Operation Iskra

Operation Iskra (Russian: операция «Искра», operat- Volkhov Front.[9]

siya Iskra; English: Operation Spark) was a Soviet mil- Despite the failures of earlier operations, lifting the siege
itary operation during World War II, designed to break
of Leningrad was a very high priority, so new offensive
the German Wehrmacht's Siege of Leningrad. Planning preparations began in November 1942.[10] In December,
for the operation began shortly after the failure of the
the operation plan was approved by the Stavka and re-
Sinyavino Offensive. The German defeat in the Battle of ceived the codename “Iskra” (Spark). The operation was
Stalingrad in late 1942 had weakened the German front. due to begin in January 1943.[11]
By January 1943, Soviet forces were planning or conduct-
ing offensive operations across the entire German-Soviet By January 1943, the situation looked very good for the
Soviet side. The German defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad
front, especially in southern Russia, Iskra being the north-
ern part of the wider Soviet 1942–1943 winter counter had weakened the German front. The Soviet forces were
offensive.[5] planning or conducting offensive operations across the
entire front, especially in southwestern Russia. Amidst
The operation was conducted by the Red Army's these conditions, Operation Iskra was to become the first
Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, and the Baltic Fleet dur- of several offensive operations aimed at inflicting a deci-
ing January 12–30, 1943 with the aim of creating a land sive defeat on the German Army Group North.[5]
connection to Leningrad. The Soviet forces linked up on
January 18, and by January 22, the front line was sta-
bilised. The operation successfully opened a land cor-
ridor 8–10 kilometres (5.0–6.2 mi) wide to the city. A 2 Preparations
rail road was swiftly built through the corridor which al-
lowed more supplies to reach the city than the Road of The area south of Lake Ladoga is heavily forested area
Life across the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga, signifi- with many wetlands (especially peat deposits) closer to
cantly reducing the possibility of the capture of the city the lake. In addition the forest shielded both sides from
and a German-Finnish linkup.[6] visual observation. Both of these factors greatly hindered
The success led to a much more ambitious offensive op- the mobility of artillery and vehicles in the area, providing
eration named Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star) less than a considerable advantage to the defending forces. One of
two weeks later. That operation had the aim of decisively the key locations were the Sinyavino heights which were
defeating Army Group North, lifting the siege altogether, some 150 metres higher than the surrounding flat terrain,
but it achieved only minimal progress.[7] Soviet forces which were one of the few dry and clear areas, and in ad-
made several other attempts in 1943 to renew their of- dition provided good observation. Since the front line had
fensive and completely lift the siege, but made only mod- changed very little since the blockade was established, the
est gains in each one. The corridor remained in range of German forces had built a dense defensive network of
German artillery and the siege was only over on January strong points, interconnected by trenches and protected
27, 1944.[8] by extensive obstacles and interlocking artillery and mor-
tar fire.[12] The Neva River and marshes were partially
frozen in winter which allowed infantry to cross it, but
not heavy vehicles.[13]
1 Background
The Siege of Leningrad started in early autumn 1941. By 2.1 German preparations
September 8, 1941 German and Finnish forces had sur-
rounded the city, cutting off all supply routes to Leningrad The Germans were well aware that breaking the block-
and its suburbs. However, the original drive on the city ade was very important for the Soviet side. However,
failed and the city was subjected to a siege. During 1942 due to the reverse at Stalingrad and the Soviet offen-
several attempts were made to breach the blockade but sive at Velikiye Luki to the south of Leningrad, Army
all failed. The last such attempt was the Sinyavino Of- Group North was ordered to go on the defensive and was
fensive. After the defeat of the Sinyavino Offensive, the stripped of many troops. The 11th Army, which was to
front line returned to what it was before the offensive lead the assault on Leningrad in September 1942, and
and again 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) separated Leonid Gov- which had thwarted the last Soviet offensive, was trans-
orov's Leningrad Front in the city and Kirill Meretskov's ferred to Army Group Center in October. Nine other di-

1
2 2 PREPARATIONS

The orders from the Stavka were:

