THE

SANKHYA KARIKA,
OR

MEMORIAL VERSES ON THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

BY

,
ISWARA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT
BY

HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.

ALSO

THE BH.A.SHYA OR COMMENTARY OF

,

GAURAPADA;
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A. F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, AND OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF PARIS
AND CALCUTTA, &C. &c.;

AND BODEN PROFESSOR OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

OXFORD,
PRINTED FOR THE ORIENTAL 'fRANSLATION FUND OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND,
BY S. COLLINGWOOD, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY.

PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY A. J. VALPY, A. M., LONDON.

1837.

,{

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TO

SIR GRAVES CHAMNEY HAUGHTON, M.A. F.R.S.

AS TO ONE
WHO WAS THE FRIEND AND ADMIRER
OF THE LATE

HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE;

WHO IS QUALIFIED,
BY HIS CONVERSANCY WITH THE SANSCRIT LANGUAGE
AND METAPHYSICAL INQUIRIES,
TO APPRECIATE THE CORRECTNESS WITH WHICH
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS
IS REPRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES;
AND
WHO HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN UNITED WITH THEIR AUTHOR
IN STUDIES, SENTIMENTS, AND FRIENDSHIP;
THE PRESENT WORK IS INSCRIBED,
AS A PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF ESTEEM AND REGARD,
BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON.

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PREFACE .

ONE of the works earliest announced for publication by the Oriental

Translation' Fund Committee was the Sdnkhya Kdrikd, a text book
of that system of Hindu philosophy to which the term Sdnkhya is
applied, and which had been translated from Sanscrit into English
by that eminent Sanscrit scholar the late Henry Thomas Colebrooke.
The accession of the lingering illness which finally terminated in his
decease prevented Mr. Colebrooke from conducting his work through
the press, and from adding to the translation those explanations and
illustrations which the text required, and which he was most competent to supply. Upon my return to England from India, therefore,
in the beginning of 1888, I found that no progress had been made
in the publication, and that the Translation of the text alone was in
the possession of the Committee.
Being desirous of redeeming the pledge which they had publicly
given, and of accomplishing the purpose which they had announced,
the Committee thought it desirable that the Translation, in its then
existing form, should be printed; and conceived that, as its extent was
insufficient to constitute a separate work, it would be advisable to print
it in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society. With this view
the manuscript was placed in my hands, that I should render such
assistance as I might he able to afford in the correction of the press.
Conceiving that the appearance of the Translation in the pages
of the Transactions would be equally incompatible with the views of
the Translator and the original intention of the Committee, I ventured to recommend that their purpose should be adhered to, and
b

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vi

PREFACE.

that the Translation should be printed, as at first designed, as a

separate work; offering at the same time to supply such annotations
as the text might seem to require, to be rendered sufficiently intelligible and explicit. The Committee approved of the suggestion, and
Mr. Colebrooke's concurrence was readily obtained.
In the meantime, in the interval that had elapsed since the work
was announced, other translations of the Sdnkkya Kdrikd had appeared. The Sanscrit text, and a version of it in Latin by Professor
Lassen, had been printed at Bonn; and the text in Roman characters, with a French translation, had been published at Paris by
Mons. Pauthiert. Many of the verses of the translation had been
also embodied in Mr. Colebrooke's general view of the sankhya philosophy; and it appeared to me expedient, therefore, to make some
such addition to the work as should give it at least more novelty
than it was otherwise likely to possess. It seemed also to be a
favourable occasion for offering to Sanscrit students an exemplification of the mode in which philosophical works are illustrated by
native commentators; and I accordingly procured the consent of the
Translation Committee to print, not only the text and translation of
the Sdnkkya Kdrikd, but the text and a translation of the oldest,
and perhaps the best, commentary upon the Kdrikd, the Bkdskya of
GAURAPADA.
In order likewise to fulfil the object of attempting to
render the doctrines of both text and comment as clear and explicit
as it was in my power to represent them, I further added to the
translation of the Bkdskya a comment of my own, deriving my elucidations however, to a very great extent, from the works of native
scholiasts, and giving the original passages at the foot of the page.
The scholia which have been used for this purpose are the
Gymnosophista: si~e Indice Philosophire documenta. Vol. I. Iswara Crishnre Sankhya-Caricam tenens. Bonnre ad Rhenum, 1882.
t Euais sur la Philosophie des Hindous, traduits de l'Anglais, et augmentes de textes
Sanskrits, &c.; par G. Pauthier. Paris, 188ft

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PREFACE.

Vll

Sankkya Tatwa Kaumudl of VlCHESPATI MISRA, and the Sankkya

Chandrikd of NARAYANA TiRTHA. The Sankkya Kaumudl of RiMA
KRISHNA has been also consulted, but it is almost word for word the
same as the S. Chandrika, and is therefore in most instances superfluous. I have occasionally referred to the Sdnkkya Sara, a separate
tract on the doctrines of this school by VIJNANA BHIKSHU; but another work by the same scholiast, the Sdnkkya Pravachana Bhdskya,
a commentary on the Sutras or aphorisms of KAPILA, the first teacher
of the Sankhya, according to tradition, has been of particular service,
and will be found often cited. Copies of these different commentaries, as well as of the text, exist in the library of the East India
Company, and the Sdnkkya Pravachana Bkdshya was printed at
Serampore in 1821. I have, however, followed a manuscript copy,
as I did not obtain a copy of the printed work until my translation
was finished.
There was little need of the labour of collation, after the very
accurate text of Professor Lassen. I have not failed, however, to
compare the reading of the different copies, and have noticed a few
of the variations: none of them are of any great importance. Where
collation was most wanted, it was unfortunately not practicable,
there being but a single copy of the Bhdskya of GAURAPADA in my
possession. The manuscript was luckily tolerably correct, but it
was doubtful in some places, and clearly faulty in others; and I may
not have always succeeded in rightly correcting, or in accurately
interpreting it. With regard to typographical errors in the present
edition of text and comment, I trust they will not be found very
inexcusable, especially when it is known that the work was for the
greater part necessarily carried on at a distance from me, during my
absence in London, and that it is the first publication in Sanscrit
printed at the Press of the University of Oxford.
Not having made the Sankhya philosophy a subject of study in
India, I have executed my task without the advantage of previous

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viii

PREFACE.

preparation. The subject indeed is but little cultivated by the Pandits, and during the whole of my intercourse with learned natives
I met with but one Brahman who professed to be acquainted with
the writings of this school. Opportunity was wanting to benefit by
his instructions, and I cannot therefore venture to claim exemption
from those liabilities to error to which the unassisted study of Sanscrit literature in Europe is exposed, especially when directed to
topics sufficiently obscure and difficult in themselves, and rendered
still more so by the sententious and elliptical style in which they
are treated. It is the fashion with some of the most distinguished.
Sanscrit scholars on the continent to speak slightingly of native
scholiasts and Pandits, but this is the consequence of measuring
their merits by a wrong scale, and censuring them for venial inaccuracies which often proceed. from too entire a familiarity with their
subject. In all studies which native scholars professedly pursue, they
have the advantage of traditional tuition, of a course of instruction,
coming down, through successive generations, from the founder of a
system, or the author of a book, to the individual who explains the
one or illustrates the other, and from whose interpretation we may
therefore reasonably expect to learn what it was originally meant to
teach. There are also in all philosophical works, especially, brief
hints and conventional allusions, which without such aid it is not
possible to decipher, and for the proper understanding of which a
native explanation is indispensable. Without therefore in the least
degree undervaluing European industry and ability, I cannot consent
to hold in less esteem the attainments of my former masters and
friends, the Sanscrit learning of learned Brahmans.
The translations to which I have above referred. are highly creditable to the translators. That of Professor Lassen in particular is of
great merit and accuracy, and is illustrated by annotations, in which
he has successfully cleared up many of the obscurities of the original
text. I have taken the plan of his notes as in some degree the

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PREFACE.

IX

model of my comment;. and although I do not always concur in his

interpretations or. explanations, I have found them always entitled
to attention and respect. In one or two instances, and especially in
regard to the first stanza, where I have most widely differed from
him, I. have sought rather to vindicate the accuracy of Mr. Colebrooke, than to impugn that of Professor Lassen. Variety of interpretation in such a case as that' of a difficult work, on an abstruse
subject, is no more than may be expected from different interpreters;
and occasional misapprehension implies no want of either competency or care.
In the course of my attempts to eiucidate the text, I have in a
few instances pointed out what seemed to me to offer remarkable
coincidences with the doctrines of classical philosophers. That an
intimate connection exists between the metaphysical systems of the
Hindus and those of the Greeks is generally admitted, although its
extent has not yei been fully made out. Weare scarcely yet indeed in
possession of the means of instituting an accurate comparison, as the
text books of the Hindus have not been printed or translated, and
general dissertations, however comprehensive or profound, are insufficient for the purpose: The present publication will go some way,
perhaps, towards supplying the d~ficiency, and may afford, as far as
it extends, authentic materials for the use of those better qualified
classical scholars who may be curious to ascertain in what degree the
speculations of Plato and Aristotle correspond with those of Kapila
and Gautama, or how far the teachers of one school may have been
indebted to those of another. That the Hindus derived any of their
philosophical ideas from the Greeks seems very improbable; and if
there is any borrowing in the case, the latter were most probably
indebted to the former. It has been objected to this conjecture,
that the total want of chronolog)~ in Hindu writings renders it impossible to pronounce upon their date, and that it is probable that
many works regarded as ancient are really very modern, as they may
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PREFACE.

have been composed long after the rera of Christianity; the notions
which they inculcate being in fact acquired from the Greeks of
Alexandria, through the intercourse between India and Egypt. That
this intercourse may have exercised a mutual influence upon some
parts of the philosophy of both countries in the first ages of Christianity-that resemblances, respectively interchanged, may be detected in the notions of the new Platonists or Platonic Christians
and of the more modern Vedantis, or in the eclectic pantheism of
the Pauraniks-is not impossible; but the Greek philosophy of that
period can scarcely have suggested the severer abstractions of the
sankhya, and we must go back to a remoter age for the origin..of the
dogmas of KAPILA. In truth, the more remote the period, the closer
the affinity that seems to prevail; and as far as we are acquainted
with the tenets of the Ionic and Italic schools, it is with them that
Hindu philosophy, unalloyed with pantheism, seems to claim kindred, rather than with the mysticism of Plato, or the subtleties of
Aristotle. The metempsychosis itself is an important feature in this
similitude: for this belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular
superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it
is the foundation of all Hindu philosophy. The great object of their
philosophical research in every sy'stem, Brahmanical or Buddhist, is
the discovery of the means of putting a stop to further transmigration; the discontinuance of corporeal being; the liberation of soul
from body. That such was the leading principle of the philosophy
of Pythagoras we learn from ancient testimony, and it essentially
influences the speculations of Plato. Concurrence in this principle
involves agreement in all the most important deductions from it, and
establishes, if not a mutual interchange, at least a common origin,
for much of the oldest philosophy of the Greeks and the Hindus.
This is a subject, however, to which I can here but thus briefly
allude, and to which I would rather invite the attention of some of
the eminent scholars of whom the University of Oxford has reason

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PREFACE.

Xl

to be proud, than impair its interest by my own less competent

attempts at its elucidation.
The whole scope and leading tenets of the sankhya philosophy
have been most accurately described by the late Mr. Colebrooke, in
the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, from various original
authorities, including that now published, the Kdrikd, or rather
Kdrikds, of the sankhya system; the term designating a collection
of memorial verses, of apothegmatical stanzas, in which the chief
tenets of the school are textually and dogmatically stated. The
sankhya philosophy is so termed, as Mr. Colebrooke has mentioned,
because it observes precision of reckoning in the enumeration of its
principles, Sdnkhya being understood to signify' numeral,' agreeably
to the usual acceptation of Sankhyd, 'number;' "and hence its
analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed." The
term is also explained, however, as Mr. Colebrooke proceeds to mention, to denote the result of deliberation or judgment, such being
one sense of the word Sankhyd, from which Sdnkhya is derived.
Agreeably to the purport of the word Karikd, 'a technical or
memorial verse,' the following work consists of a series of stanzas
systematically arranged, though not always obviously connected; and
asserting principles, rather than discussing arguments. The tract
opens with an explanation of the object of this and of all philosophy,
ascertainment of the means by which the pain of corporeal existence
may be finally and absolutely remedied, and the soul freed for ever
from body: this is declared alone to be philosophy, or the knowledge
of the real nature of all that is, agreeably to the Sankhya enumeration of things. These things, in number twenty-five, are briefly
indicated with reference to their relative character, as producing or
produced; and the work then pauses to explain the means by which
they may be known, or perception, inference, and authority. Reverting then to such of the twenty-five things or principles as are
imperceptible, especially to the first material cause, and to soul,

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PREFACE.

logical' proofs of their. actual existence are. adduced, and the points
in which they agree or differ with other things, and with each other,
are described. . We have then an explanation of the three essential
qualities of things; purity or goodness; imperfection, foulness, or
passion; :and. indifference, stupidity, or darkness. The existence of
a general, imperceptible, .unseparated, universal cause,. the substance
of which all is made, the eternal matter of the Greek cosmogonies, is
then argued; and, as a consequence of its existence, that also of.a
spiritual nature, or soul, is asserted. The properties of soul are then
detailed. We have next the twenty-five Tatwas, 'categories or principles,' of the S8.nkhya philosophy severally described. These all
resolve themselves, as may be inferred from what has preceded, into
but two, matter and spirit, nature and soul; the rest are all the
progeny or products of nature, evolved spontaneously: through the
necessity of nature's providing for the two purposes of soul, fruition
and liberation. These products are, intelligence; egotism or,individuality; eleven senses, ten external and one internal, or mind; five
rudimental elements, or elements of elements; and five gross or perceptible elements, .ether, air, water, fire or light, and earth. The
description of these different categories, of their mode and objects of
acting, of their modifications, and of their effects, occupies a considerable number of Kdrikds. We have then a general account of b0dily condition of two kinds, subtile and gross; the latter perishing at
death, the fonner accompanying and investing soul through all the
migrations to which the various conditions of the intellectual faculty,
or virtue and vice, subject it. Those conditions are then detailed at
length, and in all their modifications, constituting what is called
intellectual creation, or life, consequent upon conduct, originating
with the intellect. But, to give effect to these modifications, fonn,
as well as life, is said to be necessary; and hence results personal or
bodily creation of various descriptions. Bodily existence, however,
is described as confinement and pain, from which soul is anxious to

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PREFACE.

xiii

be exempted. Nature is said to labour also for soul's liberation, and

to supply the means, in the display which it makes of its products,
until soul, fully possessed of their real character and tendency, is
represented as casting away all notions of individuality and self, and
is no more condemned to bodily incarceration. The work closes
with stating that these truths were taught originally by KAPILA
to ASURI, and by him to P ANCHASIKHA, from , whom it descended,
through repeated generations of disciples, to IswARA KRISHNA, the
author of the Kdrikds. The date of this writer is not known, but
Mr. Colebrooke considers GAURAPADA, the scholiast on the Kdrikd,
to be the same as the preceptor of the celebrated teacher SANKARA
ACHARYA, whom there is reason to place in the eighth century.
How long anterior to this the Kdrikds existed in their present form,
we have no means of knowing, but they were avowedly subsequent
to other standard compositions of the school, and evidently represent doctrines of high antiquity, doctrines exhibiting profound reflection and subtle reasoning; although, like all the efforts of human
intellect to penetrate unaided the mysteries of existence, wholly
unavailing, and too often ending, as Cicero complains, in doubt
and impiety: "Cogimur dissensione sapientum Dominum nostrum
ignorare."
Some excuse is perhaps necessary for having delayed to publish
the present work so long after the Committee of the Oriental Translation Fund had sanctioned its publication. The work, as it is now
offered to the public, was ready for press in the course of the year
following that in which it was undertaken. Being desirous, however,
of printing it at Oxford, where the University had liberally resolved
to provide its Press with two new founts of Devanagari letters, I was
under the necessity of awaiting the completion of the types. As
soon as one fount was supplied, the text was printed. It was my
wish to have employed the other and smaller fount for the citations
which accompany my Comment; but that fount being not yet cast,
d

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PREFACE.

XIV

I have thought it preferable to incur no further delay. It is scarcely

doing justice to types of the size here employed to place them in
juxtaposition with characters so much smaller as those of the English
alphabet; but looking at them by themselves, in the pages of the
text, I think they will be found to wear a more genuinely Oriental
aspect than any that have yet been fabricated in Europe.
OXFORD,

July 1, 1837.

SANKHYA KARIKA

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SANKHYA KARIKA .

I.

T HE

inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of

pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous
because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final
relief is not thereby accomplished.
BHASHYA.
Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sankhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the
ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.
I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students ;
a short easy work, resting on authority, and establishing certain results.
Three sorts of pain. -The explanation of this .J.rya stanza is as
follows:
The divine KAPILA, the son of BRAHMA indeed: as it is said, " SANA-KA,
SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third; .A.sURI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PANCHASIKHA: these seven sons of Brahm&. were termed great sages." Together with KAPILA were bom Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and
Power: for he being bom, and observing the world plunged in profound
darkness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with
compassion; and to his kinsman, the Brahman .A.sURI, he communicated
a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES; from which knowledge the
destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said; "He who knows the twenty" five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether
"he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated
" (from existence): of this there is no doubt."
The inquiry is in consequence of the embarrassment of the three sorts
B

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of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (adAyatmika) natural
and inseparable; 2. (adAibAautika) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (adAidaivika) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal ,
and mental: corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of
the wind, bile, or phlegm: mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation of elementary matter whence it originates; that
is, it is produced by any created beings, whether viviparous, oviparous,
generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short,
by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs,
fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may
be called superhuman, daivika meaning either divine or atmospheric:
in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind,
rain, thunderbolts, and the like.
Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain, to be made 1 Into tluJ mea"", of
precluding tAem. This is the inquiry. Nor is tluJ inquiry superJl'UOtU.
That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example;
the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are
obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter,
and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that
are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and
these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you
think in this manner, it is not so; for absolute, certain,jinal, permanent.
obstruction (of pain) is not (to be eWected) by obvious means. Therefore
inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention
which are absolute and final.
COMMENT.
The first verse of the Karika proposes the subject of the work, and
not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every
philosophical system studied by the Hindus; the common end of which

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is, aecertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the

metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of
pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which
finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.
The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot
be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his
nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of
philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections
flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to
their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not
conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.
Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of
his Gym'IWSopkista, containing the translation of the Karika, has given a
version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke's. He thus renders it: "E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cogno8Cend~ ration is, qua ii depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet
in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter
absentiam absoluti, et omni IEVO superstitis remedii."
In the first member of this sentence, the translation of abkig1uta by
, impetus' is i'rreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the
doctrine laid down is 'impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of
liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.' So the same word abkig1utaka
is immediately used to mean' preventing, removing,' C depellens.' Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads apag1utaka, but this is not the reading
followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in
the S. BMskya or S. Kaumudi; it is that of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and
S. CAandrika, and although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable variation. At any rate there can be no question that
the word abkig1uta may be used in the sense of ' depeUere,' and that
sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior member of the hemistich. So in the Bktisltya of GAURAPADA we have tidkibAautikasya rakakadina abkigltatak; 'The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection and

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4
the like/ It would not be possible here to render abltigluita by 'impetus:
By VACHESPATI the term abAiglulta is defined' the confinement of the
sentient faculty (explained to mean here' life'), through the impediment
opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit-.' NARAYANA interprets it
more concisely asaAya sambandluzt, 'intolerable restraint.' 'Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious
to be free.
This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza; and as Professor
Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to
examine the passage more in detail. The following are bis reasons for
the version he has made:
" Hrec posterioris versus (drisAi~ etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scboliastarum
suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V. summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam
deseruisse censear. Is enim: 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because
obvious means of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not
thereby accomplished.' Sed vereor, ne vir summus constructionem particulre eket sententiam claudentis et a negatione exceptre male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. prorem. d. 28. Ex interpret. Colebrook.
construendum esset: d,iskte sc. sati (i. e. yadyapi drisktam vidya te) sa
(jijntisa) aptirtAa na ekant-ablulvatt. Sed ut omittam, particulre eket
nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, na inopportuno versus loco
collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se babet tota
sententia et claudicat. Equidem construo: driskte sa (jijntisa) apartlui
(bAavati) eMt (tatktipi) na (aptirtkti bkavati) ekanta-abAavatll. Prorsus
similiter dicitur ntibkavat infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur ekantyatyantok

- ~:4S"'~4iji":"'(4ijqfi"1 Af"~M"ali ~""ItJ.(r~4C1,,"sfit

lffif: I t -,~uA4C1W4f: I
t ft rif (CII1i4 'ft fctlH) m (PiI"lel)
.. qlvll ~ ~~ICilill
II ft ~ (f!il"lel) .. qlvll (~) ~
("ft1nm) ~ (-.ql,ql ~) *!'I"'~ I

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5
abluIvat, non ad drisAte refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem, qure
cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam qme post cAenna sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur prreterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo
melior evadit sententia. Ad drisAte enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum
dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosoph ire finem,
liberation em absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse
attingi, licet a1io cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones a1tero hemistichii versu continentur: philosophire (id enim valet gignasa, i. e.
cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam
et omne tempus transgredientem; deinde ad enm non perveniri ea via
qure primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium
posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se
conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ilIe per negation em
enuntiat."
In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that
does not belong to it, and which is not Indian ': arguments are often
elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position
at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only
position here advanced is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected
by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can
only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity,
if it involves the obligation of being bom again.
The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the
grammatical force of the expression cAenna or cMI, 'if,' na, 'not:' the
former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to
the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is not
that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an
elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, cAel referring to what has
been said, implying, ' if you assert or believe this;' and na meeting it
with a 1Iegatur, 'it is not so:' then follows the reason or argument of
the denial. Thus in the Muktavall: 'But why should not Darkness be
c

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called a tenth tking, for it is apprehended by perception 1 If this be said,
it is not so (iti cken-na) ; for it is the consequence of the non-existence of
absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things . '
So in the Nyaya Satra V ritti: 'If by a disturbance in the assembly
there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be!
defeat; if this be urged, it is not so (iti cken-na), because there has been
no opportunity for an answer t.' Again in the Sankkya Pravackana
Blu1skya. Sutra :-' If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it
is not so, from its dependent statet.' Comment :-' But bondage may be
occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why 1 Because
in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will
be explained in the following precept II.' Also in the Vedtinta Sara
Vivriti: 'If in consequence of such texts of the Vedas as "let sacrifice
be performed as long as life endures" their performance is indispensable,
and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in
the attainment of true knowledge; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies;
then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world.
If this be asserted, it is not so (iti cMn-na), from the compatibility of
severalty with union, as in the case of articles of khayar or other wood :'
that is, where there are several obligations, that which is most essential

~ ~ ~"": 1ftl ;itwi wR ARI~(ij ~ tfff ~ wrct

t:4'"2i(IS~'uit~'qqm 4i6l41..,(+NIPII41 .""141"'''( I

t ~
~If~'il ~~'ii~Itt(ij~4 ;a"(IAf.,q'(qi ~~Afifimr q ;at(I4e(I
~I41i( I
t At-rHf"'4~ iR=2n ~ ql(';'!1{ I
II ~ ~
fnfWlitf""I'..n ~4fMfH q atn(ijQI ~q ~ .:ian alql(ft't4
fjij(~~ 4~ 41(ij4fGl' I
~ atijl(llPli atI4$ii{)c:i 41.Jq1Pl14
t:4;;'f~6qH41 AIRllPt"i rqf~fC{ttl~M f~Rllr"Rl4ai1al: AeitH ~ ~
rqFqf~tti'" atijIGi'IIPI4q<f... il"ft WW: .:iel(6I41,,,,:ti f.<i'I'"
QlfC{Fn~'" (If~(lfC{4i( 4a(tal'l"",qqt! I

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7
may be selected from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous
form used affirmatively; as,' But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after
the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the object (of philosophy), can
the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained 1 for as he is
eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence.
If this be asserted, it is true (iti cUt; satya,n.). Brahme, one essentially
with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a state of ignorance he is
not obtained; like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for),
whilst it is hanging round the neck*.' Here it would be impossible to
refer satyam to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis
being separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle api.
Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, but these
are sufficient to shew that the construction in the sense adopted by
Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.
Accordingly his version is uniformly supported sclwliastarum suffragiis. Thus in the S. Bktiskya, as we have seen, the passage is explained,
driskte sa apdrtkd cUt evam manyQse 1UJ ekdnta, &c.; 'If by reason of
there being obvious remedies, yov, tkink indeed the inquiry superfluous,
no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.' So in the
S. Tatwa Kaumudf, after stating the objection at length, the commentator
adds, nirdkaroti, na iti; '(the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so:'
kulak, 'why l' ekdntatyantatok abltdvdtt. The S. Cltandrikd is to the
same effect, or still more explicit: 'There being obvious means, the
inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained: if (this
be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it;
no, it is not 80 t. This commentator giving the very reading, dris/ttl sati,
which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's version would errone-

~"CifC4i1lr~;pf~,*IQI'4M~ A~h':tMm ~ ('4~ql~'<Q "

~ ~ r~""'AIRM~ fetfJIQI'4MI"'lc"r~" ~ ~ f;nfi IUR ...
"41 ~<:hite'tA('4 4i;q ... fC4 Cli q\\ij ICI i ret \'4fH qrua. Ii ... 11ft '(q <0" q ni ~
crfW I t f.t(IEiOFn ;WW I 1"f! I t!'I"'-~ I t ft
~ m r.lllijlQI\JIqltll \JIdlV4lre'ilIGftfn ~r(fiitl: I ~ ~,

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ously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the Ckarulrikd word for word, and consequently the commentators
are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.
With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connexion of the negative with the latter member of the
sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they
are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory,
not argumentative; and the terms following the negative particle are the
parts or circnmstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is
grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa: 'What will not be, will not be; if it
will be, it will not be otherwise -.' So in v. 8. of the Karikd: 'The nonapprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentityt.' In
neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must
be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for
denial, as is the case in our text.
These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was
scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr. Colebrooke's accuracy;
and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to
understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his
interpretation. The commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that
nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse
to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain.
In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with a translation,
it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode
of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the
correctness of the translation.
, tBut verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there
be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to avoid it; 3. if there
be no means of extirpating it. The impossibility of extirpating it is

~ ~ n.,rq ~,fCl~'5InC::tq"l I

t JiIf44'W~iqMfelif
~I
t ~ 11: ~ ""(ilfClqan f"_'~n ~ ~:~ ;rm
$I'if., ~ ~ I ftT ~ r~(,re" I f~(iR:1ri Eat",,,,,,, ef1.~ I

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twofold; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means
of alleviation: or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its removal;
or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text,
however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish
to avoid it. From the embarrassment of the tkree kinds cif pain.-A triad
of pain, three kinds: they are the tldkyatmika, 'natural;' tldkibkautika, 'extrinsic;' and t1dkidaivika, 'superhuman.' The first is of two
kinds, bodily and mental: bodily is caused by disorder of the humours,
wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds
of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies.
The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, adkibautika and
ddkidaivika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles,
and inanimate things; the second arises from the evil influence of the
planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakskas, Rakskasas, Vint1yakas,
&c.). These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes arising
from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned
by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or

'ii"4Neij~ri' ~ W\IT t ~:""EJ4r"R4MII' ns~q,auqr{"''''i'

tJ4N~u3:4("sfq ~ tJ'elrCWi4at\'41 ij'"~'iq'atM''' t ,tqlatl
Ift(\'4I e'lPJtIl' I '" ~ 'ft1'Cf1:~ ..
'Cllr!ij@,fttnr"1" I ~:
....... at'r..."'n'fcfh I ~:lRRi ..-at ~:. '11i , nNE.CII"Uriit.... 'r~

,na ..

r" .... 'N(rClq\ ~ n"'''4,rii4q\ f.fqq ...,,(\( .. 1..4 ,. I tJl(\~

CI'nRtwi4l4lj "4i4R1r.. ri1W I .. ,..4 ..,.. si\~tilC!4~.qln'i4'
<fctiQi4~ .. f.. at~ I g __ n(lftOq'ate'''4M'({'''4,ffl1q\ ':~- I 1fT
V\q'ate,gj ~':~ W\IT I ~r" .... ,AlVctq\~, n... ,~fH'
"'ii4q,!'1"qfq eO,q(ii'CI(f.. r4W , ~ atijJ(uqerq",
aa'fiQ('ii'~tJr.. at~ I . . AR4'HiI~(tft4 ~:~ l.'S{:qf((ij, ..imD

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10
confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of knowing the
impediment occasioned by' such pain, is considered the cause of the
desire to avoid it; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subsequently explained. Pain then being
generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. Tad
apagluitaW: tad refers here to the three kinds of pain, tad having the
relation dependent upon its being used as a subordinate (relative) term.
TAe means (hetu) tif,emovi1lg.-These are to be derived from philosophy,
not from any other source: this is the position (of the text). To this a
doubt is objected; A. there are obvi0U8 mea"" tke inquiry ia aupe7jl'UOU!l;
if 80-. The sense is this: Be it admitted that there are three kinds of
pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them; that escape is
practicable; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate
to their extirpation; still any investigation by those who look into the
subject is needless; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical
principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long
study, and traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore,

~ ~ ANR&4'ij I ne.::t .. ~:~~(ij',":'(ijctfi .. , AfHtMn .. ,

"'n"i'l.(r~\tR4witsfi:t\lIn: "n'ctn' AfftfM~e:;f\ ..'" f5t@,\t,t

~: I .. _A:. ~ \tf",~aift ~:. n'''fq Rf~: '"": 'tft1

qf(e,f...~cf_ii4flI1f1lT -q'.qq;j n<:'4'1'", In'PCWf.. I ~ ~:'(111

1I\'4iIq'l'n'GI(q'lln': I '$Sq\t."~I~ "Filfi1!!", ft(lq(... tl: II
n(q'l,n,. ~: 'I1"1"'4ltal ;n;q ("1''1 ..: II ' " ~ I ft m
1tT'b ~ , ....... t1: I q ~:~ f5t@I\t'1 n.n ..: ~ ';if ~
'N@I;1 \t@ni ';if .,1"'IRt '$Sql .. IGlS" n"I ...... f~"I\t1 fletctH'
","'I I le~ctlql"~ "Se(-- ''i(~ ACI ... I.. Niit I nNt"
~ NiI ...... IWiI\tq(q(i .. l\t \ti",n"ISfftSC4(NII( I 1f1IT ';if fWft
Pftl"I"'i~t4l$ Wi ~ rq<:n f",...Wi 1fi1i ~ (tEatlti\"4

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according tQ the popular saying, "Why should a man who may find
honey in the arkka flower, go for it to the mountain?" 80 what wise man
will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of
his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for bodily affections are indicated by
eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries,
unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental
distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist
in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and political science,
and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like; whilst the
employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced
by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes
it; it is Mt so. Why? From these means MI being absolute or ji7UJl.
Ekanta means the certainty of the cessation of pain; atyanta, the nonrecurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is)
the non-existence of both these properties; the affix tan, which may be
substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual ;-88
it is said; cc From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of
various kinds, in consequence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs,
women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of
certain operation (is predicated); 80 is their temporary influence, from

el{lu(t W r~'I~ at":nn.((f~i'I I

~ql;ql! 1JirIr: .,I(\<S:
4AW"I(A th"'(1 ~ ctqfc{tl: I .. 1..e+4lfq nlq+4 1fift
~,~, ~
q I.. tilst .. f~ Mq.. CiQ4 1M*1 (I f~Cf" ;qel{l 1111 ~q 1at
" ......<: I @OCi"I~fH4+4IN ':~ .nfH.,IQ4ltC1let.,Mnlf.. <
.... ;q(ilI"IQlle"lr~: Arfl'I<lO ...... <: I n'uAi\f~ ... ':~ lri\g
..... I,qai\.,: ~: Aif\'IUql;q 1f I f"(I4ilfn I ;WW I p: I
1l'lifll.... iflri1Sl1ICiIi( I @O'I'ftl ~:4f.. ,.l(Ci(aj ~: I
':
4+4f"1W+4,.. <'!rt4Ie,: , na(i(q;lifll .... iflcft<... ICiIi( I @O'liflli'4iff
it~ 1f 1fi1 f*Ci'*4"(ilI~ elifCf~fw\'(ijr~ I @OnS. ~
1I'IT M<el;q .. 'lf.. ;:ft ;:ftf'n.,I(ilIWflle ..... I\qai\ilsftf 'Hl1I iR1IT

",.n"Wl

'I"""'"

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12
observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although
available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a stop to pain are
neither absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other
means) is not superftuous." This is the purport (of the text).'
The Sdftkkya Ckanilriltti and S. Kaumudf are both to the same effect,
and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sutras of KAPlLA,
as collected in the S. PravackaM, and commented on by VJJGNYANA
BHIKSHU, confirm the view taken by the scholiasts.
S6tra :-' The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is the final
object of soul-. '
Comment :-' The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, the
total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to
come), is the final, supreme object of soul t.'
S6tra :-' The accomplishment of that cessation is not from obvious
means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression V
Comment :-' The accomplishment of the final cessation of pain is not
(to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the like. Whence is
this 1 Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth
and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are
exhausted II.'

allfil4'~~:~ f"1~(~ ..tI~~'lf~'" t f.. "t+tllf'4 ,~~fll

~~lct"INf~<6Mf.. f" I ~sQ'lf~'INP~~:~f.. "iI~ 'ft

<aqT1f 1fR ~Iql'til P:iltllftf" II

W'f f... rct~:~INlftf.. 'l
ft(N""'1~'Iltl:
t 1l:'Ii f... rct~: ~ 4IIN...,f.. "ft: (V{M~
~(1I\4I(4.~;t R:i)'IM f.. "fw: \USi'f"ri': 'q'(Ir.'1~'Iltl: ,
t ;rr
t!1'fter,,~cp(11ft~~I't I

II

cvf1f'41,qI4l1'-~'~(N""S:

~P.:t"ftmf.~lf~ I p: I ~~lr~"1 ~:~r.:.;~ qflll'~tJ~

iir:(ctI1/tfWcttl~li(

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II.
revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is
impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in
others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a
discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperTHE

ceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

BHA.sHYA.
Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvious remedies,
yet it is not to be directed to such as are derivable from revelation. as
means of removing the three kinds of pain. .A.'IIvwavati,' what man suc..
cessively hears;' a'llusravika, 'that which is thence produced, revealed
mode;' that is, established by the Vedas: as it is said; "We drank the
juice of the acid asclepias; we became immortal; we attained eftUlgence;
we know divine things. What harm can a foe indict on us1 How can
decay affect an immortal 1" (This text of the Veda refers to) a discussion
amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In
explanation it was said, " We were drinkers of soma juice, and thence
became immortal," that is, gods: further, " We ascended to, or attained.
effulgence, or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then,
assuredly, what can an enemy do to us 1 What decay can affect an immortal1" dlaurtti meaning 'decay' or 'injury:' 'What can it do to an
immortal being l'
It is also said in the Vedas, that final recompense is obtained by
animal sacrifice: "He who offers the aswamedka conquers all worlds,
overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the murder of a Brahman."
As, therefore, final and absolute consequence is prescribed in the Vedas,
inquiry (elsewhere) should be superftuous; but this is not the case.
The text says, tlae revealed mode is like tlae temporal one-drislatavat;
'like, same as the temporal,' drisla'e,,,, tul!la. What is that revealed
mode; and whence is it (ineffectual) 1 It is impure, defective in. some
E

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respects, aM excessive in otiterS. It is impure from (enjoining) animal

sacrifices; as, "according to the ritual of the astJJamedka, six hundred.
horses, minus three, are offered at midday." For though that is virtue
w~ich is enjoined by the Vedas and laws, yet, from .its miscellaneous
character, it may be affected. by impurity. It is also said; "Many thou
sands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive ages,
overcome by time; for time -is hard to overcome." Hence therefore, as
even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode-involves defective
cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior advantages of others. Here, therefore,
by excess, atisaya, is understood the unequal distribution of temporal
rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice; the object of the ritual of the
Vedas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the revealed.
mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode 1 If this
be asked, it is replied, One d!lferen.t from botla. A mode different from
both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity,
excess, or deficiency. How is thisl It is explained (in the text: It
consists in a discriminative /mowledge, &c. Here, by perceptible princi
pies, are intended Malaat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five
subtile rudiments, the elevenorgaDs (of perception and action), and the
five gross elements. The imperceptible one is PradJuina (the chief or
grea~ one). Be tlainiing soul, P"ncslaa (the incorporeal). These twenty~
five principles are intended by the (three) terms vyakta, avyakta, and
j'IUJ. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode;
and he who knows them knows the twenty.five principles (he has perfect
knowledge).
. The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and think
ing principles, is next explained.

COMMENT.
Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are
ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites
enjoined by the Vedas, are equally unavailing; and knowledge of the

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15
three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only
mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be
attained.
The V~das are ineffiQent, from. their inhumanity in prescribing the
shedding of blood: the rewards which they propose are also but temporary t as the gods themselves are finite. beings, perishing in each periodical
revolution. The immortality spoken of in the V~das is merely along
duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things -. The
Vbdas also cause, instead of curing, pain, as the blessings they promise
to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do
not possess them. Such is the sense given by GAURAPADA to atiSaya, and
the S. Tatwa Kaumuf understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the V~das themselves: 'The j!Jotishtotna and
other rites secure simply heaven; the vajaplya and others confer the
sovereignty of heaven: this is being possessed of the property of excess
(inequality) t.'
In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPILA affirms of these two
modes, the temporal and revealed, that there' is no difference between
them t,' and that ' escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter II,'
because' recurrence is nevertheless the result of that immunity which is
attainable by acts (of devotion) ,' as 'the consequences of acts are not
eternal--.' Here however a dilemma occurs, for the V~da also says, 'There
is no return (regeneration) of one ~ho has attained the sphere of Brahma
by acts (of devotion) tt.' This is explained away by a SiItra of Kapila,
which declares that the Veda limits the non-regeneration of one who has

~ f:q(4a lil~4jqMtJlIfn ~ ~He"S4 ~

..Ii'!ri" ~ It ~ '1(lcQ It
t Wlfnillil<:41: Et"lii"
~ cUsrqlll<:tt: Et(I~4(.~ ... rntjtt,"'N t
t .. fet ... """

M:

",~elG4M~

'~(11f': ,
.. ,~elc;qEll "lf~"'M t
WlriElllt:tl,ft: ,

tt '~(ijl i4111Ml

1ft: ,

II ~11il1f~'I~ in(.

