ROBERT MOORE v. ALIX H. SANDERS, et al., 558 So.
2d 1383
(Miss.03/14/1990)
[1] SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
[2] No. 07-CA-58591
[3] 1990.MS.40073 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 558 So. 2d 1383
[4] MARCH 14, 1990
[5] ROBERT MOORE
v.
ALIX H. SANDERS, et al.
[6] EN BANC
[7] BLASS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
[8] Appellant Robert E. Moore was elected to the County Board of
Supervisors from District 2, Leflore County, Mississippi on April 15,
1986, in a special election held under the federal court ordered
supervisor redistricting plan in James Moore, et al vs. Leflore County,
Miss. et al, No. GC83-249-WK-O, N. D. Miss. A complaint was filed
with the Board of Supervisors on December 1, 1986, by the Election
Commissioner of District 2, alleging that Moore had moved out of
District 2.
[9] On January 20, 1987, Moore instituted suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi, in Cause
[10] No. GC87-7-S-O, for injunctive relief to prohibit the Board of
Supervisors from acting on the complaint. The District Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order, on January 20, 1987. After a hearing,
before Honorable L.T. Senter, the District Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order, on March 4, 1987, dismissing Moore's complaint
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c; and
abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the issue of the removal
from office under the authority of Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
[11] At a regular meeting on March 16, 1987, the Board of Supervisors
considered the complaint; conducted a full evidentiary hearing, at
which Moore was represented by counsel; ruled that Moore was no
longer a resident of District 2; and declared the office vacant. The
proceedings were recorded. Based on the evidence presented at this
hearing, the Board found that Moore had removed himself from
District 2 and established his residence at 2201 West Taft St.
Greenwood, MS., a residence outside of District 2.
[12] Moore filed a complaint for injunctive relief with the Chancery Court
of Leflore County on March 20, 1987. The petition was denied after a
hearing on March 25, 1987. Moore filed an application to certify an
interlocutory appeal on March 27, 1987, which was denied by the
Chancery Court, on March 30, 1987. This ruling was appealed to the
Mississippi Supreme Court and denied without prejudice on April 9,
1987. The Chancery Court's final order denying Moore's request for
injunctive relief was filed on July 16, 1987. From this decision Moore
appeals assigning the following errors:
[13] 1. That the trial court erred in its decision that the Defendants Leflore
County Board of Supervisors and Officials had authority pursuant to
Section 25-1-59 of Miss. Code Annotated (1972), to make a factual
determination as to the residency of a board member and to order the
office vacant;
[14] 2. That the trial court erred in its refusal to grant a preliminary
injunction in favor of the appellant; and
[15] 3. That the trial court erred in its exclusion of certain evidence
tendered by the testimony of Mr. Robert Walker and Mr. Bennie
Thompson and the testimony of adverse witness, Defendant W.R.
Webb.
[16] The Board of Supervisors contends that the real issue in this case is
whether the Chancery Court has jurisdiction when there are adequate
remedies at law available, specifically appeal
[17] of the decision to the Circuit Court under Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-75
(1972).
[18] Finding that Moore had adequate remedy at law, we affirm the denial
of injunctive relief. As this finding is dispositive, we address only this
issue.
[19] After conducting a full evidentiary hearing at which Moore was
represented by counsel, the Board of Supervisors adopted several facts,
summarized below, by a four to one vote as relevant to the residency
of Robert E. Moore (the only dissenting supervisor was Robert E.
Moore).
[20] In sworn testimony in two causes, on September 16 and November 4,
1986, Robert E. Moore stated that he was living at 2201 West Taft St.,
Greenwood, Mississippi. This residence is outside of District 2. By
affidavit dated August 9, 1986, in Justice Court of Leflore County,
Mississippi, Moore stated that his address was 2201 West Taft St. In
his affidavit dated December 8, 1986, filed with the Board of
Supervisors, Moore, stated that he started staying at 2201 West Taft St.
more on a regular basis since May, 1986. He had a utility connection
in his name at 2201-1/2 West Taft Avenue. Moore's address was listed
on his voter's card in the office of the Circuit Clerk of Leflore County
as being 2201 West Taft. In his November, 1983, Petition for
Qualification for Supervisor, District 3 (three), the address of Robert E.
