|i4g->

SEPTEMBER

OPERATIONS

1 SEPTEMBER (D + 87)

The enemy was unable to organize an established line against the

XII Corps' and offered only scattered and sporadic resistance against the

XX Corps. Feverish construction activity was reported in the Westwall

sector between METZ (U85) and SAARBRUCKSN (0,47).

Terations of Third U. S. Army as they developed during September

_Jerwent an abrupt change as the history-making pace of the Army's Au-

gust advance was slowed, making necessary a type of warfare considerably

different from that employed during the first thirty-one days of Contin
ental action. At the beginning of the month it was apparent that, what
ever the cause, an acute shortage of gasoline was seriously impairing

the Army's mobility. Subsequently came other supply shortages, plus an

enemy build-up and steadily worsening weather conditions. By the end of

September Third U. S. Army had gone from an offensive to a defensive

status, as will be shown in detail.

Twelfth U. S. Army Group directed the Third U.S. Army to cross the

line of the SEINE and TONNE Rivers in the Army zone and to advance and

seize the line VITRY IE FRANCOIS (T61) - CHALONS-SXJR-MARNE (T54) - REIMS

(T37).
The Army was to be prepared to continue the advance on Twelfth

U. S. Army Group order to seize the crossings of the RHINE River from

MANNHEIM (R59) to KOBIZNZ (L99), both inclusive.

The campaign during the month can be considered from four phases:

first, the slowing of the Army's offensive, whereupon a fleeing and

badly beaten enemy turned around at the German border and occupied the

MOSELLE River line; second, the battle in which the enemy fought desper-

ately to prevent crossings of the MOSELIE and MEURTHE Rivers, and

launched counterattacks against the north and south flanks of Third U.S.

Army; third, developments along the flanks; and fourth, termination of

the Army's activities in the BRITTANY Peninsula. Each of these phases

is summarized in greater detail at the close of the chapter.

Employing the VIII Corps (the 2d, 8th, 29th and 83d Infantry Divi
sions and the 6th Armored Division), the Third U.S. Army was to complete

reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula. The Army was to protect the south

flank along the LOIRE River to ORIEANS (F62) and thence to the east,

for this purpose at least one division was to be employed in the area

ORIEANS (F62) - MONTARGIS (X24) - SENS (X66) - TROYES (Y27).

To illustrate pertinent facts about the September campaign, maps

are presented herein, dated 15, 25, and 30 September. Charts and graphs
at the end of the chapter give figures on losses of personnel and mater-

iel by both Third U. S. Army and the enemy. A map showing main supply

routes and supply points is included. Annexes include: No. 1, Twelfth

U. S. Army Group operational directives; No. 2, Third U.S. Army opera

tional directives; and No. 3, the operational report of the XIX Tactical

Air Command.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and the CROZON

Peninsula continued. The attack of the 2d Infantry Division on the port

was supported by a forty-five minute artillery preparation, fired by the

division artillery and three field artillery groups having a total of

nine battalions. Artillery with the VIII Corps fired 570 missions, in-

cluding 136 counterbattery missions, in the twenty-four hour period end

ing at 0600. The VIII Corps artillery utilized a so-called "flash bang"

counterbattery procedure that proved very effective in silencing enemy

guns emplaced in strongly fortified positions. Single pieces, batter

ies, and occasionally, even battalions, when not actively engaged in

other missions, were kept laid on known enemy guns. All observation

facilities, including ground, air, sound and flash, were coordinated on

enemy gun positions. Whenever an enemy gun opened fire it was detected

immediately and prompt counterbattery fire either destroyed the enemy or

silenced it by driving its personnel to cover.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

61

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On this date the Twelfth U.S. Army Group

the Central Group of Armies.

Elements of the 83d Infantry Division launched an attack against

the ILE DE CEZEMBRE off ST MALO (S71) Other elements of the 83d Infan
try Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army as far

south as ORJJSANS (F62), while Combat Command n B n

of the 6th Armored Di
vision continued moving along the north bank of the LOIRE River to the

east, clearing pockets of enemy resistance enroute. Combat Command "A"

of the 6th Armored Division contained LORIENT (G72).

A medical gas treatment battalion arrived fully-equipped in the

Third U.S. Army assembly area, making a total of three such battalions

available to the Army.

Engineers continued a study of crossings of the RHINE River and

stream crossings between the SEINE and RHINE Rivers. Reproduction of

topographic maps covering the SIEGFRIED Line in front of the Third U.S.

Army was begun.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command W A" of the 4th Armored Divi
sion held the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of ST

MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42), while Combat Command "B" crossed the ri
ver in the vicinity of CHAIAINES (U50) ten miles southwest of TOUL (U61)

and occupied the high ground in that area. The 80th Infantry Division

crossed the MEUSE River in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U42) and reached

the high ground east of ST MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42).

The 2d Cav
alry Group pushed reconnaissance elements to the general line MIRECOURT

(Z86) - NANCY (U81) - PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73).

2 SEPTEMBER (D + 88)

The enemy was reported cleared from north of the LOIRE River be
tween SATJMUR (P15) and TOURS (P76) and from ANGERS (087) to ORLEANS

(F62), and made scattered contact along the XII Corps front.

VIII Corps (the 2d, 8th, 29th, and 83d Infantry Divisions, the

6th Armored Division and supporting troops) was directed by the Army

Commander to extend the area of its responsibility to include MONTARGIS

(X24), utilizing Combat Command W B" of the 6th Armored Division. Combat

Command "B" was to keep contact with the 83d Infantry Division on the

west and the 35th Infantry Division on the east.

XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40).

In the XX

Corps zone the 7th Armored Division secured a bridgehead over the MEUSE

River at VERDUN (U26), while the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the

vicinity of CHBPPY (U07) twelve miles west of VERDUN (U26).

YTY Tactical Air Command provided close support to elements of

the VIII Corps attacking BREST (V99), to Task Force nBn

attacking in the

QUIMPER (W15) and CROZON (V98) Peninsulas, and to elements of the XII

and XX Corps, while conducting fighter sweeps and armed reconnaissance

in the area REIMS (T37) - VERDUN (U26) - CHAUMONT (Z05) Aircraft flew

492 sorties during the day, which was featured by the destruction of

eleven enemy planes confirmed, six probables and twelve damaged. Thirty

three locomotives, 130 tanks and armored vehicles and 817 motor trans
ports were damaged or destroyed in the dayfs activities.

In the VIII Corps zone

strong enemy resistance.

the attack on BREST (V99) continued against

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division continued to hold

the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL

(U43) - COMMERCY (U42) The 35th Infantry Division remained in posi

tions protecting the Army south flank, while the 80th Infantry Division

maintained its hold on the high ground east of the MSUSE River in the

vicinity north of COMMERCY (U42).

The 2d Cavalry Group continued pa
trolling along the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of NANCY (U81).

Elements of the Third U.S. Army secured bridgeheads at ST MIHIEL

(U43) - COMMERCY (U42) and VERDUN (U26) in operations during the first

day of the month.

XV
(S40).

The supply situation was critical, especially as to Class III sup

plies, since transportation facilities had not kept pace with the rapid
ly lengthening supply line. This caused a strict rationing policy to be

placed in effect. Class I supplies on hand were adequate for mainten

ance plus a small reserve. Twelfth U.S. Army Group allocated 2,000

tons of supplies daily to the Third U.S. Army (tonnage for the VIII

Corps was not included in this total), 5,000 tons daily to the First

U.S. Army, and the remainder available for transport equally to Third

and First U.S. Armies. Daily requirements of the Third U.S. Army were

estimated to be approximately 5,500 tons, including 450,000 gallons of

gasoline and 10,000 gallons of diesel, plus balanced quantities of oils

and greases. The requirements became greater as divisions were added.

The daily request was for 1,050,000 gallons of gasoline, but receipts

amounted to only 110,600 gallons. Rations on hand totaled 592,562, all

of the operational type, and unit reserves were intact. Thus it was de
cided to reduce ration shipments to 500 tons daily for 2, 3, and 4 Sep
tember and increase daily gasoline requisitions to 1,500 tons, less

diesel, for Class III supplies.

62

officially was designated

Corps continued

its

concentration

in the

vicinity of NANGIS

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division secured its bridge
head east of the MBUSE River with elements at ETAIN (U47) - AMBLY (U34)

and VERDUN (U26). The 5th Infantry Division outposted VERDUN (U26) with

elements northeast and southeast of the town. The 3d Cavalry Group pa

trolled along the MOSELLE River near METZ (U85).
The 90th Infantry Di
vision remained in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

The Forces Francaises de lflnterieur continued to attack and harass

the enemy in the HAUTE MARNE and LOIRE ET CHER areas.

XIX Tactical Air Command gave support to units of the VIII Corps

attacking BREST (V99), to Task Force "B" attacking in the CROZON Penin
sula (V98) and to major elements of the XII, XV, and XX Corps, while

conducting armed reconnaissance to the German frontier. In 164 sorties

the Command claimed forty-seven railroad cars, 106 motor transports,

seven locomotives and seven tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or da

magede

S E C RVE T

R E T

u
In the 7 I H Corps zone the attack on BREST (799) and in the C&OZOK

Peninsula (798) continued.

IUB-DB-GSZKMBRE off ST MALO (371) surren
dered at 0930 to the unrelenting attack of elements of the Till Corps,

supported by artillery and bombardment by planes of the XIX Tactical Air

Command whioh used the island as a last resort target and dumping ground

for unused bombs*

As the result of fighting during the period, the 7th Armored Divi
sion secured its bridgehead on the MEUSE River and extended reconnais
sance to the east*

Classes II and 17 supplies, especially woolen clothing and blan

kets, became so critical that they were given priority for the first

time. The daily telegram requested 750,000 gallons of gasoline, of

whioh 25.390 were received*

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions

continued to consolidate their positions east of the 16SUSB River while

pushing patrols to the east*

Civil affairs detachment* were spread throughout third U.S. Amy*B

zone of operations covering two-thirds of France* French civil admin

istration was reported to be in excellent condition, capable official*

appointed by the provisional government cooperating efficiently in

carrying out the wishes of the Army Conaander. The order of the Supreme

Commander that "Civil Administration in all areas will be normally con

trolled by the French themselves1* was followed, eivil affairs detach
ments being assigned to towns and cities only when investigation indi
cated a need for them*
Through eivil affairs the Army helped in the

feeding and care of the civilian population by taking charge of cap

tured foodstuffs and gasoline released for civilian use* Many tons of

German food, Including grain, flour, sugar and rice, and hundreds of

carloads of coal were distributed* Sarly in September, through naval

liaison officers, resumption of fishing along the north coast of BRIT

TANY was allowed*

The XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (340)* The XX

Corps secured the VERDUN (U26) bridgehead while pushing patrols to the

east*

Forward Machine Gun Outpost East of Verdun

An air evacuation holding unit of the Advance Section Conminle*

tions Zone was declared available for evacuation of Third U.S. Army pa
tients*
The Engineers started projecting the proposed Army main supply

routes from the MAKHS to the MOSELU Rivers*

3 SEPTEMBER (D + 89)

Enemy capabilities as estimated at this time leaned to the conclu

sion that the overall enemy attitude would remain defensive*
The most

favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay in the

Army*s zone of advance, supported by local counterattacks, to screen the

withdrawal of his forces behind the SIEGFRIED Line* The next most fa
vored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay in the Army*a

zone of advance while establishing blocking lines south of the Amy's

south flank to screen the withdrawal of his escaping forces south of the

LOIRE River and from the upper RHONE Valley to the northeast* The third

most favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay east

of the MOSELLE River, while massing reserves from the PAS BE CALAIS,

southern France, Germany and more distant fronts for a large-scale coun
terattack*

In an estimate of enemy strength two divisions from the Italian

front were identified and a third division tentatively identified* Act

ually, with the final tabulation of enemy losses in the pocket west of

the SEINE River, the overall total of enemy combat troops on the front

had diminished during the past week*

It was estimated that the enemy

had lost 264,300 infantry and 120,000 Panzer troops* His estimated

effective strength was 106,700 infantry and 78,000 Panzer troops and his

estimated combat strength when committed was 371,000 infantry and

198,000 Panzer troops*

S E C R R T

UNCLASS/F/ffl

63

j H CI

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided close support to

units of the VIII Corps attacking BREST (V99) and to Task Force "B"

attacking in the CROZON peninsula* Close support was given to the XII

and XX Corps and armed reconnaissance was conducted up to the German

border* Fighter bombers flew thirty-eight missions with 510 sorties but

found few targets* Fourteen railroad cars and forty-five military in

stallations were damaged or destroyed*

XX Corps (tilt 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored

Division and supporting troops) was ordered to seize METZ (U85) without

delay* advance east of the MOSEIXE River within Its zone, to seize MAINZ

(M35), and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone*

The Corps was to be prepared to continue the advance to seize .FRANK

FURT (M66) on Army order and was to maintain oontaot with the First

U.S. Army on the left (north)*

Elements of the Third U.S. Army continued to secure and enlarge it*

bridgeheads, with active reconnaissance to the east during the period*

XII Corps (the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the 4th Ar
mored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to seize NANCY (U81)

and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River within its zone* It

was to protect the south flank of the Army until relieved by elements of

the XV Corps, to be prepared to continue the advance rapidly to the

northeast, on A m y order, to seize MANNHEIM (R59) and secure a bridge

head east of the RHINE River within its zone*

The Central Group of Armies officially became Twelfth U.S. Army

Group.

The Army was seriously hampered by the shortage of gasoline* Many

supporting units Including all field artillery, were immobilized* In

tto XII Corps zone movement was restricted and In the XV Corps zone ac
tivity was limited to small patrols* As the airfield at REIMS (T37) was

operational for the receipt of supplies, a request was made that gaso
line be shipped there, since tonnage allocations of the Army were not

arriving by other means of transportation* The daily request was for

590,000 gallons of gasoline, of which 49,930 gallons were received*

Engineers in the meantime began a terrain study of western Germany

to determine its suitability for mechanized operations*

A SEPTEMBER (D + 90)

The enemy built up a defensive position along the line PONTVA

MOOSSQN (U73)- TOOL (TJ61) and south along the MOSELLE River, and resist
ed strongly at NANCY (U81) and in the FORBT DE HATS (U70), three miles

west of NANCY (U81). Forward elements of the Till Corps were in oontaot

at several points with the enemy at BREST (V99)*

Twelfth U.S. Army Group directed that the Ninth U.S. Army as
sume command of the VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th and 83d Infantry Divisions

and the 6th Armored Division) although the 83d Infantry Division and the

6th Armored Division were to be released to the XV" Corps of the Third

U.S. Army upon transfer of the VIII Corps effective at 1200 hours, 5

September, and gave the corps the mission of reducing the BRITTANY

Peninsula and protecting the south flank of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group

along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS (F62), exclusive* The

Ninth U.S. Army was to prepare for further action to the east on the

right (south) flank of the Third U.S. Army.

The Army Commander directed an advance to the east with two corps

abreast, one corps initially covering the right flank and later advanc
ing to the east* A bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River was to be es
tablished, the advance was to continue and a bridgehead east of the

RHINE River from KOBLENZ (L99) exclusive to KARLSRUHE (R44) inclusive

was to be seized*

64

S E C

IA V

Artillery Cleans Mud From Shells in Moselle Sector

The daily tonnage of supplies allocated to the Third U.S. Army was

increased to 3,500 tons* Gasoline receipts began to increase, 240,265

gallons being received of 640,000 gallons requested* The Forward Sche-

Ion of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area north of MARSON (T63),

eight miles east of CHALONS SUR MARNS (T54) *

XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 2d French

Armored Division) was ordered to more to an area southeast of TROYSS

(Y27) and to protect the south flank of the A m y from MONTARGIS (X24) to

the east, relieving elements of the XII Corps* The corps was to move

the 79th Infantry DiTision, upon release by the First U.S. Army, to a

concentration area southeast of TROYSS (Y27) and was to direct the 83d

Infantry DiTision, upon release by the VIII Corps, to more to an area

seleoted by the XV Corps* It was to seize the line of the MOSELLZ RiTer

within its zone and be prepared to continue the advance to the northeast

to seize KARLSRUHB (R44) and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RiTer

within its zone, or to move through bridgeheads secured by the XII or

XX Corps* The 6th Armored DiTision, upon being released by the VIII

Corps, was to be moved to an area east of TROYSS (Y27) as Army reserve.

5 SEPTEMBER (D + 91)

On the XII Corps front the 2d Cavalry Group contacted the enemy

along a line PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) - TOUL (U61) - ST VINCSNT (U80)

BAYON (Z98) and efforts to penetrate this line met with machine gun and

artillery fire. On the XX Corps front the 3d Cavalry Group found the

area NILVANGE (U78) - HAVANGE (U78) - TERVILLE (U88) - UCKANGE (U88)

strongly held with tanks, anti-tank weapons, and infantry.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and the CROZON

Peninsula (798) was continued, with slow progress being made against a

determined enemy entrenched in solid forts and blockhouses* Artillery

with VIII Corps fired 607 missions in the twenty-four hour period ending

at 0600 4 September, including 105 counter battery missions and 263

harassing missions. Many duds were noted in the enemy artillery.

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry DiTision occupied a line

running north of TOOL (U61), with the 317th Infantry concentrated in the

Tlcinity of BERNSCOURT (U62) the 318th Infantry, less one battalion at

COMMERCY (U42), in the vicinity of FRANCHEVILLE (U61) and the 319th In

fantry concentrated in areas northwest and southwest of TOUL (U61).

The 4th Armored DiTision remained in its position east of the MEUSS Ri-

Ter while the 35th Infantry Division continued its mission of protecting

the south flank of the Army*

XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40). XX Corps

continued to secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of VKRDUN (U26) while

pushing patrols aggressively to the east*

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur captured a bridge across the

MOSELLE River, destroyed an enemy gasoline dump of 200,000 gallons, and

generally continued to harass the enemy*

The Army Commander instructed

Forces Franoaises de l'Interieur to assist in establishing traffic con

trol in key cities on main supply routes to assist in the movement of

Army supplies*

Mortar Crew Shells German Strongpoint

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry Division attacked to the

east and reached the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON

(U73) with the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of BLENOD (U73), one mile

south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the 318th Infantry in the vicinity of

MARBACHE (U72) twelve miles northeast of TOUL (U6l) and the 319th In
fantry in the vicinity of TOUL (U6l). Against stiff enemy resistance

the division was able to force a part of one battalion across the MO
SELLE River in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 4th Armored

Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River while the 35th

Infantry Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army.

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command flew close support for the

2d, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions attacking BRBST (V99), and Task

Force "B w attacking In the CROZON Peninsula (V98). Limited in its oper
ations due to adverse weather the Command flew 159 sorties in nine

missions, destroying seventy-seven railroad cars and nineteen motor

transports, while continuing to disrupt the enemy's rail transportation*

Third U.S. Army continued to secure bridgeheads, with active recon

naissance to the east, while every effort was made to bring up suffici
ent gasoline and other supplies to continue the attack toward the German

frontier*

The XV Corps continued concentrating in the vicinity of NANGIS

(S4.0), with the 79th Infantry Division enroute to an intermediate as

sembly area in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

S E C\E T

65

UNCLASSIFIED

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In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division crossed the MEUSE

River and advanced toward the MOSELLE River. Combat Command nA" of the

7th Armored Division moved in two columns to the vicinity of ROMBAS

(U87), ten miles east of CONFLANS (U66), on the north, and ST PRIVAT
LA-MONTAGNE (U76), eight miles northwest of METZ (U85), on the south.

Combat Command W B W
also moved in two columns and reached the river in

the vicinity of DORNOT (U75), five miles southwest of METZ (U85). The

90th Infantry Division closed in an area near FOAMEIX (U47), two miles

northwest of ETAIN (U47), while the 5th Infantry Division continued to

force crossings of the MOSELLE River against very stiff enemy resis
tance.

IX Corps launched an attack to the east against stiff enemy resis

tance to force crossings over the MOSELLE River north and south of METZ

(U85). Elements of the 90th Infantry Division advanced from REIMS (T37)

to an area northeast of VERDUN (U26) # The 5th Infantry Division

attacked to the east, with the 2d Infantry reaching the vicinity of BUZY

(U56), twelve miles east of VERDUN (U26) the 10th Infantry in the vicin
ity of FRESNES (H20), seven miles south of TONNERRE (H2l) and the 11th

Infantry in the vicinity of DONCOURT (U66) two miles southeast of CON

FLANS (U66).

The Forces Francaises de 1'Interieur cleared out the northern part

of the I0NNE department and continued to disrupt the withdrawal activi

ties of the enemy.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur continued guerilla actions

against strong enemy resistance in the vicinities of HAUTE-MARNE,

MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, NIEVRE, and VOSGES, where 200 Maquis were killed in

action. The enemy was cleared from the department of AUBE with several

thousand prisoners taken, including two generals.

Flying 389 sorties in thirty-one missions, the XIX Tactical Air

Command dropped 108 napalm tanks on enemy installations and troops, the

heaviest concentration of these tanks since the Command became opera

tional. Among other claims during the day were nineteen railroad lines

cut, thirty-one gun installations and forty-six military installations

damaged or destroyed.

The XIX Tactical Air Command continued its heavy pressure on the

enemy with 416 sorties in thirty-seven missions. Claims for the day in
cluded seventy-five motor transports, thirty-two gun installations, and

twenty-seven military installations damaged or destroyed.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army resumed

its advance to the east toward the heavily fortified cities of METZ

(U85) and NANCY (U81) in ALSACE-LORRAINE with the enemy offering strong

resistance.

Artillery ammunition shortages became increasingly critical* The

XX Corps had a fair supply but the XII Corps was very short of all types

of artillery ammunition and fuzes.

The gasoline situation continued to improve as the air lift began

at the REIMS (T37) airstrip, where 70,250 gallons of gasoline were re

ceived. Of 560,000 gallons of gasoline requested on this date, 275,720

gallons were received.

The gasoline shortage was alleviated by air and rail shipments of

358,840 gallons, of which 58,605 gallons were received in the first air

shipment to RENNEVILLE (Q42).

6 SEPTEMBER (D + 92)

7 SEPTEMBER (D + 93)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy held a line along the MOSELLE River

and resisted at CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z47) and in the vicinity

of NANCY (U81) - PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The enemy was entrenching in

considerable strength at GRAVELOTTE (U75) in the XX Corps zone, but

French civilians reported little troop activity along the SIEGFRIED

Line.

In the XII Corps zone the enemy continued to hold a general line

CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z47) - MIRECOURT (Z86) and north along the

MOSELLE River. In the XX Corps zone the enemy defended the east bank of

the MOSELLE River.

XII Corps continued its attack to gain a bridgehead over the

MOSELLE River. Against strong enemy resistance and continuous counter

attacks the elements of the 80th Infantry Division which were across the

MOSELLE River were withdrawn. The 317th Infantry remained in the vicin
ity of BLENQD (U73), one mile south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), while the

318th Infantry reached the vicinity of BELLEVILLE (U72) and the 319th

Infantry occupied a line from the vicinity of GONDREVILLE-SUR-MOSELLE

(U71) four miles northeast of TOUL (U6l) to VILLEY-LE-SEC (U70), three

miles east of TOUL (U6l). The 35th Infantry Division continued to pro
tect the south flank of the Army while the 4th Armored Division remained

in positions east of the MEUSE River.

