Battles of Rzhev

The Battles of Rzhev (Russian: ), also

known by veterans and historians as the Rzhev meatgrinder or slaughterhouse (" ")
due to huge losses suered by the Red Army, were a series of Soviet operations in World War II between January
8, 1942 and March 31, 1943. The operations took place
in the general area of Rzhev, Sychyovka and Vyazma
against German forces.

3. First RzhevSychyovka Oensive Operation

(Russian: - () ) (30 July 23
August 1942, other sources say ending on 30
September or 1 October 1942) by forces of the
Kalinin Front and Western Front
4. Second RzhevSychevka Oensive Operation
(Operation Mars) (Russian: ) (25
November 20 December 1942) by the forces of
the Kalinin Front and Western Front

The major operations that were executed in this area of

the front were:
1. RzhevVyazma Strategic Oensive Operation
(Russian: -
) (8 January 20 April
1942) of the Kalinin Front, Western Front, Bryansk
Front, and Northwestern Front

Battle for Velikiye Luki (Russian: ) (24

November 1942 20 January 1943) by 3rd
Shock Army of the Kalinin Front

SychyovskVyazma oensive operation

(Russian: - ) (8 January 20 April
1942) of the Kalinin Front
MozhayskVyazma
oensive
operation
(Operation Jupiter) (Russian: ) (10
January 28 February 1942) of the Western
Front
Toropets-Kholm
Oensive
Operation
(Russian: - ) (9 January 6 February
1942) of the Northwestern Front and reassigned to the Kalinin Front from 22 January
1942
Vyazma airborne operation (Russian: - ) (18
January 28 February 1942) (see also
Operation Hannover) of the Western Front
Rzhev operation (3 march 20 April 1942)
(Russian: )

5. Third RzhevSychevka Oensive Operation

(Russian: -
) (231 March 1943) by the forces of
the Kalinin Front and Western Front, at the same
time, the southern ank oensive operations on
the Bryansk Front. These were operations that
occurred during the planned German retreat from
the salient known as Operation Bel

1 Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Oensive Operation

2. Operation Seydlitz and the Soviet defensive battles around Bely and Kholm-Zhirkovsky (Russian:

, , - ) (223 July 1942) launched by 9th
Army of Germany to eliminate the salient in the
vicinity between Bely and KholmZhirkovsky and
annihilate the 39th Army and 11th Cavalry Corps
of the Kalinin Front [8]

A Soviet BT-7 light tank carrying men forward

During the Soviet winter counter-oensive of 1941, and

the Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Oensive Operation (8 January 1942 20 April 1942), German forces were pushed
back from Moscow. As a result, a salient was formed
along the front line in the direction of the capital, which
1

3 RZHEV-SYCHYOVKA STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE (OPERATION MARS)

became known as the Rzhev-Vyazma Salient. It was intended to cut major road and rail line of communicastrategically important for the German Army Group Cen- tion to the Wehrmachts 9th Army.
tre due to the threat it posed to Moscow, and was therefore heavily fortied and strongly defended.

2 Operation Seydlitz

German soldiers march through the mud, March 1942

Initial Soviet forces committed by the Kalinin and

Western Front included the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st, 39th
of the former, and the 1st Shock, 5th, 10th, 16th, 20th,
33rd, 43rd, 49th, and 50th armies and three cavalry corps
for the later. The intent was for the 22nd Army, 29th
Army and 39th Armies supported by the 11th Cavalry
Corps to attack West of Rzhev, and penetrate deep into
the western ank of the AG Centres 9th Army. This
was achieved in January, and by the end of the month
the cavalry corps found itself 110 km in the depth of the
German ank. To eliminate this threat to the rear of the
Army Group Centres 9th Army, the Germans had started
Operation Seydlitz by 2 July. However, due to the nature of the terrain the supply route the troops of the Soviet 22nd Army, 29th Army and 39th Armies which attempted to enlarge the penetration became dicult, and
they were encircled. The cutting of a major highway to
Rzhev by the cavalry signalled the commencement of the
ToropetsKholm Oensive.

Panzer III carrying infantry in March, 1942

In the aftermath of the Soviet winter counteroensive of

194142, substantial Soviet forces remained in the rear
of the German Ninth Army. These forces maintained
a hold on the primitive forested swamp region between
Rzhev and Bely. On July 2, 1942, Ninth Army under
General Model launched Operation Seydlitz to clear the
Soviet forces out. The Germans rst blocked the natural breakout route through the Obsha valley and then split
the Soviet forces into two isolated pockets. The battle
lasted eleven days and ended with the elimination of the
encircled Soviet forces.

