Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within twentyfour hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of
the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from
date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring
supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,[13] the Court
reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has
a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of
free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the
rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects
of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.[14] (emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically
codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.[15] In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public
Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.[16] (italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so
where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.[17] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for
an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the
appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory.
Source:
G.R. No. 175241