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry Division continued attack
ing against fierce resistance to drive bridgeheads across the MOSELLE

River. The 319th Infantry secured a bridgehead across the river in the

yicinity of GONDREVILLS-SUR-MOSELLS (U71) four mils northeast of TOUL

(U61) - VIIUSY-IZ-SSC (U70), three miles east of TOUL (U61) The 35th

Infantry Division prepared to move east toward NANCY (U81) and its 134th

Infantry moved to an area northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The 4th Ar

mored Division remained in position east of the MSUSS River*

Because of the wide corps frontage, the XII Corps established two

corps artillery fire direction centers, one operating in rear of the

north elements of the corps and the other in rear of the south ele
ments*

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division continued to move

to an assembly area in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

66

SE

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\ V

The XII Corps attached one 105 howitzer battalion to the 2d Cavalry

Group operating in advance of the corps with a mission to push on to

LUNBVILLE (709)* In one Instance this force encountered and attacked an

enemy column, the cavalry attacking the front of the column and the ar
tillery firing upon its rear* This combination destroyed thirty-six

enemy vehicles and inflicted heavy casualties*

8 SEPTEMBER (D + 94)

On the *TT Corps front a captured enemy overlay showed a defensive

line with strong points at SPINAL (V05) - NANCY (U81) - UBTZ (U85)
THIONVTLLE (U88) and a secondary line at SAARGSMDND (Q55) - BITSCH (Q75)

WORTH (R03) - STRASBOURG (W09) - COLMAR (V70). In the XX Corps zone the

enemy held the east bank of the MOSELLE River and a bridgehead running

from MBTZ (U85) to AMANVILLSRS (U76) - VERNVTLLE (U76), one mile east of

GRAVELOTTE (U75) and southeast to the MOSELLE,

The XV Corps prepared to move to a concentration area south and

east of TROYES (Y27). The 2d French Armored Division started its move
ment from PARIS (S04) to an area in the vicinity of BAR-3UR-AUHE (Y76)*

The 79th Infantry Division, less one combat team, moved into an area

south of REIMS (T37) and continued movement south to the vicinity of

JOINVILIE-EN-VALLAGS (ZQ8) and THOTSS (Y87), preparing to relieve ele

ments of the 35th Infantry Division which were protecting the south

flank of the Army. The other combat team of the 79th Infantry Division

was enroute from the First U.S. Army to vicinity of JOIHVILLS-fflJ-VALLAGB

(Z08).

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division, having been re
lieved by elements of the 79th Infantry Division (XV Corps), started

moving east with the 134th Infantry dosing in the vicinity northeast of

NBUFCHATBAU (Z57). The 80th Infantry Division continued its drive

against stiff enemy resistance to cross the MOSELLE River while the 4th

Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division, fighting against

increasing enemy resistance, advanced toward the MOSELLE River with the

2d Infantry in the vicinity of VERNBVILI2 (U76), ten miles northwest of

MSTZ (U85), and the 11th Infantry in the vicinity of CORNY (U74), seven

miles southwest of ifflTZ (U85). Elements of the division forced a cross

ing of the river in the vicinity of CORNY (U74) and were followed over

by elements of the 7th Armored Division. The 90th Infantry Division re

pulsed strong enemy counterattacks from the north and continued its ad
vance to the MOSELLES River, reaching a line from AUDUN (U68) to BRISY

(U77), with the 359th Infantry in the vicinity of FQAMEIX (TJ47), two

miles northwest of ETAIN (U47), cleaning up pockets of enemy resistance.

The XV Corps continued to move to its concentration area south and

east of TR0Y2S (127). The 315th Infantry (79th Infantry Division)

closed in its area east of JOINVTLLE (Z08) while the other two regiments

were en route to their new locations. Two Combat Commands of the 2d

French Armored Division closed into a concentration area in the vicinity

of BAR-SUR-AURB (Y76) with the balance of the division en route

In the XX Corps zone fierce fighting continued on both sides of the

MOSELLE River, the enemy launching four counterattacks. Elements of the

7th Armored Division and 5th Infantry Division continued to cross the

river in the vicinity of CORNY (1774), seven miles southwest of METZ

(U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to attack against very de

termined enemy resistance to secure crossings in its zone, while patrols

of the division established contact with elements of the V Corps, First

U.S. Army, on the north.

Hundreds of Germans were killed and over 1,000 prisoners taken in

the ARDENNES (080) sector by the Forces Francaises de 1'Interieur, while

1,500 resistance troops and AMERICAN elements who had been ordered to

occupy CHATILLON (080), nine miles northwest of "BUZANCY (T99), took 200

prisoners and killed 100 Germans*

Continuing its close support of Third U. S. Army, the XIX Tactical

Air Command flew 470 sorties in thirty-nine missions. Planes concentra

ted heavily on the enemy's military installations with the following

claims: twenty-eight gun installations and 136 military installations

were destroyed or damaged during the day's operation*

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 238 sorties in sixteen missions

in the day's operations with 132 motor transports destroyed and 310

horse-drawn vehicles, eleven gun installations and eleven military In

stallations damaged or destroyed during the day.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army in
creased its bridgeheads over the MOSELLE and continued to move east*

Elements of the Third U.S. Army forced crossings over the MOSELLE

River in the vicinity of CORNY (U74), seven miles southwest of MSTZ

(U85), and continued the attack toward the German border during the

period.

A beginning was made toward a policy of moving Third U.S. Army hos
pitals into buildings, all hospitals previously having been under canvas

in the field.

For the first time in September receipts of Class III supplies ex

ceeded the requests as the first rail shipment of gasoline arrived at

SOMMSSOUS (T42). Delivery of approximately 200,000 gallons of gasoline

helped to build up the unit reserves but still left receipts for the

month 2,856,000 gallons short of requests*

S E C R

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\ **'

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division moved into an

assembly area in the vicinity of COLOMBEY-IES-BELIES (Z69). The 80th

Infantry Division continued its drive to cross the MOSELLE River in the

face of ever-stiffening enemy resistance, with the 319th Infantry hold

ing the northern half of LIVERDUN (U71) six miles northwest of NANCY

(U81).
The 4th Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE

River in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U42).

9 SEPTEMBER (D + 95)

An estimate of enemy capabilities at this time still attributed to

him only a defensive attitude The most favored capability was that the

enemy could defend and delay east of the MOSBUX River, counterattacking

with armor-spearheaded assaults against the Army's bridgeheads to con

tain them and impede eastward advance*
The other capabilities in order

of preference were:L that the enemy could oppose the Army's eastward

advance with local armor-spearheaded assaults against the shoulders of

the advance from the northeast in the vicinity of TFHONVTLLB (U78) and

from the southeast in the vicinity of NANCY (U81), 2. that he could

continue to establish blocking lines south of the south flank in the

LANGRES (J22) - CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATSAU (Z57) area to screen the

withdrawal to the northeast of his forces withdrawing before the Seventh

U.S. Army, 3. that he could defend and delay in the zone of Third U.S.

Army's advance, supported by counterattacks against bridgeheads over the

MOSELLE River and the shoulders of the advance to gain time to bring up

reserves from distant areas and to organize and man the SIEGFRIED line,

and 4* that he could defend and delay in Third U.S. Army's zone of ad
vance, while launching counterattacks against the south flank from the

CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATSAU (Z57) area.

In the XV Corps zone the 79th

Infantry Division closed into its

assembly area in the vicinity of

JOINVHIZ-SN-VALLAGE (Z08), while

the 2d French Armored Division

dosed in its assembly area south

east Of BAR-SURE-AUH3 (Y76) and

made contact with Combat Command

"B* of the 6th Armored Division to

the west.

Medics Attend Wounded As Infantry Moves Forward Across Moselle

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68

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v i. /i g *> ] f i

Upon req< ast of the XV Corps, Forces Francaises de l'Interieur

troops protected the bridges and contained enemy pockets in the CHAUMONT

(Z05) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) area. The Forces Francaises de lflnterieur

reported that the departments of YONNE and AUBE were free of the enemy,

enemy casualties amounting to 2,000 killed and 5,000 prisoners. This

cleared a large area in the rear of the XV Corps.

10 SEPTEMBER (D + 96)
On the XII Corps front the enemy still held the MOSELLE River line.

There was no change in the METZ (U85) area on the XX Corps front and

the enemy continued a determined resistance to expansion of the Third

U.S. Army bridgehead east of the MOSELLE.

XX Corps continued fighting fiercely to exploit crossings of

the MOSELLE River. The 5th Infantry Division furthered its crossings

over that river, while elements of the 10th Infantry crossed at NOVEANT

(U74). The 90th Infantry Division pushed forward, with the 357th Infan
try reaching the vicinity of AVRIL (U77), four miles north of BRIEY

(U77), the 358th Infantry reaching the vicinity of FONTOY (U78), eight

miles west of THIONVILLE (U88), and with the 359th Infantry fighting in

the vicinity of AUDUN-IE-ROMAN (U68). Elements of Combat Command "A"

(7th Armored Division, with the 2d Infantry of the 5th Infantry Division

attached) reached a line in the vicinity southeast of AMANVILLERS (U76),

seven miles northwest of METZ (U85),

Combat Command "B" of the 7th Ar
mored Division was attached to the 5th Infantry Division*

The XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, and the 2d

French Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to move

without delay to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE Ri

ver within its aone and to leave behind only minimum forces necessary

to cover the south flank from MONTARGIS (X24) to CHADMONT (Z05), inclu
sive.

The enemy continued his stubborn resistance of the MOSSUE River

line along the entire Third U.S. Army zone and improved his defensive

positions in the FORET DE HAYE (U70) area, three miles west of NANCY

(U81).

XII Corps launched an attack to secure bridgeheads across the

MOSELLE River,
The 35th Infantry Division succeeded in forcing two

battalions of the 134th Infantry across the river in the vicinity of

FLAVIGNY (Z89), eight miles south of NANCY (U81), against heavy enemy

resistance, while the 137th Infantry advanced to the MOSELLE River,

The 80th Infantry Division continued to push forward against increasing

enemy resistance. Reserve Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division

moved to the vicinity of RUPPES (Z58), nine miles northeast of NEUF

CHATBAU (Z57), and Combat Command "Bn moved to the vicinity of HAROUE

(288), fifteen miles south of NANCY (U81)*

The artillery ammunition supply situation improved on all calibers

with the notable exception of 105 howitzer ammunition, which was criti
cally short. Air shipment was requested in the priority 105 howitzer,

155 howitzer, and 155 gun, XX Corps artillery did perhaps its most ac
tive firing to date, over 20,000 rounds being expended in two days. In

one instance one 240 howitzer battalion obtained six direct hits out of

ten rounds fired at a fort in the METZ (U85) area and succeeded in

starting fires. The enemy was making extensive use of the old forts

around METZ (U85) and all lighter calibered weapons had proved ineffec
tive against these defenses*

The XV Corps launched an attack to secure the west bank of the

MOSELLE River in the vicinity of CHAHMES (Z97) and EPINAL (V05). The

79th Infantry Division advanced with the 313th Infantry in the vicinity

of GONDRECOURT (Z39), the 314th Infantry in the vicinity of BETTONCOURT

(Z89), four miles north of MIRECOURT (Z86), and the 315th Infantry in

the vicinity of G2HMAY (Z28) fifteen miles northwest of NEUFCEATEAU

(Z57), The 2d French Armored Division established contact with elements

of the First French Infantry Division, Seventh U.S. Army, in the vicini
ty of SCMHERNON (N75). This development, the culmination of the Seventh

U.S. Army's landing on the Mediterranean coast of France, placed a bar

rier of friendly troops between the Third U.S. Army's right (south)

flank and the enemy, assured the Supreme Command a continuous battleline

facing the German frontier, and trapped thousands of enemy troops behind

the Allied lines in southwestern France*

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 308 sorties in twenty-five missions

during the day, with excellent claims being made on enemy rail installa
tions, eighty-eight motor transports, 200 locomotives, twenty-seven gun

installations and thirty-two military installations were damaged or des

troyed while thirteen tanks and armored vehicles were knocked out during

the day. Five enemy airdromes were attacked*

During the period elements of the Third U.S. Army continued to ex

ploit the crossing of the MOSELLE River, while additional forces concen
trated to the south preparatory to being committed*

The Third U.S. Army asked to be relieved of the responsibility for

accepting th'e surrender of a German general and 18,000 troops in the

province of LOIRE. It was recommended that the Ninth U.S. Army perform

this mission*

In the XX Corps zone heavy fighting continued.

The 90th Infantry

Division moved forward to the vicinity of TEHONVILLS (U88) with elements

of the division northwest and southwest of the city. Following a strong

enemy counterattack, the 5th Infantry Division withdrew some of the ele
ments of the 11th Infantry from the east bank of the MOSELLE River while

the 10th Infantry, less one reinforced company, fought its way across

the river in the vicinity of ARNAVILLE (U74), nine miles southwest of

METZ (U85). Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division advanced

to the vicinity of VAUX (U75), four miles west of METZ (U85),

The Army captured 2,600,000 pounds of frozen beef and 500,000

pounds of canned beef, property of the German Army, and issue to front

line troops was started at once. Four medical ambulance companies and

one field hospital were transferred from Third U.S. Army to the First

U.S. Army*

R ET

UNCLASSIFIED

69

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Concentrating on enemy troops and military installations, the XIX

Tactical Air Command flew 377 sorties during the day. Thirty-two enemy

tanks, thirty-three gun installations and thirty-two military installa

tions were damaged or destroyed during the period*

In operations for the day Third U.S. Army continued the attack to

secure bridgeheads east of the MOSELLE River while patrols established

contact with Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of SOMBEHNON (N75).

Two tank destroyer battalions arrived on the Continent thereby com

pleting the lift of all field artillery and tank destroyer units then

assigned to the Third U.S. Army,

Ammunition supply continued to be critically short especially in

the XII Corps, The weekly ammunition ration received from Twelfth U.S.

Army Group allocated to Third U.S. Army approximately one-third of a

unit of fire per day in all calibers of artillery weapons. All artill
ery stressed observed fires and held unobserved fires to a minimum in

order to conserve ammunition. Air observation post patrols proved

effective in minimizing enemy artillery fire, it being found that enemy

artillery, to avoid disclosing their positions, would not fire so long

as spotter planes were in the air.

11 SEPTEMBER (D + 97)
In the XII Corps zone the enemy held the east bank of the MOSETXE

River from PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) to GRIEPORT (Z98), except in the TOUL

(U86) area* In the XV Corps zone the enemy continued to hold a blocking

line CHATEAU VILLAIN (T90) - CHADMONT (Z04) - ANDBLOT (Z16) - RIMANCOURT

(Z26) - ST B U N (Z26) - NBUFCHATEAU (Z47) - MIR2C0URT (Z86) - CHABMES

(Z97) On the XX Corps front he held the east bank of the MOSELLE Ri
ver except for the bridgehead CORNY (U75) - NOVEANT (U74).

The XII Corps continued its attack to secure bridgeheads across the

MOSELLE River.
In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division, the 320th

Infantry less one battalion attached to Combat Command "B" of the 4th

Armored Division, assembled in the vicinity of VEZELISE (Z78), the 134th

Infantry was in the vicinity of FR0L0I3 (Z89), nine miles southwest of

NANCY (U81), while the 137th Infantry, having pushed seven companies

across the river on a line north of BAYON (Z98), made contact one mile

north of BAYON (Z98) with Combat Command B B" of the 4th Armored Divi
sion. The 80th Infantry Division continued its advance with the 317th

Infantry moving to a crossing site in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD (U72).

The 318th Infantry, in preparing to follow Combat Command "A" of the 4th

Armored Division, assembled in the vicinity of ST JULIEN-LES-OORZS

(U64), thirteen miles southwest of MSTZ (U85). Combat Command n B B of

the 4th Armored Division battled its way across the river in the vicin
ity of BAYON (Z98), with three infantry companies and two tank companies

crossing at this point and two companies of armored infantry crossing in

the vicinity of BAINVTLLS (Z98), three miles south of BAYON (Z98).

XV Corps continued its advance with the 79th Infantry Division

fighting its way toward the MOSELLE River, The 313th Infantry reached

an area northeast of CHARMES (Z97), the 314th Infantry pushed southeast

of CHARMES (Z97) and the 315th Infantry reached the vicinity southwest

of NEUFCHATSAU (Z57), clearing the enemy from that area. The 2d French

Armored Division advanced rapidly, encountering slight enemy resis

tance, with Combat Command "L" reaching the vicinity of C0NTR3XEVILLE

(Z65), east of BULGNEVILI (Z55), and Combat Command "V" reaching the

vicinity of ST BLIN (Z26). Elements of the 106th Cavalry Group reached

CHARMES (Z97).

The XX Corps continued to cross the MOSELLE River and established

bridgeheads. In the zone of the 5th Infantry Division the 10th Infan
try, plus two tank companies and one tank destroyer platoon, crossed the

river in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), while the 90th Infantry

Division continued its attack in the north sector of the XX Corps zone.

The 357th Infantry and the 358th Infantry reached the vicinity south of

THIONVILLS (U88)t while the 359th Infantry assembled in an area north

west of THIONVILLE (U88)

The 7th Armored Division with an attached

infantry regiment of the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the vicinity

south of AMANVTLLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85).

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 411 sorties in forty-five mis
sions during the day f s operations, with heavy claims on enemy rail

transportation, ninety-two railroad cars, forty-six motor transports,

forty-four gun installations, thirty-five horse-drawn vehicles, and

thirty-two military installations were damaged or destroyed.

In activities for the period the Third U.S. Army continued to se

cure bridgeheads established across the M0SSLL2 River, while major Army

elements west of the river pushed forward preparatory to making addi

tional crossings.

Of 300,000 rations requested, 65,348 were delivered. Reserves were

used to make up the shortage. A total of 247,340 gallons of gasoline

were received by air shipment to RENNSVTLLS (Q42) and STAIN (U47).

Infantry Advances in Bayon Zone.

70

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12 SEPTEMBER (D -f 98)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy still held a position on the east

bank of the MOSELLE River and strongly opposed expansion of the Third

U. S. Army bridgehead, while the same situation was evident on the XX

Corps front. There was no cohesive front line opposing the XV Corps.

Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division, by order of the

Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was released to the Third U.S. Army. The Com
bat Command was ordered to move to a designated assembly area east of

TROYES (Y27) and the Commanding General was notified that the remainder

of the division would be released soon for movement to the same assembly

area.

The XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 2d French

Armored Division) was ordered to establish contact without delay with

the Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of BAIGNSUX (097) and to maintain

continuous contact thereafter. The corps was also ordered to capture

NEUFCHATSAU (Z57) and to continue on its assigned mission. Combat Com

mand "B" of the 6th Armored Division was to take over protection of the

south flank as far east as TR0Y2S (Y27), inclusive, with the XV Corps

responsible from TROYES (Y27), exclusive, to the east*

XII Corps continued to enlarge its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE

River north and south of NANCY (U81) at DIBULOUARD (U72) and NEUVILIKR

(Z98) two miles northwest of BAYON (Z98). In the 35th Infantry Division

zone the 137th Infantry completed crossing the MOSSLLE River north of

BAYON (Z98) and the 320th Infantry crossed the river in the vicinity of

ST MARD (Z99), three miles north of BAYON (Z98).

The 80th Infantry Di
vision continued its advance as the 317th Infantry and the 318th Infan
try crossed the river in the vicinity of DIBULOUARD (U72), south of

PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73)
After fighting its way across the river, the

317th Infantry gained control of the high ground south of PONT-A-MOUSSON

(U73)
The 4th Armored Division completed moving Combat Command n B"

across the river in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98) while Combat Command "A"

crossed the river in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD (U72). Reserve Combat

Command prepared to cross the river in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98) In

the XII Corps sector a 30-minute artillery preparation was fired by 80th

Division Artillery and the reinforcing AO^th Field Artillery Group for a

crossing of the MOSELLE south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the artillery

preparation being fired in barrage fashion against the east bank of the

river. Considerable enemy artillery fire was directed at the Army's

forward elements and the bridgehead.

Liberated Russian Nationals in Third U.S. Army Area

XX Corps continued against determined resistance to strengthen its

bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River, with the 5th Infantry Division

fighting to hold its crossings on the river. The 90th Infantry Division

pushed forward with the 357th Infantry in the vicinity east of BRIEY

(U77), the 358th Infantry in the outskirts of THIONVILLE (U88) and the

359th Infantry in the vicinity north of THIONVILLE (U88),

UCKANGE

(U87), four miles south of THIONVILLE (U88), was occupied by elements of

the 90th Infantry Division, The 7th Armored Division continued to move

forward toward the river in the vicinity of AMANVILLHtS (U76), seven

miles northwest of METZ (U85).

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division fought its way for
ward, with the 313th Infantry reaching the vicinity of MUtBCOURT (Z86),

The 3 U t h Infantry occupied the city of CHARMES (Z97) and from there ad
vanced one battalion across the MOSELLE River. The 315th Infantry cap
tured the city of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) The 2d French Armored Division

continued its advance. Combat Command "L* cleared the enemy from VITTEL

(Z65), three miles northeast of CONTREXEVILLE (Z65)> and continued to

advance east to D0MPA1RE (Z85). Combat Command " V advanced to the vi

cinity of VITTEL (Z65) three miles northeast of CONTREXEVILLE (Z65)

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 388 sorties in operations, which
were featured by the destruction of thirty-five enemy planes confirmed

and seven damaged on the ground while the Command lost eight planes.

Other claims during the day's operation were sixty-eight railroad cars,

129 motor transports, thirteen locomotives and twenty-six gun installa

tions damaged or destroyed. Two enemy airdromes were attacked during

the period.

S E C R E T

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Combat Command M L" of the 2d French Ar

mile nortn of MIRECOURT (Z86).
mored Division captured DOMPAIRE (Z65) and DAMAS (Z85), nine miles west

of EPINAL (V05), and reached the vicinity of EPINAL (V05), while combat

Command "V" advanced to the vicinity of MIRECOURT (Z86).

NEUFCHATEAU (Z57), VITTEL (Z65), and UCKANGE (Z87) fell to the

Third U.S. Army advance, while other elements continued to secure and

enlarge the MOSELLE River bridgeheads.

The Army photo center opened in the vicinity of ST DIZIER (T90),

this being the first time that it was located within range of the SCR

193 radio*
One artillery radio set was thereupon established at the

officer's radio network operated for the first time as contemplated;

that is, with one set each at the Army Command Post, the photo center

and each corps artillery command post. A Third U.S. Army air evacuation

holding unit was opened at ETAIN (U47).

This was in accordance with

existing policy that the Army set up these units as far forward and as

soon as air strips became available. A request was made that the entire

air lift available to this Army be used to supply ammunition on which a

priority had been placed.

In the zone of the XX Corps the 5th Infantry Division, with Combat

Command H B W
of the 7th Armored Division, attacked to expand their

bridgehead to the south. They continued to hold the bridgehead and one

battalion of the 11th Infantry crossed the MOSELLE River. Elements of

the 90th Infantry Division moved to relieve elements of the 5th Infantry

Division, while the 357th Infantry advanced to the river in the vicinity

of RICHEMONT (U87), eleven miles north of METZ (U85).

Combat Command

"Bn of the 7th Armored Division completed crossing the MOSELLE River in

the zone of the 5th Infantry Division.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew eighty-two sorties in nine missions

with few claims for the day. Five gun installations were destroyed or

damaged and three troop concentrations were attacked.

BETTONCOURT (Z87), CHARMES (Z97), POUSSAY (Z77), AMBRICOURT (H02),

DAMAS (Z85), and DOMPAIRE (Z65) fell to the relentless pressure of the

Third U.S. Army, while bridgeheads over the MOSELLE River were enlarged

and elements of the Army crossed the MEURTHE River at DAMELEVIERES

(U09), eleven miles southeast of NANCY (U81).

13 SEPTEMBER (D + 99)
In an estimate of enemy strength in the Third U.S. Army zone at

this time, the equivalent of eight divisions, consisting of 67,500

troops and ninety tanks and assault guns, were identified in contact.

Available as immediate reserves were the equivalent of six divisions,

consisting of 53,500 troops and eighty tanks. In an estimate of the en-

emy's strategic reserves, it was considered that six divisions reported

unlocated for several weeks were capable of being employed on the Army's

front. There were indications that enemy reinforcements were en route

from other fronts. It was estimated that lay 1 October the enemy could

bring the equivalent of three divisions with fifty tanks from Italy and

four divisions from Denmark and Norway. Four other divisions were re
ported moving at various times from the two Scandinavian countries.

There were no known reinforcements for the west coming from the Russian

front, but the enemy had the capability of withdrawing an estimated

three divisions and 150 tanks from the east by 1 October. Higher head
quarters estimated that from within Germany fourteen divisions, all of

low quality, and 200 tanks could be produced by 1 October. Not all of

these divisions, of 3,000 men each, necessarily would be committed

against the Third U.S. Army but they definitely constituted the enemy's

strategic reserves for such employment.

The Class I supply situation was critical. To make up the shortage

in shipments of "Bn and operational rations from Advance Section Commun

ications Zone, 140,000 German rations were issued, numerous captured

storehouses were emptied, and field bakeries began to use German flour.

The pipeline to CHARTRES (R30) started operations with an expected gal

lonage of 100,000 daily. The air lift, which had been discontinued,

was not to be resumed until further notice, Twelfth U.S. Army Group ad
vised.

The Military Vicar, ARCHBISHOP SPELLMAN, of NEW YORK, arrived at

Third U.S. Army area and offered mass for the personnel of Headquarters

and adjoining units. He made a tour of front line units.

