Safety culture and safety management

within the Norwegian-controlled

shipping industry
State of art, interrelationships, and influencing factors
By

Helle A. Oltedal
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of
The requirements for the degree of
PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR
(PhD)

Faculty of Social Sciences

2011

University of Stavanger
N-4036 Stavanger
NORWAY
www.uis.no
2011 Helle A. Oltedal
ISBN: 978-82-7644-464-3
ISSN: 1890-1387

ii

Preface
My interest in the shipping industry started while working on a project in
which I calculated the risk for ships making contact with high-rise
constructions located shore side. When searching for background information,
I realized that very little research concerning safety related to human factors
and seafarers welfare existed. I found evidence of seafarers working under
unacceptable working conditions, sailing on rust buckets, jeopardizing their
own safety as well as that of the vesselsin some cases afraid to come
forward out of fear of losing their jobs. At the same time, working at sea was
ranked as one of the most dangerous occupations in the world. This situation
triggered my interest in the field and the research presented in this thesis.
I need to thank several people for their contribution during the process of
completing this PhD. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Ole A.
Engen for his encouragement, help, and support throughout this process. I
would also like to thank my colleague Doctor David McArthur for helping me
with statistical problems as well as useful comments and suggestions while
writing the articles. Dean A. Rune Johansen has also been a great support
during my research. Thanks to his engagement in the maritime industry, I was
able to receive funding for five more years of researchsomething that I
appreciate tremendously. I would like to mention Captain Vigleik Storesund,
who has been a great help in enabling me to understand the maritime industry
and life at sea. Last, but not least, Chief Officer Johanne Marie Trovg,
Professor Knud Knudsen, and Professor Preben Hempel Linde all made
tremendous efforts in reading through my final work.

iii

Furthermore, I would like to thank the Norwegian Shipowners Association

for helping me get in touch with their members. Although they cannot all be
mentioned by name, I wish to thank the shipping companies who volunteered
to participate and all the seafarers whodespite a hectic working situation
found time to contribute with their views. In addition several companies have
enabled me to sail on their vessels and in other ways participate in their daily
operations.
I would also like to thank Dr. Nick Bailey and Professor Helen Sampson at
the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) in Cardiff, Wales, for
making my research stay there possible.
My apologies to all of you who have not been mentioned. I cannot mention
you all, but no one has been forgotten. During my research, I have gained
valuable and useful contributions from many people of different nationalities,
including academics, practitioners, seafarers, and shore personnel working in
all parts of the shipping industry.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement and support.
I also want to apologize to my two young children who have had a mum
preoccupied with research for such a long time. I have spent long periods
away from home and, when staying at home, I have been mentally absent. I
hope I can now make up for the lost time. It would not have been possible to
complete this thesis without the support of my incredibly patient and
supportive husband Mikal. Thus, I dedicate this thesis to themMikal and
our two exceptional and wonderful children, Jrgen and Elene.
Haugesund, April 2011, Helle A. Oltedal
iv

Summary
This research focuses attention on safety challenges within the Norwegian
shipping industry. A status picture of the shipboard safety culture and the
interrelationships with safety management and organizational factors is given.
Three research questions are explored: (1) What characterizes safety culture
and safety management within the shipping industry? (2) What is the
relationship between safety culture and safety performance within the
shipping industry? (3) What characterizes shipping companies application of
the safety management concept? In order to explore these research questions,
four aims were defined to guide this work: (1) to outline and discuss the
application of safety culture and safety management within merchant
shipping; (2) to outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and
safety management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and
safety management; (3) to support the use of a methodological framework for
the assessment of safety culture in relation to safety management; and (4) to
assess safety culture within merchant shipping and analyze the relationship
with safety management and actual performance. The research questions are
further examined and specified in six journal articles.
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part I includes the overall
framework in relation to research aims. Part II presents the six journal articles.
In part I, chapter 1, a general introduction and a status picture of risk, safety
management, and safety culture within the shipping industry are presented,
which gives reason for the research aims and questions introduced in the
chapter. Chapter 2 outlines the safety responsibilities within the industry at
the international, national, and company levels. Emphasis is placed on the
v

International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which provides the minimum

standards and guidelines for operational safety management. Chapter 3
provides theoretical clarification and framing with regard to safety culture and
safety management. This chapter also introduces a general working model
used in the studies of safety culture and safety management in this thesis.
Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach. The thesis builds upon a
mixed method approach where both qualitative and quantitative techniques
are used. The main results are briefly summarized in Chapter 5, followed by a
discussion in Chapter 6 and concluding remarks in Chapter 7. The concluding
remarks concern study limitations, implications, and suggestions for future
research.
The thesis draws upon theory from both the socio-anthropological and
organizational psychological directions. In accordance with the organizational
psychological perspective, a survey was carried out. A safety culture
questionnaire developed by Studio Apertura, a constituent centre of The
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in collaboration
with the Norwegian DNV and the research institution SINTEF was used. In
total, 1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tanker and bulk/dry cargo
carriers, with 1,262 being returned from 76 of the vessels. The vessels were
initially randomly selected from the Norwegian Shipowners Association
member list, but as participation was voluntary, some withdrawal occurred.
Statistical analysis involves descriptive statistics, factor analysis, regression
analysis, and structural equation modeling. The statistical survey results were
complemented by qualitative data obtained through document studies, case
studies including two tanker companies and two bulk/dry cargo companies,

vi

interviews, participating observations and field studies at sea, and

participation in other maritime forums.
The study results indicate several deficiencies in all parts of a traditional
safety management system defined as: (1) the reporting and collection of
experience data from the vessel; (2) data processing, summarizing, and
analysis; (3) the development of safety measures; and (4) implementation.
The underreporting of experience data is found to be a problem, resulting in
limitations related to the data-processing process. Regarding the development
of safety measures, it is found that the industry emphasizes the development
of standardized safety measures in the form of procedures and checklists.
Organizational root causes related to company policies (e.g., crewing policy)
is to a lesser degree identified and addressed.
The most prominently identified organizational influential factors are the
shipping companies crewing policy, which includes rotation systems, crew
stability, and contract conditions, and shipboard management. The
companies orientation toward local management, which includes leadership
training, educational, and other managerial support, are also essential. The
shore part of the organization is identified as the driving force for
development and change in the shipboard safety culture. Thus, safety
campaigns should to a larger degree include and be directed toward shore
personnel.

vii

List of articles in thesis:

Article 1
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2009). Local management and its impact on
safety culture and safety within Norwegian shipping. In S. Martorell, C.
Guedes Soares & J. Barnett (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis:
Theory, Methods and Applications (pp. 1423-1430). London: Taylor &
Francis Group.
Article 2
Oltedal, H. & Wadsworth, E. (2010). Risk perception in the Norwegian
shipping industry and identification of influencing factors. Maritime Policy &
Management, 37(6), 601-623.
Article 3
Oltedal, H. A. (2010). The use of safety management systems within the
Norwegian tanker industryDo they really improve safety? In R. Bris, C.
Guedes Soares, & S. Martorell (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety: Theory
and Applications (pp. 2355-2362). London: Taylor & Francis Group.

viii

Article 4
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Tanker versus dry cargoThe use of
safety management systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping. In J.M.
Ale, I.A. Papazoglou, & E. Zio (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety (pp. 21182125). London: Taylor & Francis Group.
Article 5
Oltedal, H. & McArthur, D. (2010). Reporting practices in merchant shipping,
and the identification of influencing factors. Safety Science, 49(2), 331-338.
Article 6
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Safety Management in Shipping
Making Sense of limited Success. Safety Science Monitor, submitted.

ix

Contents
Preface ............................................................................................................ iii
Summary ..........................................................................................................v
List of articles in thesis: ............................................................................... viii
Contents ............................................................................................................x
Part I .................................................................................................................1
1

General background and introduction ..................................................1

1.1

Safety culture and safety management within shipping.................... 2

1.2

Research aims and research questions .............................................. 5

1.3

Aims of articles ................................................................................. 7

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry ........................................11

2.1

The International Safety Management (ISM) Code ........................ 13

2.2

Maritime administrations and responsibilities ................................ 17

The flag state ........................................................................................... 18

The Port State Control ............................................................................ 20
The company and crew management ...................................................... 23
2.3

When the regulatory framework and safety management fails ....... 24

2.4

Safety responsibilities in the maritime industrya summary ........ 27

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practice ..........29

3.1

Safety culture as an organizational integrated concept ................... 33

3.2

Organizations, management and cultural change ........................... 37

3.3

Organizational culture and safety management .............................. 41

The Man Made Disaster model ............................................................... 43

Normal Accident Theory ........................................................................ 45
High Reliability Organizations Theory ................................................... 47
Managing risk and safety culture ............................................................ 49
The theory of Practical Drift why organizations fails .......................... 51
3.4
4

Safety culture and measurable outcome variables .......................... 53

Research methodology ...........................................................................56

4.1

Quantitative research and questionnaire survey.............................. 58

Questionnaire development .................................................................... 60

Survey sample and respondents demographics ..................................... 61
Validity and reliability through theoretical conceptualization ................ 62
Validity and reliability through factor analysis....................................... 66
Validity and reliability through scale analysis ........................................ 68
Causal relationship through structural equation modeling ..................... 70

xi

4.2

Qualitative research design ............................................................. 71

Document study ...................................................................................... 71

Case studies............................................................................................. 73
Interviews................................................................................................ 73
Participatory observation ........................................................................ 74
Participation in maritime forums ............................................................ 75
4.3
5

Applied methods and statistics in articles ....................................... 76

Research results .....................................................................................78

5.1

Summary and results of article 1 .................................................... 78

5.2

Summary and results of article 2 .................................................... 80

5.3

Summary and results of article 3 .................................................... 83

5.4

Summary and results of article 4 .................................................... 85

5.5

Summary and results of article 5 .................................................... 87

5.6

Summary and results of article 6 .................................................... 89

5.7

Causal relationships between components of safety culture ........... 91

5.8

Summing up and presentations of main conclusions ...................... 98

Discussion ...............................................................................................99

Concluding remarks ............................................................................107

xii

7.1

Methodological limitations ........................................................... 107

7.2

Theoretical limitations .................................................................. 109

7.3

Future research .............................................................................. 109

7.4

Final remarks ................................................................................ 110

References .............................................................................................112

Part II ............................................................................................................124
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6

xiii

General background and introduction

PartI
1 Generalbackgroundandintroduction
Never before have so few done so much for so many. When opening the
Year of the Seafarer in 2010, these brave wordsa quotation paraphrased
from one of Winston Churchills most famous speecheswere similarly
strikingly declared by Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary General of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Few people seem to understand
the importance of seafarers and shipping in our society. The worldwide
population of seafarers serving in international trade is estimated to be
approximately 1,187,000 people from virtually every nationality. Worldwide,
about 50,000 ships carry about 90% of the worlds trade; thus, these more
than one million seafarers are transporting goods for the benefit for the
worlds population of almost 7 billion. The seafarers and shipping industrys
global importance is commonly highlighted by the phrase without shipping,
half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.
The current research is conducted in light of safety challenges within
merchant shipping. During the first five years of the previous decade (i.e.,
2000 to 2005), an average of 18 ships collided, grounded, or caught fire every
single day, and two vessels were sinking every day (Gregory & Shanahan,
2010). Merchant shipping and seafaring are traditionally perceived as a risky
industrya risk partly induced by its situational characteristics. Work at sea
is demanding as both work and leisure time happens within a small group, at
the same place, for a long period of time and with few possibilities to interact
with the surrounding world. The seafarers only alternative whereabouts when
1

General background and introduction

at sea is the sea itself, where harsh conditions prevail. Seafarers and their
vessels are constantly exposed to forces beyond their control, such as storms,
freak waves, and strong currents. Being far from port most of the time, the
seafarer must handle critical situations with little or no support from others,
with only their own competence and expertise to rely on.

1.1 Safety culture and safety management within

shipping
Human error is associated with the vast majority of accidents and incidents
within shipping. An estimated 75% to 96% of marine casualties are caused
at least in partby some form of human error (Anderson, 2003; Rothblum,
2000; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987). However, within recent safety
management theories, human error is not seen as a cause of accidents and
incidents, but rather as something shaped and provoked by upstream
organizational factors. Thus, human error is not an explanation per se, but
something that needs further explaining (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2001).
Possible explanatory factors may be related to seafarers cognitive system
(e.g., human information processing, training, motivation, and fear), social
system (e.g., social pressure, role, and life stress), and situational system (e.g.,
physical stress, environmental stress, and ergonomic aspects), which are all
assumed to be mutually interdependent (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987). It is
also widely accepted that individual factors are inextricably linked to
organizational factors and decisions (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2001; Schager,
2008).

General background and introduction

Safety at sea is regulated by the UNs agency for maritime affairs, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). From the IMO perspective, safety
management and human error are closely intertwined with the industrys
definition and application of the safety culture concept, regulated through the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code (IMO, 2010a; Lappalainen,
2008; Mitroussi, 2003). The ISM Code, which became mandatory for all
merchant vessels from July 1998 to July 2002, formally introduced the idea of
safety culture in shipping:
The application of the ISM Code should support and encourage the
development of a safety culture in shipping. Success factors for the
development of a safety culture are, inter alia, commitment, values
and beliefs (IMO, 2010a, p. 35).
However, despite the implementation of the ISM Code, recent statistics
indicate that losses are continuing to increase, resulting in a heavy loss of life
and serious damage to the environment (Soma, 2010). The statistics in Figure
1 illustrate the frequency of navigational accidents (collisions, contacts, and
wrecked/stranded vessels) from 1993 to 2009.

General background and introduction

Figure 1: Navigational accident frequency in relation to the world fleet size,

1993-2009 (Source: Lloyds Fairplay, 2010) Fleet size in number of crude oil
tankers over 100,000 dwt, chemical tankers over 10,000 dwt, containers over
20,000 dwt, RoRo cargo over 10,000 dwt, bulk over 50,000 dwt.

As shown in Figure 1, the frequency of serious navigational accidents has

increased significantly since 2002. It is also interesting to note that, since the
first introduction of the code in 1998, none of the subsequent years show
lower accident frequency than before the code was introduced. This statistical
trend raises a fundamental question: Why do we have such an increase in the
accident rates despite the introduction of the ISM Code, emphasis on safety
culture, and lower tolerance for non-conformities? Three possible
explanations have been put forth:
1. Shipping companies implementation of the ISM Code and
understanding of safety management are inadequate. The IMO
assessment of the effectiveness of the ISM Code (IMO, 2005)
indicates that implementation has resulted in more administrative
4

General background and introduction

work, procedures, checklists, and other means in order to control

human behavior. However, is safety best ensured by controlling and
restricting human behavior?
2. The ISM Codes underlying theoretical rationale of linear causality is
inadequate. Is it possible to prevent future accidents by learning from
past events? Are there any causal links between near misses, minor
incidents, and major accidents? When dealing with future events
evolving in an unforeseen and complex pattern, are other rationalities
more adequate?
3. The ISM Codes assumption of a relationship between safety culture
and actual safety performance and outcome is inadequate. What is
organizational safety culture and what determines its relations to
safety management, organizational practices, and safety performance?
This thesis provides an account of these three possible explanations.
Empirical data are collected from the Norwegian controlled liquid and dry
cargo shipping industry for this purpose. The data are analyzed and discussed
in light of theory on safety management and safety culture. The seafarers
perspective and their operative experiences are emphasized. The analyses and
discussion will be consistent with the scope of the research aims and
questions, as formulated in the following sections.

1.2 Researchaimsandresearchquestions
Although shipping is known to be a risky industry, surprisingly little research
has been done within this area. In recent years, a few articles and doctoral
5

General background and introduction

theses on maritime safety culture and climate have been published (e.g.,
Antonsen & Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for
sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009; Christophersen, 2009; Ek, 2006; Hvold &
Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for industriell
konomi og teknologiledelse, 2007; Lamvik, 2002; streng, 2007). In light of
the discussed situation, it is important to get a better understanding of what
characterizes safety culture within shipping and how shipboard safety culture
relates to safety management and human error. Thus, the following four
research aims have been developed in order to provide direction for this
thesis:
1. To outline and discuss the application of safety culture and safety
management within merchant shipping.
2. To outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and safety
management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and
safety management.
3. To give reason for a methodological framework for assessment of
safety culture in relation to safety management.
4. To assess safety culture within merchant shipping and analyze the
relationship with safety management and actual performance.
In order to pursue these aims, a questionnaire survey was carried out within
merchant shipping along with field studies, case studies, interviews, and other
qualitative methods. The population is defined within the Norwegian
controlled shipping industry as liquid tankers and dry cargo carriers above
500 gross ton. Norwegian controlled is defined as vessels owned by

General background and introduction

Norwegian parties where the owners safety management department is

located in Norway. In the study, the seafarers perspective is emphasized.
Based on the four research aims previously described, three research
questions were developed for the purpose of the thesis:
1. What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the
shipping industry?
2. What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance
within the shipping industry?
3. What characterizes shipping companies application of the safety
management concept?

1.3 Aimsofarticles
The thesis includes six separate studies with their own main aims. All aims
for each study are discussed in this section.
1. Local management and its impact on safety culture and safety within
Norwegian shipping:
The first study uses survey data collected in 2006. The data cover all sailing
personnel on 76 Norwegian controlled liquid tankers and dry cargo carriers.
The aims of the study are to:
Explore and analyze the shipboard characteristics of safety culture;
Identify which factors affect the shipboard safety culture; and
Get results in order to set direction for further studies.
7

General background and introduction

2. Risk

perception

in

the

Norwegian

shipping

industry

and

identification of influencing factors:

This second article makes use of the same survey data. In this study, the
catering personnel and captains are excluded. Risk perception is used as an
indicator for shipboard safety. The aims of the study are to:
Assess the relationship between risk perception and dimensions of
safety culture; and
Explore the influence of organizational structural variables.
3. The use of safety management systems within the Norwegian tanker
industry and whether they really improve safety:
The third study involves both quantitative survey data and qualitative data.
The sub-sample dry cargo carriers are excluded. The data and analyses are
organized in accordance with the sub-components and information flow of a
traditional safety management system. The aims of the study are to:
Describe the status of safety management within the liquid tanker
sector; and
Identify organizational structural factors that influence the safety
management performance.

General background and introduction

4. Tanker versus dry cargo regarding the use of safety management

systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping:
The fourth study is a follow-up of the third, and follows a similar structure
related to the sub-components and information flow of a traditional safety
management system. The study includes both quantitative survey data and
qualitative data. The sub-sample liquid cargo carriers are excluded. The aims
of the study are to:
Describe the status of safety management within the dry cargo sector;
Identify organizational structural factors that influence the safety
management performance; and
Compare current situations between the two sectorsnamely, dry and
liquid cargo carriers.
5. Reporting practices in merchant shipping and the identification of
influencing factors:
The fifth study involves quantitative survey data. Both the third and fourth
study identified underreporting of experience data as a substantial problem.
The reporting of experience data is regarded as a main cornerstone in a safety
management system. Thus, the aims of the article are to:
Assess the relationship between reporting practices and the dimensions
of safety culture;
Explore the influence of local management; and

General background and introduction

Further explore differences between the dry and liquid cargo carrier
sectors.
6. Safety management in shipping and making sense of limited success:
The sixth study involves both quantitative survey data and qualitative data. As
the previous studies (i.e., three through five) point to a substantial weakness in
current safety management practices, the aim of this study is to:
Explore and identify reasons for the gaps between safety ambitions
inherent in traditional safety management systems and operational
practices.

10

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

2 Safetyresponsibilitiesinmaritimeindustry
This section is, in accordance with specified research aim 1, formulated as
follows:
1.

To outline and discuss the application of safety culture and safety

management within merchant shipping.

The development of international trade and shipping in todays globalized
market has to a large degree determined the regulative structure of the
industry. The international regulative system is of high importance for the
safety of ships and crew sailing the seven seas, as every shipping company is
required to relate to this during daily operations. In order to gain proper
understanding of safety management within shipping, knowledge of the most
important laws and the international regulative framework is necessary. Thus,
some of the historical mainlines and the present situation related to safety
management and the regulatory system will be further presented. An overview
of the international regulatory system, maritime administration, and
conventions (conventions in bold) related to safety management are shown in
Figure 2 (next page).

11

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

Maritime Administrations
(Flag and Costal States)

United Nations (UN)

United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

International Maritime Organization

(IMO)

Convention for the Safety of Life

The International Safety

at Sea (SOLAS)

Management (ISM) Code

Figure 2: The maritime international regulatory system related to safety

management

As shown in Figure 2, the maritime administrations (flag and coastal states)

safety responsibilities are determined by the UN through the Convention on
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS sets the broad regulative
framework, the task of developing and maintaining workable regulations on
ship safety within this framework is delegated to the UN agency the IMO,
which is now responsible for 35 international conventions and agreements.
For the purpose of this thesis, the most relevant is the Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) chapter IX, management for the safe operation
of ships, and the guidelines for SOLAS IXnamely, the ISM Code.

12

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

2.1 TheInternationalSafetyManagement(ISM)Code
The ISM Code became mandatory for all merchant vessels above 500 gross
tons in two waves, depending upon type of vesselnamely, July 1, 1998, and
July 1, 2002. Until the adoption of the ISM Code, IMO had attempted to
improve shipping safety largely by improving the hardware of shipping (e.g.,
the construction of ships and their equipment). By comparison, the ISM Code
focuses on the way shipping companies are managed. The ISM Code is the
first to provide regulations and guidelines to promote the development of
sound management and operating practices in order to ensure crew safety and
avoid damage to the environment. The shipping industry is known to have a
reactive approach toward safety as the process of regulating the activity has
evolved primarily as a response to maritime disasters. Development of the
ISM Code was also based upon a growing recognition that loss of life at sea
and environmental pollution are influenced by the way in which companies
manage their fleets. Table 1 (next page) summarizes some of the accidents
precursory to the ISM Code (Anderson, 2003).

13

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

Table 1.
Accidents Precursory to the ISM Code
1987

Herald of Free Enterprise capsized off Zeebrugge; 190 people lost their
lives.

1987

Donna Paz ferry collided with a tanker in the Philippines; an estimated 4,386
people were killed.

1989

Exxon Valdes ran aground off the coast of Alaska, spilling 37,000 tons of oil
and causing extensive environmental damage.

1990

Scandinavian Star caught fire; 158 people lost their lives.

1991

Agip Abruzzo, with 80,000 tonnes of light crude on board, was in a collision
with the ro-ro ferry Moby Prince off Livorno, Italy. Fire and pollution
occurred, and 143 people died.