3 Rzhev-Sychyovka Strategic Offensive (Operation Mars)

Main article: Operation Mars

1.1

Sychyovsk-Vyazma Oensive

1.2

The next Rzhev-Sychyovka Oensive (25 November

Mozhaysk-Vyazma Oensive (Opera- 1942 20 December 1942) codenamed Operation Mars.
The operation consisted of several incremental oensive
tion Jupiter)
phases:

1.3

ToropetsKholm Oensive|ToropetsKholm Oensive

Sychyovka Oensive Operation 24 November

1942 14 December 1942

This oensive was conducted by the Western Front

against the Wehrmachts 4th Panzer Army and the 4th
Army.

Belyi Oensive Operation 25 November 1942

16 December 1942

1.4

Molodoi Tud Oensive Operation 25 November 1942 23 December 1942

Vyazma Airborne Operation

A Soviet airborne operation, conducted by the 4th Airborne Corps in seven separate landing zones, ve of them

Luchesa Oensive Operation 25 November

1942 11 December 1942

Velikie-Luki Oensive Operation 24 November 1942 20 January 1943

4.2

Military losses

This operation was nearly as heavy in losses for the Red

Army as the rst oensive, and also failed to reach desired objectives, but the Red Army tied down German
forces which may have otherwise been used to try to relieve the Stalingrad garrison. An NKVD double agent
known as Heine provided information about the oensive
to the OKH as part of the plan to divert German forces
from any relief of those trapped at Stalingrad.[9]

4.2 Military losses

Losses for the entire series of operations around the
Rzhev salient from 1941 to 1943 are dicult to calculate. These operations cover an entire series of battles
and defensive operations over a wide area involving many
formations on both sides.

For the whole series of Rzhev battles, the numbers are

German forces in the salient were eventually withdrawn not clear yet. But, since the mobilized manpower of both
by Hitler during Operation Bel to provide greater force sides were enormous and the ghting is violent, casualfor the German oensive operation at Kursk.
ties should be very high. According to A. V. Isayev,
the Soviet losses from January 1942 to March 1943 is
392,554 irrecoverable and 768,233 sanitary.[13] The Soviet losses during the beginning period of 1942 (includ4 Result
ing operation Jupiter) are 272,320 irrecoverable and
504,569 sanitary; with 25.7% of total manpower participated in these battles killed in the battleeld.[14] Ac4.1 Politico-military result
cording to V. V. Beshanov, the casualties of the July
September Rzhev oensive are 193.683 all cases,[15] and
during Operation Mars the Soviet suered 250.000 casualties with 800 tanks were damaged or destroyed.[16]
Isayev provided a lower number: 70,340 irrecoverable
and 145,300 sanitary.[17] The total gross casualties of Operation Mars is very high, but they only make up about
13.2% troop strength (and KIA is not over 6%); meanwhile, during the beginning phase of 1942 (including
Operation Juniper), total losses are up to 75.2% troop
strength (and dead rate 25.7%).
The retired German general, Horst Grossmann, in his
book Rzhev, the basement of the Eastern Front did not
provide the total casualties of the German side. But according to his description, from 31 July to 9 August,
A German half-track is repaired near Vyazma
one German battalion at the front line, after being exFighting in the area remained mostly static for 14 months. hausted in the violent battles, only had one commandant
Losses and setbacks elsewhere along the front nally and 22 soldiers, and by 31 August there were battalions
compelled the Germans to abandon the salient in order which had only one commandant and 12 soldiers (equal to
one squad). According to Grossmann, during Operation
to free up reserves for the front as a whole.
Mars, the German suered 40,000 casualties.[18]
Defending the salient required 29 divisions. Its abandonment freed up 22 of those divisions and created a strategic According to the German reports which are still stored at
reserve which allowed the Germans to stabilize the front the Storage Center of National Documents of Germany,
and somewhat recover from massive losses at Stalingrad. from March 1942 to March 1943, the casualties of the
2nd, 4th, 9th, 2nd Panzer, 3rd Panzer and 4th Panzer
German general Heinz Guderian had doubts about the Army (The 4th Panzer Army only have data from March
strategic aims of the later Operation Citadel, since the to April 1942) amount to 162,713 KIA, 35,650 MIA,
Germans had to abandon the strategically important 469,747 WIA. The number of soldiers that died during
Rzhev-Vyazma salient for gathering troops to attempt to treatment in the hospital are still unknown.[19][20] Accordtake a much less valuable one at Kursk.[10] The retreat of ing to Mikhail Yuryevich Myagkov, the casualties of Gerthe Germans in Operation Bel was tactically and mil- man forces from January 1942 to March 1943 are about
itarily successful, but the abandonment of the Rzhev- 330,000 irrecoverable and more than 450,000 sanitary.[7]
Vyazma pistol was a strategic loss for Nazi Germany on
the Eastern Front.[11]
The Soviet Army paid a high price in the battles of the
Rzhev salients, but with the German withdrawal an important bridgehead which could enable the Germans to
threaten Moscow was eliminated. The Germans had also
moved back to defensive positions that were as strong as
the ones they held within the salients.[12]