In the zone of the XII Corps the 35th Infantry Division continued

its advance with the 137th and the 320th Infantry Regiments moving on

NANCY (U81) from the south. The 80th Infantry Division continued to ex
ploit its crossings of the MOSSLLS River. Combat Command "A" of the 4th

Armored Division reached the vicinity of ARRACOURT (Qll), northeast of

NANCY (U81), some of its elements crossing the HgURTHS River in the vi
cinity of DAMEIEVIERES (V09), eleven miles southeast of NANCY (U81).

Combat Command "B" advanced to the vicinity of the FOHET DE VITRIMONT

(ftOO), two miles west of UJNEVILLE (709), meeting heavy resistance.

14 SEPTEMBER (D+100)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy held the east bank of the MOSELLE

River except for three Third U.S. Army bridgeheads. In the XV Corps

zone the eneray in force held the canal from the MARMI River to the SAONE

River, south of LANGBIES (J22). There was no change on the XX Corps

front where the enemy held the line THIONVILLE (U88) - METZ (U85)
PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) .

The XV Corps continued its advance to the east. The 79th Infantry

Division advanced, capturing BETTONCOURT (Z87), four miles north of

MIR2C0URT (Z86), CHARMES (Z97), POUSSAY (Z77) and AMBRICOURT (HQ3) one

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The first rail shipments of gasoline arrived at LEROOVILLE (U32),

five miles northwest of COMMERCY (1142), and at VERDUN (026). This was a

great help since truck haul distances were tremendously reduced.

The XII Corps launched an attack to capture NANGI (U81) and FCBET
DE-HAYE (U70), three miles west of NANCY (U81). The 35th Infantry Di
vision continued its advance with the 134th Infantry less two battal
ions, gaining control of the high ground on the west bank of the MOSETJ.K

River in the vicinity of PONT-ST-VINCENT (U70). The 137th Infantry hel4

a line from ST NICOLAS-DO-PORT (U90) to FLAVIGNY (Z89), eight miles

south of NANCY (U81), and the 320th Infantry held the high ground in the

vicinity of DQMBASLE (U90) . This gave the 35th Infantry Division a line

running southeast, south and southwest of NANCY (081). The 80th Infan
try Division held a line roughly northwest, north, and northeast of

NANCY (U81), with the 318th Infantry holding the high ground one mile

east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the 317th Infantry holding the high ground

in the vicinity of BSLLEAU (U82) - SIVBY (082) - MILLERY (082), eight

miles north of NANCY (081), and the 319th Infantry holding the high

ground on the west bank of the MOSELLE River from BELLEVILLE (072) to

The 4th Armored

VILLEY-LE-SEC (U70), three miles east of TOOL (06l)M

Division moved into position with Combat Command "A assembled in the

vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09), where contact was established between the

two combat commands, both located south of NANCY (081).

15 SEPTEMBER (D + 102)
(Map for this date, accompanies text)

There was no change in the enemy lines opposing the XII, XX, and XV

Corps.

The Army Commander ordered Combat Command "B* of the 6th Armored

Division to extend the area of its responsibility as far east as the

MARNE River at CHAUMONT (Z05), relieving elements of the XV Corps. The

Combat Command was to remain under the command of the Third U.S. Army.

The XII Corps fought its way forward to the MOSELLE River. A spe
cial task force composed of elements of the 134th Infantry (35th Infan
try Division) and elements of the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Divi
sion) advanced through thick mine fields and road blocks and cleared

the FORET-DE-HAYE (070), three miles west of NANCY (U81). The large

French border city of NANCY (U81) was occupied by the 134th Infantry.

The 35th Infantry Division continued to enlarge its bridgeheads across

the MOSELLE River with the 137th Infantry crossing the river in the vi
cinity of ST NICOLAS-DU-PCRT (090). The 320th Infantry succeeded in

getting across the CANAL-LA-MARNE-AO-RHIN in the vicinity of DOMBASLE

(U90), and gained control of the high ground to the north. The 80th

Infantry Division continued to enlarge its bridgehead across the MOSELLE

River against a determined enemy that fought for every inch of ground.

The 4th Armored Division, now completely across the MOSELLE River, cut

off all enemy troops in the vicinity of NANCY (081) and closed in from

the east. Combat Command "A" assembled in the vicinity of RECHICOURT

LA PETITE (058) with Combat Command *B* in the vicinity of ANTHELOPT

(Q00), southeast of NANCY (081). Severe counterattacks launched against

the 80th Infantry Division's bridgehead across the MOSELLE were broken

up and repelled. Fourteen enemy tanks were destroyed or disabled toy the

division's artillery fire. A sound and flash detachment of the 14th

Field Artillery Observation Battalion was overrun and fought as infantry

for six hours before being relieved.

XV Corps continued to move to the east. The 79th Infantry Division

pushed forward with the 315th Infantry capturing the city of CHATENOIS

(Z56) and advancing to NEOEVILLE - SOOS - CHATENOIS (Z56). The 313th

Infantry captured MIRECQURT (Z86) and REMECOURT (076), two miles west of

MIRECOURT (Z86). The 2d French Armored Division repulsed strong enemy

counterattacks and drove on, capturing MATTAINCOURT (86), two miles

south of MIRECOURT (Z86), DARNEY (Z52), two miles south of CHATENOIS

(Z56) and HOOECOORT (Z66), three miles east of CHATENOIS (Z56), and made

contact withn elements of the Seventh U.S. Army at CHAUHONT (Z05). Com
assembled in the vicinity of DQMPAIRE (Z85), while ele
bat Command &
ments entered EPINAL (V05) Combat Command NV" pushed forward and en
tered MATTAINCOORT (Z86), two miles south of MIRECOURT (Z36), while

Combat Command n D n
moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of AN
DELOT (Z16).

In the XX Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division had the 358th In
fantry west of THIONVILLE (088), the 357th Infantry in the vicinity

northwest of METZ (U85)9 and the 359th Infantry in the vicinity of AMAN~

VILLERS (076). The 5th Infantry Division attacked to expand its bridge*

head across the river while the 2d Infantry moved to a concentration

area in the vicinity of REMBERCOQRT (U64), fifteen miles southwest of

METZ (085)* The 7th Armored Division moved to a concentration area

northwest of CHAMBLEY (U65) preparing to attack through the bridgehead.

In the XV Corps zone the 313th and 315th Infantry Regiments (79th

Infantry Division) cleared out pockets of resistance in their zone and

closed into an area west of CHARJHKS (Z97). Tha 2d French Armored Di

vision continued to d e a n up pockets of enemy resistance with Combat

Command "B" and Combat Command "L" in the vicinity of HYMONT (Z86), two

Biles south of MIRECOURT (Z86), and DOMPAIRB (Z85) while Combat Command

"D" reaching the vicinity of BCXffiMONT (Z45)

The XIX Tactical Air Command was United in its day's operation due

to adverse weather condition. One hundred and eight sorties were flown

in six missions with claims of twenty-eight motor transports, six loco

motives, and seven tanks and armored vehicles damaged or destroyed.

XX Corps continued its attack to secure bridgeheads across the

MOSELLE River toward the city of WSCl (U85). The 5th Infantry Division

attacked across the river south and southwest of METZ (085) and captured

MARIEULLES (084), eight miles southwest of METZ (085), in addition to

the high ground in the vicinity of ABRY (074), nine miles southwest of

METZ (085). Elements of the 2d Infantry relieved elements of Combat

CHATENOIS (Z56), MIRECODRT (Z86). RAMECOORT (Z76), MATTAINCOURT

(Z86), DARNEY (Z52), and HOOECOORT (Z66) were captured as the Third

Army continued its advance to the east.

RET

73

S/f/ffl

15 SEPTEMBER

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF

THIRD US ARMY AND THE ENEMY SITUATION

Miles 10

IS

so

30 Miles
40 Kilometres

Kilometres l

CHALONS - NANCY
25 Km. OVERLAP ON SHEET 6, NAMUR-LUXEMBOURG

SECOND EDITION

L \G

U M

ARMY/AIR^

SHEET N? 9
630'

JFWaiowk,

</ /VfTt ' I 'i*;-Y^-**-w':

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E C\R E T

come to some terms with the German General Staff, An estimate of enemy

strength showed that fifty-four infantry divisions, with a combat

strength of 565,000 when committed and an effective strength of 165,200,

had been identified on the Allied front. Sixteen Panzer divisions, with

a combat strength of 199,500 when committed and an effective strength of

58,500 men and 335 tanks, were identified.

To these could be added

ninety tanks and assault guns of headquarters brigades. Enemy losses

were estimated as 399,800 infantry and 14.1,000 Panzer troops.

Command "B" at VITTONVILLE (U7), ten miles southwest of METZ (U85),

while the remainder of the regiment advanced to the vicinity of REMBER

COURT (U64), fifteen miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 11th Infantry

Regiment advanced to the vicinity of AUGNY (U85), three miles southwest

of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to advance with the

forward elements of the 357th Infantry reaching AMANVILLERS (U76),

seven miles northwest of METZ (U85), and the 359th Infantry attaining

positions in the vicinity of ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west of

METZ (U85). Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division crossed

the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of ARNAVILLE (U74), nine miles south
west of METZ (U85), and closed in an area in the vicinity of POMMERIEUX

(U84), seven miles south of METZ (U85)

Combat Command "BM of the 7th

Armored Division advanced south to the vicinity of VITTONVILLE (U74-),

ten miles southwest of METZ (U85) Combat Command "A" crossed the river

in the zone of Reserve Combat Command and advanced to the vicinity of

COIN SUR SEILLE (U84), six miles south of METZ (U85). This completed

the movement of the 7th Armored Division across the MOSELLE River.

The 6th Armored Division was ordered to move without delay upon

release from the Ninth U.S. Army to an area east of TROYES (Y27). Com
bat Command "BM of the 6th Armored Division was ordered to move without

delay to the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) and to continue patrols to

the south.

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division continued to clean

up pockets of enemy resistance, the 137th Infantry advancing to the vi

cinity of DOMBASLE (U90). All elements of the 80th Infantry Division

with the exception of two battalions of the 319th Infantry were across

the MOSELLE River despite enemy counterattacks. The 4.th Armored Di

vision continued to move forward.
Elements of Combat Command "A" ad
vanced to the vicinity of MARSAL (Q12), twenty miles northeast of NANCY

(U81), Combat Command "B to the vicinity of COUKBESSAUX (Q0l), ten

miles east of NANCY (U81), and Reserve Combat Command to the vicinity of

LUNEVILLE (V09), which the enemy shelled.

The 3d Battalion, of the

318th Infantry, to which 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition had been

dropped by liaison pilots of the 80th Division artillery, was relieved

after having been isolated for several days beyond ST GENEVIEVE (U33),

fifteen miles south of METZ (U85). Five artillery battalions fired four

concentrations upon enemy assembly points at the request of the 80th

Infantry Division commander. A strong enemy counterattack against the

division was broken up by the massed fires of the division artillery

coordinated with air support.

In coordinated action with XII Corps, 200 troops of the Forces

Francaises de l'Interieur assisted materially in the capture of NANCY

(U81) in the face of considerable enemy sniping activity.

Concentrating on enemy rail transportation, the XIX Tactical Air

Command flew 2% sorties in twenty-three missions during the day's oper

ations.
Claims for the day were twenty-two railroad lines cut, sixty-

two railroad cars, sixteen gun installations and eighteen military in

stallations damaged or destroyed.

The important border city of NANCY (U81) was captured by the Third

U.S. Army while the advance to the east continued.

The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area

near BRAQUIS (U4.6), eleven miles east of VERDUN (U26).

At VITTEL (Z65) were found 2,087 Allied nationals who had been in
terned for four years in hotels surrounded by wire barricades. Of

these, 36I were U.S. citizens, 1,160 British and the remainder were of

twenty-nine other nationalities. Food from captured German stocks was

sent to them.

XV Corps concentrated in an area on the west bank of the MOSELLE

River.
The 79th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicinity of

CHARMES (Z97) while elements of the 2d French Armored Division reached

the west bank of the river in the vicinity of CHATEL-SUR-MOSELLE (V0&),

twelve miles east of MIRECOURT (Z86),

The corps employed one heavy

antiaircraft artillery battalion in a field artillery role. Two coun

ter-attacks by infantry and tanks against the 2d French Armored Division

at CHATEL-SUR-MOSELLE (V06), twelve miles east of MIRECOURT (Z86), were

supported by enemy artillery fire. Both counterattacks were repelled,

one being broken up by the artillery fire of the 2d French Armored Di

vision artillery.
The 79th Infantry Division encountered little or no

enemy artillery opposition.

16 SEPTEMBER (D-hlO3)

One of the significant enemy order of battle facts at this time was

the identification in contact of four previously-reported administrative

divisions, one of which was committed in the Third U.S. Army zone. This

development indicated the extremes to which the enemy was going in seek
ing manpower.
Prisoner of war statements indicated that these divi
sions, of strength estimated at not more than 6,000 men each, were com
posed of cooks, bakers, clerks and other normally non-combatant ele
ments. Several new sub-standard Panzer and infantry divisions also were

identified.
The disclosure at this time of VON RUNDSTEDT'S restoration

as Supreme Commander of the enemy forces in the west was considered a

very important development. His reappointment only eight weeks after

his ouster was regarded as an indication that HITLER had been forced to

76

The XX Corps continued its advance toward METZ (U85) against stub
born enemy resistance. The 90th Infantry Division advanced with the

357th Infantry closing in the vicinity of AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles

northwest of METZ (U85) and the 359th Infantry closing in the vicinity

of REZONVILLE (U75), eight miles west of METZ (U85).

Reserve Combat

Command of the 7th Armored Division advanced southeast of METZ (U85),

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 286 sorties in twenty-one mis
sions during the day's operation with few claims being made. Fourteen

S E

S E CNR E T

gun installations, seven military installations

vessels were damaged or destroyed during the day.

was emplaced so that a direct hit upon a relatively small opening was

necessary for effective neutralization. In an effort to neutralize the

VERDUN Group of Forts, the corps allotted a 155mm gun battalion the sole

mission of maintaining continued fire upon this group. In addition, one

155mm gun was moved into position for direct fire upon the forts*

and eight small naval

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army contin
ued to push forward toward the east against determined enemy resistance.

A critical shortage of clothing and individual equipment developed,

the quantities required for current issues totaling 253,000 items.

17

The Forces Francaises de lflnterieur

cleared of the enemy.

reported the HAUTE MARNE area

SEPTEMBER (D + 103)
The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 133 sorties in seventeen missions

with the following claims being made: two railroad lines cut, twenty-

three railroad cars, fifteen motor transports and twenty-three military

installations damaged or destroyed during the day.

The 6th Armored Division was directed to move to the vicinity of

NEUFCHATEAU (Z57).
The XX Corps (the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions,

the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to continue

the advance and seize FRANKFURT (M66) and to maintain contact with the

First U.S. Army on the left (north).

The XII Corps (the 35th and 80th

Infantry Divisions, the 4th Armored Division and supporting troops) was

ordered to advance rapidly to the northeast, to seize DARMSTADT (M64)

and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone. The XV

Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 2d French Armored Di
vision and supporting troops) was ordered to advance to the northeast on

Army order, echeloned to the right rear of the XII Corps. It was to

protect the right (south) flank of the Army, maintain contact with the

Seventh U.S. Army, and be prepared to seize MANNHEIM (R59) and secure a

bridgehead * east of the RHINE within its zone, or to move through

bridgeheads secured by the XII or the XX Corps, Combat Command "B" of

the 6th Armored Division was ordered to report to the Commanding General

of the XII Corps and was alerted for movement to the vicinity of TOUL

(U6l), to be attached to the XII Corps.

The Army continued to drive eastward against increasing

in its day's operations.

resistance

Because of the scarcity of transport planes, a policy on evacuation

of wounded was followed whereby five Third U.S. Army Evacuation hospi
tals were to send their patients to the Army evacuation holding unit at

TOUL (U6l). Five other evacuation hospitals were to evacuate to the one

Army 750-bed evacuation hospital, which would be evacuated by Advance

Section Communications Zone*

By this time civilian refugees constituted a growing problem in the

Army zone. Of thirty different nationalities, chiefly Ukrainian Rus

sians, they began to filter back through the front lines. Civil affairs

detachments, augmented by Red Cross workers and uniformed volunteers of

the Secours National, were called forward to take charge of the refu
gees*
The VERDUN (U26) center housed 2,200 on this date and hundreds

more were moving along the roads*

In the XII Corps zone Task Force "SEBREE", consisting of Combat

Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division (which was attached to XII

Corps), the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) and one company of

the 737th Tank Battalion (4th Armored Division), was organized to clean

out the woods northeast of NANCY (U81) in conjunction with the 80th In
fantry Division. In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division the 137th

Infantry advanced to the vicinity of CERCUEIL (U91), five miles east of

NANCY (U81), and the 320th Infantry closed in the vicinity of MAZER
The last elements of

ULLES (Q01), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

the 80th Infantry Division crossed the MOSELLE River against heavy

enemy resistance, placing the entire division east of the river. Com
bat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of

MAZERULLES (Q01), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division continued to con

centrate on the west bank of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of

CHARLIES (Z97), while the 2d French Armored Division reduced pockets of

resistance along the southern flank of the Army*

XX Corps launched a coordinated attack against stubborn resis

tance to capture METZ (U85), the 90th Infantry Division attacking from

the west and the 5th Infantry Division from the south. The 7th Armored

Division had as its objective the seizing of the high ground northeast

of METZ (U85) in conjunction with the attack. Enemy artillery in the

sector remained silent for long periods at a time but the forts around

METZ (U85) had proven virtually impregnable to artillery fires and were

8till capable of heavy and effective fire. Much of the enemy artillery

35th Division Infantrymen Move Up, Northeast of Nancy

E T

UNCLASSIFIED

77

S E C

18 SEPTEMBER

\04)

In the XII Corps and XX Corps zones there was no change in the

enemy situation. The XV Corps however encountered strong resistance

along a line MQRIVILLE (V07) - ROMONT (V17) - ROXVILLE-AUX-CHENES (V17).

XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 2d French

Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to cross the MOSELLE

River and move northeast to secure the line LUNEVILLE (V09) - BADEN
VILLER (V38) between the corps left (north) boundary and a line BACCARAT

(V28) - BLAMONT (V39). The corps was to reconnoiter to the northeast

within its zone and be prepared for further advance, to protect the

right (south) flank of the Army and maintain contact with the Seventh

U.S. Army.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command HBtf of the 6th Armored Divi
sion arrived in NANCY (U81) and assembled in the vicinity of SAULXURES
LES-UANCY (U91), two miles east of NANCY (U81). Task Force "SEBREE'1

continued to clean up pockets of enemy resistance northeast of NANCY

(U81).
Elements of the 35th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Di
vision launched an attack to the east. Elements of the 134th Infantry,

35th Infantry Division, reached the vicinity of SEICHAMPS (U9l), four

miles east of NANCY (U81).

XV Corps launched an attack to the northeast and the 79th Infantry

Division succeeded in driving completely across the MOSELLE River in the

vicinity of BAYON (Z98), with the 313th Infantry, 314th Infantry and the

315th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of GERBEVILLER (V08). Combat

Command "V" of the 2d French Armored Division fought its way across the

MOSELLE River followed by Combat Command "D", and advanced to the vicin
ity of HADIGNY (V07), ten miles southeast of CHARMES (Z97).

The XX Corps continued its advance on METZ (U85) with the 5th In
fantry Division gaining its objectives in the vicinity of MARIEULLES

(U84), eight miles southwest of METZ (U85). Elements of the 90th Infan
try Division continued the attack, with the 357th and 359th Infantry

Regiments northwest of METZ (U85), and the 358th Infantry continuing to

contain THIONVILLE (U38) while protecting the northern flank along the

river line. Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division contin
ued its advance and mopped up SILLEGNY (U84), seven miles south of METZ

(U85).
Enemy artillery activity at METZ (U85), especially from FORT

JEANNE D'ARC, increased.

It was found that even 24.0 howitzers could do

no more than temporarily neutralize the forts. Eight-inch howitzers

fired on and destroyed two enemy railroad trains near METZ (U85)

The 6th Armored Division (less Combat Command lfB") moved to NEUF
CHATEAU (Z57) to relieve elements of the 2d French Armored Division pro
tecting the Army south flank.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur continued flank guard action

in the XV Corps zone, inflicting numerous enemy casualties.

78

The XIX Tactical Air Command was limited in its day's operation due

to weather condition and had light claims. In thirty-two sorties seven

gun installations and three military installations were attacked.

Advance to the east continued in

period.

all zones of the Army during

the

The Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area near

ROUVRES (T86), four miles northeast of the Forward Echelon and fourteen

miles east of VERDUN (U26).

19 SEPTEMBER (D + 105)
In his efforts to delay the Array's advance, the enemy blew bridges

in the zone of the Third U.S. Army's advance, constructed road blocks of

mines and felled trees, and built trenches, bunkers and anti-tank posi
tions.

XX Corps (the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored

Division and supporting troops) was informed that a continued threat ex

isted on the north flank in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88), which

might result in an attempt by the enemy to cross the MOSELLE River at

that point. The Corps was ordered to strengthen the Regimental Combat

Team from the 90th Infantry Division, and the cavalry then covering the

flank, with some tank and tank destroyer elements. The 90th Infantry

Division, less detachments, was to contain MfiTZ (U85), while the 5th

Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division proceeded on assigned

missions.

In the XII Corps Task Force "SEBREE" was dissolved.

The attack to

the east continued, while the 35th Infantry Division continued to clean

up the woods north of NANCY (U81).

The 80th Infantry Division enlarged

its bridgehead to the south, and advanced to the vicinity of MALLELOY

(U82), six miles north of NANCY (U81).

Combat Command "B" of the 4th

Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12) and

Reserve Combat Command advanced to the vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09)

XV Corps continued to advance to the east. The 79th Infantry

Division advanced northeast of GERBEVILLER (V08), elements of the di

vision crossing the MARTAGNE River.
The 2d French Armored Division ad
vanced with elements of Combat Command "D" in the vicinity of MOYEN

(V18), three miles east of GERBEVILLER (V08), and some elements across

the MARTAGNE River.

Combat Command "V" advanced to the vicinity of

HALLAINVILLE (V09), ten miles east of CHAftMES (Z97).

XX Corps continued its attack toward METZ (U85) with the 5th Infan
try Division driving to the north against determined enemy resistance.

The 359th Infantrv (90th Infantry Division) advanced to the vicinity of

ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west of METZ (U85), while the remainder

of the division continued to contain THIONVILLE (U88) and protect the

northern flank of the Army. Elements of Combat Command "B" of the 7th

Armored Division reached the vicinity of LOUVIGNY (U84), nine miles

R E T

south of LETZ (U85)

The enemy continued to use numerous road blocks

and demolitions covered by mortar and artillery fire to delay the ad

vance.

Five hundred Forces Francaises de l*Interieur reported to the

THIONVILLE (U88) - HAYSNGE (U78) - MAYSUVRS (U77) area at the request of

the counter-intelligence corps, to assist in controlling the local pop

ulation who were largely pro-German*

Two hundred and sixty-two sorties in twenty-two missions were car

ried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command with light claims being made*

Four railroad lines were cut, five railroad cars destroyed and ten motor

transports were damaged or destroyed during the day.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack on all fronts*

Graves registration supplies were in a critical state, with 2,000

mattress covers and 3,000 personal effects bags needed* It was necess
ary to send trucks 300 miles to the beach to obtain these and other

items*
The gasoline situation again became uncertain, for receipts had

been short since 17 September*

One hundred thousand pounds of green

coffee were received at LEROUVILLE (U32), seven miles south of ST MIHIEL

(U43), and bakeries started to roast it at once*

20 SEPTEMBER (D+106)

The enemy continued to construct defensive works in Army's zone of

advance, pressed small counterattacks and pushed patrols across the MO

SELLE River*
In an estimate of enemy strength in the Third U.S. Army

zone at this time the enemy's total effective combat strength was set

down as the equivalent of eight divisions, consisting of 63,750 troops

and 175 tanks or assault guns*

It was estimated that the enemy had the

equivalent of five divisions, consisting of 42,000 troops and 150 tanks,

as immediate reserves* Against the XX Corps it was estimated the enemy

had an effective combat strength of 27,750 troops, with thirty-five

tanks or assault guns, and 17,000 troops and fifty tanks available as

Immediate reserves*
Opposing the XII Corps it was estimated the enemy

^ad^ 19,500 troops", with seventy tanks or assault guns, and 10,000 troops

and fifty tanks available as immediate reserves* Against the XV Corps

it was estimated the enemy had 63,750 troops, with 175 tanks or assault

guns, and 42,000 troops and 150 tanks available as immediate reserves*

Third U.S. Army was ordered by Twelfth U.S. Army Group to continue

the advance to the east within its zone and secure crossings of the

RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM (R59) and MAINZ (M35). If

sufficient forces of Twelfth U.S. Army Group were available, a bridge

head in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE (R44) also was to be seized* The

Army also was to protect the south flank east of ORLEANS (W60) inclu
sive*

Shelltorn Dombasle Entered By Patrols

S E C R\E T

79

R E T

M ! ** If Itfll

The III Corps continued its attack to the east. In the zone of the

35th Infantry Division, the 134th and 137th Infantry Regiments advanced

to the vicinity of CHAMPENOUX (U91), five miles east of NANCY (U8l). In

the 80th Infantry Division zone, the 317th Infantry and the 318th Infan
try moved to an area southeast of NANCY (U81), while the 319th Infantry

moved in division reserve in the vicinity of VILLB-AN-VAL (U82), ten

miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Di
vision advanced to the vicinity of RBCHICOURT-LA-PETITE (U58), twenty

miles west of THIONVILLE (U88). Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored

Division assembled in the vicinity of FLAINVAL (Q00), four miles north

west of LUNEVILLE (V09), to support Combat Command "B" of the 4th Ar
mored Division.

