarist element is ineradicable [italics added] . (Weber , Economy II , p . 1414)
Weber also rejected as contemptible the rule of mediocre intelligent sia i n stat e an d part y bureaucracie s unde r th e guis e o f a mas s
leaderless democracy . Thes e tw o fact s drov e hi m t o advocat e th e
charismatic leadershi p o f a democraticall y electe d leader . Thi s
"caesarist" element in Weber's political though t has been the subject
of muc h controversy , whic h i s no t a t issu e here . I t is , however ,
beyond doubt that for Weber, even under the most democratic for m
of state, the passivity of masses was a given: "It i s not th e politically
passive 'mass ' tha t produce s th e leade r fro m it s midst , bu t th e
political leade r recruit s hi s followin g an d win s th e mas s throug h
'demagogy'" (Weber, Economy II , p . 1457) . Weber di d no t requir e
the libera l democrati c parliamen t t o b e th e voic e o f th e masses ;
rather, these bodies were supposed t o fulfil l tw o practical functions.
First, th e parliamen t supplie s a modicu m o f necessar y rationa l
legitimation fo r th e moder n state :

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 9

Modern parliament s ar e primaril y representativ e bodie s o f thos e

ruled wit h bureaucrati c means . Afte r all , a certai n minimu m o f
consent o n th e par t o f th e ruled , a t leas t o f th e sociall y importan t
strata, i s a preconditio n o f th e durabilit y o f every , eve n th e bes t
organized, domination . Parliament s ar e toda y th e mean s o f mani festing thi s minimu m consent . (Weber , Economy II , pp . 1407-1408 )

The secon d functio n o f the parliamen t is to provid e a countervail ing force i n order to check the power of the entrenched bureaucracy
of the state . Though the necessity of "watchful criticism" of bureaucracy was already proposed by other s (e.g., b y Mill) , it wa s Weber
who depicte d th e institutiona l framewor k within which this coul d
be accomplished.
Weber's Politica l Agenda : The Varietie s o f Irresponsibilit y
Weber was as averse to the total sovereignty of a handful of intellectuals a s h e wa s oppose d t o th e hegemon y o f th e bureaucrati c
intelligentsia as a class. Ye t he chose intellectuals as his champions
of politica l leadershi p whil e warnin g the m agains t confoundin g
their politic s wit h maxim s o f ethica l an d rationa l intellectualiza tion. T o ente r politic s for a n intellectua l migh t b e tantamoun t t o
giving u p th e searc h for symmetr y and consistenc y of the intellec tual an d mora l spheres without acceptin g the view o f the hardene d
practitioners o f "power politics. " Th e intellectua l wh o fail s t o ad just t o th e politica l callin g become s a "cosmic ethica l rationalist, "
which Weber deems to b e the mos t dangerou s political animal . H e
believed tha t thi s sort o f political intellectual would be easily overwhelmed by the ethical immorality of the world. In trying to remain
loyal to a set of absolute an d abstrac t mora l o r ideologica l principles, suc h a perso n wil l resor t t o wishfu l thinking : "fro m goo d
comes only good, but from evi l only evil follows," that is, one needs
only to take stock o f one's own intentions and rest assured that th e
results o f a n actio n will follow suit . Thus th e visionar y intellectua l
would becom e th e parago n o f "irresponsibility " (Weber , Politics,
pp. 121-122) . Suc h a bree d o f politicall y motivate d intellectual s
evoke the wrong paradigm in early Christianity when subscribing to
the maxi m o f "Do righ t and leave the rest to God. " Instead , Weber

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would advise them to take heart: The early Christians knew full wel l
the worl d is governed by demons and that h e who lets himself in for
politics, tha t is , fo r powe r an d forc e a s means , contract s wit h
diabolical power s and that for his action it is not true that goo d can
follow onl y fro m goo d an d evi l onl y from evil , bu t tha t ofte n th e
opposite i s true (Weber , India, p . 184 ; Politics, p . 123) .
In spit e o f th e beratin g o f politicize d intellectuals ' politica l nai vete, despit e callin g som e o f the m "windbags " an d "backwood s
politicians," an d despit e criticizing their "soft-headed " an d "Philistine" attitude i n trying to "replace the 'political' with the 'ethical,'"
Weber continue d t o assum e th e ultimat e corrigibilit y of the politi cally aspirin g intellectuals . Wh y wa s h e les s generous wit h politi cized bureaucrati c intelligentsia ? Becaus e thei r "irresponsibility "
was no t th e resul t o f naivete o r idealism ; it was an integra l par t o f
their statu s ethos . "I t i s i n th e natur e o f official s o f hig h mora l
standing t o b e poor politicians , an d abov e all , in the political sense
of the word, to b e irresponsible politicians" (Weber, Politics, p. 95).
At first sigh t the organize d irresponsibility of the bureaucrats migh t
seem benign when compared wit h the irresponsibility of the zealous
intellectuals (e.g. , syndicalists) . The threa t o f the former , however,
was see n b y Webe r t o b e a n accomplishe d fact , i n vie w o f Ger many's recen t disastrou s politica l events ; i t als o appeare d imma nent, a s followin g fro m th e forma l an d practica l rationalizin g
trends o f Wester n civilization. Without underestimatin g th e peril s
of intellectuals ' participatio n i n politics , Webe r diagnose d th e bu reaucratic "organize d irresponsibility " to b e infinitel y mor e perni cious an d ultimatel y incurable . Therefor e h e di d no t se t ou t t o
admonish the Prussia n bureaucrat s in the ar t o f politics; "politics"
was no t a "vocation " h e wishe d the m t o master . Instead , Webe r
attacked the m b y attributin g to thei r "careerism " nearly al l of the
evils o f Germa n politics . Th e callin g o f a civi l servant , Webe r
maintained, i s t o sacrific e his conviction s t o th e demand s o f obe dience. Thi s i s diametrically oppose d t o th e callin g o f a politician .
Weber's disapprovin g tone i s unyielding:
It i s reliably known that almost all of the me n who wer e in charge of
our policie s i n that disastrou s decade have time an d agai n privatel y
repudiated grav e declaration s fo r whic h the y accepte d forma l re sponsibility. If one asked with amazement why a statesman remained

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 9

in offic e i f he was powerless t o preven t th e publicatio n of a questionable statement , th e usua l answe r wa s tha t "somebod y els e woul d
have been found" to authorize it. This may very well be true, bu t the n
it also indicate s th e decisiv e faul t o f th e system . Woul d somebod y
else have also been foun d i f the head o f government woul d hav e ha d
to tak e th e responsibilit y a s th e truste e o f a powerfu l parliament ?
(Weber, Economy II , p . 1438 )

Weber deeme d th e struggl e o f th e force s o f freedo m agains t

modern enslavement in the bond s o f bureaucracy to b e a battle of
sheer will against all odds. Individuality and freedom did not sai l on
the favorable winds of history but had to fight hard to remain afloa t
no matte r ho w the economic tides changed. Th e "will" o f a natio n
and th e determinatio n o f its political leader s determined th e futur e
of freedo m an d individuality . Unlik e Marx , Webe r woul d no t b e
embarrassed i f he wer e asked wh o th e "We " o f histor y is:
Yet tim e i s pressing : "w e mus t work , whil e i t i s stil l day. " If , i n th e
course o f succeeding generations , a s long a s the economi c and intel lectual "revolution," the much-abuse d "anarchy " of production an d
the n o les s abuse d "subjectivism " continue unabated , the individua l
citizen wh o throug h them , an d only through them, has bee n lef t t o
depend o n himsel f fail s t o conque r certai n sphere s o f freedo m an d
personality a s hi s "inalienable " possessions , the n h e wil l perhaps
never conque r them . (Weber , Russia, p. 283 )

Prominently, the "We" o f history for Webe r is the politicall y activ e

intellectual wh o enter s politic s both wit h commitmen t t o a caus e
and wit h an awarenes s of the necessit y of compromise in orde r to ,
among othe r things , sav e th e worl d from becomin g th e priso n o f
individuality an d th e graveyar d o f freedom.
An Ethi c for Politica l Actio n
What ma y appea r a s a universal ethi c for politica l actio n i n Ma x
Weber's famous "Politics a s a Vocation" is indeed on e o f the mos t
context-dependent o f al l hi s arguments . Th e narro w se t o f guide lines Weber offered fo r the practitioner of politics as a vocation was
inspired by an attempt to dispel the naivete of politically motivate d

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intellectuals. It was also a n attempt t o prevent nihilism from settin g

in a s a resul t o f metatheoretica l an d theoretica l assumption s tha t
were take n fo r grante d b y mos t intellectual s o f th e day , an d inci dently by Weber himself . In thi s sens e Weber's politica l essays, like
his methodology , i s a soliloquy . Weber argue d tha t "som e kin d o f
faith mus t alway s exist . Otherwis e . .. th e curs e o f th e creature' s
worthlessness overshadow s eve n th e externall y stronges t politica l
successes" (Weber, Politics, p . 117) . The recommendation o f "ethics
of responsibility, " i n othe r words , i s nove l an d controversia l onl y
for th e intellectuals ; professiona l politicians t o who m a "sens e o f
proportion" an d a lukewar m commitmen t t o idea s com e naturall y
will no t b e move d b y thi s aspec t o f Weber' s politica l creed .
Despite offerin g a nearl y exhaustiv e lis t o f possibl e form s o f
methodical politica l action , Webe r remained critica l o f all of them .
After all , hi s polytheistic social ontology was based o n the ultimat e
irreconcilability o f value spheres and th e ineradicabilit y o f conflic t
from socia l life ; assumption s tha t coul d hardl y furnis h a universal
and ethicall y consisten t politica l ethic . Indeed , Webe r conceive d o f
the relationshi p betwee n sphere s o f ethic s an d politic s a s on e o f
constant an d unresolvabl e tensio n (Weber , Rejections, p . 333) . At tempts at solving this tension, observed Weber, have time and agai n
produced half-bake d compromises , suc h a s ethical rationalization s
of politica l action , whic h Webe r dubbe d "apin g o f ethics, " o r th e
claims that succes s in action indicate s moral righ t (Weber , Politics,
p. 117 ; Rejections, p . 334) . Suc h attempt s appeare d t o Webe r a s
full o f unjustifiable compromises, an d ultimatel y a s being "dishon est" (Weber , Rejections, pp . 335-336) . Bu t in criticizin g an "ethic s
of ultimate ends " Weber als o too k issu e wit h apparentl y successfu l
resolutions of the tension between ethical and rational (economi c o r
political) action . A fairl y inclusiv e taxonom y o f politica l actio n
oriented towar d ultimat e end s i s offere d i n Weber' s "Religiou s
Rejections of the World and Thei r Directions. " Unlik e action that is
"rational" from th e "practical" point o f view, the value o f "ethically
rational" action resides not in its success but in its "intrinsic worth. "
In othe r words , ethical actio n i s by definition introverted. Nonethe less, thos e wh o op t t o ac t publicl y an d politicall y accordin g t o
value-rational frameworksan d Webe r prefer s tha t politician s a t
least t o som e exten t d o somus t kee p a n ey e o n th e practica l
consequences o f their actio n a s well. Another proble m aggravatin g

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 9

the dilemm a o f ethically consistent politica l actio n i s the necessity

of usin g "violence " and manipulatio n o f th e "huma n machine " i n
order t o achiev e exalte d ethical/politica l goals . Wher e religio n
supplies the ethic s fo r politica l actio n Webe r see s onl y two consis tent way s out o f this conundrum :
The purita n solutio n opt s fo r inner-worldl y asceticism . Thi s
means actin g i n the world according to a predetermined desig n and
refusing t o ponde r th e meaning of one's actio n o r t o take responsi bility fo r it s consequences . "Th e Christia n doe s righ t an d leave s
the rest to God." Whe n the action produce s evil instead of good, the
responsibility fo r i t i s passe d o n eithe r t o Go d himsel f o r t o th e
wickedness an d foolishnes s of the creatura l world , which might, a t
any rate , stil l be conceive d o f as "the bes t o f all 'possible' worlds."
The secon d ethically consistent solutio n is not a "solution" of the
problem a s such , bu t a systemati c avoidanc e o f it . I t consist s o f
seeking refuge i n otherworldly mysticism: the conflic t o f ethics an d
politics i s thu s avoide d b y completel y retreatin g fro m th e latte r
realm. Thi s solution in its final logica l form rejects categorically al l
forms o f instrumentally rationa l action .
Less elaborate parallel s for thes e alternative s o f either retreatin g
into th e ivor y tower o f intellectual contemplatio n o r engagin g i n a
form o f inner-worldly , noncontemplativ e asceticis m aboun d i n
Eastern religions . Webe r too k particula r interes t i n th e Easter n
brand o f inner-worldly political asceticis m an d it s unique justifications for entanglement in the world. A classical example of this type
of solutio n appear s i n Bhagava d Gita . Whe n Arjun a th e maste r
warrior frette d abou t endangerin g hi s salvation b y performin g hi s
caste duties that included the killing of his kin, the supreme personality o f godhea d (Krishna ) relieve d hi m o f hi s angst b y declarin g
ethical concern s abou t one' s action s t o b e invalid . Unabl e t o per ceive th e pantheisti c natur e o f th e worl d (an d socia l life) , ma n i s
overcome b y illusory appearances an d their equally deceptiv e ethical meanings . Webe r outline d th e practica l ethic s implie d here :
Man o f knowledg e prove s himsel f i n actio n bette r agains t hi s ow n
action i n th e worl d b y consummatin g wha t i s commandedtha t
always mean s cast e dutywhil e inwardl y remainin g completel y de tached. Tha t i s he act s a s if he acte d no t . . . a s the earl y Christia n
"does righ t an d leave s th e res t t o God " s o th e worshippe r o f th e

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Bahgavata doe s th e "necessar y work " . . . h e doe s thes e an d n o

others without any concern for the consequences. (Weber, India, p. 184 )

It i s obviou s tha t Webe r considere d non e o f thes e solution s fo r

the strai n between ethics and politic s a s satisfactory. I t i s also clear
from ou r earlie r sketc h o f Weber's theor y o f "social selection" tha t
the criterio n o f correctness o f political actio n canno t b e sough t i n
its externa l succes s either . Neithe r intellectuals ' withdrawa l fro m
the world nor thei r anarchistic pacifis m nor thei r puritanica l obses sion wit h interna l consistenc y an d doin g "th e righ t thing " coul d
provide a guidin g principl e fo r politica l actio n fro m th e poin t o f
view o f Weberia n politica l ethics . Ye t Weber wa s attracte d t o th e
intellectualistic approac h t o politics . Fo r instance , a measur e o f
ethical consistency in political action seem s to have been significan t
for Weber , a s he ofte n celebrate d no t onl y the interna l consistenc y
and idealisti c single-mindednes s o f certain type s o f political actio n
but als o their usefulness: on e can attain th e possible only by wishing
the impossible. Besides, Weber knew that a rational choic e between
an "ethic s o f ultimat e ends " and a n "ethic s o f responsibility " wa s
not possibl e an d thu s n o fina l judgmen t betwee n the m coul d b e
made (Weber , Meaning, p . 16) . I n a n exceptionall y revealin g pas sage he goes so far a s disclosing his basic partialit y t o th e "ethics o f
ultimate ends " when compared wit h the more "sober" and unenter prising politica l attitud e o f the bureaucrati c intelligentsia :
In a sense, successful politica l action i s always the "ar t o f the possi ble." Nonetheless , th e possibl e i s ofte n reache d onl y b y strivin g t o
attain th e impossibl e that lie s beyond it . Thos e specifi c qualitie s of
our culture , which , despit e ou r difference s i n viewpoint , we al l es teem mor e or les s positively, are not th e product s of the onl y consistent ethi c of " 'adaptation' to the possible," namely, the bureaucratic
morality of Confucianism. I, for my part, wil l not tr y to dissuade the
nation from the view that actions are to be judged not merely by their
instrumental valu e bu t b y thei r intrinsi c valu e a s well . (Weber ,
Meaning, pp . 23-24 )

In addition , on e mus t remembe r tha t Webe r himsel f chos e th e

ethics o f ultimate end s i n respec t t o certai n curren t politica l issues
of his time (Honigsheim, pp. 124-125) . Eve n in "Politics as a Voca-

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 10

tion," one encounters passages suc h as the following: "Surely, poli tics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the hea d
alone. I n thi s th e proponent s o f th e ethic s o f ultimat e end s ar e
right" (Weber, Politics, p . 127) . It i s indeed thi s electiv e affinit y o f
intellectuals fo r a n ethi c o f ultimat e end s tha t Webe r find s i n
himself a s well as in his audience that impels him to launch a fervent
attack agains t thi s kin d o f political mentality .
Weber's critique o f idealistic politics , however , was not designe d
to tacitl y endors e the mundan e practic e o f realpolitik. Professiona l
politicians ma y no t b e impressed b y Weber's emphasis o n politica l
"responsibility," bu t they too wil l benefit fro m hi s critique of power
politics. "Politics as a Vocation" denounces the philistine attitud e of
power politicians an d thei r utter neglect of the "tragedy wit h which
all action , bu t especiall y politica l action , i s trul y interwoven "
(Weber, Politics, p . 117) . Considerin g the inevitabilit y of the la w of
"unintended consequence " o f human actionwhic h become s eve n
more tragi c a s it s dimension s ar e augmente d i n th e spher e o f
political actionn o on e ough t t o tak e fo r grante d th e simpl e an d
rational purposiv e schem e o f huma n actio n a s appropriat e fo r
political action . Th e blatan t insensitivit y o f professiona l powe r
politicians t o th e Weberia n paradoxe s o f political actio n generate s
more tha n scor n o f th e mor e realisti c observer s o f huma n affairs ;
such neglec t coul d foste r seriou s practica l problem s a s well . Th e
arrogance o f power politics ca n giv e rise to vainglor y an d conceit :
by settlin g fo r th e semblanc e o f power these supposedl y hardene d
practitioners o f realpolitik woul d easil y vitiate the purpos e o f their
entering into politics by giving up the real power and settling for the
vain semblance s o f power (Weber , Politics, pp . 116-117) .
Turning hi s attention t o intellectual s an d thei r belove d "ethics of
ultimate ends " in politics, Webe r notes once mor e that "one canno t
prescribe t o anyon e whethe r h e o r sh e shoul d follo w a n ethi c o f
absolute end s o r a n ethi c o f responsibility, " bu t h e proceed s t o
question th e "inne r poise"an d b y implicatio n th e mora l cour ageof someon e wh o opt s for th e ethic s o f ultimate ends , the easy
solution o f doing "the righ t thing," and then blamin g th e worl d fo r
the consequences of the action. Acting "irresponsibly" an d pretend ing to be blind to the consequences of one's own action is the sign of
an immatur e an d dilettant e intellectua l wh o willfull y confuse s th e
comforting visio n o f a rationall y ordere d worl d wit h th e socia l