1991

Have experienced fire and explosion off Genova, spilling 50,000 tons of
crude oil; 6 people were killed.

1991

The Egyptian ferry Salem Express struck a reef and sank; 470 people were
killed.

1991

Aegean Sea broke in two off La Coruna, Spain, spilling about 74,000 tons of
crude oil; extensive pollution occurred.

1993

Braer driven onto the Shetland Island, carrying about 84,700 light crude oil;
extensive pollution occurred.

1994

Estonia ro-ro passenger ferry sank after the bow door fell off during heavy
weather at sea; 852 people lost their lives.

A common factor appearing in these accidents was human error, which could
be traced back to poor safety management and organizational practice. By
introducing the ISM Code, IMO intended to adopt a proactive approach

14

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

toward safety, where future accidents should be prevented by learning from
and reflecting upon previous mistakes and experiences.
The ISM Code requires shipping companies to develop, implement, and
maintain a safety management system, which includes the following
functional requirements: (1) a safety policy; (2) instructions and procedures to
ensure safe operations of ships in compliance with relevant international and
flag state legislation; (3) defined levels of authority and lines of
communication between and amongst shore and shipboard personnel; (4)
procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provision of
the ISM Code; (5) procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency
situations; and (6) procedures for internal audits and management reviews. In
the codes guidelines, emphasis is placed on near-miss reporting and how to
create an organizational atmosphere in which people are willing to report
accidents and non-conformities by developing a just culture. The concept of a
just culture is also known to be a fundamental element in James Reasons
theory of safety culture and safety management (Reason, 2001). Moreover, in
order to achieve the development of an organizational safety culture, IMO
identifies three key elements: (1) recognizing that accidents are preventable
by following correct procedures and establishing best practices; (2) constantly
thinking about safety; and (3) seeking continuous improvement. IMOs
approach and perspective to safety culture is apparently instrumental, where
safety culture is seen as something that may be engineered by an
organizations structures and control systems in order to produce desired
behavioral norms and accompanying safety outcomes.
Safety management, as described in the ISM Code, is founded on a linear
causality, in which future events are attempted, predicted, and prevented by
15

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

analyzing past operational experiences. Thus, a critical system requirement is
reliability and accuracy of input datathe experience, near miss, and accident
reports ; as long as the input is reliable, the overall system presupposes the
possibility of developing efficient standardized measures in order to control
operational safety (Kjellen, 2000). One underlying assumption is that serious
injuries and accidents may be prevented by learning from and reflecting upon
incidents with no injury or damage. This idea is frequently illustrated as a near
miss-accident pyramid. However, previous research does not support this
theory (Anderson, 2003). Moreover, IMO recognized that near misses are
underreported (IMO, 2007c), and the input system requirement is not met.
This also provides a reason to question the underlying theory of linear
causality, especially if near misses, small-scale accidents, and more serious
events have the same causal chain (Rundmo, 1996).
In 2005, IMO provided a report assessing the impact and effectiveness of
implementation of the ISM Code (IMO, 2005). Based on the data collected,
IMO concluded thatwhen the ISM Code and safety cultural development is
embraced as a positive steptangible positive benefits are evident. It was also
recognized that ISM Code compliance could be made easier through a
reduction in the administrative processes by, inter alia, the reduction of
paperwork, increased reporting of operational experience data, and greater
involvement of seafarers in the development of ISM manuals, the procedural
system, and checklists. In the industry, it seems to be a common
misconception that the ISM Code requires large quantities of paperwork and
administration to function and that ticking boxes and checklists would replace
good training and seamanship (Anderson, 2003).

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Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

Although the national maritime government is responsible for implementation
of the ISM Code, the coastal state is responsible for enforcement of the code,
and each shipping company has the primary responsibility for safe operations.
However, these responsibilities are challenging as shipping today has
becomemore than ever beforea globalized industry. For example, a
vessel may have owners in one state, be registered in a second state, be
chartered by a company from a third state, and be transporting goods whose
owners belong to a fourth state. To make it even more complicated, the vessel
is sailing between ports in different states and is manned with a multinational
and culturally diverse crew, who are managed by a company in yet another
state. These sector-related circumstances have resulted in specific challenges
with regard to the administration and enforcement of international regulations,
as outlined in the following section.

2.2 Maritimeadministrationsandresponsibilities
A maritime administration may have two different roles: a flag state and a
coastal state. The coastal states responsibility for the enforcement of
international regulations is done through inspections and Port State Control
(PSC) of vessels entering their own coastal territorial waters, regardless of
which flag the vessel is flying (Stopford, 2009). The coastal state may be the
same as the flag state, but this is far from always the rule. Any ship owner is
free to register a vessel in any of the worlds flag states.1 The term flag state

The definition of a flag state is not straightforward. A myriad of descriptions of flag states have evolved,

including traditional maritime nation, embedded maritime nation, national flag, classis register, open
register, opportunist register, international open register, international register, closed register, second
register, dependent territory register, offshore register, and flag of convenience (Mansell & SpringerLink,

17

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

(or administration) is used to refer to a country that maintains a vessels
registry. The flag state has the overall responsibility for ensuring compliance
with international regulations. This responsibility encompasses the operation
of the ship, the physical status of the ship, the activities of the ship owners,
and the working conditions of the seafarers. The flag administration, in the
first instance, underwrites the safe operation of those ships under its flag.

Theflagstate
Each flag state may have a national register, second register, and/or open
register. A national register is reserved to vessels with national ownership.
Second registers, which are additional to national registers, are mostly open
registers. In an open register, ships owned by foreign entities may register.
The creation of second registers is a response to intensified competition in the
market for ship registration. In the early 1980s, the shipping market
experienced a severe depression. Since the late 1980s, a number of states have
created second registers in addition to their first national register in order to
provide some or all of the advantages of an open register as a result of the
economic crisis. A common motivation for establishing such second registers
are to attract shipowners or prevent shipowners from flagging out by
providing other or more relaxed application of the international IMO
regulations (Alderton, 2004). Income in the form of tonnage taxation fee is
also a motivation for some nations to establish a register when they do not
necessarily have the means, will, or competence to meet their responsibilities
as a flag state. According to Alderton (2004), low barriers to entry into the

2009). In this thesis, flag state refers to an open international register where any shipping owner is free to
register a merchant vessel.

18

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

flag market exist, with minimal start-up cost or time being required. This
situation has led to competition among some maritime administrations,
whichin order to encourage registration of vessels under their flagpermits
less bureaucratic control along with relaxed requirements.
International regulations adopted by IMO intend to provide a harmonized set
of rules for the industry. The previously described situation has resulted in
variations among maritime administrations in performance and application of
the international regulations (Alderton, 2004). Alderton (2004) distinguishes
between three types of administrations:
(1)

Regulatory efficient states in which the state seeks to regulate the full

extent of maritime operations.

(2)

Regulatory inefficient states; the main distinction between this

category and the first lies in the treatment of labor issues.

(3)

Unregulated states, in which the regulatory environment within these

registers is almost non-existent.

Many of todays safety-related criticisms are related to ship registration and to
which flag the vessels fly. Although substandard shipping is mostly associated
with regulatory inefficient and unregulated states, even administrations
regarded as being regulatory efficient may have defective performance. An
audit of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, which is regarded as being
regulatory efficient, revealed that the administration does not have, inter alia,
adequate operational control with its own working procedures and that the
administrated regulations are not comprehended in unison, which may result
in misinterpretations and erroneous decisions (Riksrevisjonen, 2010).

19

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

As long as the flag states benefit from running open registries and shipowners
can benefit from it, the situation will most likely never change. Moreover, the
lack of flag state control, as evident in several countries, has made PSC even
more important.

ThePortStateControl
In the wake of some major maritime disasters in the European area (e.g.,
accidents with the Erika in 2000 and Prestige in 2002, which both occurred
after the implementation of the ISM Code), it was realized that the PSC and
ParisMOU2 could and should take a more determined stance against
substandard shipping in order to ensure better enforcement of the international
regulations.
The Prestige was a Greek-operated oil tanker, officially registered in the
Bahamas, but with a Liberian corporation registered as the owner. The

The ParisMOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on Port State Control is the official document in which

the 27 participating maritime authorities agree to implement a harmonized system of PSC. The MOU
consists of a the main body in which the authorities agree on: 1) their commitments and the relevant
international conventions, 2) the inspection procedures and the investigation of operational procedures, 3)
the exchange of information, and 4) the structure of the organization and amendment procedures. The
current member states of the ParisMOU region are, in alphabetical order, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and The United Kingdom. Following the foundation built by the ParisMOU, several other regional
MOUs have been signed, including the Tokyo MOU (Pacific Ocean), Acuerdo Latino or Acuerdo de Via
del Mar (South and Central America), the Caribbean MOU, the Mediterranean MOU, the Indian Ocean
MOU, the Abuja MOU (West and Central Atlantic Africa), the Black Sea MOU, and the Riyadh MOU
(Persian Gulf). In this thesis, due to its geographic area, references will be made to the ParisMOU
(http://www.parismou.org/).

20

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

ownership of the Prestige was unclear, and it was difficult to establish
responsibility for the accident, which resulted in the spill of more than 60,000
tons of heavy fuel oil. Prior to the accident, the Prestige set sail without being
properly inspected, although a previous captain had complained about
numerous structural deficiencies.
The oil tanker Erika also experienced structural failure. Although the
structural failures were visible, the vessel was found to be seaworthy by the
classification society. The Erika was sailing under a Maltese flag and
chartered by a shipping company registered in the Bahamas on behalf of a
French oil company. With regard to the Erika, it was also difficult to establish
responsibilities (CPEM, 1999). The Erika accident resulted in a spill of about
19,800 tons of heavy fuel oil.
Although both accidents involved structural failures, they can also be
characterized as stemming from a non-functional ISM system. In a functional
safety management system, such structural failures should have been detected
and handled appropriately by the shipping company. In the case of Prestige,
the captain had even notified the company about structural deficiencies that
had not been handled properly. In the aftermath of these accidents, the
response from ParisMOU came in form of developing a harmonized vessel
detention policy, guidelines for operational PSC, and others (ParisMOU,
2007). One of the strategies was naming and shaming. Today, all inspection
results and detentions, with detailed information about the company, vessel,
and flag, are registered in a public database (at parismou.org). Information
about banned vessels and rust buckets are also made public. A more recent
initiative includes a list for the performance of flag states (MARISEC, 2008;
MARISEC, 2006; Winchester, Alderton, & Seafarers International Research
Centre, 2003). On this list, each flag state is evaluated and ranked based on
21

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

their performance on certain aspects, as PSC records ships flying their flags
along with the implementation and enforcement of important international
treaties, such as the ISM Code. Flag state performance is then ranked and
placed on a black list (poor performance), grey list (mediocre performance),
and white list (good performance). The black, grey, and white lists for 2009
included a total number of 82 flags, 24 on the black list, 19 on the grey list,
and 39 on the white list (ParisMOU. 2010).
Despite ParisMOUs intention to make shipping safer, the current inspection
system has inherent weaknesses. ParisMOUs target is to inspect 25% of all
vessels calling port. The ships are selected based on criteria as previous
inspections reports from the MOU region. A vessel flying a poor performance
black-listed flag is more likely to be selected for an inspection than others.
These criteria for the selection of vessels are understandable; however, they
disregard the fact the some of the ships flying a poor performance flag are
owned by companies that take their responsibilities for the safe operation and
crew welfare seriously. As a result, PSC resources may be used inefficiently.
It is widely known that vessels in bad shape continue to be operational,
without getting caught by the inspection net (Corbett, 2009; Tradewinds,
2007). In order to improve the current system, the ParisMOU introduced a
new inspection system in January 2011, whereby each ship is ranked as high,
standard, or low risk; this will determine the frequency of inspections. These
changes intend to prevent low-risk vessels from being overly inspected in
order to release resources for more frequent inspections of high-risk vessels.
With the implementation of this new system, it remains to be seen if it will
capture those vessels that deliberately avoid inspections.

22

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

Thecompanyandcrewmanagement
Although the overall responsibility for ensuring compliance with international
regulations belongs to the flag state, each shipping company has the primary
responsibility for the safety of their ships and crews. The ISM Code requires
shipping companies to develop, implement, and maintain a safety
management system for this purpose. However, safety management is not
only a system property; system efficiency is determined by its human
interrelationships. On board the vessels, the crew is the ultimate asset to
ensure safety at sea, which is dependent on their experience and competence.
The recession of the 1980s brought about several structural changes apart
from flagging outnamely, the establishment of manning and crewing
agencies. Crew management normally involves finding, organizing, paying,
and training crews. In order to survive financially, some companies turned to
managing ships for other owners as a means of utilizing spare management
capacity. Others found it necessary to turn to crew managers in order to hire
cheaper crew in other and unfamiliar parts of the world. This has resulted in
ships being crewed by mixed nationalities working under different contracts
and employment terms. The sudden switch to employing seafarers from
nations without maritime traditions is claimed to result in a reduction in
standards of competence, except from those relatively unusual cases where
the shipowners invest in training.
In addition, within crew management, there is variability in performance. At
one end are those who have become seriously involved in training, some with
their own training facilities and with established systems of testing crew
competence (Alderton, 2004). On the other end are those who do notnor
intend toperform such control over crew competence, which is quite a
23

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

problem, as fraudulent certificates of competence are an issue within the
industry (IMO STW 41/4, 3, 2009). As pointed out by Anderson (2003), one
might question if crew from manning agents takes the companies (safety)
goals and objectives to heart due to a lack of ownership and short
employment. When crew management is carried out by an external party, the
shipowner will lose control over assessing and ensuring qualifications,
training, and competence. The shipowner then depends on third-party
qualifications, thoroughness, and follow-up when providing crew.

2.3 When the regulatory framework and safety

managementfails
Major accidents are valuable sources of information about the regulatory
framework, organizational practices, and cultures and in which way these
impact safety. In order to illustrate how the regulatory system may fail, the
explosion and sinking of the chemical tanker Bow Mariner is further outlined.
The Bow Mariner was one out of four3 chemical tankers that exploded during
a six-month period between December 2003 and June 2004. The Bow
Mariner case is interesting for several reasons. First, the accident occurred
after the introduction of the ISM Code. Second, the accident investigation of
Bow Mariner indicated that safety culture and poor safety management are
explanatory factors of the accidents. Finally, what happened aboard the Bow
Mariner is a driving force for further amendments of the international
regulations, concerning shipboard leadership and managerial skills (IMO,
2007a; IMO, 2007b). Based on this situation, the Bow Mariner is seen as a

The other three were the tankers Sun Venus, Panama Serena, and NCC Mekka.

24

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

case suitable for the purpose of understanding and exemplification. All factual
information derives from the official accident investigation report (United
States Coast Guard, 2005).
On February 28, 2004, the chemical tanker Bow Mariner exploded and sank
in the seas outside Virginia, United States, causing the death of 21
crewmembers. The Bow Mariner, owned by the Norwegian company Odfjell
Tankers, was flying a Singaporean flag, was operated by the Greek company
Ceres, and was manned by Greek officers and Filipino crew. The vessel had a
valid Safety Management Certificate (SMC). As part of the investigation, the
vessels inspection history for a five-year period before the explosion were
reviewed and found to be unremarkable. However, during an internal audit in
June 2003, 25 observations were recorded, including one pertaining to the
failure to complete an enclosed space entry permit and another for failure to
record training. These latter non-conformities were also present during the
accident and pointed to as possible influencing factors to what happened. The
accident investigators point to numerous indications that the ISM Code
requirements were not fully implemented or functional aboard the vessel,
despite apparent documentation of full compliance with the code. These ISM
non-conformities were found to contribute to the accident. Amongst others,
no crew familiarization with the vessel was conducted.
It is also explicitly stated that the shipboard social culture and safety culture
contributed to the occurrence of the accident. This included poor shipboard
management. Aboard the Bow Mariner, the Greek captain hadin
accordance with the company policyfull authority over all personnel. Such
full authority is not unusual aboard a seagoing vessel. However, at the Bow
Mariner the distinctions between Greek and Filipino nationality were
25

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

remarkable. Filipino officers did not take their meals in the officers mess, and
the Filipino crew were given almost no responsibility and were closely
supervised in every task. The Filipino crew were simply doing what they were
ordered to do. As a result, they gained little knowledge about important
aspects of their jobs. The lack of technical knowledge and fear of the Greek
senior officers provide an explanation as to why the Filipino crew did not
question the masters unsafe order to open all the empty tanks, which was a
significant breach of normal safe practices for such ships. If the tanks had
remained closed, the explosions would not have occurred. However, as stated
in the company policy, the captains orders should never be questioned, and
the failure to obey orders was a reason for disciplinary actions. Investigations
of the accident leave no question that such fear of the ship management or
senior officers can lead to a shipboard culture where safety takes a backseat to
preserving ones employment. Interviews with crew from another Ceres
vessel indicate that this poor culture was the general rule in the entire Ceres
company.
With the case of Bow Mariner, it is evident that the ISM Code did not
generate the intended outcomenamely, safe operations and a good safety
cultureas a result of reasons not necessarily related to shortcomings in the
ISM Code itself. This situation can also be related to the lack of ability to
reveal the onboard conditions, which are related to coastal administration and
inspections. Despite documentation and certification confirming full
compliance with the code, the accident investigators pointed to numerous
indicators that the code was neither fully implemented nor functional aboard
the vessel. The onboard situation is created by organizational factors (e.g.,
crewing and shipboard management policies). The accident investigators also
regarded commercial pressure as a contributory factor to what happened.
26

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

2.4 Safety responsibilities in the maritime industry

asummary
Thus far, the safety responsibilities in the maritime industry have been shortly
outlined and analyzed. The situation is summarized in the following:
With the UN delegation of authority, IMO is responsible for
developing and maintaining workable safety regulations and laws
regulating ship safety.
The maritime administrations encompass flag state and coastal state.
The coastal state is responsible for enforcing maritime regulations
while the flag state is responsible for ensuring compliance with
international regulations.
The shipping companies have the primary responsibility for the safe
operations of ships and crew safety. Safety management is regulated
through the ISM Code, which is developed by IMO.
The crew is the ultimate asset for ensuring safety at sea. Shipping
companies may ensure safe operations by investing in crew training
and competence and ensuring that crew experience is made use of in
the company safety management system.
When ensuring operational safety, the crew relates to and is influenced by all
these actors and levels of authority. National and international legislations
represent minimum standards. Beyond the minimum standards, each shipping
company determines the crews working conditions. On each vessel, the
framework given by the shipping company is moderated by the ships

27

Safety responsibilities in maritime industry

management. Safety culture and safety management in theory and practice are
further elaborated in the following chapter.

28

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

3 Safety culture and safety management in

theoryandpractice
This section focused on specified research aims 2 and 3, formulated as
follows:
2. To outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and safety
management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and
safety management.
3. To give reason for a methodological framework for assessment of
safety culture in relation to safety management.
The concept of safety culture as a term and an explanatory factor in an
accident investigation was first used by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG)
following the Chernobyl accident that occurred on April 26, 1986 (IAEA,
1991). The Chernobyl accident occurred while a test was being performed on
a turbine generator during a normal, scheduled shutdown of one of the
reactors. At the time, written test procedures were unsatisfactory from a safety
point of view. In addition, serious violations of basic operating safety rules
were present, as the operators deliberately withdrew most control rods from
the core and switched off important safety systems (The United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1988). Both safety
management and the interrelationship with the human factors and human error
were brought into the safety culture concept and safe operations. Safety
culture was defined as both attitudinal as well as structural, relating to both
the organizational framework and structures along with the attitude of

29

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

employees at all levels in responding to and benefitting from the framework
(IAEA, 1991).
More recently, several diverse definitions of the safety culture concept have
abounded in the safety research and organizational literature (Guldenmund,
2000; Sorensen, 2002; Wiegmann, Zang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell,
2002a). In general, all the conceptual definitions can be placed in two broad
categories: the socio-anthropological and the organizational psychology
perspective (Wiegmann et al., 2002b). One difference between these
perspectives concerns the conceptual definition, which is also reflected in
methodology. From the socio-anthropological perspective, it is argued that a
superficial research model of culture should be avoided in order to build
cultural research on a deeper, more complex anthropological model. From an
anthropological perspective, the practice of ethnography and fieldwork,
qualitative in-depth studies with data deriving from interviews, observations,
and/or participation is commonly accepted as appropriate research methods.
Within this scientific direction, culture is described in text with an emphasis
on the organizational members subjective interpretation and sense making.
From the organizational psychology perspective, it is argued that culture can
be described with a limited number of dimensions, usually sought through
large organization-wide questionnaire surveys. From this latter perspective,
the culture concept is assumed to express itself through an organizational
climatea set of perceptually based psychological attributes (Guldenmund,
2000).
Another important difference between the two directions concerns their view
toward cultural change. The socio-anthropological direction considers
organizational culture to be an evolved construct deeply rooted in history,
30

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

collectively held, and sufficiently complex to resist any attempt at direct
manipulation (Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 2002b). In contrast, the
organizational psychologists regard culture as changeable and tend to focus on
its functional significance and the means by which it may be manipulated to
improve productivity and safety (Wiegmann et al., 2002b). The organizational
psychology perspective provides a conceptual bridge between safety culture,
safety behavior, and organizational safety management systems, with the aim
of controlling, guiding, or directing first-line operators attitude and behavior
toward safe operations.
The concept of safety cultureand climatehas over time been a theme of
heated discussion, with little theoretical consensus emerging on the
ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions relating to the
subject. The main differences in these questions seem to be: (1) What is the
scope of safety culture and the relationship between culture and climate? (2)
How does the concept relate to other organizational aspects and outcome? (3)
Which methods are most suitable for measurement? (Peterson, Ashkanasy, &
Wilderom, 2000). These fundamental questions have already been elaborated
upon

by

many

researchers

(e.g.,

Antonsen

&

Norges

teknisk-

naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009;

Cooper, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Hvold &
Nesset, 2009; Olsen, 2009; Sorensen, 2002; Tharaldsen, 2011; Wiegmann et
al., 2002a; Wiegmann et al., 2002c; Zhang, Wiegmann, von Thaden, Sharma,
& Mitchell, 2002). Based on his review, Guldenmund (2000) pointed out that
most of the characteristics given to culture equally apply to climate, and
within recent research it is more commonly accepted that climate is a
reflection of an underlying culture. Hale (2000) even proposed that one should
stop talking about safety culture completely and instead talk about
31

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

(organizational) cultural influences on safety (Hale, 2000). In order to grasp
as many facets as possible of the safety culture concept, a multi-method
approach is needed. As the safety culture-climate debate seems to be settling
down and has already been thoroughly discussed by many, the concept will in
this thesis only be touched upon in brief.
A general working model used in the studies of safety culture and safety
management in this thesis is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The general working model used in the studies of safety culture and
safety management

With reference to Figure 3, organizational culture/climate is seen as an

integrated concept subject to change by organizational management practices
and structures. It is assumed that both organizational cultural and managerial
features influence safety, which is defined as safety culture. As such,
organizational safety culture is perceived as a concept with integrated parts
from organizational management system practices and organizational
culture/climate. The organizational safety culture is assumed to reflect the
status of safety in the organization. Organizational safety, or safety culture, is
assessed using two measurement outcome variables: risk perception and the
32

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

state of the safety management system (SMS). The various concepts and
relationships shown in Figure 3 are further elaborated upon in the following
three sub-chapters.