Moore was listed as 2201 W. Taft Street. He had been seen at 2201
West Taft St. under circumstances which would support the conclusion
that he was actually residing there. On August 9, 1986, Lula B. Moore,
wife of Robert E. Moore, filed a sworn Affidavit in Justice Court in
Leflore County, Mississippi, stating that Moore's address was 2201
West Taft St. Moore failed to offer or produce any satisfactory
evidence of his alleged residence in District 2.
[21] The Final Order of the Chancery Court, denying Moore's petition for
an injunction, states that the denial of the Temporary Restraining Order
was based on a finding that the Board of Supervisors had authority to
make a factual determination under Miss. Code Ann. 25-1-59 as to
Moore's residency. The statutory remedy by which Moore could have
challenged the finding of the Board of Supervisors was to appeal the
Board's decision as provided in Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-75 which
states in pertinent part:
[22] Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of
supervisors, . . . may appeal within ten (10) days from the date of
adjournment at which session the board of supervisors . . . rendered
such judgment or decision, and may embody the facts, judgment and
[23] decision in a bill of exceptions which shall be signed by the person
acting as president of the board of supervisors . . . The clerk thereof
shall transmit the bill of exceptions to the circuit court at once, and the
court shall either in term time or in vacation hear and determine the
same on the case as presented by the bill of exceptions as an appellate
court, and shall affirm or reverse the judgment. If the judgment be
reversed, the circuit court shall render such judgment as the board . . .
ought to have rendered, and certify the same to the board of
supervisors . . .
[24] The comments to Miss. R. Civ. P. 65 state that the circumstances in
which a preliminary injunction may be granted are not prescribed by
the rules, but remain a matter of the trial court's discretion, exercised in
conformity with traditional equity practice. Under the traditional
practice, plaintiff bears the burden of showing the prerequisites for
obtaining the extraordinary relief of preliminary injunction. Sierra Club
v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Miss. 1978). Inadequacy of the
remedy at law is the basis upon which the power of injunction is
exercised. V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, 434 (2ed. 1950).
Injunction will not issue when the complainants have a complete and
adequate remedy by appeal. Id. 436. Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-75
provides that any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of
supervisors may appeal to the circuit court. This is an adequate remedy
at law, which Moore in fact pursued. Moore v. Sanders, et al, No. 07-
059516 (Miss. filed Oct. 21, 1988). See Havens v. Brown, 132 Miss.
747, 96 So. 405 (1923) (Appellees sought an injunction restraining the
collection of a school tax fixed by the board of supervisors. In denying
injunctive relief, the court noted that no appeal to the circuit court, as
provided by statute, was taken); Bilon-Pascagoula Real Estate Board v.
Miss. Regional Housing Authority, 231 Miss. 89, 94 So. 2d 793 (1957)
(Suit to enjoin housing authority from constructing public housing was
dismissed as a collateral attack on a board resolution from which no
appeal was taken); Stone, State Tax Comm. v. Kerr, 194 Miss. 646, 10
So. 2d 845 (1943) (Injunctive relief denied where statute provides that
the circuit court shall have jurisdiction in an action to recover any tax
improperly collected).
[25] It is clear that the statutory method of appeal to the circuit court
afforded Moore a plain, adequate, speedy, and complete remedy for a
judicial determination of his right. Therefore the action of the chancery
court in denying Moore's request for injunctive relief is affirmed.
[26] AFFIRMED.
[27] ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN LEE, P.J., PRATHER, ROBERTSON,
SULLIVAN, and ANDERSON JJ., CONCUR. HAWKINS, P.J.,
DISSENTS. PITTMAN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
[28] HAWKINS, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
[29] Hapless Mr. Robert Moore, supervisor of district 2 of Leflore County,
had his office declared vacant by the remaining board members upon
their determination he was not a resident of his district, a factual
determination he vigorously disputed. The board acted pursuant to
Miss. Code Ann. 25-1-9. *fn1
[30] Mr. Moore sought injunctive relief in the chancery court which was
denied, the chancellor finding that while Miss. Code Ann. 25-1-59 did
not specifically authorize the board to make a factual determination of
his residence and declare a vacancy, this authority was implied,
because under another statute (Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-839) there is a
duty imposed upon a board of supervisors to make an interim,
temporary appointment whenever there is a vacancy in a county office.