102 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

reality tha t h e attempt s t o influenc e b y enterin g politics : " I a m

under th e impressio n tha t i n nin e ou t o f te n case s I dea l wit h
windbags wh o do no t full y realiz e wha t they tak e upo n themselves
but wh o intoxicat e themselve s with romanti c sensations " (Weber ,
Politics, p . 127) . Her e Webe r explicitl y cast s doub t o n th e mora l
integrity o f thos e wh o choos e th e ethic s o f ultimat e end s a s a
dogmatic shiel d agains t th e irrationalit y o f the worl d and th e peril s
of actin g i n it . Th e crusadin g pitc h o f Weber' s "Politic s a s a Vocation" originates in his genuine hope of encouraging the intellectual s
to ente r politics while warning these natura l follower s of the ethic s
of ultimat e end s agains t th e danger s o f politica l irresponsibility ,
especially whe n i t come s seductivel y enveloped i n suc h wrappings
as anarchis m an d syndicalism . H e censure d th e champion s o f th e
ethics o f ultimate ends for thei r arrogance , fo r no t bein g "human "
or "mature" enough t o giv e up th e hop e o f fixing the worl d i n their
own image instea d o f adapting themselve s to th e demands o f actin g
in th e worl d a s i t stands . Wha t i s Weber's alternative ? Th e "Ethic s
of Responsibility" ! But wha t doe s tha t mean ?
The basi s o f th e ethic s o f responsibilit y is a simpl e inversio n o f
the politica l attitud e o f th e intellectuals : instea d o f th e inward looking ques t fo r consistenc y an d salvatio n throug h politica l ac tion, the y ar e advise d t o focu s als o o n th e consequence s o f thei r
actions. The y ough t t o fac e th e utter irrationalit y o f the world , the
tragic results of the law of unintended consequences, the irreducible
conflicts o f valu e spheres , and , ultimately , the y mus t abando n al l
hope t o attai n salvatio n throug h politica l action . Webe r conclude d
that the crusader, religious and revolutionary alike, must lear n that
by entering politics he contracts wit h "diabolical forces." The intel lectual enterin g politic s mus t tak e responsibilit y not onl y fo r th e
consequences o f hi s action s bu t als o fo r "wha t ma y becom e o f
himself unde r th e impac t o f thes e paradoxes " (Weber , Politics,
pp. 120-126) .
All o f thes e caveat s wer e intende d fo r intellectual s wh o wer e
considering a career i n politics. On e mus t remembe r tha t "Politic s
as a Vocation" was first delivere d as a lecture to a group o f students
of politics . Webe r wa s awar e o f th e existenc e o f radica l student s
among hi s audience and that he had replaced anothe r speake r (Kur t
Eisner) who would have preached wha t Webe r censored a s ethics of
ultimate end s i n politic s (Dahlmann , 1989) . Webe r coul d hav e

Sociology o f Politics a s a Sociology o f Intellectuals 10

concluded his lecture by simply recommending th e supplantation o f

idealism wit h a n ethi c o f responsibility . Webe r di d no t d o s o be cause he was not sur e that th e ethic s of ultimate end s was devoid of
merit, an d als o becaus e th e alternativeth e ethic s o f responsibil itywhich wa s alread y practice d b y man y nonintellectua l politi cians in any case, an d which entailed a facile invitation t o the time honored virtue s o f temperanc e a s moderation , di d no t appea r t o
him a s quit e satisfactory.
Hence Webe r reminde d his audience onc e mor e o f the unration alizability o f th e worl d an d th e traged y o f havin g t o ac t i n i t a s
though i t wer e otherwise. W e observed i n th e secon d chapte r tha t
the martia l spiri t ha s a n electiv e affinit y fo r polytheisti c religiosity
in Weber' s sociolog y o f religion . Conversely , w e migh t conclude ,
acting courageousl y in a polytheisti c world call s for th e ethic s o f a
hero; an d thi s i s Weber' s fina l messag e t o th e intellectual s wh o
contemplate actin g in th e world . Weber's mos t admirabl e politica l
actor i s neither a "cosmic ethica l rationalist," no r a crusader i n the
cause of a clearly defined universa l goal; an d thi s is exactly why th e
actor need s to b e a hero. I t is not because o/the meaningfulness of
the world that th e intellectual shoul d enter public life an d stan d hi s
ground, bu t i n spite o f it s meaninglessness.
Politics i s a stron g an d slo w borin g o f har d boards . I t take s bot h
passion an d perspective . Certainl y al l historical experienc e confirm s
the truththat man would no t have attaine d th e possible unles s tim e
and agai n h e ha d reache d ou t fo r th e impossible . Bu t t o d o tha t a
man mus t b e a leader, an d no t onl y a leader bu t a her o a s well, in a
very sober sens e of the word. An d eve n those wh o ar e neither leader s
nor heroe s mus t ar m themselve s wit h tha t steadfastnes s o f hear t
which ca n brav e eve n th e crumblin g o f al l hopes . Thi s i s necessar y
right now , o r els e me n wil l no t b e abl e t o attai n eve n tha t whic h i s
possible today . Onl y he has the calling fo r politics wh o is sure that he
shall no t crumbl e whe n th e world from his point o f view is too stupi d
or too bas e for wha t h e wants t o offer . Onl y h e who i n the face o f all
this ca n sa y "I n spit e o f all! " ha s th e callin g fo r politics . (Weber ,
Politics, p. 128 )

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4
Definitions

The Troubl e with Definin g Concept s

Waging a crusade against conceptua l ambiguities is not a n essential
part o f a socia l scienc e base d o n Weberia n principles . However ,
such a socia l scienc e mus t no t forswea r forma l considerations ,
because settin g one's conceptual house in order might be inevitable
in certai n circumstances . The necessitatin g occasio n ma y be a current o f conceptual confusion s or methodological controversie s that
threaten to interfere with the process of empirical investigation. Fo r
this reaso n Webe r himsel f decide d t o writ e on th e methodolog y o f
social an d historica l sciences . Th e subjec t o f thi s boo k ca n espe cially benefi t fro m forma l delimitation s an d redefinition s becaus e
its central concepts have been subject to both scientific disputes and
ideological feuds . Besides , a n overhau l an d reconstructio n o f th e
basic concepts o f sociology of intellectuals is indispensable for on e
of th e mai n purpose s o f thi s book : t o furthe r stimulat e empirica l
research i n th e are a o f Weberia n sociolog y o f intellectuals . O f
course, methodological consideration s are not meant to supplant or
guide empirica l research . Idea l types , a s w e hav e alread y empha sized i n th e firs t chapte r o f this book, ar e simpl y "precision instruments." The y ar e modest tools ; s o modest indee d that the y do no t
even requir e to b e inspected fo r thei r truth o r falsehood bu t rathe r
for th e degre e of their usefulness. The se t of interrelated ideal types
offered her e (Table 4.1-4.3 ) is meant t o b e o f pragmatic us e for th e
practitioners o f a Weberia n sociolog y of intellectuals . A s suc h th e
chief virtu e o f th e mode l offere d i n thi s chapte r an d amplifie d i n
successive cros s table s i s no t it s novelt y bu t it s inclusiveness ; i t
105

106 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

synthesizes element s o f tw o kind s o f diversity : tha t o f theoretica l

debates aimin g t o defin e intellectuals , an d th e divergenc e o f th e
historical an d intercivilizationa l varietie s o f intellectuality.
At the outse t i t must b e pointed ou t tha t th e apparen t "generali zations" o n whic h ou r mode l i s base d ar e no t inductivel y con structed; concept s such a s intellectuals, intelligentsia, an d me n an d
women o f knowledg e ar e heuristi c devices . Fo r on e thin g thes e
concepts d o no t clai m t o represen t ontologicall y significan t an d
universal phenomena. Rather , they prominently bear the imprint of
particular historica l an d geocultura l "value-relevan t interests " o f
Western civilization .
Being temporally an d geoculturall y grounded doe s no t necessar ily vitiat e th e purpos e o f these concepts , whic h i s to compar e an d
contrast differen t civilizations . No r i s the clai m t o universalit y by
such idea l type s tantamount t o a n imperialisti c attemp t t o monop olize th e scienc e o f intercultural understanding . Th e Weberia n dis cipline i s consistent wit h the propositio n that mor e than on e se t of
"universally valid " idea l type s ca n b e constructe d an d use d fo r
intercivilizational comparisons . I n othe r words , a Weberia n socia l
science allows for each generation an d each civilization t o construc t
its ow n universall y valid idea l type s o n th e basi s o f it s ow n value relevant interests . Th e recognitio n o f th e relevanc e o f limite d
human interest s i n th e proces s o f concep t formatio n ha s a direc t
bearing on the problems surrounding the general "definition" o f the
concepts wit h whic h w e ar e dealin g i n thi s chapter .
Some o f th e bes t studie s o f intellectual s shrin k fro m offerin g a
"definition" fo r intellectuals in order t o shu n prematur e closure s or
to avoi d a n earlie r period' s parochia l an d Eurocentri c generaliza tions tha t ofte n stretche d a concep t beyon d it s legitimat e Wester n
context an d thu s beyon d it s usefulness . W e nee d no t fea r thi s a s
long a s w e ar e awar e o f ou r positio n i n tim e an d spac e an d th e
conceptual limit s ou r "huma n condition " sets o n us . I t i s with this
knowledge tha t w e heuristically appl y a batter y o f context-depen dent concept s t o temporall y an d geoculturall y distan t peoples . I f
done correctly , this exploration wil l allo w us to "understand " the m
in a wa y that i s both scientifi c an d humane .
When engagin g i n thi s typ e o f heuristic analysi s w e mus t expec t
rhetorical question s tha t betra y a confusio n betwee n Weberia n
cross-cultural reference s an d th e booris h an d protoscientifi c an -

Definitions 10

thropology an d historiograph y o f a n earlie r perio d o f Wester n

scholarship. W e wil l b e asked : Ho w coul d yo u possibl y lum p to gether th e Gree k sophists , the Confucia n mandarins , th e medieva l
monks, an d the Islami c scribes under suc h rubrics as "intellectuals "
or "intelligentsia, " whic h wer e afte r al l develope d i n nineteenth century Franc e an d Russia? 1 Th e answe r is that w e can, onl y if we
are awar e o f th e similaritie s an d difference s betwee n thes e ver y
different types . Civilizationa l perspective s ar e legitimat e ground s
for concep t formation . Thi s statemen t applie s t o al l civilization s
equally; w e recogniz e th e righ t o f thos e civilization s that ar e th e
object o f ou r scientifi c investigation s t o retur n th e gaz e o f under standing i n their ow n terms; they ca n legitimately call ou r intellec tuals "scribes, " o r "mandarins, " if this usage i s a judicious on e an d
if it : helps the m t o thereb y achiev e a bette r intercultura l "under standing." I n th e cours e o f thi s boo k w e hav e provide d man y
examples of Weber's use of exclusively Western concepts in discussing phenomen a o f Indian , Chinese , an d Hebre w civilizations , bu t
examples o f thi s typ e o f intercivilizationa l reference , heuristic ,
ironic or otherwise , abound everywhere . Take fo r instance, Simon e
de Beauvoir' s choic e o f th e titl e Mandarins, fo r a nove l abou t a
group o f radical Frenc h intellectuals . Onl y a pedant wil l take suc h a
reference literally . I n way s that ar e no t entirel y dissimila r t o th e
ironic us e o f cross-civilizationa l references , every tim e w e us e th e
concept o f "intellectual " fo r phenomen a pertainin g t o a tim e an d
place other than that of their origin, we must expect our audience t o
look beyon d th e litera l usage .
Only i f we take pain s t o compar e an d contras t distan t civiliza tional type s ca n w e discove r similaritie s beneat h apparen t differ ences. Divers e types o f intellectuals shar e man y commo n features .
They al l ar e th e beneficiarie s o f a syste m o f division o f labor tha t
allows the m t o engag e i n th e proces s o f forma l an d substantiv e
rationalization o f ideas . The y al l foste r interna l hierarchie s an d
relate t o the hierarchie s o f prestige and powe r in their societie s i n a
limited numbe r o f ways . Intellectual s everywher e ar e responsibl e
for cultura l borrowings o r resistance to civilizational osmoses. The y
are largel y responsibl e fo r th e uniqu e flavo r o f differen t cultures .
That th e Athenian s looke d t o Spart a o r Persi a fo r guidance , an d
that th e Israelite s deliberatel y avoide d importin g th e intellectua l
products o f their neighbor s o r even guest culture s (Egyptians, Bab -

108 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

ylonians, an d Syrians ) is to a great exten t du e t o th e predilection s

of the intellectua l strata in these cultures. A sociology o f intellectuals, an d indee d an y kin d o f sociology , mus t undertak e th e ris k o f
comparing wha t might appear to be cultural dissimilarities to attain
comparative insight s an d t o stud y counterfactua l trend s i n th e
civilizational developments . Thu s w e hav e explore d a n arra y o f
striking similaritie s betwee n ideologie s an d counterideologie s o f
intellectuals in a cross section o f diverse civilizational contexts (se e
Appendix C) .
The fea r o f genera l concept s (wel l founde d a s i t migh t b e i n th e
case o f certai n kind s o f careles s theorizin g tha t hav e occasionall y
passed a s sociology ) ofte n lead s t o a for m o f steril e an d snobbis h
empirical puritanism , whic h Webe r oppose d i n hi s argument s
against Germa n historiographers : the objective reality is too ric h to
be studied i n its entirety. We need conceptua l sieve s to sif t throug h
empirical data an d to scientificall y reduce the empirica l realit y to a
manageable size . Tha t thes e conceptua l sieve s ar e crafte d i n ou r
cultures an d bea r th e insigni a o f our rootednes s i n tim e an d spac e
must concer n u s onl y i f w e ar e no t awar e o f suc h biase s o r i f we
embark o n a quixoti c attemp t t o disavo w ou r particularity . A s
mortals w e are boun d t o a tiny slice of time an d space , an d Webe r
(before Gadame r an d his Hermeneutics) urge d us to face this condi tion bot h i n considerin g th e callin g t o engag e i n "Scienc e a s a
Vocation" a s wel l a s in the wa y we engage i n it. Onc e w e are awar e
of our "limitedness" we can turn it into "perspective," a n intercultu ral "Archimedea n point " tha t alon e let s u s understan d th e other .
Mutual intercultural (o r historical) understandin g does no t requir e
a singl e universa l se t o f scientifi c theorie s bu t severa l ones . W e
understand th e othe r (i.e. , th e historicall y o r geoculturall y distan t
peoples) no t despit e ou r particularit y bu t becaus e o f it.
In creatin g a ne w taxonom y o f th e usage s o f th e concep t o f
"intellectuals" an d "intelligentsia " we have resiste d th e temptatio n
to coi n ne w word s fo r fea r o f contributin g t o th e methodologica l
confusions. Instea d o f designating on e usage as correct an d dismiss ing th e rest , ou r propose d cros s tabulatio n (Table s 4. 1 an d 4.2 )
reproduces th e commo n overlappin g usage s tha t hav e resulte d i n
many confusions . Thus th e concept "Intellectuals" appear s twic e in
our model : onc e i n vertica l orde r (a s oppose d t o vas t number s o f
"Intelligentsia") an d the n agai n i n horizontal orde r (i n contrast t o

TABLE 4,1 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f the Type s (Mission/Calling) an d Layer s (Intellectuals/Intelligentsia): Function s

Masses

Meaning
>

Masses <

- Meaning
->

TYPES OF
COMMITMENT:
to masse s or
LAYERS:\ th
e truth
Varieties
of reaso n &
hierarchies

SEEKERS O F PURE KNOWLEDGE :

MEN/WOMEN OF SCIENCE /
ARTS/LETTERS
Committed t o "meaning" (truth ,
beauty, gnosis, knowledg e overarching structures , etc.) They hav e a
"calling."

INTELLECTUALS:
(Theoretical reason , "intellect")
creative, heretic, or prophetic

I
Rationalization o f ideas by:

Reinterpretation o f ideas by:

DEVOTEES O F PUR E TRUTH

LEADING REFORMER S AN D REVOLUTIONARIES

INTELLIGENTSIA:
(Practical reason,
"intelligence")
organizer, interpreter, keepe r

4
Application o f ideas by :

KEEPERS O F TRADITIO N

PRACTICAL AGENT S O F IDEA S

Reinterpretation an d routinizatio n of
ideas by:

COMMITTED INTELLECTUALS:
LIBERATORS, SAVIORS , "ENGAGE" THINKER S
Committed t o "masses" (lead , reform , liberate, save ,
bring "happiness," etc.) They hav e a "mission."

TABLE 4.2 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f the Type s (Mission/Calling) an d Layer s (Intellectuals/Intelligentsia):

Positions an d Profession s
Masses
TYPES OF
COMMITMENT:
to masse s o r
LAYERS:\ th
e truth
Varieties
ui icasi m t x x

Meaning
->

SEEKERS O F PUR E KNOWLEDGE :

MEN/WOMEN O F SCIENCE/LETTERS/ARTS
Committed t o "meaning" (truth , beauty , gnosis ,
knowledge overarchin g structures , etc. ) The y
have a "calling."

