FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37453. May 25, 1979]

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.

Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Isabel Gabriel executed a 5-page will two months prior to her death. The signatures
of the deceased appear at the end of the will and at the left margin of all the pages.
The signatures of the three attesting witnesses appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause and on the left margin of all the other pages. The will named
private respondent as universal heir and executor, and gave legacies in specied
amounts to certain persons including the petitioner herein. The petition for the
probate of the will led by private respondent was opposed by petitioner. The trial
court disallowed the will on the grounds that the will of the deceased was not
executed and attested as required by law and that the document presented for
probate is not the purported will allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and
signed by her, and attested by the three attesting witnesses. Respondent appealed.
The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence, reversed the trial court's
decision and allowed the probate of the will.
In this petition for review, petitioner assigned ten errors which are substantially
factual in character and content. Arming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the factual nding of the Court of Appeals are not
reviewable and are binding upon the Supreme Court.
SYLLABUS
1.
APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT
REVIEWABLE. The factual ndings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable the
same being binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court, particularly where the
premises are borne by the record or based upon substantial evidence. Assignments
of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals because only legal question may be raised.
2.
WILLS; ATTESTING WITNESSES; QUALIFICATIONS. Under the law, there is
no mandatory requirement that the witnesses testify initially at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliability, his honesty and uprightness in order that his

testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such
that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he
is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of
the court, and that he has none of the disqualications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code.
3.
ID.; ATTESTING WITNESSES ARE NOT CHARACTER WITNESSES. The
instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the
execution of a will or testament and arm the formalities attendant to said
execution. The rulings concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code.
4.
ID.; ID.; CREDIBLE WITNESSES MEAN COMPETENT WITNESSES. "Credible
witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or
upon hearsay. In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental
witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code,
whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from
the belief and conclusion of the court that said witness is telling the truth. It is not
necessary to introduce prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses
are "credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing in the community
and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
5.
ID.; NOTARIAL WILLS, NATURE OF. A notarial will duly acknowledged by
the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public is a public document executed
and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public
document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing the more than merely preponderant.
6.
ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE. The attestation clause which the attesting
witness signed is the best evidence as to date of signing because it preserves in
permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the
will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose
of preserving in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of
the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or
other casualty they may still be proved.
7.
ID.; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; PHOTOGRAPHER NOT REQUIRED FOR
EXECUTION OF WILL. The law does not require a photographer for the execution
and attestation of the will. The fact that an attesting witness mistakenly identied
the photographer scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when
the will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the
photograph taken which clearly portrays the attesting witnesses and her cowitnesses.
8.

ID.; ID.; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. The discrepancy in the description of

the typewriter used by the notary which he described as "elate" which to him
meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which
was identied by an experts as "pica", and the mistake by the instrumental witness
in mentioning the name of the photographer-these are unimportant details which
could have been aected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory
such as by themselves would not alter the probative value of the testimonies of the
witnesses on the true execution of the will, for it cannot be expected that the
testimony of every person will be identical and coinciding with each other with
regard to details in an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all
details.
9.
APPEAL; FINDING OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT. The right of the Court of
Appeals to review, alter and reverse the ndings of the trial court where the
appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of
weight and inuence have been ignored and overlooked and the signicance of
which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Find of facts
made by the trial court, particularly when they are based on conicting evidence
whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses lies
particularly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
should not interfere with the same, unless the trial court has overlooked and
misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record.
10.
ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS
IS CONCLUSIVE AS TO FACTS. Among the exceptions to the rule that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court are: (1) when the conclusion as a nding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the ndings of facts are conicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
ndings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
11.
WILLS; DUE EXECUTION. Where the tree instrumental witnesses, who
constitute the best evidence of the will-making, as well as the lawyer who prepared
it and who thereafter notarized it have testied in favor of the will, and where all of
them are disinterested witnesses who stand to received no benet from the
testament, and the signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been
identied on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by any one, much less
the petitioner that they are not genuine, the decision holding that the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J :
p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1
promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA-G. R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago led
a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneciary and
executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow
and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of
residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-ve (85), having been born in 1876.
It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latter's
residence prior and up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog,
appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely
two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of ve (5) pages,
including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the
notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at
the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The
attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:

"PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

"Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan
ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba
nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala, ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel
Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati
na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN,
ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si
Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na
nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of
each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami
namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap
ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito."