4.3 Civilian losses

Before the war, Rzhev had more than 56,000 people, but
when it was liberated on 3 March 1943, there were only
150 people left, and if the population at the rural area
were taken in, the population was still only 350. Most of

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN THE SOVIET AND GERMAN TACTICS

ence in commanding and coordinating a combined force.
From May 1942, Soviet Fronts started to deploy their own
air armies for supporting the land troops, reporting under the direct command of the Front commanders. Thus
these commanders began to have some sort of full authority to use the air forces, except the long-ranged strategic
bomber units which were still under direct command of
the Soviet STAVKA.[26]

After the manpower crisis of late 1941, in 1942 the

Soviets had gathered enough strategic reserves, they also
began to pay more attention to developing them. In 1942
the Soviets managed to build 18 new reserve armies and
resupply 9 others. At Rzhev, the army received 3 reserve
Local family in front of their ruined house.
armies and had 3 others resupplied. Of course, in this
period, many Soviet units still had inadequate strength
its inhabitant were transported to Germany and Eastern and equipment, but with the more plentiful reserve force,
Europe. Among 5,443 houses, only 297 remained. The they managed to somewhat maintain stable ghting catotal material loss was 500 million Ruble according to the pability and prevent the severe uctuation in manpower.
This enabled the Red Army to conduct active defenses
current price of 1941.[21]
and prepare for large-scaled oensives.[27]
Vyazma was also virtually destroyed during the war. In
this city, two transit camps of Nazi Germany, named Dulag No. 184 and Dulag No. 230 were established. Prison- 5.1.2 Weakness
ers in these camps were Soviet soldiers and Soviet civilians in the area of Smolensk, Nelidovo, Rzhev, Zubtsov, As the second top person of the STAVKA, G. K. Zhukov
Gzhatsk, Sychyovka...[22] According to the Germans data was one of the rst Soviet military ocer to admit and to
that Soviet SMERSH collected after the battles, there make a strict self-criticism about the Soviets and also his
were 5,500 people who died because of wounds. Dur- own faults in this period:
ing the winter 1941-42, in these camps, about 300 people
Today, after reecting the events of 1942, I
each day were killed by diseases, cold, starvation, torture
see that I had many shortcomings in evaluating
and other causes. After the war, two mass graves were
the situation at Vyazma. We overestimated
discovered in the area, each a size of 4 x 100 m and in toourselves and underestimate the enemies. The
tal containing an estimated 70,000 completely unidentiwalnut there was much stronger that what
ed bodies.[23] The German also discovered and executed
we predicted.
8 local political leaders, 60 commissars and political inG. K. Zhukov.[27]
structors, and 117 Jews in the camp No.230.[24]

5
5.1
5.1.1

Strengths and weaknesses in the

Soviet and German tactics
USSR
Strength

The Soviet managed to exploit the earlier victory at the

battle of Moscow and create some advantages in the critical sector of the front. Their attacks threatened the anks
of Army Group Center and forced the German to divert
the forces to these areas, therefore reduced the pressure
on Moscow. During this time, the USSRs Army commanders began to concentrate their main forces at the
critical zones to strengthen their position in these areas,
or to muster enough power for their assaults. In addition, the Soviet also started using tanks as a main assault
force instead of a mere supporting tool for infantries.[25]
The Front commanders also got some important experi-