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16
attained the region of Brahm' to him who, when there, acquires discri..
minative wisdom -.
This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those
principles into which all that exists is distributed by the Sank"ya philosophy. Vyakta,' that which is perceived, sensible, discrete;' .Avyakta,
, that which is unperceived, indiscrete;' and Jna, ' that which knows, or
discriminates:' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications; the
second is crude, unmodified matter; and the third is soul. The object of
the S. Karika is to define and explain these three things, the correct
knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of soul
from body.

III.
the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the
Great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production
nor productive.
BHASHYA.
NATURE,

hIula (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradMna (chief), from its being the
root of the seven principles which are productions and productive; such
nature is the root. No production.-It is not produced from another:
on that account nature (prakriti) is no product of any other thing. Seven
prin.ciples.-Malaat and the rest; from its being the great (maAat) element;
this is Intellect (Budd"i). Intellect and the rest.-The seven principles
are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3-7. The five subtile rudiments. These seven
are productions and productive: in this manner: Intellect is produced
from the c"ief one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is
productive (prakrita). Egotism, as derived from Intellect, is a produc-

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17
tion; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rud~ments, it is productive.
The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore
a production; but as causing the production of ether, it is productive.
The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of
smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production'; it gives
origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of
form is a production from Egotism; as generating light, it is productive.
The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production;
it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the Great
principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen. are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action,
with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements: these form a
class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikara being the same as
viltriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principles)
-being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many
kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of
these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and
the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is
established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a
prastil.a (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by
weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.
COMMENT.
In this stanza the three principal categories of the Sankhya system
are briefly defined, chiefly with regard to their relative characters.
Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be fourfold:
1. praleriti; 2. vikriti; 3. prakriti-vileriti; and anubil.a!la rUpa, neither praleriti nor vileriti. Prakriti, according to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which is primary, that which precedes what is
made; from pra, prm, and m, 'to make.' This, however, ,is further distinguished in the text into the mula prakriti; the prakriti which is the
root and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature; and
secondary, special, or relative prakriti, or every production that in its
F

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18
tum becomes primary to some other derived from it. By praltriti may
therefore be understood the matter of which every substance primarily or
secondarily is composed t and from which it proceeds, the primary, or, 8S
Mr. Colebrooke renders it, 'productive' principle of some secondary'substance or production. This subsequent product is termed vikriti, from the
same root,m, 'to make,'with vi, implying 'variation,' prefixed. Yiltriti does
not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into existence, but merely
a modification of a state of being, a new development or form of something previously extant-. We might therefore consider it as best rendered
by the term' development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent in
the text, or 'product.' In this way, then, the different substances of the
universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical
matter is without form. Intellect is its first form, and Intellect is the
matter of Egotism. Egotism is a form of Intellect, and the matter of
which the senses and the rudimental elements are formed: the senses
are forms of Egotism. The gross elements are forms of the rudimental
elements. We are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements
to the forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not simple
developments of a simple base. Soul comes under the fourth class; it is
neither matter nor form, production nor productive. More particular
definitions of each category subsequently occur.

IV.
inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be
threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise
every mode of demonstration. I t is from proof that belief of that
which is to be proven results.
P.ERCEPTION,

BHASHYA.
Perception;-a8, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, are the
five organs of sense; and their five objects are respectively, sound, feel t

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19.
form, flavour, and odour: the ear apprehends sound; the skin, feel; the
eye, form; the tongue, taste; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that
which is) seen (or perception). That object which is not ascertainable
either by its being pr~nt, or by inference, is to be apprehended from
rigAt cifJirmati01t; such as, INDRA, the king of the gods; the northern
Kurus; the nymphs of heaven; and the like. That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is derived from apt (or sufficient)
authority. It is also said; "They call scripture, right affirmation; right,
as free from error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood
without adequate reason. He who in his appointed office is free from
partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or worthy)." In these
three are comprised all kinds of proof. J .AlMINI describes six sorts of
proof. Which of those then are not proofs? They are, presumption
(artAapatti) , proportion (sambAava), privation (abAava), comprehension
(pratibAti), oral communication (aitiAya), and comparison (upamana).
Thus: "Presumption" is twofold, 'seen' and' heard.' 'Seen' is where in
one case the existence' of spirit is admitted, and it is presumed that it
exists in another. 'Heard;' DEVADATTA does not eat by day, and yet
grows fat: it is presumed then that he eats by night. "Proportion;" By
the term one prastAa, four kuravas are equally designated. "Privation" is
fourfold; prior, mutual, constant, and total. 'Prior;' as, DEVADATTA in
childhood, youth, &c. 'Mutual;' as, Water jar in cloth. 'Constant;' as,
The horns of an ass; the son of a barren woman; the flowers of the
sky. 'Total' privation, or destruction; as when cloth is burnt, or as from
contemplating withered grain, want of rain is ascertained. In this manner
privation is manifold. "Comprehension;" as, The part of the country
that lies between the Vindhya mountains on the north and Sabya mountains on the south, extending to the sea, is pleasant. By this sentence it
is intended to express that there are many agreeable circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of the site indicating its several
products. "Oral communication;" as, When people report there is a
fiend in the fig-tree. "Comparison;" The Gavaya is like a cow; lake
is like a sea. These are the six kinds of proof; but they are comprised

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in the three; for presumption is included in inference, and proportion,

privation, comprehension, oral communication, and comparison, are com~
hended in right affirmation. Therefore from the expressions (in the text),
tkey comprise every mode of demonstratiOft, and are admitted to be threefold
proof, it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is established.
Belief of that which is to be proven results from proof.-The things to be
proven are, Nature, Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the
eleven organs, the five gross elements, and Soul. These five and twenty
principles are classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the percipient; and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and
some by authority; which is the threefold proof.
The definition of each kind (of proof) is next given.
COMMENT.
The work pauses in its enumeration of the physical and metaphysical
principles of the system, to define its dialectical portion, or the proofs
which may be urged in support of its principles.
The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said to be supported by a text of the Vedas: 'Soul is either to be perceived, to be
learned from authority, or to be inferred from reasoning -.' It is opposed
to the tenets of the Naiyayikas and Mimtinsakm, the former of whom
describe four kinds, and the latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the
logicians are,pratyaislat, 'perception;' a1lumtinat, 'inference;' upamanall,
., comparison;' and 8abda~, ' verbal authority.' Of these, comparison and
verbal authority are included by the Sankhyas under right affirmation;
the term apta -- meaning 'fit, right,' and being applied either to the
Vedastt, or to inspired teacherstt, as subsequently explained. The
Mfmolnsakas do recognise six kinds of proof; hut GAURAPADA has either
stated them incorrectly, or refers to a system different from that now
found in the best authorities of this school. KUMARILA BHATTA alludes

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to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or V rittikara, but those six

proofs are, as Mr. Colebrooke states, perception, inference, comparison,
presumption, authority, and privation; and the author of the Stistra
dipika excludes expressly sambkava, pratiblui, and aitil&ya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted
if exact equivalents can be devised. Artluipatti is literally, 'attainment
of meaning;' conjecture or presumption, ' inference;' from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject
is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly
explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, 'seen' and 'heard.' In
the Sastra dfpika the first is exemplified by the sentence, "DEVADATTA is
alive, but not in his house; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad."
'Heard,' sruta, is referred to the Vedas, and applies to the interpretation
of precepts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer
any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted. VACHESPATI also considers artluipatti to be comprised in inference, as well as sambl&ava, 'identity' or 'proportion.' Privation, he argues, is only a modification of perception; and aitil&ya, or 'report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom
it originates being undetermined. Pratiblui he does not mention. The
concluding expressions of GAURAPADA, Pratijanvtisa sa~nanam, are of
questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The
'objects of proof,' prameya, are, according to the Sankhya, all the principles of existence. Siddl&i,' accomplishment, determination,' in the last
hemistich, is explained by prat'ti, 'trust, belief:

v.
is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference,
which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that
which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.
PERCEPTION

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BHASHYA.
Driskta ' seen,' or pratyaksha, 'perception,' is application or exertion
of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest,
to sound, &c. Inference is of three ltiw, subsequent, antecedent, analogous. Inference antecedent is that which has been previously deduced;
as, rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had
been the consequence. Subsequent; as, having found a drop of water
taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred.
Analogous; as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded
that the moon and stars are locomotive, like CHAITRA: that is, baving
seen a person named CHAITRA transfer his position from one place to
another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the
moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change
their places). So obsening one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred
that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from
analogy.
Again; premises an argument, and (deduces) that wkic" is argued by it.
That inference. Premises a prior argument; that is, the thing which
has a predicate is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known)
by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is deduced from that of which it is predicated, as, having seen a
mendicant, you
, say, this is his triple staff. Rig"t affirmati01l is true
revelati01l.-.A.pta means aclu1ryas, 'holy teachers,' as Brahma and the
rest. Sruti means' the V~das.' 'Teachers and V~das' is the import of
the compound, and that which is declared by tbem is true revelation.
In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what
objects.
COMMENT.

The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation,

are here more particularly explained.
The first is defined, 'what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an

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object of sense-. AdlayatJasaya is explained by VACHESPATI, ' Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty t. N ARA YANA
explains it, ' That by which certainty is obtained!.' The organs do not of
themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which
they are approximated to the intellect: 'neither does intellect apprehend
them (rationally), being, as derived from (pra/triti) matter, incapable of
sense; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting
them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection
actually affected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like .'
The explanation given by GAURAPADA of the three kinds of inference
is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the
same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Nyaya Sutra V ritti, in
the comment on the S';'tra of Gautama " we have the following: 'Threefold inference. Prior, that is, cause; characterized by, or having, that
(cause); as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior,
effect; characterized by it, as inference of rain from tile swelling of a
river. Analogous (or generic); characterized as distinct from both effect
and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being
earthy".' Here then we have inference a priori, or of effect from cause ;

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inference a posteriori, or of cause from effect; and inference from analogy,

or community of sensible properties; for saflulnyato driskeam is '. that
which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific properties
being unnoticed .' The S. Ckandrika gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference.
The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first
member of the second hemistich. The expressions lingat and ling;t
are analogous to' predicate and subject,' or the mark, sign, or accident
by which any thing is characterized, and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus linga is explained by logicians by
the term vyaP!la II, and lingE by vyapaka ; as in the proposition, There
is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the linga, vyaP!la, 'major
or predicate;' and fire the lingt or vyapaka, the' minor or subject,' or
thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic. Inference,
then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate
and subject; or it is knowledge of the points of an argument depend- ing on the relation between subject and predicate; that is, 'Unless it
were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the
latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former'.' This is
what the logicians term paramerska, 'observation or experience.' Apta--,
according to GAURAPADA, means aciarya; and apta srutttt implies' holy
teachers and holy writ.' NARAYANA expounds it in a similar mannerU,
and adds, that apta means iswara, or' god,' according to the theistical
Sankkya 1111. VACHESPATI explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. Apta is equivalent with him to prapta, 'obtained,' and yata,
, proper, right;' and apta sruti is' both that which is right and traditional,
holy knowledge ;' for sruti is defined to be 'knowledge of the pur-

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port of texts derived from holy writ; which knowledge is of itself proof,
as obtained from the V~das, which are not of human origin, and fit to
exempt from all fear of error -.' The first term, v4kya, is explained to
signify, 'the VMs. is the teacher of religion t;' and the expression
tJakyartia is equivalent to dkerma, 'religion or virtue.' C Religion is heard
by it; as," Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotuAioma sacrifice:"
such is a text (of scripture) to' The texts of the V~das' and of other
inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as JAIGfsBAVYA says, C By me living
repeatedly in ten different great creations 1\.' So' the VMa was remembered by KAPILA from a former state of being ~.' The Mlmauakas distinguish between apta tJakya and tJ~da tJakya: the former is human, the
latter inspired, authority.

VI.
objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the
SENSIBLE

senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.
BHAsHYA.
By infmence from analogy; of things beyond the senses-the ascertainment of existing things which transcend the senses. Nature and soul are

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not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy.
Fot as the predicates Makat and the rest have the three qualities, so
m.ust that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three
qualities; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it
must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is
perceptible is known by perception; but that which is imperceptible,
and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revela..
tion, as, INDRA, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs
of heaven: these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects,
Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this
world does not exist; therefore these two are not, any more than a second
head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes
which prevent the apprehension of existing things.
COMMENT.
In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of
the three different kinds of proof to three different objects is described :
according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to,
those which transcend the senses, and of which a knowledge is attainable
only by inference from analogy, or by revelation.
The 8. Tatwa Kaumttdt concurs with the 8. Bluiskya in ~IDderstandjng
the terms of the text, samanyato drisktat -, to refer to anumanat t, intending 'inference from analogy t.' A similar explanation occurs in the
8. Pravackana Bluiskya: 'Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected II.' It appears therefore
that in this place the text does not refer either to perception or to inference in general, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference

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'1.7
from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference a priori
or a posteriori regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of
the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the
moment perceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from Hoods or clouds, and
the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat
differently from the text, or, ' It is by reasoning from analogy that belief
in things beyond the senses is attained; and imperceptible things, not
thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.' The version
of Mr. Colebrooke, in which he is followed by Professor Lassen (" qualitatis intel1ectus est per perceptionem: rerum qure supra sensus sunt per
demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod prreter sensus est, prob.r
revelatione"), rests apparently upon the authority of the S. Ckandrika and
S. Ka'Umudl. 'Sama"'!latas has the affix tasi in the sense,Ji the sixth
(possessive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appremlble by the
senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception: therefore
knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense; but knowledge
of things beyond the senses, as nature and the rest, is from inference *.'
When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sutras; 'Oral proof is fit instruction,' and 'fit instruction is
communication of the proofs by which the nature of both praltriti and
puruska may be discriminated t.'

VII.
FROM

various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived);

excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inatten,

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~8

tion, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other

ters, and intermixture with the like.

ma~

BHASHYA.
Non-perception of things here existing may proceed from, their remoteness, as of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different
countries; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium
applied to the eyelids; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are
undiscernible by the deaf and the blind; from inattention, as a person
whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him,
however intelligibly; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost,
vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are not perceived; from interposition, as a thing hidden by a wall; from predomina7we of others, as the
planets, asterisms, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered
by those of the sun; from intermizture witk tke lilte, as a bean in a heap
of beans, a lotus amongst lotuses, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a
pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in
the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually
existing things is eightfold.
Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any means) is;
by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul prevented, and how is
it to be effected 1
COMMENT.
Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived, although
they actually exist.
The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are easily understood; the particle cha, in connexion with the last, is considered to imply
the existence of other impediments besides those enumerated, such as
non-production, as of curds from milk. But these circumstances, for

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~9

themost part, account .for the non-perception of perceptible things, and

it is still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not amongst
things ordinarily perceptible, are not perceived *.

VIII.
IT is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-e~istence of
this original principle, that it is not appreh:ended by the senses, but
inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative
principles are effects; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in
some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.
BHASHYA.
Nature is not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like the particles of
smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to be apprehended 1 Its perception is from
.its dfects. Having observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature
is the cause, of which such is the effect. Intellect, egotism, the five
subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its
effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature: C nature,' pramti;
c the chief one,' pradklena; dissimilar from it: or it may be analogous, of
similar character; as in the world a son may be like or unlike his father.
From what cause this similarity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain.
Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers, whether
intellect and other effects be or be not already in nature. According
to the Slmkhya doctrine, the effects are in nature; according to the
From subtilt!! tke non-perception of tlaat natttre.

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80
Bauddhas and others, they are not; for that which is, cannot cease to
be; and that which is not, can by no means be: this is a contradiction.
Therefore, it is saidCOMMENT.
Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty: it must be therefore inferred from its effects.
The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism, and the
rest; some of which are of a similar, and !Ome of a dissimilar character,
as subsequently explained.
Effect, according to the Sankhya system. necessarily implies cause, as
it could not exist without it*: but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by VACHESPATI: '1. Some say, that that which
is may proceed from that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a
separately existent thing, but the revolution of an existent thing. 3. Some
say, that that which is not may proceed from that which is. 4. The
ancients assert, that that which is comes from that which is (or tm8 from
as). By,the three first propositions the existence of nature would not be
proved; for,.
'1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the qualities
goodness, foulness, and darkness are, the natural properties, comprises
sound and other changes of its natural condition, and is diversified by
pl~asure, pain, and insensibility; but if that which is, is bom from that
which is not f how can that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend
pleasure, pain, fonn, sound, and the like 1 for there cannot be identity of
nature between what is and what is not.
e 2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were but revolutions of
one existent thing, yet that which is could not proceed from such a
BOurce, for the property of manifold existence cannot belong to that
which is not twofold: the notion of that which is not manifold through
its comprising manifold existence is an obvious error.

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, 3. The notion of the Kanabhaksbas, Akshacharan88, and others, that

that which is not may proceed from that which is, excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot
have community: consequently the existence of nature is not proved;
and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must
first be determined".'
Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said'to be that of some of
the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause,
or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is
that of the V ~dantis, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarttal,
literally the' revolutions'-the emanations from, or manifestations of, one
only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sankhya seems to teach
a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit,
to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti. It
differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the
radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause
which exists no longer except in its effects. The V~d{mtis, on the other
hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- -

--

'r~C{1(en: e:rstlatn 1fR I 4!~ ~ f<1c"l~ 'It4~I" t:I

~RMi'4 t ~ 1J ~sefillatn tfrr , ~: efillatn tfrr 1WT: ,
" 'l~r~;(''1RN''~ 'INr.i t:I r~G4fH ~:(qtil(~(!4", I,!;qqf(
"141iJ'(iCi 1M' ft '5fIll{. 'I("+at ~ eN ($I (ij ..I: ~ ,
~ , ... (en: efill~n ler.,!;ql@4 'I(!j ~ ~(~If~~q$!GtJ
ClIM' ~ e~ern(ijl<IifC411qq~: II .~~ eiil fqqt: ~
r~Aq,.(ij'iif'1en: efillatn tfrr t:I ~ "'I\'C4i8at+at Qq,.IM"
If'1NQq,.~ QQ"'IM'nati Qiflfft~ l!"Cf II Ttti41 ..
~
tt ... IIc!} ... i ~ l!"Cf 'I(QI~~h" ~ flti4141f'i4 e~~hn{q;ql1q
~ 'It41M' 'I(Qfl1fH t:llNI .. lltr.: II w.r. lNl ... r~Cltl ~
"1<41( e't'Iiij Qfn$ll41fl n

n.

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only its present operations. The popular form of V~dfmtism asserts,

indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that
appears to exist, are unrealities, illusions, the phantoms of a dream: but
the commentator on the SankAya PravacAana declares, that the doctrine
of maya, or 'illusion,' is modem, and is contrary to the V~das, and that
those who advocate it are nothing but disguised Bauddhas: 'The cause
of the bondage of soul asserted by those concealed Bauddhas, the modem
advocates of maya, is here refuted .' In the third case we have the
authors specified as KanabAaksAas, ' Feeders upon little,' or upon atoms,
perhaps; and A.ksAacAaranas, 'Followers of controversy;' contemptuous
terms for the Vais~sAikas, who maintain the origin of all things from
primmval atoms, or monads; and who may therefore be said to deduce
what is not-the insubstantial forms of things-from actual corpuscular
substance.
The fourth or ancient doctrine, that that which is comes from that
which is, ens from ens, 'Tel &11 from 'TO ~1I, is the converse of the celebrated
dogma of antiquity, etC niAilo, niAil fit; and although in this place it is
especially restricted to the relation of certain effects to a certain cause,
yet it comes to the same thing as regards the world in general, the things
of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing; agreeably to
the Sidra of KAPILA; 'The production of a thing cannot be from nothingt;' OtJa~1I "ttIlETa, elC 'TOO I'~ ~lITO,: not only according to Democritus
and Epicurus, but according to all the ancient philosophers, who, Ari-stotle states, agreed universally in the physical doctrine, that it was
impossible for any thing to be produced from nothing: ToJTMJI & TO 1'~11 elC
"
, 8a, aowaTOIl'
\"
, .OI'O"tIlMI'OIlOIltT'
,
~
\' ,~"a'rallTeS' 0'
1''1, OllTMII
"t'JlefT
'rep'"
"tap 'Tavr'l'
Til'
OO,"'1'
'repl

tp6tTeMS'. Phys. I. 4.

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IX.
EFFECT

subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what

exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence.

Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose: every thing
is not by every means possible: what is capable, does that to which
it is competent; and like is produced from like.
BHASHYA.
From there being no instrumental cause of what exists not-non-existent, what is not-there is no making what is not: therefore effect is. In
this world there is no making of what is not; as, the production of oil
from sand: therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its
having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which
are effects, exist in nature.
Further, from selection of materials.-Uptidtina is '(material) cause,'
from the selection of it: thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects
that by which it may be produced; as he who wishes for curds, takes
milk, not water (for their matefial cause). Thence effect is.
Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or
sand. Therefore, from the non-universality of every thing in every thing,
effect is.
Again, what is capable does tlw.t to whick it is competent; as, a potter
is the capable agent; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag.
rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is
capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is.
Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause,
in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect; as, barley is
produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist),
then rice ~ight grow from pease; but it does not, and therefore effect is.
By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other
It

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characteristics do (pre)exist in nature; and therefore production is of
that which is, and not of that which is not.
COMMENT.
Arguments are here adduced to shew that the effects or products of
nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source; consequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or
source.
It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all
cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation; satItaryyam. in the text meaning' existent effect prior to the exercise of
(efficient) cause t;' or,. as the phrase also of the text asadaltarandt t is
explained, 'If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not
exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected II.' The expression
sat-lta1'!/yam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning' existent effect,' not the effect of that which exists: and the object of the
stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of
effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it :
" Qurenam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia effecta esse a 'rep ~II'T,." Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Sank"ya
Karika, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the
verse; "Ce qui n'existe pas ne peut arriver a l'etat d'effet;" but he has
mistaken the particulars-the reasons why that which is not can never
be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production:
it is not that such existence cannot be effected "par la co-operation
d'aucune cause materielle," &c., but because an effect requires an adequate
material cause, and the like.

t eMilill ~ Q;1(!]6IUQI(IP(fHi)iII: ,
II '$te.", Q;1(!]&4lql(li(

"li ~ ~ q

t~

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85
Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its
translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M. Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, "L'argumentation de Kapila est, dans l'histoire de philosophie, l'antecedent de celIe d'~nesideme et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a
pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est
qu'une cause apparente relativement a l'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi
un effet relativement a la cause qui la precede, laquelle est encore un effet
par la m~me raison, et toujours de m~me, de maniere que tout est un
enchainement necessaire d'effets sans cause veritable et independente."
M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of
the arguments contained in the text; as," That which does not exist cannot be made to exist;" and, " Cause and effect are of the same nature:"
and he adds, as a third, that" il ne faut pas s'occuper des causes, mais
des effets, car l'existence de l'effet mesure l'energie de la cause; donc
l'effet equivaut la cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the consideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects.
Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that "il n 'y a pas de cause,"
although he Dlay so far agree with the philosophers referred to, in recognising no difference between material cause and material effects: for it
must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he
is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges i~
his lectures on power, cause, and effect-that" the forms of a body are
the body itself; and that all the substances which exist in the universe
are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can
. be added which is not itself a new substance: that there can be nothing
in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and consequents
which are present in them; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are
the very causes and effects which we are desirous of investigating." Leet.
on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p.175. KAPILA, however, has
not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning;
and whatever we may conceive of his mula-plakriti, his original and unoriginated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point

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from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its
effects: the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause,
he endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious
and not uninteresting part of the Sankhya philosophy, it may be allow'"
able to recapitulate a little more in detail.
1. .Asadaltarandt; 'Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot
make or produce that which is not.' Professor Lassen renders this, ' E
nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. .Asat in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent; and karana is employed technically to
denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be
exerted in vain, unless applied to materials that existed: that which does
not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be
useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it: the same
force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the
sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source
whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive application,
is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from
nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon preexisting materials. Here, however, the application is limited and specific,
and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke's exposition of the Vedanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no
more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from
those sources alone; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents,
and indicate consequently their existence.
2. Upada1ta grakanat; 'From taking an adequate material cause:
a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product.'
There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of uptidana; 'Such as
the substance evolved, such is that from which it is evolved;' or as
illustrated by GAURAPADA, 'He who wishes to make curds will employ
milk, not water:' but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or
infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance;. 'The relation between
cause and effect is the generation of effect; but there can be no relation

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(between cause and) a non-existent effect, and therefore effect is-," and
consequently 80 is cause.
3. 'From the unfitness of all causes for every effect;' Itl",a MlmbAa..
vtibluivtit. There must be an identity of character between the sequent
and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other:
ajar is made with clay, cloth with yarn; the latter material could not be
used to fabricate a water-pot, nor clay to weave a garment. I( this was
not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes,
. ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nuci posait.

It is not, however, here intended to assert, that" idonea causa non est ulla
quam sad, -T<l &11," but that the effect must have a determinate existence
in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can produce; a8 in the
commentary on this expression in the S. PravacMna BluisAya: ' I ( effect
prior to production do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why
cause should not produce one non-existent effect, and not anothert.'
4. SalttfU!la 8(JTtytill~raruit; 'From the execution of that which the
agent is able to do.' Active or efficient causes can do only that to which
they are competent: the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar,
not a piece of cloth; they are not competent to the latter, they are
capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause, power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as
well as another.
6. KtirOMlJbluJvat; , From the nature of cause;' that is, from its being
of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently produciug
its like; or, according to VACHESPATI, 'from the identity of cause with
effectt:' 'Cloth is not different from the threads of which it is woven.

'61if(9 ~
. . '61(9 '61 a1(OIl ~.
~ '61 a1 (OIl Ie m
I ;r ~
1Ifrr "Q4lief(fH I t <arcn: ~ ""(~ 41a4'..,U .. i ft ;r ~s
N fqt).nsm 1R 'f... (eiii iI;AiI"U1fH I
t '1a1~ ~
(ij1ii4MIi\ I
L

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for it is made up of them -.' Here, then, we have precisely the discovery
of modern philosophy, "that the form of a body is only another name for
the relative position of the parts that constitute it; and that the forms of
a body are nothing but the body itself:" (Brown's Lectures:) a discovery
which, simple as it may appear to be, dissipated but recently the il1usion
of'substantial forms,' which had prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems,
however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the remotest
periods, as the commentator on the S. Pravachana, and the author of the
S. Ckandrika, cite the V~das in its confirmation: 'Before production
there is no difference between cause and effect t .' There is good reason,
however, to think that the conclusion drawn from tbe doctrine by the
V~das was very different from that of the Sankhyas, being the basis of
Pantheism, and implying that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect: the texts illustrating the dogma being
such as, 'The existent 'T~ 3/1 verily was unevolvedt-This, the Existent,
was, oh pupil, before all things II-The Unborn was verily before all .'
The Sankhyas, like some of the old Grecian philosophers, choose to
understand by tad, idam, T~ &/1, Ttl ~/I, 'the comprehensive, eternal, material cause.'
From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that effect is,
sat karya~"; that is, that it exists in, and is the same with, cause; or, as
GAURAPADA has it, makat and the other characteristics of pradhti1~ are in
pradhtina. Sat Itaryam is therefore neither' ponendum est existens (sad)
emphatice ita dictum Ttl ~/I'T~~ ~/I, per se ens,' nor' effectus existentis, ab
existente eifectum, efl'ectum a 'Tep ~/l'Tt:' the question is, whether effect
exists or not before production; and not whether it is produced C a TiP
~/l'Tt an a 'Tip p.~ ~/I'T'.' It is the production, or appearance, OF that which is
or is not; not the production of any thing BY that which is or is not;
agreeably to the Sutra of KAPILA: 'There is no production of that which

t t!rq~: JCI1lfq ..-r~

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t ~ ""416141,"41141", I
II ~Cf ~
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89
is not, as of a man's hom-The production of that which is not is impossible, as would be that of a human hom t.' Agreeably to the same
doctrine also is the reply made in the Sutras to the objection, that if
effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to it; 'It is absurd
to produce what is already extant t-' The answer is, ' It is not so; for
the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of production depends upon
manifestation II:' that is, the present existence of an effect is not the production of any thing new, but the actual manifestation of a change of
form of that which previously existed: something like the notions which
Aristotle ascribes to ancient philosophers, that all things were together,
and that their generation was merely a change of condition: "HI! op.oU 'Ta
'lrall'Ta Ka2 'TO ryl"w6a, 'TO,&"ae Ka8EtT'T'1lCf!II ~o'oUCT6a,: and it is curious enough
to find the doctrine illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes: "Faciendum est quod faciunt statuarii, qui materiam exculpentes, supervacaneam.
imaginem fUm jaciunt sed inveniunt;" or as V IJNYANA BHIKSHU has it,
, The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the manifestation
of the image which was in the stone .'
Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as proofs of
its existence; effects or products, in their separated or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess properties different from those of
their source or cause: these differences are detailed in the next stanza.

x.
A DISCRETE principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading,
mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mergent, conjunct, governed.
The undiscrete one is the reverse.

"l\t,rql~ "<1.IC:h( I
t "('1IE4\'C1I\tn \ijrql~ ;f ~
crfk I t ~ ~(4ai1.lilI'll II ~ &l4@Ill
6ij4@IO I
NMlifClq(4qAfniflan MfW.UqjgI~&lfWiifl""

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40
BHASHYA.
Discrete; intellect and the other effects. CawsalJle; that of which
there i. cause; the term Aetu meaning 'cause, as synonymous with
tqNidafUJ, kara'IUI, and "i.itta. Nature is the caule of a discrete prin ..
ciple; therefore discrete principles, as far as the gross elements inclu..
shoe, have cause: thus, the principle intellect has cau" by nature;
egotism by intellect; the five rudiments and eleven organs by egotism ;
ether by the rudiment of sound; air by that of touch; light by that of
form; water by that of tute; and earth by that of smell. In this way,
to the gross elements inclusive, a discrete principle has cause. Again, it
is illCOJlSlant, because it is produced from another; as a water-jar, which
i& produced from a lump of clay, is not constant. Again, it i, unpertHMl..
i-.g, not going every where: a discrete principle is not like nature and
soul, omnipreeent. Again, it i. mtda6le; it is 8ubject to the changes
which the world undergoes: combined with the thirteen instruments, and
incorporated in the subtile frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and
hence is mutable. It is ",.UittUlirw",,; it is intellect, egotism, the five
rudiments, and eleven organs; and the five gross elements are nppot'tM
by the five rudiments. It i, fMrgent; subject to resolution; for at tbe
period of (general) diBBOlution, the five gross elements merge into the
five rudiments; they, with the eleven organs, into egotism; egotism into
intellect; and intellect merges. into nature. Conjunct; conjoined, made
up of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Governed; not selfdependent; for intellect is dependent on nature, egotism on intellect, the
rudiments and organs on egotism, and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now explain the un discrete.
The undiscrete one is the reverse. An undiscrete principle is the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the discrete: that, is
causable; but there is nothing prior to nature, whence fo]Jows its Donproduction, and therefore it is without cause. A discrete principle is
inconstant; an undiscrete is eternal, 81 it is not produced. The primary
elements are Dot produced from any where; that is, nature. A discrete
t

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principle is un pervading ; nature is pervading, going every where. A
diScrete principle is mutable; nature immutable, from the same omnipresence. Discrete principles are multitudinous; nature is single, from
its causality: "Nature is the one cause of the three worlds;" thence
nature is single. Discrete principles are dependent; the undiscrete one
is independent, from its not being an effect: there is nothing beyond
nature of which it can be the effect. A discrete principle is mergent;
the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble), being eternal: intellect and the
rest, at the period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one
another; not so nature; and that therefore is immergent (indissoluble).
A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound, made up of parts); nature
is uncompounded, for sound, touch, flavour, form, and odour, are not in
(crude) nature. Discrete principles are governed; the undiscrete is independent, it presidt'S over itself. These are the properties in which discrete
and un discrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are similar
are next described.
COMMENT.
It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the other effects
of nature were in some !espects similar, and in others dissimilar, to their
cause: the properties in which the dissimilarity consists are here enumerated.
The generic term used for the effects or products of primreval nature
(vyakta-) means, in its etymological and commonly received senses, that
which is evident or manifest, or that which is individual or specific;
from vi, distributive particle, and anja, 'to make clear or distinct.' The
purport is therefore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Colebrooke has selected, 'discrete,' detached from its cause, and having a
separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary matter) is the reverse
of this, or avyaltta t, 'undiscrete, unseparated, indistinct.' If natura were
.substituted for tell'US, these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the application of the terms in question:

t .... ,

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Multa modis multis multarum semina rerum

Quod permixta gerit tellus diacretDque tradit.

Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by principle a tatwa,

or category, according to the Sankhya classification of the elements of
existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same
which are specified in the original Sutra. 1. Het'Umat, ' having cause,
or origin;' itet'U implying 'material, efficient, and occasional cause;'
2. Anitya t, 'temporary;' for whatever has cause has beginning, and
whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is
to be understood of them in their actual or present form or condition:
'Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but
they are perishable by their separate conditions to' So in the Sutras
, destruction' is explained' resolution into cause II.' 3.' Unpervading ~:'
, Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they
are dispersed as different modifications .' Vyapti is the essential and
inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in
sesamum, &c. 4. Sakriya - -, 'mutable,' or 'having action:' perbaps
'movable' or 'migratory' would perfectly express the sense; for the
phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one
substance to another: 'Intellect and the rest leave one body in which
they were combined, and enter into the composition of another: this is
their transition: the transition of the gross elements earth and the rest,
composing body, is well known tt.' 0.' Multitudinous:' many, an.ekatt
being repeated in various objects and persons, as 'the faculties in different individuals, and the elements in different forms 1111.' 6. Supported
~---~~-~

t'lt1f( ,
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1

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~-~

--- -

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er_4 , tt iCJI~4I ;aqni

1fW itEri qf(w<:: iij{l('{Rq&th!:';:ri
..

~ F451flfl (@I'ft<fIilql<:(n
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tt ~ I
'{Rq&t liD N iij6 (\HH f~~ I

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by, referable to, tisrita-; as an e:ffect may be considered to be upheld by

its cause, or an individual referable to a species; as trees form a wood.
7. ' Mergent,' linga t; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into,
its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest
are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature:
and when they lose their individuality. or discrete existence, they may
be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their
original source. Although, therefore, the application of linga as an attributive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely di:fferent from
that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. VACHESPATI, explaining the term, has, 'Linga, the characteristic of prall/wina, for these
principles, lnuldki and the rest, are its charaCteristics, as will be hereafter explained t:' and the author of the S. Ckandrikd has, 'Linga is
that which characterizes, or causes to be known
it is the an'Unulpaka ,
'the basis of the inference:' 'For this e:ffect (of nature) is the parent
of the inference that an undiscrete cause exists1f.' (See also Com. on
v. 5. p. 24.) According to these interpretations, 'predicative' or 'characteristic' would perhaps be a preferable equivalent; but' mergent' or ' dissoluble'" is conformable to the S. Bluiskya. The commentator on the
S. Pravackana explains it by both terms' inferential' or 'resolvable:'
'E:ffect is termed linga, either from its being the ground of inference of
cause, or from its progress to resolution tt.' 8.' Combined, conjunct,'
sdvayavatt; explained by VACHESPATI, 'mixing,' misranallll, or 'junction,'
samyoga ~~, as the elements combine with one another. It might be said,
-then, that nature is a compound, as its products combine with it; but this
is not so, for their union with nature is not mere 'mixture or conjunction,

II;'

fWT , t fl;pi 11\1,.. E4 1I'1T ~ 1""(41:

IN'''Q n;;"aaqr(t"8!lfft t
I fl;pi rc;;"atfn ",qatrH t
ifIIi..
~ it 'fi,;ijr1c{ 'fi'1E4,aqw\E4'i r... rH
"UP.4n I
t

fl;pi

,q' ,..

"''1

tt ~""'~I'I'I'I"=r=I''''''IIft''~
Mat,,,
'fi'1 'i" , q ... 'liiat ,.... ......_
'5ITii , tt e, q at q ,
1111 f1l1il(ij ,
ea7Pt: I

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44
but identification from the sameness of the cause and effect .:' a notioD
which distinguishes the pradhana of the Slmkhyas from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who, if their doctrines have been
rightly represented, taught that substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate, or component parts of a mixture, in their original
form. In the Sankhya they separate or reunite as one and the same.
10. 'Governed t:' the effects of nature depend upon its existence, and
each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or product, in furtherance of
the influence of nature, or in consequence of its existence, without which
they would cease to be, and their effects would be null; as,' In the effect
of egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of nature is
regarded; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would not be able to
produce egotism t.'
The properties of nature, or the undiscrete principle, are the reverse
of these; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omnipresent; it is immutable; it is single; it is self-sustained; it is the subject, not the predi'cate; it is entire, or one whole; it is supreme.
Although the especial object of the text here is the dissimilarity
between the effects of nature and their material cause, yet the term
avyakta applies equally to purus1w., or' soul,' also an invisible or undiscrete
principle; and accordingly soul differs from discrete principles in the
same circumstances as nature. In the properties, therefore, of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support,
substantiveness, entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond.
They differ, however, in other respects, and particularly in those in
which nature and its effects assimilate, as enumerated in the succeeding
stanza.