This meant recapturing the “bottleneck” and opening a
10 kilometres (6.2 mi) corridor to Leningrad. After that,
the two fronts were to rest for 10 days and resume the
offensive southward in further operations.[15]
The biggest difference from the earlier Sinyavino Offen-
sive was the location of the main attack. In September
1942 the Soviet forces were attacking south of the town
of Siniavino, which allowed them to potentially encircle
several German divisions, but also left the army open to
flanking attacks from the north, and it was this which ul-
timately caused the offensive to fail. In January 1943 the
offensive was conducted north of Siniavino, closer to the
German field defences in January 1943 Ladoga Lake shore, which removed the threat of flank-
ing attacks and increased the probability of success, but
forced the Soviets to abandon the idea of encircling most
visions were also reassigned to other sectors.[14] of the German forces in the “bottleneck”.[15]
At the start of the Soviet offensive, the German 18th The offensive was to be conducted by Leningrad Front’s
Army, led by Georg Lindemann consisted of 26 divi- 67th Army and Volkhov Front’s 2nd Shock Army com-
sions spread across a 450 kilometres (280 mi) wide front. manded by Major General M.P. Dukhanov and Lieu-
The army was stretched very thin and as a result had no tenant General V.Z. Romanovsky respectively. The 8th
division-level reserves. Instead, each division had a tacti- Army, commanded by Lieutenant General F.N. Starikov,
cal reserve of one or two battalions, and the army reserves was to conduct a limited offensive on the 2nd Shock
consisted of portions of the 96th Infantry Division and the Army’s flank and defend elsewhere.[16] 13th and 14th Air
5th Mountain Division. The 1st Air Fleet provided the air Armies provided air support.
support for the army.[13] The two fronts spent December training and prepar-
Five divisions and part of another one were guarding the ing for the offensive, and received significant reinforce-
narrow corridor which separated the Soviet Leningrad ments. These included not just replenishment and addi-
and Volkhov Fronts. The corridor was only 16 kilometres tional rifle divisions and brigades, but also significant ad-
(9.9 mi) wide and was called the “bottleneck”. The Ger- ditional artillery and engineer units, which were vital for
man divisions were well fortified in this area, where the breaching the heavy German defenses. Specialized win-
front line had been virtually unchanged since September ter units included three ski brigades and four aerosleigh
1941, and hoping to repel the Soviet offensive.[10] battalions.[17] To ensure the Soviet forces had air supe-
riority, which they had lacked in the previous offensive,
the air strength in the area was increased to a total of over
2.2 Soviet preparations 800 planes, predominantly fighters. Large tank forces
could not operate well in the swampy terrain, so the tank
forces were used primarily as battalions reinforcing di-
visions or slightly larger brigades, which were to operate
independently.[18]
Originally the operation was due to begin on January 1,
but poor ice conditions on the Neva caused the offensive
to be delayed until January 10–12.[17] A number of mea-
sures were taken to prevent the details of the operation
being revealed to the Germans. Only a limited number
of senior officers were involved in the planning, all rede-
ployments took place in bad weather or at night and simu-
lated attack preparations were made elsewhere to confuse
the German side.[19]
On January 10, the Stavka sent Georgy Zhukov as its rep-
resentative to coordinate the battle. The rifle divisions
occupied their jumping-off positions on January 11, and
first echelon tanks moved into their advanced positions
Situation on front on January 11 early on January 12.[20]

The plan for Operation Iskra was approved in December.

3.2 Soviet advance: January 13–17 3

3 Battle 8 and Kruglaya Grove the advance was 1–2 kilometres

(0.62–1.24 mi) deep, while even further south, the flank-
ing attacks by the 8th Army only managed to capture the
3.1 Start of the battle: January 12
first line of German trenches.[23]
The German side reacted by deploying their reserves to
the region throughout the night. One improvised bat-
tle group consisting of five battalions from the 96th In-
fantry Division, supported by artillery and four Tiger
tanks moved to Gorodok No. 2 to reinforce the 170th In-
fantry Division to the west. Another similar battle group
using battalions from the 96th Infantry Division was sent
to Workers Settlement No. 1 to support the 227th In-
fantry Division.[24]