The Soviet Army suered terribly from severe decits

in weapons and equipment due to the tremendous losses
during the German onslaught in 1941. Meanwhile, during the rst half of 1942, the reserved source of equipment was still not adequate. For example, during January
and February 1942, the Western Front only received 55%
of needed 82mm mortar rounds, 36% needed 120mm
ones and 44% needed artillery munitions. On average,
each artillery battery only had 2 rounds per day. The
weapons decit was so severe that the Front commanders
had to make occasional appeals for equipment.[28] The
serious lack of ammunition hampered Soviet eorts in
neutralizing German strongpoints, leading to heavy casualties in the assaults.[27]
The lack of munitions did not only occur in the case of
cannons and mortars, but also for small arms. During the
ammunitions famine at Rzhev salient, on average, the
Red Army only had 3 bullets for each rie, 30 bullets for
each submachine gun, 300 bullets for each light machine
gun and 600 bullets for each heavy one. The famine of

5.2

Germany

munitions in rearms and artillery pieces forced the Soviet army commanders, in many cases, to use tanks in the
role of artillery; such inappropriate usage together with
the outdated military thinking (which did not pay enough
attention to the assault role of tank forces) sharply reduced the eectiveness of the tank units, rendered them
from conducting deep penetration into the German defensive line.[29] For the tank forces, although the Soviet
possessed a large number of tanks, the numbers of low
quality, damaged and outdated ones were also large. In
the Bryansk, Western and Kalinin Front, the proportion
of low quality tanks was 69% and the rates of damaged
tanks about 41-55%. All the above facts mean that the
Red Army in Rzhev area did not have adequate preparation in terms of equipment, weapons and logistics.

5.2 Germany
5.2.1 Strength

After the Soviet winter counter-oensive of 194142,

the Germans were able to strongly hold and defend the
salient against a series of large Soviet oensives. The operations led to disproportionately high Soviet losses and
tied down large numbers of Soviet troops. The defense
of the Salient provided the Germans with a base from
which they could launch a new oensive against Moscow
at a future time. The defensive positions created by the
Germans after the retreat from Moscow were well constructed and placed. The Germans eventually withdrew
from the positions only due to losses elsewhere in the war
The worst mistakes of the Red Army in 1942 at the Rzhev and were able to withdraw from the salient with minimal
salients lies in the coordination and cooperation between losses.
its Fronts and the control of STAVKA towards them.
During the oensives in January and February 1942, instead of establishing a centralized command and con- 5.2.2 Weakness
trol with tight cooperation between the Fronts, the Soviet STAVKA and I. V. Stalin let each Front carry out German operations in 1941 directed at Moscow lasted too
their own assault without notable cooperation between late into the year. Rather than stabilize the front and crethe Fronts. Such separated and uncooperative assaults ate defensive positions, the Germans pushed their forces
failed to achieve their goals and lead to the total failure forward and left them poorly prepared for the Soviet winof the whole oensives. To make matter worse, on 19 ter counteroensive. The losses in men and equipment to
January 1942 Stalin suddenly retook the 1st Shock Army Army Group Centre were considerable. The Army group
from the Western Front with a very nonsense reason. lacked the strength to go back on the oensive in 1942.
That unreasonable act severely weakened the right wing
of the Western Front and lead to the failure of the oen- After the front stabilized, the German Army tied down
enormous amounts of manpower in holding salients from
sive at the area Olenino - Rzhev - Osuga.[30]
which they did not intend to exploit. This reduced the
Further errors in the Soviets tactics and commands were amount of manpower the Germans could devote to opthe ambitious and unrealistic goals of the oensives. erations elsewhere on the front. The Germans also used
Early 1942, the Red Army had just recovered from the some of their best formations, such as 9th Army, in a
disastrous losses during the late half of 1941, therefore it strictly static defensive role. The Rzhev salient had value
was still very weak. Even the victory at the previous bat- and tied down disproportionate numbers of Soviet troops,
tle of Moskva was already a miracle for the Soviet Union. but it is unclear if the salient was worth the loss of around
In every oensive, the aims and scale have to be correla- 20 high quality divisions for oensive or defensive opertive with the armys strength, but at the battles of Rzhev, ations elsewhere in 1942.
the Soviet commanders demanded too much from their
The abandonment of the salient was necessary in 1943 to
subordinates.[31]
create reserves for the front as a whole. But the reserves
Last but not least, another palindromic disease of the and the strength created were mostly used up in the costly
Red Army in 1942 is the hesitation in retreating from oensive directed at Kursk in 1943.
threatened sectors. As a results, many Soviet units were
trapped in a notable number of pockets when the German counter-attacked. In these cases, only the troops
of 11th Cavalry Corps and 6th Tank Corps managed 6 Controversies about the battles
to escape successfully.[32] The escape of 33rd and 41st
of Rzhev
Army was conducted on time, but they failed to keep
it secret and chose the wrong direction to move, leading to considerable casualties. And in the case of 11th This part of the Second World War was poorly covered by
Cavalry and 39th Army, the STAVKA made a serious Soviet military historiography, and what coverage exists
mistake when they planned to keep them in the Kholm- occurred only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
Zhirkovsky bridgehead for future attacks; however not when historians gained access to relevant documents. Exonly they failed to conduct any attacks but also they were act dates of particular battles, their names, outcomes, sigsurrounded and nearly destroyed during the Seydlitz op- nicance, and even losses have not been fully claried
eration.[33]
and there are still many controversies about these topics.