*fn2 The majority has
[31] When a vacancy shall occur in any county or county (Footnote
continued on next page.) affirmed, upon the basis that Moore had a
complete and adequate remedy at law by appealing the board's decision
by a bill of exceptions to the circuit court. Miss. Code Ann. 11-15-75.
*fn3
[32] Did the board of supervisors have the authority to make a factual
determination that Mr. Moore had moved out of district two and
thereby vacated his office, as held by the chancellor? And, did Mr.
Moore have a complete and adequate remedy at law as announced by
the majority, thereby foreclosing injunctive relief in chancery court?
[33] Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of
supervisors, or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may
appeal within ten (10) days from the date of adjournment at which
session the board of supervisors or municipal authorities rendered such
judgment or decision, and may embody the facts judgment and
decision in a bill of exceptions which shall be signed by the person
acting as president of the board of supervisors or of the municipal
authorities. The clerk thereof shall transmit the bill of exceptions to the
circuit court at once, and the court shall either in term time or in
vacation hear and determine the same on the case as presented by the
bill of exceptions as an appellate court, and shall affirm or reverse the
judgment.
[34] Before these questions can be comfortably answered in the affirmative,
it is necessary to ask another question, one I believe neither the
chancellor nor the majority considered.
[35] The question is: if there is an effort to remove a duly elected county
official to a constitutionally-created office because it is alleged he is
no longer a resident of the political subdivision he serves, an allegation
with which he is in rather strenuous disagreement, is the official at
least entitled to have the judicial branch of government make this
factual determination?
[36] One would think it rather elementary that the answer to this question
must be in the affirmative. If a judgment cannot be rendered against
any man upon such a simple matter as an open account, a promissory
note, or a bent fender in a motor vehicle collision except by some court
of law, how much more reason for a public official, and indeed the
majority of the electorate who put him into office, entitled to have an
impartial judge, unaffected by political persuasion or multiple conflicts
of interest, make the factual inquiry and determination whether by
some act he has become disqualified to continue in office.
[37] If he is entitled to this minimum protection, then manifestly a circuit
court limited to examining a bill of exceptions is not adequate. A
circuit court examining a bill of exceptions is an appellate function.
Footnote 3, supra. The court must take the facts set out in the bill of
exceptions, frequently before a board without even stenographic
assistance. This is a long ways from a circuit court conducting a trial.
See: Talley v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So. 2d 547
(Miss. 1975); Thornton v. Wayne County Election Comm., 272 So. 2d
298 (Miss. 1973); Stewart v. Pascagoula, 206 So. 2d 325 (Miss. 1968);
Board of Supervisors Clay County v. McCormick, 207 Miss. 216, 42
So. 2d 177 (1949). A circuit court hearing on a bill of exceptions is no
more of an adequate substitute for a trial than a slice of bread is a
substitute for a meal.
[38] I grant that there is a statutory procedure without resort to
determination by a court of law whereby a board may, following a
vacancy occurring in a county office such as that caused by death or
the unquestioned moving from the state of the official, in the latter
instance the official usually voluntarily resigning the office. Miss.
Code Ann. 13-15-839. But where there is a dispute, with the official
hotly insisting he has done nothing to cause his removal, the statute
does not come into effect until a court of law has held the incumbent
has no right to the office.
[39] In such instance there is an adequate remedy at law for the state, and
that is by a quo warranto proceeding. This is simple, effective and
judicial. *fn4
[40] According to Miss. Code Ann. 25-1-39, when a public official moves
out of the political subdivision to which he has been elected" such
office shall thereby become vacant and the vacancy be supplied as by
law directed. "He has no right following such removal to continue in
office, or perform his duties of or collect the salary from the office. If
he attempts to do so, then he most assuredly becomes a proper subject
of a circuit court proceeding. This statute triggers such cause of action.