XV Corps continued its advance to the east. The 79th Infantry Di

vision pushed forward, with the 313th Infantry advancing to the east of

LUNEVILLE (V09), the 314th Infantry advancing to the MEURTHE River, with

elements of tha regiment crossing the river and advancing to the east.

Combat Command N D n of the 2d French Armored Division actively patrolled

the vicinity up to the MEURTHE River.

Against formidable enemy resistance the XX Corps continued its

attack on METZ (U85). In the 5th Infantry Division zone the 10th Infan
try occupied POURNOY LA CHETIVE (U84), five miles south of METZ (U85),

and drove forward while the 2d Infantry cleared and occupied COIN-SUR
SEILLE (U84), six miles south of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division

continued to hold the west bank of the MOSKLIfl River in its zone. The

7th Armored Division in trying to cross the SEILLE River encountered

considerable enemy resistance. Combat Command "A" reached the vicinity

of SILLEGNY (U84), seven miles south of METZ (U85), and Combat Command

"B" fought in the vicinity of LOUVIGNY (U84), nine miles south of METZ

(U85). Enemy artillery became active again, some concentrations number

ing as many as sixty rounds. Very little of the fire came from the

forts, however, and the 155 gun emplaced for direct fire upon the forts

achieved good neutralization results.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 165 sorties in twelve missions

during the day's operation with the following claims: thirteen railroad

lines cut, thirty railroad cars, twelve motor transports, and eleven

locomotives damaged or destroyed, while five marshalling yards were

attacked with good results reported.

21 SEPTEMBER (D +107)

Numerous defended road blocks, obstacles, and demolitions were

placed by the enemy in the path of the Third U.S. Army advance. New

concrete trenches were encountered.

In the XII Corps the attack continued with the 35th and 80th In
fantry Divisions cleaning up pockets of enemy resistance and pushing

north and east of NANCY (U8l). The 6th Armored Division and Combat

Command n B w of that division moved to an area in the vicinity of JALLAU

COURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Reserve Combat

Command of the 4th Armored Division moved to the vicinity of BURES

(Qll), eight miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09)

XV Corps continued to advance to the northeast, with elements of

the 79th Infantry Division strengthening the MEURTHE River bridgehead

and elements of the 313th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of MONCEL

(V19), three miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). The 314th Infantry

crossed the MEURTHE River with three companies in the vicinity of

LORONXE (V19), six miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09) and elements of

the 315th Infantry advanced to LUNEVILLE (V09), relieving elements of

the 313th Infantry which were holding the town. The 2d French Armored

Division began to close in on the east bank of the MOSELLE River.

Heavy fighting continued in the zone of the XX Corps, the 5th and

the 90th Infantry Divisions continuing to fight violently with an enemy

determined to hold its positions at all cost. Due to strong enemy

counterattacks, the 7th Armored Division was delayed in crossing the

SEILLE River south of METZ (U85) The enemy used dug-in tanks and heavy

artillery, and made counterattacks all along the line.

An enemy counterattack against the 5th Infantry Division was pre

ceded by an artillery preparation of over 300 rounds. The XX Corps was

conserving all ammunition possible in the 90th Infantry Division in

order to balance the heavy demands by artillery firing in support of 5th

Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions. A sound and flash base was in
stalled east of the MOSELLE River in an effort to locate better the ar
tillery firing upon these two divisions.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack on all fronts.

<

Infantry Moves Toward Cover Across pen Field

V'"T

,?
J

S E C RX T

^CLASSIFIED

the morning of 27 September. A combat command from the 6th Armored Di

vision was ordered to move at once to take over the 7th Armored Divi
sion' s area.

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command flew 245 sorties in

nineteen missions with heavy claims being made on rail transportation.

Fifteen railroad lines were cut and 256 railroad cars, fourteen loco
motives, forty-seven motor transports, and twenty enemy tanks and ar
mored vehicles were damaged or destroyed during the day's operation.

The Army Commander ordered the XX Corps (the 5th, 83d and 90th In
fantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) to

continue its present mission, to give particular attention to the pro

tection of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P81) to protect the left (north)

flank of the Army, and to maintain contact with the First U.S. Army.

Small gains in the face of stiffening enemy resistance were accom

plished in the day's fighting.

The first bulk gasoline to arrive by air, a shipment of 12,000

gallons, was brought to ST DIZIEK (T90) by bombers*

22 SEPTEMBER (D + 108)

The enemy continued to construct additions to the SIEGFRIED Line

fortifications. Numerous dug-in tanks were encountered along all routes

of advance. The favored enemy capability at this time was that he could

pivot on METZ (U85) to establish a general defensive line paralleling

the SIEGFRIED Line, while gaining time to prepare the defense of the

SIEGFRIED Line proper. To execute this capability, it was considered

likely that the enemy would make a fortress stand at METZ (U85) to im
pede the Third U.S. Army's eastward advance by the diversion of troops,

artillery, munitions, and aviation, while throwing armor-spearheaded

attacks against the shoulders of the advance from the general THION
VILLE (D88) area in the north, the GERBEVILLER (VD8) - LUNEVILLE (TO9)
PCRET DE PARROT (QJLO) area to the south. While nowhere was he able to

concentrate reserves sufficient to propel a major concerted offensive,

he was still capable of massing desperate resistance. As had been the

case in the COTENTIN Peninsula, a temporary front existed, and once more

the enemy was expending his mobile reserves in piecemeal local counter
attacks of a purely defensive nature. Although temporarily succeeding

in organizing a front line, it was obvious that the enemy could never

recoup the estimated 900,000 losses inflicted in the west since D-Day.

Reinforcements were arriving on the battlefront, but they were arriving

late. Originally, the Third U.S. Army's eastward thrust was the most

menacing Allied drive, yet the Third U.S. Army reached the MOSELLE River

before any major enemy reinforcements appeared. Similarly, when the

First U.S. Army breached the SIEGFRIED Line in the AACHEN (K84) area,

more than a week elapsed before the enemy was able to mass forces to

meet the threat. The enemy's combat strength when committed was esti
mated at this time as 607,000 infantry and 191,000 Panzer troops and

his effective strength was estimated at 176,950 infantry and 46,000

Panzer troops with 530 tanks. Against the Third U.S. Army front, the

enemy had an estimated equivalent of four and one-half infantry divi

sions, two Panzer divisions, and two Panzer Grenadier divisions, with

250 effective tanks.

Infantryman Harasses Germans

The 6th Armored Division, which had been ordered to move to the vi
cinity of JALLAUCOURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81),

was directed to discontinue its movement in anticipation of a different

mission. The Third U.S. Army was ordered by the Twelfth U.S. Army Group

to release the 7th Armored Division to the First U.S. Army, to move on

In the XII
vision attacking
vision north of
pockets of enemy
MALLELOY (U82),

S E C

Corps the attack continued with the 35th Infantry Di

to the north of NANCI (U81). The 80th Infantry Di
NANCY (U81) attacked to the south to clear out large

resistance, with the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of

six miles north of NANCY (U8l) The 318th Infantry

81

R E T

Refugees of thirty nationalities were under civil affairs care and

control as follows: 2,200 at VERDUN (U26), 1,800 at HAIANGE (U78), 400

at ETAIN (U47), and 500 at BRIEI (U77), Other centers were opened at

LANDRES-PIENNE (U68), ten miles northwest of BRIEI (U77), and FAGNI-SUR

MGSELLE (U74). Eventually full responsibility for the camps was given

to French authorities*

occupied MOREY (U82), seven miles north of NANCI (U81), and the 319th

Infantry was in the vicinity of SIVRI (U82), eight miles north of NANCI

(U81). Combat Command "B11 of the 6th Armored Division attacked to the

southwest and reached the vicinity of BIONCOURT (U92), nine miles north
east of NANCI (U81).

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that effective 25 September the

minimum tonnage allocation to Third U.S. Army would be 3,500 tons.

In the XV Corps the advance to the northeast continued. The 79th

Infantry Division strengthened its bridgehead east of the MEURTHE River.

More elements of the 313th Infantry reached the vicinity of MONCEL

(V19), three miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), while elements of the

3Uth Infantry advanced to the edge of the FORET DE MONDON (V19), five

miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09), and continued to strengthen the bridge

head. The 2d French Armored Division pushed forward with Combat Command

"V" advancing to the MEURTHE River and establishing two bridgeheads

across the river, one at FLIN (V28), ten miles southeast of LUNEVILLE

(V09), the other at CHENEVIEtES (V09), nine miles southeast of LUNEVILLE

(V09)# Combat Command "D" crossed the river in the vicinity of VATHA
MENIL (V19), nine miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), and advanced to

BENAMENILE (V39), nine miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09), while Combat Com
mand *W advanced to the vicinity of VENNEZEI (V08), ten miles south of

LUNEVILLE (V09).

23 SEPTEMBER (D + 109)

Construction of entrenchments was being rushed by the enemy to meet

the Army's advance.

The XII Corps continued its attack, with the 35th Infantry Division

reaching the high ground ten miles northeast of NANCI (U81) and being

engaged in cleaning up the BOIS DE FAULX (U82) , FGRET BJ& ST JEAN FONT
AINE (N39), and the FGRET DE CHAMPENOUX (U91) . The 80th Infantry Divi
sion straightened its lines and held the high ground between MONTENOI

(U92), five miles north of NANCI (U8l), and JEANDELAINCOURT (U92), nine

miles north of NANCI (U81), while the 4th Armored Division repulsed a

strong armored attack in its zone. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armor
ed Division cleared the enemy from LEIR (U92), six miles north of NANCI

(U81), while the enemy attempted to withdraw from the pocket northeast

of NANCI (U81).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division sent aggressive

patrols to the north against the forts of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry

Division continued to advance slowly in the face of strong enemy resis

tance while the 7th Armored Division continued forcing a crossing of the

SEILLE River against heavy resistance.

XV Corps continued to advance to the

Division and 2d French Armored Division
cleared the FQRET DE MONDON (V19), five
and advanced along a general line running
VILLER (V38).

Heavy artillery fired repeatedly in close support of the 7th Ar

mored Division, the effect of these weapons being well suited for driv
ing the enemy out of positions in buildings. Accuracy of the 8-inch

howitzer made this weapon especially suitable for firing in close sup
port of the leading elements.

Attacks in the zone of the XX Corps continued with slight progress

being.made. The 331st Infantry (83d Infantry Division) closed into an

area in the vicinity of ESCH (P70) , while the 90th Infantry Division

continued to patrol aggressively and to make further advance against the

forts surrounding METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 273 sorties in twenty-three missions

during this period with many claims being made against enemy transpor
tation and military installations. Twenty-one railroad lines were cut,

while 135 railroad cars, 120 motor transports, thirteen locomotives,

four supply dumps, six gun installations and twenty-two tanks and ar
mored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command had limited air

activity due to adverse weather conditions. In ninety-six sorties,

eighteen railroad lines were cut, while twenty railroad cars, twenty-

seven motor transports, eleven locomotives, fourteen gun installations

and five enemy tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

As the result of the day's operations the Third U.S. Army continued

to attack to the east, while straightening its lines.

Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to covered billets in

ETAIN (U47), ten miles east of VERDUN (U26), the first time since arri
ving on the Continent to be indoors.

A combination of air evacuation and use of a hospital train re

sulted in the evacuation of more than 1,400 patients from the Third U.S.

Army zone. The evacuation of 374 patients from the holding unit at TOUL

(U61) enabled that unit to reopen.

Air evacuation removed 600 patients to the United Kingdom during

the period.

82

northeast. The 79th Infantry

strengthened lateral contact,

miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09),

from LUNEVILLE (V09) to BADEN

S E BiR E T

SECXET

UNCLA SSIFIED
24 SEPTEMBER (D + /10)
Patrols probing the outlying defenses of the ' SIEGFRIED Line met

strong enemy resistance from pillboxes and other strongpoints.

XII Corps continued to consolidate its bridgehead and made prepar

ations to improve its positions In the zone of the 35th Infantry Di
vision, the 134th Infantry advanced to the vicinity of ARMANCQURT (U92),

ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), and made contact with the 80th In
fantry Division on the left and the 6th Armored Division on the right.

The 137th Infantry in the vicinity of MAZEEULLES (Q01) , ten miles north
east of NANCY (U81), prepared to relieve the 6th Armored Division and

Comsat Command "B" of the 4-th Armored Division on the north edge of the

FCRBT-DE-GRDiECEY (QQ2), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). A field

artillery observation battalion's flash base in the XII Corps sector

located an enemy infantry and artillery assemblage. Two artillery bat

talions were adjusted and fired two volleys. Three times the enemy re
assembled and three times he was dispersed by two volleys from the two

battalions. Widespread destruction was the result, with many enemy dead

and wounded.

AA A

AAAAA

AAA

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling beyond LUNEVILLB (T09)

and BADONVILLHl (V38). Forward elements of Combat Command "D" of the

2d French Armored Division reached the vicinity of OGEVILLHL (729) six

miles southwest of BLAMONT (V39), while elements of Combat Command "1/

held a bridgehead at FLIN (128), ten miles southeast of LUNJCVILLI. (V09)

Forward elements of the 314th Infantry (79th Infantry Division) reached

the vicinity of LARONXE (V19), six miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09).

In the XX Corps zone the remainder of the 83d Infantry Division

closed in an area in the vicinity of ESCH (P70). dements of the 357th

Infantry (90th Infantry Division) occupied SILVANGE (U87), ten miles

south of THIONVILLE (U88). The 7th Armored Division began concentrating

west of the Hnfiyr.i.g River in the vicinity of SPONVILLE (U65), fifteen

lies west of METZ (U85), after being relieved in the bridgehead by the

5th Infantry Division. Reserve Combat Command of the 6th Armored Divi
sion was en route to the vicinity of BRIEY (U77)

Two fighter groups of the XIX Tactical Air Command, on short notice

and in almost impossible weather, flew close support of the 4th Armored

Division which was being counterattacked in force by strong enemy ar

mored elements and infantry. After destroying three enemy tanks the air

support bombed and strafed a woods and flushed a large number of enemy

tanks which were knocked out either by the air or by Third U.S. Army

armor. The weather was so bad the fighters were unable to return to

their field near ST DIZIE& (T90) and finally landed at ETAIN (U47),

where the Army Commander personally thanked them. One hundred and six

sorties in nine missions were reported by the Command. Claims for the

day included sixteen railroad cars, eight motor transports and four

tanks and armored cars damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued to patrol aggressively to the east, while

consolidating its positions during the period.

S E C R E T

ft

Engineers Bridging The Moselle

V** '"-.111.' *

"TCvV^YlVi";;i.

"4 To provide the necessary means for such limited operations,

the utmost parsimony will be used in the expenditure of gasoline and

ammunition consistent with the economy of the lives of our troops,

The first rail shipment of bulk gasoline arrived at TOUL (U6l).

The operation of the ST GERMAINE (R84) - CHALONS (T54) - VERDUN (U26)

rail link to supplement and relieve truck transportation showed shipment

of approximately 14,500 tons, with a saving of approximately 693,000

truck miles and 139,000 gallons of gasoline. Twelfth U.S. Army Group

advised that effective on 27 September the minimum tonnage allocation to

the Third U.S. Army would be 3,100 tons daily.

"5. Wherever circumstances admit, troops not in the immediate

presence of the enemy will be billeted.

As soon as the troops so bil
leted have rested and been equipped they will be given constant practice

in offensive tactics*

Twenty-eight civil affairs detachments with a total strength of

133 officers, seven warrant officers and 235 enlisted men were attached

to the Third U.S. Army for deployment in German towns in the SAARHRIJEglW

(Q47) region. They were stationed in the town of ETON (U57), fourteen

miles northeast of VERDUN (U26).

In the zone of the H I Corps the 35th Infantry Division advanced

with the 134th Infantry in the vicinity of MALAUCOURT (U92), thirteen

miles northeast of NANCI (U81), and the 137th Infantry in the vicinity

of COUTURES (U98). The 80th Infantry Division advanced with the 319tn

Infantry between LESMENILS (U83), two miles northeast of FONT-JL-MOUSSON

(U73), and LAND&EMONT (U82), five miles southeast of POOT-A-MOUSSON

(U73), the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of VILLB6 (U92), eight miles

north of NANCI (U81) and the 318th Infantry in the vicinity of MGIYEQHS

(U82), nine miles north of NANCI (U81). Combat Command "A* of the 6th

25 SEPTEMBER (D + lll)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

Forced civilian labor was being used

fortifications and strong points.

by the enemy

Letter of Instruction No U was issued

Commander* The order stated in parts

to construct

on this "date by the Army

"1. The acute supply situation confronting us has caused the Su

preme Commander to direct that until further orders, the Third Army,

with its supporting troops, and those elements of the Ninth Army placed

in the line, will assume the defensive.

"2. It is evident that the successful accomplishment of this mis

sion will require particular concentration upon two pointss

a. First, this change in attitude on our part must be com

pletely concealed from the enemy, who, should he learn of it, would cer
tainly move troops from our front to oppose other Allied armies.

b. Second, we must be in possession of a suitable line of de

parture so that we can move rapidly when the Supreme Commander directs

us to resume the offensive.

"3* In order to carry out the requirements of Paragraph 2a, above,

we will not dig in, wire, or mine, but will utilize a thin outpost stone

backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. We will further

Insure that all possible avenues of tank attack are registered in by all

batteries - Division, Corps, and Army - whose guns can bear. Under the

supervision of the Army Artillery Officer these zones of concentration

will be numbered from north to south and recorded on a uniform map to be

distributed to the units concerned, so that fire may instantly be opened

in any zone. Further, a copy of this map will be placed in the posses
sion of the Commanding General, H I Tactical Air Command so that he may

coordinate the concentration of planes upon any critical area in the

most expeditious manner. Counterattacks by our mobile reserves should

be planned and executed to secure a double envelopment of the hostile

effort with the purpose of not only defeating it but destroying it.

84

R E T

Linesmen String Communications Across Moselle

Armored Division advanort& the Vi<jinitgr of JA1LADCOURI (G02), thirteen

miles northeast of NANCX (U81). Strong enemy counterattacks in the vi

cinity of MARSAL (Q12), twenty miles northeast of NANCI (U81), were re
pulsed by the 4th Armored Division with Combat Command "A" advancing to

the vicinity of XANREY ($Ll), ten miles north of LUNEVILLE (V09), and

Reserve Combat Command advancing to the vicinity of MGNCOURT (Qll), ten

miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (VD9)

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling, particular

emphasis

placed on the roads to the south of the FCRET-DE-PARHOY U l O ) , four

miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (09), and along the LA VEZOUSE River;

and, despite enemy resistance, reconnoitered the FGRET-DE-PARROY (Q10),

four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), in preparation for an attack.

A considerable increase was noted in the amount of enemy artillery oppo

sing the XV Corps. Heavy fires were received, so much on the bridge at

FLIN (V28), ten miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), that engineers were

forced to withdraw their equipment. Corps artillery fired twenty-three

counterbattery missions and a considerable reduction in the enemy's ar

tillery activity was noted.

In the XX Corps zone the 329th Infantry (83d Infantry Division)

relieved the 5th Armored Division in its zone. While the 330th Infantry

completed relieving the 7th Armored Division in the bridgehead south of

METZ (U85), and continued to improve its positions in the MOSELLE

bridgehead, the 90th Infantry Division continued to push forward slowly

over bitterly contested ground. Reserve Combat Command of the 6th Ar

mored Division was still en route to its new assembly area in the vicin
ity of FAGNY-SUR-MOSELLE (U74) and Reserve Combat Command and Combat

Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division were en route to LONGUYON (U49).

Army artillery maintained neutralizing fires on FORTS DRIANT and JEANNE

DARC at METZ (U85) on a 24-hour basis. One hundred fifty-five rounds

of 155 gun, 100 rounds of 8-inch howitzer and twenty-five rounds of 24.0

howitzer ammunition were fired upon FCRT JEANNE D'ARC. A number of di

rect hits were obtained on the casements, two being destroyed, and an

ammunition dump was exploded. A total of 107 rounds of 155 howitzer was

fired upon the concrete shelters and casements of FORT KELLERMAN, but

chipped concrete was the sole result.

I*
_

Because of adverse weather conditions no flying was possible by the

XIX Tactical Air Command.

romtllr

In the day's action, the Third U.S. Army continued to consolidate

and Improve its positions, while maintaining aggressive patrols.

'Vf-t- -A.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Maim lie
^

^^^
^

T*

V
ibasli-

S/ I

\Toul

Damma

_ >Dche
Houdrlatncourt

Four of a fleet of cargo planes carrying 20,000 blankets, 10,000

litters and 375 oxygen cylinders unfortunately overshot the airstrip at

ETAIN (U47). One of the planes was shot down by the enemy and the other

three were lost. As a result, Third U.S. Army hospitals received only

2,500 blankets, 1,000 litters and 100 oxygen cylinders.

Chrvdlon

Montirr

I
I Tnompdp Neitfchdteau^Mfo

A terrain study of central Germany was distributed to Third U.S.

Army engineers. Studies of the MAGINOT Line were obtained from the
French Army.

( , ,nlr. ,jJ0
I..-.

iranqueville
-Graux

if

79

3 8O

1^
' Mirccnurt
imaurotirt

iSemilly
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6374
Bolognr

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^CLASSIFIED

t-t (-1 t-i I-I

XV Corps continued to patrol its zone aggressively and to protect

the south flank of the Third U.S. Army. Preparations were started to

launch a coordinated attack with air to clear the FORET DE PARROT (Q10),

four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), where patrols were still meet
ing strong resistance.

26 SEPTEMBER (D + II2)

In a Twelfth U.S. Army Group report on enemy supply and equipment,

additional evidence was cited of the frequent inability of the enemy's

supply organization to properly execute its function. Up to 16 Septem

ber, the Third U.S. Army had captured and put to use 306,000 gallons of

enemy gasoline. These were recorded totals only, the amount of unrex
ported stocks overrun and put to use by front line units probably rais
ing these figures considerably. Rapid advances of the Third U.S. Army

so disrupted the enemy's supply system that, far from being able to

rescue his sorely-needed stocks of gasoline, oils, and greases, he was

unable even to destroy them.

XX Corps prepared to launch an attack on FORT DRIANT (U75). The

5th Infantry Division continued to improve its bridgehead east of the

MOSELLE River, while elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied

GREIVELDANGE (P91). Elements of the 359th Infantry. 90th Infantry Di

vision, advanced to the vicinity of ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west

of METZ (U85) The 358th Infantry, 90th Infantry Division, relieved by

"Task Force T01EV (3d Cavalry Group, the 135th Engineer Combat Battal
ion, and a French Infantry unit, the 1st Battalion, Regiment of Paris)

moved to its new assembly area in the vicinity of VIONVTLLE (U65), eight

miles west of MSTZ (U85) The 7th Armored Division passed to the con
trol of the First U.S.Army.

Enemy effective combat strength in the Third U.S. Army zone was es
timated at this time as the equivalent of nine divisions, consisting of

76,500 troops and 310 tanks or assault guns, identified in contact, and

the equivalent of six divisions, consisting of 4-9,700 troops and 195

tanks, available as immediate reserves. Facing the XX Corps, it was

estimated, were 24,000 troops and twenty-five tanks or assault guns,

with 21,200 troops and seventy-five tanks in immediate reserve. Oppo

sing the XII Corps were 35,000 troops and 190 tanks or assault guns,

with 10,000 troops and fifty tanks in reserve. Facing the XV Corps were

17,500 troops and ninety-five tanks, with 18,500 troops and seventy

tanks in reserve.