6.1

Casualties of the Soviet forces

In 2009, a television movie was aired in Russia entitled

Rzhev: Marshal Zhukovs Unknown Battle, which made
no attempt to cover up the huge losses suered by Soviet forces. As a consequence, there were public calls
in Russia for the arrest of some of those involved in
its production.[34] In the movie, the casualties of Soviet
forces are given as 433,000 KIA. The journalist Alina
Makeyeva, in an article of Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper which was published on 19 February 2009, wrote:
The number presented by the historian is too low. There
must be more than one million Soviet soldiers and ocers
was killed ! Rzhev and its neighboring towns were completely destroyed."; however Alina could not present any
proof. Journalist Elena Tokaryeva in her article which
was published in the newspaper The Violin (Russia) on
26 February 2009 also claimed that more than 1,000,000
Soviet soldiers were killed at Rzhev. The race of the
numbers of casualties at Rzhev continued with the data
of researcher Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova from
National Museum at Tver. In her thesis Rzhev-Sychyovka,
the rst oensive in 1942 under a new point of view,
Gerasimova claimed that 1,325,823 Soviet troops lost
their lives during the four oensives at that area.[35] The
number of casualties again was raised with the claim of
journalist Igor Elkov in his articled published in the Russian Weekly on 26 February 2009. Igor said: The accurate number of casualties of both sides is still dubious.
Recently, there are some opinions about from 1.3 to 1.5
million Soviet soldiers was killed. It may reach the number of 2 million.[36]

CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE BATTLES OF RZHEV

Total casualties of 29th and 30th Army (Kalinin
Front), 20th and 31st Army (Western Front) in August 1942: 57,968 irrecoverable and 165,999 sanitary. (data of Ministry of Defence, code name
TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 150158)
Total casualties of 20th, 29th, 30th, 31st (Western
Front) and 39th Army (Kalinin Front) on September
1942: 21,221 KIA and 54,378 WIA.(data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208,
drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 163166).
Total casualties of Kalinin Front during Operation
Mars: 33,346 KIA, 3,620 MIA, 63,757 WIA.
(above source).
Total casualties of 20th, 30th, 31st Army and 2nd
Guard Cavalry Corps from 21 to 30 November 1942
(rst phase of Operation Mars): 7,893 KIA, 1,288
MIA, 28,989 WIA. (data of Ministry of Defence,
code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579,
folder 16, volume ll, pp. 190200).

