1.
pilapil v ca gr 52159 dec 22, 1989 180 scra 546, 551-552
G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989
JOSE
PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
facts:
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's
bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the
cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, an unidentified man hurled a
stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye. Private
respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in
Naga City where he was confined and treated.
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr.
Malabanan of Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no
improvement in his left eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City
where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr.
Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar
above the left eye.
Thus petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, an action
for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident which the
former granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
Issue:whether or not common carrier assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in
this
case
to
be
held
liable
to
the
injury
sustained?
Held: No.
There is no showing that any such incident previously happened so as to impose an
obligation on the part of the personnel of the bus company to warn the passengers and
to take the necessary precaution. Such hurling of a stone constitutes fortuitous event in
this case. The bus company is not an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of
transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to
become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes
to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any
breach thereof.
used in the book: Ruling
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers. 3
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human
care and foresight can provide. what constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for
the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption,
however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual
obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event. 4
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and
Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the
conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires. 5 xxx
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family
could
have
prevented
or
stopped
the
act
or
omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to
a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The
negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by
the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could
have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to
be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as
in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier
for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