Due to weather conditions the XIX Tactical Air Command had limited

air activity. In thirty-five sorties, claims included four motor trans

ports damaged or destroyed and three military installations attacked.

A shipment of 221 long tons of Classes II and IV supplies, includ

ing 86,780 blankets, was received. All divisions were issued enough

blankets to bring the total to three for each man and plans were made to

complete the issues to corps and Army troops. A survey of fortifica

tions of the MAGINOT Line was started by the engineers from information

obtained from the French Army.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group in a letter of instruction on this date

stated that the strong defensive positions held by the enemy along the

SIEGFRIED Line in the north facing the First U.S. Army and along the

MOSELLE River in the south facing the Third U.S. Army had given him an

opportunity to regroup and strengthen his forces defending the approach

es to Germany. New divisions had been arriving from training areas in

Germany and Denmark and from the Russian front.

27 SEPTEMBER (D+II3)

Since the support of the attack of 21 Army Group British was the

primary consideration at that time, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group set it
self the mission of clearing the area between its left (north) boundary

and the MEUSE River and of protecting the right flank of 21 Army Group

British.

By order of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group the XV Corps (the 79th and

90th Infantry Divisions, the 2d French Armored Division and supporting

troops) was assigned to the Sixth U.S. Army Group.

XII Corps was successful in driving back strong enemy counter

attacks. The 137th and the 320th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) re
pulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of PETTONCOURT (Q02),

ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Elements of the 80th Infantry Di

vision repulsed the enemy in the vicinity of SERRIEHES (U82), nine

miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Di
vision was en route to the vicinity of SAULXUHES (U91). The 4th Armored

Division repulsed several strong counterattacks in the vicinity of M0Y

ENVIC n(Q1D
BBZANGE iA PBTITS (Q01), and COINCOURT (Qll). Combat Com
mand B w
of the 4th Armored Division closed in an area In the vicinity

of BDRSS (Qll), eight miles northeast of IXJNBVILD5 (V09).

After this mission was assured and when sufficient forces were

available, the attack on KQLN (F5) was to be pushed. Third U.S. Army

was given the mission of holding its present positions until the supply

situation permitted a resumption of the offensive. The 83d Infantry

Division, reinforced, was assigned to the Third U.S. Army at once* The

7th Armored Division was transferred to the First U.S. Army and moved to

LQNGUION (U4-9).

XII Corps continued to consolidate and improve its position, while

repulsing severe enemy counterattacks. The 4th Armored Division moved

forward preparing to assist in heading off enemy troops in the north

which were trying to escape from the FORET DEH PAKROY

(Q10), four miles

northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). Combat Command Blf was enroute to the vi

cinity of BURES (Qll), eight miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), while

Reserve Combat Command was moving toward SERRES (P91). Combat Command

"B" of the 6th Armored Division reached the vicinity of ARMANCOURT (U92)

ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), on its way to MOIVRONS (U82).

86

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling in the vicinity of FORBT

DS PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of UJNBVTLUS (V09), prepared to

launch an attack to clear the forest after air bombardment. The 79th

Infantry Division moved the bulk of its forces to positions on the south

bank of the VENZOUSS River, while the 2d French Armored Division con
tinued to protect the south flank of the Army.

S E C

SE

E T

against FORT DRIANT (U75) that was preceded by an artillery preparation

fired by 5th Infantry Division Artillery and the supporting corps ar

tillery*
The attack reached the moat surrounding the fort before being

compelled to withdraw.

In the XX Corps elements of the U t h Infantry (5th Infantry Divi

slon) launched a probing attack on FORT DRIANT (U75) and in the face of

fanatical enemy resistance advanced to the moat surrounding the fort be

fore withdrawing.
The 83d Infantry Division pushed forward with the

The

329th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of GREVENMACHHl (L02).

331st Infantry advanced to the vicinity of REIIICH (LOO) with patrols to

the MOSELLE River, The corps experienced an increase in enemy artillery

fire at METZ (U85), especially from positions within the forts,

GRAVE
LOTTE (U75) continued to receive much of the enemy's attention, over

300 rounds having fallen on the town within a three-day period. Corps

artillery continued its neutralization fires against FORT JEANNE D'ARC

(D75) with good effect.

Over 100 rounds of 90mm antiaircraft artillery

time fire were directed against infantry entrenched in the environs of

this fort. One battalion of the 5th Infantry Division launched an attack

' *

UNCLASSIFIED

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command took advantage of

excellent weather conditions, flying 517 sorties in thirty-nine mis

sions with very good results. Among claims for the day were twenty-six

railroad lines out and 180 railroad oars, forty-five motor transports,

thirty-eight locomotives, five supply dumps, twenty-two gun installa

tions, twelve military installations, nineteen tanks and armored ve
hicles damaged or destroyed, while troop concentrations and marshalling

yards were attacked with good results reported.

28 SEPTEMBER (D + II4)

In an operational directive on this date to the XII and XX Corps,

the Army Commander informed the corps that the Sixth U.S. Army Group had

continued its attack to seize the RHINE River crossings south of SPEYJSR

(R58) inclusive.

First U. S. Army was to clear the area between its left (north)

boundary and the M2USE River and protect the right flank of 21 Army

Group British. It was to be prepared to resume its advance to the RHINE

River in the vicinity of K0I2J (F45) and BONN (F53).

It was to move the

V Corps to the north when relieved by elements of the Ninth U. S. Army.

The Ninth U. S. Army was to take over the present front of the V Corps

and upon its arrival in the line was to contain the enemy on its front.

As additional units became available it was to extend its front south to

include METZ (U85), relieving thettiirdU.S. Army elements in this area.

Third U. S. Army was ordered by the Army Commander to improve its

positions by local counterattacks to seize and secure the line of de

parture delineated in the Letter of Instruction No 4 of 25 September.

The Army was to continue aggressive reconnaissance and was to be pre

pared to resume the advance to the northeast to secure crossings of the

RHINE River and seize the FRANKFORT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area.

XII
Corps repulsed numerous

enemy
counterattacks, maintained

aggressive
patrols and continued

consolidating and improving posi

tions. The 319th Infantry (80th In
fantry Division) captured PORT SUB

SKILLS (U83), eight miles east of

PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73).
The 4th Ar
mored Division cleared in an area in

the vicinity of ARRANCODRT (Qll)

COINCOURT (Qll) and the 35th Infan
try Division concentrated in the vi
cinity Of ARMANCOURT (U92) - MANBONE

(U29) - FSTTONCOURT (QQ2).

The 6th

Artilleryman Rests During Lull in Action

RET

WWSSIflffl

87

w ii b

LASSIFIED

S E C R E T

Armored Division moved to the vicinity of LEYR (U92), six miles north of

NANCY (U81), while the 80th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicin
ity of LSYH (U92) - LESMENILS (U83)

29 SEPTEMBER (D + II5)

XV Corps launched its attack against the FORET DS PARROT (Q10),

four miles northeast of LUNBVILLE (V09), with elements of the 79th In

fantry Division advancing three miles* XV Corps passed to control of

the Seventh U.S. A m y .

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division and the 4th Ar
mored Division repulsed numerous enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of

JALLAUCOURT (402), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

Reserve

Combat Command which was en route to rejoin the 6th Armored Division

closed in the vicinity of SAULXURES (U91), two miles east of NANCY

(U81).

XX Corps continued its attack on one of the METZ (U85) forts

against strong enemy counterattacks*

Elements of the 5th Infantry Di
vision occupied the high ground in the vicinity of LESMENILS (U83), two

miles northeast of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 358th Infantry of the 90th

Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of VTONVILLE (U65),

eight miles west of METZ (U85). The 331st Infantry captured HEMICH

(LOO), while the 329th Infantry occupied the high ground in the vicinity

Of MOMPACH (L02).

An interesting employment of its air observation posts was reported

by the 4th Armored Division, in which the advance of each combat command

was habitually preceded by an air observation post whose radio had been

set upon the command channel of the combat command*

In this way the

commander of each combat command at all times had accurate and prompt

information of the situation in front of his advance. He very often had

the air observation plane land and take him aloft for a rapid aerial re
connaissance prior to employing his command,

XX Corps continued aggressive patrolling of the forts in the METZ

(U85) area. Elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied OSWEILLER

(L03) - MOMPACH (L02) and WASSERBILLLNG {112).

Five hundred and seventy-three sorties in thirty-nine missions were

carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command with the following claims

being made: seventy-two railroad lines cut, 371 railroad cars, forty-

nine motor transports, sixty-seven locomotives, eighteen gun installa

tions and seventeen military installations damaged or destroyed with

eight marshalling yards and five airdromes being attacked*

The XIX Tactical Air Command had another good day, flying 576 sor
ties in forty-six missions. Attacks continued on enemy rail and motor

transportation. Forty-five railroad lines were cut while 226 railroad

cars, sixty-six motor transports, forty-three locomotives, twenty-two

gun installations, fifty horse-drawn vehicles, twenty-three military

installations, seventy-seven miscellaneous naval vessels, three highway

bridges and three tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

Continued attacks on troop concentrations and marshalling yards were

carried out with good results being reported.

The town of REMICH (LOO) was captured by the Army, which oontinued

to improve its positions with aggressive patrols to the east in the per
iod.

Permission from higher headquarters was requested to reorganize six

towed tank destroyer battalions into self-propelled M36 battalions as

and when the necessary equipment became available*

Improvement of positions by the

face of heavy enemy resistance.

Third U.S. Army

continued in the

30 SEPTEMBER (D + II6)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division launched an attack

to clear the enemy from the FORET DE GREMECY (Q02) , ten miles northeast

of NANCY (U81). The 80th Infantry Division maintained aggressive pa

trols in its zone*
The 6th Armored Division attacked and gained the

high ground FRESNES (H20) - LEMONCOURT (Q03) and the town of

CHAMBBRY

(Y76) with the high ground to the north thereof*

XX Corps oontinued to aggressively patrol the area in the vicinity

of MSTZ (U85), but made little progress against an enemy that was deter
mined to hold its ground at all costs*

Armor Moves Through Luneville

88

UNCLASSIFIED

All air activity for

tions.

E T

the day was

grounded due to weather oondi

*s

290

fc

MeoOMr

-Itulbruck

L U X E #lBO U R
322
rTnd

RELD FROM NINTH U S ARMY

ASGD TO THIRD U S ARMY
\oJ6\ SEPT)

695

3 0 SEPTEMB

X X

*. 7^
'einheim

[nnhfeim

te^

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT

OF THIRD U S ARMY
AND THE ENEMY SITUATI

X X

?ims
199 f

'r.|\

MeamMloaW

>Mosb*cb

fBiiMllue!

X X

Villc . O V
Tourb*

628

den burg

fbrurkerf

CD

I fSnnasens
Brgzbern

* * *

TO FIRST

49

CbtmbV

U S ARMY I (
k

balons
lame
k>

'o

)h

V. j^)f

arraJbe

(26 SEPT)

Lembchq

238

559

kst Mihi/l

NUroUrt i

Vtuull

U Dimii O

M V.rtM

klUuraM

m m.

UuurB

ntdrt(on^f.

Olhno.

T^J

Jrzheim

.^ivBaden

r-le-l

rtOai

W.55l

RELD FROM FIRST U S AR*

ASGD TO THIRD U S ARMY
(6 SEPT)

bsielnbsch

Suhl

Li|ny to Borrow!

1164

4rroburgi

Atunatcig,

urg

r-ohei

IAUIK

OR*m,rupt *"

Cbar

207
ATCHD TO THIRD U S ARMY
(12 SEPT)

ehirmaok

1* Chiu.au

RELD FROM NINTH

U S ARMY ASGD
TO THIRD U S ARMY
(16 SEP

969

i>Locbvat

/]
J

rnfM

Jberndorf
St. Di

W\

404

XX

CD

2!

.Ki d i \ BUIJOTI11

5QgWotM
Contrttfv

E)z*ch

I 152 <t|

366

Tribr({
Olfrnoot 4

X X

/
504

|CZ)]2FR
ATCHD TO XV CORP
FROM FIRST U S ARMY

irttuhl

. A R M Wrtafe

369

X A
VMilUn

264

Al
U Tliil'fc*

443

s^

^
O N 5 SEPT VIII CORPS (2nd 8th 29th 83rd INF
DIVS AND 6th ARMD DIV) WAS RELD FROM ASGMT
TO THIRD U S ARMY AND ASGD TO NINTH U S ARMY.

6th ARMD DIV AND 83rd INF DIV REVERTED TO THIRD

U S ARMY LATER IN MONTH.

XV

AT 290001 SEPT XV CORPS (79th INF DIV. 2nd FR.

ARMD DIV) RELD FROM THIRD U S ARMY AND ASGD

TO SEVENTH U S ARMY FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENT

OF INTER-ARMY BOUNDARY.

Boffi
abach

n jM

Kmndd
1241 Furtw

rr "" "C>

fjwenmngen

978

REM / i

16
-149

- Si. Itirln
B4<Mt?AlMC

NMi.
ry

Haiti

NOTE:

-557

Idk.r, b

fianebar

m MIM*

J265
397

451
2I2>

Footair.

284

OPERATIONAL MAP SHOWING BATTLE LINE

% SEI

Niader

341
ialach

E T

five bridgeheads in an effort to prevent their consolidation. At the

same time the enemy launched strong counterattacks against this Army's

north and south flanks, but they were repulsed with heavy losses to

him* Sensing the threat of an armored breakthrough from the penetration

east of NANCY (U81) and LDNEVTIIZ (709), the enemy launched desperate

counterattacks against the salient. Terrific tank battles raged all

along the bridgehead during the last half of the month, with the enemy

attacking principally along the shoulders of the salient in an attempt

to force a withdrawal* These attacks met with little success, but the

enemy succeeded in stabilizing hia front and gained time for the forma
tion of new units and reorganization of his depleted divisions*

A sumnary of operations for the month, as viewed from the four-

phase standpoint, showed the following facts:

In the first phase, Third U, S* Army's swift advances and the ene
my's headlong retreat were slowed down and finally brought to a halt

early in September because of a shortage of gasoline By 3 September,

the enemy had turned his fleeing troops around at the German border and

had occupied the MOSELLE River line. Hastily-formed units, including

students from the officers' candidate school at MSTZ (U85), were thrown

into the line in a desperate effort to stabilize the front* Units com
mitted included the fruits of the enemy's total mobilization program,

the scrapings from the bottom of the manpower barrel. All along the

front the enemy rushed the preparation of hasty field fortifications,

especially along the east bank of the MOSELLE. In addition, forced ci

vilian labor, Todt workers, Hitler Youth organizations and newly-formed

Army units frantically repaired and strengthened the defensive works of

the SIEGFRIED Line and constructed successive lines of defense between

the MOSELLE and the Westwall.

The Third US* Army's artillery came into its own In the attacks on

the MSTZ (U85) defenses* The enemy's use of the many forts, both old

and modernized, presented a most difficult artillery problem* Even the

heaviest artillery proved incapable of destroying these fortifications,

but excellent neutralizing effect was achieved* The fullest exploita

tion of artillery was prevented by the prolonged scarcity of ammunition*

The enemy's artillery was capably employed, but a high proportion of

duds was noted in his fire*

The third phase, the developments along the Flanks, resulted from

the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army across the MEUSE River and on to

the MOSELLE, a drive which exposed the Army's northern flank. Sinoe the

southern flank was already exposed the Army held a vulnerable position,

which the Army Commander risked because of his belief that the enemy

was incapable of attacking the flanks in strength. The enemy's counter

attacks, made by fresh products of Hitler's total mobilization, were re
pulsed with heavy losses. Other units launching counterattacks were

overrun by Third U.S. Army advances, forced by artillery fire to re

treat, or badly mauled and the survivors captured. By 18 September, the

enemy had been forced east of the MEURTHE River and bitterly resisted

the Army's crossings. He launched strong counterattacks on 22 September

to capture LUNEVILLE (V09) and MONCEL (V19). Failing in this final

attack on the south flank, the enemy retired to the east bank of the

VEZOUSE River on 25 September, protected by strong rearguard actions*

By the end of September the Third U, S. Army's tank-infantry-air

eraft assaults, aided by the most intensive use of artillery thus far in

the campaign, had pushed the enemy successively across the MOSELLE!,

MEURTHE and VEZOUSE Rivers in the southern portion of the Army's zone

and to the FOHET DE PARROT (VI9), where the enemy was resisting stub
bornly. In the XII Corps zone at the end of the month, the enemy was

attempting to prevent the expansion of the bridgehead over the SEILLE

River in the FORET DE GHEMECEY (Q02) area and in the north he was hold
ing the east bank of the MOSELLE and a small bridgehead west of the ri
ver around METZ (U85).

Kearly 30,000 prisoners were captured during September, with an

estimated 607 enemy tanks, 663 artillery pieces and 1,735 vehicles re
ported captured or destroyed* The enemy's heavy losses in personnel and

equipment was attributed to 1. The aggressiveness of the enemy's de

fense resulting in almost continuous local counterattacks, seldom of

more than battalion strength, and 2. The enemy's low quality of per
sonnel and the unsatisfactory state of training* The bulk of the ene
my's armored and infantry divisions committed in September were hastily

organized, and included stragglers and some convalescents* Equipment

for these units, especially for the Panzer brigades, was new, but the

personnel was comnitted after only two or three weeks of training* By

the end of the month practically all of the new units had suffered se
vere losses* The new Panzer brigades had proved Ineffective and unable

to sustain heavy losses, with the result that all had been incorporated

into veteran Panzer divisions* The punishing blows to the enemy, how
ever, were inflicted at comparatively heavy losses in casualties to the

Army,

In the fourth phase, the continuing Battle of BRITTANY, the enemy

lost two of the ports into which he had withdrawn, and was being con
tained in two others. Resistance at ST MALO (S71) terminated on 3 Sep
tember with the surrender of the garrison on ILS DE CEZEMBRE after in
tense artillery and aerial bombardment* At BREST (799), the enemy con
tinued his determined resistance to the bitter end, his fanatical troops

refusing to surrender until routed from their fortifications and under

ground tunnels. Final surrender of the garrison came on 20 September

when the VIII Corps was under the control of the Ninth U. S. Army. At

the end of the month, LORIENT (G72) and ST NAZAIRE (N56) were being con
tained.

Enemy air activity was curtailed sharply in the Third U. S. Army

zone during September* Only 128 raids by 287 aircraft were made during

the month, as compared to August's totals of 1,117 raids by 3,213 air

craft, an average of nine planes per day as against 103 planes per day.

Anti-aircraft artillery claimed twenty-eight planes destroyed and fif

In the second phase, the battle of MOSELLE between 7 and 15 Septem

ber, the enemy fought desperately to prevent crossing of the MOSELLE and

MEURTHE Rivers between METZ (U85) and IXJNE7ILLE (709), launching many

local counterattacks with infantry and tanks against Third U. S. Army's

90

R E T

E T

0 I *.

a few road craters and minefields. Problems presented to the Army's

engineers were thus both varied and numerous. Bridging of the MOSELLE

under intense enemy fire including heavy artillery, cost the engineers

many casualties. Many thousands of maps were produced during the month,

first priority being given to a series covering the SIEGFRIED Line in

front of Third U. S. Army, the project consisting of 254 quadrangles of

12,000 copies each. In general, quantities of engineer supplies re-

ceived from Communications Zone were adequate, and special means were

taken to utilize considerable quantities of captured engineer materials.

teen probably destroyed during September,

Losses sustained by the German air force and a desire to husband their strength, plus bad flying
weather much of the time, was responsible for the decrease in enemy air
activity.
Terrain over which the Army's elements passed during September was
dissected by major rivers and numerous smaller streams and canals. The
enemy improved and increased his bridge demolitions as the Third U. S.
Army's advance slowed down, and mined roads heavily in the vicinity of
the MOSELLE River. Road surfaces were not materially damaged except for

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD US ARMY

SEPTEMBER

19 [20 21 22|23 24 25 I 26[27| 28 29

DAILY

'47254

BREAKDOWN
CUMULATIVE

BREAKDOWN

wmtmmmm

mmwmwm
mm
*TOTAL IS CUMULATIVE

SECRET

mm mm

FROM D + 56

f! M

91

<y~J

E T

and Belgian francs were distributed to finance

U.S. Army troops in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG.

Special emphasis was given to soldier voting during the month. In

all, 136 Third U, S, Army units were contacted and checked on soldier

voting.

The strength of the Third U. 3. Army at the end of September was

224,785, as against a strength of 346,208 at the end of August*

This

reduction was the result of transfers of the VIII Corps to the Ninth
U.S. Army and the XV Corps to the Seventh U.S. Army. Losses to the A m y
during the month ware 2,130 killed, 12,307 wounded, and 4,100 reported
missing*
Replacements received numbered 25,209* Cumulative losses
since the campaign started were 4,575 killed, 23,794 wounded, and 6,156

reported missing*
Cumulative replacements totaled 46,640. Evaders and

escapers totaled 390 for the month*

Transportation cleared 9,879 vehicles hauling 189,750 tons of sup

plies and 165,940 troops during September.

The campaign during September placed a considerable burden upon

signal facilities. Because of the necessity for rapid displacement of

Command posts, trained personnel became dispersed and difficulties were

encountered because of the lack of personnel. The Army axis of communi

cation followed that of the XX Corps during the campaign.
To increase

the speed of building forward and to lighten the load placed on all

signal construction teams, the XX Corps was directed to build or reha

bilitate four circuits, two of which were used later as the Army axis.

Enemy losses for the month were 28,845 prisoners of war processed

in Army cages, which combined with the total for August made a cumula
tive total of 88,940 prisoners since the campaign started* Not included

in thi total for the month were 1,611 prisoners of war evacuated

through medical channels*

The estimated cumulative enemy dead in the

two months was 32,000 and the wounded 96,500*

During the month the number of finance disbursing sections was re

duced to two for Third U. S. Army troops and two for each corps. Allied

military marks for use in GERMANY were distributed to finance officers

TOWNS

officers paying Third

CAPTURED

BY THIRD

U S ARMY

SEPTEMBER
TOWN
Avril
Arnaville
Andelot
Ambrecourt
Buzy
Bettoncourt
Corny
Charmes
Chatenois
Doncourt
Dornot
Dompaire
Damas
Darney
Eta in
Fresnes
Hayenge
Houecourt
Ile-De-Cezembre
Joinville
Littol Le Petite

92

CORPS
XX
XX
XV
XV
XX
XV
XX
XV
XV
XX
XX
XV
XV
XV
XX
XX
XX
XV
VIM
XII
XV

DATE
9 September
10
13
13
5
13
7
12
14
5
6
13
13
n
14
3
5
10
14
2
2
14
11

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

ii

II

II

II

II

II

TOWN
Littol Le Grande
Mirecourt
Mattaincourt
Mirieulles
Mompach
Noveant
Neufchateau
Nancy
Pont-A-Mousson
Poussay
Rambervillers
Remich
Ramecourt
Rouvres
St Mihiel
Silvange
Toul

Vittel
Velotte
Wasserbillig

II

S EC R E T

CORPS
XV
XV
XV
XX
XX
XX
XV
XII
XII
XV
XV
XX
XV
XV
XII
XX
XII
XV
XV
XX

DATE
14 September
14
14
17
28
7
12
15
6
13
30
28
15
15
2
24
5
12
14
29

r t c KE T

COMPARATIVE CHARTS-LOOSES OF MATERIEL

SEPTEMBER

10

1 1 12

13

15

14

16

17

18

19 2 0

21

22

23

25 2 6 27 28

29 3 0

fc

MARK I I I a IV

24

1
%
\

TANKS, LIGHT

421

EACI4 SYMBOL REP RESE NTS 50 1ANKI

4 9

V-

SEPTEMBER

I//

>/'

<!

/
5

10

1 12
1 13

15

14

^
MARK

r rr

. /
16

17

18

19 2 0

21

22

23

24 25

>
j

Y (OVER

as

r"

75MM)

,
A.
iVO

,*
/

^ /

As/i/-

IE

./,

/ '

>/

- /
7

10

-Ar

AS

1 1 12

13

14

15

16

17

^ ^
^U

,
EAChi

SYMBOL

^ (

REPRESENTS

18

19 2 0

r r
50

21

22 23

24

25

^*
>

r~

26

-A

27 28
* ^
r

29

30
*<*

663

PIECES
i

1
O /*>

30

151
j

, / .