A. V. Isayev also used the research of Colonel-General G.

F. Krivosheyev, his senior workmate at Russian Military
History Institute and pointed out the common results between Isayev and Krivosheyev. On the Website Soldier
of Russian Military History Institute, Isayev also said that
the electronic draft of Krivosheyev was stolen and illegally used by the hackers, hence these drafts were completely deleted from the Institute Website. Nowadays,
only the book whose copyright is held by Krivosheyev
All this data was heavily criticized by Reserve Colonel,
himself is recognized as legal document.[38][39]
Doctor of History A. V. Isayev. By providing the data
in the stored documents of Russian Ministry of Defence, Finally, A. V. Isayev claimed that the Soviet casualIsayev stated that [Igor Elkov]'s estimates were judg- ties at Rzhev from January 1942 to March 1943 were
ment[s] of people without adequate knowledge of his- 392,554 KIA and 768,233 WIA. The document lm of
tory, and are the results of demagogic motivation under Aleksey Vladimirovich Pivovarov was also heavily critthe slogan every information must be shown to the peo- icized by Isayev; he stated that in this lm, many imple. Using very detailed documents with clear origins, portant events of the Rzhev battles is not mentioned such
A. V. Isayev proved the casualties of the Soviet forces as as the breakout of 1st Guard Cavalry Corps, the breakout of more than 17,000 remaining troops of 33rd Army
below:[37]
during Operation Seydlitz, and the breakout of the 41st
Army. According to A. V. Isayev, if the lm of Alek Casualties of Western Front on Rzhev direction,
sey Vladimirovich Pivovarov and the thesis of Svetlana
from January to April 1942: 24,339 KIA, 5,223
Aleksandrovna Gerasimova were true, many living peoMIA, 105,021 WIA. (data of Ministry of Defence,
ple should have been recorded as KIA. Until now, there
code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579,
has not been any Russian articles or works which objects
folder 6, volume 208, pp. 7199).
the arguments of A. V. Isayev.[37]
Casualties of Kalinin Front on Rzhev direction,
from January to April 1942: 123,380 irrecoverable,
341,227 sanitary. (data of Ministry of Defence, 6.2 Role of G. K. Zhukov in Operation
Mars
code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579,
folder 16, volume ll, pp. 7199).
The role of Zhukov in this infamous oensive is also a
Total casualties of Western and Kalinin front dur- debated topic. American military history, Colonel David
ing Jan-Apr 1942: 152,943 irrecoverable, 446,248 M. Glantz (Hoa K) claimed that G. K. Zhukov had
to take the main responsibility in the tactical failure of
sanitary (aboved sources).

7
this operation, and this is the greatest defeat of Marshal Zhukov. In more detail, David Glantz asserted that
Zhukovs command in this oensive was not careful, too
ambitious, too clumsy and all these lead to a disaster.[40]
However, Antony Beevor disagreed with Glantzs comment. According to Beevor, at that time Zhukov had to
concentrate on Operation Uranus at Stalingrad battleeld
hence he had little time to care for what was happening
at Rzhev.[41]
The Russian authors Vladimir Chernov and Galina
Yaroslavovna also disagreed with Glantz. They asserted
that from 26 August 1942 Zhukov did not command the
Western Front, and that from 29 August he had his hand
busy with the serious matters at Stalingard.[42] It has been
asserted that Stalin was actually the commander in charge
of all the fronts at the Rzhev salient.[43] Zhukov only took
part in the commanding at Rzhev during its later periods
as a reghter who was solving the serious problems
of the battleeld at that moment.[44] Therefore, Beevor
asserted the comments of Glantz about Zhukovs responsibility were not correct.[41]

contributions, that is enough. Furthermore, the erce

and heroic resistance of Soviet citizens at Rzhev did not
only occur during the 19421943 period, but also during the defence of Moscow in 1941.[46][47][48] According
to all these facts, Rzhev, Vyazma and many other cities
have enough conditions to have the title City of Military
Glory, whether they were occupied or not.

7 References
[1] . . . 1941. . 2 ., . . .: , , 2008.
ISBN 978-5-699-30305-2
[2] . . . 41-: ,
. .: , 2005. ISBN 5-699-12899-9
[3] A. V. Isayevs estimates on Rzhev
[4] Krivosheev, Grigoriy (2001). Soviet Casualties and
Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century
[5] -
.
-
1942 ( )


[6] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec42.html
[7] " ,
19411942 II. ]
[8] [Military improvisations during the Russian Campaign
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/milimprov/
ch01.htm]

The certication document for the title City of Military Glory

of Rzhev

6.3

The Title City of Military Glory of

Rzhev

[9] Tennant H. Bayley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries and

Deadly Games, 2007, Yale University Press, p. 117. Bayley cites Pavel Sudoplatov, Anatoly Sudoplatov, and Jerrold and Leona Schecters book Special Tasks, published
by Little, Brown in 1994, p. 158159. He also quotes a
KGB chief as writing, "Marshal Zhukov knew his oensive was an auxiliary operation, but he did not know that
he had been targeted in advance by the Germans.
[10] .
.