3.1 Safety culture as an organizational integrated

concept
Within the field of organizational safety, the climate concept was first
introduced by Zohar in 1980 (Zohar, 1980). In more recent publications,
Zohar relates safety climate to an overall organizational climate made of
shared perceptions among employees concerning the procedures, practices,
and kinds of behavior that are rewarded and supported with regard to a
specific strategic focus. When the strategic focus involves the performance of
high-risk operations, the resultant shared perceptions define safety climate
(Zohar, 2010). Although climate and the underlying culture may have a
particular referent as safety, they embrace and are influenced by more than a
single unit or function in the organization. An organization has multiple goals
and multiple policies that are all manifested in organizational behavior and
practices. The different goals are often in competing conflict, like profit and
safety (Hollnagel, 2004; Hollnagel, 2009). For example, the crew may be
expected to cut corners and work faster without getting crossing prevailing
rules and regulations or jeopardizing safety. The safety climate concept
integrates perceptions toward the organizations total contexts as a regulatory
framework and competitors as well as internal matters as finance, marketing,
human resources, control systems, safety management systems, and so on.
Consequently, when measuring climate with a particular reference, it is
important to embrace the organization in a wider sense in order to reveal
conflicting areas and the priority of importance. True priorities at work (e.g.,
33

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

efficiency versus safety) have been shown to provide the strongest prediction
of actual behavior (Zohar, 2008).
The theoretical roots of the safety culture discussion can be traced back to
Barry Turner and the introduction of the manmade disaster model (Pidgeon &
O'Leary, 2000; Turner, 1978). In the manmade disaster model, an accident is
defined not by its physical impact, but in sociological terms, as a significant
disruption or collapse of the existing cultural beliefs and norms regarding
hazard. These cultural beliefs and norms are assumed to be formally laid
down in rules and procedures or more tacitly taken for granted and embedded
within working practices. This is also related to managerial and organizational
practices.
Andrew Pettigrew (1979), whose background is in anthropology and
sociology, relates the cultural concept to the everyday tasks and objectives in
organizations as a product of social processes connecting the past, present,
and future. In many ways, Pettigrews definition encompasses Turners
definition. According to Pettigrew (1979), culture is related to the less rational
and instrumental tasks in an organization as well as the more expressive social
tissue that give those tasks meaning, such as the meaning of having a safety
policy, if procedures should be followed only when safety inspectors are
present, or if efficiency is the real area of priority and the safety-first policy
only serves as a function for external stakeholders. It is argued that, in order
for people to function within any given setting, they must have a continuing
sense of what reality is all about in order to be acted upon. In this setting,
culture is the system of such public and collectively accepted meanings with
regard to safety, operating for a given group at the time (Pettigrew, 1979).

34

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

One of the most influential anthropologists of modern time, Clifford Geertz,
regards culture as webs of significance spun by man and in which man are
suspended. According to Geertz (1973), cultural scientists should try to
interpret those webs in search of meaning and explanation. Geertz (1973)
concluded that culture is most effectively treated as a symbolic system. By
isolating the elements of the symbolic system, specifying the internal
relationship, the whole system may be characterized in general. Symbols are
the surface expression of the underlying cultural structure. Pettigrew (1979)
also emphasized symbols, languages, ideologies, beliefs, rituals, and myths as
an important part in the codification of meaning and emergence of normative
patterns. For example, in accordance with requirements of the ISM Code,
shipping companies have safety policies. From a cultural perspective, policies
such as safety first are not important in themselves. The importance stems
from how such policies, as a symbol, make sense for the organizational
members. A safety-first policy may be perceived as a statement aimed to
attract customers or directed toward other external stakeholders. In the case of
the Bow Mariner, it is likely that the company safety policy would be given
meaning as a faade maintained toward external stakeholders, which can
explain the actual safety-degrading behavior on board. The vessel did hold a
valid ISM certificate and documentation, but during normal operations they
were not acted upon and complied with. This understanding of culture also
establishes a relation between culture and climatenamely, that cultural
beliefs and meaning given to organizational factors are reflected in actual
behavior. In this particular case, the symbolic system is explained by the gap
among safety policy, guidelines, and actual behavior.
One of the most widely used organizational culture frameworks is probably
that of Edgar Schein (1992, 2004), a framework that built upon Pettigrews
35

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

cultural theory. This framework explains culture at three levels: (1) artifacts
visible organizational structures and processes that are difficult to measure but
are felt and heard by individuals who enter a new culture; (2) espoused
valuesnorms, standards, and moral principles usually measured through
questionnaire surveys; and (3) basic underlying assumptionsunconscious
taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, which may be
understood by ongoing observations and participation. Schein (1992, p. 12)
formally defined culture as:
a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned
as it solved its problems of external adaption and internal
integration that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, to be thought to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those
problems.
Schein regards culture as shared assumptions expressing consistent, clear, and
organization-wide consensus. However, in looking for organization-wide
consensus, important areas of conflict will be disregarded and lost. What is
regarded and learned as valid patterns of shared assumptions depends upon
how the group is defined, which in turn opens up for the existence of various
groups and subcultures within an organization.
Regarding the Bow Mariner, it is natural to assume that the group of Greek
officers and the group of Filipino crew differ with regard to what is shared,
which also brings about the notion of subcultures. In general, it is assumed
that subcultures are found within the shipboard departments deck, engine,
and galley. Analyses of other levels in the organization may give different
results, as the group may be defined as the whole fleet or as all shipping
36

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

companies. A cultural trait identified at the industry level may be related to
manning policies and the extended use of manning agencies and contract
employment, which most regard as the only possible solution to manninga
solution that is taken for granted and not questioned by insiders, thereby
determining national subcultures. When distinguishing climate from culture,
climate is often suggested to arise from individuals whereas culture is
suggested to arise from group or interpersonal processes (Dansereasu &
Alutto, 1990)
Safety culture is assumed to be influenced by and seen as an integrated part of
an organizational culture and a product of equal processes. Organizational
culture is a relatively stable, multidimensional, holistic construct shared by
groups of organizational members that supply a frame of reference. It gives
meaning to and/or is typically revealed in certain practices manifested as
organizational climate. In the same way, Mearns and Flin (1999) described
safety climate as employees perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and
safety whereas safety culture is a more complex and enduring trait reflecting
fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and expectations. These cultural
elements can be seen through safety management practices, which again are
reflected in the safety climate and in actual behavior (Mearns & Flin, 1999).
In conclusion, most of what is true for safety culture is also considered true
for safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000).

3.2 Organizations,managementandculturalchange
Safety management and safety culture are all about changea change toward
enhanced operational safety. Both Pettigrew (1979) and Schein (2004)
regarded individuals, including entrepreneurs and leaders, as important in the
process of creating and managing an organizational culture. According to
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Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

Schein, one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation,
management, and sometimes even the destruction of culture. Although Schein
regarded leaders as important in these processes, leaders are not regarded as
the only determiner of culture. Schein also stated that culture is a result of
complex group of learning processes only partially influenced by leaders.
Groups (e.g., departments or vessels that operate within similar situations)
may behave very differently from one another as the group dynamics differ.
Schein (2004) referred to culture as those elements of a group or an
organization that are most stable and least malleable. However, according to
Schein (2004), the group itself needs a certain degree of stability. Any group
with a stable membership and a history of shared learning will have developed
some level of culture, but a group having either a great deal of member
turnover and/or a history without any challenging events may lack shared
assumptions. Zohar (1980) identified a stable workforce with less turnover
and older workers as an organizational characteristic when determining safety
climate. A stable workforce is then vital for both climate and culture. Within
the segments of shipping that have large turnover and less group stability, it
might be questioned if they have developed any shared basic assumptions
(culture) or working practices (climate).
According to Schein (2004), some barriers to the development of an
integrated shared culture exist, including the insufficient stability of group
membership and the insufficient shared history of practice or the presence of
many subgroups with different kinds of shared experience. This may lead to a
situation of ambiguity and conflict. Joanne Martin (Martin, 1992)
distinguished three perspectives: (1) integration, (2) differentiation, and (3)
fragmentation. Martins (1992) recommendation is that an organization be
viewed from all three perspectives, as one perspectives strengths are
38

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

anothers weaknesses. As a result, a greater understanding of an
organizations culture and how to approach cultural change may be obtained.
From each perspective, different aspects of culture and cultural change are
captured. This view was also supported by Alvesson (1993).
From the integration perspective, culture is described as patterns of
manifestations shared by all members of the organization, and the
organizations manager/leader is regarded as the primary source of cultural
change. One of the most renowned representatives within the integration
perspective is probably Edgar Schein (Frost, 1991; Richter & Koch, 2004;
Schein 2004). According to Scheins theory, the organizations leader is
regarded as being able to create and manage the culture in pre-given
directions. The development of subcultures is regarded as undesirable side
effects appearing when the organizations grow and mature. In such a
situation, Schein argued that the leaders effort should focus on integrating the
variety of subcultures.
From the differentiation perspective, cultural manifestations are described as
sometimes inconsistent when consensus occurs only within the boundaries of
subcultures, which often is regarded as being in conflict with each other. With
regard to influence and change, greater importance is assigned to the
environment, and teams of leaders are ascribed to have secondary influence to
cultural change. Nick Pidgeon (1998) considered the importance of
subcultures, questioning whether a unified culture may be designed within a
large organization and arguing that existing subcultures should be given
attention regarding how they differ in (safety-related) priorities, perceptions,
and interpretations of emerging safety problems. How these aspects interact
with each other, existing power relations, and the like is of equally great
importance (Pidgeon, 1998).
39

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

While both the integration and differentiation perspectives focus on what is
shared and accounts of planned and directed goals change, the fragmentation
perspective regards ambiguity as the essence of culture. In this perspective,
culture is something that is constantly fluctuating, and no stable organizationwide or subcultural consensus is supposed to exist. Cultural change is seen as
being in a constant flux, where the power of change is usually seen as being
diffused broadly in the environment and among organizational members. The
ambiguity is supposed to emerge from the complexity and unpredictability in
the organization and society; the fragmentation perspective does not assume
that the organizational members have similar reactions to these ambiguities.
Karl Weick and the theories of high reliability organizations (HRO) are well
known within this field (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Within

shipping,

subcultures,

conflicts,

ambiguity,

stress,

and

misunderstandings are likely to be present due not only to the lack of stability
of membership, but also to an insufficient shared history of practice. This
relates to both the specific work situation, but also, amongst others, to
nationality. National cultures are known to differ in aspects such as power
distance and the degree of human inequality, uncertainty avoidance, and how
they adapt to unstructured situations as well as how they integrate into a group
with regard to individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). In
addition, value of life, safety standards, and risk perception are known to
differ between nationalities. Geert Hofstede perceived culture as mental
programminga pattern of thinking, feeling, potential acting, and unwritten
rules of the social game that distinguishes the members of one group of
people from others. A certain culture is learned through the lifetime. What is
acquired in early childhood and once established is difficult to change
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Hofstede argued that layers of culture (e.g.,
40

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

organizational culture) acquired later in life tend to be more changeable.
Organizational acquirements and practicesthe visible part of cultureare
regarded as faster and easier to change.
Based on the previous discussion, it is concluded that organizational safety
culture and behavior are subject to change by organizational practices and
structures, which includes safety management systems. Furthermore,
individuals in the organization (e.g., their leaders) do have a mediating effect
upon the formation of an organizational safety culture.

3.3 Organizationalcultureandsafetymanagement
Safety management systems have two interrelated main functions: to avoid
accidents and improve safety. Theories of accident causation and safety
management have progressed over time (Borys, Dennis & Legget, 2009). H.
W. Heinrich is considered to be a pioneer within safety management and
accident causation (Heinrich, Roos & Petersen, 1980) from the first age of
safetynamely, the technical age. With reference to the shipping industry,
the first development of SOLAS belonged to a technical age; the introduction
of the ISM Code represented a transition to the age of management systems
and culture. The age of human factors occurred in between, in which the view
of human error considered the interaction of human and technical factors
when exploring the causes of errors and accidents (Borys et al., 2009).
As previously highlighted, traditional safety management systems (SMS)
described in the ISM Code fall along a linear causality where attempts are
made to predict and prevent future incidents by reflecting upon previous
experience related to empirical safety control. The traditional SMS contains
several subsystems. First, a system for reporting and collecting experience
data from the vessel itself is required, followed by a system of data processing
41

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

(i.e., summarization and analysis) in order to reveal causal factors and
perform trend analyses, which form the basis for the development of safety
measures. Both identification of causes and remedial actions are closely
intertwined

with

how

the

organization

addresses

technological,

organizational, and individual factors. Irrespective of this, one critical system

requirement is the reliability and accuracy of input data (i.e., near miss and
accidents reports). As long as the input is reliable, the overall system
presupposes the possibility of revealing a root cause and develops efficient
measures in order to control operational safety (Kjelln, 2000). Although the
fundamental rationale of safety management has changed little over the years,
the rationale for the understanding of human error and causal factors, root
causes, and adequate safety measures has changed. However, quite
surprisingly, recent research also points to insufficient scientific evidence on
the effectiveness of systematic safety management to make recommendations
either in favor of or against them (Robson et al., 2007). Thus, the obvious
question is why: Is the reason found within the theoretical rationale of safety
management or within organizational understanding and applications of the
systems or is the reason found elsewhere?
The application of traditional safety management is questioned with a
distinction between small-scale accidents and larger more infrequent accidents
(Rundmo, 1996). According to Rundmo (1996), the empirical safety control,
in which measures are developed through the analysis of past events, is only
applicable for frequent and small-scale accidents such as ordinary work
accidents. When it comes to medium-size and more infrequent accidents (e.g.,
groundings and collisions) and large-scale accidents with very low
probabilities (e.g., the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the fire at
the Scandinavian Star; see Table 1), traditional safety management is not
42

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

considered to be applicable. Such accidents are often too unique and complex
to grasp, and it will not be possible to single out some isolated underlying
causes or develop measures that cover all involved riska risk that in the first
place is considered too complex to understand. Others, such as Scott Sagan
(1993) and Charles Perrow (1999), questioned the possibility of foresight and
preventions of accidents through empirical safety management.
Within the age of human factors, human error is regarded as primary cause of
accidents. In more recent theories and subsequent ages of safety, human error
is seen as a consequence of faults deriving from other parts in the organization
or environment, complexity, interactions, and/or organizational culture. A big
difference between human error as a cause and human error as a consequence
is seen in the characteristics of remedial actions. With human error cited as
the cause of failure, the tendency for safety measures is to seek to control
human behavior with inter alia procedures and checklists. Then, when the real
cause is found to lie elsewhere in the organization, such measures may not
clearly be the answer to the underlying problem and incidence of failure, and
accidents will continue to occur. The following sections shed light on these
issues from the theoretical perspective of accident causation and prevention.

The Man Made Disaster model

Barry Turner is presumably among the first to regard latent conditions as a
primary cause in accident causation. With the development and introduction
of the Man Made Disaster model, accidents and disasters are proposed to
develop through a long change of events leading back to root causes like lack
of information and misperception among individuals (SINTEF, 2003). Turner
argued that this is a result of an organizational culture where information and
interpretations of hazard signals fail. Thus, a typical accident can be traced
43

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

back to initial beliefs and normsculture and climatethat do not comply
with existing operational reality. From this perspective, accident development
is viewed as a process, often over years, developing from an interaction
between human and the organizational arrangements of the socio-technical
system (SINTEF, 2003). With reference to accidents such as the capsize of
Herald of Free Enterprise, a common understanding of the crewgiven by
the management of the organizationwas a general understanding that the
vessel should leave some minutes ahead of schedule, even if it involved
putting pressure on those who did not move fast enough. The inherent risks of
such a practice were not questioned. From the Man Made Disaster
perspective, systematic safety management should deal with these
breakdowns in the interpretation of information. For example, are some
danger signals or causes systematically disregarded or misunderstood? As
with the Bow Mariner, why did none of the involved stakeholders (e.g.,
charterers, vetters, inspectors, and flag state) manage to reveal the degrading
shipboard safety situation?
As such, existing cultural beliefs and norms are the essence of the Man Made
Disaster theory. According to Turner, such cultural beliefs and norms might
be formally laid down in rules and procedures or more tacitly taken for
granted and embedded within working practices. An accident is then assumed
to occur because of inaccuracy or inadequacy in the accepted norms and
beliefs and of a discrepancy between the way the world is thought to operate
and the way it really operates (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). When
acknowledging the weaknesses in traditional safety management and failure
of foresight, these institutional barriers to effective learning should, according
to Pidgeon and OLeary (2000), be addressed. The aim for efficient safety
management should be to let all organizational members develop a safety
44

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

imagination that breaks the pattern of becoming overly fixated with prescribed
patterns, simplification, and ignorance. Pidgeon and OLeary (2000)
presented seven guidelines for fostering a safety imagination: (1) attempt to
fear the worst, (2) use good management techniques to elicit varied
viewpoints; (3) play the what if game with potential hazard; (4) allow no
worst case situation to go unmentioned; (5) suspend assumptions about how
the safety task was completed in the past; (6) approach the edge of a safety
issue with a tolerance of ambiguity, as newly emerging safety issues will
never be clear; and (7) force oneself to visualize near miss situations
developing into accidents. It is argued that such safety imagination is a critical
facet of organizational learning and an effective safety culture.

Normal Accident Theory

The Man Made Disaster theory also highlights how system vulnerability
arises from unintended and complex interactions between contributory
preconditions (Pidgeon, 2000), which may be linked to Charles Perrows
theory of normal accidents (NAT). However, in contrast to Barry Turner,
Perrow regards some systems to be to complex and interactive to avoid
organizational accidents completely. In such systems, safety management is
regarded as futile as accidents are doomed to happen due to the system
characteristics.
The development of NAT started with Perrows exploration of the 1979
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. During this investigation,
Perrow was struck by the fact that the present accident literature
overwhelmingly blamed the operators (Perrow, 1999). Perrow then looked
into accident reports from various industries, such as mining, aircraft, and
marine accidents, and evolved the alternative theory that risk is a result of two
45

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

dimensionsinteractions and complexityrather than human error. It is
argued that the operator is free from blame as the overall system, interactions,
and interdependencies of events are incomprehensible for a critical period of
time. Like Rundmo (1996), Perrow distinguishes between small-scale,
frequent personal accidents and other medium-sized accidents and larger-scale
accidents. Risk is, according to Perrow (1999), regarded as something
designed into organizations in the form of complex systems with tight
couplings. The paradox is, when barriers and other safety measures are built
into the system to increase safety, often it is the complexity that is increased at
the cost of safety. Perrow (1999) regards such error-prone organizations as
impossible to manage safely in the long run, thereby resulting in the notion of
normal accident. In the maritime setting, Perrow (1999, p. 230) described the
risk-inducing complexity as follows:
The ship itself, with its power plant explosive mixture,
steering apparatus, and draft in shallow channels is important,
but so are other ships, the insurance industry, the fragmented
shipping industry, attempts are regulation, rules of the road,
dangerous cargoes, national jealousies and interests, and, of
course the horrendous environmental problems of fog, ice,
and storms.
In his analysis, Perrow also pointed to conflicting organizational goals,
production pressure, and organizational pressure related to risk taking,
authoritarian structure on board, and inappropriate leadership. One of
Perrows (1999) main points was to regard all human constructions (e.g.,
vetting, class, regulatory bodies, flag state, insurance, manning companies) as
systems and not as collections of individuals or representatives of ideologies.
Dangerous accidents lie in these systems based on how the different parts fit
46

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

together and how they interact. From this point of view, safety management is
about reducing the system complexity and/or loosening the couplings to
reduce interactivity. From the perspective of NAT, Turners notion of safety
imagination is a dead end for organizational safety as long as complexity,
incomprehensible interdependencies, and tight couplings are present.

High Reliability Organizations Theory

The High Reliability Organizations Theory (HRO) developed as a result or a
continuance of Perrows rather pessimistic messagenamely, that accidents
are inevitable in some systems or organizations due to their characteristics
(Roberts, 1990). The concept of safety culture constitutes a central difference
between NAT and HRO. Whereas NAT argues that in some systems accidents
are inevitable, HRO argues that even in the most vulnerable and error-prone
systems, safety culture has characteristics that can counteract the inherent
system risk.
In many ways, HRO is in line with the arguments given by Turner, Pidgeon,
and Perrow. HRO recognized that everything that may fail during operations
has not yet been experienced; therefore, a system based on experience
feedback (as the ISM code) is doomed to fail on its own premises. HRO also
recognizes that not all incidents may be deduced to detect all possible failure
or error modes. Recognizing that the world is complex, unstable, unknowable,
and unpredictable, the HRO perspective maintains reluctance to the
simplification inherent in traditional risk assessment. Both procedures and
checklists may represent simplification of measures when a complex,
unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable working situation is attempted to be
controlled by preplanned prescriptions. This view is shared by Perrow, and

47

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

both NAT and HRO are skeptical towards those who heavily rely on risk
assessment.
In HRO, more attention is given to the real work going on in frontline
operations. By empowering those doing the actual work, operators have the
possibility to solve the situations themselves, based on their own experience
and knowledge. This is a contrast to traditional safety management from the
era of human factors with a focus on the control of human behavior. Within
the HRO paradigm of HRO, frontline personnel operate by using pre-planned
descriptions, but it is accepted that in real situations deviations will occur.
One of the HROs key points is mindfulness, which is related to the concept
of safety culture and similar principles such as Turners safety imagination.
Mindfulness is understood as a combination of alertness, sensibility,
flexibility, and adaptability. This perspective argues that unexpected events
should be handled by creating a mindful infrastructure by following five main
principles:

(1)

continuously

tracking

small

failures,

(2)

resisting

oversimplification, (3) being sensitive to operations, (4) maintaining

capability for resilience, and (5) monitoring the shifting locations of expertise.
The violation of these principles is regarded as a setback toward the more
traditional approach, where simple diagnoses are accepted, frontline expertise
is overridden by faith in risk analysis, and safety measures are developed
detached from operations. The HRO view implies that the operators gain more
responsibility, so other parts of the organization have to give them the
possibility to act. In other words, control is taken from the upper levels of the
organization in favor of lower levels.
Within HRO, safety culture is seen as essential in managing risk. All of
Johanne Martins three perspectives of safety are adopted: Each form of
culture handles ambiguity differently: Integration denies it, differentiation
48

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

selectively clarifies it, and fragmentation accepts it. In a mindful culture, all
three forms of culture are present (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 112). HRO
does not reject the fact that organizational members have shared values and
beliefs. However, with regard to safety these shared patterns are not regarded
as vital for the outcome. The shared orientations are accommodated
differently in all situations, and the chain of events and patterns of interactions
between people fall under the influence of situational conditions as stress,
misunderstandings, interpretation, and others conditions specific to each chain
of event. From an HRO perspective, more weight is placed on fragmentation
than on differentiation and more on differentiation than on integration.