29

EACH1 SYMBOL REPRESENTS S>5 TANKS

^4
1

28

&

, / ,

SEPTEMBER

27

^>

o>

VI

TANKS , MEDIUM

26

J
/ \

/<V

/O

N /

O /

O /

/V

/o

<V /

O /

O /

S /o

/O

/<V

/ \

> ^
SEPTEMBER

1735

VEHICLES

EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS

SE\C R E T

200

VEHICLES

93

UNCCLASSIFIED

E T

SE
2

SEPTEMBER
DEAD(EST)
WOUNDED (EST)
CAPTURED

1350

1100

1050

2 55

862

21 12

TOTAL

DEAD

1700
837

854

2762

12

10

14

13

16

900
985

250

750

214

492

'

4192

17

500
994
- -1 M

600

1000

1000

900

96 3
1863

235

752

640

1735

2465

1000
2443
4243

300

1 97
1897

1100
1631

20

22

21

23

18

19

400

400
500
972

500
324

1600
889

2800

1872

1224

2889

4313

500

1977

25

24
450

5500

813

1200
6

26

27

28

30

29

200

250
1200

1500

1600

2800

1500

334

231

235

197

34

2788*

7582

T"

in
)ES 2501 PW'SCV/i vrilATFT
FOR
- THROL GH MEDICAL C HANNELS
- * IM m

MONTH

COMPARATIVE

CASUALTY

CHART

THIRD U.S. ARMY a THE ENEMY

LEGEND

^ J 78.372
^

ENEMY

THIRD U.S. ARMY

NOTE' TOP OF GRAPH DAILY ENEMY CASUALTIES

BOTTOM OF GRAPH-THIRD U.S. ARMY CASUALTIES

/
/
/

if
y\

L^-4
J
4

y
^^

>

1 ^

^-r^
T

.^11= 18,537

^A

r-

57

83

12
92

W0UNDED

MISSING

2950 1

679

DAILY

>

88,500
87,000
85,500
84,000
82,500
81 ,000
79,5 00
78,000
76,500
75,000
73,500
72,000
70,500
69,000
67,5 00
66,000
64,5 00
63,000
6 1 ,5 00
60,000
58,5 00
57,000
55,500
54,000
52,500
5 1,000
49,500
48,000
46,500
45,000
43,500
42,000
40,500
39,000
37,500
36,000
34,500
33,000
31,500
30,000
28,500
27,000
25 500
24,000
22,5 00
21,000
19,500
18,000
16,500
15,000
13,500
12,000
10,500
9,000
7,500
6,000
4,50 0
3,000 H
1,5 0 0

5
175

200

305

46

13

41
443

1 6

89
325
27

152

146

69
441

416

1 22

467
1 26

TOTAL

758

SE

E T

7 66

34 6

5 7

538

407

S E C

THIRD ARMY

SUPPLY REOAN
*O SEP
A8ZC

MAIN SUPPLY ROADS

SUPPLY
5 SE.P

OPERATING RAILROADS
and

SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-30 SEPTEMBER
O th AUG

C- 4- SS.P
) ) O IS &E-P

) O- 15 SP
w

i O Zft AUG

Tic-

stp

O I SEP
C * SEP

TjO

O i SEP
C ^ SEP

O- 19 SEP
C-V> SIP
SUPPLY 6C.GAN
SEP

0 - 4 . SEP

LEGEND i
Q-OPENED
C-CLOSED

SEXRET

25 SEP

PREPARATIONS F
AjtiEW OFFENS

HUM

MirnimmaMMMURu

UNCLASSIFIED

The 35th Infantry Division pushed forward to the eastern edge of

the FORBT-DE-GREMECBY (Q02) and the town of CHAMBRET (Q02) in the XII

Corps zone*
Control of the SEILLB River in the vicinity of PORT-SUR
SEIIIE (U83), eight miles east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), was gained by

the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division)

Combat Command WA of the

6th Armored Division closed into an assembly area east of NANCY (TJ81),

while its Reserve Combat Command closed into an area northwest of PET
TONCOURT (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

Lrd U.S. Army's major activities during October, while the gener
al static tactical situation of September continued, were concentrated

on the building up of supplies, the assembly and regrouping of troops,

and the laying of plans (including carrying on of limited objectire

operations) all in preparation for a new major offensive designed to

drive the enemy back behind the RHINE River.

Re-examination of the entire supply system was made to conserve

weapons and ammunition, to obtain all possible benefits from materiel on

hand, and to accumulate required surpluses* Also accomplished was the

equipping of troops with adequate wet and cold weather clothing, and th

bringing of armored and other vehicles to top condition*

Assembly and regrouping of troops was both difficult and involved,

due to the distance from the Army zone of several organizations recently

arrived on the Continent, plus a shortage of transportation* By the end

of the month, however, they were up to T/0 and T/E strength and in posi
tion.

Planning activities for the new offensive included the execution of

certain limited objective operations to secure a favorable line of de

parture, to keep the enemy from becoming too aggressive, and to give

specialized combat experience to various units*

H I Corps carried on

such offensives successfully during the month*

XX Corps operations

against various forts protecting MKTZ (U85) provided a basis for train
ing of troops in assaults on fixed fortifications and served to deter
mine the tactical plan for future operations against the fortress city

of METZ (U85) itself.

1 OCTOBER (D + 117)

Following the heavy attack made by the 6th Armored Division on the

preceding day, the enemy made local withdrawals in the XII Corps zone,

falling back to the north of LEMONCOURT (QD3), fifteen miles northeast

of NANCY (U81). Advances in the FORET-DE-GHEMECEY (qO2), ten miles

northeast of NANCY (U81) were made in the face of enemy small arms and

mortar fire*
The enemy continued to patrol and improve his defensive

positions in the XX Corps zone and harassed Army troops with artillery

and mortar fire.

Aggressive patrols were pushed in and around the vicinity of METZ

(U85) by the XX Corps, while elements of the 329th Infantry (83d Infan
try Division) reached the outskirts of GHEV2NMACHER (L02), northeast of

LUXEMBOURG (P81) * Elements of the 83d Infantry Division made contact

with the VIII Corps (Ninth U.S. Army) on the north flank*

A number of missions were planned by the XIX Tactical Air Command,

but because of adverse weather no operations were carried out*

Occupation of the FORBT-BB-GHEMECEY (Q02), ten miles northeast of

NANCY (U81), and aggressive patrolling of enemy positions were the chief

operational results of the day*

An improvement in Classes I, II, and IV supplies was noted, but re

ceipts of Class III supplies were below requests*
A strict program of

gasoline rationing was planned and supply company commanders were

briefed on the plan.

The daily telegram requested 219,392 gallons of

gasoline, of which 95,840 gallons were received. Winter clothing and

equipment arrived in greater quantities.

To assure that front line troops would not be deprived of tobacco,

steps were taken to speed up the delivery of a ten-day requirement of

tobacco components on the basis of a troop strength of 300,000* Empha

sizing the Importance of tobacco for morale reasons, Army supply offi
cers requested and received assurance of action without delay from Ad
vance Section Comnunications Zone* During the previous month, the Third

U.S. Army had received limited supplies of tobacco because only

4,559,200 ration accessory convenience kits of tobacco and other items

were delivered of 8,030,000 kits requested*

Forty-four tons of medical

supplies were received from the Communications Zone on this date.

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99

2 OCTOBER (D + II8)

SIVHY (U82) and BCJHES (Qll) were evacuated by the enemy in the XII

Corps zone, A notable increase in enemy vehicular and troop movements

was observed south from SECOURT (U93) in the XX Corps zone.

XII Corps consolidated its

the east*

positions and aggressively patrolled to

An attack on FORT DRIANT, southwest of METZ (U85), was launched by

the XX Corps' 5th Infantry Division, a heavy aerial bombardment preced

ing it. Farther north elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied

the high ground overlooking ECHTERNACH (L03), GREVBM/tACHER (L02), and

WINTRANGE (P90), while the 90th Infantry Division occupied the high

ground west of MAIZIERBS-LES-METZ (U86).

XIX Tactical Air Command had a busy day, flying 426 sorties in

thirty-three missions with excellent results. Claims included twenty-

nine railroad lines cut, 243 railroad cars, fifty-eight motor trans
ports, thirty-two locomotives, forty-two gun installations and thirteen

miscellaneous naval vessels destroyed or damaged. Eight marshalling

yards were attacked.

Commanding ground west of the MOSELLS River and north of MAIZIERES

IES-METZ (U86) continued to be occupied by units of the Third U.S. Army

while aggressive patrols probed the enemy lines.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised the Army that effective 4 October

the basis of tonnage allocation for this Army would be 450 tons daily

per division in the Army area, and that because of the movement of the

26th Infantry Division into the area the requisitions effective on 5

October would be based on eight divisions. At this time, all divisions

and eighty percent of the smaller units had three blankets and one over
coat per man, while sufficient blankets and overcoats were on hand to

equip the remainder of the Army.

Psychological warfare leaflets addressed to specific German divi

sions were dropped by planes. A vital link in the Third U.S. Army com
munications system, known as "West Wirehead", began operations at LAXOU,

a suburb of NANCY (UB1) Built of reinforced concrete and partly under

ground, the building had suffered little damage from German attempts to

destroy it when the enemy evacuated the city. Hours of civilian circu
lation in all towns in the Army zone were fixed by the Army Commander at

from 0600 to 2000 hours*

3 OCTOBER (D + 119)

Aggressive patrols continued to push to the east and probe enemy

positions opposite the XII Corps. Elements of the 80th and 35th Infan
try Divisions repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of

SIVRT (U82), eight miles north of NANCY (U81).

Elements of the 5th Infantry Division (XX Corps) entered FORT

DRIANT, on the west bank of the MOSELLE River southwest of METZ (U85),

and met strong enemy opposition within the fort. The 83d Infantry Di
vision continued to occupy the high ground west of ECHTSRNACH (L03) and

GREVENMACHER (L02), while the 90th Infantry Division continued to patrol

its front aggressively and repulsed several small enemy counterattacks.

Twenty-three field artillery battalions supported the attack on

FORT DRIANT, firing a thirty-minute preparation followed by supporting

fires, directed against neighboring fortresses as well as FORT DRIANT.

Enemy artillery opposition to the attack was continuously heavy. Guns

of the neighboring forts of JEANNE DfARC, the VERDUN GROUPE, BATTERIE

MOSELLE and MARIVAL as well as those of the objective itself were all

active.
Third U.S. Army artillery achieved only limited results

against the heavily-fortified defenses.

Temporary neutralization was

achieved but even the heaviest caliber weapons proved incapable of

effective destruction.
Substantial damage was inflicted upon six of

FORT DRIANT's casemated guns but all were repaired and resumed firing

later in the day.

Flying 302 sorties in twenty-two missions, XIX Tactical Air Com

mand continued its attacks on enemy railroad lines and military instal
lations. Amone claims for the day were thirty-nine railroad lines cut,

seventy-eight railroad cars, thirty-five locomotives, fifteen military

installations and four small naval vessels destroyed or damaged. Eight

marshalling yards were attacked during the period.

The attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) continued, while on the re

mainder of the Army front action was limited to aggressive patrolling.

A gasoline rationing board, consisting of one officer and three en

listed men, began operations with the Class III supply section. Gaso
line was allotted in general as follows: infantry divisions, 5,000

gallons; armored divisions, 25,000 gallons; corps troops, 10,000 gal

lons, and Army troops, 84,000 gallons.
Reserve stocks of gasoline at

this time totalled 300,000 gallons. The 7th Convalescent Hospital,

which had been operating under the supervision of the Advance Section

Communications Zone since the Army became operational, was relieved from

assignment to the Third U.S. Army.

Sxcept for scattered artillery fire the enemy was quiet in the XII

Corps zone. He was reported digging in on the high ground along the

line north of CHATEAU SAIIUS (Q12) - MORVILLE (Q12). Two small counter
attacks were launched against XX Corps positions, but both were re
pulsed. The 5th Infantry Division's attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85)

was met by heavy enemy fire.

100

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VHS

(T42) daily, from where the Army would distribute the items to supply

points* Formerly the Army had trucked these supplies from PARIS (304)*

Three hundred thousand operational rations were to be set aside at Army

Reserve Point No 1* A record for evacuating patients on planes was es

tablished at the air evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U61), operated by

the Third U*S* Army*

Nineteen aircraft, carrying 494 patients, were

loaded and ready to take off one hour and eighteen minutes after receipt

of the alert* Fifty trucks were sent by civil affairs to move 300 tons

of flour from VERDUN (U26) to NANCY (U81) to relieve a serious bread

shortage there*

4 OCTOBER (D + 120)

Favored enemy capabilities as estimated at this time were that he

could combine delaying actions in the Army's zone of advance with a

fortress stand at METZ (U85), counterattacking locally with armored

spearheads and impeding the Army's advance by the diversion of troops,

artillery, munitions and aviation*

Utilizing the ring of forts around

METZ (U85) to the fullest, the enemy's objective, it was estimated,

would be to hold the city at all costs in order to use it as a pivot to

establish a general defensive line paralleling the SIEGFRIED Line* Es

tablishment of such a line would give the enemy time to organize the

SIEGFRIED Line and defenses of the RHINE River Line and secure the pow
erful tactical advantage of the crippling wet and cold fall and winter

weather* At the same time, the enemy was expected to take advantage of

the favorable terrain in the Army's zone of advance to construct one or

more organized defensive positions for employment in conjunction with

the inclement weather to defend and delay against the Army's eastward

advance*

5 OCTOBER (D + 121)

Tactical reconnaissance photographs of German positions revealed

that the enemy was building new defensive installations in the Third

U.S. Army's zone of advance.

The enemy shelled NANCY (U81) with 280mm

artillery, but no damage of a military nature resulted*

Elements of the 26th Infantry Division closed in an area in the vi

cinity of ATHIENVILJJ5 (Q01) in the XII Corps zone. The 328th Infantry

(26th Infantry Division) began to relieve elements of the 319th Infantry

(80th Infantry Division)*

While repulsing enemy counterattacks on SIVRY (U82), eight miles

north of NANCY (U81), XII Corps continued to push aggressive patrols to

the east*

Elements of the 5th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone contin

ued to fight their way forward within FORT DRIANT (U75), while elements

of ,the 10th Infantry (5th infantry Division) and the 90th Infantry Di
vision moved into positions to reinforce the attack. Heavy mortar,

artillery and bazooka fire was employed by the enemy against pillboxes

of FORT DRIANT which had been captured and occupied by the Army's

troops*

Task Force DRIANT was organized to continue the attack on FORT

DRIANT at METZ (U85), it consisted of a regiment of infantry, a company

of engineers and a company of tanks. Meanwhile, Task Force POUC (3d

Cavalry Group, less the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; 135th Engi

neer Combat Battalion, 1st Regiment de Paris, 1st Battalion of the

330th Infantry, and the 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company A)

relieved elements of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) in its

zone*

Concentrating heavily on enemy rail transportation, XIX Tactical

Air Command claimed twenty-two railroad lines cut, 248 railroad cars*

twenty-five locomotives, twenty-one gun installations, two railroad

bridges destroyed or damaged, while attacks continued against mar

shalling yards and troop concentrations*

Seven missions totaling 110 sorties were carried out by XIX Tac
tical Air Command, with light claims reported including four railroad

lines cut, fifteen motor transports, fifty-four military installations,

one highway bridge and twenty-eight small naval vessels destroyed or

damaged, and six marshalling yards attacked.

The railroad cutting pro
gram carried out by the Air Command was for the purpose of isolating the

enemy from his supply and communications in-the rear and to prevent an

enemy defensive buildup*

Aggressive patrolling continued along the entire Third U.S. Army

front, while the attack against FORT DRIANT progressed slowly against

stiff opposition*

The Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group verbally in

formed the Third U.S. Army Commander that the 10th Armored Division

would be assigned in the near future to the Third U.S. Army, and the re
mainder of the 26th Infantry Division (101st Infantry) would be re
leased to the Third U.S. Army without delay.

Arrangements were

Aggressive patrolling continued while additional elements of the

Third U.S. Army closed in an assembly area preparatory to commitment*

The Rear Echelon of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, moved to NANCY

(U81), the Forward Echelon remaining temporarily at ETAIN (U47).

made for the Advance Section Communications Zone

to bring perishable Class I supplies, meat and butter, to SOMMESOUS

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101

R E T

6 OCTOBER (D + 122)

7 OCTOBER (D + 123)

Heavy enemy artillery fire fell in CHAMBREY (Q02) and PETTONCOURT

(Q02) in the XII Corps zone. An enemy counterattack in the FORT DRIANT

area near METZ (U85) by a company of officer candidate* was repulsed by

XX Corps troops*
These troops, stationed at the officer candidate

school at METZ (U85), were picked non-commissioned officers and fana

tical Nazis, most of whom had battle experience on the Russian front* A

considerable increase in enemy artillery fire was noted in the vicinity

of MARIBULLES (U84) - VEZON (U74)*

Heavy
LEYR (U92)
Corps zone
repulsed.
ing*

artillery was used by the enemy to harass Army positions at

and GHKMECEY (Q02) in the XII Corps zone, while in the XX

an enemy counterattack west of VAIZIEKSS-LES-METZ (U86) was

The enemy held the south portion of the town in heavy fight

To enlarge its bridgehead the XII Corps launched an attack to the

northeast.
The 35th Infantry Division attacked in the direction of

FOSSIEUX (U92) and occupied that town and the high ground in the vicin
ity of MALAUCOURT (U92). The 6th Armored Division advanced in the

direction of LETRICOURT (U93) and occupied MOIVRONS (U92), while the

80th Infantry Division attacked in the direction of LIXIERES (U82).

The 104th and 101st Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division)

closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of ATHI2NVTLLK (Q01) and ele

ments of those regiments relieved elements of the 4th Armored Division

in the XII Corps zone*

Remaining elements of the corps continued to

consolidate positions and patrolled to the east*

A XII Corps attack to clear the northern half of the corps sector

up to the SEILLE River was supported by twenty-three field artillery

battalions*
There was a forty-five minute artillery preparation*

Thereafter the artillery rendered continual close support, its fires

consisting both of observed missions against targets of opportunity and

prearranged missions fired on call. Extensive use was made of time-on

target missions, including two eleven-battalion and one ten-battalion

concentration all upon the town of JEANDELAINCOURT (U92) nine miles

north of NANCY (U81). Effectiveness of artillery support, and espec

ially the counterbattery program, was amply evidenced by the fact that

enemy artillery reaction to the attack was very light. Anti-aircraft

artillery supporting the 80th Infantry Division artillery silenced a

battery of enemy 88nm guns with two direct hits at a range of 12,950

yards.

Task Force DRIANT gained control of the northwest and southwest

corners of FORT DRIANT near METZ (U85). Elements of the 83d Infantry

Division occupied WORMELDINGEN (L01), while elements of the 90th Infan

try Division entered MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the face of strong

enemy opposition*

Fighter bombers of the" XIX Tactical Air Command flew close support

for the Third U.S. Army and claimed excellent results. Among claims

were twenty-one railroad lines cut, 117 railroad cars, six motor trans
ports, nine locomotives, twenty-four gun installations, three highway

bridges, one ammunition dump and twenty tanks and armored cars des
troyed or damaged.

WORMEIDINGEN (L01) was occupied while the attacks on FORT DRIANT

and MAIZIERES-LSS-METZ (U86) continued.

On the remainder of the front

action was confined to patrolling*

In the XX Corps zone the 331st Infantry (83d Infantry Division)

completed clearing the enemy from WORMEIDINGSN (L01) while elements of

the 329th Infantry cleared the enemy from ECHTERNACH (L03) and GREVBN
MACHER (L02). The 5th Infantry Division continued to attack FORT DRIANT

(U75) while the 90th Infantry Division continued to fight its way into

Strong small arms, anti-tank, and artillery

MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).
fire was encountered.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its heavy attacks on enemy rail

transportation, flying 402 sorties during the period.

Claims for the

day included thirty railroad lines cut, 187 railroad cars, nineteen gun

installations, thirty-three military installations and eighty-three mis

cellaneous naval vessels destroyed or damaged.
Three enemy troops con
centrations were attacked with good results reported*

MOIVRONS (U92), FOSSIEUX (U92) and the high ground in the vicinity

of FOSSIEUX (U92) and MALAUCOURT (U92) were now occupied by the Army and

the enemy was cleared from ECMBRNACH (L03) and GREVENMACHBR (L02),

while other elements continued the attacks on FORT DRIANT and MAIZIERES
LES-METZ (U86) during the period.

Infantryman Finds Cover in Maizieres-Les-Metz

102

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S E C R

ISH *

9 OCTOBER (D + 125)

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff of the United States

Army; LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T- HANDY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADJJ2Y, Commanding

General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, visited Headquarters, Third

U.S. Army, and were briefed on operations.

Intensification of patrol activity was noted on the part of the

enemy, who continued to offer scattered resistance in the XII Corps

zone. A large number of enemy dead observed in the BO IS DE IA FOURASSE

(U93) was believed to be the result of aerial fragmentation bombs. The

enemy continued his heavy artillery fire in the FORT DRIANT area of the

XX Corps zone, while mines and snipers harassed the Army's advance at

MAIZIERES-IBS-MBTZ (U86).

Psychological warfare units broadcast surrender messages across the

MOSELLE River to the enemy in THIONVILLE (U86), while the enemy ceased

firing during the broadcast*

XII Corps continued to advance toward the SEILIE River, while the

35th and 80th Infantry Divisions consolidated their gains. Combat Com
mand "A" of the 6th Armored Division cleared CHENICOURT (U92) and

reached the vicinity of AJJLNOIS (U93), where it was relieved by the

317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division)

Combat Command "A" moved in

mobile reserve in the vicinity of ISYR (U91), six miles north of NANCY

(U81), while the remainder of the division moved into corps reserve in

the vicinity of SAULXURES-IES-NANCY (U91), two miles east of NANCY

(U81)
Preparations to attack in the direction of PARROY (Qll) were

started by the 4th Armored Division.

8 OCTOBER (D + 124)
While in the XII Corps zone the enemy maintained his defensive

attitude, in the XX Corps zone observers reported the movement toward

the south of a large number of enemy vehicles, including some tanks

The enemy used explosives against XX Corps troops assaulting the under
ground entrance to one of the FORT DRIANT tunnels at METZ (U85).

Task Force WARNOCK (2d Infantry), commanded by Brigadier General

ALVA C. WARNOCK, replaced Task Force DRIANT (10th Infantry) and assem
bled equipment prior to continuing operations in the tunnels of FORT

DRIANT at METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone, where resistance continued

to be heavy. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued to clear

the enemy out of MAIZIERSS-LES-METZ (U86), where house-to-house fighting

continued.

Against scattered resistance the XII Corps continued its attack to

the nortkeast and advanced two to three miles along a twenty-mile zone.

Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division advanced to LETRICOURT

(U93), while Combat Command "B" captured AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT

(U92) and JSANDEIAINCOURT (U92) Quadruple mount 50. caliber machine

guns were employed to clean out pockets of resistance. Elements of the

80th Infantry Division cleared the BOIS-DE-IA-FOURASSE (U93) area and

occupied JEANDELAINCOURT (U92), while the 35th Infantry Division ad

vanced in the vicinity of FOSSIEUX (U92)

Because of adverse weather no

XIX Tactical Air Command.

operations were carried

out by the

The day's operations resulted in elements of the Third U.S. Army

.advancing to the SEIJXE River and continuing to clear MAIZIERES-ISS-METZ

(U86) and FORT DRIANT.

Only limited progress was made by the 5th Infantry Division as it

continued its attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone.

Heavy resistance was met in the vicinity of MAIZIERES-1ES-METZ (U86)

by the 90th Infantry Division which pushed aggressive patrols to the

vicinity of METZ (U85).

Beginning on this date and for seven days thereafter an additional

supply tonnage of 250 tons daily was requested to prepare for the ar
rival of an armored division. The reserve stock of gasoline totaled

600,000 gallons.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 311 sorties during the day, which was

featured by attacks on enemy airdromes and military installations.

Forty-five enemy planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground and

among other claims were forty gun installations, thirty-nine military

installations and one ammunition dump destroyed or damaged.

10 OCTOBER (D + 126)

Heavy enemy harassing artillery fire fell throughout the XII Corps

zone.
Bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place in MAIZIERSS-I2S-MSTZ

(U86) and the enemy made extensive use of basements of houses and em
ployed bazookas against buildings occupied by troops of the XX Corps.

AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT (U92), JEANDELAINCOURT (U92) and the

wooded area southwest of LSTRICOURT (U93) were captured and occupied by

the Third U.S. Army during the period, while attacks were continued on

FORT DRIANT and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Headquarters of III Corps, commanded by Major General JOHN MTT.LT

KIN, and the 95th Infantry Division were relieved from assignment to the

Ninth U.S. Army and assigned to the Third U.S. Army. Upon arrival on

the Continent the III Corps Headquarters was established at CARTERET

(P09), moving to ETAIN (U47) on 1 November. The 83d Infantry Division

was transferred from the Third U.S. Army to the Ninth U.S. Army.

Divisions of the Army were notified'that stocks were available for

them to build their unit reserves of Classes II and IV supplies.

PI
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wra

103

Ill

XII Corps continued to consolidate its gains. A strong enemy

counterattack in the vicinity of LETRICOURT (U93) was repulsed by the

80th Infantry Division. XX Corps continued to fight fiercely for FORT

DRIANT near METZ (U85) and for MAIZIERES-LBS-METZ (U86), but made only

limited progress* Advance elements of the 95th Infantry Division ar

rived in the corps area in the vicinity of N0RR0Y-I-SEC (U67).

No missions were carried out by the XIX 'Tactical Air Command

this date because of poor weather conditions*

12 OCTOBER (D + 128)

Enemy capabilities as estimated at this time were little changed

from those estimated for 4 October. The enemy was expected to defend

and delay in the Army's zone of advance and make a fortress stand at

The capability of an enemy limited-objective offensive

METZ (U85).
north of METZ (U85) also was given consideration.

on

Tactical reconnaissance and other reports indicated the organiza

tion of defensive positions in the area LIOCOURT (U93) - CHATEAU SALINS

{QXZ) - HERNY (Q04) - CONTRIL (Q23) and from DIEUZE (Q22) to MOUSSEY

(Q30) - FORBACH (Q36) SAARGUEMINES (Q55) - BITCHE (Q75). Although coun

terattacks by the enemy against the salient east of NANCY (U81) had de
creased in intensity, entrenching activity to the immediate front and

aggressive patrolling clearly indicated a determination to contain Third

U.S. Army forces. Flooding of areas in the zone of advance further in

dicated a continued overall defensive attitude on the part of the enemy.

Numerous troop movements, both road and rail, plus the identification of

elements of a new infantry division in the THIONVILLS (U88) sector in

dicated a possible enemy thrust. Prisoners of war reported the dis
cussion by their officers of enemy plans to attack.

While consolidating gains in XII Corps zone, Third U.S. Army con
tinued to attack at MAIZIERES-1ES-M2TZ (U86).

The Army Commander escorted GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL and LIEU

TENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY to the forward command posts of the di
visions in XII and XX Corps*

11 OCTOBER (D + 127)

Tactical reconnaissance observed enemy entrenching and construction

activity along the high ground east of the SEILLE River in the vicinity

of CLEMERY (U83) and in the FORET DE CHATEAU SALINS (Q13) in the XII

Corps zone. Enemy artillery fire fell throughout the corps zone. Tac
tical reconnaissance also observed considerable movement in the rear of

the enemy lines in the XX Corps zone. A troop train entered METZ (U85)

and another moved south from KNOZ KARTHAUS (L12).

XX Corps was ordered to withdraw its forces from FORT DRIANT and to

contain enemy defenses in the METZ (U85) area with newly-assigned di

visions. Divisions which had been continuously engaged were to be

.rested, refitted and prepared for further offensive action, while train
ing of the newly-assigned divisions was to be continued.
The corps was

ordered to maintain aggressive reconnaissance and to continue coverage

of all possible avenues of tank approach.

It was to be prepared to ad
vance on Army order to secure crossings of the RHINE River and to seize

WIESBADEN (M36) and FRANKFURT (002).

The 2d Cavalry Squadron (XII Corps) relieved the 42d Cavalry Squad
ron in the vicinity of PARROY (Qll) - COINCOURT (Qll). Elements of the

80th Infantry Division repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vi

cinity of ISTRICOURT (U93) and cleared the vicinity of FOSSJEUX (U92) of

the enemy. The 26th Infantry Division continued to relieve the 4th Ar
mored Division, the Commanding General of the 26th Infantry Division

assuming command of the 4th Armored Division zone*

XX Corps began regrouping of forces, rotating units at the same

time. Advance elements of the 95th Infantry Division closed in an area

in the vicinity of N0RR0Y-I2-SEC (U67). Elements of the 358th Infantry

(90th Infantry Division) began moving to MALANCOURT (U77) to assist the

357th Infantry at MAIZIERES-IES-MBTZ (U86), where bitter fighting con

tinued. Task Force POLK was attached to the 90th Infantry Division. At

FORT DRIANT near METZ (U85) the enemy employed disabled tanks as out
posts and placed harassing fire from self-propelled guns on Third U.S.

Army troops*

Flying 124 sorties in ten missions, XIX Tactical Air Command found

few targets during this period.

Three railroad lines were cut, while

thirty-three gun installations, six military installations and six small

naval vessels were damaged or destroyed.

Regrouping of forces to conform to the new north boundary was be

gun, while FOSSIEUX (U92) was cleared by Third U.S. Army.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADIY, Commanding General of Twelfth

U.S. Army Group, made his second visit of the month to Army Headquarters

on this date.

104

. _

SEC
Multiple Barrel Antiaircraft Gun Crew on the Alert

XII Corps continued to regroup its forces despite considerable har

assing artillery fire. The 26th Infantry Division took over the zone of

the 4th Armored Division, which reverted to corps reserve.

Task Force WARNOCK withdrew from FORT DRIANT under the cover of

darkness in the XX Corps zone* The 95th Infantry Division continued to

close into its assembly area preparatory to relieving the 5th Infantry

Division. Clearance of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was continued by the

90th Infantry Division, while Task Force POIE took over the protection

of the north flank of the corps.

TTX" Tactical Air Command continued its support of the Third U.S.

Army, flying 207 sorties in eighteen missions. Fourteen railroad lines

were cut, while thirty-six railroad cars, twenty-three locomotives,

thirty-eight gun installations and thirteen military installations were

destroyed or damaged.

Regrouping of forces continued during the period, with the 95th

Infantry Division closing in its assembly area.

Orders were received from the Twelfth U.S. Army Group drastically

reducing the field ammunition allowance until 7 November, so that pos

sibility of any offensive was precluded. Immediate and strenuous

efforts were made to restrict the firing of field artillery ammunition,

a ninety-five percent reduction being obtained. No ration was imposed

upon tank, tank destroyer and antiaircraft artillery ammunition and

these weapons were effectively employed in their secondary role as ar

tillery. Extensive use of captured materiel and ammunition, including

Russian 76.2mm guns, German 88mn, 105mm howitzers, 150mm guns and

Schneider 155mm' howitzers, was made by XX Corps and to a lesser extent

by XII Corps. Ammunition for the Schneider howitzer was employed

successfully in the 155mm howitzer M-l.

Gun Crew Observes Effect of Fire on German Strongpoint

XX Corps continued to regroup its units. Elements of the 357th

Infantry (90th Infantry Division) relieved other units of the regiment

at MAIZIEHES-IS-METZ (U86), where the attack continued. The 95th In

fantry Division continued to assemble in the corps zone with elements

of the 378th Infantry, 379th Infantry and 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion

arriving at DOMMARY (U57) by rail, and motor elements of the 378th In

fantry moving into an assembly area in the vicinity of NORROY-IE-SEC

(U67).

The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters and the Forward Echelon of

XIX Tactical Air Command moved to NANCY (U81), setting up in large

military casernes there near the already established Rear Echelon. This

was the first time on the Continent for the three headquarters to be

located adjacent to one another in buildings in the same city. Many

problems not previously encountered as to housing, messing, and trans

portation of personnel were solved*

Concentrating on enemy rail and military installations, XIX Tac

tical Air Command flew 252 sorties in twenty-two missions. Twenty-two

railroad lines were cut, while 226 railroad cars, fifty motor trans
ports, thirty-two locomotives, thirty-four military installations and

five highway bridges were damaged or destroyed. Ten marshalling yards

were attacked during the day.

13 OCTOBER (D+ 129)

New defensive traces of the SIEGFRIED Line

Army Photo Center.

Considerable enemy troop movement was noted in the XII Corps zone

and tactical reconnaissance observed large enemy troop concentrations

at M0U3SSY (020) and HEMING (0,41). Heavy enemy railroad and highway

movements were observed in the XX Corps zone, with all types of vehicles

moving to and from METZ (U85)

were supplied

by The

Requirements of the Army for winter clothing and equipment were be

ing met in most cases. Ground sheets and sleeping bags began to arrive,

but raincoats, mess gear and one and two-burner stoves remained in short

supply. The reserve stock of gasoline totaled 800,000 gallons. Coal,

lubricants and oil were urgently needed for the mines and steel plants

of the industrial valley running from BRIEY (U77) to THIONVILUB (U88).

As reserves were expended, the situation became more acute daily,

threatening the employment of a majority of the civilian workers in the

area.

XII Corps continued to consolidate its positions, the 317th Infan

try (80th Infantry Division) continuing to relieve the 328th Infantry

(26th Infantry Division).

R E T

105

R E T

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its pressure on the enemy's rail

transportation, flying 107 sorties during the day's operations. Claims

included 143 railroad cars, twenty-eight locomotives and five military

installations destroyed or damaged, while four marshalling yards were

attacked with good results reported.

14 OCTOBER (D + 130)

The enemy continued to shift troops in both forward and rear areas

of the XX Corps zone. Hostile patrols became bolder, displaying marked

interest in artillery locations, and penetrated as far as REZONVILLE

(U75) and ST MARCEL (U75). An enemy armored reconnaissance in force in

the vicinity of BEZANGE IA PETITE (Qll) was repulsed in the XII Corps

zone, and a minor infantry attack in the vicinity of EEZANGE (Qll) also

was beaten back. Patrolling and probing of enemy positions continued.

Strengthening and consolidating of its positions was continued by

the Army during the period, while fighting progressed in MAIZIERES-IES

MSTZ (U86).

Daily tonnage estimates for the period 29 October to 13 November

were submitted to Supreme Haadquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, which

was to make tonnage allocations based on bids forwarded by Twelfth U.S.

Army Group. Estimates were as follows: For Class I, 1,000 tons for

maintenance, 214 tons for reserve, a total of 1,214 tons. For Classes

II and 17, 225 tons for maintenance, forty-seven tons for reserve, a to
tal of 272 tons. For Class III gasoline, oils and greases, 1,900 tons

for maintenance, 401 tons for reserve, a total of 2,301 tons. For civil

affairs, twenty tons for maintenance, five tons for reserve, a total of

twenty-five tons. The grand total was 3,345 tons for maintenance, 714

tons for reserve, a total of 4,059 tons. No gasoline was received on

this date, nor was there a forecast of any shipments. Fifty-eight and

one-half tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications

Zone.

The 90th Infantry Division continued to fight its way forward into

MAIZIERES-L2S-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone. With the exception of

some attached units, the 95th Infantry Division closed into its assembly

area in the vicinity of NORROY-IE-SEC (U67).

Nineteen missions totaling 230 sorties were carried out by XIX

Tactical Air Command with good results being reported against enemy

rail transportation*
Among the claims for the day were twenty-five

railroad lines cut, 207 railroad cars, forty-one motor transports,

twenty-four locomotives, sixteen military installations, one fuel dump

and nine tanks and armored cars destroyed or damaged. Eleven marshal
ling yards were attacked*

Consolidation of positions was continued during the period by the

Army, while concentrating the 95th Infantry Division in an assembly area

in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67). Fierce fighting continued in

the town of MAIZIERES-IS-METZ (U86).

The quartermaster tonnage

2,325 long tons*

allocation was

increased from 2,100

The ordnance supply situation was serious enough to warrant local

purchases. Arrangements were made to let contracts for a number of

critical items of simple construction and therefore easy to manufacture.

If these were successfully produced it was planned to contract for Items

more difficult to manufacture.

to

16 OCTOBER (D-h 132)

15 OCTOBER (D-h 131)

Enemy patrols were active and sporadic artillery fire fell through
out the XII Corps zone. Tactical reconnaissance observed enemy troops

moving between the north and south forts of the VERDUN group at METZ

(U85) in the XX Corps zone.

Patrols observed heavy enemy vehicular traffic in MALAUCOURT (U92)

and JALLAUCOURT (Q02) in the XII Corps, zone, while in the XX Corps zone

the enemy maintained a purely defensive attitude. Enemy artillery ac

tivity showed a decrease.

The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) completed relief of the

166th Engineer Combat Battalion (reinforced) in the left (north) di

vision zone. Other elements of XII Corps continued to consolidate their

positions.

Regrouping was continued by the 80th Infantry Division in the XII

Corps zone, while the 328th Infantry (reinforced) of the 26th Infantry

Division closed in an area in the vicinity of BSZANGE-IA-GRANDE (Q01),

east of NANCY (U81), then moved to relieve the 166th Engineer Combat

Battalion (reinforced). The 137th Infantry (35th Infantry Division)

relieved the 134th Infantry on the left pf the division zone, and the

134th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of BRIN-SUR-SEILia (U92)t

northeast of NANCY (U81).

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued the attack in

MAIZISRES-LBS-MBTZ (U86), where house-to-house

fighting continued.

Elsewhere in the XX Corps zone the 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Di

vision) moved from its assembly area at NORROY-IJS-SBC (U67) to the zone

of the 5th Infantry Division southwest of METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command was grounded throughout the day because of

adverse weather.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued fighting in MAI

ZXERBS-LES-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone, with the 3d Battalion of the

357th Infantry making slight gains within the city. Relief of the bat
talion was completed by the 2d Battalion of the same regiment.

106

Inquiries were made to the Communications Zone and the Advance Sec
tion Communications Zone in regard to the non-receipt of gasoline of 15

S E C RXT

S "" ~ !

5 f. ft i r

/ S E C R E T

PLAN A

October and the lack of a forecast of any having been shipped. The

daily telegram on this date requested 334,740 gallons of gasoline, but

none was received in the Army area and reserves were used to supplement

previous receipts of 56,000 gallons for the days commitments.

"a.

General Plan:

Third U.S. Army will:

(1) Snvelop

METZ (U85) defensive works

from north and

south.

(2) Advance northeast within zone

(M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area.

17 OCTOBER (D+ 133)

(3) Be prepared

Troops of XII Corps continued active patrolling.

for further

to seize

offensive

the MAINZ

action to the

northeast.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division XX Corps zone continued

fighting in MAIZIEHES-LES-MBTZ (U86) against atubborn resistance. The

378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) closed in an area southwest of

PRENY (U74), southwest of METZ (U85).

The 377th and 379th Infantry

Rginnts (95th Infantry Division) moved to the same general area in

the zone of the 5th Infantry Division.

b.

Scheme of Maneuver:

(1) Phase One:

(a) Contain METZ (U85) on the west*

(b) Cross MOSELLE River north of MSTZ (U85) and

seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of B0UIAY (Q16).

Bad flying weather again hindered XIX Tactical Air Command during

the period, but forty sorties were flown with light claims being made*

Railways and other transportation * facilities behind the enemy lines

continued to be the focal points of attack.

(c) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUS

SON (U73) and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENEERG

(FALQJJEMONT) (Q15).

Fighting continued in MAIZIEHES-LES-METZ (U86), while units in con

tact with the enemy were relieved and supplanted by fresh troops and ac
tive patrolling continued all along the Third U.S. Army front in the

day's operations.

(d) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing

(U85) area and isolate MSTZ (U85) defensive works.

from the METZ

(2) Phase Two:

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expedi

tionary Force, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DETERS, Commanding Gener
al, Sixth U.S. Army Group, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, to re
view the plan for resumption of the offensive.

(a) Advance northeast with two corps abreast. One

corps will remain initially in the area northeast of BRIEY (U67), ad

vancing on Army order echeloned to the left rear.

Corps and divisions were notified that, beginning on 18 October,

issues of gasoline would be reduced twenty-five percent until further

notice. The daily telegram requested 363,624 gallons of gasoline, but

only 13,375 gallons were received.

(b) Continue rapidly to

River between MAINZ

1* Establish a bridgehead east of the RHINE

(M35) (inclusive) and MANNHEIM (R59) (exclusive).

DARMSTADT (M64) area.

2. Seize
"*

the MAINZ

(M35) - FRANKFURT (M66)

(c) Be prepared for further

18 OCTOBER (D + /34)

offensive action to the

northeast.

"4.

Tactical reconnaissance and other reports indicated the organiza

tion of enemy defensive positions in the area LIOCOURT (U93) - CHATEAU

SALINS (Q12) - HERNY (Q04) - C0N1RIL (Q23) and from DIEUZE (Q22) to

MOUSSEY ($30) - FORBACH (Q36) - SAARGUSMINES (Q55) - BITCHE (Q75), mak

ing clear that the enemy was determined to contain the Army's forces.

CORPS MISSIONS:

a. XX Corps (5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Division, 10th Ar

mored Division and supporting troops) will
(1) Contain MSTZ (U85) defensive works west

of the M0

SELLS River.

Plans for resumption of the offensive by Third U.S. Army were is

sued on this date* Two alternate plans were described, "A" and *B"*

They stated in part:

S E C R E T

UNCLASSIFIED

107

S E C

PLAN "B*

(2) Cross the MOSELDS River in the vicinity of THIONVILLE

(U88) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize

rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOUIAY (Q16).

"1.

SCHEME OF MANEUVER

a. Phase One

(3) In conjunction with XII Corps, destroy any enemy

forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area and be prepared for further ad
vance to northeast*

(1) Contain METZ (U85) on the west.

(4) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:

ELLE River
(016).

(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE River be

tween MAINZ (M35) and OPPENHEIM (M43) (both inclusive).

(3) Attack northeast, with two corps abreast, from the

PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) - NANCY (U81) area to seize rail and road facili
ties in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (Q15) - BOUIAY (<U6).

(b) Seize MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) area.

(5) Be prepared for further advance

to the

northeast.

(4) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85)

area and isolate METZ (U85) defensive works.

b. XII Corps (26th, 35th and 80th Infantry Division, 4th and

6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) will

b. Phase Two - (After METZ (U85) has been neutralized).

(1) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON

(U73) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize

rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FAIAUEMONT) (Q15).

(1) Advance northeast with two corps abreast, one corps

advancing on Army order, initially echeloned to the left rear,

(2) Continuation of

(2) In conjunction with XX Corps, destroy any enemy

forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area and be prepared for further ad
vance to northeast.

2.

(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE River be

tween OPPENHEIM (M43) and MANNHEIM (R59) (both exclusive).

c. Ill Corps (and supporting troops) to

(1) Assemble in an area northwest of BRIEY (U67).

northeast on Army

assigned by Army

order, echeloned

(a) Seize rail and road

FALKENBERG (FAL&JEMONT) (Q15).

facilities in vicinity of

(b) Seize rail and road

facilities in vicinity of

(2) In conjunction with

forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area
vance to northeast.

to left

rear.

(3) Continuation of

III Corps, destroy any enemy

and be prepared for further ad

the advance to

be the same as Plan

"A".

(1) In the advance Corps will be disposed in depth with

armor*J.n lead; armor to be reinforced by motorized infantry. These

leading elements will pass around obstacles and points of resistance

wherever possible in order to continue the advance to the RHINE River.

Infantry forces following will advance rapidly, clear enemy resistance

and consolidate gains.

b. XII Corps (two infantry

and supporting troops) will

divisions, two armored

divisions

(1) Attack northeast from the NANCY (U81) area destroying

the enemy in its front and protecting the south flank of Third U.S.

Army.

(2) Reconnaissance will be pushed to maximum in order to

seize intact all possible crossings of major river obstacles (e. g., the

SAAR and RHINE Rivers)."

108

PONT-A-MOUSSON

BOUIAY (Q16).

order.

(3) Advance

as Plan "A".

CORPS MISSIONS:

(1) Attack northeast from vicinity of

(U73) with one armored and two infantry divisions and

(b) Seize DARMSTADT (M64) area.

of troops as may be

the advance to be same

a. XX Corps (one armored division, two infantry divisions and

supporting troops) will

(3) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:

(2) Assume command

(2) Seize and secure all possible crossings of the MOS

in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88), and advance on BOULAY

(2) Assist XX Corps in seizing rail and

in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQJJEMONT) (<U5).

E T

road facilities

in

i:

C3) Continuation

of the advance to be

S E CAR E T

same as Plan W A W .

19 OCTOBER (D + 135)

e. III Corps (two infantry divisions, one tank group - to be

made up of tank battalions detached from infantry divisions - and one

tank destroyer group) will

(1) Contain MSTZ (U85) defense works west

The enemy continued to improve his positions by digging, mine-lay

ing and construction of fortifications in the XII Corps zone. Enemy

activity in the XX Corps zone consisted primarily of active patrolling

and moderate artillery shelling. Front lines remained unchanged.

of the MOSELLE

River.

Units on front line duty in XII Corps zone were relieved by units

in reserve, while front lines remained unchanged.

(2) With a minimum of one infantry division, one tank

group and one tank destroyer group, seize and secure all possible cross
ings in the THIONVILLE (U88) area.

(3) Attack southeast and assist XX Corps

and road facilities in vicinity of BOUIAY (<U6).

(4) Assist XX Corps in destroying

drawing from METZ (U85) area.

(5) Be prepared to
zone echeloned to left rear.

(6) Protect

left

The 95th Infantry Division, XX Corps, continued to relieve the 5th

Infantry Division in the vicinity of METZ (U85), while elements of the

latter division closed into an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68). The

3d Battalion, 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) continued bitter

fighting in MAIZISRES-I2S-METZ (TJ86).

in seizing rail

any enemy forces with

Adverse weather conditions again confronted XIX Tactical Air Com
mand, nevertheless sixty-eight sorties in five missions were carried

out. Claims included ten railroad cars, five locomotives, twenty-six

military installations and three small naval vessels destroyed or dam

aged.

advance to the northeast in XX Corps

(north) flank

of Third U.S. Army."

Fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) during

with the front lines remaining unchanged.

the period,

Twenty rounds from an enemy 280mm railway gun fell in the vicinity

of the XX Corps command post at JARNY (U66). This gun, or guns, appear
ed at intervals along the entire Army front during the month but did

little damage. Favored targets in addition to JARNY (U66) were NANCY

(U81) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), each of which was shelled two or three

times. Effect of the fire was entirely harassing, only minor damage

being inflicted. Eighty-nine German planes, the largest concentration

of enemy aircraft to appear in the Army area for some time, flew over

NANCY (U81) during the night, but no bombs were dropped.

Estimates at this time credited the enemy with the capability of

making a determined defensive stand, aided by favorable terrain in the

Army's zone of advance which the enemy had fortified with extensive en
trenchments and flooding of low areas. It was considered likely that

the enemy would attempt to contain the Army's salient by defending and

delaying tactics, counterattacking locally with infantry and armor. In

conjunction with his entrenching, it was believed the enemy would use

METZ (UB5) and its protective ring of forts as a pivot for his defensive

line, attempting to hold back Third U.S. Army until he could bring in

reserves to organize and man the SIEGFRIED Line and gain time to take

advantage of the inclement weather of fall and winter. The capability

of a limited objective enemy offensive north of METZ (U85) also was

given consideration.

20 OCTOBER (D + 136)

Aggressive patrolling and rotation of elements in contact with the

enemy continued in the XII Corps zone. Front lines remained generally

unchanged. Two batteries of 90mm antiaircraft artillery knocked out the

locomotive of an enemy supply train operating behind MSIZ (U85).

Enemy mines and booby traps were encountered by XII

Tactical reconnaissance reported large tank and troop
south of DIEUZE (U22) Enemy activity in the XX Corps
chiefly of entrenching and increased artillery and mortar

Elements of the 95th Infantry Division began relieving units of the

5th Infantry Division to the west and southwest of MSTZ (U85) In the XX

Corps zone. Two battalions of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division)

in the bridgehead east of the MOSEHE River were relieved by the 379th

Infantry (95th Infantry Division). Elements of the 90th Infantry Di

vision continued fighting in and around MAIZIERES-TJ2S-MSTZ (U86).

Some reliefs by minor Third U.S. Army elements in the line took

place in the XII Corps zone, but there was no change in the front lines.