.: , 1999. (Guderian Heinz. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg, 1951.. Rossiya Publisher. Smolensk. 1999. Chapter IX: Chief Inspector of
Armoured Units) (Russian)

Rzhev was conferred the status of City of Military

Glory by the President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin on October 8, 2007, for courage, endurance and mass heroism, exhibited by defenders of the [11] . 10 .
city in the struggle for the freedom and independence
.: ; , 2003. (Alexander Bevin. How
Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Erof the Motherland.[45] This act also caused heated derors That Led to Nazi Defeat.L.: Times Books, 2000.
bate and controversy. Many people believed that Rzhev
Published at Moskva in 2003. Chapter 10: The lost at
shouldn't be a City of Military Glory since it was under
Moskva; Chapter 19: Citadel collapsed) (Russian)
Nazi German occupation before being liberated. However, according to the law, being occupied does not pre- [12] , .

vent a city from receiving this honorary title. As long as

1939-1945. .: ,
its citizens, military personnel and government ocers
1980. (Aleksandr Mikhilovich Samsonov. The failure
paid a large contribution for the Great Patriotic War and
of the Nazi Germanys invasions. Science Publisher.
Moskva. 1980. Chapter 11, section 1)
expressed great heroism, bravery and patriotism in these

[13] http://actualhistory.ru/isaev-rzhev2
[14] Krivosheev, Grigoriy (2001). Soviet Casualties and
Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (Russian).
Olma.
[15] .
. .: , 2003.

1942

[16] .
. .: , 2003.

1942

REFERENCES

[30] , .
. . .:
, , 2005. (Alexei Valeryevich Isayev. A short
course about the history of World War II The Oensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. Yauza & Penguin Books.
Moskva. 2005. Part II: The oensive in the whole front.
Section 7: Total results of the winter couter-oensives)

[17] , .
. . .:
, , 2005.

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.:
-, 2000. (Boris Vadimovich Sokolov. Unknown Zhukov: The unamended portrait of the century.
Rodiol Publisher. Minsk. 2002. Chapter 8: The year of
1942 Victory and tragedy)

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der Ostfront. Friedberg : Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1980.

[32] , . . .:
, 1963. (Pavel Alekseyevich Belov. Behind us
is Moskva. Military Publisher. Moskva. 1963. Foreword
by M. V. Malakhov)

[19] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec42.html

[33] Aleksey Isaev. About the casualties of the Soviet Union

during the ghting at Rzhev salient. Modern History magazine. Moskva. July 2012

[20]
[21] http://rshew-42.narod.ru/rshew_history.html
[22] http://dulag184.vyazma.info/
[23] http://www.stapravda.ru/20090619/poisk_
rodstvennikov_soldat_pogibshikh_vo_vremya_vov_
38220.html
[24] http://www.jewniverse.ru/RED/Shneyer/glava2os_v%
5B2%5D.htm#_ftnref23
[25] , .
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, , 2005.(Alexey Valeryevich Isayev. When
the surprising element was lost. History of World War II The Unknown Truth. Yauza & Penguin Books. Moskva.
2006. Part I: 1942 Summer-Autumn Oensive. Section
1: the rst summer attacks) (Russian)
[26] , .

1941-1945 . .: ,
1977. (Mikhail Nikolayevich Kozhevnikov. The Soviet
Air Force Command and Sta in the Great Patriotic
War (1941-1945). Science Publisher. Moskva. 1977.
Chapter III, Section 2) (Russian)
[27] G. K. Zhukov. Memoirs. Vol 2. Qun i nhn dn Publisher. Hanoi. 1987. pp. 269270. (Vietnamese)
[28] , .
. .: , 1977. (Ivan Khristoforovich
Bagramyan. We come to victory like that. Military Publisher. Moskva. 1977. Chapter 3: At Western Front)
[29] , . :
1-
. .: , , 2007.
(Pyotr Ilyich Kirichenko. Everything begins with diculties The activities of 1st Tank Corps Red Banner.
Yauza & Penguin Books. Moskva. 2007. Chapter 5: In
RzhevVyazma operation. Section 1: Old faults and new
challenges)

[34] Film Spurs Russia to Squelch Criticism of Soviet War

Tactics HistoryNet
[35] -
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1942 ( )