Masses <

COMMITTED INTELLECTUALS :
LEADERS, LIBERATORS , SAVIOR S
Committed t o "masses" (lead , reform , liberate ,
save, brin g "happiness, " etc.) The y hav e a

Science

Religion

Thought Scienc

INTELLECTUALS:
(Theoretical reason ,
"intellect")
creative, heretic ,
or propheti c

Top scientist ,
discoverer

Exemplary
prophet

Top theoris t Majo

INTELLIGENTSIA:
(Practical reason ,
"intelligence")
organizer, interpreter,
keeper

Expert,
researcher

Theologian
monk, mysti c

Scholar, criti c Enginee

r
doctor,
lawyer,
teacher

hierarchies \

Meaning

e
r
inventor

Religion

Thought

Emissary
prophet

Reformer,
revolutionary
philosopher/
king

Priest, mentor ,
scribe, teache r

Agitator,
activist,
bureaucrat,
teacher,
mass media ,
publishing

Definitions 11

seekers o f pur e knowledge : "scientists/writers/artist s etc.") - Th e

model amplifie s the confusio n i n th e usag e o f th e ter m "Intellec tual" befor e reorderin g it s element s an d resolvin g th e confusion ,
The mode l coul d b e viewed as askin g the "native" : Whe n yo u sa y
"Intellectuals" do yo u mean a s opposed t o to p "scientists/writers /
artists" o r d o yo u mea n a s opposed t o "Intelligentsia" ?
Another purpos e o f th e presen t mode l i s t o includ e almos t al l
types an d profession s that hav e bee n identifie d wit h intellectuals
and intelligentsia , preserving fo r th e empirica l researche r th e pre rogative o f excludin g a particula r categor y i n an y give n researc h
project. Th e abov e cross-tabulatio n i s based o n Weber' s theor y of
the relativ e autonom y o f th e spher e o f ideas a s i t als o reflect s his
interest i n th e interfac e of ideas an d interests .
The Horizonta l Differentiatio n
The horizonta l axi s differentiates intellectuals on th e basi s o f their
commitment t o "ideas" on one extreme and to "th e people " o n the
other. Intellectuals share the lonely journey o f "Men an d Women of
Letters /Scienc e /Art " (tha t lea d awa y fro m th e people ) t o tran scend th e banality o f quotidian existence . They all aspire to attai n a
higher state of universal bliss, to attain Sophia, Gnosis, Knowledge,
Truth, Beauty , Overal l Pattern s an d Structures , an d i n short , th e
"Meaning" an d th e "Essence " o f life . Man y o f th e definition s of
men an d wome n o f knowledg e an d "Intellectuals " focu s o n th e
means an d consequence s o f thi s search , namely , th e heav y an d
dense us e o f symbol s and th e creatio n o f a privatize d jargon tha t
often tur n int o password s t o privilege d inne r circle s o r eve n int o
symbolic tool s o f powe r an d domination . Bu t thes e ar e al l eithe r
means or consequences of the origina l quest for meaning that alone
signifies bot h intellectual s an d seeker s of pure knowledge . The tw o
groups ar e fellow travelers on the road t o transcendence. Intellectu als are bor n onc e som e decid e t o "com e back " to th e masse s wit h
the fruit s o f thei r discoveries . Thi s differentiatio n is therefore pri marily based o n a moral choic e rather tha n o n a hierarchy o f mor e
or les s talented. Whil e seeker s o f pur e knowledg e have a "calling"
to pursu e th e truth , intellectual s ar e committe d t o a "mission" to
return t o th e masses . Classica l Gree k "intellectuals " debate d

112 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

whether "Th e Goo d Life " consiste d i n the lif e o f the intellec t o r i n
public lif e i n th e polls. Plat o wa s certain tha t i t la y i n intellectua l
life, bu t h e als o argue d tha t th e philosophe r wh o ha d acquire d a
taste fo r baskin g i n the su n o f truth an d beaut y (wh o would natu rally b e loat h t o g o bac k t o th e dar k an d dan k cav e o f ordinar y
people in order t o lea d them ) ought nevertheless to g o back. A t the
two pole s o f thi s allegorica l movemen t betwee n th e trut h an d th e
masses w e ca n discer n th e archetypica l categorie s o f philosopher s
and philosopher-kings .
We have already observe d an elective affinity betwee n the development of an "ideology o f intellectuals," that is, a theory advocating th e
political empowermen t o f intellectuals , an d th e belie f i n th e thre e
principles o f (1) the existenc e o f truth, (2 ) its attainabilit y an d socia l
relevance, an d (3 ) the assumptio n tha t intellectual s woul d selflessl y
carry out the search for truth. The "counterideologies" of intellectuals
usually attack the last two premises (attainability an d social relevanc e
of truth , an d particularly , th e allege d selflessnes s o f its carriers) . We
have also pointe d ou t that a n elective affinity exist s between the view
of historica l progres s as a "semiautomatic" machination (advocate d
by August e Comte, Leste r F. Ward, V . I. Lenin , an d Georg e Lukac s
and mos t o f the reformis t thinkers) an d th e ideolog y o f intellectual s
who would then take the wheel and steer history in the right direction .
By contrast , th e "full y automatic " evolutio n (advocate d b y Herber t
Spencer, Willia m G . Sumner, Bakunin , Rosa Luxemburg , an d mos t
of th e anarchist , libertarian , an d conservativ e thinkers ) ha s bee n
favored b y th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s fo r it s implicatio n
that history has no need for the meddling of some complacent savants
professing t o correc t it s course. 2
The flo w o f convert s betwee n th e tw o categorie s o f intellectual s
and seeker s of pure knowledge (regions 1 and 2 ) depends on historical circumstances . Wheneve r ther e i s a coheren t an d compellin g
ideology of intellectuals, o r whenever there is a definite social cause
or a n indisputabl e "good," seekers of pure knowledg e are likely to
consider seriously that, besides responding to their calling to pursue
the truth , the y mus t als o fulfil l thei r dut y t o a socia l "mission" ; t o
turn towar d the people whom they had lef t i n the cave of quotidian
illusions; t o becom e "intellectuals. " A s a rule , however , seeker s of
pure knowledg e encounte r thi s allege d missio n wit h trepidation :
from th e poin t o f view of enthusiasts of knowledge, intellectuals are

Definitions 11

in dange r o f compromisin g thei r integrit y an d willingl y engage i n

what Weber called "the sacrific e of intellect." Conversely, periods of
great socia l upheava l cause d o r exacerbate d b y intellectuals , an d
especially disastrous failures of reformist movements, bring in their
wake mas s defection s o f sociall y committe d intellectual s t o th e
ranks of seekers of pure knowledge (from region 2 to region 1) . As a
matter o f course, however, seekers of knowledge who neglec t their
social missio n by carryin g o n thei r ques t fo r trut h mus t appea r t o
intellectuals a s a selfis h an d elitis t caste , wistfull y indulgin g thei r
eccentric hobbie s a t th e expens e o f their people .
The variety of arguments between Intellectuals (seekers of knowledge) and (scientists/writers/artists ) represents a great deal o f literature writte n abou t intellectuals , b y intellectuals , an d foro r
againstintellectuals. Plato urged th e polls to force the contempla tive intellectuals to come back t o the cave of everyday illusions and
undertake the putativel y unpleasant tas k o f leading the people . H e
also advise d agains t toleratin g thos e intellectual s wh o refus e t o
think in a responsible or constructive way; poets among others were
to b e banished fro m hi s Republic. Mar x predicte d that a group of
intellectuals woul d join th e peopl e (workin g class) bu t no t befor e
seeing that the end of their class privileges was at hand. An excellent
example o f thi s debat e ca n b e foun d i n th e publi c exchang e tha t
kept Sartr e an d Camu s a t loggerhead s ove r th e "responsibility " of
intellectuals t o joi n th e publi c protest s agains t th e Frenc h wa r i n
Algeria. Thos e contemplativ e intellectual s wh o recogniz e thei r so cial "mission" do no t necessaril y remai n i n their ow n sub-category
in transitio n fro m regio n 1 to regio n 2 . A scientist , fo r instance ,
does no t alway s turn int o a n invento r (se e Table 4.2) . Contempor ary scientist s (e.g. , Sakharov ) an d philosopher s (e.g. , Russel l o r
Sartre) often advocate d politica l positions totally unrelated t o their
field o f research . Consisten t wit h th e platoni c scenario , th e char isma emanating from havin g been closer to the source of normative
philosophical o r scientifi c truth s seems to hav e sufficientl y legitim ized th e politica l ambition s o f intellectuals.
Max Webe r did not merel y sanction thi s kind o f engagement. H e
went ou t o f his way to encourag e intellectuals ' direct participatio n
in politica l processes , becaus e h e feare d th e comin g hegemon y of
the bureaucratic intelligentsia. But Weber, as we have demonstrated
in Chapte r 3 , wa s als o wear y o f intellectuals ' politica l naivete ,

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dogmatism, an d irresponsibility . This feelin g le d him to g o to grea t

lengths t o war n intellectual s agains t th e peril s o f confusin g th e
attitude calle d fo r i n th e symmetrica l an d consisten t univers e o f
intellectuality and that they needed t o adop t onc e they chose "Politics a s a Vocation. " A n interestin g reactio n t o th e dilemm a o f th e
seekers o f pure knowledge wishing to preserv e their integrit y whil e
engaging i n politic s ca n b e discerne d i n Georg e Orwell' s advic e t o
intellectuals wh o wis h to fulfil l thei r socia l "mission " withou t com promising thei r commitment s t o th e pursui t o f truth : "Whe n a
writer engage s i n politic s h e shoul d d o s o a s a citizen , a s a huma n
being, no t a s a writer . . . shoul d h e refrai n fro m writin g about
politics? . . . certainly not ! . . . Only he shoul d d o s o a s an individ ual, a s outsider, at the mos t a s unwelcome guerrilla on th e flan k of
a regula r army " (Orwell, 1960 , pp. 270-271) .
Before turnin g t o th e vertica l differentiatio n of intellectuals an d
intelligentsia le t u s conside r a probabl e criticis m tha t migh t b e
leveled agains t ou r definitio n o f seeker s o f pur e knowledg e a s
seekers o f some kind o f universal truth. This definitio n may b e said
not t o fi t th e postmoder n intellectual . I n response , firs t le t u s
remember that doubts , cynicism , and eve n hostility to th e ideal s of
universal or objectiv e truth an d beaut y or their purity or attainabil ity ar e s o ol d a s t o b e virtuall y coterminou s wit h th e birt h o f
intellectuality. An y reade r o f Gree k classic s know s tha t t o argu e
that "truth " i s nothin g bu t powe r i n disguise , o r tha t i t i s bu t a
semantic illusio n i s not a n altogethe r nove l inventio n o f poststruc turalism. Fro m th e sociological poin t o f view, however, the carrier s
of suc h ideas , regardles s o f the conten t o f their message , ar e easil y
categorized a s intellectuals. They ar e to be identified a s intellectuals
not onl y becaus e o f thei r socia l functio n an d wa y o f lif e (e.g. ,
livelihood, language , etc. ) bu t als o becaus e th e searc h fo r tran scending th e illusion s (includin g tha t o f trut h an d beauty ) i s a
singularly intellectua l one . Thi s searc h to o involve s a "journey "
leading t o a n allege d highe r stat e o f awarenes s assume d b y th e
critic, a feelin g o f liberatio n no t onl y fro m th e simple-minde d
delusions o f th e commo n fol k bu t als o fro m th e vulgarit y o f les s
sophisticated colleagues . Th e distanc e thu s create d betwee n tradi tional, modern , o r postmodern intellectual s an d the naive duratio n
of everyda y experienc e i s signifiedno w a s muc h a s everb y
jargon, a careful an d critica l mod e o f speech, a privatized languag e

Definitions 11

that Gouldner , followin g Bernstine , ha s calle d th e "Cultur e o f

Critical Discourse. "
The importan t criterio n for ou r horizonta l differentiatio n i s that
both seeker s of pure knowledg e and intellectuals , through contem plation an d discourse , do , t o varyin g extents , "depart " fro m th e
quotidian realit y o f everyday life; whethe r they achiev e thei r "nir vana" i s o f secondar y importance . Ou r idea l typica l mode l thu s
seems t o remai n relevan t a s lon g a s unforeseeabl e substantiv e
changes i n th e traditio n o f Wester n intellectualit y hav e no t dis solved al l interes t i n contemplatio n an d discourse , o r a s lon g a s a
Tolstoyesque moo d o f populis m ha s no t cause d mas s defection s
from th e intellectua l an d contemplativ e wa y o f lif e b y whic h w e
identify th e intellectuals .
Having said this, we must also concede the seminal importance of
the substantiv e change s i n moder n occidenta l ar t an d intellectual ity. A s with almost ever y othe r aspec t o f the so-calle d postmoder n
development, th e occidenta l revol t agains t th e occidenta l "logos "
was alread y presen t i n wha t i s generall y know n a s "Modernism. "
Weber addresse d th e issue s of "disenchantment o f the world, " an d
the indulgin g o f intellectuals i n th e irrationa l core s o f life , (e.g. , in
eros). As the great theoris t o f the avant-garde, Renato Poggioli, has
pointed out , th e movemen t i n moder n ar t awa y fro m rationa l
perspective, proportion, representation , and humanism towar d th e
portrayal o f the grotesque, the novel, the non-Western , the mecha nistic, th e abstract , an d th e surrealisti c was alread y presen t i n th e
art o f the turn o f the century. At that time, artist s replaced rationa l
and purposiv e executionreasone d "action " wit h whic h socia l
scientists dealwit h "gesture " and spontaneou s techniques . I n hi s
article unde r th e headin g "Intellectuals " i n th e Encyclopedia o f
Social Sciences, Edwar d Shil s ha s rightl y discusse d thes e ne w
movements no t a s a serie s o f break s wit h intellectualit y but a s it s
secondary traditions .
The movemen t awa y fro m Wester n reason , whic h ha s bee n
praised b y a sectio n o f leadin g contemporar y intellectual s a s
ground breaking , had alread y been recognized by Weber and haile d
by Marcus e an d Adorn o a s the onl y avenu e o f salvatio n fro m th e
reified forma l reason tha t has come to dominat e th e moder n Occi dent. Th e curren t vogu e o f postmoder n literar y criticis m i s bu t a
continuation o f what ha s alread y happene d i n the world o f art an d

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architecture withou t trul y disrupting the continuatio n o f the West ern bourgeoisie an d it s economic an d politica l systems . For al l their
obstreperous rebelliousness , th e oppositiona l movement s o f thi s
century ar e possibl e onl y in the boso m o f bourgeois society , which
they continu e t o decry . The histor y o f this centur y has show n tha t
antirational movement s quickl y wither away even at the helm of the
very alternatives the y seek (e.g., fascism and socialism) . In any case,
the artist , th e scholar , an d th e intellectua l stil l (an d perhap s mor e
than ever ) depart fro m everyda y life b y a disciplined an d adep t us e
of languag e an d symbol s in searc h o f a kind o f "truth," even if it is
to proclai m tha t ther e i s n o suc h thing . Schumpeter' s theor y tha t
capitalism canno t figh t th e oppositiona l intellectua l becaus e i t i s
based o n freedo m o f commerc e i s somewha t eccentric . Webe r ha s
convincingly demonstrate d tha t th e kin d o f libert y Schumpete r
alludes t o i s n o longe r necessar y fo r full y matur e capitalism . T o
discover reasons for tolerating oppositional intellectual s i n the West
we must look in the direction o f the "relatively autonomous" sphere
of politically liberal ideals that th e Wester n world ha s institutional ized an d sacralized . Thes e ideal s wil l remai n effective , however ,
only a s long a s the Wester n "people" do no t abando n them . Unlik e
Schumpeter, Webe r di d no t tak e thes e guarantee s o f libert y fo r
granted.
The Vertica l Differentiatio n
Our vertical classification i n the tables must b e more familiar to th e
sociologically traine d reader . Rathe r than dependin g o n a volunta ristic choic e betwee n servin g the peopl e o r seekin g th e truth , i t is
based o n a mor e objectiv e rankin g order . I n th e to p category ar e
placed th e intellectuals , th e bes t an d th e brightest , th e "producers "
of intellectua l commodities ; o n th e lower level ar e locate d th e
humble processors, the mediocre "consumers" an d disseminators of
thought products . O f course, it is not entirel y true that the group at
the bottom does not create, nor that to belong to on e or the other is
purely a matte r o f objectiv e criteri a o f excellence . Eve n her e a
"choice" must b e made betwee n Weber's "theoretical " and "practi cal" reason , betwee n wha t ancien t Greek s alternativel y calle d
sophia an d phrenosis, or betwee n wha t Richar d Hofstadte r (1962 )

Definitions 11

has labele d "intellect " an d "intelligence. " However , th e wa y thi s

choice i s mad e depend s a s muc h o n th e intellectua l talent s an d
qualifications o f the agen t a s it doe s o n th e agent' s idea l propensi ties.
The interes t o f the historica l an d sociologica l approache s i n th e
vertical classificatio n i s du e t o it s hierarchica l natur e an d t o th e
huge number s o f intelligentsia tha t for m it s base. Perhap s anothe r
reason for the popularity of the categor y of intelligentsia is that it is
more sociologicall y tangible . B y thi s w e mea n tha t a stratu m o f
intelligentsia resembles the rest of the strata an d classes in society in
the unproblematic way in which it organizes an d embraces an arra y
of idea s t o protec t it s interests . Unlik e intellectual s whos e idea l
interest i n rationa l developmen t o f idea s clashe s wit h an y fixe d
ideological arrangemen t o f them, th e intelligentsi a naturall y advo cate ideas that are conducive to its class or status interests . It i s not
surprising therefore to se e that the majo r attentio n o f the sociolog y
of intellectual s ha s bee n focuse d o n intelligentsia . Th e majorit y of
the literatur e i n th e Marxis t theor y o f intellectual s als o ha s deal t
with intelligentsia. Gouldner's criticism of Marxist literature (that it
is ventriloquist and unreflexive , that it does not accoun t for itsel f in
the sam e languag e i n whic h i t talk s abou t creatio n o f idea s an d
ideologies amon g othe r classes) can be interpreted a s criticizing the
absence o f intellectuals from the Marxis t sociolog y of intelligentsia.
The mos t cogen t theor y o f intellectuals in the Marxis t discours e is
that o f Gramsc i (1978) . Ye t he , too , seem s t o b e talkin g abou t
intelligentsia when he asserts that everyon e in the society is to some
extent a n intellectua l an d tha t al l classes hav e thei r ow n "organi c
intellectuals." Any clas s analysi s o f idea s canno t hel p bu t expan d
the sociolog y of intelligentsia .
Conversely, any sociology of intellectuals that wishes to focus on
"intellectuals" in the sens e we have define d th e ter m i n the vertica l
differentiation tend s t o transcen d clas s barriers . Mannheim' s no tion o f the "free-floatin g intellectual" i s a cas e in point. Thi s theo retical stran d withi n th e sociolog y o f intellectual s i s based o n th e
observation tha t th e categor y o f "intellectuals " comprise s a smal l
number o f creative individuals. Th e thi n stratu m o f intellectuals i s
not merel y the object of external conflicts with the laity, the author ities, and the intelligentsia. I t also harbors a profound inner tensio n
between its own ideal and material interests . Ho w can such a group

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be conceive d o f a s a n ideologicall y ambitiou s class ? Intellectuals '

"ideal interests" li e in th e constan t rationalizatio n o f the spher e of
ideas an d i n a relentless attempt t o transcen d th e immediate worl d
in searc h o f it s meaning , it s essence , o r it s beauty . Idea s tha t
emanate from this search can only occasionally b e conducive t o th e
interests of various socia l classe s and strata . Viewed as a flux, ideas
are destabilizin g an d potentiall y dangerou s t o th e interest s o f an y
given social class, including those of the intellectuals themselves. To
recapitulate: stabl e ideal edifices canno t b e built on the lav a flow of
ideas. Intellectual s ar e b y definition unstabl e a s a class because , as
the carrier s o f relativel y autonomou s ideas , the y canno t abid e fo r
long a moratoriu m o n thinkin g criticall y abou t an y se t o f sacre d
ideas, eve n whe n suc h idea s ten d t o justif y thei r ow n materia l
interests.
Society's fea r o f th e constan t rationalizin g proces s tha t woul d
erode it s "cor e ideas " ha s give n ris e t o a distrus t o f intellectuals ,
who ar e th e carrier s of , thi s process , t o thei r feeling s o f "aliena tion," and finally , t o a n arra y o f objective social sanction s agains t
intellectuals. These sanction s are usually devised an d enforce d b y a
nucleus o f anti-intellectua l ex-intellectual s wh o hav e alread y per formed th e "sacrific e o f intellect. " I n th e religiou s spher e thi s i s
exemplified a s the church' s establishmen t o f officia l limit s o n free wheeling thinkin g b y creatin g "dogma. " Conformin g t o dogm a i s
less a source of painful soul-searching for intelligentsi a than it is for
intellectuals; becaus e th e forme r hav e les s vested (ideal ) interes t i n
unadulterated rationalization s o f ideas o r pur e thinking .
Max Weber' s politica l sociolog y highlight s th e potentia l tensio n
inherent in the vertical differentiation of intellectuals and intelligent sia. I n th e thir d chapte r w e have referre d t o Weber' s fea r tha t th e
subservience of intelligentsia to their ow n interests as well as to othe r
social interest s woul d mak e the m perfec t superintendent s fo r wha t
he terme d th e "iro n cage " or th e "hous e o f bondage" of the future .
His observation s abou t socioeconomi c force s o f modernit y com bined wit h hi s study of ancient orienta l bureaucracie s ha d provide d
Weber with a daunting insight about the irreversible bureaucratizin g
trends o f th e moder n society , whic h woul d guarante e th e furthe r
entrenchment o f a proliferatin g intelligentsi a a t th e expens e o f th e
increasing isolatio n o f intellectuals . H e foresa w th e possibilit y o f
"orientalization" of th e West : organize d stat e bureaucracie s woul d