1C1lr~r~ e~ll(ij 1<OIMCiI ""

t q(ri4i ,
l ;vt ~ (CI'Ii4sM stt:lr4ri~ "1""'1,[0&1"$ri "'"lViI ef'Qji
~ :tIMit@'I< stt:lr_Ur"rn ,
;r

iJ 1N1t:l4i4

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XI.
A DISCRETE principle, as well as the chief (or un discrete) one, has
the three qualities: it is indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.
BHASHYA.
Haa tl&e three qualities: it is that of which goodness, foulness, and
darkness are the three properties. A discrete principle is indiscriminative; discrimination does not belong to it: that is, it cannot distinguish

which is a discrete principle and which are properties, or that this is an

ox, that is a horse: such as the properties are, such is the principle; such
as is the principle such are the properties; and the like. Objective;
a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of), from its being an
object to all men. Common; from being the common possession of all,
like a harlot. Irrational; it does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or
dulness. Prolific; thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect; the five
rudiments and eleven organs of egotism; and the five gross elements of
the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive, are specified
as 'those of a discrete principle; and it is in them that the chief (or .ndiscrete) one is similar: "Such as is a discrete principle, such is the chief
(or undiscrete) one." Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities, so has the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having
the three qualities, are the effects: so in this world effect is of the like
quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with black threads. A
discrete principle is indiscriminative; so is the chief one, it cannot discern
that qualities are distinct from nature, that qualities are one thing, and
that nature is apother; therefore the chief one is indiscriminative. . A
discrete principle is objective; so is the chief one, from its being the
object of all men. A discrete principle is common; so is the chief one,
being common to all things. A discrete principle is irrational; so is the
chief one, as it is not conscious of pain, or pleasure, or dulness. Whence
is this inferred 1 From the irrationality of its effects; from an irrational
N

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46
lump of clay proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the
chief one been explained. S01d is in tkese respects, as in t/wse, tke reverse:
this is now explained.
Reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. Soul is the
reverse of both, thus: Discrete and undiscrete have (the three) qualities;
80ul is devoid of qualities: they are indiscriminative; 80ul has discrimination: they are objects (of sense or fruition); soul is not an object (of
sense or fruition): they are common; soul is specific: they are irrational;
80ul is rational; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows,
pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is rational: they are prolific; 80ul is
unprolific; nothing is produced from 8Oul. On these grounds soul is said
to be the reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles.
It is also said, as in t/wse, referring to the preceding verse; for as the
chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be without cause, &c. such
is the 8OUl. It is there stated that a discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like; and that the undiscrete one is the reverse; that is, it
has no cause, &c.; 80 80ul is without cause, being no production. A
discrete principle is inconstant; the discrete one is constant; so is 8Oul;
and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete principle is
multitudinous; the undiscrete is single; so is 8Oul. A discrete principle
is supported; the undiscrete is unsupported; so is 8Oul. A discrete principle is mergent; the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble); 80 is 8Oul; it
is not in any way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct; the
undiscrete one uncombined; 80 is soul; for there are no (component)
parts, such as sound, &c., in soul. Finally, discrete principles are governed; the un discrete one is independent; so is 8Oul, governing (or
presiding over) itself. In this way the common properties of 80ul and
nature were described in the preceding stanza; whilst those in which
they differ, as possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these three
qualities, with which both discrete principles and the undiscrete one are
endowed.
COMMENT.
In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to its products

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47
are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth verse, in which. it was
asserted, that in some respects the effects of nature and nature itself were
analogous. This being effected, the text proceeds to state that soul has
not the properties which are common to nature and its products, but
possesses those which are peculiar to the former; agreeing therefore in
some respects with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its
effects or products.
The three qualities"', or ,atwat, 'goodness,' rajast, 'foulness,' and
tamasl\, 'darkness,' which are familiar to all the systems of Hindu speculation, are more particularly described in the next verse; soul has the~
not. Pradklzna,' the chief one,' crude nature, and its products, have not
discrimination, viveka , the faculty of discerning the real and essential
differences of things, of 'distinguishing between matter and spirit, of
knowing self; the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from
existence) .' By the term' objective'" is intended that which may be
used or enjoyed, such 88 the faculties of the mind, and the organs of
sense; or such as may be perceived by observation, vijnana tt: such
nature, or pradhana, may also be considered 88 the origin of all things
inferable by reason. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, 88
afterwards explai~ed. Achetanatt, ' irrational;' that which does not think
or feel, unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghaduta; 'Those afflicted
by desire seek reliefboth from rational and irrational objectsl\l\;' explained
either' living and lifeless,' or 'knowing and ignorant ;' chetanll"
being defined' knowledge of right and wrong,' or 'of what ought, and
what ought not, to be done ttt.'
The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of

~: ,
t ~,
t~,
II ~ ,
fC4~' ,
at,*Cli",";qi:l~_lei fq~"'I;f n"ICliliiirq~cq~CI n"'",,'I(qj
~ I
...... fC4ii1at ,
tt fc:tijl .. ,
U .~" .. ,
1111 ~
itpilff{ "1t'f"t'q411.n"l~n~'1 ,
AI4.44Alf(!!'1 ,
fcf
~""lfq~ ..."''1 I
... ~n"l I ttt 'laiil'laiifq~"'ifl I

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48

those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in

one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many,
aneka -; consequently soul should be single, eka t; and it is so, according to the S. Bluish!la t. On the other hand, the S. Tatwa Ka.mtUJ.
makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudinous: 'The
properties of non-causability, constancy, and the rest, are common to
soul and nature; multitudinousness is a property common to (soul and)
an undiscrete principle II.' The S. Ckandrikti confirms the interpretation,
, The phrase tatoo eka implies that (soul) is analogous to the un discrete
principle in non-causality and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration .' This is, in fact, the Sankhya doctrine,
as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the
Sutra of KAPILA; 'Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition.:'
that is, ' the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free .'
Either, therefore, GAURAPADA has made a mistake, or by his ~ka is to be
understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or
several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it
(R. A. S. Trans. vol. I. p. 31), 'individual.' So in the Sutras it is said,
, that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of
receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels tt.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular soul
which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and
liberation; for, as the commentator observes, 'one soul is born, not

_~, t
t ~ t
t =-A, &4""''4&4" 'iNf l'"
.... ~ ,
II 1iIi(<<'4"Mf..rqM'~ It\f, ..~,qu:a'4fW ,!~f4('111 ~

~~t
~ 'iNf :q'6ijw\~4i;cnSq{@'1'4+4'F<:iff ~
&4i4\ec?tS'4~~t4~rrt t
$I ..... 'f~ &4ct(il'n: '1~f4C1f'" t
.. '144 41W\ ~ 5114" 1IT1ft ~ Wiil' ~ ~ 'jUlH t
tt ~sila"-'4 '1'''I.na, iII"'tJ('III t4alr~~: t

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49
another (in a regenerated body) .' The singleness of soul therefore, as
asserted by GAUBAPADA, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.

XII.
qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness;
are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint; mutually domiTHE

neer; rest on each other; produce each other; consort together;

and are reciprocally present.
BHASHYA.
'!I'ke qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness, are severally the same

as what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what is indifferent: thus

goodness is all that is pleasure, priti meaning' pleasure;' being one with
(or consisting of) that (pleasure): foulness is one with, or consists of,
disagreeableness (aprita): darkness consists of, or is the same with, dulness; vis/uida meaning mAlia, 'dulness, stupidity.' Next, are adapted
to manifestatima, &c.; artka signifying' competency' or ' fitness.' Good:.
ness, then, is for the sake of manifestation; it is fit for, or adapted to it :
foulness is for activity; darkness for restraint: that is, the qualities are
connected with, or possessed of, manifestation, action, and inertia. Tkey
mutually domineer: they are mutually paramount, sustaining, productive,
cooperative, and coexistent. Thus, they are said to domineer mutually;
that is, they severally prevail or predominate over each other, or they are
displayed by the properties of pleasure, pain, or dulness. When goodness is dominant, it overpowers foulness and darkness by its own properties, and is exhibited or identified with light and joy. When foulness
predominates, it overpowers goodness and darkness, and exists in pain
and action. When darkness triumphs, it suppresses goodness and foul-

~ .~ !iii I aM ;rrq"(: I
o

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50

ness, and is supreme as one With insensibility and inaction. So tkeiJ rest
on each other: the qualities combine with one another, like binary atoms.
They produce each other, as the lump of clay generates the earthen jar.
Tileg consort together, as males and females cohabit: as it is said, " Goodness is the consort of foulness, foulness of goodness; darkness is called
the consort of both:" that is, they are respectively associates. They are
reciprocally present: they abide or exist reciprocally, according to the
text, "qualities abide in qualities" (that is, the same qualities may be
regarded as different, according to their different effects): thus, a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is
the cause of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment (insensibility) to the dissolute: and in this manner she is the cause
of the influence of all three qualities. Thus also, a king, assiduous in
protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the bad: here foulness
(activity) produces the effects of goodness and darkness. So darkness,
by its investing nature, produces the effects of goodness and foulness, as
clouds, overshadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by
their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and overwhelm absent
lovers with despair. In this manner the three qualities are reciprocally
present (or perform the functions of one another).
COMMENT.

The three qualities are here described, by their effects and relations;
by the production of pleasure, pain, and indifference; and by the manner in which they are detached or combined in their operations and
influence.
The terms priti and aprlti are here used as synonymes of mkka, ' pleasure,' and dukka, 'pain;' vislulda: as a synonyme of moka, 'bewilderment,
stupefaction, dullness, or insensibility.' The composition of atma with
these terms, prltyatmaka, implies 'essential or inseparable presence,' like
that of life or soul in the living body. An exact equivalent for such a
compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense may be conveyed by such expressions as ' consists of, comprehends, is one or iden-

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tical with,' and the like. Atma is here used also to shew that the proper.
ties have positive existence; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of
pain; pain is not the mere absence of pleasure; as,' Negatives could not
be essential ingredients in any thing: pleasure, pain, and insensibility
are therefore entities; the word atma implying being, existence, existent
nature, or property *.'
The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities is sufficiently illustrated by GAURAPADA; but V ACBESPATI understands the text
as in some respects differently constructed. Instead of considering the
last term, vrittaga t, as a distinct condition, angon:gavrittaya t, expounded
in the S. BluJskya, parasparam varltante II, they are reciprocally present,'
he interprets vritti by kriya, 'act, operation, function,' and compounds it
with each of the foregoing terms . In all other respects his explanation
of the .terms coincides with that of the elder commentator. The pas~ae
quoted by GAURAPADA is cited by ViCHESPATI, with some difference, from
the Vedas: '.As it is said in the agama, all universally present are the
associates of each other: goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of
goodness; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness is said to
be the associate of both. Their original connexion, or disjunction, is
never observed '.' The Ckand"ika concurs with the S. Tatwa Ka"mtul
in the explanation of vritti.. This commentary likewise offers some
additional interpretation of the terms priti, &c. Thus prfti is said to

* ~:
~,

qtafl

,~,C{cnSN 1l{('C1T: I .a'ii4\1"(+CI ~'qq"

t fli'J~,'4'1' I
t ",wnWCi,W4: I
II q'4{
m';f (,-ftf:) A~'41f..e.uift 4'4'wnWCi'f~q"an

Swi\;q'iil41,answi\;q5t~~"anSanWCifiil'~"4: I ' ~ ~
'f'.lill .. wnWCif41'~': ei ... llfl4~'1i4 (}ii~ ~ ~ eM~

,;f '"'
~

n41e'l,ftt n:r,~ WeM(5t4l ~ ~: eM(~~ffi

'lfSGlfl 'Zfi iI'41' f~: EtA an itt PClA ail in ci\ qM t1IW I .. ~
~ -,fwq( ';f :qlltl1fn I
'{'5t:

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comprise 'rectitude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom:' aprlti, besides' misery,' implies' hatred, violence,envy, abuse,
wickedness:' and visMda is not only' insensibility,' but' tardiness, fear,
infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, and ignorance. Whenever either of these
is observed, it is referable to the corresponding quality -.'
In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded
as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible
by 80ul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or
prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three
qualities in equipoise, according to the Sutra, ' Prakriti is the equal state
of goodness, foulness, and darkness t:' on which the commentator remarks, 'Satwa and the rest are "things," not specific properties, from
their being subject to combination or disjunction, and from their having
the properties of lightness, heaviness, and strength t:' and again, ' From
the construction of intellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like cords wherewith to bind the victim the 8Oulll.' So in the S.Sara,
, Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that (pramti), being of
the same nature ~'-' Such expressions as" qualities of nature" are to be
understood (in the same sense) as (the term) "the trees of a forest".:'
that is, the forest is nothing different from the trees of which it is the
aggregate, although particular trees or clumps may 80metimes be indivi-

..... lftftr:

'(iJqMet (l]f1I~c":tltctl'9JI'I1 ~~~A4I~I"f

(r.rt I ... dlfn':(iJ q Mt1(Jj l4~q~(f1i\Hf~,<:'f~T;ri I rc.ql~
~ ;aqiWSt1(Jj fqAM~44 .. ,f\ij4N "'fi~'Ia1(t4l,.,,,,,,(l .. i ~
riSqM-nf lf1I' nl"14l: A~nlll 1fW ~: I
t eM(~(Iii ...ei
~'Rt'ct(Q:f1 t(~: ,
t eMI(lP", C;:6iURu ~ ~iQN'1 TfT: ~
rrfct41' lct l4 1't. M(W"4iWSM'l~lf~a:AMI. I
I '!~tiiq,,~
.J(l]Iii1~f1(ct1f~ (~r... UiIi1M"1 , ~ ~MI~"'I"'n'Ui'" "~MI'" I
~ ~~ (~,p~ cmsi

4 .. Q ~

tfW '<itvi I

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58
dualized. In like manner nature is not different from the qualities, but
is the aggregate of them. 'Ingredients or constituents of nature,' therefore, would be a preferable term perhaps to ' quality;' but' quality' is the
more ordinary acceptation of the word guna, and it may therefore be
used, remembering only the distinction made by the Sankhyas of its
materiality, as a constituent part of nature itself; the qualities being, in
fact, only the conditions of things, and therefore not separable from the
things themselves. It may be thought possible that there is some connection between the gunas which are the constituents of prakriti, and the
qualities, passions, or affections of primary matter of the older philosophers, alluded to by Aristotle; from the changes produced by which on
one unaltered substance all things originated: T~S' P.tll oUfTlaS'il7f'op.eJlow'IS',
~ oe
{I"6
.0-"'''' '
~
~
, TO",
~"
' "apX'I1I ""TOlS'
'7l'a efTl p.eTatJW\.I\.OIlCl'1'JS',
TOllTO
fTTOlXelOJl
/Cal~ TaUT'I1I
OJITOIII T'III
..,,_fTlJl
elJlal. Metaph. I. 3.
Another analogy may be conjectured in the identification of the two g,cnas, satwa and rajas, with priti, ' affection,' and apriti,
, aversion,' as they thus correspond with the cpl~;a and lIei/CoS', the' love'
and 'strife' of Empedocles, as the principles of creation; respectively
the source of what is good or evil.
The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas is employed
is sufficiently clear from the explanation given of them in the text; and
the meaning of the equivalents which Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them
must be understood according to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen
renders them essentia, impetus, and caligo ; which, similarly understood,
are equally unobjectionable: but as the name of a' quality,' satwa, is not
perhaps well rendered by' essence,' or even by 'existence,' wh.ich is its
literal purport, 'goodness,' denoting exemption from all imperfection,
seems to be preferable. Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the
quality; and the term ' foulness,' derived from its etymology from ranj,
, to colour or stain,' will better comprehend its characteristic results. The
quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio of the Stoics, and
might be rendered by that word, or by C passion,' in its generic acceptation. 'Darkness,' or caligo, expresses both the literal and technical
signification of tamas.
p

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54

XIII.
GOODNESS

is considered to be alleviating and enlightening: foul-

ness, urgent and versatile: darkness, heavy'and enveloping.

Like a

lamp, they cooperate for a purpose (by union of contraries).

,
BHASHYA .
. Goodness is alleViating, &c.-When goodness predominates, the frame
is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. FO'Ulness is
urgent and versatile.-What urges, urgent, exciting: as a bull, upon seeing
another bull, exhibits vehement excitement; that is the effect of foulness.
Foulness is also seen to be versatile; that is, a person under its influence
is capricious. Darkness is keavy and enveloping.-Where darkness prevails, the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inadequate to the performance of their functions. But here it may be said, If
these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce
by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, tkey cooperate,
like a lamp,/or a (common purpose).. Like a lamp, their operation is for a
(common) purpose: as a lamp, which is composed of the opposites, a
wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the qualities of goodness,
foulness, and darkness, although contrary to one another, effect a (common) purpose.
This question involves another. It was said (in ver.H) that a discrete
principle, as wen as the chief one, has the three qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like. Admitting this to be true of the
chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that intellect and the rest have
also the three qualities, and are indiscriminative, and the like 1 This is
next explained.
COMMENT.'

The description of the three qualities is continued in this verse.

Goodness is alleviating; lagku, 'light;' it is matter, elastic and elevating. generating upward and lateral motion, as in the ascent of flame, and
the currents of the air. It is the cause of active and perfect functionality

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55
also in the instruments of vitality; enlightening, pralttisakam, ' making
manifest,' the objects of the senses. The term ishtam, meaning ordinarily
, wished, desired,' imports in the text merely drislitam, 'seen, regarded,
considered'-' by the Sankhya teachers t.' Foulness is urgent and versatile.-The qualities of goodness and darkness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their own peculiar consequences; and it is only
by the restless activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness
that they are roused to action; upasktambkakam t being here explained
to signify' stimulating, impelling,' udyotaltam, predakam II, contrary to its
usual sense of 'opposing, hindering.' It might be supposed to imply
some relation to the primitive shtabki , ' stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid ;'
inasmuch as the idea appears to be that of action consequent" upon
obstruction, or inertia, 'reaction.' Thus, as illustrated in the S. BOOshya,
a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by, another.
The S. Tatwa Kaumudl has, 'The qualities goodness and darkness, on
account of their own inertia, are inoperative, in regard to the exercise of
their own effects, until excited by foulness. Having been roused from
inactivity, they are made to put forth vigour and energy; and therefore
foulness is said to be urgent 111".' The Ckandrikti is to the same effect:
, The meaning is this: From the production of combination and activity
by foulness, the definition of that quality is excitement and versatility '*'*:
It is not necessary, however, to take into consideration the sense of the
primitive shtabki, for upashtambkaka is not derived from that root, but
from stambku tt, a Sautra root; which therefore, although the meanings of

E6(ijH;IIi

~ I
r4C1nClI
~.

,r~q&M'{'lMlq-q I

\I '3,"n'lIA I
l4 .... qt~ ($i({\qt!~ I iltq~IC::I", I4GfICIII

E.CI'ltijl4,r,
..:::c::.

'3WiI@ 1441"" '14lri I

t ~i@4I:q~: I
t 'A
~ ~ I
' ~Nni14l ~ct~

C:

nr<:~1W\'3qt!~ '(5t ~In I

..~

(!5I~q

riiliClcn~qMNm{ flij,,*, ~r_C1M ~ ('51({\ Met(ijr... r"~: I

tt~1

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56
shtabhi are usually also assigned to it, may take the import required by

the text, of' urging' or 'exciting.'

The quality of darkness is' heavy,' guru, causing sluggishness of body
and dulness of mind. It is also varanaka, 'surrounding, enveloping,' so
as to obstruct light, retard motion, &c.
But these qualities, although contraries, cooperate for a common purpose; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, although mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light. The common object of the qualities
is the fulfilment of the purpose of soul, as is subsequently explained.

XIV.
and the rest (of the properties of a discrete
principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the
absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover,
(as well as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrated by
eft'ect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of
contrariety).
INDISCRIMINATIVENESS

BHASHYA.
That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the rest is
proved from the influence of the three qualities in mahat and the other
discrete principles: but this is not proved in the undiscrete; therefore it
is said, by the absence the reverse of it: the reverse of it; the absence; the
non-existence of the reverse of that: thence the undiscrete principle is
established; as, where there are threads, there is cloth; the threads are
not one thing, and the cloth another. Why 50? From the absence of the
reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this manner the discrete and undiscrete principles are established. The latter is remote, the
former is near: but he who perceives discrete principles, perceives the
undiscrete one also, as there is no contrariety between them. Hence also
the undiscrete one is proved b!l effect possessing the properties of cattSe in
this world: such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the effect;

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thus, from black threads black cloth is made. In the same manner, as
the characteristics of intellect and the rest are their being indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific, such as they are, such the
undiscrete is proved essentially to be. From the influence of the three
qualities, indiscriminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete
principles; and from there being no difference between them (and the
undiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties of cause and
effect, the undiscrete principle also is demonstrated.
But it is replied, this cannot be true; for in this world that which is not
apprehended is not; but the undiscrete one is, although not applicable.
COMMENT.
It was stated in ver.8, that ma1w.t and the other effects of pralniti
were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to their original. The
circumstances in which they were dissimilar were specified in ver. 10,
and those in which they agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first
of the concurrent properties that was named was that of their possessing
the three qUalities; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained what was
meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza it is asserted, that as
the effects of pramti have the three qualities, they must have, as a necessary consequence, the other properties, want of discrimination and the
rest, enumerated in ver. 11; and that as they have them, their origin, or
prakriti, must have them also, as there is no essential difference between
the properties of cause and effect.
The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the varied affections and conditions of all substances, is the obvious cause of perplexity,
or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in fact, the same state or condition.
Traigunya is the influence or any consequence of the three gunas. The
next expression is variously interpreted.
Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abluivat-,' and from the absence
thereof in the reverse;' that is, the absence of want of discrimination, &c.

to

nflQaij4lltlilCfIi( I
Q

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in that subject which is the reverse of the material products of nature,
as, for instance, soul, is a negative proof of their existence in the former.
The properties o.f contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each
other: but one property of soul is freedom from the three qualities, whilst
that of matter, or any material product of prakriti, is their possession;
consequently the former must be capable, and the latter incapable, of
discrimination. The same may be said of the other properties of makat
and the rest. Thus VACHESPATI observes: 'It (the assertion) is first
plainly or affirmatively expressed in the natural order: it is then put
negatively, or in the inverted order; from tke absence thereof in tke reverse;
from the absence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the products of prakriti, in regard to want of discrimination and the like to.' The
S. Cltandrika has a similar explanation: 'The reverse of that want of
discrimination; where that is that is the reverse (of maltat, &c.), or soul:
for in soul there are not the three qualities; or, where there is not want
of discrimination there are not the three qualities, as in soul t :' intimating, therefore, that tad, ' thereof,' may refer either to the three qualities traig'Un!la, or to want of discrimination, &c.
There is, however, another sense attached to the expression; and the
reverse is understood not to signify soul, or any thing contrary to maltat
and the rest, but to imply contrariety or incompatibility in the properties
of their origin, or prakriti: that is, indiscriminativeness and the rest are
the properties of maltat, &c. not only from their possessing the three
qualities, but because there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness,
&c. in prakriti. This proposition is indicated by VACHESPATI, who, after
explaining the passage as above, adds, 'Or it may be understood as

1cM1(w:q'll;i\wi

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~ ~ "14@l~lq,,,, I
t ft~lfq~fqaq~ Fq Qaij4\ 11'1
e4itfjQaijll .. liiU " ~'l<tql"lqlll'4' ~ ..... 'fct4n.;;.... ,q4it ...
~OOCI"Iii4qr(F" I
I

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taking for its two subjects vyakta and avyakta (discrete and undiscrete
matter), and by the inverted proposition (or negatively) asserting that
there is no reason (to the contrary) arising from one being exempt from
the three qualities *: The same is more explicitly stated by GAURAPADA.
The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced from the
inlluence of the three qualities, relates in the first instance to vyakta,
'discrete matter" not to avyakta, or 'indiscrete:' but the same must
apply to the latter also, because there is no property belonging to it
which is incompatible with, or the reverse of, the properties of the v!lakta,
or 'discrete matter,' makat, &c.; as in the case of the cloth and the
threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them.
The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either simply that
discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness, &c. or that both it and
indiscrete matter are equally devoid of discrimination, proceeds to draw
the conclusion that such an indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with
properties similar to those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no
difference of property between cause and effect; agreeably to the Sutra,
'The three qualities, insensibility and the rest, belong to both (prakriti
and its products)t:' and VACHESPATI observes, 'Effect is seen to be the
same in its properties with cause. As the properties of the threads, &c.
are identical with those of' cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure,
pain, and insensibility, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished
as makat and the rest, are proofs that similar conditions must belong to
their cause: the existence of pradktina or avyakta, as a cause, of which
pleasure, pain, and insensibility are the conditions, is consequently establishedt'

* ~ en 611"'1611. qeflti'4 ~ "J4.4 l;.ft" ll:Cf ~

~"611:'
t r..'J<UI~";f"'lr<:.an: I
t ~ ~ 'I(!]'J(!]Iiii'

~ ""'Ir~'J(!]IN1' qalf<. "'" iiI(~lrc{MtliQ;fIN ""i{(!]

~a,q4l(4i;q(!] (CI'I(ij'I"~s!til(IN1;f1 ~rC4"&i "'" ~ in(
I

::..
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xv.
SINCE

specific objects are finite; since there is homogeneousness ;

since eft'ects exist through energy; since there is a parting (or issue)
of eft'ects from cause, and a reunion of the universe,BHAsHYA.
The undiscrete principle is cause: this is the completion of the construction of the sentence. Since specific objects are finite: as in the world,
wherever the agent is, his limits are observed: thus, a potter makes
certain jars with certain portions of clay; so with intellect: intellect and
the other characteristics (of nature) are finite, as specific eft'ects of it.
Intellect is one, egotism is one, the subtile rudiments are five, the organs
eleven, the gross elements five: from the limitation of these species
nature is their cause, which produces finite discrete principles. If nature
were not the cause, then discrete principles would have no limit: from
the measure (or limit) of specific objects, therefore, nature exists, whence
discrete principles are produced. Since there is /wmogt1lleOfU'lU1U: as in
the world, that which is notorious is observed; for having seen a religious
student engaged in sacred study, it follows that his parents were assuredly
of the Brahmanical tribe: so having observed that maAat and the other
characteristics have the three qualities, we conclude what their cause
must be; and in this way from homogeneousness the chief one exists.
Since Yfects exist tArOt/,gA energy: in life, that which is effective in any
thing is active in the same: a potter is able to make a jar, therefore he
makes a jar, not a piece of cloth. Since there is a parting of Yfect from
cause: the chief one is cause; that which makes is cause, that which is
made is effect: the separation of cause and effect: thus; a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water, milk; not so is its cause, or the lump of
clay; but the lump of clay produces the jar, the jar does not produce the
lump of clay. So having observed intellect and the other effects, it is
inferred that cause must have been separated, of which these discrete
principles are detached portions. Again, since tAere is a reunion of tke

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universe (vaiswarupa). Viswa here means' the world f rUpa, 'individualization' (or specific form): the abstract condition of the form of the
world is the universe: from its reunion. nature exists (as cause); whence
there is no mutual separation of the five gross elements, earth &c., composing the three worlds; or, the three worlds are comprised in the gross
elements. The five gross elements ar~ earth, water, fire, air, ether; which
at the Season of general dissolution return in the order of creation to a
state of non-separation, or into the modified five subtile rudiments: they
and the eleven organs reunite in egotism; egotism resolves into intellect;
and intellect into nature. Thus the three worlds, at the period of general
dissolution, reunite in nature; and from such reunion of the discrete and
undiscrete principles, like that of curds and milk, it follows that the
undiscrete principle is cause.
COMMENT.

The sentence is incomplete, the government being in the first member

of the following verse; karanam asti-avyaktam, 'There is (a general)
cause (which is undiscrete).' Hitherto the subjects discussed have been
the existence of effects, and their correspondence or disagreement with
their cause. It is now shewn that cause exists imperceptible, or undiscrete.
From specific tjfects being finite: from the certain or definite measure
of the varieties of discrete principles, as one intellect, one egotism, five
rudiments, and the like. If there were no certain and defined cause, the
effects would be indefinite and unlimited: the water-jar, however, must
be limited by the earth of which it consists, and which, as a distinct body,
is no longer extant. 'Homogeneousness,' samanwaya, is defined' the common nature of different things,' as the property of generating pain, pleasure, and dulness, which is possessed by intellect and the rest. Efficts
exist through energy: 'through the energy, ability, or power of cause they
--'-----

------------------------

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become active *:' A parting, or issue, of effect from cause, and final
reunion of the separated effect. Vaiswarupa is merely a synonyme of
ktirya, 'effect;' that which is of various, or every, sort of form, or nature.
The evolution of effect from unseparated cause is illustrated by comparing
nature to a tortoise, the limbs of which are at one time protruded, and at
another retracted within the shell: 'As when the limbs which are in the
body of the tortoise protrude, then they are distinguished, or (it is said)
this is the body, those are the limbs: so when they are withdrawn into it
they are undistinguished (from the body)t.' S. Tatwa Ka'Umudt. In like
manner the water-jar or the diadem exist in the lump of clay or of gold,
but are distinguished from it only when individually manifested; they
become mere clay or gold again on losing their detached condition: thus
earth and the rest exist in the subtile rudiments; those and the organs of
sense and action in egotism; egotism in intellect; and intellect in nature:
when manifested or put forth they are separated or distinguished from
their several sources, but at the period of universal dissolution lose their
distinct form, and become progressively one with their common original:
the existence of which therefore, as their undiscrete cause, is proved both
by their appearance or separation, and disappearance or reunion.

XVI.
THERE

js a general cause, which is undiscrete.

It operates by

means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as

water; for different objects are diversified by influ.ence of the several
qualities respectively.

~ Aee.it I
t 1I'IT ,.ul'l(\"( 'I~eeIWlf..
ftf:e(f", ~ ~ ~Hl'l(\(ilnl;q(0t4II'I;ftfH I " f.. fC/l'l'u

'1(Q'Irlhn:

;:nR

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BHASHYA.
That which is known as the un discrete principle is the cause; whence
intellect and the other effects proceed. It operates by means of the tkree
qualities.-That in which are the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and
darkness, is the (aggregate of the) three qualities. What then is that?
The equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the chief
one (nature). Also,jrom mixture.-In like manner as the Ganges unites
into one river the three streams that descend upon the head of R6dra, so
the (aggregate of the) three qualities, the un discrete, produces a single
discrete principle; or, as many threads combined form one piece of
cloth, so the undiscrete generates intellect and the rest from the interweaving of the three qualities: and thus from the influence of the three
qualities and their aggregation the discrete world proceeds. But if discrete
principles proceed from one undiscrete, then one form should be common
to all. This objection is invalid; for it is by modification, like water,jrom
II variety in tke receptacles of tke several qualities, that the three worlds,
derived from one undiscrete principle, assume different conditions of
being. The gods are united with pleasure, mankind with pain, animals
with dulness; so that a discrete principle, emanating from one nature,
becomes modified, like water, according to the diversified receptacles of
the qualities. Prati prati implies' several order:' g"na araya, ' a receptacle of the qualities,' by the difference of that receptacle (according to
that several receptacle) in which it is lodged. Discrete principles are
varied from modification; as the simple element water, when fallen from
the atmosphere, is diversely modified as various fluids, according to its
various combinations, so from one pradklma proceed the three worlds,
which are no longer of one (uniform) character. In the divinities the
quality of goodness predominates, foulness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely happy. In men the quality of foulness abounds,
and goodness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely miserable. In animals ~odness and foulness are inactive, and darkness
prevails; and therefore they are supremely insensible.
In these two stanzas the existence of nature (p"adkdna) has been determined: in the next place, that of soul is to be established.

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COMMENT.
In this verse, besides the conclusion drawn from the arguments in the
preceding stanza, it is here explained how nature, which is one, produces
diversified effects. This is said to be through the influence of the three
qualities, the combination or several predominance of which in various
objects is attended with a modification and diversity of that which is
essentially one and the same.
'Modified condition,' according to VACHESPATI, 'is the character of the
three qualities, which are never for a moment stationary,' except when
creation is not: and from this constant vicissitude ensues combination
in different proportions, or the predominance of one or other in different
objects; for they are always combined, or mixed, in different proportions.
This is the mixture, the blending, or co~tention of the qUalities which the
text intends. Hence proceeds the modification of the original matter; as
rain water, falling upon different trees, is modified as the juice of their
different fruits. 'As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with various situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent,
or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel
karanja, and wood-apple t.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So, according to Cudworth, the Italic philosophers maintained that the forms and qualities of
bodies were only different modifications of primary matter. "The same
'numerical matter," he observes, "differently modified, causing different
phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and
qualities in the things, as when tke same water is successively changed and
transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice." Intellect. System, 111.426.
It may be doubted if the latter portion of the verse should not be
-----------------------~

--

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*' qftU=tE.CIiUCn f.....J(91 ;lIqftUl et(9"Qrnt;ft I

t 1I'fT
#of 11\('lW4!(~'(~" rq H'" \f.. f~ 'OPIle 1fJ HI nSfiM HI iff' fcwE.CI
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1I1n n:.t~it I

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preferably rendered, 'By modification, like water, according to the receptacle, or subject, of the qualities *.' Such is evidently the sense in which
the S. BIu1sAya understands it, and such appears to be that of the above
illustration; the simple water being modified, as sweet, sour, &c., according to the tree by which it is absorbed, and the fruit of which it constitutes the juice. So certain objects are fitted for certain qualities; as the
gods for goodness, men for foulness, animals for darkness; and nature is
modified in them accordingly; that quality predominating which is con.
formable to the receptacle: the question here being, not the origin of
things, but of their different properties. V ACHESPATI, however, seems to
. make the diversity of objects depend upon the qua1itie8, not the difference of qualities upon the subject; explaining the phrase prati gu",a,.,.aya
visMsMt,. , The difference which is produced by the recipience of each
several quality; thence, &c.t' The CAanilrikti has the same explanation,
adding, ' Diversity is from diversity (different ratio) of qualities t.' There
is no incompatibility, indeed, in the two views of the meaning of the text,
as the variety of things depends upon the difference or disproportion of
the three primary qualities, whether those qualities modify, or be modified by, the subject to which they belong: in either case the variety is not
a different thing, it is only a modification of the same thing, pradluin.a.

XVII.
the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since
the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned). must exist; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency
to abstraction; therefore, soul is.
SINCE

AOtArH'JcgliJi4lr~~'II", I
~I
t 'jcgq'l",,"l'lwl I
s

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BH.A.SHYA.
As it is said, " Liberation is obtained by discriminative knowledge of
discrete and undiscrete principles;" and whereas the undiscrete has been
shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (ver. 9), 80
soul being, like the undiscrete principle, subtile (not cognizable by the
senses), its existence is now established by inference. Soul is.-Why 1
Beco,use tAe o,sseinbla.ge of objects is for o,nolher's use.-The assemblage of
intellect and the rest is for the use of soul: this is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its eirects), like a bed. In like manner as a bed,
which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cords, cotton, coverlid, and
pillows, is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component
parts render ~o mutual service; thence it is co~cluded that there is a
man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose use it was made: so this
body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use;
or, there is soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of
an aggregate of intellect and the rest, has been produced.
Again, soul is, beco,ttSe the reverse of toot wAicA Ao.s tAe tAree quo,iities
Iuu been declo,red: as it was stated in a former verse (1 J), 'A discrete
principle has the three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, Sec.;" and
it is added, " Soul is in these respects the reverse."
Again, soul is, because twe must be superintendence.-As a charioteer
guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, 80
the soul guides the body: as it is said in the SwAthi Tantra, " Nature,
directed by soul, proceeds."
Soul is, because there must be an enjo!Jer.-In like manner as there must
be some one to partake of food flavoured with sweet, sour, salt, pungent,
bitter, and astringent flavours, so, as there is no capability of fruition in
intellect and the other products of nature, there must be soul, by which
this body is to be enjoyed.
Again, 80ul is, because there is a tendency to abstractim,.-Kaivalya is
the abstract noun, derived from kevala, 'sole, only'-for, on account of,
that (abstraction); the practice of it: from the exercise of (or tendency
to) abstraction (for the sake of its own separation or detachment) it is

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inferred that soul is. That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally
desires imperishable release from succession of worldly existence.
It is next to be determined whetl:\er this soul be but one superintendent over all bodies, like the string that supports all the gems of a
necklace; or whether there be many souls presiding severally over individual bodies.
COl\{M~NT.

Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle are h~e

adduced.
The existence of soul is established by inference: a bed implies a
sleeper; nature, made up of its effects, is for the production of pain,
pleasure, and insensibility, of which soul alone is conscious. But ad..
mitting that the assemblage is for the benefit of another, why should that
other be soul? because soul is not a similar aggregate; it is not made up
of qualities and the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as
was explained in verse 11: or, as the commentator on the S6tra, Sa'lt"ata
parart4atwatt, observes, because the property of pain or pleasure, which
is identical with body, must be different from that which enjoys the one,
or su1rers the other. Because t"ere must be an enjo9er.-.The existence
of an enjoyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain; election
between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something else, which is
soul. 'Intel1ect and the rest are the things to be used (blwgya) or perceived (driiya), and consequently imply one who perceives t.' S. Tatwa
Ka'Um'Udi.

The term kaival!Ja, rendered' abstraction,' signifies' detachment from

the world;' or, as it is explained, 'absolute suppression of the three kinds
of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or
prophets. It must therefore be something different from intellect and the

~:(Etan(I""'H4I1 &lifil~II:' ~ ~hIlHI: I

t e(riq(ltl
~I
t ~ I1:4IT GJ'ilI(an .. ';if {el("""~ IUiHI 1WT
itIrf riWilcf\d l!T l"4IGJ'CAIClfnf(ih: ~ ... IMfIt I

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rest, which are the same thIng as pain, and cannot effect a separation from.
their own essence *.' 8~ Tatwa Katlmudt So V IJNANA BBIKSBU explains
kaival!Ja, ' absolute extirpation of pain t.'
The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so many
original aphorisms of KAPILA; as, 1. 'Soul is distinct from body, &c.t:'
2. 'From an aggregate being for another's use 1\:' 3. ' From (the proper..
ties of) soul being the converse of the three qualities, &c.:' 4. 'From
superintendence ~:' o. 'From the tendency to abstraction ..,' The commentator notices a different reading of the last S6t~ 'From natUre
not being competent to abstraction:' but this he considers erroneous tt.
The fifth book of the 8. Pravackana contains other S6tras affirmative of
the separate existence of soul.

XVIII,
birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously; multitude of souls is demonstrated.
SINCE

BHASHYA.
Life and death, and the instruments (of life).-From the several allotment

of these: this is the meaning of the text. Thus, if there was but one soul,

n n ..