[36]
[37] A. V. Isayev. Soviet casualties during the war at Rzhev
Salient. Modern history Magazine, July 2012
[38] Trang web chnh thc mang tn Ngi lnh ca Vin
lch s qun s Nga
[39] Cun sch chnh thc Tn tht ca qun i Lin X v
Nga trong cc cuc chin th k XX do NXB Olma.
Moskva n hnh nm 2001 thuc bn quyn ca Grigoriy
Krivosheev
[40] , . .
1942
. .: ACT: , 2006. Bn gc: David M.
Glantz Zhukovs Greatest Defeat: The Red Armys Epic
Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942. Lawrence (KS): University Press Of Kansas, 1999. (David M. Glantz. Tht
bi ln nht ca Zhukov - Thm ha ca Hng qun trong
Chin dch Sao Ha nm 1942 Moskva: ACT: Astrel,
2006.)
[41] Beevor, Antony (2012). Chin tranh th gii th hai .
London: W & N. ISBN 0297844970
[42] Vladimir Aleksnadrovich Chernov v Galina
Yaroslavovna Grin. K nim ln th 70 cc chin
dch Pogorelov-Gorodishche v Rzhev-Sychevska (ln
th hai) nm 1942. Gii thiu B sch c bn ca
Bo tng Chin tranh v quc v i Trung ng Nga.
Solda.ru. 1-8-2012
[43] S. M. Stemenko. The Soviet General Sta in War.
Moskva 1985. page 51.

[44] , .
:
. .: , , 2006.
(Aleksei Valeryevich Isayev.
Georgy Zhukov, the
nal solution for the king. Yauza & Penguin Books.
Mt-xc-va. 2006. Chapter 10: Single-handedly settling
the disaster)
[45] . 1345 8
2007 . (The President of the Russian Federation. Ukaz #1345 of October 8, 2007 On the assignment
to Rzhev of the Honorary title of the Russian Federation
City of Military Glory. ).
[46] http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?869039
[47] http://docs.kodeks.ru/document/90201672
[48] http://docs.kodeks.ru/document/902039651

Further reading
Svetlana Gerasimova, The Rzhev Slaughterhouse:
The Red Armys forgotten 15-month campaign
against Army Group Center, 19421943, by Helion
Publishing, Solihull, 2013. ISBN 9781908916518,
Hardcover, 280 pages, photos, maps.

External links
Rzhev Battle 1941-1943 (Russian)
Horst Grossmann Geschichte der rheinischwestfaelischen 6 Infanterie-Division 19391945
(German)
German war photos (Russian)
Battles of Rzhev (Russian)

10

10

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Battles of Rzhev Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev?oldid=674020963 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Llywrch,

Bobby D. Bryant, Dimadick, PBS, Altenmann, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Wwoods, Ezhiki, Bobblewik, Sca, Gdr, Piotrus, Balcer, Ularsen,
Bender235, Geocachernemesis~enwiki, Russ3Z, Colonel Cow, Wendell, Hohum, Woohookitty, Tabletop, BD2412, Dcheng, Ian Lancaster, Valip, Chobot, Wavelength, Aeusoes1, Welsh, Obey, Ligand, Curpsbot-unicodify, SmackBot, Historian932, Verne Equinox, Srnec,
Hmains, Chris the speller, Jayanta Sen, [email protected], Liontooth, Valenciano, Robosh, Clarityend, Vanisaac, Kerbabs, ChrisCork,
Ruslik0, Languagehat, TheCheeseManCan, Thijs!bot, JAnDbot, Gcm, Magioladitis, Dodo19~enwiki, Buckshot06, Roches, KConWiki,
Maksiml~enwiki, Mrg3105, Ko Soi IX, VolkovBot, TXiKiBoT, Armourhistorian, Chathrineorange, Nolens Volens, SieBot, Altzinn, Mild
Bill Hiccup, SchreiberBike, Sholokhov, Stoljaro1987, Addbot, Farawayman, Zorrobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, ArthurBot, LilHelpa, Xqbot, FrescoBot, RedBot, Full-date unlinking bot, Gaius Octavius Princeps, EmausBot, John of Reading, Gcdragon101, Gunbirddriver, ClueBot NG, Frietjes, BG19bot, Frze, Hamish59, Peacemaker67, Mogism, Crock81, Jop2~enwiki, JamesRussels, Jonas Vinther,
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