Definitions 11

control masse s o f postmoder n "fellahin. " Thu s Webe r stake d hi s

hopes o n individualisti c intellectual s t o figh t th e tid e o f th e gri m
future an d it s bureaucratic stor m troopers : the intelligentsia .
It is tempting to compare th e difference betwee n intellectuals and
intelligentsia with Weber's distinction betwee n those who live "for"
politics an d thos e wh o liv e "off" o f it . Indeed , Webe r make s thi s
distinction i n th e contex t o f contrastin g th e politica l intellectual s
who enter politic s with a mission, o n the one hand, an d the career ism o f part y intelligentsia , o n th e other . Th e forme r liv e "for "
political ideal s an d th e latte r liv e "off" them . Thi s poin t demon strates th e consistenc y o f th e idea l type s propose d i n thi s chapte r
and th e idea l type s o f Weber . Bu t i t wil l als o sho w u s ho w thes e
ideal types must not be used. These ideal types are only of analytical
value. A s suc h the y ar e mean t onl y fo r th e indirec t us e o f th e
empirical researcher . Thos e wh o liv e fo r politic s also , an d quit e
frequently, liv e of f i t a s wel l (Weber , Politics, p , 84) . In a simila r
manner ou r definitio n o f a n "intellectual " can b e exclusivel y ap plied onl y in limited case s to a given individual or stratum. Onl y in
so far a s one engages in a particular kin d of reasoning is one a ma n
of woma n o f knowledge, science , letters , o r arts . Onl y in s o fa r a s
this perso n turn s back t o brin g a Promethean gif t fo r the masses is
he o r she an intellectual . A t other moment s the sam e perso n coul d
be a member of intelligentsia, for instance whe n he or she attends a
trade unio n meetin g o f artists, writers, o r universit y professors. Of
course, as there are people who enter different categorie s dependin g
on historica l changes , th e perio d o f their lif e an d eve n time o f day,
there ar e thos e wh o readil y confor m t o th e pur e typ e an d ca n b e
safely place d i n a category . A rarel y reflectiv e specialist , a typica l
bureaucrat, a scientist , o r a philosophe r totall y dedicate d t o th e
discovery o f trut h ca n res t i n an y o f th e squar e abode s o n th e
diagonal apposit e end s o f ou r cross-tabulatio n (Tabl e 4.2) . Th e
validity of our cros s tabulation, however, does not depen d o n thei r
numbers, o r eve n o n thei r existence .
Columns an d Rows
One of the interestin g properties of the cross tabulation of Table 4.2
is th e capacit y o f it s column s an d row s t o reflec t th e varietie s o f

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controversies tha t hav e characterize d th e debat e betwee n intellec tuals (i n bot h senses,) , seeker s o f pur e knowledge , an d th e intelli gentsia. W e can slightly alter ou r cross tables (Table s 4. 1 and 4.2 ) to
fashion a n instrumen t fo r classifyin g th e varietie s o f debate s tha t
have occurre d withi n th e spher e o f intellectualit y (Tabl e 4.3) . Th e
first colum n in this table could be said to represent the otherworldl y
orientation o f intellecta s th e "departure " from th e lif e worl d o f
the masses indicated i n the previous two tables. Th e second colum n
represents th e inner-worldl y orientation o f intellectuals in the sam e
sense tha t a "retur n t o th e masses " charcterize d the m i n th e pre vious tables . Th e row s represen t th e hierarch y o f intellectuals an d
intelligentsia, a s wel l a s thei r respectiv e affinit y fo r theoretica l o r
practical reason . I n th e firs t colum n w e ca n locat e suc h work s o f
literature a s Dostoyevsky's "Grand Inquisitor " chapte r i n Brothers
Karamazov wher e a priest confronts Jesus, whos e Second Comin g
cannot hel p bu t und o th e stabilit y o f the church . Weber' s frequen t
references t o the tensions between prophets an d priests may also be
seen as a typical tension between the top an d bottom section s of the
first column . Floria n Znanieck i i n hi s semina l work , Th e Social
Role o f th e Ma n o f Knowledge (1965) , also describe s th e relation ship betwee n th e to p an d th e botto m o f th e firs t column : Zna niecki's "The Discovere r of Truth" would be placed a t the top o f the
first colum n whil e "The Systematizer " belongs a t th e bottom . Th e
unification o f the two roles, however, occasionally occurs ; that is , a
discoverer o f trut h migh t actuall y foun d hi s o r he r ow n schoo l o f
thought. Znaniecki' s metapho r i s als o on e o f movemen t an d i s
consistent with the simile we have used in the horizontal differentiation: the seeke r of pure knowledge is "going," he or she is facing the
truth. T o becom e a n intellectua l on e mus t turn back (towar d th e
people); t o becom e a member o f intelligentsia ( a systematizer ) on e
must stop. A seeke r o f pur e knowledg e wh o "want s t o foun d a
school mus t kno w whe n t o sto p i n hi s o r he r function , Principia
non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" (Znaniecki , 1965 ,
p. 123 )
The relationship s betwee n revolutionarie s an d part y functionar ies and thos e betwee n politicians an d stat e bureaucrat s typif y th e
tensions between the top an d the bottom o f the second column. Th e
controversy betwee n Leni n an d Luxembur g i s a n exampl e o f thi s
debate.

The ventur e o f describin g the "choice " betwee n th e firs t ro w

(otherworldly calling ) and second ro w (inner-worldl y mission ) ha s
also produce d a great dea l o f literature. A t the to p o f the intellec tual hierarch y w e can plac e work s suc h a s Weber' s "Politic s a s a
Vocation," and a t the lower row we might consider work s debating
the relativ e merit s o f variou s intellectua l occupations , such a s a
sixth-century documen t b y a Persian philosopher wh o is discussing
whether to become a philosopher, a religious leader, or a physician,
and afte r carefu l consideratio n h e decide s t o choos e th e latte r
(Baabe Borzouye h Tabib) (Tabl e 4.2) .
It goe s withou t sayin g tha t certai n area s o f ou r origina l cros s
tabulation (Table s 4.1-4.3) present more complications than others.
Regions 1 and 4 are the simplest, as they represent more simple and
monolithic elements: the realm of ideas (region 1 ) that is, the logical
and cumulativ e rationalizin g trend s o f pur e ideas , ca n b e bes t
carried o n unencumbered b y the concern s o f this world . Similarly ,
region 4 i s relativel y simple , a s i t represent s th e intersectio n o f
practical reason, and o f inner-wordly zeal for applyin g the reveale d
or discovere d principles.
Regions 2 and 3 are th e mos t complicated , a s they tend t o com bine in varying proportions a melange of less compatible elements.
TABLE 4.3 . Cross-Tabulatio n o f th e Primac y o f Callin g o r Missio n o f
Intellectuals an d Thei r Rol e a s Carriers o r Organizer s o f Ideas: Literatur e
Seekers of pure knowledge
(otherworldly)
1

Politics as a vocation

Intellectuals
as carriers
of ideas

Intelligentsia
as organizers
of ideas

Committed intellectuals
(inner-wordlyy)

G
r
a
n
d

I
n
q
u
i
s
i
t
o
r

Babe Borzouyeh Tabib

w
h
a
t
I
s
T
o

B
e
D
o
n
e?

122 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

Region 2, for instance combines abstract maxims derived from pur e

ideas wit h a n inner-worldl y zeal fo r thei r actualization . Emissar y
prophecy, leadin g a revolution , o r bein g a philosopher-kin g al l
involve a mor e complicate d synthesi s o f element s tha n anythin g
that ca n b e foun d i n th e firs t region . A monk , a scholar , an d a
researcher, who m w e classif y i n regio n 3 , hav e t o balanc e thei r
otherwordly aspiration s wit h th e demand s o f thei r positio n i n so ciety, whic h ma y no t accommodat e the m a s wel l a s i t doe s thei r
sources o f emulatio n i n regio n 1 .
The cros s tabulations offere d i n this chapter ma y als o be used t o
create a taxonomy o f the type s of more recen t empirica l and theo retical works done in the fiel d o f sociology of intellectuals. Many of
the empirica l work s suffe r fro m insufficien t clarit y o f definition .
Others see m t o subscrib e t o mutuall y exclusiv e definitions . Usin g
the cros s tabulation s propose d her e wil l allo w th e admissio n o f
almost al l o f thes e work s t o a unifie d an d cumulativ e bod y o f
sociology o f intellectuals. Konra d an d Szeleny i (1979), Djilas (The
New Class), an d th e majorit y o f Easter n Europea n scholar s dea l
with th e lowe r ro w (region s 3 and 4 ) a s wel l a s wit h transitio n of ,
and contradictio n between , th e intellectual s o f regio n 2 an d th e
intelligentsia of region 4. As a rule those with an interest in the clas s
position o f intellectual s usuall y focu s o n th e intelligentsi a o f th e
bottom row. The exception to this rule would b e the conspiratoria l
theories o f anarchist s an d certai n extrem e form s o f populis m o r
even Marxism tha t worry about a takeover o f the society by a band
of Jacobi n intellectual s (e.g., Bakuni n an d Machajski) .
The idealis t traditio n fro m Plat o t o Durkhei m an d Parson s fo cuses, howeve r thoug h no t exclusively , o n th e uppe r hal f o f th e
table. In this group we also categorize those who prefer to underlin e
the dissent: the destabilizing and oppositiona l properties o f intellectuals such as Feuer and Dahrendorf an d even Shils. From our poin t
of vie w th e decisio n eithe r t o suppor t o r t o oppos e th e existin g
order i s one that i s made b y the intellectual s i n a n extraintellectua l
realm o f values. Idea s tha t lend themselve s t o suc h positions, how ever, ar e produce d i n the sam e regio n o f intersection o f theoretica l
reason and inner-worldly concerns. Opposition , alienatio n an d cen sure can b e caused b y the transnational characte r o f the rationaliz ing process , b y the desir e o f intellectuals t o tampe r wit h th e "cor e
ideas," "noble lies, " and sacre d value s o f th e society . However , i t

Definitions 12

can als o b e cause d b y a theoreticall y consisten t adherenc e t o th e

core value s o f the society , while the actua l constellatio n o f interests
of dominant group s favor s neglecting their authenti c for m i n favor
of compromises. Whe n thi s happens intellectual s ar e alienate d an d
prosecuted a s a ne w orthodoxy , no t fo r opposin g th e cor e value s
but fo r thei r unadulterate d loyalt y t o them . Mos t o f th e work s
about America n intellectual s that concentrat e o n thei r alienation ,
marginality, an d opposition , includin g th e recen t interes t i n Ne w
York intellectual s represente d b y Ala n Wal d (1987 ) an d Thoma s
Bender (1987) , can b e categorize d i n this section .
Russell Jacoby' s Th e Last Intellectuals (1987 ) addresse s a n ominous developmen t in what h e defines as the disappearanc e o f intellectuals i n academia. He is talking o f a massive shift fro m th e righ t
column (region s 2 an d 4 ) to th e lef t colum n (region s 1 and 3) .
Weber's "politics as a vocation" addresse s problems that arise when
seekers of pure knowledge enter the spher e o f politics (fro m regio n 1
to region 2) but refuse to tone down the ethics of ultimate ends, which
is a survival of their pervalent etho s i n a world o f pure thought. Thi s
essay also deals with intellectuals' objectiv e conflict wit h the bureauc racies tha t woul d b e placed unde r the m in the secon d column .
Besides categorizin g the alread y existin g research , on e ca n envi sion the possibilit y of conducting new intercivilizational research i n
the are a o f Weberia n sociolog y o f intellectuals . Fo r instance , th e
intercivilizational stud y o f religiou s intelligentsi a can benefi t fro m
the sectio n o f our mode l that deals with the religiou s intellectuality
(Table 4.4). Both th e Buddhis t an d th e Islami c concept s allo w th e

TABLE 4.4 . Comparativ e Stud y o f Religiou s Intellectuality

in Isla m an d Buddhis m
Departure for the Holy Return
Leaders Islam

1. EXEMPLAR Y PROPHEC Y 2
: Val i Islam
Buddhism: Buddh a Buddhism

3. MYSTI C QUEST , mon k 4

Followers Islam
: Are f Islam
Buddhism: Mon k Buddhism

for Saving Others

. EMISSAR Y PROPHEC Y
: Nab i
: Buddhisatv a
. CUR E O F SOULS , pries t
: Ale m
:

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

leader a spiritual a s well as physical departure fro m peopl e an d th e

reality o f everyda y lif e i n orde r t o attai n th e spiritua l truth , the y
also deman d a selfles s return , i n orde r t o brin g salvatio n t o th e
denizens of the mundane world . It is very difficult t o locate substan tive similaritie s betwee n th e "truths " sough t i n th e tw o religiou s
traditions, ye t our mode l facilitates a comparison between the types
of religiou s intellectuals an d intelligentsi a i n s o far a s they emulate
their leaders in "departing" from an d "returning" to the people. Th e
exemplary prophec y o f Buddhis m ha s a n emissar y aspec t a s th e
emissary prophecy o f Islam ha s an exemplary root. Both Islam an d
Buddhism allo w a followin g fo r th e pur e seeke r o f trut h o r th e
exemplary prophet , th e Buddhis t mon k an d th e Islami c mysti c
(Sufi o r Aref) , althoug h thi s positio n i s muc h mor e centra l t o
Buddhism than it is to Islam. But, Buddhism lacks the institution of
priesthood. W e mus t not e tha t non e o f thes e statement s ca n b e
illuminating withou t qualification s tha t mus t highligh t th e reason s
that th e compariso n hold s th e th e exten t t o whic h i t doe s not .

Appendix A
Weber o n th e "Positivist Intuitionist" Controvers y

To shiel d themselve s fro m th e positivis t onslaught , som e socia l

thinkers 1 took i t upon themselve s to erect a "Chinese wall " between
the realms o f "nature" and "culture." To further protec t themselves ,
they turne d th e latte r int o th e magica l garde n o f "subjectifying "
sciences (Weber, Knies, p. 130 ) at whose gates the law s of causality
stopped (Weber , Knies, p. 135) . The trodden paths o f natural deter mination an d empirica l observatio n withi n thi s domai n traile d of f
into th e mis t o f "huma n freedom. " Th e allege d unpredictabilit y o f
human actio n wa s perceived as neither a disadvantage nor , a s their
kinder adversaries maintained, a s a sign of the youth o f the cultura l
sciences. On the contrary , it signified th e dignit y of the real m o f the
humanities an d ha d t o b e treasure d a s such . Th e dept h o f thi s
mysterious real m coul d b e fathome d onl y i n th e ligh t o f "empa thetic understanding, " "suggestive 'interpretation,' " "feeling s o f totality," and th e lik e (Weber , Knies, p . 177) .
If Webe r seem s t o disenchan t thi s magica l garde n i t i s no t be cause h e is willing to giv e ground t o positivist reductionism. In fact,
Weber, being an advocate o f verstehen, felt comfortable doing awa y
with th e magi c o f subjectivit y becaus e h e di d no t nee d t o hid e
behind it . Thi s wa s s o becaus e h e neve r too k th e monopolisti c
pretensions o f positivis m t o th e real m o f scienc e seriously . Webe r
was abl e to transcen d th e positivist-intuitionis t controversy , and i n
doing so , h e onc e mor e leape d ahea d o f hi s time , anticipatin g th e
latest turn s i n th e sociolog y o f science. Conside r th e following .
125

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

Even the knowledg e of the mos t certai n propositio n o f our theoretical sciencese.g. , th e exac t natura l science s or mathematics , is , like
the cultivatio n an d refinemen t o f th e conscience , a produc t o f cul ture. (Weber , Objectivity, p . 55)

Nevertheless, if one want s to imagin e Webe r a s a defender o f th e

autonomy o f the cultura l science s in th e fac e o f positivist invasion ,
one migh t characteriz e hi s strategie s a s uniquel y offensive . Not e
that, for example, in the case of "unpredictability" o f human action ,
Weber neithe r establishe s it a s a weaknes s of th e socia l science s t o
be overcom e b y furthe r developmen t o f these disciplines , no r doe s
he glorify i t as a unique property of the humanitie s t o b e cultivated
and recognize d a s such . Instead , h e point s ou t tha t thi s situatio n
arises becaus e th e historica l an d sociocultura l phenomen a ar e im portant fo r u s as individual events. And individua l events by defini tion cannot be deduced fro m general laws, as none of the nomologi cal formulas of mechanics can predict the way a specific falling roc k
would brea k int o splinters (Weber, Knies, p. 122) . But this does no t
usually pose a problem for natura l science s becaus e they are, i n th e
majority o f cases , intereste d i n generalize d statement s abou t th e
laws governing "nature,"2 which is for Webe r a logically (not empir ically, a s positivists presumed) closed system (Parsons, 1964 , pp. 8 9). Whe n thi s i s no t th e cas e (e.g. , i n th e cas e o f seismolog y an d
meteorology), insofa r a s th e empirica l discipline s i n questio n ar e
interested i n specifi c prediction s rathe r tha n th e genera l law s gov erning chang e i n nature , the y ar e als o face d wit h th e proble m o f
unpredictability.
Or, tak e th e "lawmaking " controversy. Here , too , Weber' s posi tion i s base d upo n exposin g th e weaknesse s o f the positivis t argu ment. Thi s render s ipso fact o th e intuitionist arguments , shape d t o
meet th e positivist challenge, obsolete . Webe r does not conced e that
lawmaking i s th e exclusiv e advantag e o f nomologica l disciplines ,
nor doe s h e tak e prid e i n th e fac t tha t "huma n freedom " defie s
regulation a s a matte r o f principle . Webe r maintain s tha t cultura l
phenomena ar e even more susceptibl e to lawmaking an d regulatio n
than ar e th e natura l phenomen a (Weber , Knies, p . 125) . Bu t suc h
general laws , regardless o f how "subjectivel y adequate " they migh t
be (e.g. , th e law s o f economi c conduct) , ar e o f littl e valu e fo r th e
causal explanatio n o f concret e action . Wit h thi s convictio n Webe r