Managing risk and safety culture

James Reason (Reason, 2001) developed a widely used practical definition
and approach to safety culture. Barry Turner and the Man Made Disaster
model provided much of the conceptual foundation for Reasons work
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). Reasons approach to safety management and
safety culture is also to a large degree adopted by the HRO perspective
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Based on the organizational culture literature,
Reason (2001) differs between two theoretical stands: those who regard
culture as something an organization has and those who regard culture as
something the organization is. Reason favors the former approach and thus
regards culture as something changeable and manageable by organizational
practices.
Like Turner, NAT, and HRO, Reason is also concerned about the
organizational factors that trigger an accident. According to Reason (2001),
accidents by their nature are not directly controllable, as many of the causal
influencing factors lay outside organizational control and influence. As such,
49

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

rather than struggling vainly to exercise direct control over behavior,
accidents, and incidents, organizational managers should measure and
improve the processes of underlying factors, such as training, procedures,
planning, budgeting, goal conflicts, and others. Thus, an efficient SMS system
should help identify those conditions most needing correction and not be
limited to non-compliance of global rules. Attention should also be directed
toward the quality of these global rules (e.g., accuracy, relevance, availability,
and workability of procedures). The information reported into the system
should embrace organizational factors as well as local workplace factors and
unsafe acts. The cultural factor is linked to commitment, competence, and
cognizance within the organization as a whole.
Reason (2001) regards safety culture as a cornerstone in efficient safety
management in order to get the needed operational information. He identifies
safety culture using four critical subcomponents: (1) a reporting culture, (2) a
just culture, (3) a flexible culture, and (4) a learning culture. Together, these
interact to create an informed culture. According to Reason, an informed
culture is one that collects operational experience data that are characterized
by an organizations climate in which members feel free to report without
experiencing negative, unfair, or in other ways meaningless consequences.
Attention is also given to how the interpretation of information and outcome
is influenced by the overall company policy. Reason is more preoccupied with
organizations internal organizing than how safety is influenced by other
organizations and macroeconomics than by national and international
conditions such as politics, laws and regulations.

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Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

The theory of Practical Drift why organizations fails

Safety culture in shipping is often depicted side by side with compliance to
prevailing procedures and other safety measures. However, if compliance is to
be a valid key performance indicator, it is presupposed that these safety
measures are appropriate for the actual action. The development of
standardized measures fitting all real-life situations are a challenging if not an
impossible task considering the complexity and unpredictability of most
situations. This is also pointed out by NAT and HRO. The Practical Drift
Model (PDM) provides an explanation for how and why organizations
experience such gaps among standardized measures, real situations, and
actions, referred to as practical drift (Snook, 2000). PDM combines HRO and
NAT in two ways, emphasizing how different degrees of mindfulness will
depend on different situations and contexts. During their lifetime,
organizational systems develop both tight and loose couplings, which they
shift in betweentight to loose couplings and back againas the various
sub-units within the operative part of the organization alternate between a low
and high degree of interdependence. The model also captures both contextual
and temporal factors when explaining why incidents and accidents occur,
along with practical drift from the global rules, such as standards, procedures,
and checklists.
Standardized rules are often designed according to organizational lifecycle,
where the governance structure is top-down oriented. Using organizational
safety management systems, organizational managers put large effort into
developing extensive routines and procedures in order to make the
organization robust and resilient against future unforeseen events. When
designed, tight couplings and rule-based action of logic is assumed to
51

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

characterize the organization. This, in contrast to an operational situation, is
assumed to be loosely coupled, and the real world does not act in accordance
with the organizational design. When organizations experience that
unforeseen events do not occur as expected, the attention toward the
limitations and inadequacy in routines and procedures become a part of
everyday life and practice and are therefore more relaxed. Others (e.g.,
Hollnagel, 2004) point to real-life work processes that are irregular and
unpredictable in contrast to work regulationseither explicitly by procedures
and instructions or implicitly by rules, standards, or good practice. Another
issue arises when these rules are developed detached from the operational
situations (e.g., in shipping by shore personnel); consequently, accuracy,
relevance, availability, and workability of the rules may be low. Moreover,
company policy may favor efficiency over safety.
As a result, the sharp end operatorswhen aware of this situationwill be
able to break the strict rules without fear of sanctions or punishment. On a
local basis, breaking strict rules may actually get the job done quicker and
more efficiently. The operator may be rewarded for achieving additional
goals in the organization. During such a process of de-coupling, the
organization will become increasingly free from global rationality.
Subcultures with their own logic of action based on experiences and tacit
knowledge develop, and the operators accordingly drift further away from a
rule-based system to a more task-based system.
According to PDM, accidents and incidents occur when the system suddenly
and stochastically becomes tightly coupled, as with the Bow Mariner,
Scandinavian Star, and Herald of Free Enterprise. In such situations, the
involved operators are forced to act on the assumption that all others act in
accordance with the original rules and procedures initially designed. The
52

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

operators become trapped in a game in which trusting their own logic of
actions is the only solution while they must simultaneously base their decision
on the assumption that others are following the general rules.
After an unwanted event, the outcome is often even more tightly designed
control criteria. James Reason describes such an approach to safety
management as a person-oriented approach, which may also be perceived as
belonging to a blame culture, implying crew shortcomings as the cause of
error. With human error cited as the cause of failure, the tendency is for safety
measures to seek to control human behavior by developing more procedures
and checklists. When the real cause is found to lie elsewhere in the
organization, such measures may clearly not be the answer to the underlying
problem and incidence of failure, and unwanted events will continue to occur.
Global rules may be perceived as less and less meaningful; thus, constantly
relying on them will further undermine the safety system as more procedures
are violated and the local units drift even further apart from global rationality.
Less reporting of experience data could also be a consequence in the longer
run.

3.4 Safetycultureandmeasurableoutcomevariables
The IAEA has built its concept of safety culture upon Edgar H. Scheins
three-level model and regards safety culture as both attitudinal as well as
structural relating to both the organizations and the individuals (IAEA, 1991).
Based on this conceptual definition, INSAG and IAEA regard systematic
safety management, which belongs to the first layer in Scheins model (i.e.,
artifacts), as a tool for promoting a strong safety culture and achieving a good
safety performance. This may be measured in the second layer, espoused

53

Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

values, using a questionnaire survey. The third layer, basic assumptions, may
be captured by observation.
Using previous research within the oil industry, Rundmo (1996) demonstrated
that risk perception and risk behavior are significantly correlated, but also
relatively independent from each other. The association between risk
perception and risk behavior is then caused by the fact that the same predictor
affects both variables. Crew risk perception and other subjective assessments
are suggested as good indicators of the safety level, but not as predictors for
risk behavior. It is further suggested that employees behavior to a great
extent is constrained by the conditions under which they work. When the
working conditions are not perceived to be satisfactory, employees know that
the occupational risk is higher; they feel more unsafe, which will affect their
risk perception (Rundmo, 1996). Risk perception as a measurement variable is
supported by Zohar (1980), who used climate research to assume that an
individuals

perception

focuses

on

the

organizational

environment,

organizational control system, and safety management system.

Drawing from the Man Made Disaster theory, safety culture is the product of
cultural beliefs and behavioral norms regarding hazards, which are laid down
in the organizational control system and thus reflected in procedures and
guidelines. This is in accordance with Schein (1992, 2004), who regards
organizational control systems (e.g., safety management systems) as a
manifestation of basic underlying cultural assumptions. In this respect,
companies approach to safety management is a manifestation of the
underlying beliefs and thoughts on how safety management should be
performed. Pettigrew (1979) relates the cultural concept to how everyday
tasks and objectives in the organization are expressed as well as their
meaning, including how the organizational members comprehend the
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Safety culture and safety management in theory and practise

importance of the organizational control system and derived safety measures
in relation to other directions given by the company. This approach aligns
with Geertzs (1973) work referring to the social processes where meaning
and sense making arise. Social processes are influenced by crew composition
and human resource policies. Personal beliefs and values are also antecedents
to behavioral norms. Traditional cultural researchers also regard beliefs and
values as less changeable as they are acquired through a lifetime and therefore
deeply rooted within the individual. However, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)
argue that beliefs and values learned through an organizational context are
more changeable as they are acquired at a later stage of life. The
organizational context and organizational control system are assumed to
directly impact behavioral norms.
When managing behavioral norms by means of an organizational control
system, Kjellen (2000) defined the system as one that provides the
information needed for safety and signaling related to health and safety
matters. In this regard, Reason (2001) regarded safety culture as the
cornerstone for ensuring the information flows as needed. Reason also
addressed the safety management system as a whole, with regard to how the
incoming experience data are analyzed and processed into safety measures.
From this, the state of the safety management system is regarded as a
measurement outcome variable.

55

Research methodology

4 Researchmethodology
This chapter describes the research methods applied in this thesis. Based on
the discussion in Chapter 3, climate will not be separated from culture, but in
theory and research methodology the recommendation from both perspectives
will be taken into consideration. This synthesis of qualitative and quantitative
methods is regarded as important in order to understand how culture is created
through social processes while quantitative methods simultaneously say
something about how widespread certain patterns of behavior and perceptions
are within the industry and statistical associations. The application of a multimethod approach is also supported by others. According to Cooper (2000), the
triangulation of different methods allows the researcher to take a multifaceted
view of safety culture, so that the interrelationships among psychological,
behavioral, and situational factors can be examined with a view to establish
antecedents, behaviors, and outcomes within the specific contexts.
Triangulation allows the employment of each methods strengths in order to
overcome the others weaknesses. Both Rousseau (1990) and Schein (1992,
2004) identified that different layers of culture are amenable to different
research methods. For example, the fundamental content of culture is assumed
to be unconscious and highly subjective. The organizational members basic
assumptions, values (what is important), and beliefs (how things work) as
well as cultures social construction are difficult to assess without interactive
probing. Moreover, the organizational members fears and defenses are
difficult to elicit without interaction, which gives reason for an ethnographic
methodology. On the other hand, the organizational members patterns of
behavioral norms (how things are done) are far more accessible to observation
from outsiders and respond to structured instruments and quantitative
methods.
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Research methodology
According to Geertz (1973), cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at
meanings, assessing guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from
better guesses. However, the previously described examples illustrate how
such guesses might be wrong if not related to individuals own experiences
and national, situational, and/or historical context. Street Corner Society is a
method of participant observation where becoming native, without being too
attached, is a part of the research strategy (Whyte, 1991). In accordance with
Street Corner Society, the researcher lives with the community in order to
understand the nature of the field, learn to understand the group, and build
trust and credibility. Whyte also demonstrated how such qualitative studies
may be expressed and presented in a more quantitative format. Whyte has
become a major spokesman for the advantages of integrating research
methods, including those typically associated with quantitative research
(Bryman, 1991). As such, there is no adversative relationship between cultural
field studies from an anthropological perspective representing qualitative
methods and the quantitative methods typically from the psychological
perspective.
From the authors own experience, the ethnographic approach has been
valuable not only to understand, but to correct misunderstandings. For
example, when conducting the first field studies, one Philippine mate
discussed her former Norwegian captain, who refused any crew members to
whistle on the bridge. Both the Philippine mate and I interpreted this as an
indication of authoritarian leadership. However, months later, after getting a
better understanding of seamanship in a national historical context, I found
that this interpretation was wrong and in fact related to superstition, which is
quite common among the older generation of seafarers. In the days of sails,
the seafarers needed wind, and they whistled to call for the wind. Nowadays,
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with engine propulsion, wind is no longer wanted as wind causes waves.
Thus, whistling is not allowed as it calls for the wind. In other situations,
misinformation may be a result of deliberately withholding information as the
group being researched does not trust the researcher. In another field study, I
observed that all engine crew wore helmets in the engine room, as required.
However, after one week at sea, once I had become familiar with the group, I
learned that usually no one wore their helmets. They only applied the rules
when they had a third party on boardan outsider.
Apart from this, also favoring an integrated use of methods, cultural
interpretation, and theoretical development is suggested to follow its own
unplanned course in the search of grasping and analyzing the web of
significance and structure of symbols and meaning, plunging more deeply
into the same ideas. These theoretical formulations do not make much sense
or hold much interest apart from the context of interpretation. Indeed, a safety
culture study carried out within the anthropological tradition alone could have
brought descriptions, interpretations, and understanding of how safety is
interwoven with symbols and cultural elements on a single vessel or in one
department. However, the developed theories would not make any sense
outside that unit. Thus, within the organizational aim of enhancing safe
operations in general, this approach would not be very useful.

4.1 Quantitativeresearchandquestionnairesurvey
A quantitative design incorporating a questionnaire is used to develop an
understanding of the manifestation of culture and to give direction for the
subsequent qualitative studies. In order to grasp the underlying dimension of
safety culture through the use of questionnaire, a high level of instrument
qualitynamely, reliability and validityis required.
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Research methodology
The starting point of every questionnaire is item generation, concerning which
questions and themes should be included. This stage is also related to content
validity. Although Hinkin (1995) suggests a strong theoretical framework as a
starting point, followed by a sorting process allowing for the deletion of
conceptually inconsistent items, Guldenmund (2007) suggests two different
approaches for questionnaire development. First, a descriptive model of the
construct can be used as a starting pointnamely, a normative or theoretical
approach. Second, theories and results of previous research can be used in
combination to construct a new questionnaire, which is a more pragmatic
approach.
However, some inherent difficulties exist in both of these frameworks. First,
if starting with a theoretical approach, a lack of theoretical consensus may
result in different themes, scales, and items depending upon the researchers
theoretical stand. Second, as a result of the first point, previous research may
be difficult to use due to, inter alia, the variety of themes, scales, and items
used. Moreover, when established theory is derived from empirical research,
the theory itself may be misleading due to the vast amount of far-fromvalidated measurements in use. Hale (2000) perceived part of the problem as
being induced by the tendency for each researcher to start from scratch by
developing his or her own instrument. Hardly any scales have been reused in
the same form in more than one study, and they can therefore not be
systematically refined and improved by combined research efforts across
several research groups. It is important to keep in mind that the cultural
disagreements and differences related to epistemology, ontology, and
methodology, to a great extent, may explain the many different measurements
in use.

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Theory plays a key role in how measurement is conceptualized, and the lack
of theoretical consensus poses a clear challenge to researchers. Under such
circumstances, it is especially important to be mindful of measurement
procedures and development. In addition, it is considered impossible to reach
theoretical progress without adequate measurement (Hinkin, 1995). As
described here, the situation within the field is complicated, and some
important questions are raised regarding whether the methodological
disagreements derive from a lack of theoretical consensus or if theoretical
consensus is lacking due to methodological differences and the use of flawed
measures. In order to overcome some of these problems, a previously
developed instrument was used in this thesis

Questionnaire development
In order to examine safety culture, a questionnaire developed by Studio
Apertura, a constituent centre of The Norwegian University of Science and
Technology (NTNU), in collaboration with the Norwegian DNV and the
research institution SINTEF, was used. Their development was based on a
theoretical review and an evaluation of eight preexisting questionnairesfour
developed in Norway, two in Denmark, and two in the United Kingdom. The
evaluation was carried out according to five criteria: (1) foundation
(theoretical foundation, documentation, and premises for application), (2)
thematic width, (3) practical experience of use, (4) the ability to describe and
measure safety culture, and (5) the ability to be used at multiple levels
(individual, group, team, company). A more thorough description of the
development is available (Antonsen & Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige
universitet. Institutt for sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009; SINTEF, 2003;
Studio Apertura, 2004). The questionnaire was previously used to survey
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safety culture on board supply vessels and found to be acceptable for use
within merchant shipping. The full questionnaire and letter of introduction are
included in Appendix 1.

Survey sample and respondents demographics

The research population is Norwegian-controlled dry cargo and liquid carriers
above 500 gross tons. A total of 150 target group vessels were randomly
selected from the 953 vessels within the Norwegian Shipowners
Associations list of members for 2005. The target group of 150 vessels
represented approximately 15% of the overall population, which was
considered to be large enough to be representative of the population as a
whole (Neuman, 2000). A sample of 10% is recommended, but some
withdrawals were expected; thus, a 5% margin was included in the original
sample. The sample was stratified with regard to status of the vessels flag
register (white, grey, or black listed flag) and type of vessel (general cargo,
bulk carrier, oil tanker, gas tanker, or chemical tanker).
Following the initial selection, telephone calls were made to each company to
ask for their participation. Thirty-one companies, with a total of 83, vessels
agreed to participate while 45 companies with 67 vessels in total declined.
Reasons for not participating included:
Being unable to contact the company despite repeated efforts (23
vessels, 16 companies).
The vessel was not owned by a Norwegian party and therefore was not
defined as Norwegian controlled (15 vessels, 8 companies).

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Ship management was outsourced to a non-Norwegian country and
therefore was not defined as Norwegian controlled (14 vessels, 8
companies).
The company refused to participate (12 vessels, 10 companies).
The remaining vessels were sold (3 vessels, 3 companies).
The population was later redefined, and vessels managed from a nonNorwegian country were not considered to be Norwegian controlled.
In total, 1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tankers and bulk/dry
cargo carriers; 76 vessels from 29 companies returned a total of 1,262 forms,
resulting in an individual response rate of 80.2%, a vessel response rate of
91.5%, and a company response rate of 93.5%. The questionnaires were
returned from 40 liquid bulk carriers (liquid tanker) and 36 dry bulk carriers
(dry cargo); 63% of the respondents were employed on a liquid tanker and
37% on a dry cargo vessel. Twenty-two nationalities were represented, with
the majority from the Philippines (65.5%), followed by Norway (9.2%),
Poland (8.1%) and Russia (5.5%). Unfortunately, no company with vessels
flying a black-listed flag was willing to participate.
The further validation process (results are included in the articles in part II) is
based on the following premises and methodological guidelines.

Validity and reliability through theoretical conceptualization

The starting point when developing a questionnaire and scales is conceptual
definition, which specifies the theoretical basis. A questionnaire is normally
comprised of several dimensions or constructs represented by several partly
overlapping items, called multidimensional scales. When generating the item
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pool, each item making up a construct should reflect the latent variables
underlying the theme (i.e., the different features or dimensions of the safety
culture concept). In order to truly reflect the underlying feature, the items in
each dimension should ideally have a common cause (i.e., local management)
or consequence (i.e., work practices). Thus, an underlying assumption is that
the items reflecting one single construct are unidimensional. In other words,
within each measured dimension, items are strongly associated with each
other while simultaneously representing a single dimension of the concept.
Three reasons for using a multi-item measure instead of a single-item measure
are noted. First, an individual item is not reliable due to a considerable
random measurement error. Second, an individual item lacks precision and
can only categorize people into a relatively small number of groups. Third, an
individual item lacks scope, and it is very unlikely that a single item may
represent a complex theoretical concept (DeVillis, 2003; Gliem & Gliem,
2003; Hair, 1998; Shevlin, Miles & Bunting, 1997; Spector, 1992). Summing
up, single items are considered to be less valid, less accurate, and less reliable
than multi-item constructions. It is also suggested that a scale should consist
of a minimum of three items in order to be robust (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan,
2003). However, due to collinearity, the use of multiple items could represent
a problem in regression models and when independent variables are created
by summing items in a scale. Such an additional method represents a
procedure that does not control for the effect of measurement error.
Regression parameter estimates may be attenuated or increased (Shevlin et al.,
1997).
When ensuring the conceptual definition, the primary concern is content
validity, which is a requirement for construct validity (Hinkin, 1995). Content
validity is the degree to which elements of the measurement are relevant to
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and representative of the underlying safety culture concept. Determining
whether the scale or item-set has good content validity can be done from a
number of sources of relevant theory, empirical literature, and expert
judgment. Construct validity concerns the degree to which inferences can
legitimately be made from the operationalized constructs in the questionnaire
to the theoretical concepts on which those operationalizations were based.
When using multidimensional scales, both the convergent validity of the
respective subscales (i.e., the degree to which the items within a particular
subscale measure the same unidimensional construct) and their discriminant
validity (i.e., the degree to which the items in different subscales measure
different rather than the same construct) need to be considered. Both content
and construct validity are concerned with how the measurement fits with the
theoretical foundation and power of generalizationnamely, external
validity. When the objective of a study is to establish a causal relationship
(i.e., using regression analysis), internal validity is of particular consideration,
referring to the confidence placed on the assessed cause-effect relationship.
The internal validity of the conclusions reached depends on the reliability and
validity of the questionnaire or scales used (Neuman, 2000; Raubenheimer,
2004).
Other aspects that should be taken into consideration are whether the items are
measuring a perception or an attitude. Perceptions are considered more
volatile and mostly oriented toward the current workplace conditions, whereas
attitudes are considered to be less open to change, more durable, and
developed through experiences both inside and outside the workplace. Cooper
(2000) cautions against the use of measurements that include attitude scales
due to the risk of muddying the construct. Previous research has shown that
attitudinal questions have more positively skewed responses than the
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perceptional questions and may therefore influence the analytical results.
Moreover, Cooper (2000) indicated that the mix of attitudinal-perceptual
questions is one explanatory reason that different factor structures emerge
across research groups.
Measurement errors threaten the validity of the conclusion about the
relationship between the constructs. Method bias has both a systematic and a
random component, with the systematic error in particular being considered a
major problem. One source of method bias is apparent when the same
measurement is used for all constructs, making it difficult to assess the
strength of the bias. The direction also varies, and the observed relationships
may be either inflated or deflated. Potential sources of common method biases
are produced by a common source or evaluator (e.g., social desirability,
consistency motive acquiescence, or positive and negative affectivity)
whereas method effects are caused by an items characteristics (i.e.,
complexity, ambiguity, scale format, and negatively worded items). Method
effects are caused by item context produced by the measurement context
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Podsakoff et al. (2003) presented several approaches
to addressing this problem. However, others regard the common method
biases as an urban legend, claiming that the supposed effect on correlations is
overstated (Spector, 2006). Spector (2006) further pointed to the fact that, as
long as there is uncertainty related to the presence and size of a possible bias,
applying methods, inter alia statistical methods, in order to control the bias
effect might produce biases itself, as one might control for something that
does not exist. However, being aware of the possible problems makes it easier
to consider them during the process of developing a valid measurement.