3.2 Soviet advance: January 13–17

Soviet advance on January 12

The night before the start of the operations, the Soviet

night bombers attacked the German divisional headquar-
ters and artillery positions to disrupt the German com-
mand and control. The bombers also attacked German
airfields and communication centres to disrupt the flow of
reinforcements.[21] Operation Iskra began at 9:30 on Jan-
uary 12, when the two Soviet fronts began their artillery
preparation, which lasted for 2 hours 20 minutes on the
western side and 1 hour 45 minutes on the eastern side
of the bottleneck. The Soviet attack started five minutes
before the artillery preparation finished with a Katyusha
barrage, to fully exploit its effects.[22] Soviet advance by January 18
The Leningrad Front forces achieved their greatest suc-
cess between Shlisselburg and Gorodok 1. Here, the The next five days saw very heavy fighting as the Sovi-
ets slowly advanced through heavy German defences and
Soviet 136th and 268th Rifle Divisions with supporting
tanks and artillery captured a bridgehead approximately repelled German counterattacks. On January 13, bad
weather prevented the Soviet side from employing their
5 kilometres (3.1 mi) wide and 3 kilometres (1.9 mi)
deep.[22] At 18:00 the sappers constructed bridges near air force. That day they gained almost no ground and
incurred heavy losses.[25] The German side, after their
Mar'ino to allow second echelon troops to advance. How-
ever, attacks further south, near Gorodok only resulted in counterattacks had failed to throw back the Soviet troops,
started further reinforcing the area by assembling battle
the capture of the first line of German trenches. The at-
tack further north at Shlisselburg failed. By evening, the groups using portions of divisions from the quiet parts of
Front command decided to exploit the formed bridge- the front. These included battle groups from the 1st In-
head and troops attacking Shlisselburg across the Neva fantry Division, the 61st Infantry Division, the 5th Moun-
were redeployed there and started attacking it from the tain Division and the SS Police Division.[26]
south.[23] On January 14 the weather improved enough to allow air
The Volkhov Front attack saw less success as the forces support again and the Soviet advance resumed, albeit at
of the 2nd Shock Army managed to envelop but not de- a slow pace. To speed up the encirclement of the strong
stroy the German strong points at Lipka and Workers point at Lipka, the Soviet side used the 12th Ski Brigade
Settlement No. 8. The latter was an impressive defen- which crossed the ice of the Ladoga Lake and attacked
sive position with a garrison of 700 men and 16 bunkers. the German rear lines. By the end of the day the German
Heavy flanking fire from these strong points prevented forces in the Lipka and Shlisselburg areas were almost
any further advance, but the 2nd Shock Army penetrated completely cut off from the rest of the German forces.[27]
the German defenses 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) between these Throughout January 15–17 the Soviet fronts fought to-
points. Further south, between Workers Settlement No. wards each other, capturing the strong points at Workers
4 4 AFTERMATH

Settlements Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, and most of Shlisselburg. SS Police, 21st Infantry, and soon after the 11th Infantry
By the end of January 17 they were only 1.5–2 kilome- and 28th Mountain Divisions. The Soviet forces captured
tres (0.93–1.24 mi) apart between Workers Settlements Workers Settlement No. 6 but were unable to advance
Nos. 1 and 5.[28] On January 15, Govorov was promoted any further.[7]
to colonel general.[29]

3.4 Front line stabilises, railway construc-

3.3 Linkup and land corridor: January tion: January 22–30
18–21
There were no changes in the front line after January 21 as
a result of Operation Iskra. The Soviet forces were unable
to advance any further, and instead started fortifying the
area to thwart any German attempt at re-establishing the
blockade. On January 22, work started on the rail line
linking Leningrad to the rest of the country through the
captured corridor. The plan from the GKO written on
January 18, ordered the construction to be finished in 20
days. The work was completed ahead of schedule and
trains began delivering supplies on February 6, 1943. The
operation officially ended on January 30.[32]

4 Aftermath
Operation Iskra was a strategic victory for the Soviet
forces. From a military perspective, the operation elim-
Soviet advance by January 22 inated the possibility of the capture of the city and a
German-Finnish link up, as the Leningrad Front was
On January 18, at 9:30 the lead elements from the 67th now very well supplied, reinforced and able to co-operate
Army's 123rd Rifle Division and 2nd Shock Army's more closely with the Volkhov Front. For the civilian
372nd Rifle Division linked up near Workers Settlement population, the operation meant that more food was able
No. 1, thus technically breaking the blockade and mark- to reach the city, as well as improved conditions and the
ing an important date in the Siege of Leningrad. German possibility of evacuating more civilians from the city.[7]
forces north of the settlement were cut off. Group Huh- Breaking the blockade also had a significant strategic ef-
ner, made up of two battle groups under the Lieutenant fect, although it was overshadowed by the surrender of
General Huhner, commander of the 61st Infantry Divi- the German 6th Army at Stalingrad only a few days later.
Notably, the first Tiger tank captured by the Soviets was
sion, was supposed to hold the corridor between Work-
ers Settlements Nos. 1 and 5 but was no longer able to taken during this battle. It was undamaged and evacuated
by the Soviet forces for evaluation.[33]
do it. Later that day the Soviet forces captured Workers
Settlement No. 5 after repelling a strong German coun- Also the victory led to promotions for Govorov, who was
terattack. The lead elements from the 67th Army’s 136th promoted to colonel-general on January 15, and Zhukov,
Rifle Division and 2nd Shock Army’s 18th Rifle Divi- who was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union on
sion linked up to the north of the settlement at 11:45.[30] January 18. In addition Govorov and Meretskov were
Group Huhner became cut off too and was ordered to awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st Class on January 28.
break out through the forested area toward Siniavino be- The 136th and 327th Rifle divisions were awarded the
fore the main Soviet forces arrived and made a break- designation of 63rd and 64th Guards Rifle Divisions,
out impossible. Group Huhner abandoned its artillery while the 61st Tank Brigade was designated the 30th
and heavy equipment[27] and ran “the gauntlet of fire” be- Guards Tank Brigade.[3]
fore reaching Siniavino on January 19–20. The breakout For the German side, the battle left the 18th Army very
was costly for both sides. By early afternoon, the So- stretched and exhausted. Lacking sufficient reinforce-
viet forces cleared Shlisselburg and Lipka from German ments, the command of Army Group North made the
forces and started liquidating the forces remaining in the decision to shorten the front line by evacuating the De-
forests south of Lake Ladoga.[31] myansk salient. The salient had been held throughout
During January 19–21 the Soviet forces eliminated the 1942, despite being encircled for a few months, as it
encircled German forces and tried to expand their of- was an important strategic bridgehead. Together with the
fensive southward towards Siniavino. However, the 18th Rzhev salient (which was also evacuated in spring 1943),
Army significantly reinforced its positions there with the it could potentially be used to encircle a large number of
 5