. tJlenctH ii1@"It..
(ijl~aq('f) :q"U~1 ... I ~.
q;Cit~ :qIN p.... q;:~
4IAtJiilMetcd ';f 1C11(l",j ~ it ~ ~:(Iii4q;I: ~ ~
ai\:qnhj tJ4N;ft I
t ~:~INiifl"C{: I
t tJa(lrC{aqrnR:w:
'141"( I
1\ e@nQ(ltlMIi\. I
~ "'l(ijlr~:r~q~4Ih( I
~ .mt
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then when one was bom, all would be born; when one died, all would
die; if there was any defect in the vital il)struments of one, such as
deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then aU would be
blind, deaf, dumb, maimed, and halt: but this is not the case; and therefore, from the several apportionment of death, bi~, and instruments of
life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated. Since occupati0ft8 art fUJI at
once vniversal.-Yvgapat means, 'at one time.' Not at once; or, at one
time. Occupatio''': as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not
observed to occur at one moment; but some are busy with virtuous,
others with vicious, actions; some cultivate indifference to the world, and
some acquire true wisdom: therefore, from the non-contemporaneousness
of occupation, multitude of souls is concluded. Also, since qualities ojfect
variously.-From the contrary nature of the qualities multitude of souls
is proved; as, in birth in general, one endowed with the quality of goodness is happy; another with that of foulness is wretched; and a third
having that of darkness is apathetic: hence, therefore, multitude of souls
is proved.
Soul is not agent: this is next declared.
COMMENT.

The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual incorporation of

soul in different bodies, is here maintained.
Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body; death, its
detachment: soul being always existent, and not in itself subject to birth
or death; as in the S. Pravackana Bkdskya -: also the S. Tatwa Kavmudl; 'Life is the combination of soul with the pains incident to body,
&c.; not any modification of soul. Death is the abandonment of those
bodies, &c.; not the destruction of soul t.' The instruments of life are

SC4t"~

;ilrqfWfct:tlsn ,~"f.. tMI"'ICfIi(

t <@fw
anfc(~(:tlf~: '1~"E4\1 ..n ~ ;f " '1~"Qqf(ijJI": , ftill"Cf
I~:ti ql\ilIln 1ro!i ;f Mliit;f\ fct:tl.,: ,
';(l1f

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the organs of perception and action, with egotism and intellect. ' Allotment,' ,"yama, properly' rule, regulation,' is explained by vyavastAa,
which may import' distribution;' as, ' The distribution is in regard to different souls in several bodies .:' so also the S6tra of KAPILA; 'From the
distribution of life, &c.. follows the multitudinousness of soul t.' The term
is especially understood, however, of the distribution which is laid down
by religious and legal authorities, ' a prescribed distribution or allotment,'
as the commentator on the S6tra observes, after stating, 'The virtuous
man is happy in heaven,' &c. (see p. 48), 'Souls are many, as otherwise
there would not be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of
conditions, as is laid down in the Veda and the law t.' If soul were one,
all the accidents, vicissitudes, and interests of existence would simultaneously affect all individuals.
But though manifold, as individualized, this individual BOul is one and
unchanged, through all its migrations into various forms, until its final
liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not that which wears it,
as has been before explained (p.48).
The multiplied existence of BOul is in especial contradiction to the
doctrine of the Vedlwtis, of the universality of one supreme BOul of the
world, from which all human BOuls are derived, as in such texts as this;
, One only existent soul is distributed in all beings; it is beheld collectivelyor dispersedly, like the re6ection of the moon in still or troubled
water. Soul, eternal, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied
by the power of delusion, not of its own nature II.' This is undoubtedly
the doctrine of the Vedas, and the SlLnkhya teachers, who profess to
receive those works as authority, are obliged to interpret the texts

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71
unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner. Thus the Sutra of
KUlLA asserts, 'There is no contradiction (to the doctrine of many souls)
in the unity of the Vedas. from its reference to the comprehensiveness of
genus *:' that is, Soul, considered as genus. is but one; its nature an.d
properties are common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection with individual aggregates of the products of nature. 'Genus
here means community, unity of nature; such is the purport of the
unity of the Vedas; not indivisibility, from the absence of any motive
(for its continuing undivided). This is the meaning of the Sutra t.' The
subject is discussed at considerable length by VIJNANA BBIKSBU; but,
notwithstanding his arguments, it is clear that the Sankhya doctrine is
contradictory to that of the Vedas.
The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Vedas. As far
as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that
human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of
men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls
and bodies were both portions of the 'T~ ~JI, the' one existent,' of the Stoics;
and even Aristotle appears to have conceived the human soul to be an
intellectual energy, derived from an eternal intelligence. Cudworth asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sankhya notion
of the eternity of individual souls. "It doth not follow," he remarks,
" because they held souls to be ingenerable, that therefore they supposed
souls to have existed from all eternity of themselves unmade. This was
never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic theists, who maintained ceternitatem animontm, did, notwithstanding, assert their essential
dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun, as if
they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation, from an
eternal Sun." Intel1. Syst. III. 429.

* ;Uln,f"fq(\," 5tIPnQ(ii411( I
'5I1fit': ~1i11;qi\~Qi'i
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XIX.
And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is
witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.
BHASHYA.
A.nd from tkat contrast: the contrast of the possession of the three
qualities. Contrast: reverse. Soul is void of qualities, is discriminative,
enjoyer, &c. The contrast is that presented by these attributes of soul;
and thence, the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents
(active), it follows that soul is (passive) witness. This sentence is syntactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multitudinousness of
soul. The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists
from action. Again, abstraction (detachment) is an attribute (of soul);
the property of being sole is detachment or abstraction, difference or
distinctness (from all others); that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the
three qualities. Next, being a bystander (is an attribute of soul): the
condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul is a bystander,
like a wandering mendicant: as a vagrant ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does
not act where the qualities are present. Bence also proceed the properties of being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, so~l is a
spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it contemplates).
The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, engage in acts in
the relation of agent and act; not sOul: and in this manner the existence
of soul is demonstrated.
But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition 1 as, I will
practise virtue, I will not commit crime: here soul must be the agent;
for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes cannot be entertained).
This is a dilemma: to explain which it is said-

COMMENT.
In the'preceding verse it was stated that soul was many; in this, its
other attributes are enumerated.

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The conjunction eka,. in the term tamu:lt-eha, connects the sentence
with the preceding, or with bak'Utwam, 'multitudinousness.' The contrast
alluded to is that intimated in ver. 14, and is this: Soul has not the three
qualities, it is discriminative, it is perceptive, it is specific, it is rational,
it is unprolific; being the reverse, in these respects, of nature and its
effects. Not being an object of sense, but percipient of such objects, it
observes and testifies to the existence of nature and its products, like an
evidence in a lawsuit being plaintiff and defendant. 'That which is
irrational cannot observe, and that to which an object is apparent is a
witness -.' Solitariness is 'exemption from the three kinds of pain t ;'
or, in fact, total abstraction from the world: this is the necessary consequence of being devoid of the three qualities, which are essentially the
same with pleasure, pain, and dulness; and from them, therefore, soul is
equally free. From the same cause, absence of qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emotions, proceeds the next property of
soul, that of being a bystander; madkyastka, ' neutral, indifferent, unconcerned;' udasfna, 'neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain.'
Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to activity; and
being without them, soul is consequently inert: the same is considered
to he also the necessary result of its being' discriminative and unprolific,
or unproductivet.' VIJNANA BHIKSHU restricts the term sliltshl,' witness,'
to the sense of ' beholder,' distinguishing it from the other term, to which
such a translation is more applicable, drasktri, as importing one who has
the object near to, or before, his eyes; the latter implies seeing in general:
hence he says, 'Soul witnesses or contemplates buddki (intellect), and
sees the other principles II.'

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xx.
THEREFORE,

by reason of union' with it, insensible' body seems

sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger

appears as the agent.

(s~ul)

..

BHASHYA.
Here soul is said to be possessed of sensation; and in connection with
it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assuming the appearance
of sense seem sentient: as in life, a jar with cold water appears to be
cold, with warm water seems' to be warm; so intellect and the rest, from
union with it, with soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the
active application (of sense), not the soul: for although in common it is
said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent. How so 1
Though tke q'UJlities be active, (soul) tke stranger appears as the agent.
There being activity of the qualities, soul, which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent; which it is not. Here is an illustration: as a man who is not a thief, being taken up along with thieves,
is suspected to be a thief also; so soul, being connected with the three
active qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also.
In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, imperceptible, and
thinking principles (ver. 2. p. 13) has been explained; from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is next expounded why the
union of the two (chief) principles, nature and soul, takes place.
COMMENT.

It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul, and not, as it
appears to do, in the products of nature; and that activity resides in the
qualities, not, as it appears to do, in soul.
The term cMtana, from c/tit, 'to reBect,' means in general 'reason,
intelligence;' but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every
faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of
soul only, as will be more distinctly made clear when the functions of the
senses, of consciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn

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to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions
are conveyed. They seem, however, to act independently, but this is
merely from their Uni011, with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul;
samyoga being explained by the commentators to mean here merely
sannidluina, 'approximation: In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active, mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active
through a similar contiguity. 'I am sentient; wishing to do, I do: here
a common origin or subject of action and reflection is apprehended*:
S. Tatwa Kaumudi. But this is an error, as the site or subject of action
and reflection is distinct t. The term linga in the first line is explained
to denote ma"at and the subtile products of prad/ulna. Uddslna, ' indifferent,' is said also to mean 'inert to'
But it appears that there are passages in the Vedas and in the lawbooks which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to budd"i II: and to
meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, ' Agency from
affection, intelligence from propinquity ~;' that is, 'The apparent agency
of soul is from the affection (or operation) of budd"i; the apparent intel
ligence of budd"i (understanding) is from the proximity of soul; neither
is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire and iron
in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the
former from the latter ~.' S. Prav. S. In like manner the S. Ckandrikrl
exemplifies the doctrine by reference to buddki, the organ of the understanding; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which cketana,

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76
, intelligence,' is to be understood: 'Thence the effect (of pradlu1na), the
category buddlti, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to
be that which says) I know, becomes as it were endowed with knowledge -:' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This,
however, applies equally to aU the other products of nature, as far as to
the subtile rudiments, whether individua11y considered, or as composing
subtile body t. They are all non-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their
activity depends on combination with the qualities; their sentient power
on proximity to soul: and the conjoint presence of these two properties
leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.

XXI.
the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction,
the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that
union -a creation is framed.
FOR

BHASHYA.

The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of nature);
that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other
effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of
nature with soul; and the same ~nion, which is also for the abstraction
(of the latter), is like the association of tlte /talt and blind. As, a lame man
and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their
way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to
inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of
walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the
- --------------

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'77

blind man's shoulders, and was th1lS carried on his journey, whilst the
blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion.. ID the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that.of
moving'; it is like the lame man: the faculty of moving, but not of seeing,
is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a
separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when
their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's
end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and
soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between
them is dissolved.
Again, By that, by that union,.a creation is framed.-As the birth of a
child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of
creation results from the connection of nature and soul.
The text next describes the particulars of all the products of nature.
COMMENT.

The object of the union of soul and nature, or the final liberation of
the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here explained.
, Contemplation,' darsana, is considered to comprise' fruition,' bkoga.
As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection, it can neither enjoy nor
observe; and its existence would be therefore without an object, unless
there were some other one capable both of observation and fruition .
This other one is soul. But, again, as. pain is inseparable from nature,
so enjoyed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed from the combinat~on;
and this detachment, or the liberation of purified soul, necessarily requires some one from which to be liberated: that some one is nature:
consequently, for the fulfilment of their respective ends--the fruition of
nature, and liberation of soul-their mutual cooperation and combination
are essential. 'Abstraction,' kaivalya, is explained by V1CHESPATI, 'The
cause of the attribution of separation to purified soul, which cannot be

~ 1OO;:i ~1"1(41ifi{41 ~ ~

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without previous union with nature -.' But these results cannot be attained without the evolution of the products of nature, and consequently
.they assume their several developments, or, in other words, a creation is
fra'llU!A/,; as it is only in the state of discrete principles that nature is to
be contemplated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the
same, and of their source, that soul can detach itself from nature. For
both purposes, therefore, the world must exist, as developed from its
material cause.
There are passages in the Vedas, however, attributing creation to soul;
as, 'That was from it-From this soul was ether produced t.' To this it
is replied, that all that is herein intended is the attribution of the act of
the inferior, or nature, to the superior, soul: 'As in the world it is said.
that a king triumphs or is defeated, when it is not he, but his army, that
suffers a defeat or achieves a victory to'S. Prav. Sara.

XXII.
nature issues the great one; thence egotism; and from
this the sixteenfold set: from five among the sixteen proceed five
elements.
FROM

BH.ASHYA.

su-

Nature (p,.akriti) is also termed' the chief one' (pradluina), 'the

preme' (bra/nne), 'the undistinguished' (avyaktam) , 'the multi-comprehending' (bakudhamika) and ma!la. Such are its synonymes. From that
which is devoid of characteristic attributes, or from (crude) nature, the
great one (maltat) is produced: this is also termed' intellect' (budtlki); it
is also called as'ltri, or' demoniac;' mati, or' understanding;' 'notoriety'

e"''1~t4Id1"I@uF"r.. ct~ ~ ~ e"''!~t4Id1"I@Urft: JNr.I

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79
(kAyati), 'knowledge' (jntlna), 'wisdom' (prajM). From thence proceeds
egotism, also called ' the origin of the elements,' &c. (bkutadi), ' th~ luminous' (taijasa), 'the modified' (vaikrita), 'conscience' (abkimana). From
tAis tM aia:teenfold aet.-From tkis, from egotism, the class of sixt~en is
derived. This consists of the five subtile elements, or the archetypes of
sound, touch, form, :flavour, and odour: the synonymes of tafl-matra are
all words denoting' subtile' (suksAma): also the eleven organs, the ear,
the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, which are the five organs of perception; the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and
generation, which are the five organs of action; and, besides these, mind,
making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and sensation.
These constitute the class of sixteen produced from egotism. From jifJe
amO'1lK tM aia:teen.-From the five subtile elements proceed the five gross
elements: as it is said, "From the archetype sound, ether is produced;
from touch, air; from form, light (or fire); from :flavour, water:; from
odour, earth: and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements
proceed.'~ As also it is said, " From discriminative knowledge of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the -thinking soul (see ver. 2)

liberation is obtained." Now, therefore, intellect and the rest, to the

gross elements inclusive, forming twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text); the undiscrete principle has been described (see
ver. 15, 16); and soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19); and these constitute the twen.ty-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the
Sankhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe to be composed of these principles-called tatwa8, from the abstract of tad,.' that,'
implying the abstract existence of those principles-as it is said, " He
who knows the twenty-five principlel, whatever order of life he may have
entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven,
he is liberated: of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The twenty-five
categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the five subtile (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of se.nsation and of action, and the
. five gross elements.
It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues tAe g1'eat one. What is
meant by that great one is next defined.

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COMMENT.

The categories of the Sankhya system have been before alInded to

(ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual relations, and of the properties which they have in common, or by which they are discriminated
from one another; but we have them here enumerated in. the order . . of
their production, as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of
their functions contained in the following stanzas.
The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattwa, or /as usually
and with equal correctness written tatwa, is explained by GAURAPADA to
mean 'the abstract existence,' astitwa*, ot',rrla, essentia, of tatt, THAT; that
thing, which is the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a
real existence, and must be known. The more common etymology, tat,
'that,' and twam, 'thou,' belongs to the Vedanta system; as in the Ma/u1va/cya, tat-twam asi, ' that (supreme soul) thou art,' implies the identity
of universal and individualized spirit.
We have in -the schoUa of GAURAPADA on this stanza some synonymes
of nature and the two first principles, the analys!s of which elucidates
the ideas entertained of them by the'Sankhyas. The succeeding stanzas
will afford an .opportunity of adverting to the terms used for intellect and
egotism, and we may here confine the inquiry to the synonymes of
nature, or matter.
Prakriti, as has been previously mentioned (p. 17), intimates, that
which precedes, or is prior to, making; that which is not made from any
thing else. It is also used relatively, to signify that which is the source
from which a product is derived; so that maltat is the prakriti of alul'II,kara,
&c. (see p. 18). Here, however, our business is with the primary source
, of all. material products, and the term indicates merely that which preceded (pra) production (kriti); what that may have been is left wholly
undefined or unimplied by the particular term. The same may be said
of it agreeably to another etymology given in the Sankkya Sara, where

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pra is interpreted by prakrisAta, 'principal, chief, best,' analogously to
its other denomination, pradluina, 'the chief.' Pradluina is derived from
pra, 'principal,' and dlui, 'to. hold:' 'that in which all generated effect
, is comprehended.' The next synonyme, avyakta, 'the unseparated,
the undistinguished, the unperceived,' has been also previously noticed
(p.41) as derived from anja, 'to make clear,' with vi, separative preposition, and the negative a prefixed: the term i~ of as frequent occurrence
as either of the/preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme o!J1rakriti in the Pur~nas and ill Manu. BraAme, which is to be carefully
distinguished from BraAma, the personified creative power, is ordinarily
applied either to the Vedas or supreme spirit, and is an uncommon synonyme of prakriti; but. as derived from vriAa, 'to increas~,' it implies
the'first principle of which the expansion becomes all perceptible objects.
BalmdAanaka is derived, like pradAana, from dAa, to hold;' dkanaka,
'the holder' or 'comprehender' of baku, 'much', of all things. Maya, in
its ordinary sense of' illusion,' is applied to prakriti, not by the Sankhyas,
for they maintain the reality of existing things, but by the Vedantis and
Pauranikas, who regard creation as a delusion or as a sport of the Creator:
it is derived from the root ma, 'to measure,' and may here perhaps imply
either' comprehension,' like pradAana, or 'extension.' There is no explanation of the term by any oftheScholiasts. 'VIJNANA BHIKSHU quotes
the Vedas to shew that it is synonymous with prakriti t. In the Sankkya
Sara we have other synonymes, as, sakti, ' power,' 8vvap.tr; aja, 'the unborn, the un produced ;' tamas,' darkness;' and avidya, 'ignorance II.'
Now what is to be considered as the sense of these words 1 By what
equivalent is prakriti to be best rendered? Professor Lassen translates
it procreatria:, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality,
and therefore, although very well agreeing with the origin~ term as used
by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can

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scarcely be considered as indicative of that which not only produces, but

is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance of all
things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term sometimes by 'nature,'
and sometimes by 'matter:' the former expresses both the parent and the
progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subject of prosopopeia.
It is therefore preferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language can offer. At the ~ame time the correct equivalent is' matter,'
materia, qtUlSi mater, 'the substance and source of material things;' not,
however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the
Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither
parts, nor form, nor sense, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of
body, was yet the one universal, incorporeal, invisible substance from
which all bodies were derived. tuo 8~ T~II TOU 'YryOlloTo~ opaTOU Kat '7f'allTCdr
atu8".,.ou p.".,.epa Kat inro8oX~1I P.-/rrE 'Yijll P.-/rrE aepa P.~TE np P.~TE ~8Cdp >"e,,/wp.EII, P.-/rrE

..

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do

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8ex.e~.

Timreus. See also the Physics, b. III. c. 6. That we are to understand this of the prakriti of the Sankhyas is evident from the meaning of
its several appellations. It is also said by VIJNANA BHIKSHU, that' the
world is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiality *: 'It is not individual or formal, but universal material to'S. Pro
Bhashya. Its invisibility is, as we have seen (ver.8. p. 29), attributed, not to
its non-existence, but to its subtilty (saukshmya). Prakriti is also defined
the equilibrium of the three qualitiest;' and here it differs from the
subject matter of Aristotle in having qualities. These qualities, however,
whilst prakriti is yet unevolved, neutralize each other, and are scarcely
qualities as regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or
their activity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as separate
from its products. So far, however, prakriti may be considered as different from the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces

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88
products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore
more akin to the " plastic nature that acts, ~.,ua TOU, for the sake of something." In the Sankhya system, however, such nature is not distinct
from matter itself, whilst it appears to be a different principle in the
writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly
described; for, as Cudworthobse"es of Aristotle," he nowhere declares of
this nature of his, whether it be corporeal- or incorporeal, substantial or
accidt:mtal." To conclude, we are to understand of the prakriti of the
Sankhyas, primary, subtile, universal substance, undergoing modification
through its own energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest
as individual and formal substance, varied according to the predominance
of qualities, which are equipoised and inert in the parent, and unequal
and active in the progeny.

XXIII.
ASCERTAINMENT

is intellect.

Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and

power are its faculties, partaking of goodness.

Those partaking of

darkness are the reverse.

I

BHASHYA.
The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning,
determining) is ascertainment: as in the seed the future germinating
shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is
cloth: that intellect which will so determine is so defined. This intellect
has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and
darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness, is of four
kinds, virtue, lmowledge, dispassion, power. Virtue comprises humanity,
benevolence, and acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama). The
former are said in the Patanjala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood,
of dishonesty, of incontinence, and of avarice: the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and
worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonymes, manifestation, cer-

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tainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal. The former is
(knowledge of) the Vedas and their six subordinate branches, recitation,
'ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy; also (of) the puranas,
and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature
and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness: this is soul, perfect, devoid of
qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired; by internal knowledge, liberation.
Dispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the
indifference of one who contemns sensible. objects from observing their
defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them; the inconvenience of attachment to them; their liability to decay; and the injustice
they cause. The latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream.
Power is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being: it is
eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness,
reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose.
Atomic existence is meant by , minuteness;' so that a person becoming
atomically subtile or minute may traverse the world: 'magnitude' is said
of one who may make himself a giant: 'lightness' is having limbs like
the fibres of the lotus stalk. or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon
the tops of the filaments of a flower: 'reach' is attainment of a desired
object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may. be :
, gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting whatever is desired: 'dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a king: 'subjugation' is having
all things subject: 'irresistible purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and
motion of all things, from Brahma to a block, agreeably to the will of the
person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness are
overcome by that of goodness.
But those partaking of darkness are the reverse.-When intellect is influenced by the quality of darkness, then its four properties are the reverse
of the above; they are, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. In this
manner intellect having eight members, as i~ is affected by goodness or

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foulness, is produced 'from the undiscrete principle having the three

qualities.
Intellect has thus been explained. Egotism is next described.
COMMENT.
The :first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by its
properties.
Intellect (btuld1&i) is ad1&yavasaya. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory
equivalent for this word, nor to understand precisely what is meant by it.
In the .Amera Kos!&a it occurs as a synonyme of Ut8tikat, 'effort, strenuous and continued effort, perseverance;' according to RAMASRAMA, 'possessing great powerl.' He derives it from s1&o antaiarmmani II, 'finishing,
making end of,' with adki , 'over,' and ava~,' off;' that is, entirely or
absolutely ending or effecting; as in the Hitopadisa: 'The precepts of
knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion:
of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach":
In the Mittiks!&ara, utsalta is explained, ' Effort (or perseverance) in the
performance of acts accomplishing the objects of man tt.' In the Bkatti
Kavya we have the word used in the sense of ' wish, purpose, determination:' 'The bird said to the monkeys, You have not studied the law, if at
such a season you wish (or resolve) to die tto'
In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vis1&aya ad1&yavasaya HII,
, ascertainment of several objects,' was given as the definition of dris1&ia,

iJtYlCielll: I
t :a~t(: I
"u1f~ I
;af\t I
~ iJt"Cf I

t iJtfriij",,~

-ofri fctilli1rctAiTU ft I ~ N

~ lI(Tq: I

II

lit ;aiR'

.. ~ (4E'4i1C4U1Cielll4tU:

((iinMf4.*ltnm

Aq;lijIlNt1

tt ,E"It1el"t:lq;u1I~S1IiICielll: I
tt SI'"(
'qlt:lO"l qfl t:lIUI,ftut . - : I
IIwtu( USr~t:lcq
CiQiii I

1111

1fi etftri

APriFq"IIIU1Cielll: I
z

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'perception;' and the explanation of the Scholiast, lnMldkiv!JaptIra jntiMm,
'knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty,' was cited
(p.23). The same commentator, VACHESPATI, here defines it. 'the specific
function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself;' or, to quote the passage at length, ' Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and
the agent, as will be explained. Every one who engages in any matter first
observes, or considers; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this;
and then determines, this is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act:
this is familiar to every one. Thence this ascertainment that such act is
to be done is the determination of intellect, which is as it were endowed
with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the
specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the
definition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its
generic and specific distinctions t.'
The explanation of the S. Ckandrika is to the same effect: 'Adk!Javasa!la is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp;
it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me t.'
These explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention,
or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection; but the
determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not
necessarily signify that it shall be done: it is only the conclusion or
ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not
indispensably connected with the notion of will; as in the example given

,fWUUql<.,I;:f I
t 'lllCiQqEUan .,-fW: I f1pn fliCilqM(i%
(f~qtlCiI fat oqq(tl 'IIIlMleq iiMI(iiAtyR '(Rlf~ 'toq~
H~if4U4qQf" nn"Aqtn
Ml,few I n ~s1i q;vioqftrit
fctf~"CiAafter."I"'I(lq"'''n''CilCiI
~S",qelan ,W(fll'fR
(ijiillql(ij~ .,-fW: ~ ';f ,WMtlcti eiil"'leiil"51liftCiiilq:~
.Ui( I
t 'lllCiQqelan ~ ,Wiilfi1if4I'IU.... an ~qA:i4q

1frr

,fWqf((!lIiilq(ijilr~i)E4: I

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by GAURAPADA; where, in the simple conclusion after consideration, "this
object is a jar; that, is a piece of cloth," no wish, or will, is indicated; no
act follows. It is clear also that he considers ad"yavasaya merely as the
functions of intellect in exercise: they are in intellect, and part of it, as
the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an
instrument; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed
through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the S. Pravackan4
BIuIs"ya, which explains ad"yavasaya, ' the synonyme, as well as buddki,
of the great principle (makat) , and its specific function denominated
ascertainment . '
The other synonymes of this principle are, lnuld"i, derived from
lnul", 'to know,' 'knowing, intellect.' Makat, , great, the great principie;' 'The first and most important of the
, products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the wholet.' .A.sunt: this is a very unusual and
questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. Bluiskya, and may
be an error, perhaps for semuski, one of the synonymes of budd"'i in the
A.mera koska. It cannot be connected with asura, ' a demon,' as if the
faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jnyana, ' true knowledge.' There is no good reason why it should be derived from AsURI,
the pupil of KAPILA, unless allusion is made to sOme personification of
intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given
in the Bluiskya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one entitled
to any confidence. Mati means' understanding:' manyate anaya, that
by which any thing is understood. Kkyati properly signifies 'fame,'
but here means ' notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge;' as in the Smriti,

it(WMEat q.alan Gjf.f(if4il1CWel4411ii f.. 1Iii441@6IE4lel\lI(4dl

"filf<if4tl: I
it..,aij I

t it(:;4 ~"(\1'M'I.a iqIQ*IPii@".aI'l

t "I'~ I
..

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'The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are
always produced -.' Jnya,w. is usually the term for 'true or divine knowledge;' knowledge of matter and spirit leading to liberation; but it is
here employed in its generic purport, 'that by which things are known.'
The same may be said of prajna, which is also commonly used in the
sense of' true wisdom,' but here implies merely, 'that by which knowledge is obtained,' prajnayat~ anaya, as RAlIrIAsRAlIrIA expounds it. Several
of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application, bear an
analogy to the "oUr of Aristotle, and the cpp&""trtr of Plato. M. Cousin
considers the category to be' une sorte d'ame du monde.' It is, however,
the instrument most proximate to soul, by which the latter perceives,
wills, and acts.
Intellect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The
former are, 'virtue,' dAerma; 'knowledge,' jnyana; 'dispassion,' tJairagya;
and' power,' aiswaryya. The latter are their negatives, 'vice,' ad!&erma;
, ignorance,' ajnyana; 'passion,' atJairagya; and' weakness,' anaiswaryya.
These again comprehend specific varieties.
DAerma, 'virtue,' according to the S. BM'''ya, comprehends morality
and religion. The S. Tatwa Ka'UmutU explains it, 'The cause of happiness and liberation to' As the source of prosperity and happiness in life,
it is the discharge of religious and moral obligations!; as the means of
liberation, it is the observance of the eightfold yoga, or eiglit modes of
contemplative devotion II. Jnyana, or 'knowledge,' is defined by the
same Scholiast to be, ' distinct notion of the difference between the three
qualities and soul .' 'Dispassion,' tJairagya, is the extinction of raga,
colour,' or passion, which like dyes of various hues tinctures the soul1T.'

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'Power,' aiawaryya, is the possession of superhuman faculties. It is
always termed eightfold, even in the S. BMsA!la, although nine varieties
are there named: one of them, however, 'heaviness,' garim.tl.'lJ, finds no
place among the definitions given there, any more than in other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under the faculty of magnitude.
The four first faculties, 'minuteness,' anima; 'lightness,' lagAima;
, reach,' prapti; and' magnitude,' makima; are explained and illustrated
every where much in the same way. According to VACHESPATI, the
person endowed with the first can make his way into a solid rock: with
the second, he may ascend to the solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as
Moore has it, "may dance on a beam of the sun:" with the third, he can
touch the moon with the tip of his finger: and with the fourth, he may
exp~d himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are
less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded: the shades of dif.
ference are indeed so slight, that they may all be resolved into one, ' absolute power over matter.' 'Gratification of will,' pro'/u1m!la, is generally
defined by ickchkdnabkigkdta, 'unobstruction of wish;' or, as explained
by HEMACHANDRA, in his commentary en his own Lexicon, ' The wishes
of a person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties of
material nature, such as form and the like; so that he can swim, dive,
or float in earth as readily as in watert.' This is sometimes adduced in
illustration of the meaning of the next faculty, but less accurately. That,
is termed vasita, which VACHESPATI defines, 'absolute subjugation of the
elements and elementary beings t.' The Ckanilrika makes it ' independance on matter II,' which is much the same as prakam!la; and a similar
confusion occurs in RAMAsRAMA'S commentary on AMEBA, for he illustrates
it by , swimming or diving on dry land .' 'Subjugation of nature' is the
usually accepted import; as HEMACHANDRA, ' Thus as (with this faculty)

~:

tt"''155tfit f.... 55tP"

II ~ngW1qt.. ". I

t ~ ttn(q~ihi:(Qlf~f~"ISfi:t("ift
CI,"~' I.
t ~ 'CI1ft' ~qRlq,,~ 1
~ ~.... ct'f'+155tf~ .. 55t~ I
Aa

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anyone determines the elements shall be, so they remain -o' The next
faculty is ' dominion,' fSita. According to VACHESPATI, it is ' disposition
at will of the production, arrangement, and expenditure of the elements
and elementary beings t.' NARA.YANA explains it, 'directing or impelling
them at will t.' RAMAsRAMA interprets it prabAutwa, 'dominion, sovereignty; under which inanimate things obey command II.' The last
faculty is termed yatrakamtivaSa!lita. In RAMASRAMA'S commentary he
reads the word kamtivaSa!lita ; and the only variety he notices is that of
the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the dental, instead of the
palatal letter 11". According to the latter reading it is derived from S"'.,
'to sleep;' to the former, from 8M tt, 'to destroy:' in either, with ava
prefixed, meaning, as RAMAsRAMA explains it, 'he who tranquillizes or
destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires no' The reading of GAURAPADA is, however, yatrakamtivasa!lita, as one compound; and the common
definition of the term is 'true (infallible) purposellll,' wherever exercised:
'Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be
complied with by that which is the subject of his purpose; the elements
themselves must conform to his designs o' The CAandrika has, ' Whatever the will proposes, that it obtains1l"1fo' HEMACHANDRA, in his text,
gives the word as in the B/uJ.skya, !latrakamtivasayitwam; and explains it,
'he who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be directed"':'
and he illustrates it by saying that' an arhat, or Bauddha saint, can, by
-------------------------

lr.f

111fT mf;r ('1fti&U i{l f;f ) lI'd <4(*111 q II fn "'II q fn e aft I

t ~fH'Ie:ti A\t<4'l(&iIlIe:tIa:ftl I
t ~fHqile:ti \i~"1
~~ I
II ~ 'te:t(4QI<4(IClIlijlQ;lf(9: I
i:AJnl '<4'AJ
ill ~ '"" 'lill<4iHfilnl I
11" Q;lill<4\tIP4nl I
...... ~ t
tt
I
U q;.iI 1e:t<4iift-iII<4QfH <4 I I
1111 \t",\i~nl I
1{'II(:i11 ~ ~
liH1f.. ~<4f", I
11"11" IIMilil
6I(OIElIfH ftfAlMOt I
... 11""1 il6I 'II i OIt:Cuft fH I

..n

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virtue of this faculty, convert poison into ambrosia, and administer it as
means of vitality -.'

XXIV.
CONSCIOUSNESS

is egotism.

Thence proceeds a twofold creation.

The elevenfold set is one: the five elemental rudiments are the
other.
BHASHYA.
Pke eleven/old set: the eleven organs. Pke five elemental nuliments:
elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments, sound, touch, form,
llavour, and odour. What sort of creation proceeds from that which is
thus defined is next explained.
COMMENT.

The third category is here specified, and described as the source of

the senses and their respective objects.
The term here given as the synonyme and definition of' egotism,'
alw:,,;,tira t, is abkimdna t, translated ' consciousness.' The ordinary sense
of both words is pride, and the technical import is 'the pride or conceit
of individuality;' 'self-sufficiency;' the notion that' I do, I feel, I think,
I am,' as explained by VACHESPATI: 'I alone preside and have power
over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are
for my use. There is no other supreme except I; I AM. This pride,
from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egotism II.' The principle, therefore, is something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness,

fC1ti1itCll'1"'11q \'i~M ~ llC4cUftP" I

t .. @"'I(: I

t~: I
1\ ~ CS(CIIIMlr'i4R 1fii ';f ""I@it~: 1JW\:
CS(CII@it .. ~ 4!C4ltft r~tilC4t: """ ;iilwn ... IR1yR: "'N(QlI@it
~ 1its~: mS~I((ij6ijC4@I(MI<:@"(: I

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or conscunce. It might be better expressed, perhaps, by 'Ie moi,' as it
"",,,,,,,,r ..,,n of
notion of
t'idds to the
concen tratKnn
and feelingKK
dwidual.
The other Q,T1nr""",'~'~' of this cat:en4KKKKn
rather
it, as the next stanza intimates. Taijasa,' the active' or 'the ardent,'
from tijas, ' light, splendour, ardour,' refers to its animating or exciting
influence on human actions, in connection with the quality of foulness.
Bkutadit, 'primitive element; and vaikritat, 'the modified,' as explained
the BkasitlJi:Z,
:next verse,
deing, in COlln4:~n'iltmKK
Klarkness and
the principle
the organs
sense procK:K'KI
must not
that this
K:dotism or
has a phyKKiK'7nl,
metaphysicfKI
according to the Sankhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by
which the impression of individuality is conveyed to soul. It is in this
capacity that it may be considered the primary element, the parent of
the rudiments of the elements, or the objects of sense, and of the
which thed
It is,
same with
is only by
the objects
'%KKe can becomn f:f?lt'iKKs:';:iKKiTI:Rn

xxv.
FROM

affected

ntevenfold set

as a dark

@4:articles:
both
,

that

proceedKK thn
being, come
by fOUha:KK:KKKK,

BHASHYA.
When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and foulness,
that egotism is of the pure kind; the name of which, according to ancient

t If"lf~!

t~: I

98
teachers, was vaikrita, ' the modified: From this modified egotism the
class of eleven organs is produced. Tke good set: perfect organs; adequate to their functions: the set is thence called good. Again; from it,
a a dark origin of heings, cJ--c.-When darkness predominates in egotism
over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called dark, or, as it was
named by the old masters, 'primitive element," hhfJ.tlldi. From it come
elementary particles; the fivefold set. The first element of the elements
is darkness; therefore it is usually called tke dark: from that primitive
element the fivefold rudimental set proceed. Both issue from tkat principle tdfected by foulness: that is, the egotism in which foulness predominates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination taijasa, ' the
active;' and from that both proceed; both the eleven organs and five
rudiments. For the pure egotism, which is vaikrita, 'the modified,' becoming so modified, produces the eleven organs: but to do this it takes
active egotism for its assistant; for pure (satwika) egotism is inert, and is
only able to produce the organs when co~bined with the active. In like
manner the dark egotism, or that which is called' primitive element,' is
inert, and becomes active only in union with the active, when it produces
the five rudiments. Therefore it is said, both the organs of sense and
their objects issue from the modification of egotism affected by foulness.
The good elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which is
affected by the quality of goodness. They are next particularized.
COMMENT.

The products of egotism are here described as proceeding from three

modifications of that principle, varied by the influence of the three
qualities.
The terms used to designate the' pure,' or satwika principle; the
'dark,' or tamasa; and the 'foul,' or rajasa; 'variety of egotism,' or
vaikrita, hhutadi, and taijasa; have been explained. According to our
text, as understood by the Scholiasts, the eleven organs of sense issue
from pure or modified egotism, and the five rudiments from elemental
egotism; both being influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The
commentator on the S. Pravackana has a rather different explanation,

Bb

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interpreting ~kada8aka, 'eleventh,' not' elevenfold:' according to him,
this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind of egotism; the
other ten from the second kind; and the elements from the third. "Svtra:
The pure eleventh (organ) proceeds from modified egotism. Comment:
Eleventh, is mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is
of the quality of goodness; therefore it is born from egotism, affected by
goodness, called t1ailtrita. This is the sense. Hence it follows, that from
egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the other ten organs of sense; and
from egotism, affected by darkness, proceed the rudiments""." This interpretation he defends by the authority of the law-books and Puranas;
and he gives a similar tum, although rather indistinctly expressed, to the
text of the Karilta. In the stanzas subsequent to this, to ver.37, the
organs of sense are fully described, and in ver.38. the text returns to the
elements. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any explanation
of them in this place. There is a remarkable expression in the BIuisAya,
which presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies. GAURAPADA
says, 'the first of the elements was darknesst.' It is the first of the
'elements,' not the first of' things;' for it was preceded by unevolved
nature, and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality. It
. therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to elementary or visible creation, when " chaos was, and night," and when
N ullus adhuc Mundo prrebebat lumina Titan,
Nee nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phrebe.