At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures
of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the
same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961
Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the

two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other
pages. The will is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and
underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)",
etc., appearing at the top of each page.
prLL

The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic
Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic
Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be
paid; that legacies in specied amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda.
de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin,
Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and
Evangelina, Rudyardo, Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena, all surnamed
Santiago. The herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in
the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan
at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and
executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal, already
acquired, or to be acquired, in her (testatrix's) name, after satisfying the expenses,
debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing
the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1.

that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative

2.

that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;

3.
that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in
the second alternative
4.
that the purported will was procured through undue and improper
pressure and inuence on the part of the principal beneciary, and/or of
some other person for her benefit.

Lutgarda Santiago led her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After
trial the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of
which read:
"Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this
Court finds:
"1.
That there is no iota of evidence to support the contention that the
purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper
pressure and inuence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other
person for her benefit;
"2.
That there is insucient evidence to sustain the contention that at
the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked
testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;

"3.
That sucient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact
that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as
required by law;
"4.
That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented
for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported will allegedly dictated by the
deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting
witnesses on April 15, 1961.
"WHEREFORE, Exhibit 'F', the document presented for probate as the last
will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel, is hereby DISALLOWED."

From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent

Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in
question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon
consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now
under review, holing that the will in question was signed and executed by the
deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and
witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as
required by law, 2 hence allowed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid
decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago.
Thereafter, parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28,
1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the
motion for reconsideration stating that:
"The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence
shows that the supposed last will and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not
executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several
occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the
instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
"The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration
hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined
the oral and documentary evidence of record. There is no reason to alter the
findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7

In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that
respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in reversing the ndings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The
Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in
the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon,
which comment was led on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the
Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on
November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for insucient showing
that the ndings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial
evidence.

Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales led a

Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her
Comment or Opposition 11 led on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to
Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the
petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit
"F" was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no
proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses.
II.
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the nding of the lower court that the
preparation and execution of the will Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in nding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously
furnished with the names and residence certicates of the witnesses as to enable
him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten
lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank
shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same
occasion.
V.
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's nding that it was
incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any
note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI.
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the nding of the trial court that
Matilde Orubia was not physically present when the will, Exhibit "F" was allegedly
signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed.
VIII.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions,
evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented
by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in
rejecting said testimonies.
IX.
The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an
exercise of the power of supervision.
X.
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and
admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are

substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must
again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the
factual ndings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding
and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line
of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12
and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more
recent cases of Baptista vs. Carillo and CA (L-32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214,
217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26,
1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
LibLex

". . . from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by
the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its ndings of fact
being conclusive. More specically, in a decision exactly a month later, this
Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel it was held that the same
principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with
the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal
of its findings of fact. . . .

Stated otherwise, ndings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by

substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said ndings of the
appellate court are nal and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its
premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what
is more, when such ndings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual
issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to
alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reversed. Where the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to that of the
trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to dulyproven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is
not without some recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to
consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her rst assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental
witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the requirement in Article 806,
Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which
must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted
to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that
the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright,
or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the
qualications of the witness are rst established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not
synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820

and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the
same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code
should receive the same settled and well-known meaning it has under the
Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code
provisions on wills with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We nd no merit to petitioner's rst assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil
Code provides the qualications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article
821 sets forth the disqualication from being a witness to a will. These Articles
state:
"Art. 820.
Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or
more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.
"Art. 821.

The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1)

Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

(2)
Those who have been convicted of falsication of a
document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially
or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in
order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is
enough that the qualications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced
from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or
more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise,
as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and
write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualications
under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must
first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community,
his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness,
because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as
used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the
Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization
must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing
in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty
and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character
witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the
Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner
has in their opinion all the qualications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualied under the provisions of the

Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).