Jones v. State ex rel. McFarland, 207 Miss. 208, 42 So. 2d 123 (1949).
[41] Quo warranto is the appropriate proceeding in which to determine this
right or title to a public office, and to oust an imcumbent who is
unlawfully holding the same. State ex rel. Smith v. Morgan, 338 (Miss.
1978); State ex rel. Patterson v. Land, 31 Miss. 529, 95 So. 2d 764
(1957), suggestion of error overruled 96 So. 2d 828; State ex rel.
Livingston v. Bounds 212 Miss. 184, 54 So. 2d 276 (1951); Jones v.
State, supra; Hood v. Cruso, 179 Miss. 234, 174 So. 552 (1937),
suggestion of error overruled, 173 So. 167; State ex rel. Parks v. Tucei,
175 Miss. 218, 166 So. 379 (1936).
[42] Indeed, this Court has held, and it is the law generally, that when the
remedy of quo warranto is available, it is the exclusive remedy. Even
the chancery court has no business to hear such a matter. In Lacey v.
Noblin, 238 Miss. 329, 118 So. 2d 336 (1960), Mr. Lacey sought by a
bill of complaint for an injunction in chancery court to try the right to a
public office. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill, and this
Court affirmed:
[43] The chancery court was correct in sustaining the demurrer. It is well
established that a bill for injunction will not lie to try the right and title
to a public office, but the proper remedy is by quo warranto. Miss.
Code 1942, Secs. 1120-1145 [11-39-1 39-3 1972 Code]; Town of
Sumner v. Henderson, 1917, 116 Miss. 64, 76 So. 829; Yates v.
Summers, 1936, 177 Miss. 252, 170 So. 827. . . .
[44] 238 Miss. at 333, 118 So. 2d at 338. Also, Spencer v. Mayor and Board
of Aldermen of Yazoo City, 215 Miss. 160, 170, 60 So. 2d 562, 565-
566 (1952), in which this Court held a bill of exceptions could not
serve the function of a quo warranto proceeding. Also, McKenne v.
Thompson, 186 Miss. 524, 191 So. 487 (1939).
[45] The only circumstance in which this Court has recognized another
method of removing a public official than by quo warranto was
conviction in circuit court of misconduct in office, and the judgment of
conviction carries with it his removal from public
[46] office. Cumbest v. Commissioners of Election, 416 So. 2d 683 (Miss.
1982); Bucklew v. State, 192 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1966). Under this
circumstance, however, Section 175 of the Mississippi Constitution, a
self-executing provision, mandates his removal.
[47] 74 C. J. S. Quo Warranto, 4, p. 179, states:
[48] In the absence of constitutional or statutory regulations providing
otherwise, quo warranto proceedings are the only proper remedy in
cases in which they are available. Thus quo warranto, or a proceeding
in the nature thereof, is the sole and exclusive remedy and method by
which various matters may be tried and determined, as, for example,
the right and title to office. . . .
[49] *****
[50] Dispute as to facts. According to some decisions quo warranto lies
only when the facts are in dispute, as considered infra 6, and it is the
exclusive remedy when the relief sought is of such nature as otherwise
to warrant the use of the remedy.
[51] See also, Coulter v. Reese, 261 Ala. 663, 75 So. 2d 608, 610 (1954);
and State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164 (Fla. App. 19___),
aff'd 178 So. 2d 1, wherein the Alabama and Florida courts hold that
where quo warranto is available it is the exclusive remedy.
[52] 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto, 7, p.235 states:
[53] The generally accepted and recognized rule is that in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary, quo warranto proceedings are the
only proper remedy in cases in which they are available. Thus, where
the remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that there is
no concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of statutory provision.