In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the word rajas
has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to the doctrine of an active
principle, the moving mind, the eros, that set inert matter into motion, and
produced created things.

~I""
fi

~ '1<>'" ',~
~ 'I
Act H ~.
ctl'HI<>t'I(I( II ll'I<>'JI"I\(4.U

~ 1R: ''''tiQlii4'I(QiIIi4 ~lfiaI'iIIHWitHI( ~lfiaI'ni'I(lriI'''H

t.Rt'l: I iii Hiii (I ""~ 1@'I(I((j fi{Ci I f4Q H,iII~ I@',O. H........ I qft rq Rt
'I'it&{ I

t l1nlll4Ii11lf<'1.n(dill: I

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XXVI.
INTELLECTUAL

organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue,

and the skin: those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory
organ, and that of generation.

BHAsHYA.
Reckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs are called
'intellectual.' Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin: thence
the term for the skin which is used (in the text), 'that which touches,'
sparsanaka. Intellectual organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five objects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Tlwse of
aetion, etc.-They perform acts, whence they are called' organs of action :'
thus, the voice articulates; the hands variously manipulate; the feet
effect motion; the excretory organ, excretion; and the sexual organ,
generation. Thus are enumerated ten organs, five of intellect and five
of action. The character and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next
described.
COMMENT.
The five instruments or means of perception and five of action, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza.
The term' organs' is correctly applicable to the material instruments
by which perception is exercised; but it is not to be understood of the
gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye, ear, hand, &c., which are parts of
gross body. The word' senses' would therefore be a less equivocal term,
only that it does not so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which,
though subtile, is substantial. The original word, indri!la, is defined to
mean whatever relates or belongs to indra, said to be a synonyme of soul,
the senses being indicative, being marks or sigQS, of the presence of soul-:

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accordingly each is denominated a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication -.'

XXVII.
(IN this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of
action). It ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the
rest. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and
so are external diversities.
BH.A.SHYA.
Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be botA. Among
the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and among those of action
. it is an organ of action also. As it performs the function of the organs
of sensation and of those of action it belongs to both. It ponders (or purposes); whence the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate
with the rest; for such is the meaning of the word sadkermya. The organs
of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced, along with mind,
from egotism affected by goodness, have this (property, of origin) in
common with mind; and from this common property mind is an organ
likewise.
Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by goodness.
What, then, is the function (vritti) of mind? Reflection (sankalpa) is its
function. Sound and the ~est are the functions of the organs of sensation.
Speech and the rest are the functions of the organs of action. Now
are
,
these various organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Iswara J
or are they self-generated? since nature, intellect, and egotism, are devoid
of sense; and soul is devoid of action. Thence, according to the S{mkhya
doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the cause (of the variety of the senses).
Therefore it is added, TAey are numerous by specific modification of qualities,
and so are external diversities: that is, the several objects of these eleven

. "

'.

'

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organs, or sound, toucb, form, ft.avour, and odour, wbicb are the objects
of five; speech, manipulati~n, motion, excretion, and generation, tbe
objects of other five; and reft.exion, the object of mind; these all proceed
from specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special difference) of such modifications of the qualities tbe multifariousness of the
organs proceeds, as well as the diversity
of external objects: consequently
,
this variety is not the work of Iswara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor
of nature, nor of soul; but from modification of the qualities, produced
by spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the result of
a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient (unconscious or
irrational). How then does it take place 1 This, as will be afterwards
explained, is in like manner as the secretion of milk is for the growth of
the calf, so tbe proceedings of nature take place for the liberation of soul,
without soul's being cognizant of them; so the unconscious qualities become modified by tbe existence of the eleven organs, and tbeir varieties
are tbence derived. Hence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for tbe
purpose of looking up to heaven; and in like manner the nose, the ear,
the tongue are commodiously situated for tbe apprehension of their respective objects: the organs of action are also distributed conveniently
for the discharge of their several duties of tbeir own nature, through the
modification of the qualities, not as their objects; as it is elsewhere said,
" Qualities abide in qualities; that which is the function of the qualities
is their object." External diversities, therefore, are to be regarded as
made by the qualities: this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature
is the cause.
The several functions of the organs are next specified.
COMMENT.
After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and of action,
this verse explains how it is that there are various organs and objects of
sense; and it is said to depend in both cases upon specific modifications
of the qualities of nature.
Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its function is
,an,kalpa, a word that more commonly means' resolve, purpose, expectacc

aayerlsche
StaatablbllCilhek
Mlinchen

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tiOl};' as in the Hitopadisa, 'the crow,' LagAu.patanaka, says, 'All has
heen heard by me; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends *..
And MENU: 'Desire is the root of expectation; sacrifice is its productt:'
or, as KULLUKA BHATTA explains it, 'Sanltalpa is understanding to this
effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected
In both passages the notion of 'conclusion from foregone premises' is
conveyed, and that seems to be its meaning here. Thus VACHESPATI
explains it: 'The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an
organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicable II.' Again,
it is said, " First, knowledge or perception is simple (inconsiderate), like
the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like: it is produced by the
mere thing; but when" after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding,
and intellect is in accordance with perception, that period (or interval) of
determination is the operation of the mind'" Here, then, sanltalpa is the
process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception,
so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality
and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception
and action; perceiving the objects presented by the senses, and forming
them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of
organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness; and consequently it consists of the same material ~.
The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very
intel1igible. The variety of the senses and of the objects of the senses is

t.

-,w 1Rf ~
~1I Hii4i f1~.
QHicU.,. ~~\itau

....m

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t 4i~iiM:
~ 1RfT: 4i+N~~: I
"'~(ijl (cf'4t
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t .~ ...

I ..,.
Mlf:f4Hf'4f'(lt(ij C4ftq~'1f" ~""\lf'4e:ffq :tC4f'4fn ~RI" ~

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said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the
three qualities. V ACHESPATI understands the allusion to external objects
to be merely illustrative; that is, the internal organs are diversified by
modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects
are varied by the same modification-:' and the translation follows this
explanation. In the Blulshya a different reading in the original occurred,
which would require the passage to be rendered, ' and from variety of
external objects t :' thus ascribing the diversity of the organs, not only
to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects,
which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argument,
although GAURAPADA is somewhat obscure; but the variety is noticed
and admi~ted by the author of the Chandrikat.
The S. Pravachana Bhaskya considers the multifariousness spoken of in
theS6tra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Karika,
as restricted to mind: 'Multifariousness is from modification of qualities,
as the variety of human condition (is from various association): that is, as
the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the
influence of his associations; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage
with sages, a different person with others; so mind, from its connection
with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of
the organs with which it is severally associated II.' The association of
mind with the organs is intimated by the Vedas, as in the text,' My mind
was elsewhere, I did not hear .' The very illustration used by Locke:
-- --~~ -.-. -----------------

~ @! 1"it {lij 1f'('f ~~ ij.f~ ne:cftRilij: I

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lrcf

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;n:: e"4~liiC''''M ~ "f11;fl~'" i( ~~ P. (~QHf.("s",
,ifOI lrcf ~s,", :q~(lfcte'''i( -:q?1(IVJ~~Pf ~ .. ,rc{1rt
f<4NJtn4l' ;n;n ~ I
iIlifOl ........ ' w~ci .. ,tWltiif... fH ,

e ...

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"A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some
objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon
the organ of hearing: therefore it is evident that perception is only when
the mind receives the impression," says the English philosopher; and
the Hindu infers, that' the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense,
even for perception, as they would otherwise be incapable of performing
their functions:
The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from consciousness,
intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense,
a sensori'Um, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose description of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well
enough with the Hindu notion:
Primum; animum dieo mentem quam Slepe dicamus
Esse bominis partem nibilo minus ac manus ac pes
Atque oculei, partes animantes totius exstant.
LUCRBTIVS, 111.94.

XXVIII.
THE

function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observa-

tion only.

Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are

the functions of five (other organs).

BHASHYA.
The term' only' (mat,.a) is to be understood in the sense of specialty,
or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, " Alms only
are received;" that is, nothing else is received. Thus the eyes are
observant of colour (form), not of flavour and the rest; and so of the

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other tenses. And in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision);'
of the tongue, taste; of the nose, smell; of the ear, sound (hearing); of
the skin, touch: these are the functions of the intellectual organs. Speecl
a'Ml tie rut (are the functions) of the five organs of action; or, speech is
the function of the voice (la,.,ftZ, &:c.); handling, of the hands; treading,
of the feet; dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum;
and generation of offspring, of the sexual organs: 'function or object'
being required for each term by the grammatical construction of the
sentence.
The functions of intellect, egoti8JD, and mind are next described.
COMMENT.

The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense 8eTerally.

The general term for the office of the senses is tiloclana, literally
, seeing, beholding, perceiving, ,observing.' According to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first un deliberative, and the second
deliberative knowledge; or, in short, what is understood by , perception t.'
The commentator on the S. Pravaclana, who gives this explanation,
observes, however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the
property of the mind only, whilst simple or undeliberative perception is
that of the external senses; and this appears to be the doctrine of the
Sankhyas: the senses receive simple impreBBions from without of their
own nature; whether those impreBBions are perceived, depends upon the
cooperation of the internal senee, or mind. The term for' function' is
vritti, explained by vytiptira, 'active exercise or application;' also by
samartAyam, ' ability, adequacy;' and pllala, ' fruit, result.' GA11llAPADA

t .. iMl .... '4 'iii ... pq~i@Uti , .r.4iiMl

;r.i 1Jr.f ~ r':":~$N' , ~"(ij'U ~irlsii"" i~61~rH ,
~
f~ ~
~ ~q fq\fl1'fq If'(ii'Mt ,.. It, ('ifl ~ ..... i

;liMl .. ;:i ,

"'Ii r..

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q;erct

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Dd

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has vis/w,ya, ' object;' and it may be said, that the function and object of
a sense is the same thing, sight being both the function and the object of
the eye. There is some difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, although there is none in understanding what is meant by them.
Thus rlJpa, 'form,' or, as l"endered in the text, ' colour,' is the object and
office of the eye; it is therefore equivalent both to visible substance and
sight. So of sabda, 'sound;' it is both hearing and that which is heard.
8persa, 'touch,' is the faculty and the substance to which contact may be
applied. In rasa, , taste,' and gand/w" ' smell,' we have the double equivalents, as both words in English, as well as in Sanscrit, express both the
sense and the sensible property. In English, ' voice' is a function; but
here, at least, vfick is also the instrument of speech. In the other organs
of action the function is more readily rendered; but the difficulty in any
case is only that of language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit.

XXIX.
Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respecti ve characteristics: these are peculiar to each. The common
function of the three instruments is breath and the rest of the five
vital airs.
BHASHYA.
The natural properties, which are the several characteristics, are the
respective c/w,racteristics (as previously defined). Ascertainment is intellect
(ver. 23): that also is the function of intellect. Conscicnuness is egotism
1ver. 24): consciousness is both its characteristic and its function. Mind
ponders (ver. 27): such is its definition; and reft.ection, therefore, is the
function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind, their
respective characteristics are their specific functions. The functions of
the intellectual organs, as before explained, are also specific (the same is
- ---------------------------

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the case with the organs of action). But now their common function is
described. Tile commonfunction of tke i1l8t",ments.-The function of the
instruments in common is Iweatk and tke rest of tke five vital airs; the airs
called pnina, apana, samana, udana, and vyana. These are the five airs
which are the common function of all the organs of sense. The air, for
instance, called prana is that which is perceptible in the mouth and
nostrils, and its circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds
(of instruments): that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are
cODnected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage,
gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prana, 'breath' or 'life,'
from ' breathing.' From carrying downwards (apanayana), the air apana
is so named; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of
the organs. Samana is so named from conducting equally (samanayana)
the food, &c. (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of
the body, and its circulation is the common function of the instruments.
The air uOOna is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding
best (un-nayana). It is perceptible in the space between the navel and
the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the
organs. Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through
the whole. body is effected is called vyana, from its penading (vyapti) the
body like the etherial element. The circulation of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs. In this manner these vital
airs, as the common function of the instruments, are explained; that is,
the common function of the thirteen kinds (of organs).
COMMENT.

Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instruments, mind,

egotism, and intellect, which as the same ~ith their definitions have
already been specified, they have a common office in the evolution or
circulation of the internal aerial humours which constitute vitality.
The translation limits this community of function to the three internal
instruments only, or to i~tenect, egotism, and mind; and such is the
interpretation of VACHESPATI MISRA: 'The five airs, or life, is the function
of the three (internal) instruments, from being present wherE:l they are;

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and absent where they are not -." So the S. PraVfM:M1Ia Bit. explains
the S6tra Sama",ya kara1la vritti t; which is also the phrase of the Kanka,
the function of the three internal instruments t.' GAURAPADA, however,
understands vitality to be the common function of all the organs, external
and internal; or thirteen instruments, ten of the former, and three of the
latter kind. The expression of the text also is general, and applicable
either to all the organs, or to any of them, 88 variously understood. The
two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly speaking, the sense
followed in the translation is most correct; for although vitality is the
common function of all the senses, yet it is essentially so of the internal
senses only: it might continue with the privation of any or all of the
external senses, but could not, 88 ViCHESPATI states, subsist without the
internal organs, 88 it depends upon their existence for its own. So also
the S. Pravaclta,1Ia BluJskya calls the vital airs not only the functions,'
but' modifications, of the internal instruments II.' These vital airs are not
to be confounded with v/Jp, or' elemental air,' for the V~d88 are authority
for their diB"erent origin: 'From him is born vital air, mind, and all the
senses, heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth .' 'The
attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal instruments
arises from their being susceptible of a sort of motion similar to that of
air, and from their being governed by the same deity'.' The vital airs
are, in fact, the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and digestion.
That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to
partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from
some misapprehension of the phamomena of breathing, fiatulence, and
arterial pulsation. The term used by GAURAPADA to designate their

,At...

'Ii414Jliilrq'((Ultlii q!SlilcUi4c(\ sHq;t

lil ~
~,
t \tli4lat'({f1:1'-: ,
tWill': '((u"i4~,fw: ,
II qf{4JliiI~: ,
t!n4iIS5iI4tfl lINt 1;.r. Wif.-;:4tlf(ij::q , 1i
cUiWlfH(lq'ill{Ratifi ~ ,
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action occurs sya,ula1UJ, 'moving, circulation,' in the copy; but spanda1UJ,
'throbbing, pulsation,' were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices
assigned to them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation or a pulse. Thus Pra1UJ is breath, expiration and inspiration.
.Apana is flatulence, crepita. Sama1UJ is eructation, supposed to be
essential to digestion. Uda1UJ is the pulsation of the arteries in the head,
the neck, and temples; and Vyana is the pulsation of the rest of the
superficial arteries, and occasional puffiness of external parts, indicating
air in the skin. The situations assigned to the five airs by the S. Tatwa
Ka?tm,,,d are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prana is there
said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel, and great
toes; .Apana, of the back of the neck, the back, the feet, and the organs
of excretion and generation; Samana, of the heart, the navel, and the
joints; Uda1UJ, of the head, throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose;
and Vya"a, of the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to
understand how such absurd situations should have been selected. The
S. BIuisAya may be taken as the expression of the earlier notions.

xxx.
OF all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in

regard to sensible objects. The function of the three (interior) is, in

respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.
BHASHYA.
OJ all jO'Ur tke junctions are instantaReO'US.-The four are, intellect,
egotism, and mind, in connection with anyone of the organs of sense.
Of these four the function is instantaneous in regard to perception, or in
the ascertainment of perceptible objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and
the eye.see form at once, in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a post. The same three, with the tongue, at once appreciate flavour; with the nose, odour: and so with the ear and ski,n.
Ee

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Again; their functions are also grad'Ulll in regard to sB7&8ible objects.-Of
that aggregate of four the function is also (occasionally) gradual (pro
gressive). 1'hus, a person going along a road sees an object at a distance,
and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man: he then observes some
characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there; and doubt being
thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates that it is a post; and thence egotism interposes, for the sake of
certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain) it is a post. In this way the func ..
tions of intellect, egotism, mind, and eye are (successively) discharged.
And as in the case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of
the objects of perception.
But in respect of an unseen one, tke functions of tke t!tree are preceded bg
tkat of Ike fourt!t.-Unseen implies time past, or future: for instance, in
respect to ' form,' the function of the eye has preceded that of intellect,
egotism, and mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch; of
the nose in regard to smell; of the ear in relation to sound; and of the
tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind
are preceded in order by those of the senses in regard to time future or
past, whilst in regard to time present they may be either instantaneous
or gradual. FurtberCOMMENT.

The consentaneous or successive operation of the three internal and

anyone of the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described.
The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense
may be instantaneous VJugapat), like a dash of lightning, or as at the sight
of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the
business of one and the same moment: or their operation may be gradual or ~uccessive (krama8as), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye
to see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to
conclude. GAURAPADA rather disarranges the order of succession, and
places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or
conviction. VlcHE8PATI's illustration is more regular: 'Thus, the ear

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hears the twang of a bowstring; mind reflects that this must be for the
flight of an arrow; egotism says, It is aimed at me; and intellect determines, I must run away *: Whenever the object is unseen, adriskta, not
present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior
perception of it; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators,
there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The
expression of the text, tat purviTta vritti, 'their prior function,' might be
thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint operation of the
internal and external organs at some former period. This, however,
would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in budd"i, or' intellect,' alone; as in the Patanjala Sutra, 'Proof,
refutation deliberation, sleep, memory; these are said to be the functions
of intellect t.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely perception or
observation by the external sense, alockanam (see ver. 28), conveying
simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired
through an external organ, any further consideration of it is the gradual
operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present,
conviction may be either momentary or successive: the Sankhyas maintaining the possibility of consentaneOU8 operation of the organs of sense
and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the
Vaiseshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process: Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the
internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent
upon a former impression received by an external sense; but as concerns
themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or successivet. The

. iltiliANJf(n i4~ I: q;~ 1"fI1 fe~~(~ ftt41 1(1SM1 1" i\ <(Is!

"'+.I(I,n(: qat.u4If... f" ~~ ~ -:q 1ft J:t~iftfl4f~1;:qi1
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t J:ti4I(9fc:tq~4Ifq~
f;f"iJ"ln4llf I ~ ~ ql""M ~ 1ff 'QJfT 1f_1W~ ~
I
t Wiif: ~1U"'4(04 ,'Iq", iI'ft(9 ~ 1f'it'lfi~I-1(1fr
ft if1nSftslftfW 4(\ 51~ 1I

If<<

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108
illustration' which occurs in the BluiskY4 and other commentaries, of the
course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined,
is something like that with which, in the Philebus, the formation of
opinion is elucidated.

XXXI.
THE instruments perform their respective functions, incited by
mutual irwitation. The soul's purpose is the motive: an instrument
is wrought by none.
BHASHYA.
Swam is repeated, implying' several order:' that is, intellect, egotism,
mind, perform their
, respective functions, the incitement to which is mutual invitation. Akula implies' respect and alertness.' They do this for
the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting
it through intellect: that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and
the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, why it
does so 1 the answer is, tke purpose of tke soul is tke motive. Soul's purpose is to be fulfilled: for this object the activity of the qualities occurs,
and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How
is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act? They act of their own
accord. An instrr,ment can be wrougkt by none.-The purpose of soul
alone causes them to act: this is the meaning of the sentence: an instrument is not made-not roused-to act by any human superior.
It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are.

COMMENT.
The circumstances that induce the internal and external organs to
perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and
spontaneous disposition to effect the objects of soul.
The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or incitement.
Their cooperation in the discharge of their respective functions is compared to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in a common

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assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another
. It is objeet4:;d?
the organs
non-senti~;Ht?
of intellige4:%~;t;;
be supposed
less to
design or
or
the terms
H?;;,?u........ to signify
etnensible influems:e
the activitd
exerts upon that of another, if there be no impediment in the way; a
sort of sympathetic or consentaneous action. .A.kuta here means incitement to activity; that is, at the time when one organ is in action. the
of anothee if n@} obstruction hinder itt~' 'With this view the
instrument}
s:h}~s:cted by a
the adaptWS:hm:s
mutual
their natures
of soul,
for this
action is
liberation; which purpose they of their own accord, but unconsciously.
operate to fulfil, in the same way as the unconscious breast spontaneously
secretes milk for the nourishment of the infant; according to the Sutra,
'As the cow for the calf:' that is, as the milk of the cow of its own accord
edort of another?
L~~t~~?t'" for the use
and awaits
perform the&ws:
for the sake
of their o}}ws:}
soul . S. n~S:~S:iy;g};:ss:,f,f,f Rh. They
of their own
gRot in the
one to comnel
'"
expression is,' Not by any sovereign man ~:' perhaps some particle, such
as va, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense, 'Neither
by a deity nor a mortal;' or the phrase may imply, that they are not
compelled to action even by soul. as a divinity; but fulfil soul's purposes
an innate
undirected bh
enmmal agent.

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110

XXXII.
INSTRUMENT is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, maintains, and
manifests: what is to be done by it is tenfold, to be compassed, to
be maintained,. to be manifested.
I

BHASHYA.
Instru.ment.-Intellect and the rest are three; the intellectual organs
are five; the organs of action are five: all together thirteen. What this
performs is next declared: it compasses, maiRtains, au manifests; that is,
the organs of action compass and maintain; those of perception manifest.
How many kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that
which is to be done by it, is tenfold; of ten kinds, as hearing, touch, &c.
by the instruments of perception; speech and the rest by those of action:
and thus by the former, manifestation, and by the latter, comprehension
and support, are effected.

COMMENT.
The sense of the term karaM, 'instrument' or 'organ,' is here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and internal organs.
The instruments or organs are thirteen; that is, three internal, intellect, egotism, and mind; and ten external, or the organs of sensation and
action. Their respective functions as organs have been explained: their
effects as instruments are classed under three heads, ' compassing,' tiMrana *; , maintaining,' dktirana t; and 'manifesting,' praktiSaRa t. The
first. which means, literally, ' taking, seizing,' and rendered in the text
, compassing,' signifies' the application of an organ to the object to which
it is adapted II.' and is the especial function of the organs or instruments
of action. 'Maintaining,' dktirana, ' supporting, upholding,' is, according

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to the S. BluUkya, also the office of the instruments of action; but the
authors of the S. Tatwa Ka.mudl and S. Ckandrilld assign it to the three
internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being especially the
supporters of vitality. 'Buddki, aka",kdra, and mind uphold, through
their function being designated as the production of the vital airs, &c.*'
The elder commentator could not, of course, admit this doctrine; for we
have seen (ver. 29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments
contribute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in
attributing 'manifestation, enlightening,' prakds~, to the intellectual
organs. The objects to be effected by the instruments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes: speech, manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be compassed, to be effected, dkaryat, by
the actual application of the several organs: sound, taste, touch, smell,
form to be manifested, to be made sensible, prakaSya: and all of them,
together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are to be
dMryyat, upheld or maintained.

XXXIII.
INTERNAL instruments are three; external ten, to make known
objects to those three.

The external organs minister at time pre-

sent: the internal do so at any time.

BHASHYA.
Intern.al i",stncments.-Intellect, egotism, and mind are three, from the
difference between intellect and the others. Ezternal ten.-The five
organs of perception and five of action are the ten external instruments,
and they are to make known objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism,

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and mind. Time present: that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one
that is past, nor one that is to come: the eye sees present form, not that
which is past, nor that which is future: the skin touches present substance: the tongue tastes present flavour: the nose smells present odours,
nor past nor future. It is the same with the organs of action: the voice
articulates actual, not past nor future words: the hand takes hold of a
present water-pot, not one that has been or is to be: the feet traverse a
present, not a past nor a future walk: and the organs of excretion and
generation perform present, not past nor future offices. External organs,
therefore, minister at time present. Tile internal ones do so for any time.Intellect, egotism, and mind regard objects of any period: thus intellect
forms an idea, not only of a present water-jar, but of one that has been
or will be made: so egotism exercises consciollsness of an object past,
present, or future: and mind considers the past and future, as well as the
present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for all times.
It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends specific,
and which unspecific objects.
COMMENT.
The difference between the functions of the external and internal
organs, as concerns time, is here explained: the action of the former
being confined to time present; that of the latter comprehending also the
past and the future.
Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within the
body .; the external from being applied to exterior objects, making
them known to the internal organization. The term visluzya, 'object: is
also explained by bkogya, 'that which is to be enjoyed;' and vytipdra,
, exercise;' and viskaytikkya, 'that which declares or makes objects
known.' It is also defined as 'that which occasions the exercise of the
functions of the three internal instruments t.' External sensation is
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necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, consciousness, and
intellect apprehend from present objects those which have past, or are to
come; as past rain from the swelling of a river; and future rain, in the
absence of any other prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the
ants. This last phrase alludes probably to the well known destnlction
of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy season: they then take wing,
and fly abroad in vast multitudes, of w~ch few survive; according to the
,;~ ,3 ~
'When the
Hindustani proverb, ~
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ants are about to die, their wings come forth.' The expression" ants'
eggs," pipflilttiftda, is, however, rather questionable. It occurs in both
copies of the 8.. Tatwa Kaumudl.
~.

XXXIV.
these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific
and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five
objects.
,
AMONG

BHASHYA.
Tke intellectual orga1UJ concern specific objects: they apprehend objects

which have specific properties. The intellectual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell, along with objects of indifference,
pleasure and pain. The organs of the gods apprehend objects which
have no specific distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action,
speech concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articulates
words, recites verses, and the like; and this instrument is the same in
both orders of beings. The rest-all except speech; the hand, the foot,
and the organs of excretion and generation-regard all five objects: that
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is, sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other
organs; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the
hands; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may
be characteristics; the excretory organ separates that in which the five
objects abide; and the generating organs produce the secretion which is
equally characterised by the five organs of sense.
COMMENT.
Another distinction is made in the functions of the external instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific characteristics.
Objects are distinguished as having specific characters or effects, saviSeSM ... , and as devoid of them, nirviSes/w, t; and the instruments are discriminated according to their capability of" conveying notions of either.
The organs of sense in mortals can apprehend only those objects which
have specific characters; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c.; or
moral, as pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and
of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic properties,
and which exercise no moral effect, producing neither pleasure, pain, nor
indifference. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi identifies' specific' with' gross corporeal' objects t, and ' unspecific' with ' subtile and rudimental' objects 1\;
the latter of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and
deities . This distinction applies to all the external organs, except the
voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate sensible, specific, or
corporeal words alone; for it is the organ of the voice that is the origin of
speech. Speech cannot, like sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing
gross or subtile exterior to the speaker; it must proceed from him,
through the agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore
be gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot be the
source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order of beings

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speech must be specific. 'The rest,' seskani referring to the organ of
speech, implies the other organs of action, all of which may regard the
five objects of perception; that is, they may comprehend them all; as
'from the combination (or capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste,
in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken
hold of by the hand, &c.' S. Tatwa Kaumudf.

xxxv.
intellect, with the (other two) internal instruments, adverts
to every object, therefore those three instruments are warders, and
the rest are gates.
BHASHYA.
SINCE

Witk tke internal; that is, intellect, with egotism and mind. .Adverts
to; takes, apprehends; that is, apprehends sound and the rest at all
three seasons. Therefore these tkree are warders, and tke rest are gates.The rest; the other instruments; instruments being understood. FurtherCOMMENT.

A metaphor is employed to illustrate the functions of the external and

internal instruments.
The internal instruments are compared to warders, doorkeepers, or to
persons having charge of a door or gate; not opening and closing it
merely, but as taking note of all that enter: the external senses being
the doors or gateways by which the objects of perception gain admission.
---

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XXXVI.
characteristically differing from each other, and variously
affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.
THESE

BHAsHYA.
These, which are called instruments: they variously affected by qualities. How affected 1 Like a lamp; exhibiting objects like a lamp. Characteristically diJIering; dissimilar. having different objects; that is the
sense. Objects of the" qualities is intended. Variously qlfected by q'l141ities; produced or proceeding from qualities. Soul's whole purpose.-The
instruments of perception and action, egotism and mind, having illustrated the object of soul (as attainable) through each respectively, present
it to the intellect, place it in the intellect; and consequently soul obtains
pleasure and the rest; that is, every object seated in intellect. FurtherCOMMENT.
The process by which ideas are conveyed to soul is here described.
Intellect (buddhi or mahat) is the instrument or organ which is the
medium between the other instruments or orga~s and soul; that is, all ideas
derived from sensation, reflection, or consciousness must be deposited in
the chief or great instrument, intellect or .understanding, before they can
be made known to soul, for whose use and advantage alone they have
been assembled. They are variously affected by the qualities.-They convey impressions or ideas, with the properties or effects of pleasure, pain,
and indifference, accordingly as they are influenced by the qualities of
goodness, foulness, and darkness. In fact these organs are identified
with the qualities by all the commentators. GAURAPADA says, 'they
proceed or are born from them -:' and in the S. Tatwa Kaumudl and

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S. Ckandriklz they are called also ' products or modifications and varieties
of the qualities;' thus the former has, 'The external organs, mind, and
egotism are affections of qualities; they are changes of condition of the
qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness .:' the latter,' These affections
of the qualities are kinds (or varieties) of them t.' It might have been
preferable, therefore, to have rendered the expression gunavis~ska, ' modifications or affections of the qualities.'
The progressive communication of impression to soul is thus illustrated
by V1CHESPATI: 'As the head men of a village coUect the taxes from the
villagers, and pay them to the governor of the district; as the local
governor pays the amount to the minister; and the minister receives it
for the use of the king; so mind, having received ideas from the external
organs, transfers them to egotism; and egotism delivers them to intellect,
which is the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the
use of the sovereign, soul. The same idea is more concisely expressed
in the S. Pravackana BA. ' Sutra: In the common employment of the
organs the chiefship belongs to buddlti, as in the world. Com'flumt: As
the function of the organs is in common, through subservience to the
purposes of soul, so the most important is that of intelligence; like the
office of the prime minister amongst the chiefs of villages and the rest,
who are all alike engaged in the service of the king t.' The cooperation
of opposites for a common purpose has been once before (p. 54) compared
to the light of a lamp, derived from the combination of oil, cotton, and
flame.

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XXXVII.
SINCE

it is intellect which accomplishes soul's fruition of all which

is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtle difference between the chief principle (pradkdna) and soul.
BHAsHYA.
A.II: whatever comes within the reach of the organs, and in all three
(past, present, and future) periods. Fruition: several or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the organs of perception and
action, whether in gods, men, or animals. The internal instrument intellect accomplisltes, completes or effects; consequently it is tMI, again,
which disC1'imiMtes, makes a distinction between the objects of nature and
soul, (or establishes) their difference or severalty. Subtle: not to be apprehended by those who have not practised religious austerities, (or such
distinctions) as, this is nature, the equipoised condition of the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness; this is intellect; this is egotism;
these are the five subtile rudiments; these the eleven organs; these the
five gross elements; and this, which is different from them all, is soul.
He whose intellect explains all this obtains liberation.
It was said above (ver.34) that" objects are specific and unspecific:"
which these are respectively is next described.

COMMENT.

The function of discriminating between soul and nature is here also

assigned to intellect.
The immediate contiguity and communication of intellect with soul, as
that of a prime minister and a sovereign, enables it to appreciate the
latter; whilst its being the medium of conveyance to external objects
familiarizes it with them also; and thus it is enabled to distinguish between both: or, as explained in the Chandrika, this discrimination is the .
necessary consequence of its relative function; for as it conveys ideas of
pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause of its fruition, it is

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subservient to another, to something of a different nature from its own;
and the knowledge of this is discrimination. between nature -and soul.
'AU, sound and the rest, with which the preposition pran (implying
severalty) is to be connected. The fruition is that of soul. As intellect
accomplishes this, consequently although it be as it were a chief principle, yet it is for another's use, not its own; and as hence arises the
purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly intended to be expressed
in the phrase, It is tkat again wAicA discriminates, &c . '

XXXVIII.
THE

elementary particles are unspecific: from these five proceed

the five elements, which are termed specific; for they are soothing,
terrific, or stupifying.

BHASHYA.
The five subtile elements, which are produced from egotism, or the
rudiments sound, touch (substance), form, flavour, and odour, are said to
be unspecific; they are the objects (of perception) to the gods, characterised by pleasure, producing neither pain nor stupefaction. From thue
five proceed tkefive elements, called earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These
are said to be specific. From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds; from
the rudiment flavour, water; from form (colour), fire; from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound, proceeds ether. These gross
elements are termed specific. They are the objects of the senses of men,
and are sootAing, causing pleasure; terrific, causing _pain; and stupij!ling,
causing insensibility; as the ethereal element may give delight to one

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person coming forth at once from within a house, so the same may be
the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat, or wind, or rain; and
if he be going along a road leading through a forest, in which he loses
his way, it may then, from the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction:
so the air (or wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeable to one feeling cold; and when tempestuous and loaded with clouds
of sand and dust it is stupifying. The same may be said of fire and the
rest. There are other specific varieties.
COMMENT.

It was intimated in ver. 34, that objects were both specific and unspecific; and it is here explained, that by the former is meant the various
property which the same element possesses at different times, and under
different circumstances, in regard to mortals; and by the latter, the uniform and unvaried operation of tlie subtile rudiments in respect to the
gods.
The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very intelligible,
according to their usual identification with what we are accustomed to
consider as qualities, not substances, or sound, tangibility, form or colour,
flavour, and odour; sabda, sparsa, rUpa, rasa, and gandlw.. It seems,
however, that we should regard the rudimental elements as the imperceptible subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible
elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So VIJNANA
BHIKSHU calls them subtile substances, the elements which are the
holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour,
taste, and smell; but in which, as a genus, the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not occur: they are not varieties of the
gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclusively resides; whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements
that elementary property resides alone (without being diversified, as
agreeable, &c.); and as there is no distinction between a property and
its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment,
tan matra; the existence of which as a cause is inferred. from that of the

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gross element as an effect-.' Ttm matra is a compound of tad, 'that,'
and matra, ' alone;' implying, that in which its own peculiar property
resides, without any change or variety: so VlcHESPATI explains the text,
'Sound and the rest; the subtile rudiments; for the properties of agreeable, &c. do not belong to them, they have no quality which is fit for
(mortal) fruition. This is the meaning of the word matra t. '-' These
rudiments, though not appreciable by human sense, are said to be sensible to sages and to gods, producing to them pleasure only, from the predominance with them of the quality of goodness, and consequently of
happiness t.'
The notion of something more subtile than the elements was not
unknown to early Grecian philosophy, and Empedocles taught that they
were compounded of some more minute matter, or of elements of the
elements, CM'o'Xf!ia- (lTO'XJOW. Plutarch and Stobmus, according to Cudworth, understand by these rudiments of the elements primary atoms; but
it may be doubted if they are to be 80 understood, for, according to Aristotle, Empedocles held that there were four elements, out of which all
bodies were composed, and which were not mutually transDlUtable. In
fact the doctrine of Empedocles, which was that of the school of Pythasoras, offers another analogy to the Indian, in the assertion, not of four,
but of five elements, according to Plutarch, or the author De placitis philosophorum, 1. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Intellect. Syst.
1.97. That Empedocles was not of the atomic school is evident from

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Lucretius, who specifies him as one of those who greatly misunderstood
the principles of things :
Principiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas
Et graviter magnei magno cecidere ibi casu.

1.741-2.

