Held: 1.
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office
has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office
not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where
this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term
if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will
carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term
fixed by law.
Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer
is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The
legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the
same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which
may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is
founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy
and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.
(Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo])
2. The rule is settled that unless holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited,
the incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and qualified to
assume the office. This rule is demanded by the most obvious requirements of public
policy, for without it there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to elect or a
refusal or neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the public service entirely
suspended. Otherwise stated, the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the
time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into office. (Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA
728, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Davide, Jr.])
215.
What is RESIGNATION? What are the requisites of a valid resignation?
Held: 1.
It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines
his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in
some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the
office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of
the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The
last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998)
2. Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment (Gonzales v.
Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 [1961]).
The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
(Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, en Banc [Puno])
216.
What is abandonment of an office? What are its requisites? How is it distinguished from
resignation?
Held: Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of
an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control
thereof.
Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in
general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through
nonuser.
Abandonment springs from and
is accompanied by
DELIBERATION
and
FREEDOM of CHOICE. Its concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no
longer legally repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy.
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention
may be express or inferred from his own conduct.
Thus, the failure to perform the duties
pertaining to the office must be with the officers actual or imputed intention to abandon
and relinquish the office. Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it
results from a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer
a relinquishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of abandonment; first, an
intention to abandon and, second, an overt or external act by which the intention is
carried into effect. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276,
Jan. 16, 1998)
217.
When may unconsented transfers be considered anathema to security of tenure?
Held: As held in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 653 citing Ibanez v. Commission on
Elections, L-26558, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 1002, 1012 and Section 12 of the Tax Code).
x x x the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security
of tenure applies only to an officer who is APPOINTED not merely assigned to a
particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. X x x
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of
perpetual employment.
It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or
transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due
process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the
power to dismiss. But where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for
so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the
law.