Corps patrols.

concentrations

zone consisted

fire.

The 95th Infantry Division continued to relieve the 5th Infantry

Division in the XX Corps zone. Elements of the division thus relieved

moved to an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68)

Command of the bridge
head area near METZ (U85) was assumed by the Commanding General of the

95th Infantry Division. House-to-house fighting continued in MAIZIERES

LES-METZ (U86), with the 3d Battalion of the 357th Infantry . (90th In
fantry Division) battling the enemy in the city.

Thirty-four sorties were carried out by XIX Tactical Air Command,

but because of adverse weather conditions no targets were found.

S E C RTE T

109

^CLASSIFIED

Battling Mud and Flood Conditions Along Swollen Moselle River

Fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command were out in force dur
ing this period, carrying out twenty missions totaling 245 sorties.

Claims included twenty-four railroad lines cut, fifty-seven railroad

cars, seventy motor transports, twelve locomotives and five military in

stallations destroyed or damaged, A dam on the SEILLE River was attack
ed and destroyed.

Defensive positions were maintained and aggressive patrols probed

enemy positions all along the Third U.S. Army front in the day's opera
tions.

21 OCTOBER (D + 137)

Defensive patrolling, sporadic artillery shelling and increasing

vehicular movement toward the north characterized enemy activity in the

XII Corps zone, A defensive attitude, with the enemy covering his front

with aggressive patrols and artillery and mortar fire, was maintained in

the XX Corps zone.

After the 26th Infantry Division closed into the XII Corps front

line it launched an attack, elements of the division advancing 2,000

yards to the east in the BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (0,11) area toward M0NC0URT

IXU.

Relief of the 5th Infantry Division by the 95th Infantry Division

was completed in the XX Corps zone. The remainder of the 5th Infantry

Division moved to an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68), Fighting con

tinued in MAIZIERES-LBS-METZ (U86) by the 3d Battalion of the 357th In
fantry (90th Infantry Division),

Flying 174 sorties in fifteen missions, XIX Tactical Air Command

continued its attacks on the enemy. Twenty-six railroad lines were cut,

eighty-seven railroad cars, eighteen motor transports, ten locomotives,

ten gun installations and two highway bridges were destroyed or damaged.

One troop concentration and four marshalling yards were attacked during

the period.

Fighting continued in MAIZIEEES-I2S-METZ (U86) during the period,

with Third U,S, Army elements advancing to the outskirts of M0NC0URT

and BSZANGE-IA-PETITE

Intelligence reported that a large railway gun, believed to be the

280mm weapon which had been shelling NANCY (TJ81), was in the railroad

shops at METZ (U85) for repairs. A pilot from the 10th Photo Recon
naissance Group adjusted a 155mm gun battalion upon the shops, follow
ing which 140 rounds were fired for effect, sixty of these under air

surveillance. The firing was concluded with six rounds of white phos
phorous shell which caused large fires. An intelligence agent dispatch
ed to ascertain the results of the firing reported demolition of the

gun, twenty-two cannoneer casualties and complete wreckage of the area.

A political survey showed the region of NANCY (U81) to be strongly

conservative and anti-German, Local administration, headed by two dis

tinguished educators, co-operated fully with the Third U.S. Army,

110

SE

The credit system of ammunition supply, under which allocations

were made to the Armies on the basis of overall availability and mis
sions assigned, was put into effect by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Only

ammunition on hand in depots of the Advance Section Communications Zone

was available to the Armies on credits established by Communications

Zone. During the time these depots were being stocked, shipments to

Third U.S, Army were curtailed*

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARL A. SPAATZ, Conmanding General United States

Strategic Tactical Air Forces, visited Headquarters of Third U.S. Army

during the day*

22 OCTOBER (D-M38J

ET

Y /.

The days operations resulted in positions being consolidated west

of BEZANGE-IA-PETITE (Qll) and MONCOURT (CUD while active patrolling

was continued and fighting progressed in MAIZIEHES-LES-METZ (U86).

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of the

Twelfth U.S. Army Group, conferred with the Army Commander on the pro
posed offensive, the date of the attack, fixed by weather conditions

rather than by the calendar, being after 5 November*

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that tonnage allocations, effective

with requisitions forwarded on 24 October, would be increased to 5,300

tons daily. Third U.S. Army was informed that there would be no further

air evacuation of patients either atJPOUL (U61), operated by the Army,

or at ETAIN (U47), operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone.

It was decided that holding units would continue to operate these fields

and evacuate patients by rail.

Except for moderate resistance with small arms, emplaced infantry

weapons and mines at MONCOURT (Qll) and BOIS DE FRONTIERS (Qll), the en
emy was relatively inactive in the XII Corps zone* A slackening in ar
tillery fire and patrol activity was noted in the XX Corps zone*

Letter of Instruction Number

ceived* It stated in part:

10, Twelfth U.S. Army

Group, was re

2* a. Twelfth Army Group will regroup and prepare for an advance

by all three armies to the RHINE River. Target date, First and Ninth

Armies, 5 November* However, attack will not be made more than two days

prior to attack of Second British Army. Target date, Third Army, 10

November "

c. Third Army,

(1) Advance in zone to the RHINE in the MAINZ (M35)

WORMS (L50) area and seize a bridgehead immediately if the situation

permits. If it is impracticable to seize a bridgehead, Third Army will

attack to the north and clear the area to the MOSELLE***

Supplies Move to the Front in One of Many Vast Convoys

"3.

The 26th Infantry Division consolidated its positions on the high

ground west of BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Qll) and MONCOURT (Qll), east of NANCY

(U81), and prepared to resume the attack to clear both towns. Elsewhere

in the XII Corps zone units in front line duty were rotated and active

patrolling continued*
Except for sporadic artillery fire the enemy was

relatively inactive.

23 OCTOBER (D + 139)

Prior to resumption of the offensive, the 26th Infantry Division

consolidated its gains in the XII Corps zone, while the remainder of the

corps continued to maintain positions and conduct extensive patrolling.

In the XX Corps zone, movement into an assembly area west of AUDUN

(U68) was completed by the 5th Infantry Division*

Fighting on a small

scale continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Because of unfavorable weather conditions

carried out by the XTJC Tactical Air Command.

no

operations

were

Active patrolling was continued in the XX Corps zone. The 5th In

fantry Division continued to move to an assembly area west of AUDUN

(U68). Minor fighting continued in MAIZIEHES-LES-METZ (U86).

Third U.S. Army elements

(U86) during the day.

XTJC Tactical Air Command continued to hit the enemy rail and mili
tary installations, flying 152 sorties during the day. sixteen railroad

lines were cut, eighty-nine railroad cars, fifty-three motor transports,

eighteen locomotives and five gun installations were destroyed or

damaged*

Twelfth U.S. Army Group in a letter stressed the necessity for

strict supply discipline to conserve items in limited supply or items

which, through indifference to supply discipline, might quickly reach a

critical status. It was desired that reserves be built up only within

prescribed levels.

continued to fight in MAIZIERES-LSS-MSTZ

UNCLASSIFIED

S E C NR E T

Operational necessity dictated the immediate procurement of extend

ed end connectors, also locally called "duck feet", for medium tank

tracks. These connectors were attached to the ends of the tank track

end connectors, enabling the tank to secure more flotation and insure

better progress in the mud. Approximately 25,000 connectors were re

ceived from Communications Zone on operational priority and installed on

tanks of XII Corps units. Contracts were placed with NANCY (U81) area

manufacturers for 200,000 connectors.

25 OCTOBER (D + 141)

Capability of the enemy to launch a limited objective offensive

north of MSTZ (U85) was no longer given consideration in view of de

velopments. Small advances were made in the XII Corps zone by the 26th

Infantry Division, which occupied MONCOURT WOODS (Qll) and some high

ground to the east of NANCY (U81) against spotty resistance by the en

emy. The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) relieved the 104th In
fantry of the same division and assumed command of the newly-won area.

Elsewhere positions were maintained and strengthened.

24 OCTOBER (D + 140)

Intensive training of troops by the 5th Infantry Division was

started in the XX Corps zone, while the 90th Infantry Division completed

its regrouping. Active patrolling continued along the entire corps

front.

The 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) relieved the 320th In

fantry of that division. Elsewhere in the XII Corps zone there were no

changes in the front lines, and active patrolling was continued. NANCY

(U81) and ST MAX (U81) again were shelled with sixteen rounds of German

280mm artillery, three shells narrowly missing the Army Commander's

quarters. A dud shell landed between the two wings of the 12th Evac
uation Hospital in NANCY (U81), cutting a thirty-six foot course into

the ground and coming to rest at a point twenty feet deep.

XIX Tactical Air Conjmand was limited in its day's operations be

cause of poor flying weather, but in forty-four sorties nine railroad

lines were cut and twenty-eight railroad cars and twelve gun installa
tions were destroyed or damaged.

Small-scale fighting continued at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), which

the enemy shelled heavily. Front line units in the XX Corps zone were

rotated and patrolling was continued aggressively. An advance party of

the 10th Armored Division arrived in the corps zone.

Many items of captured enemy ordnance were modified for Third U.S.

Army use during this critical supply period. Approximately 14,000

German spark plugs were renovated for use in M-4 tank engines and many

German motorcycles were rebuilt with captured spare parts and issued to

Army troops.

Adverse weather conditions again prevented XIX Tactical Air Command

from carrying out missions.

Third U.S. Army forces maintained their

aggressively during the period.

positions

and

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN C. H. IEE, Commanding General of Communica

tions Zone, European Theatre of Operations, visited Third U.S. Army

Headquarters during the day.

patrolled

26 OCTOBER (D + 142)

Third U.S. Army notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary

Force that since 1 October the Army had received 2,100,000 gallons of

gasoline less than requested in daily telegrams based on tonnage alloca

tions.
This deficiency steadily reduced Army reserves, although all

units were strictly rationed, until gasoline for 1<33S than two opera
tional days remained on hand and basic loads were impaired. A new daily

allocation of gasoline to units was approved by the chief of staff. Ar

mored units were allotted 12,500 gallons instead of 25,000, infantry

divisions were allotted 6,500 gallons instead of 5,000, and there was an

increase in the allocation to corps for corps troops. The supply of B

rations became critical.

Active patrolling and rotation of front line troops continued in

the XII Corps zone. Forward elements were harassed by intermittent

small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.

The 10th Armored Division began a move to the XX Corps assembly

area, while elements of the corps continued to patrol and maintain their

positions.

Nine missions totalling 226 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air

Command, with twenty-seven railroad lines cut and fifteen locomotives,

nine military installations, three highway bridges and two miscellane

ous naval vessels were damaged or destroyed.

While additional major units continued to move into Third U.S. Ar

my's area during the day, positions were maintained.

112

S E C K E T

S E C

IINCLASSIF'ED

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that, effective with requisitions

forwarded on this date, the tonnage allocations for Third U. S. Army

would be 3,500 tons, exclusive of ordnance Class V supplies which would

not be charged against the allocation. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was in
formed that even with rigid rationing of gasoline, unit reserves were

being lowered. Shortages of tires, tubes and patches had now reached

the danger stage.

27 OCTOBER (D + 143)

Enemy activity on the XII Corps front consisted of patrolling,

heavy mortar fire and light artillery fire. Active patrolling and light

artillery fire characterized enemy activity in the XX Corps

zone.

Front line positions remained unchanged in the XII Corps zone, with

aggressive patrolling being carried out. The 10th Armored Division con
tinued to move toward the XX Corps assembly area.

Planes of XIX Tactical Air Command were

because of unfavorable weather conditions.

grounded during the period

The Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group gave verbal au

thority for the Army to proceed with the reorganization of tank destroy
er battalions (self-propelled). Arrival of special trains considerably

increased the stocks of B rations.

28 OCTOBER (D + 144)

Positions were maintained and units in contact with the enemy con
tinued to be rotated in the XII Corps zone, An increase in the enemy's

flare activity was noted.

Signal Corps Lineman Repairs Wire

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division resumed the attack on

MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone, with satisfactory pro

gress being made. On the remainder of the corps front there was no

change. An antiaircraft gun battalion, firing in support of XX Corps

Artillery, shelled an enemy troop concentration near the VERDUN forts at

METZ (U85), causing heavy losses to the enemy.

29 OCTOBER (D + 145)

Concentrating on enemy rail and military installations, XIX Tacti

cal Air Command flew 241 sorties in eleven missions. Among claims for

the day were twenty-five railroad lines cut, 219 railroad cars, sixty-

five motor transports, thirty-three locomotives, thirty-one military in

stallations and five highway bridges damaged or destroyed.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division seized all of the town of

MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) except for the town hall where the enemy re
sisted stiffly. This final attack on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was pre
ceded by a thirty-minute preparation by XX Corps artillery, emphasis

being placed on counterbattery fires. Initially the enemy's artillery

reaction was strong and included fire from positions which previously

had remained silent. These positions were promptly attacked with coun
terbattery fire so that early ascendancy was achieved over enemy artil-

Patrol activities continued along the front during the period,

while positions were maintained and the attack on MAIZIEKES-LES-METZ

(U86) was resumed.

S E C

UNCLASSIFIED

113

CLASSlFIEfl

S E C R\E T

lery and maintained throughout the attack. Elements of the 10th Armored

Division arrived in the corps area in the vicinity of MARS-LA-TOUR

(U6$), west of METZ (U8$). Elsewhere in the corps zone there was no

change, METZ (U85) had been completely cleared and Fort3 DRIANT, JEANNE

D'ARC, PLAPPEVILLE and ST QUENTIN were being contained by the 5th Infan
try Division.

30 OCTOBER (D + 146)

Positions were maintained in the XII Corps zone while front lines

were unchanged* The enemy employed harassing mortar and artillery fire

along the corps front*

Elements of Headquarters, III Corps, closed in VANDELAINVILLE

(U74), southwest of METZ (U85), while the main force remained in CARIER
ET (T09)*

All organized resistance in M/HZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) ended at 1400

in the XX Corps zone*

The 10th Armored Division closed in its assembly

area near MARS-LA-TOUR (U65), west of METZ (U85). The 2d Infantry and

elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) were en route to

the zone of the 95th Infantry Division near MSTZ (U85),

Combat planes of the XTX Tactical Air Command had one of their best

days of operation. Flying seventeen missions with 419 sorties various

targets were attacked including enemy aircraft, marshalling yards,

railroads and gun positions. Four hundred and seven tons of bombs were

dropped and 100 enemy fighters were engaged in the air. Twenty-four en
emy aircraft were claimed shot down while the XIX Tactical Air Command

lost six fighters. In addition, five bridges, fifty-nine locomotives,

156 railroad cars and thirteen motor cars were claimed destroyed as well

as nine marshalling yards and twenty-two military buildings hit. The

XIX Tactical Air Command lost a fighter group, which was ordered to be

attached to the First U.S. Army*

Two missions of fifty-three sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air

Command during the period, but no claims were reported*

The supply situation was still incapable of sustaining an

if launched immediately*
Twelfth U.S. Army Group was asked
authority to the Advance Section Communications Zone to ship
gasoline over and above the requirements of other Armies to
U.S. Army in order to build up reserves*

Principal operational achievement of the day was the clearing of

MAIZI2RSS-LE3-METZ (U86) except for the town hall.

offensive

to grant

available

the Third

31 OCTOBER (D-h 147)

(Map for this date aooompanies text)

Patrolling was active

change in the front lines*

in the XII Corps

zone, but there was no

In the XX Corps zone the 2d Infantry and elements of the 10th In

fantry (5th Infantry Division) relieved elements of the 95th Infantry

Division in the MOSELLE River bridgehead. Elements of the 10th Armored

Division relieved the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division), which

moved to an area west of AUDUN (U68), northwest of METZ (U85). There

was no change in the front lines.

XIX Tactical Air Command again was limited in its operations be

cause of adverse weather conditions, but flew eighty sorties with claims

of one railroad line cut and seventeen military installations destroyed

or damaged*

As the result of operations for the day, Third U.S. Army continued

to rotate and regroup its units in contact with the enemy in order to

give the maximum rest to troops who had been in combat for a consider
able time*

Advance Section Communications Zone was asked for an emergency

shipment of 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel and was informed that the

Third U.S. Army daily telegram requests were not being met. No diesel

was on hand and arrangements were made with the Seventh U.S. Army to ex
change 10,000 gallons of No. 10 motor oil for 10,000 gallons of diesel,

the exchange to be made on 1 November*

* * * * *

Supplies Travel By Rail Across Bridge Built By Army Engineers

UNCLASSIFIED

S EC

SE

UNCLASSiFIED

OCTOBER-

MARK I I I

IV

COMPARATIVE CHARTS-LOSSES OF MATERIEL Q

IT

d
mUm

10

II

IT

ft

TANKS, LIGHT

CKJ

12

14 15

13

16 17 18 19 20 21 2 2 23 24 25 2 6 27 28 29 30 31

42

i
EACH SYME

*EPR :SENI S 5 TAN KS

i _

o Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo X\ Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo Xo

OCTOBER-

10

II

12

14

13

15

16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2 8 29 3 0 31
16

MARK VI
SYMBOL REPRESENTS
i

3 TANKS

TANKS, MEDIUM
v - x o x ^ x o x 6 x o x o x \ x o x o x o x o

OCTOBER-

10

xo

X O X N

X O X ^ X O

12 13

14 15

X O X O X O X O X O X O X O

16 17 18

X O

X O X O X O X O X O X O

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
28

ARTY (75MM a OVER)

EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS

4 PIECES

# 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 /O/O/O/O/O/O/N /O /O /O /O /O/O/O/O/O /n^/o/o / o / \ / \ /o /o /o

OCTOBER-

10

12

13 14

15 16

17

18 19 2 0 21 22 23 2 4 25 26 27 28 29 3 0 31

107
VEHICLES

SYMBOL

REPRESENTS

116

S E^GL R E T

10 VEHICLES

ET

<

OCTOBER
DEAO(EST)
WOUNOED(EST
CAPTURED
TOTAL

2
2800
102

800

300

800

225

10

2000
2033

2000

12
300

13

14

16

17

1800

500

18

19

20

21

6 60

22

23

24

25

26

W0UNDED

27

29

28

500

300
7

9
474

CASUALTY

15

31

30

1300
5

409

CHART

*INCLUDE c i ^07 PW'Q FVAPIIATPn

THROUGH MEDICAL CHANNELS FOR MONTH

f\

39,000
38,000
37,000
36,000
35,000
34,000
33,000
32,000
31,000
30,000
29,000
28 000
27 00O
26 00 0
25 000
24 000
23,000
22 000
21 000
20 0 00
19 000
18 000
17 000
16,000
15 000
14 000
13 0 00
12 0 00
11 000
10000
9,0 00
8,0 00
7,0 00
6,0 00
5,0 00
4,0 00
<
3,0 00
2,0 00
1,0 0 0
0
DEAD
DAILY

51

COMPARATIVE
A.f\ f\f\

THIRD U S ARMY a THE ENEMY

LEGEND
^

r~ KI r~ k A \ /

33,472

/
_,

NOTE TOP OF GRAPH O A I I Y

FNFMY

BOTTOM OF GRAPH- THIRD

CASUALTIES

U S ARMY CASUALTIES

^ '

'

< >

i >

( i

( 1

//

/
/
/
/

-4 v

>

i >

11

<

kaMCS

<

"<

1I

5,989

[- 1

|'

131

MISSING
TOTAL

60

S E C Rs E T

UNCLASSIFIED

117

THIRD ARMY

MAIN SUPPLY ROADS

OPERATING RAILROADS

and

SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-31 OCTOBER 1944

AROUEMINES
0-/2 SP

c-/2 ocr
w xo- a SSP
T Jc/2 ocr

1-5 ocr
\O-lf iP

k- lo ocr

LEGEND
O C -

118

OPENED

CLOSED

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY ThllRD US ARMY

13 I 14 I 15 I 16 1 17

OCTOBER

DAILY

I9|2O|21

61*60723

BREAKDOWN

CUMULATIVE

BREAKDOWN

Cumulative

CUMULATIVE

FROM

I AUGUST

His build-up reached the equivalent

front by 1 October.

THB MONTH IN REVIEW

of seven divisions

along the Army

Following is a brief summary of operations for October:

Ill Corps remained in CARTSRST (T09) on the COTBNTIN Peninsula

throughout the month with the exception of advance elements of corps

Headquarters which closed at VANDKLAINVTLLE (U74), south of METZ (U85),

on 29 October,

Major contact with the enemy resulted from the XII Corps drive to

enlarge and improve its bridgehead east of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE

Rivers and the Third U.S. Armyfs effort to wipe out the enemys bridge
head west of METZ (U85). Aggressive and determined enemy opposition met

both of these offensives. The enemy's resistance in the first days of

the month carried the impetus developed in the last days of September.

Enemy resistance to the XII Corps expansion of the bridgehead east

of NANCY (U81) continued strong throughout the first part of the month.

S E C-if E T

CLASSIFIED

119

\i

.+

,..

,.

f*

,,i

y>

'

However,
numerous unsuccessful counterattacks
sapped the enemy's

strength without preventing further development of the bridgehead to in

clude the high ground along and east of the SEILI2 River which the Army

desired*

During October, the 7,346,755 gallons of gasoline received amounted

to 67 percent of requests*
As the result of rationing, average daily

issues of gasoline were approximately 216,000 gallons, in contrast to

the average issue of 313,000 gallons during September* The Army reserve

stock of gasoline at the end of the month totaled 638,235 gallons*

In the XX Corps zone the line from the northern boundary south to

HAUCONCOURT (U87) remained stable with the enemy disposed thinly along

the east bank of the MOSELLE River*

Enemy patrols crossed to the west

of the river and harassing and interdicting artillery fire persisted

throughout the period in this area*

In the METZ (U85) bridgehead the

defending forces, stiffened by a battalion of officer candidates from

the school at METZ (U85), staved off the capture of FORT DRIANT.

Slightly to the north in the same bridgehead, the enemy tenaciously de

fended through the month the Army's assault on MAIZIBRSS-LBS-MBTZ (U86),

from which he was finally cleared on 30 October*

At the end of October the ammunition supply was still tight and

units in contact voluntarily instituted a system of self-rationing when

the seriousness of the situation became known to them. Ordnance Class

II and Class IV supplies were in an improved condition at the end of the

month, although fire control equipment was still critical. The shortage

of small arms was greatly alleviated because of the battlefield recovery

drive instituted earlier in the month. During October Third U.S. Army

ammunition personnel handled 124,361 tons of ammunition and attached

Quartermaster truck companies traveled 450,000 miles to haul supplies*

In the Army bridgehead east of NANCY (U81), the enemy was cleared

to the general line SI7RY (U82)--FHBSNES (Q02)~ CHAMBHEY ($02) in the

first four days of the month, with bitter fighting developing at SI7RY

(U82)* For the remainder of the month the enemy was able to mount only

small, local counterattacks, none of which did more than delay tempor
arily the taking of the limited objectives designed to strengthen the

Army's bridgehead*

Early in the month the enemy realized that the current major threat

to the stability of his front did not exist in the Third U.S. Army zone*

The counterattacks against the XII Corps diminished rapidly as the enemy

reshuffled his forces and disposed his better-trained and more mobile

elements to meet the growing major threats in Holland, at AACHEN (84)

and in the Seventh U.S. Army zone*

At end of the month the enemy

strength opposing the Army was estimated at five divisions*

Enemy air activity was on a limited scale during the month as com
pared to August and September*
Only when a serious threat to vital

areas developed was any large scale effort made by the Luftwaffe. Anti
aircraft claims for the month were twenty-seven planes destroyed or

probably destroyed, bringing the total since beginning of operations to

464*

120

UNCLASSIFIED

During the month, 5,070 vehicles in forty-two convoys were cleared

for Third U.S. Army units carrying 194,655 tons of supplies and 119,530

troops.

Battle casualties and changes in casualty status reports pertaining

to 17,412 casualties were processed, an average of 561 per day.

During October there were 629 normal promotions, 234 battlefield

promotions and seventy-four battlefield appointments processed. A total

of 2,541 awards were made to Army personnel.

Towns captured by the Third U.S. Army during October were GREVEN
MACHER (L02), WORMELDINGEN (L01), ECHTERNACH (103), MOIVRONS (U92),

FOSSIEUX (U92), AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT (U92), JEANDE1AINC0URT

(U92), and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86)*

As the month, ended, D-Day for resumption of the offensive against

the enemy was announced as between 5 and 8 November, depending on the

weather, but in any case not later than 8 November.

Strength of the Army at the end of

against 224,785 at the end of September.

the month

was 252,000, as