*fn5
[54] If courts generally hold that when the remedy of quo warranto is
available, no other court may grant such relief, and indeed the court
which does have subject matter jurisdiction cannot hear such matter
except by a quo warranto proceeding, it follows, at least in my mind,
that a board of supervisors cannot validly hold a proceeding in the
nature of a quo warranto.
[55] Quo warranto is a circuit court proceeding, and one which, it must be
observed, affords an effective and efficient manner to promptly address
the validity of a person's claim to office. Indeed, when brought upon
the relation of the Attorney General or
[56] district attorney, the respondent has the burden of showing his
entitlement to the office. State ex rel. Smith v. Morgan, 361 So. 2d 338,
340-341 (Miss. 1978); State v. Land, 231 Miss. 529, 95 So. 2d 764
(Miss. 1957); Jones v. State, 207 Miss. 208, 42 So. 2d 123 (1949).
[57] While we are not called upon to address the issue in this case, I would
perceive grave constitutional difficulties in a statute which did
specifically authorize the board of supervisors of a county to conduct a
proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto on a county official and
declare his office vacant. This Constitution only authorizes the
Legislature to empower the Governor to remove some official from
office. Miss. Const. Art. V, 139:
[58] Section 139. The legislature may empower the governor to remove and
appoint officers, in any county or counties or municipal corporations,
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
[59] I do not read anything in this section authorizing a board of supervisors
to make such determination.
[60] Because I question whether a statute giving a board of supervisors
specific authority to conduct a hearing and declare an office vacant
would pass constitutional muster, I find it difficult to fathom, as did the
chancellor, some implied authority in the board to make such factual
determination. Because a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto is
such a simple and expedient matter to determine the right of a public
official to his office, it seems an anomaly to me this route was not
chosen by the Leflore County board.
[61] I have been speaking of quo warranto for simplification, but it should
be pointed out that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure have
supplanted the statutes as to rules of practice and procedure pertaining
to quo warranto, and under the Mississippi Rules any such relief is
obtained by motion or actions specifically seeking such relief.
Appendix B, MRCP" Quo Warranto 11-39-1 through - 61. "And, while
I have no doubt that either the Attorney General or district attorney
would have lent his name to a proceeding in the nature of a quo
warranto in circuit court in this case, it should also be pointed out this
would have been unnecessary under this Court's holding in Dye v.
State ex rel. Nale, 507 So. 2d 332, 337-338 (Miss. 1987). In that case,
rather than inquire whether the Attorney General should have been the
relator, we considered the" standing "of the legislator relators to sue. If
two state senators had standing to challenge the Lieutenant Governor's
exercise of powers, then surely the remaining board members of a
board of supervisors have standing to seek judicial determination
whether Mr. Moore had
[62] vacated the office by moving out of the district.
[63] Whatever else might be said about this Court's adoption of MRCP, it
was certainly never intended to abolish or limit the remedy of quo
warranto itself in circuit court by whatever name it might be called, or
to expand or limit any court's jurisdiction to hear such matter. To the
contrary, the entire purpose of the rules is to facilitate the statutory
remedies available. There is nothing about our adoption of the Rules to
suggest our prior decisions holding the chancery court was an
inappropriate place to hear a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto
were overruled, Lacey v. Noblin, supra. It would be usurpation on the
part of this Court to attempt to grant jurisdiction to a court to hear a
matter not provided for either by legislative enactment or our
Constitution. Most assuredly our Rules did not attempt to confer
specifically or by implication authority upon a board of supervisors to
conduct a trial in the nature of a quo warranto.
[64] If a board of supervisors under Miss. Code Ann. 25-1-59 has the
authority to conduct a hearing and remove a board member, it can with
equal authority remove a circuit clerk, chancery clerk, sheriff, or
county superintendent of education. I should think the county officials
in 81 counties will take this news uneasily.
[65] Historically and by ancient precedent, quo warranto has been the
appropriate method to try the right of a public official to hold the
office. This is a proceeding which has served its purpose well. When
this remedy is available, courts have been unwilling to permit
substitutes.