Appendix A : Th e Positivist-Intuitionist Controversy 12

took i t upon himsel f to determin e the extent t o whic h the "normative an d d e facto " element s influenc e th e real m o f econom y (a n
intention tha t i s implie d i n th e origina l titl e o f hi s Economy an d
Society), rathe r tha n tryin g to furthe r refin e th e abstrac t "law s o f
man's economi c behavior. " Weber even goes so far a s to clai m tha t
the discover y o f natura l law s i s o f shee r heuristi c valu e fo r al l
sciences alike ; nomologica l o r historical , natura l o r sociocultura l
(Weber, Roscher, p. 63) .
At this point , i t would b e appropriate t o ad d a few words abou t
the wa y Webe r conceive d o f th e relationship s betwee n th e tw o
realms o f natura l an d cultura l sciences . W e know tha t Webe r di d
not think much of the positivist claims about the superiority of their
methods i n the stud y o f sociocultural phenomena ; h e doubte d th e
adequacy o f thei r conceptio n o f th e natura l world , a s wel l a s th e
mission they ascribed to the nomological discipline s in capturing its
essence in their abstract formula : "It i s not the 'actual' interconnections o f 'things ' bu t th e conceptual interconnectio n o f problems
which defin e th e scop e o f variou s sciences " (Weber , Objectivity,
p. 68) .
We als o hav e show n tha t Webe r rejecte d th e prevalen t notion s
held b y th e protagonist s o f th e intuitionis t schoo l regardin g th e
fundamental chas m betwee n th e tw o type s of sciences . H e di d no t
attribute thi s differenc e t o th e antinom y o f the subjec t matter s o f
human an d exac t sciences , i.e., the inanimate , determine d world of
nature a s oppose d t o th e meaningful , volitiona l actio n o f th e
human bein g i n societ y (Weber , Knies, p . 185) . Fo r Weber, th e
domains of cultural and natural sciences are neither identical nor
mutually exclusive. H e founde d hi s methodolog y o n th e basi c as sumption tha t th e natura l worl d an d th e cultura l worl d ar e i n
hierarchical orde r an d thei r relationshi p i s one o f "genus-species. "
"Action" is no t th e logica l opposit e o f "behavior, " i t i s a specifi c
kind o f behavior, loade d wit h meaning attributed t o it by the actor ;
the social action is a subclass of the action. Huma n subjectivit y does
not radicall y oppose the empirical world; it just make s a part o f the
latter mor e complex . I t i s possibl e (Weber , Knies, p . 140 ) an d
sometimes necessary (Weber, Economy I , p. 18 ) to use the method s
of the empirical sciences in the cultural sciences to understand som e
cultural phenomen a (Weber , Economy I , p. 10 ) or even to "verify "
interpretive hypothese s abou t the m (Weber , Knies, p . 160) . Whe n

128 MA

X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

and wher e thi s shoul d b e performe d i s t o b e determine d b y th e

empirical researc h (Weber , Knies, p . 140) . O n th e othe r hand , th e
methods mos t suite d fo r interpretiv e sociology (i.e., the teleologica l
rationalistic metho d o f interpretation ) ca n b e o f grea t heuristi c
value for th e natura l science s (e.g., the us e o f the functiona l purpo sive schem e i n physiology ) (Weber, Economy I , p . 15) .
Yet ther e ar e method s molde d exclusivel y fo r th e stud y o f th e
cultural phenomena . Bu t th e difference s betwee n thes e method s
and thos e o f th e natura l science s d o no t originat e i n ontologica l
dissimilarities o f their subjec t matter, bu t i n differen t interest s the y
are responsive to (Weber , Knies, p. 184-185) . Therefore, i f one uses
the method s o f natura l sciences , on e ca n catc h a glimps e o f th e
social worldth e view behaviorists get. This view is not necessaril y
wrong, bu t lacking . B y looking a t socia l phenomen a i n thi s light ,
one i s likely to "mis s out " o n a substantia l amoun t o f informatio n
that i s availabl e i n th e real m o f th e sociocultura l phenomen a
(Weber, Biology, p . 389) . Weberia n sociologist s d o no t categori cally rejec t th e us e o f th e method s o f th e exac t science s i n th e
exploration o f socia l phenomena . Rather , the y g o beyon d th e dis covery o f correlation s an d functiona l relationships : the y ca n ac complish somethin g whic h i s neve r attainabl e i n th e natura l sci ences, namely , th e subjectiv e understandin g o f th e actio n o f th e
component individuals . Th e natura l sciences , o n th e othe r hand ,
cannot do this, being limited to the formulation o f causal uniformi ties i n object s an d event s and th e explanatio n o f individual fact s b y
applying them . W e do no t "understand " the behavio r o f cell s bu t
can onl y observ e th e relevan t functiona l relationship s an d general ize o n th e basi s o f these observations . Thi s additiona l achievemen t
of explanation b y interpretive understanding, a s distinguished from
external observation , is , o f course , attaine d onl y a t a priceth e
more hypothetica l an d fragmentar y characte r o f its results . Never theless, subjectiv e understandin g i s th e specifi c characteristi c o f
sociological knowledg e (Weber , Economy / , p . 15) .

Appendix B
On Verificatio n of th e Idea l
Types: Winch , Schutz , an d Oake s

Preserving the meaning that th e social acto r attribute s t o hi s or her

behavior a s an integral part o f the socia l sciences presents interpretive discipline s with a difficul t choice . The y see m to hav e to eithe r
neglect or to otherwis e fill o r bridge the gap that invariably emerges
between th e understandin g o f th e socia l acto r an d tha t o f th e
scientific observer . Webe r considere d th e proble m bu t pu t of f a
rigorous attempt t o solve it. He dismissed a s unconducive and naive
the suggestion that an empathetic identificatio n with the subject can
be used to fill the gap between the intended and observe d meanings.
A close reading o f Weber's theory o f concept formation als o reveals
that h e di d no t dee m i t necessar y or scientificall y sound t o bridg e
that ga p throug h verificatio n of interpretive inferences. Instea d h e
devised hi s interpretive methods s o that verificatio n of interpretive
schemes i n th e sens e o f collatin g the m wit h th e actua l existin g
meaning or other empirical data would not be necessary. As this has
been sufficiently discusse d throughout the text, in this appendix we
shall concentrat e o n th e suggestion s o f Gu y Oake s an d Pete r
Winch, who, presupposing the necessity of verifying th e ideal types,
have proceeded t o apprais e Ma x Weber' s theory o f ideal types . We
shall then turn t o Alfre d Schutz' s critique o f Weber's methodolog y
with regar d t o thi s problem.Weber' s rejectio n o f th e empatheti c
school wa s spelled ou t clearl y enoug h t o preven t an y seriou s com mentator fro m ascribin g to hi m suc h ideas . Bu t a s these example s
indicate, a scholarl y inclinatio n persist s t o attribut e t o Webe r a
solution (t o th e proble m o f th e rif t betwee n intende d an d inter 129

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

preted meanings ) tha t involve s "verification " o f idea l types . Th e

proponents o f th e verificatio n thesi s trea t th e idea l type s lik e th e
theories o f natura l sciences ; that is , a s genera l statement s abou t a
class o f actuall y existin g phenomena , t o b e furthe r validate d an d
verified. Thi s procedur e i s to b e carrie d ou t throug h exposin g th e
ideal typica l "hypothesis" t o th e empirical data . The implication, in
keeping with the tradition of natural sciences, would be that a single
diversion betwee n fact s an d theor y mus t (ideally ) culminate i n th e
devaluation o f the theory. O f course, as we have alread y mentioned ,
an idea l typ e i s no t debunke d i f th e empirica l realit y o r th e inten tionality o f the "native " doe s no t confor m to it . Quit e the contrary,
it is, insofar a s such diversion s exist, o f course, within a reasonabl e
range, tha t th e idea l types are useful. I t mus t b e borne i n mind tha t
in dealin g wit h idea l types , we d o no t as k "whethe r o r not " the y
"subsume" the reality; rather "t o wha t extent " th e realit y "approxi mates" the idea l types .
Unlike Weber, Oakes' s interes t i s a linguistic and logica l one ; it is
not sociological . H e i s concerne d abou t matter s suc h a s th e trut h
conditions fo r th e ascriptio n o f th e constitutiv e concept s (Oakes ,
1977, p . 23) . I n hi s introductio n t o Weber' s Roscher an d Knies,
Oakes claim s tha t th e productio n o f meaningfu l interpretation s
must b e don e "i n suc h a way that i t ca n b e verified. " However , th e
passage quote d fro m Webe r i n th e footnot e doe s no t i n an y wa y
support th e ide a suggested b y Oakes. W e have alread y mad e i t clear
that certai n kind s o f "meaning" need verification , but thi s doe s no t
apply t o th e idea l typica l meanin g constructions . Webe r believe d
that "ou r habitua l mode s o f thought an d feeling " vouch th e subjec tive adequac y o f a n interpretation . Eve n th e determinatio n o f th e
"causal adequacy" o f an ideal typical construct would not furthe r o r
fortify th e universalit y o f it s subjectiv e adequacy . T o gaug e th e
causal adequac y o f a n idea l typ e i s t o demonstrat e th e exten t t o
which the ideal type can be "useful" b y showing the extent to whic h
the realit y deviate s fro m it . Th e determinatio n o f th e causa l ade quacy o f an idea l type , therefore , i s not a n instrumen t o f testing th e
"truth condition " o f "socia l hypotheses " (Weber , Economy / ,
pp. 11-12) . Gu y Oakes , however , i n hi s effor t t o bridg e th e hiatu s
that separate s th e socia l acto r fro m th e scientifi c observer, suggests
that th e scientifi c interpretation o f the idea l typ e mus t b e corroborated b y th e socia l actor' s understanding . Fo r thi s t o happen , firs t

Appendix B: Verification o f th e Ideal Types 13

the subjectivity of the social actor mus t be "reproduced." Onl y if the

reproduced meaning is shown to b e an exact replicatio n of the ideal
type ca n th e idea l type satisf y Oakes' s "verstehen criterion " an d b e
finally accepted :
If th e investigatio n i s successful , there i s a sens e i n whic h i t shoul d
mirror o r reproduc e th e native' s ow n account: the criteria whic h th e
social scientist employ s for the ascriptio n o f a given [social] predicat e
should b e equivalent to th e criteria whic h th e nativ e employ s for th e
ascription o f th e sam e (social ) predicate . (Oakes , 1977 . pp . 24-25) 1

This verificatio n involves two methodologicall y dangerous steps.

First, th e "reproduction " of the subjectivit y of the native . We have
already demonstrate d ho w Webe r wen t t o grea t length s t o prov e
that thi s i s an impossibl e an d unnecessar y task t o undertake . Sec ond, an d b y far th e mor e dangerous step , consists o f the matchin g
of th e idea l typica l constructio n agains t th e reproduce d "actua l
existing meaning " o r th e "native' s account. " Thi s latte r ste p in volves a reduction o f the pur e type s to th e actua l existin g meaning
and, thus , remove s the keyston e o f Weber' s methodolog y an d re verses it s telos. I t appear s no t t o hav e occurred t o Oake s that "th e
native's account " cannot b e the ultimate criterio n for the validity of
the idea l types , simply because Webe r introduced the possibilit y of
"semiconsciousness" as well as "false consciousness" of the concrete
social actor .
The sam e concer n fo r verifiabilit y o f idea l type s underlies Pete r
Winch's critiqu e o f Weber . I n hi s Th e Idea o f a Social Science,
Winch criticize s Weber fo r suggestin g tha t statistica l correlation s
can b e use d t o "verify " interpretation s (Winch , 1977 , p. 112) . H e
also criticize s Webe r fo r hi s "implie d suggestion" : "Verstehen i s
something whic h i s logically incomplet e an d need s supplementin g
by a differen t metho d altogethe r namely , th e collectio n o f statis tics." Then he goes on to criticize this allegedly Weberian viewpoint.
His criticis m i s valid, bu t i t reject s onl y Winch's "idea " of Weber' s
methodology. Winc h proposes , "Th e compatibilit y of a n interpre tation wit h the statistic s doe s no t prov e its validity" (Winch , 1977 ,
p. 113) . This obviousl y i s no t contrar y t o Weber' s position . Suc h
concurrence woul d onl y prov e tha t th e idea l typ e i n questio n i s
useful (no t valid) . Winc h als o seem s to hav e confused the determi -

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

nation o f "causa l adequacy " o f a n idea l typica l constructio n wit h

the proces s o f verificatio n o f genera l law s i n th e natura l sciences .
Finally a reference must b e made t o Alfre d Schutz , wh o criticize d
Weber fo r hi s perfunctor y treatmen t o f th e varietie s o f subjectiv e
experience an d especiall y for neglecting to deal wit h the disjunction
that exist s betwee n personall y experience d an d th e observationall y
or motivationally interpreted types of meaning (Schutz , 1967 , pp. 7 ,
8). H e expressl y wishe d t o clarif y an d radicall y analyz e th e taci t
presuppositions o f Weber's interpretiv e sociology. O n th e questio n
of verifiabilit y o f idea l types , h e seem s t o hav e accomplishe d thi s
task. Schut z argue s tha t actua l existin g meaning , an d idea l typica l
meaning ar e fundamentally different 2 an d tha t mutua l understand ing, eve n i n everyda y life , i s problematic . Abov e all , h e maintain s
that achievin g tota l symmetr y between the intended an d interprete d
meanings i s impossible. 3 Bu t thi s doe s no t rende r interpersona l o r
sociological understandin g unattainable, 4 a s th e rif t betwee n th e
two type s o f meanin g i s guarantee d t o remai n negligible . Thi s i s
vouched for by the fact that the parties to any interaction shar e with
each othe r an d th e observe r a common objectiv e contex t o f mean ing. This make s observationa l an d motivational understandin g pos sible an d allow s fo r th e constructio n o f th e subjectivel y adequat e
ideal types . Togethe r wit h Weber , Schut z maintain s tha t verifica tion o f idea l type s i s no t onl y impossible bu t als o unnecessary .
In socia l science s th e mod e o f understandin g i s alway s th e indi rect observatio n o f the worl d o f predecessor s o r tha t o f contempo raries.5 Thu s enterin g int o a face-to-fac e relationshi p eve n fo r th e
purpose o f checkin g th e validit y of th e idea l typ e woul d ips o fact o
spoil th e scientificit y o f th e procedure. 6
Besides, idea l type s ar e b y definitio n unverifiable. 7 The y neve r
refer t o no r ca n the y eve n b e corroborated b y individuals. 8 Schut z
could, o f course , hav e adde d t o thi s lis t b y mentionin g tha t fo r
Weber eve n the availabilit y o f a thorough motivationa l understand ing of the concrete socia l acto r doe s not alte r th e situation. Fo r eve n
if suc h a n inne r understandin g come s int o conflic t wit h th e idea l
type, i t doe s no t necessaril y refut e th e idea l typ e i n question : "Th e
'conscious motives ' ma y wel l even t o th e acto r himself , conceal th e
various 'motives ' and 'repressions ' which constitut e th e rea l drivin g
force o f hi s action " (Weber, Economy I , pp . 9-10) .

Appendix C
Weber an d Isla m

Weber's ow n generalizing observations abou t th e religiou s need s of

warriors, a s reflecte d i n religion s tha t ar e tailore d t o thes e needs ,
tend t o exclud e Isla m a s on e suc h religion . First , Islam' s radica l
monotheism (singularit y of the divine in principle) would thwart th e
warrior's characteristi c penchan t fo r polytheism , monolatr y o r he notheism (Weber , Judaism , p . 133) . Second , belie f i n predestina tion an d divin e determination instea d o f irrational fate or "kismet,"
which was generally favored by the warriors, prevailed i n the Qura n
and pervade d th e attitud e o f the prophe t an d hi s disciples (Weber ,
Economy I , p. 575) . Furthermore, pride , a necessary component o f
martial spirit , i s abhorre d i n Isla m a s inimica l t o th e spiri t o f
religion, which demands "total submission" to Go d (Weber, Social,
p. 291) . Islam no t onl y encourages religiou s humility but als o con tains concepts such as sin and salvation , which, in Weber's view, are
not suppose d t o b e particularly pleasin g to th e dignifie d religiosity
of th e warriors . Finally , Isla m i s no t a n exclusivel y masculin e
religion; it does not offe r hierarchica l promotion t o its believers nor
does i t emphasiz e disciplin e an y mor e tha n othe r occidenta l reli gions do . Th e las t thre e characteristic s are , however , found i n two
other religion s that Weber associated with warriors: Zen Buddhism
in Japa n (Weber , India, p . 279) , an d Mithrais m i n Rom e (Weber ,
Economy, pp. 475-76) . I n the former case , the asceti c and contem plative exercise s o f th e Ze n monk s see m t o hav e appeale d t o th e
professional warrior s an d t o thei r appreciatio n o f discipline. Mith raism offere d Roma n centurion s no t onl y an exclusivel y masculine
religion bu t als o a n essentiall y magica l an d sacramenta l distribu tion o f grace an d th e possibilit y o f hierarchical advancemen t i n it s
133

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

mystery ceremonies . I t shoul d b e born e i n min d tha t i n bot h case s

we deal with radically transformed versions of religions that in their
original for m ha d no t bee n warrio r religions . Thi s ma y dissuad e
one from dubbin g them a s warrior religions in the sens e that Webe r
means i t i n th e cas e o f Islam . I n respons e t o th e questio n wh y
Weber designate d Islam , whic h ha s bee n bot h i n it s origina l for m
and i n its social characte r a n occidenta l religion , a s the quintessen tial warrio r religion , th e followin g explanatio n ma y b e offered .
Weber base d hi s ideal type of Islam o n prevailin g Europea n stereo types, for h e never got aroun d t o devotin g a s much tim e to Isla m as
he did to Judaism, post-Reformatio n Christianity , and the religions
of Indi a an d China . Thi s explanatio n endow s les s psychologica l
significance t o Weber' s slip s an d error s o f omissio n i n studyin g
Islam tha n do othe r scholar s o f this area , namely , Brya n S. Turner.
However, thi s i s no t mean t t o reject , bu t rathe r t o complement ,
Turner's particula r explanatio n o f Weber' s treatmen t o f Isla m
(Turner, 1974 , p. 141 , 176).