In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for
they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and arm the formalities
attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid
down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the nding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are
competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, which ndings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept
and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualication of any of
the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18
years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another. While the petitioner submits
that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a
witness due to his qualications under the rst Article and none of the
disqualications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the
attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term
credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a
witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a
credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness
are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a
credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the
instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good
standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the
second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the
driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that
Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix. But the relation
of employer and employee much less the humble social or nancial position of a
person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo-Pekson
and Perez-Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo,
Off. Gaz., March 18, 1941, p. 788).
llcd

Private respondent maintains that the qualications of the three or more credible
witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article
820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which
says "may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this
Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will

are concerned simply means "competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay,
95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed
and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the
testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by
at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and
not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay." (emphasis supplied).
I n Molo Pekson and Perez-Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme
Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any
person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf,
or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will.
This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820.
The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneciary in a
will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualication of a
witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualications as to age, mental capacity
and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his
testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this
point, a few of which we may cite:

"A 'credible witness' is one who is not disqualied to testify by mental

incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc. of Dauphin County vs.
Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226 Pa. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010." (Words and Phrases,
Vol. 10, p. 340).
"As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a
'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 837." (Ibid, p. 341).
"Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wills means
'competent witness'; that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact
of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State
Bank of Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App. 60 S. W. 2nd 888, 889." (Ibid, p. 342)
"The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be
attested by two credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the
time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice,
to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being
determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the time it is
oered for probate. Smith vs. Goodell, 101 N.E. 255, 266, 258 Ill. 145."
(Ibid.)
"'Credible witnesses', as used in the statute relating to wills, means
competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not legally disqualied
from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest,
or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying
generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject
matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co., 152 N.E.
545, 546, 322 Ill. 42." (Ibid. p. 343)

In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a

will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his
credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief
and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of
Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,
1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony."
In ne, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in order to be competent
must be shown to have the qualications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and
none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible,
that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence
be rst established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their
testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they
have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses were "credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing in the
community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of
errors, petitioner disputes the ndings of fact of the respondent court in nding that
the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in
nding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and
residence certicates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the
document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under
the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond
cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in
holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or
document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present
when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the
other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court
gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly
executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the
petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual, We must repeat what We have previously laid
down that the ndings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling
which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We will consider and
discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's ndings are
suciently justied and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged
unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the oce of Atty. Paraiso

and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation
and execution of the will and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was
available at the moment impugns the nding of the Court of Appeals that although
Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his oce
on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but
he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and
that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The
nding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya
that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will
but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to
witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she
was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which
was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's oce, which
testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his
wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certicates a few days before Exhibit "F"
was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certicate No. A-5114942 was issued at
Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certicate No. A5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court
correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the
securing of these residence certicates two days and one day, respectively, before
the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing
coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notied that they would be
witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
LLphil

We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the
oce of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly
drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the
Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself,
then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to
fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed
by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fteen minutes at the clinic
of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testied to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to
the day that the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested
him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really
wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a
medical certicate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to
be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly
concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her
witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the
photographer in the law oce of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their
gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's nding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished

with the names and residence certicates of the witnesses as to enable him to type
such data into the document Exhibit "F", which the petitioner assails as
contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso
was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective
residence certicates) immediately upon their arrival in the law oce by Isabel
Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testied that it was
only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree
with petitioner's contention. We nd no contradiction for the respondent Court held
that on the occasion of the will-making on April 15, 1961, the list was given
immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any
previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence
certicates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in
April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in
the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and
sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly
executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a
notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary
public, the same is a public document executed and attested through the
intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the
facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA
407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.

Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the
three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan"
were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all
present in the same occasion merits Our approval because this conclusion is
supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On
page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert.",
"date issued" and "place issued" the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax
Certicate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas, Rizal appears to
be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certicate numbers, dates
and places of issuance of said certicates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were
personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's
even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the
appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The
technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and
the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso."
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties
disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty.
Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends
that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F"

without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was
an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suering
from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal
cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is
a nding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in
determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond
Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached
by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence
appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in
her business aairs as she actively managed the aairs of the movie business
Isabelita Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before
her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal
Province and acted as co-administratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased
husband Eligio Naval. The text of the will was in Tagalog, a dialect known and
understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the
respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum, a fact unanimously testied to by the three attesting witnesses and
the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also benet of merit. The evidence, both
testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming
that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15,
1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya. Such factual nding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the
contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present
when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 along with her cowitnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that
Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on
Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for
which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that day
is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the
appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable
that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day
for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of
occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same.
Anyway, her presence at the law oce of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April
15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the
afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation
clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the
documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the
notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that
Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the
will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary
public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed

is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent

form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the
very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving
in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that
in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they
may still be proved.(Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68
Phil. 745).
LLpr