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Validity and reliability through factor analysis

When data are collected, factor analysis is a common method for validation of
the questionnaires conceptual definition. Factor analysis defines the
underlying structure of the interrelationship (correlation) between the
variables in the questionnaire data by defining a set of common underlying
dimensions known as factors. However, not only do the constructs share that
they are facets of the same concept, but correlations could also bedue to
similarities in measurementcommon source and/or common method
(DeVillis, 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2003). If the data are not biased, the
extracted factors comprise internally consistent and correlated items that
externally differ from the other factors. Thus, the extracted factors are
assumed to have discriminant and convergent validity. The convergent
validity is further assessed by the means of scale analysis and inter-item
statistics.
For the method of factor analysis to be appropriate, a certain sample size is
required. Preferably, the sample size should be 100 or larger. As a general
rule, it is suggested to have at least five times as many observations as there
are variables to be analyzed. Some even propose 20 cases for each variable.
Small sample sizes or low variable-case ratio lead to higher chances of
overfitted data (i.e., deriving factors that are sample specific with little
generalizability) (Hair, 1998). Hair (1998) also pointed out that correlations in
small samples could be deemed significant and appear in the factor analysis
just by chance. In addition, if no items are substantially correlated, factor
analysis is not applicable. The methods applicability is commonly tested by
Barletts test of sphericity, which should be significant, and Kaiser-MayerOlkin (KMO), which should exceed 0.60 (Hair, 1998).

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Factor analyses can be done from an exploratory or confirmatory perspective.
Exploratory techniques are often more useful early in the validation process,
while confirmatory techniques are far more common when the instrument in
question has been previously validated. The most common method for
extracting factors is Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which is
considered suitable when the research purpose is data reduction or
exploration, but should not be used in causal modeling. When the research
purpose is theory confirmation and causal modeling, Common Factor
Analysis (CFA) (e.g., Principal Axis Factoring [PAF]) is most suitable (Hair,
1998). An important tool for interpreting factors is factor rotation (Hair,
1998). Varimax rotation is the most common method for interpretation.
However, the varimax rotation method, which belongs to the group of
orthogonal rotation techniques, may be problematic to use. Orthogonal
techniques assume that the underlying factors are independent, but from the
theoretical perspective dimensions of, for example, safety culture, they are not
regarded as independent but as an integration of various sub-facets. To
validate a questionnaire, CFA is recommended with an oblique rotation
technique. Oblique techniques allow for correlation between factors and are
preferable when the researchers aim is to obtain several theoretically
meaningful factors or constructs (Field, 2005; Hair, 1998; Pett et al., 2003).
Moreover, confirmatory analysis is recommended when the final objective is
structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis (Hoyle, 1995).
Each items, or variables, fit with the underlying dimension is represented
by factor loading. Factor loadings range from 1 to -1; the closer to 1, the
better the representation of the underlying dimension. The definition of a
significant loading depends upon the sample size. A small sample size
requires higher loading than a large sample. In addition, variables
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communalities should be assessed. Communality refers to the total amount of
variance an original variable shares with all other variables included in the
factor analyses. Variables with low loadings and low communalities should be
considered for deletion (Hair, 1998). By one rule of thumb in CFA, loadings
should be 0.7 or higher to confirm that independent variables identified a
priori are represented by a particular factor. However, such high loadings (
0.70) are not typical, and real-life data may not meet this criterion. Thus,
some researchersparticularly for exploratory purposesuse a lower level
such as 0.4 for the central factor and 0.25 for other factors (Raubenheimer,
2004). On the other hand, factor loadings must be interpreted in light of
theory and their practical significance, not by arbitrary cutoff levels alone. In
addition, items with multiple significant loadings at various factors should be
deleted, as this is a sign of multidimensionality (Hair, 1998) and, thus, not
discriminant valid. In a multidimensional scale, it is recommended that a
minimum of three items load significantly in each factor. The more items
there are per factor, the more likely is it that the factor will replicate as
originally constructed (Pett et al., 2003; Raubenheimer, 2004). When using a
validated questionnaire, the extracted factors should be similar to the
theoretical construct as operationalized.
Factor correlation analysis is often done in order to check construct validity,
which is viewed as the extent to which an operational measure truly reflects
the underlying safety culture concept as well as whether it operates in a
consistent manner.

Validity and reliability through scale analysis

Various statistics can be selected in order to estimate the reliability of scale
and items, including alpha models, split-half models, Guttman models, and
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parallel and strict parallel models. Cronbachs alpha is extensively reported as
the most commonly accepted measure for internally consistency reliability
(Hinkin, 1995; Shevlin, Miles, Davies, & Walker, 2000). Internal consistency
(convergent validity) is statistically tested by Cronbachs alpha coefficient
and inter-item statistics. Although no consensus exists with regard to the
Cronbachs alpha coefficient, usually a value above 0.7 is considered
acceptable, although some advocate for a level of 0.8 or better, especially
when a new scale is being evaluated (Netemeyer, Sharma & Bearden, 2003;
Raubenheimer, 2004). Others suggest that when dealing with psychological
constructs, values below even 0.7 can, realistically, be expected because of
the diversity of constructs being measured (Field, 2005).
Although high reliability is generally cited as evidence of good psychometric
properties of a scale, it is noted that Cronbachs alpha value on its own should
be used with caution (Shevlin et al., 2000). The value depends upon the
number of items in the scale and is a function of, inter alia, the inter-item
correlation and the item-total correlation. Thus, the inter-item statistics should
also be examined. Inter-item statistics, or convergent validity, are related to
the extent to which different scale items assumed to represent a construct
converge on the same construct. Convergent validity is the degree to which
multiple attempts to measure the same concepts agree, which may be tested
by the item-total correlations. Rules of thumb suggest that the item-total
correlation should exceed 0.5 (Hair, 1998) or 0.4 (Field, 2005) and the interitem correlation should exceed 0.3 (Hair, 1998), but not 0.8. An inter-item
correlation exceeding 0.8 suggests that items are duplicates of one another
(Pett et al., 2003). Moreover, Shevlin et al. (2000) argued that a high estimate
of Cronbachs alpha may indicate the presence of systematic error, such as
scales deviating from unidimensionality. In such cases, extraneous variables
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can make a substantial contribution to inflating the Cronbachs alpha value
rather than the actual dimension being measured. Indeed, when the factor
loadings of the dimension being measured are low, the presence of systematic
errors can greatly inflate the estimate of Cronbachs alpha, especially with
large sample sizes (Shevlin et al., 2000). These findings substantiate the
importance

of

reporting

item

statistics

so

that

the

presence

of

unidimensionality can be evaluated, along with factor loadings and cross

loadings.

Causal relationship through structural equation modeling

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is applied to test the causal relationship
between the components deriving from factor analysis. Through SEM
analysis, it is possible to estimate multiple and interrelated dependence
relationships. SEM is focused on testing causal processes inherent in theory.
Moreover, this method has the ability to represent unobserved concepts, as
safety culture, in these relationships and account for measurement error in the
estimation process (Hair, 1998). The structural relations between tested
variables are specified with both a theoretical and empirical foundation.
SEM is an extension of both factor analysis and regression analysis. The
method serves purposes similar to multiple regressions, but in a way that takes
into account the modeling of interactions, nonlinearities, measurement error,
and correlated error terms. SEM also considers when the independent
variable(s) as well as the dependent variable are measured with multiple
indicators, such as when extracted using factor analysis. Hence, the
advantages of SEM compared to multiple regressions include more flexible
assumptions. SEM analysis also opens up the possibility to explore multiple
relationships simultaneously, where regression analysis only examines a
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single relationship at the time, holding all other variables constant (Hair,
1998).
The final model is evaluated with goodness-of-fit criteria assessing the overall
model. Assessing the goodness-of-fit is not as straightforward as with other
multivariate dependence techniques (e.g., multiple regressions) as no single
test best describes the strength of the SEM model. Instead, a number of
goodness-of-fit measures have been developed; when used in combination,
the results are assessed from three perspectives: overall fit, comparative fit to
a base model, and model parsimony. However, there is no consensus of what
accurate levels of fit are, as none of the measures (except the chi-square
statistics) have an associated statistical test. According to Hair (1998), several
guidelines have been suggested, but ultimately each researcher must decide
whether the model fit is acceptable (Hair, 1998).

4.2 Qualitativeresearchdesign
The term qualitative research refers to any kind of research that produces
findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of
quantification. Although some of the qualitative data may be quantified, as
with census data, the analysis itself is a qualitative one (Strauss & Corbin,
1990). The most prominent qualitative research techniques employed in this
study are: (1) document study, (2) case studies, (3) interviews, (4)
participatory observation, and (5) participation in maritime forums.

Document study
Document study is an indirect method of data collection that does not require
participation of the subjects involved. Official maritime accident investigation
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reports (CPEM, 1999; Danish Maritime Authority, 2009; Justis-og
politidepartementet 1991; National Transportation Safety Board, 1990; United
States Coast Guard, 2005) are studied in order to understand how safety
culture, safety management, and context interact and influence the course of
events.
In addition, administrative safety management documentation has been
studied in the four different companies selected for the case study (further
information about these cases follows). This includes safety meeting minutes,
reported events, root cause analyses, procedural manuals and checklists, and
other available relevant documentation. Analyses were performed with the
intention of understanding the companies approaches to safety management
and priority areas. Of particular interest were safety information data
analysesnamely, how the experience information was categorized and their
approach to identifying causes in cases of near-miss, incidents, and accidents.
Such analyses occurred with reference to the previous mentioned ages of
safety and to which degree technical, personal, and underlying organizational
causes were identified. The analyses were also seen in relation to safety
measures and changes done upon the processed informationnamely, if
changes aimed at introducing more control in the form of procedures and
checklists or if changes were done in other levels of the organizational
structures and policies (e.g., manning policies). This part of the document
analysis was complemented with interviews.
The document studies have given valuable insights into understanding how
safety culture, safety management, and context interact and influence
accidents. These studies also provided a better understanding of shipping
companies approach to safety management. They have enabled the study of
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past events and issues to identify changes over time; however, some
limitations exist. The documents are not representative; therefore, findings
cannot be generalized. Which documents were made available depended upon
each company; thus, a full comparative study between cases could not be
performed. In addition, all documentation should be considered as biased as it
represents the view of its authors (Sarantakos, 1998)

Case studies
Case study research involves studying individual casesin this case shipping
companiesin their natural environment for a long(er) period of time,
employing a number of methods of data collections and analyses. Four case
studies were carried out in two tanker companies and two dry cargo
companies. The statistical results from survey data analyses were used as
criteria for selecting cases and focus areanamely, mixed crew nationality
and ship management. Thus, a better understanding of the structure,
processes, and complexities underlying the statistical results were achieved.
Administrative document studies (as previously described), interviews, and
participatory observation were performed along with seminar participation.
The information gathered is used to illustrate, explain, and expand the
quantitative findings. However, some of the drawbacks with case study as a
method are poor representativeness and poor replicability (Sarantakos, 1998).

Interviews
In contrast to document studies, interviewing requires direct interaction with
the respondents and heavily relies on their involvement, participation, and
contribution. Both formal and informal interviews were performed. Open
formal interviews were carried out with shore-side personnel working in
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selected case companies within the department of safety management and/or
manning. When available, top-level management was also interviewed. The
interview process had to be adapted to the subjects availability; thus,
individual interviews were conducted in some cases and group interviews in
others. The scope of the interviews also changed over time as a better
understanding of the industry was acquired. Therefore, the first interviews are
more superficial in character then the last. All interviews were recorded.
When interviewing the sailing personnel, a more informal and ethnographic
approach was selected. Safety issues, behavioral norms, violation of
standards, and the like are sensitive issues. Most crews are not Norwegian and
do not enjoy fixed employment; thus, many fear losing their job from being
open about the situation. Most interviews conducted in the field studies were
done as a part of daily conversations after a trusting relationship had been
established. None of these interviews were recorded.

Participatory observation
Participatory observation at sea was also carried out. During the study, vessels
from various companies sailed for different periods of time, ranging from one
to two weeks.4 During the field studies, I participated in daily work activities
such as ballast tank cleaning, mooring operation, loading, and acting as watch
keeper at night. However, in a 24-hour society, leisure time is also of great
importance. During my spare time, I participated in leisure activities and
games. I experienced that spending time with the crew was essential to

The shipping industry is known to be a highly transparent industry. Thus, to ensure that all participants

remained unidentifiable, the number of vessels sailed is not included.

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gaining their trust, and the first days no questions of a more sensible character
were asked. When interacting with the crew, informal interviews were carried
out as part of the daily conversation. Both interviews and observations aimed
to understand how the ship management influenced the work on board and to
understand team and group processes from within the group. Although the
crew knew about my research area in more general terms, research questions
were never explained in detail to avoid biases.
Participatory observation has the advantage that group processes and
management practices may be observed in their natural environment. In
addition, it is possible to retrieve firsthand information that respondents are
unable or unwilling to offer during formal interviews (e.g., deliberate
violations of safety standards). However, one limitation is that participatory
observation can only be employed with smaller groups; thus, findings cannot
be generalized. Although behavior is directly observed, the method does not
offer frequency of behavior. The method is also exposed to observer bias,
selective perception, and memory and offers no control measure regarding
bias, attitude, and opinion of the observer. In particular, the latter were
experienced during the field study, especially when working with lower-paid
crew from the third world originating from poor conditions. I had much
empathy for this group. Being aware of my own bias gave me some control
over the situation in order to remain objective.

Participation in maritime forums

Participation in maritime forums and seminars as a method was used for two
reasons: (1) to gain an understanding of the maritime context and
interrelationships and (2) to ensure quality assurance of results. Inspired by
William Foote Whyte and the Street Corner Society, an ethnographic
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approach was adopted to gain an understanding of the research area and build
up credibility and trustworthiness. As a part of this, the maritime aspects
became integrated into my own social life as well as my research. Early in the
study, I reallocated myself from my institutes economical and administrative
department, where I was originally employed, to the department of nautical
sciences. Along the road, I also became chairman of the Nautical Institute
Norway Branch, an international organization working to improve the safety
and efficiency of shipping. I then became an official member of the
Norwegian delegation participating in IMO meetings. Thus, by carrying out
research at the maritime industry, I became a part of the industry itself.
Several presentations of my results have been given at national and
international conferences, both for governmental and non-governmental
industrial stakeholders and company conferences. Feedback from the
audience has been used to interpret statistical results and define critical areas
for further investigation. As with participatory observation, going native
wasand still isan area of concern.

4.3 Appliedmethodsandstatisticsinarticles
An overview of methods for data collection and statistics applied in the
different papers is presented in Table 2. Although not explicitly stated in all
articles, all quantitative results are interpreted in a qualitative framework.

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Research methodology
Table 2.
Overview of Methods for Data Collection and Statistics

1
x

Article Id.
2
3
4
x
x
x

5
x

6
x

Field study at sea

---

---

---

Shore interviews

---

---

---

Maritime/safety related conference attendance

---

---

---

---

IMO attendance

---

---

---

---

---

Survey comments

---

---

---

Survey quantitative data

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)

---

---

---

---

---

Cronbachs alpha

---

---

---

Correlation (Pearsons r)

---

---

---

Inter-item, item-total statistics

---

---

---

Analysis of variance (ANOVA)

---

---

---

---

---

Linear regression analysis

---

---

---

---

---

Logistic ordered regression analysis

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Transformed standardized factor scores

---

---

---

---

---

Summarized

---

---

---

Data collection
Maritime document study

Analysis

Development of factors used in analysis

Summarized

items

from extracted

factor

structure
items

based

on

theoretical

relationship

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5 Researchresults
This section summarizes each article, including the objective, applied method,
main results, conclusions, and interrelationships. All articles are related to the
three research questions developed for the purpose of this thesis:
What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the
shipping industry?
What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance
within the shipping industry?
What characterizes shipping companies application of the safety
management concept?
Finally, a structural model testing the causal relationship among the latent
dimensions of safety culture is presented.

5.1 Summaryandresultsofarticle1
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2009). Local management and its impact on
safety culture and safety within Norwegian shipping. In S. Martorell, C.
Guedes Soares & J. Barnett (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis:
Theory, Methods and Applications (pp. 1423-1430). London: Taylor &
Francis Group.
The objective of this article was threefold: (1) explore and analyze the
shipboard characteristics of safety culture; (2) elaborate upon which factors
affect the shipboard safety culture; and (3) use the results to set the direction
for future studies. The first two objectives are stated in the article.

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Research results
The article first states the theoretical approach to safety culture, along with the
methodological framework. Safety culture is perceived as a reciprocal
interrelated fusion of three main elements. The first element is internal
psychological factors, including each individuals attitude and perception
toward safety, work situation, and organization. This element was measured
using a questionnaire. In addition, formal and informal interviews were
performed to get a more comprehensive understanding of what is happening
inside peoples heads. The second element is observable safety-related
behavior, or what individuals are actually doing on board. Safety-related
behavior, which is perceived to be partly determined by the first element (i.e.,
psychological factors), was also measured by a questionnaire, in which
individuals reported their own behavior in working situations. In addition,
participatory field studies were conducted to observe actual behaviors.
Behavioral patterns are regarded as a manifestation of shipboard culture and
of a culture existing on a higher level in the organization (i.e., organizational
factors). Finally, the third element is organizational factors (e.g., employment
policy, safety management policy, approach towards efficiency versus safety),
which were measured by case studies and interviews. However, the
questionnaire also comprised questions related to organizational factors. In
this approach, the contextual influence is also important. Distinctive
characteristics of the shipping context are, inter alia, life and work on board as
a total institution and a 24-hour society.
A mixed method approach was applied, where retrieved data were integrated
into the interpretation, although this was not explicitly stated in the article.
Consequently, psychological measures traditionally referred to as safety
climate and safety culture traditionally explored by qualitative methods were
not distinguished. In this article (and the others), statistical data were all
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Research results
interpreted in a qualitative framework. It was recommended that the
questionnaire not be used as a single method; thus, it was referred to as a
safety culture questionnaire.
The statistical approach was based on a combination of exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses, using the method of principal component. The
exploratory factor analyses were carried out with orthogonal varimax rotation.
In the confirmatory factor analysis a one-factor solution on each construct was
performed. Based on a comparison of the exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses, five factors were found to be valid: (1) crew interaction, (2)
reporting practices, (3) competence, (4) local management, and (5) working
situation (proactive work practices).
The qualitative data indicated that the shipping companies crewing strategy,
which includes employment terms, rotation systems, and policy toward
shipboard management, are interrelated with how safety culture is manifested
on board. Considering seafaring as a 24-hour society and the geographical
distance between the on-shore organization and the vessel may affect both the
quality of those systems and plans developed on shore and their
implementation on the vessels. Thus, ship management was identified as a
key factor to a sound safety culture along with the on-shore crewing strategy.

5.2 Summaryandresultsofarticle2
Oltedal, H., & Wadsworth, E. (2010). Risk perception in the Norwegian
shipping industry and identification of influencing factors. Maritime Policy &
Management, 37(6), 601-623.
Based on the findings from the first article, the second paper aimed to assess
the relationship among shipboard safety, safety culture, and shore-based
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Research results
organizational factors, using risk perception as a proxy variable for the
general safety level on board. The objective of this article was to assess the
relationship between risk perception and the dimensions of safety culture.
With regard to assessing the relationship between risk perception and safety
culture, the article introduced risk perception as a dependent variable, thereby
expanding the trinity methodological framework presented in the first article
(i.e., person, behavior, and situation) with a measurable dependent variable.
Risk perception has been found to be adequate as a dependent variable, as
previous research indicates that risk perception and risk behavior are strongly
correlated. It is suggested that risk perception is a good indicator for safety
level in general, which is constrained by the situation and context.
Explorative principal component analysis with varimax rotation was applied
in order to explore the latent dimensions of safety culture. Eight factors were
identified, providing a good representation of the concept of shipboard safety
culture: (1) competence, (2) interpersonal relationship (crew interaction), (3)
shore orientation, (4) ship management (local management), (5) proactive
work practices, (6) feedback, (7) demand for efficiency, and (8) reporting
practices. Furthermore, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried
out to explore any associations between the demographic (nationality, age,
department, and vessel type) and organizational (work description) variables
as well as both dependent variables (i.e., risk perception and the independent
safety culture dimensions). A linear regression analysis (OLS) was
subsequently conducted to assess the associations between risk perception and
the dimensions of safety culture, controlling for any potentially influential
demographic and organizational factors.

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Research results
Based on the results, the overall safety in respondents working situations was
perceived to be very high, which may indicate a relatively good safety
standard. The ANOVA analysis showed significant differences between age
groups in the dimensions of interpersonal relationship and shore orientation.
The type of vessel indicated significant differences on the dimensions of
competence, local management, and feedback. Those working on dry cargo
vessels perceived the feedback on reported experience data to be better than
those working on liquid tankers. However, those working on liquid tankers
had a better perception of their own level of competence and their local
management than those working on dry cargo vessels. Finally, work
description (i.e., teamwork versus individual) showed significant differences
on all dimensions of safety culture. Crews working on a team perceived the
dimensions of competence, interpersonal relationship, local management,
feedback, and reporting practices to be better than those working on an
individual basis. Crews working on a team also felt less demand for efficiency
and perceived the shore side of the company to be more safety orientated.
The regression analysis indicated that local management, working practices,
and reporting practices have a positive association with risk perception while
demand for efficiency has a negative association with risk perception. The
working situation has a positive association when work is performed on a
team in contrast to when work is performed on an individual basis. None of
the demographic data were significantly associated with risk perception.
For future research, it was suggested to further examine the characteristics of
teamwork along with the concept of group identity. It would also be of
interest for future research to examine risk perception both in general and in

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relation to potential differences among nationalities, along with differences
among white, grey and black listed flags of registration.
Given that the overall research topic in the current thesis concerns safety
management on dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers, the remaining articles
address safety management within dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers in
greater detail, starting with liquid tankers. The third article also suggests
differences with regard to safety management within the two sectors.