Appendix D
Ideologies an d Counter-Ideologie s
of Intellectual s i n Occidenta l Eas t
and West : A n Idea l Typica l Mode l

Auguste Comte preferre d th e sovereignty of the "savants" to that of

the people ; fo r hi m socia l evolutio n mean t tha t scientifi c politic s
would hav e t o replac e th e irrationalit y o f democrati c politic s
(Comte, 1969 , p. 275) . His version of social evolution was geared t o
reject th e Spenceria n interpretatio n o f the historica l progres s tha t
developed independen t o f huma n volitio n an d wa s imperviou s t o
artificial prodding .
Lester Fran k Ward , Comte' s America n disciple , called Spencer ian sociolog y " a gospe l o f inaction " an d " a we t blanke t o n th e
enthusiasm o f al l wh o woul d follo w socia l science " (Ward , 1894 ,
p. 618) . War d mad e explici t wha t remaine d implici t i n Comte .
Cosmic an d organi c evolutio n wer e differen t fro m socia l evolutio n
in that, i n the latter , consciou s (telic) actio n becam e th e ver y agen t
of social evolution (Ward, 1903 , pp. 15-17) ; spontaneous evolutio n
belonged t o lowe r stages o f evolution (Ward, 1844 , p. 276) . Ward' s
ideology o f intellectuals' sovereignty, for whic h he coined th e ter m
"sociocracy," would no t counte r socia l evolution , bu t onl y termi nate it s spontaneou s phase. 1 "Thu s fa r socia l progres s ha s i n a
certain awkwar d manner , taken car e o f itself, bu t i n the near futur e
it wil l hav e t o b e care d for " (Ward , 1926 , p. 706) . I f w e cal l argu ments suc h a s thes e th e exceptionalis t arguments , War d coul d b e
said t o hav e achieve d th e ultimat e rationalizatio n o f it . War d di d
not nee d t o justif y th e interventio n o f human s i n th e proces s o f
135

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

evolution i n th e nam e o f extraneou s contingencies , becaus e h e

argued tha t huma n "telic " intervention i s th e onl y for m o f socia l
evolution i n th e moder n age.
Having establishe d th e necessit y of intervening in th e proces s of
social evolution, the ideologie s of intellectuals must eithe r establish
or presuppose that their designated agent s o f intervention (savants,
sociocrats a s th e vanguar d o f th e proletaria n party ) wil l selflessl y
engage in their political task. They usually take the second path and
simply shar e th e platoni c assumptio n tha t " a ma n wh o ha s learn t
about righ t wil l b e righteous " (Plato , Gorgias, Par . 460) . Ward' s
sociocrats woul d be
the las t to clai m an undue share. They work for al l mankind an d fo r
all time, and al l they as k i s that al l mankind shal l forever benefi t b y
their work . . . . The y onl y as k a n opportunit y t o appl y scientifi c
principles t o grea t things . (Ward , 1926 , p. 583)

Lenin claim s th e sam e purit y fo r hi s leadin g elite , or , a s h e call s

them, "a doze n tried an d talented " (Lenin, 1973 , p . 118) . Althoug h
their title implies mere technical superiority , the leaders of the part y
were in fact entruste d with the grave task o f shaping the conscious ness of the proletariat, who m they were supposed to represent . Th e
problem wa s tha t i n Lenin' s vie w th e proletaria t wa s pron e t o
"opportunism" and wa s unable t o transcen d it s economic concern s
for idea l one s (Lenin , 1973 , pp. 37 , 69 , 107).
The proponent s o f counterideologies of intellectuals in bot h traditions o f sociolog y an d socialis m als o see m t o hav e use d paralle l
tactics. Le t u s examin e th e position s o f Ros a Luxembur g an d
William Graha m Sumne r i n this category :
1. The y uphol d th e sanctit y o f socia l evolutio n an d objec t t o
human intervention s in it. Their evolutio n makes n o leaps. Sumne r
stated: "The only possible good fo r societ y must com e o f evolution
not revolution " (Sumner , 1914 , p. 207) . Rosa Luxembur g likene d
evolution t o a delicat e developin g organis m whos e natura l pac e
must no t b e disturbed : "Sto p th e natura l pulsatio n o f a livin g
organism, an d yo u weake n it , an d yo u diminis h it s resistanc e an d
combative spirit " (Luxemburg , 1970 , p. 129) . The interventionis t
cure o f th e proletaria n consciousnes s fo r th e part y intellectual s
attempted b y Lenin , i n he r view , wa s worse than th e diseas e itself:

Appendix D: Intellectuals i n Occidental East an d West 13

"Historically, th e error s committed b y a truly revolutionar y move ment are infinitely mor e fruitful tha n the infallibility o f the cleverest
central committee " ^Luxemburg , 1970 , p. 130) .
In short , th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s uphel d th e ful l
automaticity o f socia l evolution . Eve n i f histor y proceed s i n a
zigzag and prolonge d fashion , the y argued, it would be wiser to let
it run it s course than to unleas h the "telic" or volunteeristic subjec tivism o f intellectuals i n th e hop e o f hastening o r correctin g it .
2. Th e counterideologie s o f intellectual s hesitat e t o waiv e th e
possibility of selfish manipulatio n o f social change by the intellectu als who ar e supposed t o shap e i t for the sake o f universality. In th e
occidental Wes t this suspicion takes the form of a simple mistrust of
human nature . Sumne r states : "Th e reaso n for excesse s o f th e ol d
governing classes lies in the vices and passion s o f human natur e . . .
these vices are confined to no nation" (Sumner, 1970 , p. 27) . In the
occidental East , however , thi s argumen t i s muc h mor e potent .
Drawing upo n th e anarchis t an d Machdevis t (derive d fro m th e
name o f the Polish-born Russia n revolutionar y Waclaw Machajski)
traditions, th e Eastern Europea n counterelite s have reduced Marx ism an d socialis m t o mer e ideologica l facade s fo r th e rul e o f th e
intelligentsia. O f course , ther e i s enoug h i n Mar x an d Engels' s
compendium o f writings to suppor t th e thesi s o f social determina tion o f consciousness. It is on this very basis that Ros a Luxembur g
chides Lenin for trusting the fate o f the proletariat t o "professiona l
revolutionaries": "Th e 'intellectual ' a s a socia l elemen t whic h ha s
emerged ou t o f the bourgeoisi e an d i s therefore alie n t o th e prole tariat, enters the socialist movement no t because o f his natural clas s
inclinations bu t i n spit e o f them" (Luxemburg, 1970 , p. 124) .
The counterideologies of the Eastern European intellectual s state
the cas e even mor e categorically :
The intellectual s o f ever y ag e hav e describe d themselve s ideologi cally, i n accordanc e wit h thei r particula r interests , an d i f thos e
interests hav e differe d fro m ag e to ag e it ha s stil l been th e commo n
aspiration o f the intellectual s o f every ag e to represen t thei r particu lar interest s i n each context a s the genera l interest s o f mankind. The
definition o f universal , eternal , suprem e (an d henc e immutable )
knowledge display s a remarkabl e variabilit y ove r th e ages , bu t i n
every ag e th e intellectual s defin e a s suc h whateve r knowledg e bes t

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUAL S

serves th e particula r interest s connecte d wit h their socia l rolean d

that i s whateve r portio n o f th e knowledg e o f th e ag e serve s t o
maintain thei r monopol y of their role . (Konrad an d Szelenyi , 1979 ,
p. 14 )

One can assume that they are inspired not onl y by Marx and Engels
but b y Bakuni n an d Machajsk i a s well. The anti-intellectualis m of
anarchism had alread y denounced bot h Marxis m an d the elitism of
Utopian socialists. Bakuni n hel d th e reign of intellectuals to be "th e
most aristocratic , despotic , arrogan t an d elitis t o f al l regimes "
(Bakunin, 1972 , p . 319) . For him , th e dominatio n o f the educate d
class ove r th e uneducate d woul d reproduc e al l thei r othe r differ ences, the demolitio n o f which had bee n promised b y the educate d
vanguards a t th e outse t (Bakunin , 1953 , pp. 77-81) . Bakuni n eve n
foresaw th e reig n o f bureaucratic intelligentsi a as the fina l resul t of
the elitis m o f intellectua l ideology : th e state , then , become s th e
patrimony o f a bureaucrati c clas s (Bakunin , 1972 , p. 96) . Wacla u
Machajski turne d Bakuninia n anti-intellectualis m int o a universa l
conspiracy theory of intellectuals. H e maintained, tha t the workers
would no t hav e their workers ' government eve n after th e capitalist s
have disappeare d a s th e intelligentsi a woul d continu e t o rul e
through th e workers ' deputies.
The structura l similaritie s o f ideologies and counterideologie s of
intellectuals i n divers e tradition s o f socialis m an d sociolog y con firm th e thesi s tha t simila r ideologica l need s ca n generat e simila r
ideologies. Ma x Webe r allude d t o thi s possibilit y whe n h e ac counted fo r th e developmen t o f simila r ideologie s o f th e welfar e
state i n a variety o f civilizational contexts (Weber , China, p. 143) .

Appendix E
Epistemology an d Methodolog y

Max Weber' s theory of concept formatio n take s Rickert' s an d thu s

Kant's entir e epistemolog y fo r granted . Therefore , Webe r a s a
sociologist di d not tak e i t upon himsel f to enlarg e on epistemological problem s an d neithe r shoul d we . But a brie f clarificator y not e
seems t o b e i n orde r i n vie w o f recen t critica l comment s tha t ar e
directed a t Weber' s allege d epistemologica l confusion . Thes e criti cisms are the result of a conflation or collapsing of the epistemolog ical an d th e methodologica l level s o f concep t formation . Kantia n
epistemology provide s a n answe r t o th e proble m o f the incompre hensibility o f reality , whil e neo-Kantia n an d especiall y Weberia n
methodologies dea l wit h a worl d tha t i s comprehensibl e ye t infi nitely rich. By ascribing a categorical form , such as existence, to th e
raw contents o f our sensations , the Kantia n epistemolog y turns th e
latter int o "facts. " A n aggregat e o f thes e fact s constitute s wha t
Weber alternatel y call s "empirical " o r "concrete " o r "objective "
reality. S o whe n Webe r claim s tha t socia l science s ar e the science s
of objective reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschafi), h e is referring to a n
already categoricall y formed reality . Accordin g to Ricker t the tas k
of methodology i s to reduce the infinite multiplicity of the empirica l
reality throug h method s o f individuali/atio n (i n historica l o r cul tural sciences) and generalization (i n exact sciences) . To these meth ods o f reductio n Webe r adde d th e metho d o f constructin g idea l
types. Therefore , i t i s an erro r t o charg e tha t Webe r though t tha t
ideal type s mus t b e compare d wit h th e prephenomena l realit y i n
order t o mak e the latter comprehensibl e (Oakes, 1987) . Rather, the
task o f methodolog y i s to discove r method s b y whic h a scientifi c
reduction o f a comprehensible ye t infinitely comple x realit y ca n be
139

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X WEBER' S SOCIOLOG Y O F INTELLECTUALS

achieved (A . Sadri , 1987) . Webe r neve r implied tha t "th e element s

which are used to construct the concepts of both the natural and the
social science s ar e lifte d directl y fro m th e 'infinit e flux ' o f realit y
without conceptualization," a s Hekman has charged. Th e Weberian
remark t o whic h thi s critiqu e refer s deal s onl y wit h infinit e multi plicity of empirical data not th e "flux" o f formless sensations (Hekman, 1983 , p . 23) . Late r Hekma n explicitl y identifies th e "infinit e
multiplicity" o f reality , whic h i s th e conditio n o f th e empirica l
reality, wit h th e "chaos " of reality , whic h apparentl y refer s t o th e
flux o f th e prephenomena l realit y (Hekman , 1983 , p. 30) .
Weber believed that th e generalizing methods of exact science s as
well a s th e individualizin g an d idea l typ e generatin g method s o f
social, historical , and cultura l sciences all aim at achieving the sam e
goal: reductio n o f the infinit e multiplicit y of empirical reality . I t is
the commonalit y o f goa l amon g th e sciences , not th e similarit y of
the method s o f achievin g it , tha t constitute s th e basi s o f Weber' s
claim to scientifi c status o f the social , historical , an d cultura l disci plines. I n contras t t o thi s vie w th e mono-methodologica l approac h
of positivist s sought t o establis h th e scientificit y o f socia l science s
by concedin g tha t th e onl y possible manne r o f masterin g th e mas s
of empirica l data is to follo w th e generalizin g method s o f the exac t
sciences whic h promised t o banis h th e trivia l an d th e uniqu e whil e
saving th e "essential, " tha t i s the "general. "
Unlike the proponents of "subjectivism" o r "intuitionism," Weber
did not link a critique of positivism to relinquishing all claims to the
scientific status . Rather , h e sought to legitimiz e the interest histori ans evinc e in the "unique " and th e historicall y o r culturall y signifi cant aspect s o f the world . While arguing fo r th e applicabilit y o f the
methods o f exac t science s to th e spher e o f social , historical , an d
cultural sciences , Webe r als o maintaine d tha t th e us e o f specifi c
methods fo r achievin g a n interpretiv e understandin g o f th e mean ingful phenomen a i s indispensabl e fo r thes e sciences . Webe r wa s
able t o uphol d thi s complex positio n becaus e h e did not dee m tha t
the real m o f meaningfu l phenomena exclude s tha t o f natura l phe nomena. Indeed , i n on e specifi c sens e th e real m o f the social , cul tural, an d historica l science s is "the same " as th e real m o f nature :
both ca n b e reduce d t o an d capture d b y generalizin g method s o f
natural sciences . Fo r Webe r meaningfu l phenomena ar e a t leas t a s
susceptible to generalizatio n an d predictio n a s are the natura l phe -

Appendix E: Epistemology an d Methodology 14

nomena. Webe r conceive d o f the real m o f meaningful phenomen a

not i n opposition t o bu t a s a more complex region o f the worl d of
natural objects . Hi s interpretiv e method s d o no t clai m t o b e th e
only mean s o f studyin g th e real m o f meaningfu l phenomena .
Rather, they promise to provide a more sensitive and efficient se t of
apparatus fo r explorin g an d exploitin g its complexities an d possi bilities. I n othe r words , i t i s th e differenc e o f "interest " no t th e
dissimilarity o f the subjec t matter tha t necessitate s the deploymen t
of differen t method s fo r th e stud y o f natura l an d sociohistorica l
phenomena.

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Notes

Chapter 1
1. A n excellen t expositio n o f thi s ha s bee n provide d i n th e wor k o f
Thomas Burger , Max Weber's Theory o f Concept Formation.
2. "Science s ar e foun d an d thei r method s ar e progressivel y develope d
only whe n substantive problem s are discovere d an d solved . Purely episte mological o r methodologica l reflection s hav e neve r ye t mad e a decisiv e
contribution t o this project.. . . Methodology can only be self-reflection o n
the mean s whic h hav e proven t o b e valuabl e i n actua l research . Explici t
self-reflection o f this sort is no more a condition for fruitfu l researc h tha n is
knowledge o f anatom y a conditio n fo r th e abilit y t o wal k "correctly. " I n
fact, whoever tried t o walk by applying his knowledge of anatomy would be
in dange r o f stumbling . The schola r wh o attempt s t o bas e th e aim s o f his
research o n a foundatio n o f extrinsi c methodologica l consideration s i s in
danger o f falling int o difficultie s o f the sam e sort " (Gu y Oakes, Introduc tion t o Roscher an d Knies, pp . 14-15) .
3. Quote d b y Mommsen , "Ma x Weber' s Politica l Sociolog y an d hi s
Philosophy o f Worl d History, " p . 25.
4. Webe r declares : "Actio n i n th e sens e of subjectivel y understandable
orientation o f behavior exist s only as the behavio r o f one o r mor e individual human beings " (Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I , p. 13) . In the case
of othe r commonl y used concepts, suc h a s state, etc., Weber suggests that :
"for th e subjectiv e interpretatio n o f actio n i n sociologica l wor k thes e
collectivities mus t be treated a s solely th e resultants and modes of organization o f th e particular acts o f individual persons, sinc e thes e alon e ca n b e
treated a s agent s i n th e cours e o f subjectivel y understandabl e action "
(Weber, Economy I , p . 13) .
5. Thi s wa s don e i n greate r detai l i n Critique o f Stammler (1971) , a
more refine d versio n of which appears i n the firs t chapte r o f his Economy
and Society.
143

144 NOTE

6. Ma x Weber , Economy an d Society, firs t chapter .

7. I n Weber' s origina l text "der tatsdchlich . . . gemeinte sinn" or actua l
existing meanin g i s oppose d t o "[der] i n einem begriffilch konstruierten
reinen typus . . . subjektiv gemeinte Sinn" or th e subjectiv e meaning of the
theoretically conceive d pure type.
8. Thi s i s evidence tha t Ma x Weber , followin g Rickert, presupposed a
neo-Kantian epistemolog y according t o whic h a flo w o f unforme d sensa tions a s i s immediatel y presen t i n huma n consciousnes s (le t alon e whe n
reproduced i n the min d o f an observer) does no t qualif y a s "knowledge" of
concrete facts . Suc h sensation s onc e categorically forme d (e.g. , as existing
things, chronologica l successions , o r a s objectivel y possibl e trends , etc. )
constitute the set of knowable facts. Once scientifically treated, i.e., selected
through generalizing or individualizin g methods o f abstraction, thes e facts
come t o constitut e th e basi s o f concept s tha t ar e th e buildin g block s o f a
scientific understanding . Withou t categorie s an d withou t abstraction , i t i s
impossible to tal k of knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge. To "capture"
the ra w content s o f the socia l actor' s intentionality , therefore , woul d b e a
fruitless task . Fo r a critiqu e o f mor e recen t commentarie s o n th e abov e
controversy, see Appendix B. For a n excellen t elaboration o f Weber's epistemology se e Thomas Berger' s Ma x Weber's Theory o f Concept Formation.
9. B y contrast , idea l types , a s w e wil l explai n later , d o no t requir e
"verification" i n th e sens e in whic h hypotheses ar e verifie d i n th e natura l
sciences.
10. Alfre d Schutz' s efforts t o unravel the constitution of the meaning fo r
the solitary or interacting individual, are admittedly inconsequential for the
social sciences , which are b y definitio n intereste d i n "indirect socia l obser vation" (Schultz , 1967 , pp. 221 , 223, 226, 229 , 242) . In turnin g away fro m
the question s o f concret e subjectivit y o f individuals , Webe r seem s to hav e
anticipated Gadame r (Truth an d Method, pp . 39 , 166 , 171, 236-240) an d th e
later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, pp . 107 , 116-132), who als o
chose t o focu s o n th e communal , intersubjective , and ultimatel y practica l
aspects o f interpretatio n rathe r tha n refinin g an d purifyin g th e concret e
subjectivity i n isolation fro m it s cultural an d traditiona l surroundings .
11. "Meaning " ma y b e o f tw o kinds . Th e ter m ma y refe r firs t t o th e
actual existing meanin g i n the give n concrete cas e o f a particular actor , or
to th e averag e or approximat e meanin g attributabl e t o a given plurality of
actors; o r secondl y t o th e theoreticall y conceive d pure type o f subjective
meaning attribute d t o th e hypothetica l acto r o r actor s i n a give n typ e of
action. (Weber , Economy I , p . 4)
12. Se e the quotatio n a t th e beginnin g o f pag e 7 .
13. Firs t ther e i s the "teleological, " "rationalistic" reconstructio n o f th e
hypothetical cours e o f human action . Thi s i s used i n economic an d socio -