It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion, that the
senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, partake of a common
nature, is expressed in the celebrated, though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same philosopher:
r alll ""~v yap yaiav dW6nrap.01, UaT' tJ' f&'p
Al81p' tJ' al81po. ~uw, 4Tap 7rVpl rip citm,AOV:

By the earthy element we perceive earth; by the watery, water; the

air of heaven by the aerial element; and devouring fire by the element
of fire.'
As opposed. to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative gross
elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are susceptible of three
qualities; they may have specific or varied effects, may be diversified as
species; they are said, accordingly, to be soothing or agreeable, terrific
or disagreeable t, and stupifying, bewildering t; that is, they may be
either of these, according to the different circumstances in which the
influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates. When
goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the object affected,
they are santa, tranquil or pleasant;' when foulness, they are glwra,
frightful, disagreeable;' and when darkness prevails, they are perplexing,' murka: as VACHESPATI; 'In the gross elements, ether and the rest,
some, through the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant,
agreeable, light; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terrific,
painful, restless; whilst others, through the influence of darkness, are
stupifying, depressing, heavy II.'
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XXXIX.
(bodies), and such as spring from father and mother,
together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects.
Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting; such as issue from
father and mother are perishable.
SUBTILE

BHASHYA.
Subtile: the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated, form the
rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect (makat) and the
rest, and which always exists, and undergoes successive states of being
(transmigration): those are subtile (bodies). Suck tu spring jrOflt jat_
au mot_ are the cementers or means of the aggregation of gross bodies,
or by the effect of the mixture of blood and seminal secretion in sexual
cohabitation, at fit seasons they form the envelopment of the subtile body
in the womb; that subtile body then is nourished, through the umbilical
cord, by the nutriment derived from the food and drink received by the
mother; and the (entire) body, thus commenced with the triple ingredient of the subtile rudiments, the cognate investure, and the gross elements, becomes furnished with back, belly, legs, neck, head, and the rest;
is enveloped in its sixfold membranes; is provided with blood, flesh.
teD.dons, semen, marrow, and bones; and is composed of the five gross
elements; ether being supplied for its cavities (or extension), air for its
growth, fire for its nutriment, water for its aggregation, and earth for its
stability: and thus being- equipped with all its (component) parts, it
comes forth from the maternal womb. In this way there are three kinds
(of bodies): which of these is constant, and which temporary, is next
described. The subtile bodies are lasting.-Subtile; rudimental elements:
these are lasting, constant; by them body is commenced, and migrates,
according to the imperative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts,
deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of
virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes.
So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is attained; when that is

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attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation: these sorts
of bodies, or sv,btile, therefore, are called lasting. Sv.eA as issve from
fatllel' a'Rd motker are periskable.-Having left that subtile body, the frame
that proceeds from mother and father ceases, even here, at the time that
the breath departs; the body born of parents ceases at the time of death,
and merges into earth and the other gross elements.
What subtile body is, and how it migrates, is next described.
COMMENT.
Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according as they.
were with or without specific or diversified effects: they are here cl888iBed according to their forms, their origin, and duration.
A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the objects of
the classification. Are they bodies in general? or are they gross bodies
only? In the preceding stanza it was stated, that the subtile elements,
the tan matras, were unspecific; whilst their effects, the gross elements,
were' specific,' visesAa. It is now stated, that there are three kinds of
vi8esitas, ' sorts, species, specific differences;' but it is not explicitly defined of wkat these are the varieties. Mr. Colebrooke, following the principal commentators, renders it 'sorts of objects;' that is, of bodies in
general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense of viS/ska, 'specific,'
from the preceding stanza, conside~ the variety here spoken of to concern
only gross or perceptible elementary bodies: "Distincta, elementa qUIe
distincta dicuntur (ver. 38). Distinctorum triplex est divisio in subtilia,
a parentibus progenita, crassa" (ver. 39). He admits that the commentators are against this
, interpretation, but concludes rather that they are in
error, than that ISWARA KRISHNA should have employed the word visesluJ
in a double sense.
Tile interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to his critical
acumen and judgment, and is possibly correct, although it is scarcely
compatible with the notions of subtilty and durability which the text
ascribes to this branch of the triad. His view is not, as he supposes,
wholly unsupported by the commentators; for VIJNANA BHIKSHU similarly explains the stanza, as will presently be noticed. The passage

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is one of some importance" 88 it regards apparently the history of. the

Sankhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile body which.is the
immediate vehicle of soul, 88 we shall have occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40. If the meaning of the text be 88
Prof. Lassen renders it, it furnishes reason to suppose that the author of
the Ktirikti had introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, 8S
will be subsequently indicated.
According to GAURAPADA and NARAYANA, the sorts or species intimated
in this' verse are different from those described in the preceding; the
former calls them, 88 above, , other varieties *;' and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, 'So many 8re the specific varieties; but these are not
all, there are others to' VACHESPATI'S expression, 'A further species .of
species t, might be thought to . refer to the gross elements; but, from
the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not intend to, limit
the specific differences to gross elementary bodies. Agreeably to the
explanation, t~en, in which these writers concur, bodies in general are,
threefold, subtile, generated, and elementary; and. consistently with this
view they consider' subtile,' ,ukskma, as equivalent to tan-mtitra, 'rudi-
mental:' thus GAURAPADA has, 'Subtile is the aggregated rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemental subtile body \I:' so also VACHESPATI; 'Subtile means subtile bodies; subtile body is one specific object:'
and the Ckandriltti; 'Subtile are what are called rudimental bodies ,.'
Consequently they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this
verse to be something entirely different from the gross elementary Vi8~skas,
or ' species,' of the preceding verse; not merely sub-species or varieties
of the same: and it must be admitted that there is some inconsistency in
the Ktiriltti's speaking of sv.bti16 bodies being a species of grOl8 bodies; of
"

* ~ fcti)eil: t
t ilOnP4'rl 'i!<f fcti)iU
\4iiflMlI( I
t fcti)'II(ijlifctl'rl< fCli)'IJlI( t
~ n"'lf~' "tliij~< t
~ iij~(itiQ fcti)'I: t

tfrr ~

f.... WaS'N

II n"'I~lf4Q4

~I: ~(t: qf(,rE*4nl: t

~I fA'liij~(I@U: t

Kk

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the imperceptible being a variety of the perceptible. According to V IJNANA
BHIKSHU, however, the text merely intends by 'subtile,' slJk,AfIUJ, a modification of gross elementary body; a corporeal frame, which is subtile
only relatively, or which is more refined than the second kind of body
specified in the text, that which is begotten: 'The nature of that body
which is the support of rudimental body is explained in the Ktirikti,
"subtile, generated," &c.: here is meant, body aggregated of the five
elements, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements, which is
subtile relatively to generated body . ' The same notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subsequently cited; and there remains no doubt that this commentator understands by the
of the
text, 'a subtile variety of gross elementary body,' diatinctone". diati'IICtio.
The other commentatol'8 understand by it, 'rudimental bodies,' elementa
indiatincta. Either interpretation is therefore allowable: the latter agrees
best with the philosophy, the former with the construction. of the
original.
In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible bodies
only are intended; bodies generated or begotten are made of the gross
elements, agreeably to the Sutra, ' Body consists of the five elements t:'
they are, however, in some degree distinguished here from the elements;
holding, according to GAURAPADA, a middle place between them, and
rudimental bodies serving to combine them; upacMyaka causing upacAaya,
'proximate aggregation;' the parts of the embryo being derived in the
first instance from the parents, and their development being the result of
the accession of the elements, for purposes which he describes. There
is some incongruity, however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where there is no essential difference; organized matter being, in
fact, the same with elementary matter. The other commentators, therefore, give a different explanation of the term ' great elements,' restricting

_,Ama

~ .... 4fi,f("an'l'" ,,~, i"n,fqif511 1f

~ i"n,fQif5ltJ6(,ihqael ~ ae'lnQ"'4fif"rft I
fri\'~:

~ n""~'

t~

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it to inorganic matter. Thus V ACHESPATI observes, ' Subtile body is one
variety of objects; generated bodies are a second; and the great elements
a third: water-jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the
class of the great elements -.' So also the C1w:ndrika: 'Subtile bodies
are those called rudimental; generated, are gross bodies; and the great
elements are mountains, trees, and the like t.'
In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the Scholiasts on
the Kdrika, we have, in fact, but two distinctions, subtile and gross; the
latter being subdivided into organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which is especially recognised in the S6tras: thus in the
S. PrafJackmuJ Bluish!!a, the S6tm, 'Thence (the origin) of bodyt,' is
explained, 'from the twenty-three tatwas (or categories) two kinds of
bodies, subtile and gross, proceeded II:' and again, 'GroBS body is for the
most part generated (some bodies being inorganic), the other (subtile
body) is not.'
The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the di1ferent duration of these three kinds of bodies; 8'I,btile are ~t: and here we
have an argument in favour of the translation adopted; for no form of
gross body could be considered as lasting: as composed of the elements,
in however delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of death;
whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile elements, endure either
till liberation " or until the great Pralaya
Dissolvi quo qureque supremo tempore possint.

F-

~ tlt}(il" fet.,et: , iiiii[fq'15ii f.dlat: , ~

~ 14cittliiti f~tI 1f ,
t ~i f(ij'itlt}<i@li: 'lIT
nif'lipii: 'lM'C:i: , ~ qin\li(4I: ,
t n44i..,6(\141 ,
II nEi4i1i4ilni.,fftnNIi( (U(M4ilfItl6(1at~i<", 1fR ,
1IIin
~ ~ Juattl (ft<'llniiii'
' "i~etlq('iiiif~iit: ,
.. WT
iii@iAMati(ctfHt. ,

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128

XL.
body), primreval, unconfined, material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying; Invested with dispositions, mergent.
(SUBTILE

BHASHYA.
Primtl!val; whilst yet the universe is uncreated: in the Drst creation
of nature, at that season subtile body is produced. Unconfined; uncombined either in the state of animals, men, or gods; and from its subtilty
wholly unrestrained, or passing into rocks and the like without obstruc-.
tion; it migrates; it goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates. Composed of i1ttellect, witA olAer swhtile principles; having maIuJt
and the rest: that is, intellect in the first place, with egotism and mind,
to the five subtile rudiments, to the subtile principles, to the rudimental
elements. It migrates; it traverses the three worlds, as an ant the body
of Siva. Unenjoying; without enjoyment: that subtile body becoming
capable of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of
action, through its aggregation by external generated body. Invested
witA dispositions.-Dispositions, as virtue and the rest; which we shall
hereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested witA; coloured or affected by.
Subtile body is that which, at the period of universal dissolution, possessed of mallat, intelligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into
the chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution, remains
extant there until creation is renewed, being bound in the bondage of the
stolidity of nature, and thereby incompetent to the acts of migrating and
the like. At the season of re-creation it again revolves, and is hence
called linga, 'characteristic' or 'mergent,' or s"ksAma, 'subtile.'
From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism, and the
eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next explained.

COMMENT.

The condition of subtile body, in regard to commencement, duration,

and term, is here described.

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The commentators are agreed that the subtile body here spoken of is
the linga, or the liRga sarfra, ' rudiment,' or 'rudimental body;' ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accurately, confounded: the liaga consisting, as intimated in the last phrase of the BIulsAya, of thirteen component parts, intellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action; whilst
the linga sarlra adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the five rudimental elements, In this form, however, they always coexist, and it is
not necessary to consider them as distinct: thus the S6tra of KAPILA
states, 'one liflg'a of seventeen .;' that is, according to the Scholiast,
, in the beginning, at creation: there is but one rudimental body at
the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs,
five rudimental elements, and intellect t.' . This was at first embodied
in the pereon of HIRANYAGAIlBHA, or BRAHMA, and afterwards' multiplied
individually, according to variety of actions t.' In this enumeration
egotism is omitted, being included, according to the commentator, in intellec., 'Unconfined,' OMJkta, means unobstructed, capable of passing
into any bodies. The next epithet, Riyala, translated' material,' is explained by GAURAPADA as above, by nitya, 'permanent, lasting;' and
VACHESPATI attaches to it the same signification, 'It endures till the
period of universal dissolution \I; and the S. Pro BIulsAya observes, also,
that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same season : a property, of
which it may be observed by the way, that it furnishes another reason
for identifying the saksltma, or 'subtile body,' of the foregoing stanza
with the liRga, or' rudimental body,' of this verse. The CAandrikd explains niyata differently, ' distinct in different persons~.' The composition of subtile body is explicitly described by VACHESPATI: 'Subtile body
is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven senses, and the five
- - . - - - - - - - --

- ---- --

---

"'A~' fWi ,
t fMI.iJ~( ... ii.(i ..... re4!;qia. ~
~: , il'.ttilf~.Ag q:qn ......... f({l iJPiilOt... A(VJ I
t 1II'A6
~: ",dtfcwi)iII.,\ '
\I ........ RM ... (dlfHn ,
n4.iij: I
~ RRI.ii4r~ I

~ RMii

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elements.. He ascribes, however, to this a specific or' diversified existence, from its endowment with senses, which are the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifference t.' The commentators agree that subtile body
is subject to enjoyment or suffering only through its connection with
generated body; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in which it partakes of them; for
it is repeatedly declared that the seat of enjoyment and suffering 'is
lnuJdAi, or 'int~llect;' through the presence of which as an ingredient
in subtile body, it is immediately added, the latter is invested with' dispositions,' bkava6; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in
ver.23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term bkdva was
rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by 'sentiments,' but in another
(ver. (3) he expressed the same 'dispositions,' which, as far as relates to
the mental bMvas, appears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell.
dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible: 'In a dead body
there can be no sense of pleasure or pain; this all admitt.' In order,
however, to be placed in circumstances leading to such enjoyment or
suffering, generated body is necessary; and therefore subtile body migrates~ sansarati, goes from one body to another continually: hence the
world is called samara, 'migration' or 'revolution.' 'Through the inftuence of intellect the whole of subtile body is affected by dispositions or
conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact
with a fragrant ckampa ftower II.' S. Tatwa Kaum'l/'di. Subtile body is
called linga from its consisting of those principles which are 80 termed,
either from their indicating or characterising that nature from which
they proceed, or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the

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CAandrikll has, 'Linga, from designating, apprising*:' GAURAPADA, as
above, 'It merges into nature at the season of dissolution:' and ViCHESPATI, 'Linga is so termed because it suffers resolution (laya), or from its
characteristic indication of the source from which it proceeds t.' See
also remarks on ver. 10. p. 43.

XLI.
As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without
a stake, &c. so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without
specific (or unspecific) particles.
I

BHASHYA.
As a picture without the suppo~ of a wall or the like does not stand;
as the shadow does not stand without the stake (the gnomon of a dial);
that is, without them does not exist. The term et cetera comprises (other
illustrations); as, water cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without
water; fire without heat; air without touch; ether without extension;
earth without smell; so by this illustration it is intimated that it, the
rudiment (linga), does not subsist without unspecific or rudimental particles. Here also specific elements are implied, or body composed of the
five gross elements; for without a body, having specific particles, where
can the place of the linga be; which, when it abandons one corporeal
frame, takes refuge in another. Supportless; devoid of support. Subtile
(person); instrument of thirteen kinds: this is the meaning of the text.
For what purpose (these subtile elements are embodied) is next
described.

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COMMENT.

In the preceding verse it was stated that subtile person migrated, or

as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in another. It is now
explained why this must be; and that it proceeds from the necessity of
something to give to subtile principles asylum and support.
The text accordingly states, that the' rudiment,' the linga, cannot
exist without such support; but with regard to the support itself there is
some difference of opinion, the passage being variously read and interpreted.
GAURAPADA reads the expression, avisesAair vina, 'without unspecific
particles;~ by which he states that he means the ' rudimental particles,'
the tan matras. He adds, that specific particles, gross elementary bodies,
are also necessary; using the terms avisesAa and vis~ska as they were
before employed (ver. 38), to represent severally the rudimental and gross
elements. VACHESPATI and NARAYANA read the phrase vis~sAair vina,
'without specific particles;' but they use the term ' specific' apparently
in its general acceptation of' species,' without reference to its technical
employment in ver. 38; for they confine its purpose to that of' subtile
bodies.' 'Wit/unct specific particles; without subtile bodies: that is the
meaning,' S. Tatwa Kaum'Uda. ' 'Witlwut specific particles; without very
subtile bodies: the rudiment (linga), being unsupported, does not remain;
but being supported by subtile bodies it exists t.' S. CAandrikd. So far
therefore, although the reading be different, the interpretation appears to
be the same. The linga, or ' rudiment'-for it is to be observed, that it is
this which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the linga
Sarira, 'rudimental body'-cannot subsist without a bodily frame. Whence
that frame is derived, GAURAPADA makes sufficiently clear. The linga,
or 'rudiment,' consists of but thirteen principles-the unclothed faculties
and senses: the rudimental body, by which they are aggregated and

fcr.n rqiJ~n::fH ~tj6l:n:i'Cru1: I

t ff!4"__ (fH~tj6
(F~~ I fl:;j7i r.:t(116Iai ;f f,UJ fH ~ ~tja (I "Iii fn,* f" I

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defended, is a taft mdtrika body, composed of the rudimental elements
(p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enveloped in a bodily
frame of gross elementary composition.
It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the S. Tatwa Kavaudl and the C!&a1Ulrika have not attended to the distinction, and that
they intend by their' specific or subtile bodies' only one of the 'species,'
or tnShMs, which may be intimated in ver. 38; a modification of the
gross elements enclosing, not the naked' rudiment,' the li'nga, but the
'rudimental body,' the linga sartra. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation-of VIJNANA BHlltSBU, who, commenting on this stanza of the Karika,
explains 'specific particles, those which are called subtile amongst gross ;
a species or variety of gross elements:' and he says, that' the definition
of subtile body which is given in the preceding stanza, "composed of
intellect with other subtile elements" (p. 128), as compared with the
expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made
between subtile body and the specific variety of the gross elements,
which is also called subtile .'
The question then is not one merely of a difference of interpretation,
but it is a difference of doctrine. According to GAURAPADA'S explanation,
which appears to be the original theory, living bodies consist of two
parts, one of a subtile, and one of a gross nature; the l~tter perishes or
decomposes at death; the former may live on through the existence of
the world: the latter gives cover to the former, which is the immediate
vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through successive perishable bodies, until soul's liberation, or until a period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to their primitive and common parent.
To this body the term of li'nga sarSra, 'rudimental body,' is properlyapplied; it is also called ativakika, that which is swifter than the wind in
passing from body to body; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, "it seems

P4~: "'M~I@t: "'MICfI,"(~(r..

atICfC{(ad 'Irlati

~i~li{i "'M~ftl .. i nW;.1 .. 6(i.~Cf.lit .. i4(C{ir~~q~",

ritiCilfC{ if41('c"'lf('lati ~"q.a,"~ rM.,M~iC4tl:
Mm

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to be a compromise between an immaterial 80ul and the difficulty which
a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual
existence, unattached to matter." Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 3~.
But some of the expounders of the Sankhya doctrinet have not thought
even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gr088 body; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support, to which the present vene of
the Kdrikd and the other passages which 8eem to allude to a subtile
form of specific ot gross elementary matter relate, according to V UN.AliA
BHIH.8Hu: 'HaTing abandoned gross bod,., a support is necessary for the
passage of rudimental body to other regions, and another species of. body
is established -.' This is more particularly explained in the same writer'.
commentary on a somewhat obscure S6tra immediately preceding: '''In
the body, which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudi~ntal
body); for the denomination of bod! is applied to one as it is &0 tile
other." That is, the receptacle or support of that rudiment, wbich will be
described as composed of the five elements, is supported or CODtained in
bod y constituted of the six organic ingredients (bones, blood, &e.); to which
the name body is applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of
the word adAiil,,' M1ta (dika, "body," being understood appareatly in either
case "containing" or "comprehending"). The corporeity of the Tebicle or
receptacle (adAilAt1uJna) arises from its relation to the (aggregate) Urtga;
the corporeity of grOM body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular
body. This is the meaning of the text. We have therefOJ:e three (kinds
of) body established t.' Quoting a passage which appears opposed to

- 'lM'\@

c;i),,'1t(, .... ,at fl:;Fr~ "aO'1t(

t ~ ~ "'I~"'<': II 'ift1f fc;;'I"

iqiI'

Riunftfft
~tl""'''''cn c"$"'(ijt["q~' "~I1bilt. ~ ~A!~' ""~

e:i[41~ijl~J'" fI~lf~tl~ iJ't)Wi~(ql~r~kCtl: ~

lJ1;C~ ~~1NTt~llISt4Ilij ~M~ (@~~r" q.a4r~",,,: 1I'n
~ "t\('IIai fiR I

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188
this, and to intimate, as GAURAPADA has dOlle, a twofold di8tinetion only
of bodies, the same writer observes, 'What is l8id in writings, upon the
authority of the VMu, that there are but two (kinds of) bodies; arisesfrom their identifying the tudimental and vehiculat bodies as ODe; 8S they
are mgtually permanent and subtile *.' This is no doubt correct; but it
is very unlikely that the elder writets admitted any form of the grOM
elemeDta 10 be equally permanent and subtile 88 the rudiments from
....hioh they proceeded. In the institutes of Manu, for instance, although
the doctrille there laid down is of a different tenor from that of the
Sinkhya system, we have but two kinds of bodies, a subtile and a substantial one* described: 'After death another body, composed of the five
rudimental elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may
suffer the tortul'eS of the infernal regions to' Mmm, XII. 16. We haTe
here, thea, a body composed of the fiTe rudimental elements. In the
BIuJg(Jf)ad Gila it is intimated that soul retains the senses and mind in
the intervals of migration: 'At the time that spirit obtains a body, and
wben it abudoDs one, it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the
wind wafts along with it the perf1lme of the flowers t.'
If VACHBItPATI be coiTect in his interpretation of the word J*rtI8lUJ, the
Veda make! ooe kind of subtile body of the size of the thumb: '''YAMA
drew forth Tioleotly the subtile body, 8S big as the thumb."-The specification of the size merely denotes- minuteness; extraction of soul would
be abNrd; anti therefore by puruska must be meant" a subtile body;" that
which reposes in g:tosa body 8-' This, agreeably to the older doctrine, would

* If.l~ ~~'II"~"4iW rf\f,.i46(rftilf...,a<;(f<wftNfilt

II"M~ ~~~""lfr~lnlllM'
t ~ 1!Cr JtI41IAr. ir.q
1'tn'i1i,4ii( ~ 4lni1iiiff4lJtfllsNcift 1JCi.
t~~
rtf II"I'tif-ilft *tift iij(; Itf\a "If~ ~ah P.. CiJ i arl-.lf.. elf ," at ul'

*' i.n

H"1"~.''''ttCIfrr iA'J'I'" ~ r...",~ ..... ilM(~" "''li

Jti "Mi1.t~h" fl M14

r.. .1....'" r.. Gfi~ i~~ """qiij"(

" ... (111 f( 1ft . . 1Jfft im tfW

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be rudimental body; according to later refinement, vehicular. It is
the latter which, as Mr. Colebrooke mentions (Tr. R. As. Soc. 1.33) in
PATANJALI'S Yoga slutra, is conceived to extend, like the ftame of a lamp
over its wick, to a small distance above the skull; and which, according to
M. Cousin, is "la fameuse pensee intracranienne, dont on a cm faire
recemment une decouverte merveilleuse." Hist. de la Pkilosopkie, 1.195.
The notion of some corporeal, however subtile, envelopment of soulthe e1~",xo", umbra, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or ghost-giving to invisible
and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, " such," as Good.
(Translation of Lucretius) observes, "as will at least enable the soul to
assume some degree of material configuration, and to be capable of corporeal feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its separation
from the body"-has prevailed in all times and in all ages. Nor was the
doctrine confined to the people or the poets: such of the philosophers as
maintained the immateriality of soul, attaching to it, until its final purification, some portion of corporeal substance, or some substantial, though
subtile investure, or ~x"pa, or vehicle. Thus Cudworth (vol. III. 517)
states, that' the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose
human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body,
but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or
airy body accompanying them; as also they conceived this spirituous
body to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its
interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that
other gross earthly part of the body is by death put off as an outer garment." It also appears, that" besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous body, the ancients held that there is a third kind, of a higher rank,
peculiarly belonging to such souls, after death, as are purged and cleansed.
from corporeal affections, called by them tr;'pa aU'Yoel~er, or a luciform
body." The authorities quoted by Cudworth for these opinions are new'
Platonists, or Christian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries; and it
seems not unlikely that they borrowed some of their notions from the
doctrines of Christianity. They profess, however, to repeat the tenets of
Pythagoras and Plato; and Cudworth asserts, that the distinction of two
interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the

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terrestrial body, is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists, but a
tradition derived down from antiquity. Mosheim, in his translation of
Cudworth, has entered, in a note, very fully into an inquiry as to the
origin of the opinion of a subtile body investing soul, and concludes,
" Vetus hrec opinio aut si mavis superstitio, ab ipsis fere Gnecorum
heroicis temporibus ducta:" and Brucker, in reference to his observations on this subject, remarks, "Hoc vero magna doctrina et ingenio
demonstravit Mosheimius hanc de vehiculo opinionem non demum in
juniorum Platonicorum cerebro enatam esse sed fuisse dogma canle
antiquitatis." Hist. Philos. I. 714. Although, therefore, less clearly expressed than by the Hindu writers, the early Greek philosophers entertained similar notions of the nature of the subtile body, which was
inseparable from soul until the period of its final exemption from transmigration.

XLII.
the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before
it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence,
FOR

with the aid of nature's influence.

BHASHYA.
The purpose of soul is to be fulfilled, therefore nature proceeds to
action. This (purpose) is twofold, apprehension of sound and the other
objects of sense, and apprehension of the difference between qualities
and soul. Apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense is enjoyment of sensual gratification, as fragrance and the like in the spheres of
BrahM and the rest: apprehension o.f the difference between the qualities and soul is liberation. Therefore it is said, For the sake of soul's wish
subtile person is active. Tkrough relation of means and consequences.Means (or antecedents) are virtue and the like: consequences are their
results, such as their ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall hereafter explain. By tkeir relation; their connection. Witk tke aid of
Nn

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Mture's injlumce; of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king in
his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority, so by the
application of the supreme authority of nature, through the relation of
means (or causes) and consequences, subtile body exhibits: that is, nature
commands subtile body to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross) bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile
atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen instruments (or
faculties and senses). It assumes various conditions, by its birth, amongst
gods, animals and men. How does (it exhibit) 1 Like an actor, who when
he enters upon the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again
8 mortal: or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the relation
of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an
elephant, a woman, or a man.
It was said (ver. 40), " Subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions." What those dispositions are is now described.
COMMENT.

The circumstances on which transmigration depends are here said to

be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority of nature.
Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation; and to accomplish one
or other of these, subtile body passes through various conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts on different dresses to personate one while Rarna, another while YudkisktAira, or again, Vatsa *.
The purpose of soul is enforced by the power, authority, or influence of
nature t. VilJAutwa; as illustrated by GAURAPADA, means' kingly or
supreme authority.' VACHESPATI understands it as ' universality' rather,
as in the text of the Purana: 'This wonderful vicissitude is from the
universality of naturet;' that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides these motives, the purpose of soul and
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inlluence of nature, which may be regarded as the remote and proximate
causes of transmigration in general, it is stilI necessary to have what may
be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause; the reason of the
particular migration; the cause wherefore, in particular instances, subtile
body should ascend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or
wherefore it should descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a
brute. This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or
instrumental means or causes, 'IIitnittas, with their incidental consequences or effects, the uimittikast; as virtue and vice, which lead severally to reward and punishment after death; that is, to regeneration in
an exalted or degraded condition. Thus the Ckandrikd explains the
terms: 'Nimitta is virtue and the rest; naimittika is the effect, having
the 'IIimitta for its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection of these two, subtile body, assuming the form of gods or other beings,
performs its part to' Professor Lassen has been needlessly perplexed by
this verse, and has strangely rendered it as follows: "Corpusculum hocce
propter genii causam effectum,ludionis instar se habet ad has modo ad
ilIas origin arias et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctionem procreatricis cum potestate sua."

XLIII.
ESSENTIAL

dispositions are innate.

Incidental, as virtue and the

rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument.

The uterine

germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to
the body).
----------------

,
t f"1f"t \lA\lf~ ~ffiifw~
~A\lfe:'I(... ' "lA"((lfe: wp4lA4iliit ~ fi;pf ~ ~
'cuf~6~ qf(al" 6IIct(fn I
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BHAsHYA.
Dispositions (1Jluivas, 'conditions') of being are considered to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or i"nate, are those four
which in the first creation were cognate with the divine sage K.uILA,
or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The essential are declared;
these were four sons of BRAHMA, SANAIU, SANANDANA, SANA.TANA, and
SANATKUMARA; and these four dispositions were produced with them, who
were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or perpetually juvenile
bodies), in consequence of the relation of causes and effects (or in consequence of m~rit in a former existence): therefore these dispositions are
called essential. Iracidmtalare those derived through the corporeal form
of a holy teacher; from which (in the 6rst instance) knowledge is incidentally obtained by such as we are; from knowledge comes dispassion;
from dispassion, virtue; and from virtue, power. The form of a teacher
is an incidental product (of nature), and therefore these dispositions are
termed iflCidental: "Invested by which, subtile body migrates" (ver. 40).
These four dispositions are of the quality of goodne88; those of darkness
are their contraries: as above, "Virtue, &c. are its faculties partaking
of goodness; those partaking of darkness are the reverse" (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion,
power, vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. Where do they abide? Tkey
are considered appurtenant to tke instrument. Intellect is an instrument,
and to that they are appurtenant; as in ver. 23, "Ascertainment is
intellect; virtue, knowledge," &c. Effect; body. Tke uterine germ and
tile rest 1Jelong to it; those which are born of the mother, tile germ and
tke rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which are
(generated), for the development of the infant, in the union of the blood
and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old
age are produced; the instrumental causes of which are food and beverage; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the
body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like.
It was said (ver. 42), "Through the relation of means and consequences :" this is next explained.

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COMMENT.
We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by the term
dispositions, used in a former passage (ver. 40).
The translation of bkava adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this place is
'disposition:' in the passage referred to he had employed, as above
remarked, 'sentiment;' but it was there changed, in order to preserve
consistency. Neither word perhaps exactly expresses the purport of the
original, nor is it easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some
respects 'condition,' mode, or state of being, conditio, as rendered by
Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the different circumstances to which bMva is applied; although, as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very well express all the senses in which
IJluiva occurs. These circumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal.
The first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo, infancy,
youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as respectively cause
and effect; virtue, &c. being the efficient cause, or ni'lllitta; bodily condition the naimittika, or consequence; as V.iCHESPATI explains the object
of the stanza, , which,' according to him, ' distinguishes incidental cause
and consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of body t.'
But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into the two
classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also characterised according to their origin, as sansiddkika, prakrita, and vaikrita, rendered in the
text 'innate, essential, and incidental.' Prof. Lassen translates them
conditiones absolutfJ!, ptmdentes ab origine, pertinentes ad evoluta principia.
Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is necessary.
, Superhuman' or ' transcendental' would perhaps best explain the first,
'as they are, according to the commentator, peculiar to saints and sages.
According to GAURAPADA, they occur only in one instance as the cognate

lUCf: ,

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conditions of the divine LPILA, the author of the Sankhya system. The
second class, which may be rendered 'natural, agreeably to his view,
which is a little mystical, originated with the four holy and chaste sons
of BRAHMA. The third class, those which are incidental or constructive,
vaikrita, belong to mortals, as they are produced in them by instruction.
V.4.cHESPATI recognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation, the innate (sansiddkilla) with the essential (prtikrita) dispositions,
they being both swtihktivika, 'inseparable, inherent,' not the production
of tuition, and opposing to it the constructive or incidental (vaikritika)-.
A similar. account of their origin as in the Bktiskya is given, but under
these two heads only: 'Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage.
the venerable and great Mufti KAPILA, appeared, spontaneously endowed
with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means
(of producing them), as (the lessons of) PRACBETASA and other great
Riskist.' These dispositions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument, that is upon buddki, or ' intellect,' of which they are faculties,
as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life depend
upon the body, and are the immediate effects of generation and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue, vice, &c.

XLIV.
By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region
below: by knowledge is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage.

~,rH41 ~ri4rW41 AI,rH41 4tifef.'Ittm: ~ t.fW

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BHAsHYA.
By virtue ascmt.-Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads
upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of
Brahma, Prajapati, Soma, Indra, the Gandharbas, the Y8.kshas, the
R8.k.shasas, and Pisachas: the subtile body goes thither. Or if vice be
the efficient cause, it migrates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a
vegetable, or a mineral. Again; by lmowledge, deliverance: knowledge
of the twenty-five principles; by that efficient cause, deliverance: the
subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called' supreme spirit' (paramtitmd).
By the reverIe, borulage: ignorance is the efficient cause, and that (effect)
bondage is natural (prakrita), incidental (vaiktirika), or personal (ddb'ina),
as will be explained: "He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge)."
Next, other efficient causeS are declared.

XLV.
By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration: by power, unimpediment; by the reverse, the contrary.
BHAsHYA.
If anyone has dispassion without knowledge of principles, then from
such dispassion unpreceded by knowledge occurs absorption into nature,
01' when the individual dies he is resolved into the eight primary elements,
01' nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments; but there is no liberation, and therefore he migrates anew. So also by foul passion; 88, I
sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or human
enjoyment; from such foul passion proceeds worldly migration. By
power, unimpediment.-Where eightfold power, as minuteness, &c. is the
efficient cause, then non-obstruction is the effect. Such power is unim-

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peded in the sphere of Brahma, or in any other. By the reverse, the
c01It,ary.-The contrary of unimpediment is obstruction, which proceeds
from want of power, every where obstructed.
Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enumerated: what
they comprehend (or amount to) is next described.
COMMENT.
In these two verses the efficient causes of the various conditions of
subtile body and their effects, or its conditions, are detailed.
These causes and effects are 'collectively sixteen, eight of each: the
former are positive and negative, as diversified by the qualities of good
ness and fouiness (ver. 23); and the effects respectively correspond.
They are accordingly,
CfJU8e.

1.
S.
5.
7.
9.
11.
18.
15.

Effect.

Virtue.
2. Elevation in the scale of being.
4. Degradation in the scale of being.
Vice.
Knowledge. 6. Liberation from existence.
Ignorance.
8. Bondage or transmigration.
Dispassion. 10. Dissolution of the subtile bodily fonn.
Passion.
12. Migration.
Power.
14. U nimpediment.
Feebleness. 16. Obstruction.

By 'virtue,' dAerma, both religious and moral merit are intended.

.Ascent, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted station in another
birth; the term stluina implying both place and degree. According to
GAURAPADA, this ascent is eightfold, and the subtile frame may after
death assume a new body amongst the various classes of spirits, Pisachas,
Rakshasas, Y8.kshas, and Gandherbas; or may attain a place in the
heaven of Indra; of Soma, or the moon; of the Prajapati.s, or progenitors
of mankind; or even in the region of Brahma. It is a curious, though
perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato (Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly
beings: their places, however, seem to be the planets exclusively. The

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author of the S. To Kaumud' understands by ascent, or elevation, ascent to
the six superterrestrial regions,Dgu, or Bk",var loka, the atmosphere; Swer
lola, the heaven of Indra; Malw.r Ioka, Janaloka, and Tapoloka, worlds of
sages and saints; and Satya loTta, of Brahma. By degradation he understands descent to the subterrene regions, Ptitala, Rasatala, &c. These
notions are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in
heaven and hell are but temporary, and subtile body must even afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of migrations before
escape from the bondage of existence can be finally accomplished.
B01Ulage is said by the commentators to be of three kinds, intending
thereby three different errors or misconceptions of the character of soul
and nature; the prevalence of which precludes all hope of final emancipation. 'These errors or bonds are, 1. Prakritika; the error or bondage
of the materialists, who assert soul in nature (or matter): 2. Vaikritika;
the error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with any of
the products of nature, as the elements, the senses, egotism or intellect:
and, 3. Daltskina; the error or bondage of those who, ignorant of the real
character of soul, and blinded by the hope of advantage, engage in moral
and religious obsel'Vances:' as VACHESPATI *. These errors confine the
soul to its subtile material frame for various protracted periods; as, for
instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense, for ten manwa"taras, or above three thousand millions of years (3,084,480,000).
By dispassion occurs 'absorption into nature,' prakriti layat; or, as the
Kaumud~ and Ckandrika express it, ' resolution into the chief Qne and the
rest t.' GAUIlAPADA makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear:
according to him it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into

. *~: A'-Ifwil ~ <:tRtlijj.fw , H"AtHIClI"'"I"It{1t

A!P"'lql~"ft it'fi Altm 11'\1: , __ "'Irtil ~ ~ ff4"'I<IZlCl
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its constituent elements: but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation; itis only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of
migratory existence until knowledge is attained.
The remainder of the text requires no explanation.

XLVI.
is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability,
acquiescence, and perfectne8s. By disparity of influence of qualities
the sorts of it are fifty.
BHAsHYA.
THIS

This aggregate of sixteen causes and affects is called an intellectual

Pratyaya means lnuldki, 'intellect.' "Intellect is ascertain ..
ment," &c. (ver. 23). This intellectual creation is of four kinds,ohstruetion, disahility, acquiescence, and perfectne8s. In this classification, doubt
(obstruction) is ignorance; as when anyone beholding a post (at a distance) is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. Disability is when, even
though the object be distinctly seen, the doubt cannot be dissipated. The
third kind is called acquiescence; as when a person declines to doubt or
determine whether the object be a post or not; saying, What have I to do
with this. The fourth kind is perfectness; as when the delighted observer
notices a creeper twining round the object, or a bird perched upon it, and
is certain that it is a post. By disparity of influence of qlllZlities.-By the
unequal (or varied) inlluence of the qualities of goodness, foulness, and
darkness, acting on this fourfold intellectual creation, there are fifty modifications of it: and these kinds in which severally goodness, foulness,
or darkness prevails, and the other two are subordinate, are next particularized.
COMMENT.
creation.

In this and the five following stanzas the modifications of the causes
and consequences, or the conditions of existence produced by the intel...

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lectual faculties, as influenced by the three qualities, are detailed and
classified.
By 'intellectual creation,' pratyaya serga, is to be understood the
various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power,
and their contraries. Pratyaya properly means' trust,' but is here considered to be synonymous with buddAi. It may be understood as implying , notion;' and pratyaya serga is the creation or existence of which we
have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic exis~nce,
of which we have an idea or sensible perception; the bAula serga t, or
, elemental creation.'
Existence then, dependent on the faculties of the intellect and their
consequences, is further distinguished as of four kinds: 1.' Obstruction,'
viparyaya, is explained by V1CHESPATI 'ignorance' (ajna1UJ), by GAURAPADA 'doubt' (sa'ltSaya): 2.' Disability,' aSakli, is imperfection of the instruments or senses: 3. TusAli is 'acquiescence' or ' indifference:' and,
4. SiddAi is' complete or perfect knowledge.' 'In the three first are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and the rest (see p. 88), all
except knowledge, which is comprehended in perfectness t.' S. TallOa
Kaumudf. This is the collective or generic division. Each genus is again
divided so as to form fifty species, according as they are affected by the
three qualities, or the predominance of one, and the depression of another 1\. The species are enumerated in the succeeding verse.

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XLVII.
are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of
instruments, twenty-eight of disability: _acquiescence is ninefold;
perfectness eightfold.
THERE

BHA.SHYA.

Five distinctimu of obstruction.; namely, obscurity, illusion, extreme

illusion, gloom, and utter darkness: these will presently be explained.
There are twtmty-eigAt kiRds cif disability from defect of iflStruments; which
also we shall describe. Acquiescence is ninefold, being the kinds of knoW':
ledge partaking of the quality of foulness in an ascetic. Pe7fect7&B88 is
eigAtfold, which in holy men consists also of the kinds of knowledge
partaking of the quality of goodness. These will all be explained in
order; and first of obstruction.
COMMENT.

We have here the fifty varieties of intellectual creation, or conditions

dependent upon the faculties of intellect, simply enumerated under each
head respectively.
The text in each case is limited to the enumeration of the number of
the varieties, leaving their designations and descriptions to be supplied
by the scholia: accordingly we have in the BIuisAya the five distinctions
of obstruction specified. They are referred to in the text, in the succeeding stanza, for the purpose of enumerating their .ubdivisions, and it
is unnecessary therefore to enter upon the detail here.