5.3 Summaryandresultsofarticle3
Oltedal, H. A. (2010). The use of safety management systems within the
Norwegian tanker industryDo they really improve safety? In R. Bris, C.
Guedes Soares, & S. Martorell (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety: Theory
and Applications (pp. 2355-2362). London: Taylor & Francis Group.
The aim of this article is twofold: (1) describe safety management within the
liquid tanker sector and (2) identify factors that influence safety management
performance.
The theoretical rationale of traditional safety management systems was
introduced for the first time in this article. Traditional safety management was
presented as a system containing four sub-systems: (1) reporting and
collection of experience data from the vessel; (2) data processing,
summarizing, and analysis; (3) development of safety measures; and (4)
implementation. The topic of focus was presented in a situational context
where safety concerns need balance to ensure profits and economical
concerns. Safety management as such is related to the International Safety
Management (ISM) code. This article was the first to explicitly state that it
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Research results
adopted a multi-method approach combining surveys, case studies, field
studies, interviews and other qualitative information, although all the
concerned articles are based on a multi-method approach.
With regard to the statistics and factor analysis, the survey items were
grouped as they relate to the information flow in a safety management
systemsmore precisely: (1) crews reporting practices, (2) analysis and
follow up by shore side, (3) procedures and checklists, and (4) perceived
balance between commercial pressure and safety concerns. Explorative
principal component analysis was carried out in each group in order to
examine the items interrelationships. Shore-side development of safety
measures was also analyzed, although most findings stemmed from the
qualitative data.
The results indicated a situation with substantial underreporting of experience
data from the vessels. Such underreporting may be explained by the crews
fear of negative consequences, a complicated reporting system, and a lack of
understanding of the overall safety management system. The development of
measures tends to focus on controlling human actions, often in the form of
excess use of procedures and checklists. This situation was traced back to a
person-oriented approach in safety management. Moreover, procedures and
checklists are often perceived as being problematic to use in daily shipboard
operations. In order to turn such a situation around, it was suggested that the
seafarers experience be taken seriously, with regard to both reasons for
underreporting and their experience with new measures. On board, the ship
management was identified as a factor strongly influencing the shipboard
situation, and it is suggested that the shore side pay more attention to that

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Research results
element. Other organizational factors that were suggested to influence the
situation included employment conditions and crew stability.

5.4 Summaryandresultsofarticle4
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Tanker versus dry cargoThe use of
safety management systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping. In J.M.
Ale, I.A. Papazoglou, & E. Zio (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety (pp. 21182125). London: Taylor & Francis Group.
As the overall research topic in the current thesis concerns safety management
on both dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers, this article focused on safety
management within the dry cargo sector in order to compare the findings with
the liquid tank sector. The aim of this article was to (1) describe safety
management within the dry cargo industry, (2) identify factors that may
influence safety management performance, and (3) compare the current
situation within the dry cargo to the liquid tanker industry. This was the first
article to provide a description of the two sectors (i.e., liquid and dry cargo)
with the purpose of conducting comparative exploration and analysis. The two
sectors were introduced in order to make each sectors major safety
challenges visible.
This article served as a follow-up to the third article and, thus, followed a
similar structure related to the information flow of a traditional safety
management system. Although a multi-method approach was applied, only
areas in which statistical data were available for both sectors were presented
and analyzednamely, (1) crews reporting practices, (2) procedures and
checklists, and (3) perceived balance between commercial pressure and safety

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Research results
concerns. An explorative principal component analysis was carried out at each
group in order to examine the items interrelationships.
This article pointed to a central custom-related difference between the two
sectors. Although customers of dry cargo shipping have fewer safety-related
requirements, the tanker sector is extensively embedded in the Norwegian oil
industry, which explains the extended focus on safety in general, safety
management, attitudes, etc., within the tanker industry compared to dry cargo.
Underreporting of minor incidents and near misses are more present within
the dry cargo industry. In both sectors, reporting frequency is correlated with
feedback given upon reported events. Although both sectors have substantial
underreporting, our data indicated that the safety campaigns, which are typical
for the oil industry, have some positive effects on reporting practices.
However, within the dry cargo industry, such feedback is perceived as better
than within the tanker sector. The analysis suggested that the shore tanker
organization is not prepared to manage the growing workload that increased
reporting brings about. The organization fails to obtain feedbacks motivating
effect, which again may counteract the effect of safety campaigns. However,
it was suggested that the dry cargo industry could benefit from such
campaigns when it comes to increasing crews awareness and recognition of a
near miss, along with a better understanding of reportings importance in
safety-management systems. It was recommended that the shore side provide
resources for the potential increase in number of reports placed and proper
follow-up. When following up the reports, the development of new measures
should also be considered carefully, and alternatives to the development of
new procedures should be developed. The experiences from the tanker
industry suggested that the development of a constantly increasing, detailed,
and extensive procedural system may undermine safety. Moreover, the
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Research results
analysis suggested that safety measures be initiated by internal and industrial
need, not external demands from the customer. When externally initiated,
safety management may be less integrated into the operational part of the
organization. It was also suggested that this external demand is related to the
existence of a poor procedural system.
Both the third and the fourth articles pointed to a situation with substantial
underreporting of experience data. Reporting is regarded as a critical
cornerstone in formal safety management. Some influencing factors were
suggested, and the fifth article further assessed the relations among reporting
practices, safety culture, and organizational factors.

5.5 Summaryandresultsofarticle5
Oltedal, H., & McArthur, D. (2010). Reporting practices in merchant
shipping, and the identification of influencing factors. Safety Science, 49(2),
331-338.
This article pursued three aims: (1) assess the relationship between reporting
practices and safety culture, (2) explore the influence of familiarity with local
managers, and (3) further explore differences between vessel type (i.e., liquid
and dry cargo).
Reporting practices are regarded as a cornerstone when working with
systematic safety management, and this article was the first to statistically
explore factors affecting reporting practices. A review of safety research
within the maritime sector indicated thatalthough underreporting of
experience data is regarded as a major problem within the industrylittle
research has been done. With a foundation in both theory and results derived
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Research results
from research within other high-risk sectors, barriers to experience data
reporting were summarized in the following categories: (1) fear of
disciplinary action or of other peoples reactions; (2) risk acceptance, where
incidents are regarded as a part of the job or unpreventable; (3) useless, as
reporting does not lead to any changes; and (4) practical reasons like time
pressure or a complicated reporting system.
In the statistical analysis, explorative principal component analysis with
varimax rotation was carried out, followed by a scale reliability analysis.
Seven factors were extracted and found to be valid, reflecting crews
perceptions of (1) their own competence, (2) interpersonal relationships
among the crew, (3) shipboard management, (4) work practices, (5) feedback
on reported safety information, (6) shore orientation to safety, and (7)
perceived demand for efficiency. An ordered logistic regression was then
carried out in order to explore the relationships between extracted factors and
reporting practices. In the analysis, the dependent variable reporting practices
were measured with four possible outcomes: (1) never/seldom, (2) sometimes,
(3) often, and (4) always.
The results indicated that high competence, a good and open interpersonal
relationship among the crew, safety-oriented management, execution of
proactive work practices, and feedback on reported events all increase the
odds of being in a higher category of the reporting frequency measure. On the
other hand, shore orientation downgrading safety and prioritizing efficiency
increase the odds of being in a lower category of the reporting frequency
measure. With regard to feedback, vessel type, and management, the effect of
these variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable. The
effect of both vessel and feedback is larger when moving between the higher
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Research results
categories. Crews who have been working with their closest manager for more
than one year tend to report more often. However, the effect of being familiar
with ones superior is larger when moving between the lower categories.
None of the identified factors should be addressed in isolation from each
other. As followed from the discussion, they are all important and mutually
dependent. Thus, the internal relationship between the identified dimensions
of safety culture should be further explored using, for example, structural
equation modeling and/or path-analysis, as performed in this thesis.

5.6 Summaryandresultsofarticle6
Oltedal, H., & Engen, O. A. (2011). Safety Management in Shipping
Making sense of limited success. Safety Science Monitor, submitted
This article sought to (1) explore the gaps between the safety ambitions (in the
form of, e.g., rules and procedures) and operational practice on board and (2)
identify possible pitfalls when relying on safety through a system perspective
(as described in articles three through five), without focusing on its human
interrelationships.
A multi-method approach combining surveys and case studies, including field
studies and interviews, was applied. Previous articles (i.e., three through five:
Oltedal, 2010; Oltedal & Engen, 2010; Oltedal & McArthur, 2010) all pointed
to substantial weaknesses in current safety management; thus, this article
explored the theoretical rationale behind traditional safety management.
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability Organization Theory
(HRO) were outlined, with an emphasis on how they explain and make sense
of safety, risks, and accidents. The conceptual framework of the Practical
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Drift Model (PDM), which seeks to combine NAT and HRO and explain why
seemingly well-regulated organizations (e.g., within shipping), develop traits
that may evolve into big accidents and disasters, was applied. The PDM
model allows us to look for possible new explanations of the success and
failure of safety strategies. In an effort to question what the scientific safety
literature has offered to make sense of the gaps between safety ambitions and
the practical outcome, some examples of gaps from our own data were
examined more closely.
The structure of the article followed the four stages of the PDM model, with
each stage being supported by qualitative and quantitative data. (1) Design
refers the stage in which organizational managers or designers develop
extensive routines and procedures in order to make the organization robust
and resilient against attacks and unforeseen events. (2) Engineered refers to an
operational situation in which the routines and procedures are first applied and
experienced to not always match the real situations. (3) Applied refers to
situations in which the designed control measures are substituted with a logic
of action based on individuals experiences and tacit knowledge. (4) Fails
refers to a situation of change (e.g., major unforeseen event such as ship
collisions), when individual units are forced to act on the assumption that all
others are acting in accordance with the original rules and procedures as they
were initially designed. The actors are then trapped in a game where trusting
their own logic of actions is the only solution while they must simultaneously
base their decision on the assumption that others are following the general
rules.
The article concluded that the industry could gain from abandoning the
person-oriented approach, where control measures are designed to control
human actions, often in the form of the excess use of procedures and
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checklists.

These

measures

developed

through

traditional

safety

management system are standardized to fit allwhether in a fleet of 5 vessels

or 100 vessels. This creates a paradox when confronting actual work
situations, where operations are never the same. The vessels are different, the
people, constellations of people, power figurations, weather and so on. A
standardized measurement will therefore never align with reality. Yet human
actions and deviations are compared to the standard and found to be
erroneous. In an attempt to gain control, new and even more detailed
measurements may be developed, thereby creating a vicious cycle resulting
from the anxiety of not being in control. Organizations should abandon such
person-oriented approaches in their search for causal and influencing factors.

5.7 Causal relationships between components of

safetyculture
In order to test the multidimensionality of the theoretical safety culture
construct, a first-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out,
resulting in six dimensions that were found to be a reliable reflection of the
safety culture concept: (1) company orientation, (2) local management, (3)
crew interaction, (4) competence, (5) proactive working practices, and (6) risk
perception. All dimensions and their interrelationships were further discussed
in articles number 1 (Oltedal & Engen, 2009), number 2 (Oltedal &
Wadsworth, 2010) and number 5 (Oltedal & McArthur, 2010) and are briefly
presented below.
Company orientation reflects the crews perception of the shore organization.
A high score indicates that the company has a reactive approach and statistics
are a major concern, whereupon the crew perceives the safety work to be a
faade. A low score indicates that the company is proactive and cares about
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the human consequences of hazardous situations, whereupon the crew
perceives the companys safety work to be a real priority area.
Competence reflects the crews perception of their own training and ability to
work safely and handle critical and hazardous situations. A high score
indicates that crews see themselves as having a high level of competence in
these areas; a low score indicates a low competence level.
Local management reflects crews perception of their closest manager as a
role model as well as the managers engagement and interest in ensuring
safety in work operations. A high score indicates good safety management; a
low score indicates poor safety management.
Proactive work practices reflect performance of proactive activities, such as
safe job analysis and hazard identification, as well as how safety is prioritized
in daily operations. A high score indicates that proactive work practices are
performed on a regular basis, whereas a low score indicates the infrequent
performance of proactive work practices.
Group interaction reflects the relationship amongst the crew, including their
problem-solving abilities, form of communication, and sharing of safety
information. A high score indicates the presence of a good interpersonal
relationship amongst the crew, whereas a low score indicates that the onboard group interaction is poor.
Risk perception is an indicator related to the onboard safety and the crews
own assessment of the probability that they or any other crewmembers will
have an accident on board the vessel during the next 12 months. A high score
indicates a low probability of an accident to occur; a low score indicates a
high probability that an accident will occur.
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Research results
In the SEM structural model (see Figure 4) the latent dimensions of safety
culture are tested for causal relationships. Postulated causal relationships are
grounded in both theory and empirical results. The hypothesis is that the
shipping companys orientations toward safety at the shore side of the
organization influence the safety culture on board the vessel; thus, company
orientation towards safety is set as an exogenous variable. The outcome
measurement variable is represented by the crews overall risk perception.
Each path was analyzed and evaluated; paths with no significant effect were
removed from the model.

Figure 4: Structural model testing for validity of causal structure

All paths in Figure 4 are reasonable and consistent with the theoretical
construct. The model shows a good fit (RMR=0.044, CFI=0.957, and
RMSEA=0.052). The root mean square residual (RMR) represents the
average residual value derived from the fitting of the variance-covariance
matrix for the tested hypothesized model. In a well-fitting model, this value
will be small (0.5 or less). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a measure of
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complete covariation in the data. CFI ranges from zero to 1.00, with values
close to 0.95 being advised. The root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) takes the error of approximation in the population into account.
RMSEA values of less than 0.05 are indicative of a good fit between the
hypothesized model and the observed data. RMSEA values as high as 0.08
represent reasonable errors of approximation (Byrne, 2010). The standardized
regressions weighted (Stand. Reg.) together with significance value (P) are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3.
Standardized Regression Weights and Significance Value of Structural Model
Dimension of safety culture

Stand. Reg.

Local management.

<--- Company orientation

-.390

***

Crew interaction.

<--- Local management.

.494

***

Competence

<--- Local management

.169

***

Competence.

<--- Crew interaction.

.575

***

Proactive work

<--- Local management

.300

***

Risk perception

<--- Company orientation

-.256

***

Risk perception

<--- Crew interaction.

.131

***

Risk perception

<--- Local management

.122

.002

Proactive work

<--- Competence

.233

***

i
Proactive
work

<--- Crew interaction.

.194

***

Standardized total effect of each latent variable is further presented in Table 4.

Standardized total effect is the sum of each latent dimensions direct and
mediated effect.
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Table 4.

Risk perception

.000

.000

.000

.000

.152

Crew interaction

-.193

.494

.000

.000

.000

.000

.244

Competence

-.177

.453

.575

.000

.000

.000

.456

Risk perception

-.329

.187

.131

.000

.000

.000

.151

-.195

.501

.328

.233

.000

.000

.362

Proactive
practices

work

Correlations

Competence

.000

Squared Multiple

Crew interaction

-.390

practices

Local management

Local management

Proactive work

Company orient.

Standardized Total Effects

The results from the SEM analyses indicate that company orientation has a
direct effect upon the performance of local management on board the vessel
(-.390) as well as a direct effect on the general risk perception (-.256). When
safety work in the company is not perceived as a genuine effort, local
management is perceived as being less safety oriented while the risk level on
the vessel is generally perceived to be higher. Management/leadership style,
commitment, and visibility are also among the most commonly measured
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dimensions in safety research in general (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden,
2000). Within the maritime sector, research initiated by the Maritime and
Coastguard Agency in the United Kingdom identified various core leadership
qualities necessary for effective safety leadership (Maritime and Coastguard
Agency, 2004). On board, these qualities were primarily geared toward the
captain as a key leader of safety, but also toward lower ranks with leadership
responsibilities.
Local management demonstrated a direct effect upon the competence
dimension (.169), proactive work practices (.300), risk perception (.122), and
crew interaction (.494), suggesting that local management plays a major role
in the development of safety culture on board. Proactive work practices
increase the chances of revealing potentially dangerous situations; thus,
preventive measures should be introduced in advance of operations. Error
detection and correction are also assumed to be stimulated by teamwork
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009). The relationship between local management
and company orientation (-.390) indicates that the company is the driving
force for how management is performed. The relationship between company
orientation and local management is one directional, indicating that
experiences from shipboard management do not influence the overall
company policy. Likewise, management-relationships are one directional,
indicating that the management is not adapted to the shipboard situationan
individual is either a good manager or he/she is not. Traditionally, no
requirements concerning formal management competence or training have
been established within shipping. Such requirements were recently adopted by
amendments of the STCW convention, which will put into force on January 1,
2012.

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Furthermore, competence has a direct effect on proactive work practices
(.233), indicating that well-informed crews trained to handle risk are better in
performing proactive work practices. However, quite surprisingly, proactive
work practices have no direct effect on the general level of risk perception.
Competence includes both training acquired on board the vessel and training
acquired on shore. Also included are the orientation new crew members
receive when joining the vessel, which is often referred to as familiarization
and safety-related drills carried out on board. Within safety research,
competence is among the top five most commonly measured themes (Flin et
al., 2000). Minimum training requirements are covered by international
conventions and regulations developed by IMO, with parts are required to be
performed onboard. For example, every crew member must participate in at
least one abandon ship and one fire drill every month. These drills should, as
far as practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency
(International Convention for the Safety of Life as Sea, 1974, International
Maritime Organization, 2009). On board, the captain and the ship
management are ultimately responsible for how such drillsas well as other
onboard training arrangementsare carried out.
Finally, crew interaction has a direct effect upon the competence dimension
(.575), proactive work practices (.194), and risk perception (.131). This
relationship is also one-directional; thus, crew interaction is suggested to be a
driving force when it comes to how onboard competence-increasing activities
are performed as well as proactive work practices. The relationship between
local management and crew interaction is one directional, suggesting that
management plays a major role in how crewmembers interact, but
management does not adjust its style to the crews characteristics and
dynamics. A trusting relationship is regarded as a key factor in forming a
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Research results
safety culture (Reason, 2001). The importance of group interaction and
teamwork has also been suggested as influencing accidents to a greater extent
than individual unsafe acts (Barnett, Gatfield & Habberley, 2010; Mitropoulos
& Cupido, 2009).

5.8 Summing up and presentations of main

conclusions
The main conclusions drawn from the research indicate that the shore side of
the company is the driving force for onboard safety culture. Thus, undesirable
onboard working practices may be traced back to shore-side organizational
decisions. The onboard conditions are influenced by the shore side in three
ways: (1) the organizations manning policy (e.g., contract arrangements, mix
of nationalities, and rotation systems), which establish the premises for the
cultural development; (2) the approach to safety management, which lay the
foundation for the reporting culture and system efficiency; the industry to a
large degree is person oriented, with excessive use of standardized measures;
and (3) shipboard management has a major mediating influence as the shoreside organizations contribution as a support function sets the stage for
shipboard management performance. All three areas are further discussed in
the following chapter.