As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in

holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof
that the will was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the
respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's identification of the photographer as "Cesar
Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya)
and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a
minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a
photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia
mistakenly identied the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her
testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters
here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays
Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya." Further, the respondent
Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings,
jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The
evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will
on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of
this occasion. Hence, their identication of some photographs wherein they all
appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking
was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by
Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the rst incident upon the insistence of Isabel
Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present
was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was
duly executed and witnessed on the rst occasion on April 15, 1961," and We agree
with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence
which do not require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution
or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of
witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand,
the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the
description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite"
which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was
typewritten but which was identied by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I as "pica",
the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be
Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed
unimportant details which could have been aected by the lapse of time and the

treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative
value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz,
28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person will
be identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and
that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach
us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain
incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of
falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch as not all those who
witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating
their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the
contradiction in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the ndings of the trial court should not have
been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a
better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the
trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established
exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the
ndings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has
found that facts and circumstances of weight and inuence have been ignored and
overlooked and the signicance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial
court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when
they are based on conicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of
credibility of contending witnesses lies peculiarly within the province of trial courts
and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant
case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and
misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the
appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief
that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;"
that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed
anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased
signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court
gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion
that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record
to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will-signing occasion was a
mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde
Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate
court to reverse ndings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over the lower courts.
LLpr

Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among
the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specically, We arm that

on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the
oce of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of
that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certicate from one Dr.
Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's oce and
told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel
Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote
down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by
her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she armed
their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after nishing the document,
he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel
signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin
of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three
witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at
the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5
of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the
bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of
the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya;
that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation
clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel,
Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will
as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion
of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one
Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya,
Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will,
and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had
earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of
Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the identities of
the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law oce with Isabel
Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim-which was not controverted that he
wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates
any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual nding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or
document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was
incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on
record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports
the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or
document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses
uniformly testied that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that
other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or
document. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court itself believed
was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she
executed her will.

Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite
simple. The rst was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites;
the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for
P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her
brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces
including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee; the
fth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the
principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth
disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant
Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in
extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the ndings of fact are conicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making
its ndings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9,
1967; Hilario, Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall
within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the ndings
of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on
record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We nd no
abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent
Court's ndings of fact are not conicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its ndings of fact are binding and conclusive
and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at
bar in its full force and eect, without qualication or reservation. The above
holding simply synthesizes the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect to
petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and,
therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We
nd the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We nd that the Court of
Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to
probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual ndings upon its summation and
evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of
evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on
April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
signing and witnessing the same in the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after nishing
the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other
copies for his le and notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will,
Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the oce of
Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because
the rst picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done

because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be
taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia
was not present."
Cdpr

Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of

the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies
and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who
constitute the best evidence of the will-making have testied in favor of the probate
of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in
the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested
witnesses who stand to receive no benet from the testament. The signatures of
the witnesses and the testatrix have been identied on the will and there is no
claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not
genuine. In the last and nal analysis, the herein conict is factual and we go back
to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the ndings of facts of
the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, De Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.

Penned by then Acting Presiding Justice Juan P. Enriquez, concurred in by

Associate Justices Mateo Canonoy and Ramon C. Fernandez.

2.

Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 81-101.

3.

Annexes "H" and "I", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 108-154.

4.

Annex "K", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 167-198.

5.

Annexes "L" and "M", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 199-248.

6.

Penned by Associate Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, and concurred in by Associate

Justices Cecilia Muoz Palma and Mateo Canonoy.

7.

Annex "N", Petition; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 250-251.

8.

Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 270-312.

9.

Rollo, Vol. II, p. 317.

10.

Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 323-354.

11.

Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 363-385.

12.

The citation of authorities which begins with Mamuyac vs. Abena, 67 Phil. 289
(1939) lists some 35 leading cases up to Ramirez Tel. Corp. vs. Bank of America,

L-22614, Aug. 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191.

13.

De Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 129 (1971); Bunyi vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA
504 (1971); Napolis vs. Court of Appeals, 43 SCRA 301 (1972); Talosig vs. Vda. de
Nieba, 43 SCRA 472 (1972); Evangelista and Co. vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416
(1973); Tiongco vs. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 (1974).