[66] In Smith v. Dillon, 267 App. Div. 39, 44 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722-723
(1943), the New York Supreme Court noted:
[67] Quo warranto is a common law remedy. Its origin is obscured by
antiquity and little is known thereof save that the writ came into
existence at some unascertained period early in the history of that
system. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ
of right for the King against one who usurped, misused, or failed to
exercise some office or franchise. It is the remedy or proceeding by
which the sovereign or State determines the legality of a claim which a
part asserts to the use or exercise of an office or franchise and ousts
the holder from its enjoyment if the claim is not well founded or if the
right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited or lost. 44 N.E.2d 722.
[68] *****
[69] [Q]uo warranto . . . will lie only where the party proceeded against is
either a de facto or a de jure officer in possession of the office. In
addition the writ only lies when the facts are in dispute. 44 N.Y.S.2d
723. [Emphasis added]
[70] In Kessler, et al. v. Silleck, 57 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1945), suit was filed to
obtain an injunction against payment of salary of the town's tax
assessor, who it was claimed did not legally hold the office, because he
did not own realty in the town, a prerequisite of a statute for
qualifications of an assessor.
[71] The Court held the petitioners had sought an improper remedy because
the official's" title to office depends, not upon admitted facts . . . but
upon disputable and extraneous facts. "And," Under the circumstances
where shown, the questions of fact should be tried in quo warranto. "57
N.Y.S.2d 328.
[72] The New York court's holdings are in accord with ours. Lacey v.
Noblin, supra.
[73] In my view the board of supervisors had no authority to make a factual
determination Mr. Moore was not a resident of supervisor's district
number two over his protest, and thereupon declare his office vacant,
and the chancellor erred in dismissing the petition for injunctive relief.
Neither did an appeal to circuit court by a bill of exceptions afford
complete and adequate remedy for the board's actions against him. I
would reverse and remand this cause to the chancery court for
appropriate injunctive relief, or enter judgment here that the board
proceedings were a nullity.
[74] I therefore respectfully dissent.
Opinion Footnotes
[75] *fn1 The pertinent portion of this statute reads: 25-1-59. Vacancy by
removal or default.
[76] If any state, district, county, county district, or municipal officer during
the term of his office shall remove out of the state, district, county, or
municipality for which he was elected or appointed, such office shall
thereby become vacant and the vacancy be supplied as by law directed.
[77] *fn2 Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-839 in pertinent part reads: 23-15-839.
Appointments to fill vacancies in the county or district offices; special
election procedures; procedure where only one person has qualified for
candidacy in special election.
[78] district office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the board of
supervisors of the county, by order entered upon its minutes, where the
vacancy occurs, or by appointment of the president of the board of
supervisors, by and with the consent of the majority of the board of
supervisors, if such vacancy occurs when said board is not in session,
and the clerk of the board shall certify to the Secretary of State the fact
of the appointment, and the person so appointed shall be
commissioned by the Governor; and if the unexpired term be longer
than six (6) months, such appointee shall serve until a successor is
elected as hereinafter provided.
[79] *fn3 Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-75 in pertinent part reads: 11-51-75.
Appeal to circuit court from board of supervisors, municipal
authorities.
[80] *fn4 The pertinent portions of Miss. Code Ann. 11-39-1 and 11-39-3
read: 11-39-1. To what cases applicable.
[81] The remedy by information in the nature of a quo warranto shall lie, in
the name of the state, against any person or corporation offending in
the following cases, viz:
[82] First - Whenever any person unlawfully holds or exercises the
functions of any public office, civil or military, or franchise, or any
office in any corporation, city, town, or village, and to try the right to
any such office. 11-39-3. Proceedings - how and where.
[83] The proceedings in the cases set forth in section 11-39-1 shall be by
information, in the name of the state, by the attorney general or a
district attorney, on his own motion or on relation of another, and, in a
case to try the right to an office, on the relation of the claimant thereof.
The information shall be field in the circuit court of the country of the
residence of the defendant; or, in the case of an officer, where he acts
as such; . . .
[84] *fn5 When this authority speaks of other statutory provisions, it is
speaking of statutory provisions which have been expressly abolished
quo warranto by statute, See 4, p. 232.
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