98

Discussion

6 Discussion
This chapter presents a discussion of the overall results from all articles
included in this thesis. The discussion is related to the research questions
given in the introduction:
1. What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the
shipping industry?
2. What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance
within the shipping industry?
3. What characterizes shipping companies application of the safety
management concept?
At the international level, safety management within shipping is carried out
through the delegation of authority from the UN to IMO, delegating
responsibility for developing and maintaining workable safety regulations.
Each coastal state is responsible for the enforcement of maritime regulations,
while each flag state is responsible for ensuring compliance with international
regulations. The results of this study indicate that the structure of the
administrative authorities has some deficiencies as some maritime
administrations may be involved in shipping activities without fulfilling their
safety responsibilities. In many instances, they are unable to detect real safety
threats on board when performing inspections. However, the shipping
companies have the primary responsibility for the safe operations of ships and
the welfare of the crew. Safety management is regulated through the ISM
Code, which was developed by the IMO. One of the intentions behind the
ISM Code has been to develop a safety culture within shipping. Study results
indicate several deficiencies related to both the industrys application of safety
99

Discussion
management and the underlying theoretical rationale. It is important to
emphasize that there are variations within companies.
Articles 3 and 4 indicated that the application of safety management in
relation to culture is associated with two areas. First, safety culture is
associated with a reporting culture. A vessel with a high reporting frequency
is regarded as having a good safety culture. Reporting emphasizes what has or
could have gone wrong, while experience data and suggestions for
improvement are less emphasized. This restricts the crews ability to learn and
improve. The qualitative results point to several situations where less serious
episodes (e.g., a misallocated knife) has been reported while more serious
episodes (e.g., gas on deck) have not. Reasons for not reporting include fear
of being blamed by the ship management or shore organization. The review of
investigation reports shows that human error is still identified as the major
cause of maritime accidents, which impedes the possibility of revealing
underlying organizational causes. An inherent intention of the ISM Code was
to move the shipping industry application of safety management from the age
of human factors to the age of organizational factors. This study indicates that
the application of the code still operates within the era of human errors,
resulting in safety measures aiming to control human performance through
procedures and checklists. Second, a safety culture is associated with
compliance with the developed safety measures, but without questioning
whether or not the given safety measures are adequate for the situation.
Depending upon the type of operation, the crew is expected to relate to safety
directives given not only by their own company, but also by the operator,
charterer, and customer. In many instances, these directives are not applicable,
are incompatible, or do not reflect the onboard operation. Better integration of
operating personnels experience and expertise could improve this situation as
100

Discussion
safety measures in some cases are developed by people with no seagoing
experience. The overall study results indicate that such weaknesses are related
to the shore side of the organization. The SEM analyses support the
relationship between shore-side and shipboard practices. In his thesis, Soma
(2005) found that safety is a quality of the ship owner rather than the vessel.
Within the industryespecially within the liquid tanker sectorreporting and
compliance are attempted by safety campaigns aimed at altering the crews
attitudes. However, according to the theoretical discussion, personal attitudes
are less amendable by such means. Despite the campaigns, the results indicate
that a substantial underreporting of experience data occurs. It could be time to
focus attention on shore-side personnel. Launching safety campaigns aimed at
shore-side personnel would enable them to gain a better understanding of their
own roles as a support function and how their practice affects operational
practicenot only with regard to safety management per se, but also
concerning the influence of other parts of the organization (e.g., commercial
pressure and crew resource management).
Another drawback is standardization. Measures are generally standardized to
fit all vessels within a company fleet. The shore personnel fail to understand
the diversity created by situational circumstances in operations, crew
constellations, the vessels technical condition, and so on. Accordingly, the
crew bypasses the problem with standardization and develops their own
deviating working practice. In particular, article 6 dealt with this subject.
These processes may be seen in relation to Snooks theory of practical drift
(Snook, 2000). Formal instructions given by the company are complied with
on paper, but onboard the vessels working practices are adapted to the
situation. However, as the crew at this point uses their experience and tactical

101

Discussion
knowledge to ensure safe operations, deviations from standardized procedures
should not uncritically be put on par with unsafe operations.
The standardization of safety measures is necessary in relation to crew
organization and lack of crew stability. Life and work on board are known to
be a highly formalized, hierarchical, and authoritarian organization, with a
clear chain of command, clear communication lines, levels of authority, and
clearly defined tasks and activities that are more or less the same on all vessel.
Such organization makes it possible to handle crew as changeable
components. Indeed, within the industry, such an organizational structure is
necessary in order to handle the lack of crew stability. However, the lack of
both crew stability and standardization may be problematic for other safety
reasons as well. A lack of crew stability may be a barrier to change, and safety
management is all about changechanges of work practices and attitudes and
others; thus, crew may not see the benefit of their efforts. By the time
necessary changes are highlighted, crew have most likely signed onto another
vessel, where they might experience the same problems. Shipboard
management may be problematic as the ships management is not familiar
with each crewmembers capabilities and limitations; by the time they finally
get to know them, the crewmember changes vessel. Finally, crewmembers
lack familiarity with the specific ship, the rest of the crew, and the
management. The influence and importance of crew stability is discussed in
articles 1, 3, 5, and 6. Crew stability also relates to team dynamics; article 2
indicates that the onboard safety level is perceived as better when work is
performed as a team.
The overall study results further identified the onboard management as a
driving force. Management and leadership as mediating factors have support
in climate research from Zohar (1980), who found managements attitude to
102

Discussion
be of major importance in fostering a safe work environment. This is also
supported by cultural research done by Pettigrew (1979) and Schein (1992,
2004), who both regard individuals (entrepreneurs and leaders, respectively)
as important in the processes of creating and managing an organizational
culture. In articles 2 and 5, ship management was statistically associated with
risk perception and reporting practices. The shipboard management is
responsible for implementing prevailing regulations and company policies.
The SEM analyses demonstrated that local management has a direct effect
upon all shipboard dimensions of safety culture and that the quality of the
shipboard management is influenced by the shore side of the company.
Evidence indicates that the ship officers are getting dual instructions regarding
safety performance as well as demand for efficiency from other parts of the
organizations. Thus, safety and efficiency are balanced in daily operations,
where efficiency and corner-cutting activities are rewarded in absence of
accidents, but are simultaneously identified as causal factors when accidents
occur. Ambiguous instructions from shore should be counteracted by a strong
shipboard management. However, according to the results, few ship managers
have formal management and leadership education. In addition, shipboard
management is not evaluated by crewmembers on a regular basis. By
recognizing the importance of ship management, the company should provide
support in order to ensure adequate onboard management and leadershipfor
both the crew and the shore side.
Shipping companies understanding of safety management has also resulted in
more administrative work, which makes less time available for attention to
operations. The constant development of new procedures increases the
systems complexity as defined by Perrow (1999), resulting in the industry
becoming increasingly prone to accidents. The work situation is less easy to
103

Discussion
understand when the procedural framework does not fit the situation and
when each procedure is not internally coordinated with the overall framework.
With reference to Perrow (1999), fewer procedures may simplify the system
characteristics and increase resilience. To this end, an understanding of when
standardized measures and procedures are appropriate should be reached. This
is not to suggest that standardized measures and procedures should be
completely abandoned. However, the crew should be able to trust their
relevance and applicability, which relates to the casual rationality inherent in
safety management systems along with limitations of foresight.
Safety management as described by the ISM code is based upon causal
rationality, where attempts are made to prevent future events by reflecting
upon previous experiences. However, insufficient scientific evidence exists on
the effectiveness of systematic safety management to make recommendations
either in favor of or against them (Robson et al., 2007), which may be related
to their application. As pointed out by Rundmo (1996), the application of
traditional safety management is questioned with a distinction between smallscale accidents and larger and more infrequent accidents (Rundmo, 1996).
Measures developed through the analysis of past events are in theory only
applicable for frequent and small-scale accidents, such as ordinary work
accidents. When it comes to medium-size and larger and more infrequent
accidents, traditional safety management is not considered to be applicable.
Such accidents are often too unique and complex to grasp or to single out
some isolated underlying causes. When the course of event is unclear, it is
difficult to develop measures that cover all involved risk as the risk in the first
place is considered too complex to be fully understood. This highlights the
second point: the limitation of the foresight of future events. The study results

104

Discussion
indicated that the shipping industry does not differ sufficiently between these
types of events and, thus, applies the same logic independent of type of event.
The results from the study point to a situation in which serious accidents are
on the rise, despite the introduction of the ISM Code and systematic safety
management. This can also be seen in relation to the different ages of safety
and the recent development of an adaptive age. The adaptive age of safety is
characterized by a shift from reliance on systems supported by safety culture
to operations. The focus on operations is also in accordance with the theories
of HRO and mindfulness. When recognizing the limitations of safety
management systems and safety rules, which attempt to control human
behavior, it is proposed that adaptive cultures should be embraced (Borys et
al., 2009). Consequently, resilience engineering requires a change in
perspective from human variability as a liability and in need of control to
human variability as an asset in a situation getting out of control, thereby
making it important for safe operations. Embracing variability as an asset
challenges the comfort of management and, thus, may meet resistance from
the industry. However, with reference to the standardization and development
of global rules, the industry could ask whether they are made for comfort and
to simplify the work for shore personnel or to support safety in daily
operations. A consequence of safety management is to shift the focus to how
crew is coping in daily operations under constantly shifting circumstances as
well as learn from their adaption processes. This should also be seen in
relation to the fact that most of the time, when crewmembers adapt, the
operations are still performed in accordance with the super-eminent objectives
(Hollnagel, 2009). In order to follow such an approach, the crew should be
able to trust in the applicability of procedures and the safety measures that
ought to be in place. Second, crewmembers should have the possibility to
105

Discussion
develop skills, competences, and tactical knowledge in order to handle any
unexpected, infrequent situations that cannot be prevented through traditional
safety management and standardized measures. Third, when things do go
wrong, organizations should remove themselves from a person-orientated
approach in which operators are blamed.
Safety culture encompasses not only what is done at the operational level, but
also at all levels in the company. In order to improve safety, companies
should look for influencing factors derived from organizational structures and
policies. The shipping industry is known to employ crewmembers from
various nationalities through manning agents located in each country, without
giving the crewmembers a fixed company employment, thereby resulting in
instability. With this in mind, one might question if some of the vessels do
have a (safety) culture at all as they lack stability in the group. Without
structural stability, they have not been given the possibility to develop the
deeper and less conscious levels of cultural patterns and sense making; nor do
they have the possibility to develop the experience and tactical skills
necessary to handle new and emerging unexpected situations as their efforts
are orientated toward making sense of what is unfamiliarnamely, new crew,
new power relations, new social constructions, and the like. The study results
indicate that loose conditions of employment affect the overall safety
management system (e.g., in the form of more underreporting of experience
data due to fear of negative consequences and a lack of trust). By changing
such a manning strategy, the company could have better possibilities to create
a positive safety culture and build competence so that the crewmembers have
better premises for handling unsafe situations.

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Concluding remarks

7 Concludingremarks
This chapter includes a discussion of the major limitations for the thesis with
regard to methods and measurements. Suggestions for future research and
implications are also addressed.

7.1 Methodologicallimitations
The major methodological limitations concern the validity of the
questionnaire and sample characteristics. The questionnaire did not show the
ability to cover all aspects of the safety culture concept, which is a limitation
affecting the overall validity of the study. Due to low reliability, several items
and constructs were excluded from the further statistical analysis. One
explanation is poor representative reliability across subpopulations or groups
of people (Hair, 1998; Neuman, 2000). It may be fair to assume that some
groups (e.g., Norwegian employees or senior officers) are better informed
about their companys strategic and tactical management and operations and,
therefore, are better placed to answer some of the questions related to the
company. A second issue concerns the constructs itself. DeVillis (2003)
focused on the fact that the items constituting a construct or dimension should
share a common cause or consequence. Some of the questionnaire constructs
did not meet this latter requirement.
Biases could also be produced by national differences, languages, and
response style. In a cross-national study, Harzing (2005) found that English
language survey versions tended to be more homogenized, potentially
obscuring

cross-national

differences.

McCrae

(2001),

who

studied

Norwegians and Filipinos, did not find such differences. Given that
questionnaire language could potentially bias the results, the questionnaire
was also made available in Norwegian, Polish, and Tagalog. Taking this into
107

Concluding remarks
consideration, cross-cultural comparisons of results are not performed in the
current study. In addition, indicated differences at the organizational level
(e.g., between type of vessel and employment terms) should not be
overestimated.
The survey data are representative of vessels flying a white and grey flag
only, as those registered under a black listed flag did not want to participate.
As participation was voluntary on behalf of the company, it is assumed that
those participating do, in general, emphasize safety in their operations; thus,
the results are biased in a positive direction. Moreover, the survey data are
only representative of members of the Norwegian Shipowners Association.
The possibility exists that the results are subject to the common method bias
(Podsakoff et al., 2003) due to the data deriving from a common source (e.g.,
a common scale for different questions). Potential statistical remedies have
been suggested. Spector (2006) is skeptical of the merits of such approaches.
He argued thatgiven that it is not possible to know the existence or extent
of any possible biastreating it could in fact introduce more bias than what
existed in the first place. He recommended using a multi-method strategy so
that results do not rely exclusively on the results of one questionnaire. In the
current research, case studies, interviews, participatory, and field studies were
used to validate the data.
As with the survey data, a question of validity arises to the qualitative data. In
order to be certain that the elements of culture identified by qualitative
methods, Hopkins (2006) recommended consulting the members of the
culture. If the members of the culture fail to recognize the description of their
culture, the description must be called into question. Accordingly, all results
in this thesis were also presented to several people working within the
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Concluding remarks
industry; they expressed that they believe the results to be giving an accurate
representation of the situation.

7.2 Theoreticallimitations
The principal objective of this thesis has been to examine the role of safety
culture for safety management and vice versa. Limitations also follow from
the theoretical stand and research perspective. By focusing on cultural
influences on safety management, other areas of equal importance give way.
Research with other perspectives (e.g., professional culture, national culture,
or a sociotechnical approach) would bring about different results. For
example, technological changes have unquestionably left their mark on both
operational safety and the organizational structure of the industry. The
shipping industry has, since the early 1960s, steadily adopted the automation
and integration of new technology (Alderton, 2004). Yet despite the
introduction of new technology partly intended to increase safety by, for
example, reducing human error, new technology may also be the cause of new
and emerging risk (Schager, 2008). This could be a mismatch between
ergonomic aspects and the human information processing system,
overreliance in technology that may fail, loss of operational skills and
experience necessary for handle critical and unexpected situations, or changes
in the social and organizational system.

7.3 Futureresearch
With estimation that 75% to 96% of marine casualties are caused by some
form of human error (Anderson, 2003; Rothblum, 2000; Wagenaar &
Groeneweg, 1987), human error is possibly overemphasized as a causal
explanation for accidents at sea. Research on organizational and structural
factors in shipping accidents indicates that the human element is identified as
109

Concluding remarks
a causal factor without addressing the relationship to underlying
organizational and structural factors. Still, the need exists to trace the human
factors to conditions resulting from decisions taken at higher organizational
levels (IMO, 2010b). A new investigation into accident reports can possibly
identify other organizational and structural factors related to shipping
accidents. If reviewed and analyzed according to, for example, the accident
model developed by James Reason (2001), latent organizational influences,
local workplace factors, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts can be
identified. With new findings discussed in light of theories developed by
Snook (2000) and Hollnagel (2009), among others, alternative explanations
can be put forward, such as how frontline personnel make sense of
organizational safety communications and adapt their work practices through
social relations and psychological mechanisms, thereby moving safety
management and research into the new era of the adaptive age (Borys et al.,
2009; Hollnagel, 2009; Snook, 2000). The adaptive age embraces adaptive
cultures and resilience engineering and requires a change in perspective from
human variability as a liability and in need of control to human variability as
an asset and important for safety. Efforts could also be made to better identify
and measure the social processes among workers, along with further
exploration of the relationship among management, leadership, and safetyrelated matters Thus, better insights into how behavioral norms interact with
and are formed by the social life on board could be achieved.

7.4 Finalremarks
This thesis has explored the safety culture and safety management within
shipping in relation to current theories of safety management and safety
culture. The major limitations of the research along with implications for

110

Concluding remarks
safety practitioners and researcherspreviously addressed in this thesiscan
be summarized as follows.
Survey: Parts of the applied questionnaire showed several deficiencies, and
results may be biased due to common method, psychometric properties,
language, and characteristic with the sample, which may affect the validity of
the conclusions. Future research should strive to develop an instrument in
order to reduce such biases.
Research model: The strengths and limitations of both qualitative and
quantitative research should be acknowledged, and future research should be
open to a multi-method approach.
Safety researcher: As the theories of safety management are developing over
time, safety researchers should strive to develop a better understanding of the
limitations of current safety management systems and be open to research
within the prevailing adaptive age.
Safety practitioners: In practical applications of safety management, one
should rely less on safety through standardized measures and experience data.
This includes understanding the difference between events where such
measures are applicable and unexpected events where it is adequate to support
competence-promoting activities so that the operators have the ability to adapt
their behavior to new situations. The human inferential capacity in handling
unexpected situations should not be underestimated in relation to technology.

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References

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Article1
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2009). Local management and its impact on
safety culture and safety within Norwegian shipping. In S. Martorell, C.
Guedes Soares & J. Barnett (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis:
Theory, Methods and Applications (pp. 1423-1430). London: Taylor &
Francis Group.

Article2
Oltedal, H. & Wadsworth, E. (2010). Risk perception in the Norwegian
shipping industry and identification of influencing factors. Maritime Policy &
Management, 37(6), 601-623.

Article3
Oltedal, H. A. (2010). The use of safety management systems within the
Norwegian tanker industryDo they really improve safety? In R. Bris, C.
Guedes Soares, & S. Martorell (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety: Theory
and Applications (pp. 2355-2362). London: Taylor & Francis Group.

Article4
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Tanker versus dry cargoThe use of
safety management systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping. In J.M.
Ale, I.A. Papazoglou, & E. Zio (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety (pp. 21182125). London: Taylor & Francis Group.

124

Article5
Oltedal, H. & McArthur, D. (2010). Reporting practices in merchant shipping,
and the identification of influencing factors. Safety Science, 49(2), 331-338.

Article6
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Safety Management in Shipping
Making Sense of limited Success. Safety Science Monitor, submitted.

125

Article1
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2009). Local management and its
impact on safety culture and safety within Norwegian shipping. In S.
Martorell, C. Guedes Soares & J. Barnett (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and
Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications (pp. 1423-1430).
London: Taylor & Francis Group.

Local Management and its impact on Safety Culture and Safety within
Norwegian Shipping
H.A Oltedal
University College Stord/Haugesund

O.A. Engen
University of Stavanger

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses safety culture on tankers and bulk carriers and which factors affect the
safety culture onboard vessels. The empirical setting for the study is the Norwegian shipping industry. Safety
management is a challenging issue within shipping for several reasons. First of all, life and work onboard a
vessel is a 24 hour activity and the crew has few possibilities of interacting with the surrounding society.
Secondly the geographical distance between the on-shore organization and the vessel may affect both the
quality of those systems and plans developed on shore and their implementation on the vessels. The ship
management is thus identified as a key factor to a sound safety culture along with the on shore crewing
strategy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will discuss the safety culture
within the Norwegian shipping industry with tankers
and bulk carriers, and identify which organizational
factors may affect this particular safety culture.
In Norway, shipping has for several centuries
been the principal trade, and Norway as a maritime
nation has roots way back in the Viking age. Today
Norway is one of the five largest shipping nations in
the world, after Greece, Japan, Germany and China.
In the third quarter of 2007 the Norwegian foreigngoing fleet comprised 1,795 ships, the highest
number ever in Norwegian history, of which about
49 percent are flying under the Norwegian flag
(Nrings- og handelsdepartementet 2007). The
remaining 51 percent may register in any of the
world's more than 150 flag states. Norwegian
shipping companies employ some 57,000 seamen
from more than 60 different nationalities and of
which about 30 percent are Norwegian
Nationals(Norwegian Shipowners' Association ) The
crew may be recruited and managed by the shipping
company itself, or by one of the world's many
professional crew hiring companies. Within the
Norwegian fleet, most sailors are contractemployees working on different vessels during each
enrolment, which results in continually shifting
working groups. The situation today is a result of a
structural change dating back to the 60s and 70s
when technical development allowed for bigger
vessels with more automation and monitoring, along
with the need for reorganization to improve
efficiency. This resulted in a cut in the crewing

level. Later in the 80s a global recession caused

further structural changes; flagging-out, use of
external crewing agencies and signing on crew from
developing countries and lower wages (Bakka,
Sjfartsdirektoratet 2004). However, the shipping
industry is today facing new manning related
challenges as there is a global shortage of
manpower, this is due to three main challenges:
First, it is less attractive nowadays to work in the
shipping industry. Second, the recruitment for ship
crews has been slow. This has resulted in the third
situation where the liquefied natural gas (LNG)
shipping sector is drawing crew from the tanker
industry, and the tanker industry in turn is drawing
people from the dry bulk sector.
In 1894 the British Board of trade carried out a
study which showed that seafaring was one of the
world's most dangerous occupations, and it still is
(Li, Shiping 2002). Regulations in order to reduce
the risk at sea were introduced about 150 years ago.
These regulations initially encompassed measures to
rescue shipwrecked sailors, and further requirements
for life-saving equipment, seaworthiness and human
working conditions. Traditionally the safety work
has focused on technical regulations and solutions
even though experience and accident statistics
indicate that most of the accidents at sea somehow
were related to human performance (Bakka,
Sjfartsdirektoratet 2004). However, a few very
serious accidents at sea that occurred in the late 80s
resulted in a change towards how safety was
organised, and more focus was given to the human
barriers and how the seafarers working conditions

were affected by organisational and managerial

factors both on shore and at sea. Along with this
the term safety culture started to gain a foothold also
within shipping. The idea of safety culture within
shipping was officially introduced on the 4th
November 1993 by the adoption of a new resolution,
the present SOLAS Convention 1974 Chapter IX,
entitled Management for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention, also known as
the International Safety Management Code (ISM
Code) (Le Meur 2003).
Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to
elaborate the following questions:

adoption and internal integration, that has worked

well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to
be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think and feel in relation to those
problems(Schein 2004).
Further we have decided to use a methodological
framework presented by Cooper (2000), and the
application of this framework will be discussed
below. Cooper (2000) introduces a reciprocal model
of safety culture that allows the multi-faceted and
holistic nature of the concept to be fully examined
by using a triangular methodology approach,
depicted in figure 1.

What characterises safety culture on tankers and

bulk carriers?
Which factors affect the safety culture on board
vessels?
With reference to shipping, this article will more
concretely analyse crewing strategies such as
outsourcing of crewing management and the
extended use of contract employment instead of
permanent employment. Our hypothesis is that these
conditions may contribute to an unfavourable and
error-inducing working environment, i.e. poor
communication between shore management and the
ship management and the remaining crew,
unworkable procedures, lack of loyalty to the
organisation, dysfunctional interaction, fear of
reprisals, which again counteract the development of
a safety culture.
2 APPROACH TOWARDS SAFETY CULTURE
There seems to be no clear consensus concerning the
ontological, epistemological, and methodological
questions related to the topic of safety culture. The
main differences seem to be
(1) Definition of the scope of safety culture and the
relationship between culture and climate.
(2) Which methods are regarded as most suitable for
measurement.
(3) The relationship to other organisational (safetyrelated) aspects (Cooper 2000, Guldenmund 2000,
Neal, Griffin & Hart 2000, Peterson, Ashkanasy &
Wilderom 2000, Sorensen 2002, Yule 2003).
However, it is not the scope of this paper to
problematise the concept of safety culture. As a
point of departure we will apply Scheins definition
of organisational culture:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group learned as it solved its problems of external

Internal
Psychological
Factors

Person
Safety
Climate

CONTEXT
External Observable Factors

Situation
Organisational
Factors

Behavior
Safety
Behavior

Figure 1. Reciprocal safety culture model (adopted from

Cooper, 2000)

Coopers (2000) model contains three elements:

(1) The subjective internal psychological factors i.e.
attitude and perceptions.
(2) Observable on-going safety related behaviour.
(3) The organisational situational features.
According to Cooper (2000) these elements reflect
those accident causation relationships found by a
number of researchers, such as John Adams, Herbert
William Heinrich and James Reason. The
investigation of several serious shipping accidents
such as Herold Free Enterprize (Department of
Transport 1987), Exxon Valdes (National
Transportation
Safety
Board
1990)
and
Scandinavian Star (Justis- og politidepartementet
1991)is also congruent with their findings. The
Herold Free Enterprize accident was partly caused
by members of the crew not following best practice,
but was also due to managerial pressure from the
organizations upper level to sail as early as
possible, along with other mistakes made by the onshore management. Two years later when the US
tanker Exxon Valdes grounded, the accident
investigation determined several probable causes
linked to human errors induced by managerial faults

in the upper levels of the organisation. At the vessel,

the third mate failed to properly manoeuvre the
vessel, possibly due to fatigue and excessive
workload. The master failed to provide a proper
navigation watch, possibly due to impairment from
alcohol. At the onshore part of the organisation, the
shipping company fails to supervise the master and
provide a rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon
Valdez. In addition to this effective pilot and escort
services were lacking. The following year, in 1990,
there was a fire on the passenger liner "Scandinavian
Star". In the aftermath of this accident the
investigation brought into focus organisational and
managerial faults with regard to a lack of
competence and training, but also weaknesses in the
wider social-technical system. These weaknesses
consisted of ownership separated from management,
unsatisfactory control routines by the flag state and,
in general, an overall maritime system with a lack of
transparency. Further, Coopers (2000) three
elements will be outlined more in detail, starting
with safety related behaviour.
2.1 The importance of safety related behaviour
Herbert William Heinrich work (published in 1931
Industrial Accident Prevention) is the basis for the
theory of Behaviour-Based Safety (BBS), which
holds that as many as 80-90 percent of all workplace
accidents are caused by human error and unsafe acts
(Tinmannsvik, 2008). Scheins (2004) definition of
culture does not clearly address observable
behaviour patterns, but behaviour is regarded to be
partly determined by a persons perceptions, feelings
and thoughts. However, Schein (2004) regards
behavioural patterns as a manifestation of a culture
existing at a higher level in the organisation, and not
as culture itself. When it comes to BBS, the current
theories posit that safety culture, and a reduction of
accidents may be achieved through continuous
attention to three domains:

(1) Environmental factors such as equipment, tools,

physical layout procedures, standards, and
temperature.
(2) Person factors such as peoples attitudes, beliefs,
and personalities.
(3) Behaviour factors, such as safe and at-risk work
practices, referred to as the Safety Triad (Geller
2001).