XLVIII.
distinctions of obscurity are eightfold. as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is
utter darkness.
THE

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BHASHYA.
OhsCtt.rity is eightJold; final dissolution being so distinguished through
ignorance; as when a person thinks that soul merges into the eight forms
of prakriti, or the five rudiments, egotism, intellect, and nature, and
thence concludes, I am liberated: this is eightfold obscurity. The same
is the number of kinds of illusion; in consequence of which, Indra and
the gods, being attached to the possession of the eight kinds of superhuman power, such as minuteness and the rest, do not obtain liberation,
but upon the loss of their power migrate again: this is called eightfold
illusion. Extreme illusion is of ten kinds, accordingly as the five objects
of sense, sound, tQuch, form, taste, and. smell, are sources of happiness to
the gods or to men. In these ten objects (or the five objects of sense
twice told) consists extreme illusion. Gloom is eighteenfold.-The faculties of superhuman power are eight sources, and the objects of sense,
human or divine, are ten, making eighteen; and the feeling that makes
men rejoice in the enjoyment of these eighteen, and grieve for the want
of ti!em, is gloom. Utter dar1mess has in like manner eighteen varieties,
originating with the eightfold superhuman power and the ten objects of
perception; but it applies to the profound grief felt by one who dies
amidst the abundance of sensual delights in the season of enjoyment, or
who falls from the command of superhuman faculties: that is utter darkness. In this manner the five varieties of obstnlction, obscurity and the
rest, are severally subdivided, making sixty-two varieties.

COMMENT.
The five kinds of obstruction, ignorance, or uncertainty, alluded to
in the preceding stanza, are here specified, and their subdivisions enumerated.
'Obstruction,' viparyaya*, means, properly, whatever obstructs the
soul's object of final liberation: it is consequently any cause of bondage,

rqq~41: ,

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150
of confinement to worldly existence, or of perpetual migration, and is"
therefore one of the four elements of the creation of the world; as, if
spirit was not so confined, created forms would never have existed. So
the Sutra of KAPILA has, 'Bondage is from obstruction .;' but liberation
depends on knowledge: bondage therefore arises from ignorance, and
ignorance or error is obstruction. GAURAPADA accordingly uses sanaayat,
'doubt' or ' error,' as the synonyme of viparyaya; and the specification of
its sub-species confirms this sense of the term, as they are all hinderances
to final emancipation, occasioned by ignorance of the difference between
soul and nature, or by an erroneous estimate of the sources of happiness,
placing it in sensual pleasure or superhuman might.
The five varieties of obstruction or error are, 'obscurity,' tamas; 'illusion,' moka; 'extreme illusion,' 'IIwk/zmoka; 'gloom,' tamisra; 'utter darkness,' andkatamisra. The distinctions are more subtle than precise, but
their general purport is sufficiently obvious; they all imply ignorance of
self, and thirst of pleasure and power. Another enumeration, that of the
Yoga, or Patanjala school, as repeated by VIJNANA BHIItSHU, calls the
five species, 'ignorance' (avidya), ' egoism' (asmita), 'love' (raga), , hate'
(dwesluJ), and' idle terror' (abkiniv~sa)t as fear of death and the liket.
They are called also in the same system, 'the five afflictions II.' These
are identified with the species named in the text. Obscurity is that ignorance which believes soul to be sealed in primary nature, or one of its
filost seven products; and is therefore eightfold. Illusion is that egoism
that exults in the appropriation of the eight superhuman faculties; and
is consequently eightfold also. Eztrel1l6 illusion, or love, is addiction to
sensual objects, as they are grateful respectively to gods and men: therefore this class of impediments to liberation is tenfold. Gloom, or hate, is
of eighteen kinds; ten as affecting the ten objects of sense, or the five
divine and five human, as before distinguished, and termed by GAURA-

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t .. fCljCl,r~n'(I'I""ilr~

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I

drisktti, 'seen,' per~eived by men; and anusraviltti t, 'heard traditionally,' by men, of the gods: and eight connected with the possession
of the eight superhuman faculties. The mental conditions here intended
are those of fierceness and impatience, with which sensual enjoyments
are pursued, or superhuman powers are exercised. Utter darlmess, or
terror, is the fear of death in men; and in gods, the dread of expulsion
from heaven by the Asuras: in either case the loss of pleasure and power
is the thing lamented; and as their sources are eighteen, 80 many are the
subdivisions of this condition. These distinctions are said to be the work
of former teachers; as in the S. Pravachana Bluishya: 'The subdivisions
are as formerly described: that is, the subdivisions of obstruction, which
is said to be of five species, are such as were fully detailed by former
teachers, but are in the Sutra but briefly alluded to, for fear of prolixityt.'
PADA,

XLIX.
DEPRAVITY

of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the

intellect, are pronounced to be disability.

The injuries of intellect

are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

I

BHASHYA.
From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of disability;
this has been declared (ver. 47): these are, depravity of tke eleven organs,
or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smen, dumbness,
mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity. Together
with injuries cif tke intellect: as, together with these, there are twentyeight kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the

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intellect. By inversion oj acquiescence and perfect1lU8: that is, there are

nine kinds of acquiescence, and eight of perfectness; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these (seventeen), the eleven above
specified, compose the twenty-eight varieties of disability. The kinds of
injury of the intellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence
and perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties.
The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained.
COMMENT.

The various kinds of the second class of conditions or disability are

here enumerated.
'Disability,' asakti, or incapability of the intellect to discharge its
peculiar functions, is the necessary result of imperfection of the senses,
or of any of the organs of perception and of action. But besides these,
which are sufficiently obvious, such as blindness, deafness, and any other
organic defect, there are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally
injurious to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the
conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and perfectness.
Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfaction as to notions of
nature, means, time, and luck, and addiction to enjoyment of the five
objects of sense, or the pleasures of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The
contraries of perfectness are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from
redection, from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of
pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or of
liberality.

L.
sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative
to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.
NINE

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BHASHYA.
Five internal sorts of acquiescence.-Those which are in the individual
are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to means, to time, and to
luck. The first is, when a person understands what nature is, its being
with or without qualities, and thence knows a principle (of existence) to
be a product of nature; but knows this only, and is satisfied: he does not
obtain liberation: this is acquiescence in regard to nature. The second
is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of existence), depends upon
external means, such as the triple staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics): liberation is not for him: this is acquiescence
in regard to means. Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person
satisfies himself that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unnecessary to study first principles: such a one does not obtain liberation.
And in the same way acquiescence as relates to luck is when a person is
content to think that by good luck liberation will be attained. These are
four kinds of acquiescence. Five external, relative to abstinence frmA (enjoyment of objects).-The external sorts of acquiescence are five; from abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense; that is, when a person
abstains from gratification through sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell;
such abstinence proceeding from observation of (the evils of) acquiring,
preserving, waste, attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness.
Acquiring is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pasturage
of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There is pain ill the
preservation of what has'been acquired; and if they be enjoyed, they are
wasted; and waste, again, is vexation. When attachment to sensual
pleasures prevails, the organs have no repose: this is the fault of such attachment. Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment (of
sensible objects); and this is the defect of injuriousness. From observing
then the evil consequences of acquiring and the rest, abstinence from
enjoyment of the five objects of sense is practised; and these are the five
sorts of external acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and
external kinds proceed the nine sorts of acquiescence. Their names are
differently enumerated in other works, or ambhas, salilam, ogha, vrishti,
sutamas, param, S1,netram, nankam, and an"ttamtimbkasikam: and from

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the reverse of these kinds of acquiescence, constituting the varieties of
disability, injuries of the intellect arise, named (according to' the last
mentioned nomenclature) anambkas, asalilam, and so on. From the contrariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of the intellect.
Perfectness is next described.
COMMENT.
The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference, are specified in this verse.
The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tuskti, are of two
descriptions; internal or spiritual, ad"yatmiia, and external or sensible,
bakya. GAURAPADA explains the former,' being in self or spirit -.' VACHESPATI defines them, ' Those kinds of acquiescence are called internal which
proceed from discrimination of self, as different from nature t.' According
to VIJNANA BHIKSHU, they are those principles or sentiments which preside
over collected or composed soul t. Of the different species, the first, or
that which relates to nature, acknowledges it as the radical principle of all
things, but expects that as every thing is but a modification of nature, so
nature will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example, and
the individual I remains passive and complete II. Another person, as the
means of liberation, adopts a religious or mendicant order, or at least bears
the emblems, as the staff, the water-pot, and the like: the term fJividikti
used in the B/u1,skya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error. Others
suppose that liberation must come in time, or at least by a long continued course of meditation. Others imagine it may come by good luck;
and contenting themselves with these notions or practices, omit the only
means of being freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five
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external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence from the five
objects of sensual gratification; not from any philosophic appreciation of
them, but from dread of the trouble and anxiety which attends the means
of procuring and enjoying worldly pleasures; such as acquiring wealth,
preserving it, spending it, incessant excitement and inj ury or cruelty to
others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of these divisions of
acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the usual sense of which
is quite different, and which may therefore be regarded as the slang or
mystical nomenclature of the followers of the Yoga. There is some difference in the precise expressions, but they are of a similar purport
in general. The first four, the synonymes of the internal modes of acquiescence, are alike in all the authorities; or, ambAas, ' water;' salila t,
also' water;' ogka t, 'quantity;' and vrisAti 11,' 'rain.' GAURAPA.DA then
has for the five exterior modes, sutamas, 'great darkness;' para'l, 'shore;'
sunJtra", 'a beautiful eye;' narikatt, 'feminine;' and anutta_mbAinita tt, ' unsurpassed water.' V.iCHESPATI makes them, param, suparamllll,
'good shore;' aptiram H, ' shoreless;' anuttamambAas ", 'unsurpassed
water;' and uttamtimbkas, 'excellent water.' The Ckandriltti has the
same, except in the third place, where the term is ptirtipara ttt, 'both
shores;' with which theSe Prav. BA. agrees. No explanation of the words
is any where given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.

LI.
hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means
thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.
REASONING,

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BHASHYA.
ReasOfting; as when a person always reasons, What here is truth 1
What is the future 1 What is final felicity 1 How may I attain the object
(of my existence)! and from reflecting in this manner, the knowledge is
acquired that soul is different from nature; that intellect, egotism, the
rudiments, the senses, the elements, are several and distinct. In this
manner knowledge of the (twenty-five) principles is attained, by which
liberation is accomplished. This is the first kind of perfectness, called
reasoning. Next, from knowledge acquired by hearing proceeds knowledge of nature, intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, and the
elements; whence liberation ensues: this is perfectness by hearing.
When from study, or the perusal of the Vedas and other (sacred) writings,
knowledge of the twenty-five principles is acquired; that is the third
kind of perfectness. Prevention of tke three kinds of pain.-When, for the
purpose of preventing the three kinds of pain, internal, external, and
superhuman, a holy teacher has been attended, and liberation is derived
from his counsel; then this constitutes the fourth kind of perfectness.
This is threefold, with reference to the three different sorts of pain, and
makes, with the three preceding, six varieties of perfectness. Next, intercourse offriends; as when a friend, having acquired knowledge, obtains
liberation: this is the seventh kind of perfectness. Gift; as when ~
person assists holy men, by donations of a dwelling, of herbs, of a staff, a
wallet, food, or clothing; and (in requital) receives from them knowledge,
and thus obtains liberation: this is the eighth sort of perfectness. In
other books these eight kinds of perfectness are termed taram, sutaram,
tarataram, pra'fllodam, pramoditam, pramodamdnam, ramyakam, and saddpramuditam.--From contrariety to these, the injuries of intellect which
occur, or causes of disability, are termed ataram, asutaram, &c.; thus
completing the twenty-eight kinds of disability, as in the text (ver. 49),
" Depravity of the eleven organs, together with inj uries of the intellect,"
&c. Thus the contraries of the sorts of acquiescence being nine, and the
contraries of the kinds of perfectlless being eight, they form seventeen
injuries of intellect; and these, with the eleven defects of the organs,
constitute twenty-eight kinds of disability, as previously stated.

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In this way the various kinds of obstruction, disability, acquiescence,
and perfectness, have been affirmatively and negatively described. Again,
tke forementioned tkree are curbs of perfectneas.-Forementioned; that is,
obstruction, disability, and acquiescence; they are curbs of perfectness :
threefold curbs from their severalty. As an elephant is kept in check
when restrained by a goad (or curb), so, impeded by obstruction, disability, and acquiescence, the world suffers ignorance: therefore abandoning them, perfectness alone is to be pursued; for by a person having
perfectness knowledge is attained, and thence liberation.
It was stated (ver. 40) that" subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions:" those dispositions were previously said to be virtue and the
rest, eight in number, modifications (or faculties) of intellect; which again
have been described as modified by obstruction, disability, acquiescence,
and perfectness. These (together) constitute intellectual creation, also
called dispositional (or conditional): but subtile body is called a rudimental (or personal) creation, extending throughout the fourteen sorts of
created things. (See v. 53.) It then becomes a question, whether soul's
purpose is accomplished by one kind of creation, or by both 1 This is
next explained.
COMMENT.

The different kinds of perfectness are here specified.

By 'perfectness,' siddlti, is here to be understood the means of perfecting or fulfilling the purpose of soul, or the conditions essential to its
attainment; the circumstances productive of knowledge; the necessary
consequence of which is exemption from future transmigration. 't Reasoning, hearing, study, intercourse of friends, and gift, are secondary kinds of
perfectness, as subsidiary to the prevention of the three kinds of pain,

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which constitutes a triple principal class: they are respectively distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those objects.' S. Tatwa
Ka'Umudt. Reasoning, according to VACHESPATI, is' investigation of scriptural authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the scriptures:'
and investigation is defined, 'refutation of dubious doctrine, and establishment of positive conclusions -.' 'Hearing is oral instruction, or
rather the knowledge thence derived, or knowledge derived either from
hearing another person read, or from expounding a work t .' S. Pro Bla.
Intercourse of friends! is explained in the S. Tatwa Ka'Umud, to signify
'dissatisfaction with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a
pupil, or a fellow-student II.' VIJNANA BHIKSHU defines it, 'acquirement
of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who comes to give instruction .'
ViCHASPATI and NARAYANA agree in rendering dana 1f-which GAURAPADA explains by 'gift, liberality,' particularly to religious characters
-by Suddki, 'purity;' meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge; deriving it from the root daiptt, 'to purify;' and not from
dd'tt, 'to give.' The former cites the authority of PATANJALI for this
sense of one kind of perfectness: 'Undisturbedness of discriminative
knowledge, that is, purity; which is not attained except through long
repeated and uninterrupted practice of veneration. That is also comprehended in discrimination by the term dana 1111. He also observes that
others interpret it 'gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts

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knowledge . ' The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only t. The
term for 'curb,' ankuSa t, is the goad or iron hook used to guide an
elephant: it is here explained by nivarana, 'hindering;' and 'as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder perfectness, they are to be
shunned 1\.'

LII.
dispositions there would be no subtile person: without
person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold
creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.
WITHOUT

BHASHYA.
Witlurut dispositions, without intellectual creations, there wO'Uld be no
subtile perSlm, no rudimental creation; from the non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions). Witk01d perSlm, without rudimental
creation, tkere wO'Uld be no pause of dispositions; from the indispensability
of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and
from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually initiative,
like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in this, for (the relation)
is that of species, it does not imply the mutual relation of individuals.
Thence proceeds a twofold creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other rudimental (or personal). FurtherCOMMENT.

It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a twofold

creation, necessarily prevails; one proceeding from the intellectual facul-

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ties, the other from the rudimental elements; each being indispensable to
the other.
It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions: and it was then explained (ver.43, et seq.) what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions of the intellect (described in
ver. 23), or virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power,
and debility. These were said (v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation, or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddki, or the
intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions, the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be manifested in a bodily
state, and therefore require necessarily a creation of a different character,
personal or rudimental creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible products of nature; intellect and its faculties included. Nor
is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally necessary for their
occasional cessation: thus virtue, vice. and the rest necessarily imply and
occasion bodily condition; bodily condition is productive of acts of vice
and virtue; vice and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition; and so on :
like the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other; the
tree bears the seed; from the seed springs the tree, again to put forth
seed; and so on for ever; neither being initiative, neither being final.
But one result of bodily condition is knowledge; knowledge is liberation,
when soul is disengaged: subtile body then resolves into its rudiments,
and the dispositions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way
there are two creations, the bktivtikkya, that termed' conditional' or
, intellectual;' and the lingaltkya t, that called' rudimental' or' personal.'
Both these seem to be considered by the text, as well as by GAURAPADA
and VACBESPATI, as varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or
'intellectual creation.' The commentator on the S. Pravackana so far
agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds more closely to
a creation of intellect, regarding the linga as buddki itself, and the bkava

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as its conditions or dispositions. Thus, commenting on this verse of the
Ktirika; he observes, 'B1u1va signifies the modes of the apprehension (or
the faculties) of intelligence, as the properties knowledge, virtue, and the
rest. Linga is the great principle, or intelligence -.' He calls them both
samasAti sarga, ' a collective or generic creation.' By the other commentators, however, the linga is also called the tanmatra, or ' rudimental creation t:' and it furt:her seems to imply' gross body;' for' fruition, which is
one of sours objects, cannot be accomplished without both bodies; without the receptacle that enjoys, and the objects to be enjoyed to' The
author of the CAa1ulrika has accordingly adopted a totally different version of this passage, understanding by bAavakA'!Ia, not any reference to
intellectual creation, but the creation of sensible objects, the objects to be
enjoyed; lingakA'!Ia, or ' personal creation,' being the enjoyer: 'Without
the bAavas, or present objects of sense, the linga, or aggregate of imperceptible principles, intelligence and the rest, could not be means of
fruition; whilst without intelligence and the rest there could be no pause,
no cessation, of the means of enjoying sensible objects. This is the purport of the text II: And he defines lingn to be' that which is only indicated, which is actually not visible, as intellect and the rest;' and b1u1va,
'that object which is perceived or apprehended by the senses, the class
of sensible objects :
The succession of the two kinds of creation, as mutually cause and
effect, is said by VACHESPATI to be eternal, and without a beginning, as
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even in the commencement of a kalpa bodily existence results from the
conditions of similar existence in a former ltalpa -.

LIII.
divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold;
mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living
beings.
THE

BHAsHYA.
Divine, of eight sorts; Bd.hma, Prajapatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gandherba, Yaksha, Rakshasha, and Paisacha. Animals, deer, birds. reptiles,
and immovable substances are the five grovelling kinds. Manltirul is
single. In this way there are fourteen sorts of creatures, there being
three classes in the three worlds. Which is supreme in each is next
explained.
COMMENT.
The intellectual or rudimental creation hitherto described has been
that of creation generally; we now have an account of specific or individual creation, composed of fourteen classes of beings.
The fourteen classes of beings are, first, eight superhuman, or Brd"ma,
that of BRAHMA and other supreme gods; 2. Prajapatya, that of progenitors, the Menus, the Rishis, or divine sages; 3. Saumya, lunar or planetary; 4. Aindra, that of INDRA and divinities of the second order;
5. GarulAerba, that of the demigods attendant on INDRA, and of similar
beings; O. RdltsAasa, that of demons, foes of the gods; 7. Yaks"a, that of
the attendants of KUVERA; 8. PaisacAa, that of mischievous and cruel
fiends. These are divine or superhuman beings. The ninth class is that
of man, which contains but one species. . We have then five classes of
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----.--- .. ---------- - - - - - - -

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inferior beings; or, counting from the preceding, 10. Animals, or domestic
animals, pam; 11. Wild animals, as deer and the like, mriga; 12. Birds;
13. Reptiles, or creeping things, including fish sarfsripa; and 14. Stkavara, fixed things, such as vegetables and minerals. These constitute the
"!Iaskti serga, specific or individual creation; or, as denominated in the
text, the bkautika sarga, the creation of bkutas, 'beings;' or elemental
creation; the fonns of things requiring the combination of the gross
elements.

LIV.
there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is
full of darkness: in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from
BRAHMA to a stock.
ABOVE,

BHASHYA.
.Above: in the eigbt divine regions.

Prevalence of goodness: the ex-

tensiveness or predominance of the quality of goodness. Above is goodness predominant, but there are foulness and darkness also. Below, tke
creation is full of darkness.-In animals and insensible things the whole
creation is pervaded by darkness in excess, but there are goodness and
foulness. In tke midst, in man, f(lUlness predominates, although goodness
and darkness exist; and hence men for the most part suffer pain. Such
is the world,from BRAHMA to a stock; from BRAHMA to immovable things.
Thus non-elemental creation, nldimentdl creation, conditional and elemental creation, in beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immovable)
origin, are the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature.
COMMENT.
The various qualities dominating in the different orders of beings are
specified in this stanza.
--------~.-----

- - - - - . - -.. -. - - - . - - -

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The coexistence of the several qualities, with the predominance of
one or other of them, in different beings, has been previously explained
(p. 54), as wen 88 the different orders. or states of existent beings; constituting, according to GAURAPADA, sixteen forms or kinds of creation:
that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four
modifications of nature; or, from the invisible prillciples, from the subtile
rudiments, from the conditions or dispositions of intellect, and from the
gross elements.
.

LV.
THERE

does sentient soul experience pain, arlsmg from decay

and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of

the essence (of bodily existence).
I

BHASHYA.
Tl&ere: in the bodies of gods, men, and animals. Pain produced by
decay, and produced by deatl&. Sentie1tt soul: soul having sensibility.
Experiences: soul experiences; not nature, nor intellect, nor egotism, nor
the rudiments, senses, nor gross elements. How long does it suffer pain?
this (the text) discusses. Until it he released from its person. As long 88
it is in subtile body, composed of intellect and the rest, it is discrete (or
individualized); and as long as migratory body does not rest, so long, in
brief, soul suffers pain, arising from decay and death, in the three worlds.
Until it he released from its person: until the discontinuance of subtile
person. In the cessation of subtile body consists liberation; and when
liberation is obtained, there is no more pain. By what means, then, can
liberation be effected 1 Whenever knowledge of the twenty-five principles, the characteristic of which is knowledge of the distinctness of soul
and body, is attained; or whenever a person knows that this is nature,
this intellect, this egotism, these are the five rudiments, these the eleven
senses, these the five elements, and this is soul, separate and dissimilar

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from them all; then from such knowledge proceeds cessation of subtile
person, .and thence liberation.
The object of the activity (or development of nature) is next explained.
COMMENT.

The presence of soul in these creations, and for what period, is here
specified.
Having defined the different objects which form the twenty-five categories or tatwas of the Sankhya philosophy, the text now comes to the
main object of that and of all Hindu systems, the final dissolution of the
connection between soul and body. The rest of the Karika is devoted to
the illustration of this topic. In this verse it is said that soul experiences
pain in the different stages of existence, until its corporeal frame is discontinued; for soul itself is not susceptible of pain, or of decay, or death:
the site of these things is nature, but nature is unconscious, insensible;
and the consciousness that pain exists is restricted to soul, though soul is
not the actual seat of pain; its experience of pain depends upon its connexion with rudimental person, of the material constituents of which,
decay, death, R.nd pain are concomitants. 'Pain and the rest are from
nature, they are properties of intelligence. How do they become connected with sense 1 Soul (purusha) is that which reposes (sete') in body
(pun): subtile body is immediately connected with it, and becomes
thereby connected with sense *: S. Tatwa Kau,nudl. When soul is released from body, its susceptibility of pain ceases: pain is therefore of
the essence t of its own nature; that is, it is the inseparable concomitant
of bodily creation, according to PATANJALI, as quoted in the S. CIw:ndriklz:
'All is pain to the wise, through the conflict of opposite qualities, and
by the sufferings arising from affiicting vicissitudest;' that is, from the

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dread of death and the reiteration of birth; to which even the conditions
of spirits, sages, and gods are subject. Thus the S6tra of KAPILA: 'The
pain of death, decay, and the rest is universal*;' as explained in the
S. Prav. BluUhya: 'The pain of death, decay, and the rest is the common portion of all beings, whether above or below, from BRAHMA to immovable things t.' So also another 86tm: 'It is to be shunned, from
the connection of'successive birth by the thread of regeneration II:' that
is, according to the commentator, ' since regeneration is unavoidable, even
after ascent to the regions above; and in consequence of the succession
of births, that regeneration must be in an inferior condition; even the
world above is to be shunned II.' GAURAPADA and ViCHESPATI take no
notice of the expression, 'Pain is of the essence.' The S. Chandrika explains it, ' Creation is essentially of the nature of pain .' RiMA .KRISHNA
calls it, ' Former acts;' the acts of a former life 1[.

LVI.
evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements,
is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for
another's sake as for self.
,
BHASHYA.
THIS

This (or' thus, this,' ityeska) implies conclusiveness and limitation

(that is, in this way all that has been hitherto described). Evolution of
nature: in the instrumentality or act of nature. Whatever evolution of

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OW(anr.. an'''e:~anr",~.~ msf14(;j't~~ I ~ ~

~ ~ ~:~:

~ ~ An""~Ui

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nature, from intellect to tile special elements: that is, (the evolution) of
intellect from nature; of egotism from intellect; of the rudiments and
senses from egotism; and of the gross elements from the subtile. Is performed for tile deliverance of eacl, soul respectively. -This evolution is
effected for the liberation of each individual soul which has assumed
body, whether brute, human, or divine. How (is it effected) 1 It is done
for another's sake asfor self: as, for instance. a person neglecting his own
objects transacts those of a friend, BO does nature; BOul makes no return
to nature. .A.s for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of another is
the apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, or knowledge
of the difference between BOul and qualities; for BOuls are to be provided
(by nature), in the three worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with
liberation: such is the agency of nature; as it is said, " Nature is like a
utensil, having fulfilled BOUI'S object it ceases."
It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational; then how can
nature, like a rational thing, understand that by me, BOul is to be provided
in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation?
This is true; but action and cessation of action are both obse"ed in
irrational things; whence it is saidCOMMENT.
The object of nature's activity is here said to be the final1iberation of
individual soul.
Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its" motion" or evolution,
takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any object of its own. The
term is aramhha, 'commencement,' 'successive origin or beginning,' as
detailed in former passages: that is, of i!ltellect from crude nature; of
egotism from intellect; and so on. This is the spontaneous act of nature: it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such as
the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent; as BRAHMA, it is without
(external) cause.' ' But it is objected, Nature being eternal, her works

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should be so too; and forms once evolved should therefore endure for
ever. To this it is replied, The work is done for a special purpose, the
liberation of individual 8Oul; and that when this is accomplished, nature
ceases with regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal
desists when it is dressed t.' S. Tatwa Ka'Umudt According to GAURAPA-DA, and to the text of the following stanza, nature 80 acts spontaneously; but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute
a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul
to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends. constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sankhyas for
the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of existence are known,
and by whom nature is guided, as stated by V ACHESPATI: 'But whether
this (evolution) be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational
principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore
there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied 8Ouls, though
rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character;
therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, which is
.Iswara, or God t.' This is not inconsistent with the previous doctrine,
that creation is the evolution of nature: it is so, but under the guidance
of a ruling Power. The atheistical Sankhyas, on the other hand. contend
that there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the activity
of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing 8Oul's object, is an intuitive
necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing passage.

at(t(.. 'liit ,,"(..(OIl ~ A,f~QC{.. mit fPlctilH lrCi ~

'1~tU~ ..n:qr4UA,Wl AljfH4 ~ an:qaf" ii m .. ,;iiaqtfll
t (OII',HI( ~ q(lti err~: AqWH t .. ~ A1if"(~H"q ~
ijiiti:f" HWtlcfQ Atndtl81HI ~: t .. ~ I"ijl'lI ~H;iil wfq
Al;fHiitN8Idiiti:f~ W1Ii A1ifH(Ci4i;ql;U~ij;qlit. t HwuefGl eiltij

~ AtH(Ri8IHI ~ 1fW t

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LVII.
As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish
the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the
soul.
'BHAsHYA.
As grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into milk,

and nourish the calf; and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is
grown; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the liberation of soul. This
is the agency of an unintelligent thing.
COMMENT.

The intuitive or spontaneous evolution of nature, for soul's purpose, is

here illustrated.
As the breast secretes milk for a purpose of which it is unconscious,
and unconsciously stops when that purpose, the nutriment of the young
animal, is effected; so nature, though irrational, constructs bodily forms
for the fruition and liberation of soul; and when the latter is accomplished, ceases to evolve. The illustration is from KAPILA, as in the
S6tra, 'From irrationality the activity of nature is like (the secretion of)
milk -.'

LVIII.
As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete
(principle) to liberate the soul.

BHASHYA.
As mankind, being influenced by desire, engage in acts of various

kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when the object is

xx

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accomplished, so the Chief one, active for the purpose of liberating soul,
desists, after having effected the twofold purpose of soul; one, cognizance
of enjoyment of the objects of sense; the other, cognizance of the differ
ence between soul and qualities.
COMMENT.

Another illustration is here given of the activity of nature.

According to VACHE8PATI, this verse is an explanation of the phrase
(in ver.66), 'For another's sake as for self*;' assigning, in fact, an object
to nature, the accomplishment of its own wish; av.tsukya being rendered
by icAcklui, 'wish:' and this wish, which is, 'the liberation of soul, being
gratified, nature desists t.'

LIX.
As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists
from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to
soul.
BHAsHYA.
As a dancer (or actress), having exhibited her performances on the

stage in dramatic representations, rendered interesting by the display of

love and other passions, in situations drawn from history or tradition, and
accompanied by music and singing, desists from acting when her part is
finisbed, so nature, having exhibited itself to 8Oul, in the various characters of intellect, eg~tism, the rudiments, senses, and elements, desists.
What the cause of such cessation is, is next described.
COMMENT.

An illustration is here given of the discontinuance of nature's activity.

Ranga, properly a stage or theatre, is said in the S. Tatwa Kav.mu.di

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to imply also the audience -. A dancer is equally an actress, 'lUJf'ttalti,
at least was so in ancient times. The dancing girls of Hindustan are
rather singers, than either actresses or dancers.

LX.
nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means
accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul,
devoid as he is of qualities.
GENEROUS

BHAsHYA.
By '1lU1lnifold meam.-Nature is the benefactress of soul, of unrequiting
soul. How 1 By the characters of men, gods, and animals; by circumstances involving pain, pleasure, and insensibility; by the properties of
the objects of sense: in this way having by various means exhibited herself to soul, and shewn that' I am one; thou art another;' having done
this, nature desists. Thus she accomplis"es tIle wis" of that (soul) which
is eternal, witlwut benefit (to herself): as a benevolent man gives assistance to all, and seeks no return for himself, so nature pursues or effects
the purpose of soul, without deriving from it any advantage.
It was said above (ver.59), "Having manifested herself, nature desists." It is next shewn what she does, having desisted.
COMMENT.
This verse may be considered as a further explanation of the ex.pression in ver. 56, "Nature labours for the benefit of soul as if for self,
but not for any advantage."
, Generous, benevolent t :' 'Not expecting a return; for it is not true
generosity to do good to another with the expectation of requital t.'

(W~P.. (iI'~i4 (illf~if: q,r<'IC{iiqMetllf.. ,

t 'iq~"
'roft , q(l~ A.,q~,,(e.~ 1f '1ft n:Fn .. P.. lli4:

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17i
S. Ckandriiti. 'Soul being devoid of qualities (ver. 19), is consequently
devoid of action, and can therefore do nothing by way of return -.' Nature 'accomplishes, goes to,' clUlrati or ackarati, or 'effects,' kurute. The
last word of the verse is differently read.

LXI.
in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware
of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze
of soul.
NOTHING,

BHASHYA.
There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature,
in my opinion: for which reason (nature's) opinion consults another's ad~
vantage. Wherefore nature says to herself, " I have been beheld by that
soul," and does not again present herself to the view of that soul; that is,
she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text
means by gentle.
,
It (the text 1) declares Iswara (God) to be the cause of the world: thus;
"Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul),
, for its own pleasure or pain, go
to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Iswara." Others say, spontaneity is
cause: "By what (or whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of
many colours;" that is, they are so naturally (or spontaneously). Here,
bave said, How can beings endowed with
therefore, the Sankhya teachers
,
qualities proceed from Iswara, who is devoid of qualities 1 or how from
soul, equally devoid of qualities 1 Therefore (the causality) of nature is
rendered probable. Thus; from white threads white cloth is fabricated ;
from black threads black cloth: and in the same manner, from nature,
endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed
with the
,
three qualities also, are produced. This is determined. Iswara is without
qualities: the origin of the three worlds endowed with qualities, from

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him, would therefore be an inconsistency. By this (same reason) soul
also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause: "Time is the
five elements; time destroys the world; time watches, when all things
sleep; time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories, the
discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul; and by one of them
time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity
merges into it (nature): and time, therefore, is not cause; neither is spontaneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause; and there is no cause of
nature. Site does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. Therefore
it is my opinion that there is no cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than
nature, such as iswara and the rest.
'
It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, "Soul is liberated; soul
migrates:" on this it is observedCOMMENT.

Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act.

Nature being once fully seen-that is, known or understood-by soul:
disappears, goes no more into its sight; it c~ases to be, with respect to
that individual soul. Why is this 1 Because it is the most soft, the most
gentle or timid, su/tumtiratara, of all things. The term /n,mti'ra, properly
implying 'soft' or 'young,' is explained by the Scholiasts to signify
, bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul *.' V ACHESPATI. Sukumarata'l'a salajjat, NARAYANA and RAMA KRISHNA. In the S. Bhtishya it
is rendered by subkogyatara t, ' more fit to be enjoyed;' but this refers
less to the metaphorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and
might be rendered, 'more plastic;' there being nothing so suitable as nature
(matter) for the cause or origin of sensible objects. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi
amplifies and explains the illustration: 'Nature is like a woman of virtue
and family: such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by

* " .. ,<n<.. r.,lltJMn, '!~Et~"'\1r@,n'

QMfii I
t tr~l' atn< ,

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some inadvertence, surprised in disabille by a strange man, but she takes
good care that another shall not behold her oft' her guard. Nature being
once fully seen by discrimination, has too much matronly. decorum to
allow herself to be looked at a second time -.' The S. Ckandrikd has a
similar exposition t. The S. Pravachana Bh. cites this verse in explanation of the S6tra, "Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further
approach of nature (to soul); like a woman of familyt:' that is, 'When
nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that the distress, &c. of
migration are owing, she is put to shame by the detection, and ventures
no more near soul; as a woman of family keeps aloof from a husband by
whom she knows her faults to have been found out. And this is considered as an additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of
nature II.' This is my opinion refers to what has preceded, there is nothing
more gentle, as is shewn by the term iti; also by the Blu1skya of GAURAPADA. It is clear, therefore, that the expression refers to the author;
such is his opinion; that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that
nature is actually more timid or soft than any thing else--for the phrase
is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration-but that it seems
so to him; the words having the force of' methinks, it seems:' 'Nature,

- _'1.qkt(au ~ tMGI'l(fH41'<Jet41;acq(l A41I~f"lrMnR1~an

~~
it q(,!~,,1Q'
.... it(~1
~
~~ 1"'1
'"' Alinn _A41'1.~.
11'4.. 1 ~
q,'It(,f(9 ';f q(lIrrftfn I l!Ci A1jfnd", 'MGI'[iiTS~ m 'A
~ ';f '''~t$n ~: I t . : q(41Iii4iH '1~'ElCij ~ ~
~,ql m ~ cft&IIIIU .. 1 Feftcht "li4iij;i ;{(qfn I
t~

1iNsflI ti\qeq(!j l(lIli4~ I ~ I

I ,!~"Cij ~:

11ft:

".Hf"NS!4Iii4*lf~~"~"h~:AiMffitnllll: ~: tj.. ;!i'1~ej 1P'j

qeq(!j ~ 'lI1IT it If...., if ~ ft ~ Mffilnl Pf
~ itlf.... 'qeciiFn nlfct.... tl: I
@:N'It(r~fn I
1frr

it -mw:

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it seems to me, or methinks, is the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things,
and cannot bear to be stared at rudely: once seen, therefore, as she is,
she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen no more.' Such is
the obvious purport of the text, which is merely a further illustration of
the idea conveyed in ver. 59. GAURAPADA has gone out of his way rather
to discuss the character of a first cause; giving to suktJ,maratara a peculiar
import, that of' enjoyable, perceptible;' which nature eminently is, and
is therefore, according to him, the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in other words, of creation.

LXII.
VERILY

not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but

nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and

migrates.
BHAsHYA.
Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is loosed, nor
migrates; for, because, nature, il" relation to varicnu beings-in relation
(or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of
intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and gross elements-is bound, is
liberated, or migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes
every where, and how therefore should it migrate 1 migration being for
the purpose of obtaining something not previously obtained. The phrases,
therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loosed or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration. From knowledge, the end of soul and
existence, the real nature of soul is attained. That being manifest, soul
is single, pure, free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no
bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore said (see next
verse), "Nature binds and liberates herself;" for where subtile body,
composed of the rudiments, and having a triple cause, exists, such body
is bound with triple bonds; as it is said, " He who is bound by the bonds
of nature," of nature's products or of works, "cannot by any other be

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loosed" (see Comment, ver. 45). Such a subtile body is affected by virtue,
vice, &c.
Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates. How is next described.
COMMENT.
The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage,
liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.
The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents
of bondage and liberation to soul. Apparently, however, the difference
is one of words only.
Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to change. It
cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which it does not perform;
and as it is never in bondage, it cannot be set free. The application of
these terms to soul, therefore, is to be understood in a relative, not in a
positive sense; and their positive signification is properly restricted to
nature. It is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that
undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches herself to soul,
when she separates from it, the converse is equally true, soul is attached
to, or is separated from, nature; and is consequently said to be bound, to
be set free, to undergo change. But soul is passive in all these things;
it is nature that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. GAURAPADA'S explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but such appears
to be his understanding of the text. So also ViCHESPATI: 'Soul is without qualities, and exempt from vicissitude. How then can it be liberated ?
To soul, not liable to change, there could apply none of the circumstances
termed bondage, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness: nor could
worldly change or migration, another name for which is death, affect soul,
incapable of action -.' The same commentator adds, 'These circum-

."'''('11

';f

'1~ElilIC:O'J4nSqf{({!lifl
~: I eclle ...."'.~I"':qI ... i
'ifi'ler~"I .. i ~Sqf\(t!lri4;;qen;cn~, ~" ll<f ~ '1~EI('II ;f

eel(! ~lcllq(elU"lr(il

r.. f'4i:qiilli( I

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stances, which are in truth the acts and conditions of nature, are ascribed
to and affect soul as the superior, in the same manner that victory and
defeat are attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to
his generals; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not
theirs . ' So N ARAVANA explains the text: 'Binding is the confinement
of nature, in the various forms of intellect, &c.; and bondage and liberation are attributed to soul only through the contiguity of intellect, to
which they belong, and not to soul t.' It is from ignorance only that
bondage and liberation are ascribed to soul; as by the Sutra t, as explained by the Scholiast, 'Binding and liberation, or endurance of, and
exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in reality or absolutely,
but (are considered as such) from ignorance; for the binding and liberation mentioned are (conditions) of nature \I.' So also the Sutra , ' From
actual pain suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from
its attachments; that is, from its being affected by virtue and the rest,
which are the causes of pain; like an animal; that is, as an animal may
be bound or loosed, when entangled in a rope'.' The distinction, after
all, is little more than nominal, except as it is the necessary consequence
of the inactivity attributed to the soul.
- ------------------------

1 ;n&1Ii61~1 ~GIl'Qfl ~ee(fn ~~~~

AtW

4e,(I: ~ :aq,.tijiH 1I1n ::II~q(I::IIan 1rql ln,qfq E.CIlf"'1q,,~fl

n<:I~\!t l1fC1l;ri ~IPIMIWrctiM(IaI ,,"'M'~: E.CIlfleiili4fl'i{ I

t A,fn(q "1"'li6I~1 iCll I P<:I 1(1 n"'(1\ 'ft1n ~ ~

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~ A1fft(q I
Atfl(i::ll(lalll( e41 IM"( q'!qi( I
' ~
H(qi::ll~'" nMil ~:~ ~til'" eellMll:
~
~ q'!qCjil4i q'[(5Alrf'SAn~1 ~ nlf~fCltl: I
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LXIII.
By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she
releases (herself), for the soul's wish.
BHASHYA.