Soviet forces. However, in the situation that had devel- [23] Isayev p.455
oped, retaining it was no longer possible.[34]
[24] Glantz p.277
Nevertheless despite these conditions, the Stavka knew
that “Operation Iskra” was incomplete, as the corridor it [25] Isayev pp.456–457
had opened was narrow and was still in range of the Ger-
[26] Glantz p.280
man artillery, and the important heights and strong point
at Siniavino were still under German control. This led [27] Isayev p.457
Zhukov to plan a much more ambitious offensive oper-
ation named Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star). The oper- [28] Glantz pp.281–282
ation had the aim of decisively defeating Army Group
[29] Kiselev p. 140
North, but faltered early on.[7] The Soviet forces carried
several other offensives in the area in 1943, slowly ex- [30] Glantz p.282
panding the corridor, making other small gains before
finally capturing Siniavino in September.[35] However, [31] Glantz p.283
the city was still subjected to at least a partial siege as
[32] Isayev p.461
well as air and artillery bombardment until January 1944,
when the Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive broke through [33] Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger Ausf. E Sd. Kfz. 181
the German lines, lifting the siege completely.[36] achtungpanzer.com

[34] Isayev p. 467

5 Notes [35] Glantz p. 323

[1] Glantz pp. 262–263 [36] Glantz p.303

[2] Isayev pp. 450–451

[3] Glantz p. 285 6 References

[4] http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/
• Glantz, David M. (2002). The Battle for Leningrad
poteri.txt
1941–1944. Kansas University Press. ISBN 0-
[5] Glantz p. 259 7006-1208-4.

[6] Glantz pp. 284–285 • Исаев (Isayev), Алексей Валерьевич (2006).

Когда внезапности уже не было. История ВОВ,
[7] Glantz p. 284 которую мы не знали. (in Russian). М. Яуза,
[8] Glantz p. 366 Эксмо. ISBN 5-699-11949-3.

[9] Isayev p. 441 • Киселев (Kiselev), А. Н. (1971). Полководцы и

военачальники Великой Отечественной. (in Rus-
[10] Glantz p. 264 sian). Молодая гвардия.
[11] Glantz p. 265

[12] Glantz pp.216–217 7 Further reading

[13] Glantz p. 263
• Glantz, David M. (2005). Leningrad: City Under
[14] Glantz p. 262
Siege 1941–1944. Grange Books. ISBN 1-84013-
[15] Isayev p. 444 798-3.

[16] Glantz p. 268 • Haupt, Werner (1997). Army Group North. The
Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945. Schiffer Military
[17] Glantz p. 266 History, Atglen, Pennsylvania. ISBN 0-7643-0182-
[18] Glantz pp. 269–270 9.

[19] Glantz p. 272 • Krivosheev, Grigoriy (2001). "Россия и СССР

в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил:
[20] Glantz p. 273 Статистическое исследование" [Russia and the
[21] Isayev p.454
USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Loss
of armed forces: Statistical study] (in Russian).
[22] Glantz p.274 Google translation
6 7 FURTHER READING

• Meretskov, Kirill (1971). На службе народу (in

Russian) Serving the People. Imported Publications,
Incorporated, (English Translation). ISBN 0-8285-
0494-6.
• Федюнинский (Feyuninsky), И. И (1964).
Поднятые по тревоге (in Russian). Военное
изд-во МО СССР.

Coordinates: 59°54′00″N 31°04′01″E / 59.9000°N

31.0670°E
 7

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