Notes 14

logical theory . Th e historica l individuals , condense d int o concept s tha t

single ou t an d emphasiz e some o f thei r significan t aspects , constitut e th e
second importan t variet y o f idea l type s (historica l idea l types) . I t i s ou r
contention (a s in the case o f the concep t o f rationality) that Weber was well
aware of the difference s i n the differen t concept s he referred to b y the sam e
name. This is not a case of methodological confusio n on Wpber's part, but ,
at worst , a lac k o f clarification , du e t o carelessness , tha t ha s create d s o
much controversy in the impor t o f the concept s of ideal type or rationality .
It must b e o f some value for thos e scholars wh o tend t o overemphasiz e th e
distinction betwee n historical an d sociologica l idea l type s to conside r tha t
for Webe r these two occurred i n the same genius. "Social action is for u s the
behavior o f individuals , either historicall y observe d o r theoreticall y possi ble o r probable , behavio r relate d t o th e actua l o r anticipate d potentia l
behavior o f othe r individuals " (Weber , Logos, p. 160) .
14. Se e Appendi x B for furthe r discussio n o f thi s point .
15. Pau l F . Lazarsfel d i n hi s revie w of th e voluminou s result s o f socia l
psychological survey s that wer e published unde r th e titl e "Th e America n
Soldier, A n Expositor y Review " demonstrate s thi s wit h singula r lucidity .
He firs t trick s th e reade r int o agreein g tha t a se t o f conclusion s derive d
from th e aforementioned surveys are self-evident and tha t thei r rediscovery
would b e a wastefu l an d futil e practice . The n h e reveal s tha t th e actua l
results wer e diametrically opposed t o thes e ostensibl y obvious statements ,
adding that thes e opposite conclusion s would have also appeare d "obvious"
had the y bee n state d first . H e concludes , "Obviousl y somethin g i s wron g
with th e entir e argumen t o f 'obviousness.'"
16. Heidegge r an d Gadame r brough t thi s aspec t o f Wester n socia l
philosophy, whic h was onl y implici t i n Weber , t o ful l fruition .
17. Ye t Weber argue d fo r "ethica l neutrality" in social sciences . This fo r
him simpl y meant tha t th e valu e judgments tha t i n certai n scientifi c projects tur n u p a s th e en d resul t o f a n ostensibl y objectiv e researc h canno t
possibly follo w fro m th e impute d scientifi c premises . Webe r maintaine d
that suc h valuations mus t appea r autonomously , an d no t disguise d a s the
final verdict of scienceat the beginnin g rather than a t the end of research .
Values may then be put in suspended animation while the empirical investigation proceed s (Weber , Meaning).
18. I n the rationalistic parlance of Descartes an d Kant , "common sense "
is close to o r a synony m o f "vulgar thinking. " Vico , wh o ha s rightl y been
recognized a s th e firs t challenge r o f th e Cartesia n "monomethodologica l
approach" to al l science s an d th e foundin g father o f verstehen sociology ,
approached th e questio n fro m a differen t angle . H e appeale d t o commo n
sense a s a communall y based judgmen t (Vico , Th e Ne w Science, pp . 142 ,
350) whose goal wa s to revea l what is "important" and "right," not t o see k

146 NOTE

after th e universall y valid truth . Celebratin g Vico' s appreciatio n o f com mon sense , Gadamer criticize d Kant fo r onc e more relegatin g it to a purely
subjective (and reflective ) judgment o f taste (Gadamer, pp . 19-39) . Criteri a
for subjectiv e adequacy o f sociological idea l types evince a Vicoea n appre ciation fo r th e commo n sense.
19. Habermas' s critica l remarks concernin g the relativisti c tendencies of
Weber presuppos e a mor e comprehensiv e an d inclusiv e conceptio n o f
social sciences and collapse the Weberian distinction between dogmatic an d
social science s (Habermas , Legitimation Crisis, p . 110) ; 1979 , pp . 178 185); 1981 , The Theory , pp. 200-204) . Fo r a critical appraisa l o f Haberma s
in thi s connectio n se e Hekman , 1983 , pp . 138-145) . Le o Straus s i s also
weary o f th e relativisti c implication s o f Weber' s though t (Strauss , 1953 ,
pp. 45-70) . Indeed , Webe r woul d agre e with hi s neo-pre-Aristotelian (Ha bermas, 1973 , 4 1 ff.) and neo-Aristotelia n critic s tha t th e socia l scientis t
can. i s entitled to , an d mus t pas s valu e judgments o n issue s concerning his
own a s wel l a s alie n civilizations . He would , however , disagre e tha t th e
social scientists in question must do so as a social scientist o r in the name of
science.
20. I n Schutz' s vie w onl y th e stud y o f th e historica l pas t pose s th e
problem o f lac k o f acces s t o th e "commo n cor e o f knowledge " share d b y
the predecessors . B y presupposing th e homogeneit y o f the "contemporar y
civilization" for which he offers n o justification, Schutz refuse s t o recogniz e
the proble m o f cross-cultura l interpretation . Thi s neglec t i s evident i n th e
following passage :
My predecessor lived in an environment radically different no t onl y from
my ow n bu t fro m th e environmen t which I ascrib e t o m y contemporar ies. Whe n I apprehen d a fello w ma n o r a contemporary , I ca n alway s
assume the presenc e of a common core of knowledge. The idea l types for
the We - an d They-relationship s themselve s presuppos e thi s kerne l o f
shared experience . Tha t highl y anonymou s idea l type , "m y contempo rary," shares by definition wit h me in that equally anonymous ideal type,
"contemporary civilization." Naturally this is lacking to m y predecessor.
The sam e experience would seem to hi m quit e differen t i n the context o f
the cultur e of hi s time . (Schutz, 1967 , p. 210)

It is , o f course , b y n o mean s self-eviden t tha t fo r th e contemporar y occi dental th e "commo n cor e o f knowledge " share d b y medieva l Europea n
burgers would be more accessibl e than that shared b y contemporary India n
yogis, Siberia n shamans , o r Japanes e Ze n masters .
21. Value-relevan t interests are constitutive of both inter- and intracultura l
studies. Eve n withi n a cultur e th e idea l type s kee p losin g thei r illustrativ e
functions owin g to th e ebb s an d flow s o f historical interests . Therefore, th e
social sciences are condemned t o "eternal youth" (Weber, Objectivity, p . 104) .

Notes 14

22. Webe r continues:

This knowledg e ma y functio n positivel y t o suppl y a n illustration , indi vidualized an d specific , i n th e formatio n o f the concep t o f feudalis m o r
negatively, to delimit certai n concept s wit h which w e operate in the stud y
of European cultura l histor y from the quite different cultura l trait s of the
Incas and Aztecs ; this latter function enable s us to mak e a clearer geneti c
comparison o f th e historica l uniquenes s o f Europea n cultura l develop ment. (Weber , Mayer, p . 156 )

23. Thoma s Burge r (p. 43 ) remains unimpresse d with Rickert's solutio n

concerning th e inclusio n o f secondar y data , tha t is , thos e fact s tha t ar e
apparently unrelated to the interest of the historian. Berger rightly observes
that mer e "tactfulness" an d "taste" can hardl y govern a scientific selection
of th e secondar y facts . B y broadenin g th e concep t o f historica l interest ,
Weber opene d ne w avenue s towar d th e resolutio n o f thi s methodologica l
problem.
24. "Th e typ e of social science in which we are interested i s an empirical
science o f concret e realit y (Wirklichkeitswissenschafi). Ou r ai m i s th e
understanding o f th e characteristi c uniquenes s o f th e realit y i n whic h w e
move" (Weberr , Objectivity, p . 72) .
25. "[Th e us e o f historica l idea l types ] gives ris e t o n o methodologica l
doubts s o long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical developmental
constructs and history ar e to b e sharply distinguished fro m each other , and
that th e construct here is no more than th e means fo r explicitly and validly
imputing an historical event to its real causes while eliminating those whic h
on th e basi s o f ou r presen t knowledg e see m impossible " (Weber , Objectivity, p . 102) .
26. "Indeed , th e partly brilliant attempts which have been made hithert o
to interpre t economi c phenomen a psychologically , sho w i n an y cas e tha t
the procedur e doe s no t begi n wit h the analysi s o f psychologica l qualities ,
moving then to the analysis of social institutions, but that , o n the contrary ,
insight int o th e psychologica l precondition s an d consequence s o f institu tions presuppose s a precis e knowledg e o f th e latte r an d th e scientifi c
analysis o f their structure " (Weber , Objectivity, p . 88) .
27. Thi s doe s no t exclud e th e us e o f idea l type s fo r taxonomica l an d
conceptual constitutiv e purpose s i n order to offe r a preliminary definition
of th e objec t o f investigatio n (Weber , Stammler, p. 123) .
28. Th e ancien t philosophica l zeal for subsumin g the particular s unde r
the universa l le d t o th e rankin g o f analogica l reasonin g a s inferio r t o
inductive generalization an d deductiv e inferences. The infatuatio n o f Car tesian an d positivis t scientists with the discovery of eternal law s also led to
a tota l depreciatio n o f th e analogica l method . Th e champion s o f th e
methodological autonom y o f huma n sciences , however , explore d th e un -

148 NOTE

popular, nonorthodox logica l an d methodological avenue s such as Vicoean

"imaginative universals " (Vico , 1965) , Weberia n idea l type s (Weber ,
Protestant, p . 47) , an d Wittgensteinea n operationalism . Th e affinit y o f
ideal type s to analogies , therefore , i s characteristic rathe r tha n unique . I n
other context s Webe r suggest s a wide r us e o f th e historica l comparativ e
studies wher e stud y o f analogou s event s take s precedenc e ove r isolatin g
general aspect s o f th e event s i n questio n (Weber , Mayer, p . 130) .
29. Acceptin g unfalsifiabl e statements i n scientifi c procedure s appear s
to blu r th e Popperia n demarcatio n lin e betwee n scienc e an d metaphysics .
However, i n thi s w e hav e onl y followe d hi s ow n example . I n hi s earl y
deliberations o n th e philosoph y o f science , Kar l Poppe r elaborate d an d
consistently adhered t o the principle of falsifiability a s the only criterion for
the distinguishin g demarcatio n lin e o f falsifiability . The twiligh t zon e o f
"historical interpretation " thu s allow s for scientifi c unfalsifiability. Poppe r
argues that t o fight the extensive multiplicity of empirical reality the science
of histor y must incorporat e th e value-relevan t interes t o f the historia n a s a
guide for selection and reductio n of the data, or in his words: "Undoubtedly
there ca n b e n o histor y withou t a poin t o f view; like th e natura l sciences ,
history mus t b e selectiv e unless it i s to b e choke d b y a floo d o f poo r an d
unrelated material " (Popper , 1961 , p. 150) . But, h e goes on to explain, suc h
selective approache s mus t no t b e mistake n fo r theories , a mistak e h e
attributes to "historocists." The followin g i s entirely compatible wit h Web er's vie w a s represente d i n Chapte r 1 :
As a rul e thes e historica l "approaches " o r "point s o f view " cannot b e
tested. They cannot b e refuted, an d apparen t confirmations are therefore
of no value , even if they are a s numerous a s the star s in the sky . We shall
call suc h a selectiv e poin t o f vie w o r focu s o f historica l interest , i f i t
cannot be formulated as a testable hypothesis, a historical interpretation.
(Popper, 1961 , p . 151 )

30. Considerin g al l of these instances on e wonder s how Webe r could b e

accused o f no t distinguishin g betwee n the meanin g a s experience d b y th e
social actor , an d tha t attribute d t o th e socia l actor s b y th e observe r
(Schutz, 1967 , p . 8) . Th e idea l typ e i s clearl y "ours, " an d w e us e i t a s a
measuring devic e fo r gaugin g th e uniquenes s o f th e concret e reality .
31. Nonetheless , the proponent s o f Althuserian structuralis m ar e horri fied b y Weber's introductio n o f cognitive interests into the objective proces s
of causation : "Weber' s metaphysica l an d fundamentall y religiou s concep tion o f th e relatio n o f ma n t o th e worl d o f natur e therefor e entail s a
systematic epistemologica l relativism , a relativis m define d a t th e leve l of
cultural value s rather tha n individua l subjectivity, but a relativism nonetheless" (Hindess , 1977 , p . 33) . Th e structuralis t critiqu e o f Weber' s "episte -

Notes 14

mological relativism " i s reminiscen t o f th e neo-Aristotelia n critiqu e o f

Weber's "cultural relativism" : the y both sh y away from definin g the criteri a
for eithe r cultura l o r epistemologica l universa l an d objectiv e truth .
32. Georg e Lukacs has consequently adopted Weber' s category of objective possibilit y to demonstrat e tha t th e emergenc e o f the proletaria n clas s
consciousness an d ultimatel y socialist transformatio n i s not a n automati c
or necessar y developmen t bu t a n "objectiv e possibility " (Lukacs , 1971 ,
pp. 204-205 ; Arato , 1979 , pp. 87-114) .
33. I n his critique o f Edward Mayer , Weber used the interesting allegory
of th e throwin g o f regula r a s oppose d t o loade d dic e t o demonstrat e th e
difference betwee n "chance causation " an d "adequate causation." Her e th e
same exampl e i s furthe r develope d t o virtuall y embrac e al l th e concept s
that hav e bee n discussed i n thi s section . I n regula r dice , the chance s o f all
six side s to com e uppermos t ar e equal . I n thi s cas e w e deal wit h "chanc e
causality," th e subjec t matte r o f calculu s o f probabilities . However , i f th e
dice ar e "loaded," there is a favorable chance tha t a certain sid e will come
out uppermost . Onl y her e ca n w e introduc e th e concep t o f "adequat e
causation" and the "objective probability" of the coming out of the side that
is favored by the loading of the dice. Now to tak e Weber's analogy on e step
further, suppos e a die is loaded s o that it favors, by a chance o f 99 to 1 , th e
side tha t read s six . Als o suppos e that thi s di e i s tossed, bu t jus t befor e i t
stopped rollin g a n earthquak e cause d a sligh t jerk o f the table . Th e deter mination o f th e causa l significanc e o f th e earthquak e depend s o n th e
outcome. If the outcom e is still a six, then we shall argue that although th e
last movemen t wa s par t o f th e causa l chai n tha t necessitate d th e fina l
outcome, its causal effec t ca n be treated a s negligible. This is so because the
coming uppermos t o f the numbe r wa s "adequately caused: " the outcom e
was "objectivel y possible " fro m th e beginnin g a s i t wa s favore d b y th e
process o f loading . Th e fina l "accident, " that i s th e movemen t cause d b y
the earthquake , therefore , could, for al l practical purposes , be replaced by
any movemen t cause d b y othe r externa l factors , o r i t coul d eve n b e alto gether eliminate d withou t any changes i n the outcome . O n the othe r hand ,
if in this case the side that reads an y other number should com e uppermost ,
we conclud e tha t sinc e th e outcom e wa s no t favore d b y th e objectivel y
possible circumstances (i.e. , the wa y in which the di e was loaded) th e fina l
"accident" must b e treated a s causally important .
34. Hi s two famous essays , "Social Psychology o f the Worl d Religions "
and "Th e Religiou s Rejection s of the Worl d an d Thei r Directions, " clearl y
attest t o this . Especially , se e Weber, Rejections, p . 357 ; Social, p . 281 .
35. Thi s poin t wil l b e discusse d i n detai l i n Chapte r 3 .
36. Thi s poin t wil l b e develope d furthe r i n Chapte r 2 .

150 NOTE

Chapter 2
1. I n othe r words , Weber' s sociolog y o f religio n an d hi s sociolog y o f
intellectuals a t onc e vindicated an d transcende d Marx' s a s wel l a s most o f
the Marxis t theorie s o n th e subject . However , i t i s feasibl e t o envisio n
Weber a s a theorist wh o attempte d t o debun k Marxism , bu t thi s could b e
done onl y if the following conditions are satisfied : (a ) I t is maintained tha t
Marx's sociolog y of religion is exhaustive, in which case amending it would
be to challeng e it s comprehensiveness; (b) A n attitud e i s adopted whereb y
one deductivel y attributes, an d the n reduces , all ideas t o th e constellatio n
of interests , i n whic h case th e possibilit y of othe r mode s o f mutua l influ ence an d determinatio n i s excluded a priori.
2. Thi s assertion , however , i s followe d b y a n explanator y not e tha t
sheds som e ligh t o n the relationship s between magic an d prophecy , Weber
was a t pain s t o emphasiz e tha t prophet s (especiall y emissar y prophets )
rejected th e magica l practice s i n favor o f a complete rationalization o f th e
religious sphere . Th e questio n migh t arise : Ho w ca n ther e b e s o muc h
hostility betwee n magician s an d prophet s i f on e i s th e precurso r o f th e
other? O f course , th e contras t i s no t s o drasti c because , despit e thei r
rejection o f magic , th e prophet s sough t t o legitimiz e themselve s t o th e
masses throug h subtl e claim s t o magica l charisma . "Wit h them , however ,
this has merel y been a means o f securing recognitio n an d follower s for th e
exemplary significance, the mission, or the savior quality o f their personali ties" (Weber, Rejections, p . 327) .
3. Thes e term s hav e bee n define d i n Chapte r 1 .
4. I t woul d be wrong t o conclude that thi s discussio n i s an endorsemen t
of Mannheim's concep t o f "free floating intellectuals." Mannheim takes th e
"possibility" o f transcendin g clas s interest s fro m Webe r bu t transform s i t
into a n exclusive privilege of the educated classes . O f course, th e apparen t
naivete o f hi s theor y i s no t th e resul t o f a n "error " explicabl e i n th e
framework o f th e "autonomous " sphere o f academi c contemplation . I t i s
the direc t effec t o f Mannheim' s ideologica l zea l t o whic h I hav e alread y
alluded.
5. I d o no t wis h t o ente r th e discussio n o f rationality i n thi s book , a s
Stephen Kalberg , Donal d Levin , an d Mahmou d Sadr i see m t o hav e dis cussed th e matte r sufficiently . Se e the bibliograph y fo r th e relevan t works
of thes e authors .
6. Al l these assertions res t o n Weber' s basi c ontologica l assumption s t o
which w e shall return .
7. Thi s poin t belong s i n thi s sectio n onl y i f w e concu r tha t neithe r
skepticism nor passionat e denia l of religion bu t onl y a categorical indiffer ence towar d i t ca n b e considere d entirel y irreligious.