By seven. modes.-These seven have been specified, as virtue, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are the seven
modes (or conditions) of nature by which she binds herself, of herself.
And that same nature, having ascertained that soul's object is to be
accomplished, liberates herself by one mode, or by knowledge.
How is that knowledge produced 1
COMMENT.
Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one.
Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver.23). She binds herself of her
own accord. She frees herself by one mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. 'Nature binds herself (in her own work), like a
silkworm in its cocoon -.' Sutra. Atman is here uniformly explained by
swa, 'own self.'

LXIV.
So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible,
one only knowledge is attained, that neither I
nor do I exist.
BHASHYA.

AM,

nor is aught mine,

So, by the order explained, the study of tke twent!J-five principles,

knowledge of soul, or the discriminative knowledge, 'this is nature, this

179
is soul, these are the rudiments, senses, and elements,' is acquired. Neither I am: I am not. Not mine: not my body; that is, I am one (thing),
body is another. Nor do I exist: that is, exempt from egotism. This
is conclusive, incontrovertible: free from doubt. Viparyaya means' doubt,'
with the negative prefixed, 'absence of doubt;' and viSuddha, 'pure;'
pure through absence of doubt. Single.-There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause of liberation is produced, is manifested
(individually). Knowledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul.
Knowledge being attained, what does soul 1
COMMENT.

The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here described.

It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles, tatwabhytisa;
familiarity with them; frequent recurrence to them: it is finite or conclusive, apari~sha; it leaves nothing to be learned: it is perfect, as being
without doubt, aviparyayaviSuddha: and single, the one thing needful,
khala. What sort of knowledge is this 1 or what is the result it teaches?
The absence of individuality; the notion of the abstract existence of. soul.
Neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist: that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor individual agency. I am not precludes action
only. Indeed As, the root, together with bhu and kri, are said to signify
action in general t. Ntismi therefore signifies, not' I am not,' but' I do
not.' The S. Tatwa Kaumud then proceeds: 'Thus all acts whatever,
whether external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflection,
perception, and all others, are denied as acts of soul: consequently, there
being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as an individual agent) exist. Aham here denotes" agent;" as, I know, I sacrifice,
I give, I enjoy-or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agentnor is aught mine: an agent implies mastership; if there be no agent

.. Iijftrq 1ii4r.t fili44If1ltf ft:iiJqflr I

f11"4Q:q;U
I

1fW

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there can be no abstract mastership (or possession).' The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression, ntismi; explaining it na anni, ' I am male;' or puruslUJ, ' unproductive of progeny,'
of acts t. The S. Prav. Bit:. commenting on this verse of the Karilta.
has, 'Neither I am, denies the agency of soul; nor (is aught mine), denies
its attachment (to any objects); nor do I exist, denies its appropriation
(of faculties)t.' The Sutra is to the same effect: 'From relinquishment
(consequent on) study of principles; this is not, this is not U:' that is, of
all the objects proceeding from praltriti, not one is soul. The phraseology
is ascribed to the Vedas, and a similar passage is thence cited: 'Hence
comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is not (soul is not), from
it: such is not so; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that
it is). It is not, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not f,'
&c. And the Ckandrikll explains the terms similarly: 'I am not means
I am not agent; therefore I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain: exemption from being the seat of pain and
the rest is thence determined. Nor do I exist: by this, difference
from egotism is expressed .' RAMA KRISHNA repeats the words of the
I

,.. rm :iUQ4ct,:laUr~," ..e+NIM;'iI"lf.. 'il1 .... (lf'" GIJltAl'iiel

6I4lql(1 illMr.. Arnrc.'IIlf.. 4il'll6l4Ir.. atn'iitMr.. 6I4lql(lils..n ;n

~ 1O.. IWI' l(\WI' ~St ~

1fW
QOa::tijl"f{. I ~ 1rcf ;f ~ I 'Wlf@ (CIlfflni ~
~,m ~41fCl" (CIlfWftf4Vi: I
t iI"ctl .. 1+tflfH ~
~ ;f ~ I
t "1\4ftf4IM": qiqf..q\lt ;f ~ tf;r ~
f;iiN: ~ nleJlNff~q: I
1\ ~ ~ f4lani(
~ rm;r -,fir: I iI"I~i) ;ww ;ww ".nQ4lf~n "f4;Qrq(a::tfw ~
~ ;ww "f4IMI "f4lf~:fdi, I
"1+iftf4(t4 ;f ,wl\'iflf4'1li ..

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Ckandrilta. By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct
contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system,
one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely
intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any
individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings.
I am, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products,
(substantially,) is, does, or suffers; and not soul, which is unalterable and
indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting
them, as it were, or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of
nature, by whom they are really experienced"': for soul, according to
the Vedas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffected by
passion, universal t. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin
has supposed, to " Ie nihilisme absolu, demier fruit du scepticisme."

LXV.
of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure
and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven fonns.
POSSESSED

BHASHYA.
By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds nature, like a
spectator, at leisure and composed; as a spectator seated at a play beholds
an actress. Composed: who stays (or is involved) in self; or staying or
abiding in one's own place. How is Prakriti; debarred from prolific
ckange? Not producing intellect, egotism, and the other effects. Consequently precluded fro-m t!wse seven forms: desisting from the seven forms

,.
~

Af"fq.~-q(Q ~sfq ~:~ V: t

,.: ~ ~ f"(!&IR\ ~:

t Q..... .n~:

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or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and
which are no longer required for the use of soul, both whose objects
(fruition and liberation) are effected.
COMMENT.
Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza,
or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent
of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.
Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, prekskaka, one who beholds
a dancer or actress; at leisure, avasthita, or without action, nishkriya;
and at ease, sustka. This is also read swastka, 'calm, collected in self;'
or nirtik1cla, 'unagitated.' Nature consequently has nothing more to do.
The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected, by
knowledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.

LXVI.

HE desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has
been seen.

In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

BHA.SHYA.

One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold;) so one,

single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by
him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds;
there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific
difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature
and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union,
whence is creation ~ TIUfI'e being uniOlt of tltese two; that is, of nature
and soul; there being union from their universal diffusion: yet there is
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no further occa.sitnt for the world; from the object of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is twofold; apprehension of the objects of sense, as sound, &c.; and apprehension of the difference between
qualities and soul: when both these have been effected there is no further
use for creation; that is, of further creation (of future regeneration); as
in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given, when such a union is effected there
is no further connection of object: so there is no further occasion for
nature and soul.
If upon soul's acquiring knowledge liberation takes place, why does
not my liberation (immediately) occur 1 To this it is observed-

COMMENT.
The final separation of soul from nature is here indicated, as no further
purpose is answered by their continued union.
The first part of this stanza repeats the illustrations given in preceding verses (61 and 6S): "Nature, having been fully seen or understood,
ceases to act.-Soul, having seen or understood, ceases to consider;"
becomes regardless, tl.pekslaka. Consequently there can be no future
reunion, no future creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not
the cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly existence:
the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul. The activity of nature
is the consequence of her subserviency to sours purposes; and when they
are accomplished, all motive for action, all inducement to repeat worldly
creation, ceases. 'The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination,
are the excitements to the activity of nature; if they do not exist, they
do not stimulate nature. In the text the term motive implies that by
which nature is excited in creation (to evolve the world): which cannot
be in the nonentity of the objects of soul" VACHESPATI. So also N A-

;f

'!~tuitj ~ ~'lfC4a." Atrql(A1Aail$l'lfC4rq,!~qlitj

Aan$lCiH: I"" Ai5q~ WI Atf"(~~fH Aan$l;:i H~

Jrtfli

ql.aM e:t14iflf" I .

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RAYANA: 'In the (mere) union of these two there is no motive for the
production of the world.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the
objects of soul, individual existence must cease for ever.

LXVII.
By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become
causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's
wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse pr~viously
given to it.
BHASHYA.
Though perfect knowledge, that is, knowledge of the twenty-five principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. How 1 Like the whirling of a wheel; as a
potter, having set his wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates
a vessel, and takes it off, and leaves the wheel continuing to tum round.
It does so from tke tiffect of previO'US impulse.-From the attainment of
perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest have no influence upon one who is
possessed of such knowledge. These seven kinds of bonds are consumed
by perfect knowledge: as seeds that have been scorched by fire are not
able to germinate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul.
These then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the yogi) the
causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues from the effects of
previous impulse. Why is there not from knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice 1 Although they may be present. yet they perish the
next moment, and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those
which a man does in his present body by following instituted observances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes, and then
liberation occurs.
What liberation, is next specified.
----

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COMMENT.
A reason is assigned why pure soul is not at once set free from body.
This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of apology for the human forms of
KAPILA and other teachers of the Sankhya doctrines, who, although in
possession of perfect knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or
Yogf, is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dispassion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily existence;
and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects of virtue,
&c. lasting after the cause has ceased; like the whirl of a wheel after the
impulse that set it going has been withdrawn. 'As, when the potter's
work is done, the wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum
given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such
influence has expired; so virtue and vice, incident to body initiative and
mature, constitute impulse -,' The effects of former acts of virtue and
vice, then, cease when the impulse derived from them is worn out; and
the possession of knowledge prevents all future acts. GAURAPADA apparently suggests a difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body;
such as the observance of the Yoga, or performance of prescribed rites.
These acts may be performed by a sage possessing perfect knowledge,
and should therefore produce certain consequences. They lead, however,
to no results; for as far as they are themselves concerned, they are but of
brief duration, perishing as soon as performed; and with regard to any
future effects, they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage, but
it is not very perspicuous.

aevnq(ftsfif tMIMaqlqi\ ~ ~'Ii(@l4(Ch1(<4tJl'''''''' f\n

fir

\fifMqf\q"<4tJli['4(H 48R

AI(liIqf(ql" ~ 481(! I

r.. R44 ~ I tJ6(f(*llrfi ~

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186

LXVIII.
WHEN

separation of the infonned soul from its corporeal frame

at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then

IS

absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

BHASHYA.
When bodily separation is accomplished, by destruction of the effects
of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it, having accomplished its
object, nature ceases: then ab,olute, certain-final, unimpeded-4eliveranee, liberation, consequent upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness (separation), which is both absolute and final.
COMMENT.

This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of inquiry, absolute and
final liberation.
When the consequences of acts cease, and body, both gross and subtile,
dissolves, nature, in respect to individualsou1, no longer exists; and 80ul
is one, single, free, kevala, or obtains the condition called kaivalyam.
This, according to ViCHESPATI and NARAYANA, means' exemption from
the three kinds of pain *: GAURAPADA gives no definition of the term,
except that it is the abstract of k~vala t. What the condition of pure
separated soul may be in its liberated state, the S{mkhya philosophy does
not seem to hold it necessary to inquire.

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LXIX.
abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul,
wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are consider~ has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.
THIS

BHASHYA.
Soul's object is liberation: for that (purpose) this abstnue, secret, nowledge (has been expounded) by tlas migkty saint, by the divine sage KAPILA.
WAerein, in which knowledge, tke origin, duration, and termination, the
manifestation, continuance, and disappearance, of beings, of the products
(or developments) of nature, are couidered, are discussed. From which
investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of the
twenty-five principles, is produced.
This is the Biasky" of GAURAPADA on the S8.nkhya doctrines, propounded, for the sake of liberation from migration, by the Muni KAPILA ;
in which there are these seTenty stanzas.

COMMENT.
This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were originally
taught.
The commentary of GAURA.PADA closes here in the only
copy of the
,
MSS. procurable; and consequently omits al1 notice of IswARA KRISHNA,
to whom a subsequent stanza of the text attributes the Karika. In the
BAaskya it -is said that the work commented on is the Sankhya declared
by KAPILA; but that ,the Karika is not the work of KAPILA, the other
Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sutras of that teacher, as
given in the Sankky" PravacAana, although it follows their purport, and
sometimes uses the same or similar expressions. GAURAPADA may therefore probably only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to
the doctrines of the Sutras, not that it is the work of the Muni. These
doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy stanzas; of which, however,
our copy has but sixty-nine. The verses of the Karika, as usually met
with, are seventy-two; but there also reference occurs to seventy verses,

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as comprising apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text,
derived from older authorities. Either GAURAP.A.DA thought it unneces~
sary to explain the concluding three verses of the Karika, or there is
some omission in the copy, or they do not belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently inaccurate, the metre of the third line of the
stanza being defective.
The KAPILA to whom the Slmkhya philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted ,by GAURAP.A.DA, in his comment upon the first stanza of the text, he is enumerated
amongst the sons ofBRAHMA. VIJNV.A.NABHIKSHU asserts him to have been
an incarnation of VISHNU.. He refers also to the opinion of a Vedanta
writer, that KAPILA was an incarnation of AGNI, or' fire,' upon the au-.
thority of the Smriti t; but denies their identity. There does not appear
to be any good authority for the notion. Kapila is a synonyme of fire,
as it is of a brown, dusky, or tawny co]our; and this may have given rise
to the idea of AGNI and the sage being the same. The identification with
VISHNU rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the Vaishnavas
is, that there have been twenty-four Avattlras of VISHNU, and KAPILA is
one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is no doubt the
Ramayana, in which VASUDEVA or VISHNU is said by BRAHM..\. to assume
the form of KAPILA, to protect the earth against tbe violence of the sons
of SAGARA, searching for the lost steed intended for their father's aswamedha. 'tBRAHMA having heard the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the dread of destruction, replied to them, and said, VAsUDEVA

~ 1JR(li q;""A4['EI11 ~Cfl"{ rq'1<i%tAM1Q;f@Hlat AQ;INJ

HCfI~ t
t ;an~: ~ 'ftNMI ~ ei@4.,I((lI ACftQ; lfW
I
t (Cf"I;:ri CA:
l1'ICfI", ~ """(ii@:

wn

ltfrt:

A1CfI~ ~e"'(dl'" t"I""CfA..nf@"I~

atillai ~ -pn Cf 1~(OtI lfh:rR:
iifi{tft 1fNCf~el ~ 1l:" l1'PU"{ ~:
~IFqM ~qiil\1Qlat \l1<atiCIf.. ti 'Rj I

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is the Lord, he is MadllatJIJ, of whom the whole earth is the cherished
bride; he, assuming the form of KAPILA, sustains continually the world.'
So also the Malulb1u1rata: 'Then spake incensed, KAPILA, the best of
sages; that VASUDEVA, indeed, whom the holy MUfli, eall KAPILA -.' According to the Blu1gavat, he was the fifth incarnation of VISHNU: 'The
fifth A.vatara was named KAPILA, the chief of saints. who revealed to
AsURI the Slmkhya explanation of first principles, which has been impaired by time t.' Book I. s.12. The latter half of the third book describes him also as an A.vatar of VASUDEVA, but as the son of DEVAHtITI,
the daughter of SAYAMBHUVA Menu, married to the Prajapati KERDDAMA.

LXX.
great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately im,
,
parted to ASURI, ASURI taught it to P ANCHASIKHA, by whom it was
THIS

extensively propagated.
COMMENT.
Purifying; that which purifies from the defects which are the cause
of pain; ptivana or pavitra. Great, chief, principal, agryam, mukkyam.
This verse anticipates an objection that may be made to the authority of
the text; as it may be said, Although the 'words of KAPILA must command attention, of what weight are the lessons of an uninspired teacher?
The answer is, that they are the
, same which were originally taught by
KAPILA himself to his pupil AsUBI. According to the passage cited by

nw: "Pl'

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44(1<151

'NM1 'If.:m.i4:

11 'A1!: .rqM ijfi1cjli41:

It

t qSij ..: ~On;f\ ;nil f~.iQ: 4iMfCIIIH

i\q"41'(~ "iEli .U..QI .. f4r.. (jai "
3c

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190
GAURAPADA, in his notes on the first stanza (p. 1), AsURI is also a son of
BRAHHA. He is mentioned elsewhere as the pupil of KAPJLA, and preceptor of PANCHASIKHA, but there are no details of his history. Of PANCHASIKHA there is some account in the Maluibluirat, on occasion of his
visiting JANAKA, king of Mitkiltl, and imparting to him the SAnkhya
philosophy. He is there also said to be named likewise KAPILA *; which
the commentator explains to mean that he was like KAPILA, being the
disciple of his disciple t, as the text proceeds ,to call him; 'He, the longlived, whom they term the first disciple of AsURI t.' He is also called
KAPILEY A, from his being, it is said, the son of a Br6bmani named
KAPILA. ' AsUIlI went to the sphere in which that which is Brakme, the
mystic-named, and multiform, and eternal, is beheld. His disciple
was P ANCHASIKHA, nourished with human milk: for there was a certain
Brahman matron, named KAPILA, of whom he became the son, and at
whose bosom he was fed; thence he obtained the denomination of KAPILEYA, and divine imperishable knowledge II.'

LXXI.
RECEIVED by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written
in Arya metre by the piously disposed 1SWARA KRISHNA, having
thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

4Iii'l: .f4M ei@u: A(.. fQA5i'Qrft , t ~: .R4M(iiji'A

ftjiUW,ECiH ,
t ..",(: ~ ftrti arii'll\i($iftrC4;f ,
\I 4I""'1e: 1RI ;:" ..u~ci Atm
'iIt"r(4\1sM "r~ . . Afftil~ "(6144
~ ci'ElN((1: N-n ii'i'*4Qtte,11':

.. ,,,4ft ,r'4M'~'ii "~<)4I1'&r.;ft

, ....... ,., .... Ri4l': ~ fqqr" ri

nrr. ~ 4,fttM4IM ~ p .. ~A!41 I
~:

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191
COMMENT.

Succession or tradition of pupils,' sis"yaparampara: each pupil be.

coming teacher in his turn, as is the case with the Pandits to the present
day. It rarely, if ever, happens that any branch of Sanscrit literature is
acquired by independent study: every science is studied under some
teacher of eminence, who can, not unfrequently, trace his traditionary
instruction upwards
for several generations. The interval between PANt
CHASIKHA and IswARA KRISHNA is not particularized, but was probably
considerable, as no allusion to the author of the Karika occurs in the
older writings. If his commentator GAUBAPADA be, as is not unlikely,
the preceptor of SANKARA ACHARYA, iSWARA KRISHNA must date anterior
to the eighth century.

LXXII.
subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of
the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative
tales, and omitting controversial questions.
THE

COMMENT.

We have here in the text reference to seventy stanzas, as comprising

the doctrinal part of the Sankhya. In fact, however, there are but sixtynine, unless the verse containing the notice of KAPILA be included in the
enumeration; and in that case it might be asked, why should not the
next stanza at least, making mention of the reputed author, be also
comprehended, when there would be seventy-one verses. The Scholiasts
offer no explanation of this difficulty.
The sixty topics alluded to in the text are, according to the Raja
Varttika, as cited by VACHESPATI, 1. the existence of soul; 2. the.existence of nature; 3. the singleness, 4. the objectiveness, and o. the subservience, of nature; and 6. the multifariousness, 7. the distinctness, and
8. the inertness, of soul; 9. the duration of subtile, and 10. that of gross,

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body. These are the ten radical categories. To them are to be added,
the five kinds of obstruction, nine of acquiescence, twenty-eight of disability, and eight of perfectness; making altogether sixty. Another
enumeration specifies the sixty categories or objects: 1. soul; 2. nature;
3. intellect; 4. egotism; {'-7. the three qualities; 8. the class of the five
rudiments; 9. that of the eleven senses or organs; 10. that of the five
elements. These are the ten radical padtlrtluu, or categories. The remaining fifty are the same as those previously enumerated. In consequence of comprehending all these topics, the Kariktl is a system, a
_Ira; not a partial tract or treatise, or prakarana; although it omits
the illustrative anecdotes and controversial arguments. The Karikd
must consequently refer to the collection of LPILA'S aphorisms, called
Sdnk"!I" PravacAana. This work is divided into six chapters, or ad"!la!ltU;
in the three first of which are contained all the dogmas of the system
furnishing the materials of the Kdrikd; the fourth chapter is made up of
short tales or anecdotes, dk"!layiltas, illustrative of the Sankhya tenets;
and the fifth is appropriated to the refutation, paravatia, of the doctrines
of different schools. Exclusive of these two subjects, fSWARA KRISHNA
professes, therefore, to give the substance of the S. PravacAana, or of the
S6tras of LPILA assembled in that collection.
The Ak"!ltlyiklu are in general very brief and uninteresting. The
S6tras, in fact, supply only a subject for a story, which the Scholiasts
may expand much after their own fancies. Thus the Sutra, ' From instruction in truth, like the king's son t: On which VIJNANA BHIKSHU
narrates, that 'there was a king's son, who, being expelled in infancy
from his native city, was brought up by a forester, and growing up to
maturity in that state imagined himself to belong to the barbarous race
with which he lived. One of his father's ministers having discovered
him, revealed to him what he was, and the misconception of his character was removed, and he knew himself to be a prince. So soul, from

~'MtJ'(iI,tl""I.( A4(QJtfttij tll .. "i4fn fW

t (fil'1"q'M\q~li( I

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the circumstances in which it is placed, mistakes its own character, until
the truth is revealed to it by some holy teacher, and then it knows itself
to be BraAme.'
The controversial portion of the original S6tras is as brief as the narrative, and, from the nature of the subject, much more obscure. The
argument is suggested, rather than advanced, and it remains for the
Scholiast to amplify and explain it. A specimen of the mode in :which
this is effected will -best exemplify the darkness and difficulty of this
part of our subject. Some modern followers of the Vedanta assert that
liberation is the attainment of (pure) felicity. To this it is replied: 'Manifestation of _felicity is not liberation, from its not being a property t .'
Thus explained by the Scholiast: 'The condition of happiness, or that
of attainment (or manifestation), is not a property of soul. The nature
(of-soul) is eternal, and is neither an object to be attained, nor the means
of attainment. Therefore the attainment of happiness cannot be liberation. This is the meaning (of the S6tra t).' 'Attainment of happiness in
the region of BRAHMA and the rest is a secondary (or inferior) sort of
liberation; as to maintain the contrary would be in opposition to the text
of the Veda, which says that a wise man abandons both joy and sorrow II.'

iI4~4itl@ilf~'1 .n..tJ5I'1~ 51 ..... '1(lf'ii~lif(n: SJc;(CQ ~

~ en Au" @~ ~~iiI;qiill .. Gi f1r5i ~ ,"'({it litt: wiN
1ffif ';f" SJctUS('q(I5I'!... Qiiil (l5Ildtfit ~ ~ \fiJi~ct 'ii1""Mlr~
~ iqiT ~UrM'"ct(l5l'''lctiilIM.''' (15II@iiI\'Iftfit t t!ct"ctlrC{'J~
"""'- qf\:'l(ijfct ..... I"M .. lr~ f..itt'l'lrC{~q"."'lct"ctIM"" 1l1IT
@it~fit t
t ..t"<:lr~aqr"a1f"r"'qUi"'h( t
t il41ii1f..
il4I&:1<\;ens'fl:taqr"4i!;q .. lI1in .. lfQ \.CI4i!;ci ';{ r...itt,,~rit ';f ~
" ..elG4ii1M "'''<:lr...aqfw;1il" ~: t
I i111"'(1r...aqflfi ..
... M"IEJ ~ aafth<cwfn ~: t iI4;qiiil fcti'~ (~,""51@lrft
fW ,fit fcwu '11i( t
3D

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194
, Further; if attainment be a faculty of soul, what sort of faculty is it 1 Is
it constant or temporary. In the first case, there may be, even in the
state of accomplishment, still the existence of the object of soul: in the
last, inasmuch as there is perishableness of all that is engendered (or,
that which has a beginning must have an end), then eternal liberation is
subject to termination: therefore the attainment (or manifestation) of
felicity is not chief or real liberation; and the assertion that it is so, is a
false conclusion of the modem V~dantis: this is undeniable-:

f'''lf~8i4.(Iii4~ fq ~ 'Ai ~ .. f...... 1en WTW ~"M

en '14$" 1'11M , ~~ AI1In.ri4U tflijjE4l1ltJlql\(dQ1I(1
11<:lf~8i4f"al@ll4fleJ 1fR 11<ft'" 'i1(1f.... l1l .. qfe'ilifi *l~fft ~ ,

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ft ttlqi't1I~4"'1'" 1.... "'nlsl1lctli( ,q, .

tt I@i4"'1 fl<"'I

",NMI" ""GI~ ~"Ir~il~ 'ii"fd ~

"'I $t4t Ii( tt i@4"~' at f(ct fq f@ri I Ari (41 I.. I
iiiEC444..,q
A"I(ijm'iI"'lilf~
~ ",lIIftril .. tt41lemst Act8!i1fl1 II
~:(t~~flt , 'iII('ai1 'iII1~1"1 'lScnllri: f_aM II Ql1alctli( ".~ri:
",R1M1 ;n1f riG"1 , e .. "'..e ..
ilrfl .... e .. lri .. :
'iII14jf(: ",fqM'ct ~: qSijf1J4SGltwql ,
~ ""41: 1'": ~ liNt "c:4 ..: II
",AlM('ai tti'N.I ~ ~ "(la ..iltijaijsafH , 1r<i ~ -aN.:
~ "iirilal(tM4N 4ttl(ql(Af11i(ij eMiI'4.4fl f5ltltt
"1 .. 1...i14jr(Qail~I" "'''(ijI1l( qSijf4"PdriMI .. i !JI"'l"CijI~
1I{:2f ,,, .. I!:4S'Ian ~,
qSijfcit1fHriMSlfl ~ ri"liJiit ~

<:....

1JarW

~ ~ f1J~ cnflf
;rt1( ~: I
riOt<:41 IS: I ~:4S~"lf~\ilrilfittI~rH I n ~:\Cf"I'1i , 'ill Iill Ifiii , ,

~ I ~~,~", II ri~IClIlf81' ftfctti "I(l( lIT

~ ~ , "1<'( ctlrifqwa4lfqq~ .. t" SiI(liftttl(lfC{ , "1 ..4
fAlIfqanailfAlI4iilailr~ II ~ "'i!f~ti ~ri44I"f.. rl1'
"i III q11" q rettt(l\'4(\J "" ",,{q;I41., 41 411\14" "'<tI 1i{(i4 i ~,~ ~
B

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(I'Silij'Sit=4C{SllAc~11,f: e'ltJlsqSilaffl " ~ I <ql:t.

111( ~ , ~: lMqrnf"-- "'" ~ ~ atCqSilatft 1ftii\'
iQlqlriC441",f.. qlri.fct4i II 1!:"ci 1I'IT ~:('Iatlf~'Ilrilf.ijl\u 'Iall
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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS .

THE text of the Kdrikd has been in the first instance derived from a
copy in the handwriting of Mr. Colebrooke, which he had prepared for
the press. I have collated this with Professor Lassen's edition and with
a very good manuscript in my own possession. Besides these, the different commentaries include the text, and the Sdnkkya Pravackana Bkizskya
cites many verses of the Karika. Altogether, therefore, the text may be
considered as printed upon a collation of eight copies, which may be thus
referred to: A. Mr. Colebrook.e's transcript; B. my MS. copy; C. Professor Lassen's edition; D. the text in GAURAPADA'S commentary; E. that
in the Sankkya Tatwa Kau7m.ull; F. that in the Sankkya Ckandrika;
G. that in the Sankkya Ka'Umud; and H. the passages of it in the Sankkya Pravackana Bkaskya. Of the Sankkya Tatwa Ka't,mudl I had three
copies, and two copies of the Sdnkkya Ckandrikd. I had but one copy of
the BktIskya of GAURAPADA.

P.l. I. 1. ~ A.D.G. n~qlnifi B.C.E.F.

P.2. 1.14. ~: ~:\Cf would be more correctly ~:\'f: Wilkins, r.53.
In noticing this deviation from rule, however, my chief object is to observe, that such deviations are frequent in the MSS., and that, although
I have corrected some of them, I do not regard them in all cases as errors
or inadvertencies: they seem in general to be intentional, and to be designed for the sake of greater perspicuity.
P.3. l. 9. For fcw'lf. read fCi'lfW
P.5. 1.17. For~read nfQ1;1(
P.5. 1.18. Afriiil#C4I\i\ii1I;:i. As intimated in the translation (p. 21),
these words are of questionable import, and possibly erroneous. The
o

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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

want of another copy renders their correction hazardous, but in all probability the first term should be ~ or ~ ordinarily' light' or
'shining,' but perhaps here said to denote 'Cf'RI' abode, place;' or the
construction may be lriW~- iiRW!tleeitl;:f implying 'conformity,
adaptation,' from ~ 'according to,' and ~ , to sit.'
P.6. v. 6. Rift r"-Rr~r. D.
P. 8. v. 8. ~-E.'44i;q G. which Professor Lassen has followed. All
the other copies concur in the first reading, which the sense of the verse,
as explained by the scholiasts, requires.

P. 10. I. 11. For ~ read ~

P.ll. I. 4,5, 7. Some blanks occur in this part of the MSS. of the
BMskya, which have been conjecturally supplied; as, 15"'"
l1QJ

n'11- eli1I~1 -- 'A'1'r.i

and 1N1'-'~ct -- ~ ;r 1fT - - cf~~rq; and it1n

How these have been supplied may be seen in the respective passages.
P. 11. 1.11. For

read

P. 12. 1. 10. For;af~ and ~ read ~

P. 13. I. 2. For

eNi1l

read

eNni1l

P.13. v.13. Professor Lassen changes ;aqe~ to ~ which

he derives from ~ 'stabilire, firmare.' All the MSS., however, read the
word with the cerebral, not the dental sibilant, and there is no doubt of
their accuracy. The rule of Panini by which a radical '" is changed in
inflexion to ~, "IN'~: "': ~: not applying to this word, which is derived
from ~ cI. 5 and 9. This root is the subject of a special rule, by
which it is provided that after a preposition containing the vowel l. or ~
the radical ~ shall be changed to "'. Of course after "', if is changed to
~, making ;aqe~.
The original rule is Panini, 8. 3. 67. ~: I

~ I (~n~ "lin(ct4lct~4l II (~nW\qe'l"'lr~CU ;a,(~ ~

iiRl~: ~ I ~ ~; to .which we may add ~

la11frr, whence ;a q e ~

P.16. 1.14. iiRlaalllt.-. has been substituted for the iiRl(lctiA.-. of

the MSS., which is evidently incorrect.

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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 16. l. 15. For

l1C1aaq'IRlfl

P.16. v.17. H. reads ~

read 1Pf1q':IRlfl
r-., The sense is the same.
for .....
eQln.

P. 16. I. 18. For """ read ~

P.17. l. 7. For "(011'11 .... 1 read .. \riII .... 1
P.17. v.18. For 'S(;f;l-~ B.D. Either word is correct.

1frr.

P.19. v.20. l1c:""1(1~" B. D. omitting

The sense is unaffected, and the metre is preserved by reading the final syllable long.

w~rd should be 'd~I4t.n

P.19.l.19. For q~\i\ fetiQ(ij read q~({\f~iQ(ij
P.19. l. 8. The third

P.20. 1.9. For .. P<;j'I~ read .. fA'I~I:

P.21. l. 1. For

41,"'"

read

41'41.

P.22. v.24. The second line is read ~r'{CIl!'I~'(ij""I": qSlil,.q

~'"
B. and *l'I~'fIiI'I(Q(ij""'I"'! ~,;(Met(ijiq": D. The sense is much
the same, but the last is wrong as to metre. It is evident also from the
comment that follows that it is a mistake, and that the final words should
be q~,"q-c:i,;(Met~-q" being the explanation of~

P.23. v.26. ql\."i('l41r"'1 B. ql\.'4('14I: E. In the first line, (e .. H

., I @iii I is the reading of B. C. E. F. but D. confirms the text, not only
by the same terms, (e"EtI';"'IP.-:t, but by explaining the term EtI'; .. ,

r...

'"
'"
P.24. v.27. ~A.E.F.
~B.C.D.
Thedifference
involves a difference of interpretation, as noticed in the Comment (p. 99).
The explanation of the Blulskya, D, is 80 clearly incompatible with the
'"
'"
reading ~
that in the first instance I corrected it to ~:
as in the same page, I. 15, 18, which should be read, agreeably to the MSS.,
'"
~
P. 24. l. 23. For iii{, ' " read 1fi{. "'", and for ~ 1!f read ~: 1!f
P.25. v.28. ,qlfC{,B.D. fct(I(C.D. The variations are immaterial.

qft!M ifM"'jte": read qf(Qnt1iijlte":

For "r,r-.;:C1E'tt read ,r'f(ft(C1~C1

P.25. 1.12. For

P.~. I. 6,7.

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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 26. 1. 3, &c. ~4i4l1l'l<:~i1 ought perhaps to be Ei4<:i1. See Translation,

p.l05.
P.26. 1. 22. After
some such word as ~ should be inserted, although it is not in the MS.: it occurs in the passage when
repeated in p. ,~

"..nq"i

P.27. 1. 8. For

,~

read

P.29. 1. 3 ~d 15. For

'ct

'J",r"'-'\lCftlrn read 'lCftrlft-'lCt\lrft

"-''''H4Ir.... read "'ltW4Ir",

P.29. 1. 4. For
P.30. 1.11. For 1ITQf

"1'..

C;
read
(..,41
P.30.1.14. .. CilqU(, which is the reading of the copy, should probably be .. CiI4l.1'( 'after departure' or' death.'

A"50

read "A'5O'
P.31. 1. 6. ~ has been conjecturally supplied, the writing of the
copy being very indistinct.
P. 31. 1. 16. The MS. has '18!<O< which has no meaning, and has
been therefore conjecturally changed to 'Iii <0<
P. 31. l. 20. Instead of 'IT6"t q;wl Ci tW I'( it is possible thatthe phrase
should be tW" (41,,&4CitW. i( C from the influence of iniquity.'
P.33. 1. 11. A passage has been here omitted: it should run, "(ij'1~
P.30. I. 21. For

tW"l,qMr... Ii r~'1 ~ ~
cnftr. I 'l(ij'1~iiI''ilUqMr...iilijl 1111. It has been given in the
iill'ilUqMfatMijI\!Jiil I

Translation, p. 137.
P.33. 1. 18. For rct~iilq; read
P.36. v. 47.

rct{'4q;

tWWi .. D. which is allowable.

P.37. l. 4. " ..... I".e.~ was read in the MSS. " ........... ,
was evidently an error.
P.37. 1.18. For

n'i'iIC{ij

P.38. 1. 1. The MS. has

shews to be erroneous.

which

read ft~',<Oij

rctqa141Hilf6iJN ... itCil which the sense

P.38. l. 11. For ~ read ~

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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P.38. v.50. iIt IQU ffiliEN iii n((ill E. The difference is unimportant. F.
has 141'II@II1 which is incorrect;
q(41lii1 D; and D. F. read

fcwilan

~for~
P.39. 1. 9. After 1ITQf insert

1iTej 1ITfi:r

P.40. l. 9. For iltl16ian read iltl16i~

P.40. v.53. The reading of this verse is materially varied in D, although the sense is substantially the same: .

ilttpq~ ~

lij.an;j ~ ~

"UiGi M~.rq" ~'U~"'s1i "'" ~:

I
Professor Lassen has
which is not warranted by any MS. and
although perhaps a defensible, is an unusual form of the derivative. G. has

lij.anill,

lijan~
P.42. v.56. A,fn,Kt
by the comment.

D;

and the variation is advisedly, as appears

P.43. v.59. iltliill;:i A'It4-Afq t:tl D. But the term of our text
is used in the following comment.
P.43. v.60. For ... (fn
P. 44. v.61.

~ D.

JI1fW: ,t11I(fl( C; which is manifestly wrong.

P.44. 1.6. Although suspecting some error in this citation, I had no

means of correcting it. Before printing the translation, however, I met
with the passage correctly given in the commentary of MADHUSUDANA
GUPTA upon the Bkagavad Gita, and have rendered it accordingly in
p. 172. It should be, ~ 5t"*l(;ft"~SCl41Iii1": ~:~:
P.44. v.62. nQ'lI'ii .. UlWS1IT E; and ~ is explained "'1~a-l-q'fn:
~: The particle is not inserted in any other copy. C. is singular in
the order of the words, and transposing ~ and

Cif\iiM

P.45. l. 5. Instead of ~ read ~

P. 46. v. 66. A. B. E. F. G. agree in reading <a q("".... ilI I,. although, as
Professor Lassen justly objects, "metro refragatur." D. gives the correcter reading ;aq(ft'" explaining it ;aq(nl

f"1""'ll:V

m JI1fW:

Digitized by

Coogle

VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

This copy also varies in the beginning of the hemistich:

<.J 1(011

("1ilet'

~ I!tl(f"i'ijq("'1
P.47. 1. 4. For

'1~

read

'!~tiiQ

Other variations than those specified above may no doubt be discovered in different manuscripts, and even in those which have been
consulted; but they are in general palpable blunders of transcription,
unworthy of the honour of being perpetuated in print.

Bayerlache
Staatsblbllothek
MOnchen

Digitized by

Coogle