Notes 15

8. I t would , however, be one-sided t o conside r thi s statement i n isolatio n

from Weber' s theor y o f idea s an d interest s becaus e hi s theor y i s a s incon ducive t o materialisti c determinis m a s i t i s to an y for m o f emanationism .
"Intellectualism," Weber argued, "is only one sourc e o f religious ideas. " Le t
us no t forge t tha t fo r Webe r such intellectualism itsel f presuppose s a se t of
material conditions , namel y "leisure." H e note d tha t "n o ne w religion " ha s
ever resulted fro m shee r contemplative religious search b y intellectual circles
"or fro m thei r chatter " (Weber, Economy I , p. 517 ; India, p . 236).
Chapter 3
1. Se e th e vertica l differentiatio n i n th e cros s tabulatio n propose d i n
Chapter 4 .
2. Hanna h Arend t describe s th e predispositio n o f intellectual s wh o
gravitated t o fascis m in the following passage : "They read no t Darwi n bu t
the Marqui s de Sade. I f they believed at all in universal laws, they certainly
did not particularl y car e to conform to them" (Arendt, 1968 , p, 28) . Lesze k
Kolakowski attempted t o explai n th e popularity o f radical antirationalis m
among moder n intellectual s i n term s o f thei r collectiv e psychology : "W e
may explai n conversion s o f thi s type , i n psychoanalyti c terms , a s a ven geance o f i d upo n th e excessivel y developed eg o or , i n socia l terms , a s a
result o f the alienatio n tha t almos t ever y intellectual experience s an d tha t
forces hi m t o loo k fo r communit y othe r tha n th e elitis t Republique de s
Lettres, giving him the sense of confidence, spiritual security, and authorit y
that i s lacking i n intellectua l work " (Kolakowski , 1972 , p. 11) .
3. Th e similarit y between this concept an d tha t foun d amon g th e Israe lites i s mostl y apparent . Indeed , th e absenc e o f powerfu l king s an d thei r
state bureaucrac y i n ancien t Israe l migh t hav e preclude d th e notion s o f
charity an d th e curs e o f th e poor . Bu t luckil y for th e poor , th e Israelite s
shared the idea of collective punishment. If the cries of the poor wer e heard
by Yahweh , the divin e wrat h woul d envelo p no t onl y th e princ e an d hi s
functionaries bu t als o th e whol e nation .
4. Th e usag e o f this ter m i s due t o Professo r Arthu r Vidich .
Chapter 4
1. Th e word "intellectual" date s bac k t o the Dreyfu s affai r i n France. I t
was firs t use d derisivel y bu t the n embrace d b y th e defender s o f Dreyfus ,
including Zol a an d Durkheim . Thi s wor d has retained th e connotations o f
a high-minded an d somewhat oppositiona l attitud e tha t were implied i n its

152 NOTE

original usage . Th e wor d "intelligentsia, " it s Roma n wor d cel l notwith standing, i s o f Russia n o r possibl y Polis h coinage . I t referre d t o th e vas t
numbers o f th e educate d clas s tha t graduall y appeare d t o distanc e them selves fro m bot h th e stat e bureaucracie s an d th e nobility . Ou r usage i s
meant t o captur e som e o f th e origina l flavo r o f oppositio n an d high mindedness i n th e cas e o f "intellectuals " an d th e emphasi s o n th e vas t
numbers an d th e importanc e o f educatio n i n th e cas e o f "intelligentsia. "
2. Fo r a discussio n o f thi s topi c see Appendix D .

Appendix A
1. Namel y th e post-Kantia n Germa n intuitionists .
2. A s particular beings , we are "interested" in "our" past . I t i s a uniqu e
history tha t w e see k t o mak e sens e ou t of . Fo r occidental s o f th e lat e
twentieth century , it is interesting to stud y the Frenc h Revolutio n an d th e
two world wars (even when we study revolution or war in general), whereas ,
except i n certai n cases , we would no t b e interested in a particula r natura l
object o r process. Fo r instance, we might study the general laws that gover n
the branchin g o f th e bough s o f a certai n specie s o f tree , bu t w e woul d
scarcely b e interested in the histor y behind th e branchin g ou t o f a particu lar tree and the extent to which accidental happenings hav e interfered with
the genera l la w establishe d fo r th e species .
Our interes t in our presen t is also directed b y our situatio n a s particular
beings. Th e questio n o f theodicy only amon g th e intellectuals , and onl y in
their intellectualizin g moments, pertain s t o th e meanin g o f th e universe .
Among th e masse s an d othe r socia l strat a an d classes , however , the prob lem o f evi l ha s alway s been relevan t onl y insofa r a s th e fat e o f particula r
individuals o r group s o f peopl e ar e concerned .
The rootednes s o f this i n the huma n conditio n i s made obviou s b y E . E .
Evans Pritchard wh o notes that witchcraft performs a similar function in the
life o f th e Azande . Withou t neglectin g th e immediat e cause s o f deat h o r
misfortune, th e Azand e ten d t o "explain " it b y witchcraft. "In speakin g t o
Azande abou t witchcraf t an d i n observin g their reaction s t o situation s o f
misfortune i t wa s obvious tha t the y di d no t attemp t t o accoun t fo r th e
existence o f phenomena , o r eve n th e actio n o f phenomena , b y mystica l
causation alone . Wha t the y explaine d b y witchcraf t wer e th e particula r
conditions i n a chai n o f causatio n whic h relate d a n individua l t o natura l
happenings in such a way that he sustained injury" (Pritchard, 1980 , p. 21).
Witchcraft fo r the Azande provides the missing link between the two apparently unrelated chain s o f causation tha t acte d independentl y and coincide d
in such a way that brough t misfortun e upon a particular individual. "Witch-

Notes 15

craft explain s wh y event s ar e harmfu l t o ma n an d no t ho w the y happen .

Azande perceive s how the y happen just a s we do" (Pritchard , 1980 , p . 24) .
Appendix B
1. O f course , knowin g that Webe r oppose d thi s positio n i n numerou s
passages o f his methodological essays, Oakes qualifies this statement b y the
phrase: "There is a sense in which," and a footnote where he quotes Webe r
to th e effec t tha t thi s reproductio n doe s no t requir e an y unanalyzabl e
sympathetic feelin g o n behal f o f th e observer . No r doe s i t involv e a n
"immediate" reproductio n o f the experienc e o f the "native. " But thi s stil l
leaves us in the dark. W e still do not kno w in "what sense" (and where ) does
Weber sugges t tha t a n idea l typ e mus t coincid e wit h th e "actua l existin g
meaning" i n the min d o f the "native. "
2. "Ther e is a difference i n kind betwee n the type of naive understanding
of othe r peopl e w e exercise in everyda y life an d th e typ e o f understandin g
we us e i n th e socia l sciences . I t i s our tas k t o fin d wha t distinguishe s tw o
sets of categories from each other: (1) those categories i n terms of which the
man i n the natura l standpoin t understand s th e socia l worl d an d which , in
fact, ar e given to the social sciences as material with which to begin, an d (2)
those categorie s whic h th e socia l science s themselve s us e t o classif y thi s
already performe d material" (Schutz , 1967 , p. 140) .
3. "Th e postulate , therefore , that I can observe the subjective experience
of anothe r perso n precisel y as he does i s absurd. Fo r i t presupposes that I
myself hav e live d throug h al l th e consciou s state s an d intentiona l Act s
wherein thi s experienc e ha s bee n constituted " (Schutz , 1967 , p. 99) .
4. "I t migh t see m that thes e conclusions woul d lead t o th e denia l of the
possibility of an interpretive sociology and even more to the denial that on e
can eve r understand anothe r person' s experience . But thi s i s by n o mean s
the case . W e are assertin g neithe r tha t you r live d experience s remai n i n
principle inaccessibl e t o m e nor tha t the y ar e meaningles s t o me . Rather ,
the point is that th e meaning I give to your experiences cannot b e precisely
the sam e a s the meanin g yo u giv e t o the m whe n yo u procee d t o interpre t
them" (Schutz, 1967 , p. 99) .
5. What , then , i s the specifi c attitud e o f social scienc e t o it s object , th e
social world ? Fundamentally , i t i s the sam e a s th e attitud e o f the indirec t
social observe r toward hi s contemporaries (Schutz , 1967 , p . 99).
6. "Thi s very 'possibility o f being questioned ' (Befragbarkeii) i s a specifi c
characteristic o f the object of direct social observation" (Schutz , 1967 , p. 156) .
7. "Her e ther e i s n o distinctio n betwee n th e meaning-contex t o f th e
observer and tha t o f the actor . The reason is simple: if there is a real perso n

154 NOTE

corresponding t o th e observer' s postulate d idea l type , the n h e wil l b y

definition inten d wha t th e observe r ha s i n mind . Howeveran d thi s is the
basic postulat e o f socia l science the motive s ascribe d t o th e idea l typ e
must b e bot h causall y adequat e an d adequat e o n th e leve l o f meaning "
(Schutz, 1967 , p . 229) .
8. N o matte r ho w man y peopl e ar e subsume d unde r th e idea l type , i t
corresponds t o n o on e in particular . I t i s just thi s fact tha t justified Weber
in callin g i t "ideal."

Appendix D
1. Th e socialis t ideologie s o f intellectual s hav e rarel y enunciate d thei r
legitimizing claim s wit h simila r clarity . Th e exceptio n t o thi s rul e i s Lu kacs's declaratio n tha t
the blin d powe r o f the force s a t wor k wil l onl y advanc e "automatically "
to thei r goa l o f self-annihilation as long a s that goa l i s not withi n reac h
. . . the blind forces really will hurtle blindly towards the abyss, and only
the consciou s wil l o f th e proletaria t wil l b e abl e t o sav e mankin d fro m
impending catastrophe . (Lukacs , 1971 , p. 70 )

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Inde:

Adaptedness, 2 7
Adequacy, subjective . Se e
Meaning adequac y
Adequacy, causal . Se e Causation ,
adequate
Archimedes, poin t of , 56 , 57 , 10 8
Ashuka, King , 26 , 86
Automaticity o f social evolution ,
78, 112 , 136-38
Babylon, 19 , 47, 55 , 107-8
Bahgavad Gita , 99
Bakunin, Michael , 79 , 86 , 112 ,
122, 13 8
Bolshevik, 35 , 79
Brahman, 46 , 63 , 67
Bodhisattva, 5 4
Buddhism
egalitarianism of , 49 , 55
intellectualism of , 46 , 55 , 60 , 63 ,
123-24
mendicant order , 46 , 52-53, 55
Mahayana, 64 , 13 3
religion fo r th e masses , 47
religion o f masses , 46 , 6 6
spread t o Asia , 25 , 26
transformations of , 6 4
Zen, 64 , 13 4
Byzantine Empire , 48

Catholic church , 38 , 62
Causation
adequate, 24 , 26 , 53 , 83 S 130,
132, 14 9 n 1
chance, 14 9 n 1
historical, 23-24 , 26
Christianity; anti-intellectualis m
of, 61 , 6 2
carriers of , 52 , 53 , 57
opposition t o mas s religiosity ,
62
political ethics of , 95-96
Competition i n social action , 30-31
Comte, Auguste , 72 , 79 , 112 , 13 5
Conflict, sociolog y of . Se e Socia l
conflict
of valu e spheres , 82 , 83, 93 , 95,
98, 10 2
Confucianism, bureaucrati c
morality of , 10 0
religion o f civi c strata , 5 5
religion o f intellectuals , 6 4
state cult , 46-47 , 52 , 55, 62
theory o f education, 8 6
Counterfactual trends , 24 , 108
Cross-cultural theory , 106- 8
Demagification, 54 , 65
Determination, reverse , 23 , 53

163

164

INDEX

Determinism
economic, 56
ideal, 2 4
materialist, 24 , 66 , 124
psychological, 6 6
Dharma, 51
Differential advantages , 3 1
Dionysos, worshi p of , 53 , 54
Disenchantment, 6 6
Dualism, doctrin e of , 68
Egypt, cultura l influence s of , 19 ,
55, 87 , 91-92, 107- 8
Elective affinity , 52 , 58 , 61 , 64 , 87 ,
101, 103 , 11 2
Ethical rationalists , cosmic , 23 , 95,
103
Ethical rationality , 98 ; see also
Substantive rationalit y
Ethics o f responsibility , 29 , 98 ,
100-103
Ethics o f ultimat e ends , 29 , 44, 98,
100, 101 , 12 3
Evolution, 27 , 39 , 78 , 7 9
Fellahin, 91, 11 9
Feuerbach, Ludwig , 40 , 46
Filial piety , 47, 64
False consciousness , 8 , 13 1
Greece, 5 3
Hellenism, 46
Henotheism, 5 0
Hinduism
and magic , 5 2
religion fo r th e masses , 47 , 48
religion o f the masses , 4 6
sacrifice o f th e intellec t in , 6 3
spread i n India , 19 , 48
Historical accidents , 23 , 25 , 26 ; see
also Causation , chance

Historical causation , 5 , 22, 26

Historical interest , 22 , 23 , 26
Historical materialism , 22 , 37 , 38,
39, 42; see also Determinism ,
materialist
Ideal type s
construction of , 11 , 2 2
falseness, 15 , 1 6
fictitiousness, 14-1 5
heuristic, 11 , 14 , 20
historical, 13-20 , 14 5 n 1
rational, 11 , 12-2 1
self-evidence of , 13 , 83, 8 8
subjective adequac y of , 16 , 17,
18, 8 3
teleological, 12 , 21, 14 4 n 1 145 n 1
verification of , 13 , 19-20 , 129 32
Individual, religiou s need s of , 44
Individualism
epistemological, 3
methodological, 2 2
occidental individuality , 73 , 88,
97
romantic, 3
Indra, 43 , 50
Infrastructure, 37 , 38
Interpretive sociology , 7 , 11 , 1 6
Intuitionism, 22 , 125 , 15 2 n 5
"Iron cage, " 91, 11 8
Islam, 47 , 52 , 53 , 123 , 133-3 4
Israel, 47 , 54 , 55
Jacobism, 9 3
Jainism, 38 , 46, 47, 48 , 93
Judaism
anti-intellectualism of , 61 , 6 2
autonomy fo r economi c an d
social factors , 6 2
carrier of , 5 2

Index 16
intellectuality of , 6 1 Mitra
plebeian character , 55 , 56 Monolatry
Karma, 6 8 Neo-kantians
Kismet, 13 4 14
Krishna, 54 , 99 Nirvana,
Kshatriya, 38 , 47, 5 1 Nominalism
Legitimation, 9 4 Objectiv
Lenin, V . I. , 35 , 36 , 40, 48 , 59 , 79 , 53
112, 120 , 13 7 "Orientosis,
Li (Confucianism) , 5 0 Osiris
Liberalism, 79 , 86 , 88 , 89-90, 92,
93, 9 4 Patrimonia
Literati, 47 , 55 , 62, 86 , 90 Persia
Lukacs, George , 36 , 74, 112 , Pharisai
149 n 1 , 15 4 n 5 Plato
Luxemburg, Rosa , 35 , 112 , 120 , 13
136, 13 7 Platoni

5
, 43 , 13 3
, 50
, 88 , 139 , 14 5 n 1 ,
6n1
45 , 55 , 64
, 5-6
e possibility, 23 , 26, 47,
, 69 , 73 , 91 , 92 , 14 9 n 1
" 74, 9 1
, 54

l bureaucracy , 39 , 85
, 47 , 65 , 107 , 121
c religiosity , 53
, 72 , 74 , 76 , 77 , 113 , 122 ,
6
c complex , 34 , 74
Polytheism
Machajski, Waclaw , 72 , 122 , 13 7 religious
, 66 , 103 , 133
Magic socia
l an d ontological , 29 , 50,
interests o f the priesthoo d in , 66
, 81, 88 , 98, 10 3
55 Powe
r politics , 95 . Se e also
rationalization of , 22 , 42, 45 , 52 , Realpolitik
63 Predestination
, 49 , 68
Mannheim, Karl , 34 , 72, 76 , 117 , Progress
,28
150 n 2 Proletariat
, 36 , 42 , 56 , 136 , 190
Marathon, Battl e of , 4 7 "Proletariod,
" 57
Marx, Karl , 33-37 , 40-43, 89 , 97, Prophec
y o f doom, 38 , 91, 93
150 n 1 Prophec
y o f good fortune , 38 , 62
Meaning Protestantism
,53
actual existing , 6-9 , 129 , 130 , Providenc
e vs . fate, 49-5 5
131 Purita
n ethos , 51
adequacy, 16 , 83
average, 8 Quran
, 13 4
subjective, 126 , 130 , 13 2
Methodenstreit, 3 Rationalis
m
Mesopotamia, cultura l influence s economic
, 53 , 87
of, 39 , 73 , 83 , 85 , 9 1 optimistic
, 55
Mill, John Stuart , 76 , 79, 91, 92, pragmatic
, 84
93, 9 5 religious
, 63

166
Rationality, cognate s o f
irrationality, 33 , 53 , 59 , 60, 67,
68, 78 , 102 , 13 5
overrationalize, 8 2
rationalism, 63 , 65-84
rationalizing, 2 6
underrationalize, 67 , 82
unrationalizable, 29 , 66 , 10 3
Rationality, type s of
ethical, 53 , 54 , 55 , 57 , 98
formal, 60,96 , 107 , 115
instrumental, 54 , 10 1
practical, 29 , 59 , 68 , 73 , 96 ,
98
substantive, 5 9
theoretical, 59 , 60 , 61 , 63 , 71 ,
72, 81 , 109 ; see also
Rationalization
Rationalization
essence o f intellectuals , 7 1
ethical, 14 , 42, 44 , 55 , 57 , 65 ,
98
of ideas , 109 , 11 8
intellectual, 6 1
of magic , 60 , 63 , 64 ; see also
Magic
paradox of , 65-68
substantive, 64 , 68, 71, 72, 81,
107, 13 5
theoretical, 38 , 61; see also
Rationality
Realpolitik, 10 1
Reductionism, 3 6
Reflexivity, 34 , 3 6
Reification
of idea l types , 1 1
of reason , 67 , 11 5
Reinterpretation o f ideas, 39 , 41,
65, 67 , 73 , 10 9
Religious needs , 41, 42, 46
Rickert, 139 , 14 4 n 1 , 14 7 n 1

INDEX

Rita (Hinduism) , 50
Roman Empire , 5 3
Sacrifice o f the intellect , 60 , 63,
72, 11 8
Schutz, Alfred , 131 , 132 , 14 4 n 1 ,
146 n 1
Shivaism, 46, 63
Social conflict (conflic t sociology) ,
26, 30 , 3 1
Social Darwinism , 26 , 27, 28 , 79
Social determinatio n o f
consciousness, 35 ; see also
Determinism
Social relationships , 10 , 31
Social selection , 5 , 26 , 30 , 31 , 10 0
Socialism, 73-74 , 78 , 84, 87-88,
91,93
Sociology o f knowledge , 16 , 33,
34, 36 , 37 , 52 , 53 , 58 , 7 0
Strauss, Leo , 77 , 14 6 n 1
Summer, Willia m Graham , 112 ,
136, 13 7
Tantrism, 46 , 6 3
Taoism
religion o f intellectuals , 6 4
religion o f th e masses , 46 ,
64
theory o f education , 8 6
Telic, 136 , 137 , 138
Theodicy, 31 , 44, 45 , 55 , 65 , 68,
82, 15 2 n 5
"Unintended consequences, " 31 ,
65, 101 , 10 2
Usury, 3 8
Value judgment, 2 8
Value neutrality , 2 8

Index 16
Value relevan t interests, 18 , 54 , 22, Ward
106, 108 , 14 6 n 1 , 14 8 n 1 13
Varuna, 43, 5 0 Welfar
Verstehen ,7 , 125 , 131 , 14 5 n 1
Vishnuism, 63 Yahweh

7
, Leste r Frank , 72 , 79, 112 ,
6
e state , 39 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 138
, 43 , 61 , 151