When adopting this approach humans are seen as a

cause of accidents, whereupon interventions to
enhance safety are aimed at changing attitude or
behavior (i.e. poster campaigns, training, procedures

and so on, or changing the technology they operate).

This orientation towards risk and safety management
has traditionally been and still is adopted from the
majority of the shipping companies. The BBSapproach has been criticised for placing too much
responsibility on the people operating the systems,
assuming that they are responsible for the outcome
of their actions (Dekker & Dekker 2006). An
alternative view is to recognise human error not as a
cause of accidents, but as a consequence or symptom
of organisational trouble deeper within the
organisation, arising from strategic or other top level
decisions. This includes resource allocation, crewing
strategy and contracting (Dekker, Dekker 2006,
Reason 2001, Reason, Hobbs 2003). An organisation
is a complex system balancing different, and often
also conflicting, goals towards safety and production
in an aggressive and competitive environment
(Rasmussen 1997), a situation that to a large extent
is current within shipping. The BBS approach
towards safety often implies that more automation
and tighter procedures should be added in order to
control the human actions. However, the result may
be that more complexity is added to the system. This
in combination with the organisation's struggle to
survive in the competitive environment, leads to the
system becoming even more prone to accidents
(Perrow 1999) (Dekker & Dekker 2006, Reason
2001, Reason & Hobbs 2003) However, the concept
of focusing on the human side of safety is not
wrong. After all, the technology and production
systems are operated, maintained and managed by
humans, and as the final barrier towards accidents
and incidents they are most of the time directly
involved. The proponents of the BBS approach
argue that behaviour control and modification may
bring a shift in an organisation's safety culture, also
at the upper level, but this is most likely if the focus
is not exclusively addressing observed deficiencies
at the organisation's lower levels (DeJoy 2005).
DeJoy (2005) calls attention to three apparent
weaknesses related to the BBS approach:
(1) By focusing on human error it can lead to victimblaming.
(2) It minimises the effect of the organisational
environment in which a person acts.
(3) Focusing on immediate causes hinders unveiling
the basic causes, which often reside in the
organisational environment.
Due to this, we will also include the organisational
environment in the safety culture concept, as
proposed by Cooper (2000).

2.2 The relation to organisational factors

When human error is not seen only as a cause of
accidents, but as a symptom and consequence of
problems deeper inside the organisation, or what
Reason (2001,2003) refers to as latent organisational
factors, emphasis is placed on weaknesses in
strategic decisions made at the top level in the
organisation. These strategic decisions may reflect
an underlying assumption about the best way to
adapt to external factors and to achieve internal
integration, and if they are common for most
shipping companies an organisational culture may
also be revealed.(Schein 2004). Schein (2004) also
stresses the importance of leadership. The top
management influences the culture as only they have
the possibility of creating groups and organisations
through their strategic decisions. And when a group
is formed, they set the criteria for leadership and
how the organisation will support and follow up
their leaders. The leaders, at all levels on shore and
at the vessel, are also key figures in the development
of a safety culture. It is their task to detect the
functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing
culture, and to channel this to the upper levels of the
organisation. In return, the upper levels of the
organisation should give their leaders the support
necessary in order to develop the desired culture.
3 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Coopers (2000) framework put forward the
importance of methodological triangulation in order
to grasp all facets of the cultural concept. The
internal psychological factors are most often
assessed via safety climate questionnaires. Our
approach is to start with such a survey in order to
gain insight into the seafarers perceptions and
attitudes related to safety, along with self-reported
work behaviour related to risk taking, rule violation
and accident reporting. The survey also includes
questions related to crewing strategy, which opens
up the possibility of assessing the relationship
between the organisational situation and actual
behaviour. The survey results are used to determine
which organisational factors are most likely affect
the safety culture, and to define research areas for a
further qualitative study.
3.1 Development of questionnaire items
The survey instrument was developed by Studio
Apertura in collaboration with DNV and SINTEF.
The development was based on an evaluation of
seven already existing questionnaires in comparison
with various theoretical views of the safety culture
concept (Studio Apertura 2004). Minor adjustments
were made after a pilot for use within the tanker and

bulk carrier sector. This resulted in a questionnaire

with constructs and accompanying number of items
as presented in table 1. All items were measured on
a 5 point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree
to strongly agree, or very seldom/never to very
often/always.
Table 1. Questionnaire constructs and number of items
Construct
Number of items
Top managements safety priorities
3
Local management
7
Procedures & guidelines
7
Interaction
18
Work situation
8
Competence
5
Responsibility & sanctions
7
Working environment
9
Reporting practices
10

3.2 Questionnaire sample

A total of 1574 questionnaires were distributed to 83
randomly selected Norwegian controlled tankers and
bulk carriers. All vessels were flying a flag on the
Paris MOU white or grey list. 76 vessels returned a
total of 1262 completed forms, which gives an
individual response rate of 80% and a vessel
response rate of 91.5 %. The survey was carried out
in 2006.
3.3 Statistical analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) v.15.0 was used to perform all of the
analysis, which included descriptive statistics,
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) and bivariate correlation
analysis.
With regard to the EFA, the principal component
analysis with Varimax rotation was carried out. The
factors were extracted based on the three following
analytical criteria: (1) Pairwise deletion, (2) Eigen
value more than 1, and (3) factor loading more than
0.50. Of the extracted factors, all factors with 2 or
fewer items were removed, based on the notion that
a factor should be comprised of at least three items
to be robust (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). A
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), using a onefactor solution for each construct, has also been
performed. The advantage of the CFA is that it
allows for more precision in evaluating the
measurement model (Hinkin 1995), and the results
were compared with the EFA for providing validity
evidence based on the hypothesis that a valid
instrument should produce similar results.
Each factor was then evaluated using the KaiserMeyerto-Olkin (KMO) parameter, and only factors

with KMO value at 0.60 or above were included in

the further analysis (Hair 1998).
This was followed by a scale-reliability test. For
that purpose, the Cronbachs Alpha coefficient of
internal consistency was calculated, and evaluated
along with inter-item statistics. Cronbachs Alpha is
a measure of scale reliability concerned with the
proportion of a scales total variance that is
attributable to a common source, presumed to be the
true score of the latent construct being measured. In
our case that will be the safety culture. Usually a
value above 0.7 is considered acceptable, although
some advocate an alpha level of 0.8 or better
(Netemeyer, Sharma & Bearden 2003). As the alpha
value is a function of, inter alia, the average interitem correlation; the inter-item correlation and itemtotal statistics have also been evaluated. Rules of
thumb suggest that the item-total correlation should
exceed .50, and the inter-item correlation should
exceed .30 (Hair 1998), but it should not exceed .80.
An inter-item correlation exceeding .80 suggests that
items are duplicates of one another (Pett, Lackey &
Sullivan 2003). Then the remaining items went
through a last CFA, a five-factor solution, in order to
provide each factor's explained variance.
Finally, correlation analysis has been carried out
in order to evaluate the construct validity, which is
viewed as the extent to which an operational
measure truly reflects the underlying safety culture
concept, and if they operate in a consistent manner.
Based on this analytical process, five factors (1)
interaction, (2) reporting practices, (3) competence,
(4) local management, and (5) work situation were
found to be reliable and valid. The aforementioned
factors are presented further in detail in the next
section.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Results from descriptive analysis
Regarding demographics, 21 different nationalities
are represented. The Filipino contingent forms the
largest group constituting 63 % of the sample,
followed by the Norwegian group with almost 11 %,
and the Polish which represents 9 %. The last major
group was the Russians with 6 %. The other
remaining 17 nationalities were represented in a
range from 3 % to 1%.
There is also great variation with regard to
employment conditions. All in all, 12 % of the
sample consists of permanent employees, of whom
80 % are Norwegian and 16 % from the European
Union. 91% of the Norwegians are permanent
employee. The remaining 9% are apprentices,
substitutes or newly employed on probation. Only 3
% of the non Norwegian sailors are permanent
employees. With regard to the Filipino seafarers, the

largest nationality, 99.6 % are contract employees,

most on 9 month contracts (62 %), followed by 6
month contracts (27 %). The extended use of
contract employment is reflected in their experience.
All in all, 85 % had three years or more experience
within shipping in general. However, 69 % of the
sample had worked on the current vessel for only 1
year or less.
The employment terms were in general different
for the captains. The captains normally do not have
sailing periods that exceed 6 months. The most
typical sailing period for the captains is 3 months or
less.
4.2 Results from factor analyses
From the 9 theoretical safety culture constructs, a
five factor solution was derived, (1) interaction, (2)
reporting practices, (3) competence, (4) local
management, and (5) work situation.. With regard to
the local management, competence and work
situation factor both EFA and CFA result in final
solutions consisting of the same items, but with
minor differences in factor loading. The CFA
included three more items in the interaction factor
than the EFA, and the final factor, reporting
practices resulted from only the CFA.
Four of the constructs did not pass the reliability
tests. The first, top managements safety priorities,
was excluded due to low representative reliability
across subpopulations. This construct also consisted
of too few items. The remaining three constructs,
procedures and guidelines, responsibility and
sanctions and working environment were
excluded due to low validity, mostly resulting from
poor theoretical relationship within the items of each
construct.
For the further analysis the results from the CFA
are used. The 5 factors in question are presented in
Table 2 along with number of items and explained
variance.
Table 2 Final factors, number of items and explained variance
Factor
Number Explained
of items variance
Interaction
8
35,63 %
Reporting practices
5
9.77 %
Competence
4
7.12 %
Local management
3
5.96 %
Work situation

5.08 %

Each factors Cronbachs alpha value and inter

item statistics is presented in table 3.

Table 3.
statistics
Factor

Final factors, Cronbach's alpha and inter-item

Interaction
Reporting practices
Competence
Local Management
Work situation

Alpha
.878
.808
.839
.866
.817

Inter-item
range
.360 - .606
.335 - .761
.497 682
.692 - .716
.512 - .749

Item-total
range
.520 - .724
.491 - .668
.628 - .712
.724 - 774
.554 - .739

The alpha values range from .808 to .878, and the

internal item statistics are all within the
recommended levels. The five factors are therefore
considered to be a reliable and valid reflection of the
underlying safety culture concept.
Further,table 4 presents the correlation
coefficients between the factors, or safety culture
dimensions. All correlations are significant at the
0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 4. Factor correlation matrix. Pearsons r.
F1
F2
F3
F1: Interaction
F2: Reporting
Practices
F3: Competence
F4: Local
management
F5: Work
Situation

F4

F5

1
.352
.639

1
.323

.474 - ..362

.367

.494

..441

.444

.322

The five safety culture dimensions correlate in a

positive direction, which is consistent with the
theoretical concept, and they are therefore
considered to be a valid reflection of the underlying
safety culture construct.
5 DISCUSSION
All three constructs have a good alpha level, and as
the alpha levels are concerned with the variance that
is common among the items, these constructs also
reflect the areas where it is possible to speak about
safety culture. With reference to Coopers
framework towards safety culture, we will further
discuss how the organisation's factors such as
crewing strategy, witch includes employment terms,
rotations system and policy towards the on board
shipping management, may affect the on board
safety culture and climate represented by the
identified dimensions. The organisation's structural
factors are all to be found within Coopers element
of situation, while the identified safety culture
dimensions are to be found within the elements of
person and behaviour.

Interaction is the dimension accounting for the

largest proportion of the total explained variance,
with 35.63 %, meaning that with regard to safety
culture most of the variance in the original data is
explained by this dimension. When taking into
account how distinctive a ship is as a work place,
this is no surprise. A ship may be characterised as a
total institution since both work and leisure time
happen at the same place and with few possibilities
to interact with the surrounding world (Goffman
1968). In such a setting the crew members are
socialised into a common culture and rules of
interaction. Schein (2004) refers to this as internal
integration. The interaction climate is characterised
by lack of stability within the crew due to different
terms of employment. First of all, permanent
employment seems to be reserved for the Norwegian
sailors. Sailors of other nationalities are almost all
contract employees. In addition, the length of
contract varies and all crew members have different
dates for signing on and signing off. Schein (2004)
points out that lack of stability may be a threat to the
possibility of developing a culture: () there must
be a history of shared experience, which in turn
implies some stability of membership in the group.
Even if the crew as a group is in constant change,
they all have common history as seafarers. So even
if lack of stability within the group indicates that a
common culture should not develop on the ship, a
common culture of how to act and interact may have
developed amongst the seafarers, and when a new
crewmember is signed on a new vessel, he knows
what is expected from him. However, the question is
if such a culture is a safe culture? Reason (2001,
2003) emphasize that to reach a safe culture, the
organisation should strive for an informed culture
where those who manage and operate the system,
both on board and on shore, have current knowledge
about the factors that determine the safety of the
system as a whole, which again depends on that the
crew on board are prepared to report their errors and
near misses, and the reporting practice is one of the
dimensions deriving from the analyses, explaining
9.77 % of the variance. This dimension also includes
feedback on reported events. In order to attain good
reporting practices, the organisation should strive to
create an atmosphere of openness, trust and loyalty.
Integrating into the group is also a survival
mechanism, and every crewmember will most likely
make an effort to integrate. If not, he would most
likely have a hard time during his contract period
with no possibility to leave the vessel and the other
crewmembers. However, to compromise oneself and
be open about one's own mistakes is not always an
easy task, especially not in an unknown working
environment. Something that may reinforce the
crewmembers' fear of reporting their own mistakes
is the ongoing practice that each crew member is
evaluated by their senior officer / captain, and based

on this report get recommended or not recommended

for re-hire. Interviews have revealed that this
evaluation practice differs. Some practise an open
evaluation where all parts are involved, with focus
on how to improve the evaluated crews
shortcomings, and where the shore organisation
seeks to ensure that the evaluation is conducted in as
objective a way as possible. At other vessels, the
evaluation is closed for insight by the evaluated and
may also be highly subjective. Some of the
respondents have expressed that by reporting, their
next contract may be at stake, or they may meet with
other negative consequences. So, lack of stability
and constantly changing working groups may
sacrifice a trusting and open environment, and thus
also the sailors' commitment to safety.
A crew committed to safety is essential, but not
enough. Lack of competence may cause a situation
where the crew do not identify potential dangerous
situations, or create them. Competence, which
accounts for 7.12 % of the total variance, is in this
setting comprised of activities performed on board
the vessel, and is all under the control of the captain,
training, drills and familiarisation when signing on.
Also, the competence dimension does correlate
strongly with the interaction dimension with a
correlation coefficient at .639. This indicates that a
situation when the sailors are feeling confident with
the nature of their task also results in a better
interaction climate where conflicts are more likely to
be absent. As with the interaction climate,
competence will also be affected by the crew
stability. A crew member that is constantly signing
on new vessels and that has to interact with new
crew members and leaders, uses more effort
adapting to the new situation, working out how
things are done at that specific vessel, the informal
structure onboard and so on. When more stability is
provided, more effort may be placed on upgrading
their competence, and the competence will be kept
within the vessel and organisation. Both the training
activities and crewing strategy may be controlled by
the ship management, and thus these safety culture
dimensions are also, to a certain degree,
controllable.
The dimension of work situation consists of proactive activities as Safe Job Analysis (SJA), safety
evaluations and the possibility they have to prioritize
safety in their daily work. So how may the
organisation affect this? For one, they may supply
sufficient crew. Today many vessels are sailing with
a smaller crew at the same time as new standards
and resolutions like the ISM-code increase the
amount of paperwork to be done. Both own
observations and interviews reveal that inter alia
check lists and SJA are done in a mechanical
manner. This may originate from various reasons
such as an overload of work, no understanding of the

importance of those activities, lack of feedback or

improper planning by the local management.
The local management dimension, accounts for
5.96 % of the explained variance, and the direct
effect of local management is relatively small.
However, local management is considered to have
an indirect effect on the safety climate through the
managers, or senior officers, affect on the interaction
climate, competence and training activities,
reporting practices and the work situation. Again we
wish to focus on the importance of stability within
the work group. Most captains have a sailing period
of 3 months or less, while most of the non
Norwegian ratings have a sailing period of 9 months.
Most senior officers also have a shorter sailing
period then an ordinary rating. Then a rating
possibly has to deal with several different leaders
during his stay. And each captain and department
manager's leadership style may vary, and are
sometimes even destructive, as shown by following
comment from a Pilipino engineer. The only
problem on board is the treatment of senior officers
to the lowest rank. (..) There are some senior
officers who are always very insulting towards jr.
officers and rating. Schein (2004) regards the
leader as an important key figure in the cultural
development. At sea the captain holds a key role.
The captain is the one in command at every vessel,
and according to Schein (2004) the captains
orientation will affect the working climate, which
precedes the existence of a culture. So, in a situation
where lack of crew stability impedes the
development of a safety culture, the role of the
captain is even more vital. Also, it is important to
take into account that the leadership style that is
practised on board not only affect the sphere of
work, but also time off. However the Captains
themselves may not be aware of their own
importance, or how they affect safety. Most
Captains, or other department leaders for that matter,
do not have managerial training or education. When
adopting a cultural view towards safety, as in this
research, in as opposed to a behaviour based view,
more emphasis is placed on organisational factors.
Decisions regarding crewing strategy, employment
terms and managerial development programmes are
all strategic decisions made on shore. With reference
to Scheins culture definition, we will argue that the
safety culture originates within the organisation on
shore. Based on Scheins definitions of culture there
ought to exist a pattern of shared basic assumptions
that may solve the problems the shipping industry is
facing. Our case however has revealed an offshore
practise characterised by extended use of contract
employment, lack of stable working conditions on
board the vessels, and little or no use of managerial
training and development. This practice does not
promote a good safety culture and is considered to
has a negative effect on the overall safety level.

6 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to analyse the
characteristics of the safety culture on Norwegian
tankers and bulk carriers, and identify what
organisational factors may affect the safety culture
on board vessels. Statistical analysis identified five
safety related dimensions on board the vessels:
interaction climate, reporting practices, competence,
local management and work situation. Within
shipping the interaction climate is characterised by
unstable working conditions. Under such conditions
it is difficult to achieve and maintain a stable crew,
and proper management becomes even more
important. Also the Captain has a vital role, as he
has the possibility to directly affect all the other
safety related aspects through his own leadership
style. The Captains, officers and ratings normally
have different employment terms and shift terms.
This may jeopardise the development of a sound
safety culture as the crew has a poor possibility of
developing common behaviour practices and a
mutual understanding of how to do things right. As
neither the Captains nor the officers normally have
any managerial training, their leadership styles often
affect the safety in a negative direction. The on
board situation is to a large extend considered to be
created by the on-shore crewing strategy and
management policy.
In order to develop a sound safety culture onboard, the shipping companies should go in new
directions and pursue a crewing strategy which
offers more favourable employment terms and fixed
shifts for all nationalities, and strive for a more
stable workforce. Another measure would be to
accept the Captains and department managers roles
as leaders, and offer managerial development. A
final measure will be to develop a policy and system
that ensure proper onboard management.

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Article2
Oltedal, H. & Wadsworth, E. (2010). Risk perception in the Norwegian
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This article is not available in UiS Brage due to copyright.

Article3
Oltedal, H. A. (2010). The use of safety management systems within
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The use of safety management systems within the Norwegian tanker

industry do they really improve safety?
H.A. Oltedal
Stord/Haugesund University College, Haugesund, Norway

ABSTRACT: Since the implementation of the ISM-code, all shipping companies have been required to have
a safety management system. This paper explores the Norwegian controlled shipping industrys safety
management performance with regard to incident and near miss reporting practices, data analysis, procedures
and checklists, and the balance between commercial pressures and safety concerns. In so doing, the research
is limited to the tanker sector, with the emphasis on the sailors' perspective. The statistical data used are
derived from a survey carried out in 2006, supported by qualitative information deriving from two case
studies. The results indicate several deficiencies with regard to all parts of the system. In order to work with
safety management based on other principles, the adoption of an organizational approach towards safety
management is proposed, as opposed to a person approach i.e. awareness of characteristics and limitations of
human nature and taking crews' experience seriously with regard to areas such as procedural development and
resource requirements. Also to make clear, in terms of communication and actions, that safety is the top
priority. It is also suggested that a closer and more stable relationship towards contract employee crew would
facilitate improved safety management. Moreover, it should be recognized that riskiness will always be a part
of life, and that it may never be totally eliminated.
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety management within shipping is regulated by
the International Safety Management (ISM) code.
The ISM code came into force on the 2 July 1998,
as a consequence of a mounting concern about
poor management standards within the industry.
By implementing the ISM code, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) seeks to better
ensure that each shipping company pays attention
to safety in ship operations. The code requires
companies to establish safeguards against all
identified risks, with functional requirements to
develop, implement and maintain a safety
management system (SMS). Further, the code
requires that the SMS should be founded on
reporting of accidents and non conformities, in
order to develop safety measures (International
Maritime Organization, 1994). Within the industry,
it is well known that large variations with regard to
companies adherence to the code exist. In 2007
the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris
MoU) carried out 5,427 inspections on 5,120 ships
in the European and North Atlantic region. One in
five of the inspections showed ISM deficiencies, of
which reports of non-conformities and accident
occurrence were amongst the most common
deficiency. This raised interest in further research

into to how the requirements of the ISM code are

put into practice within the industry. Hence, the
objective of this paper is to explore safety
management status within the Norwegian
controlled shipping industry, by gas and liquid
cargo carriers (tankers). The following areas for
research will be explored:
- Description of the current situation within safety
management.
- Identification of factors that may influence the
safety management performance.
2 THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE OF THE
ISM CODE
Safety management, as described in the ISM Code,
is founded on a linear causality where attempts are
made to predict and prevent future incidents by
reflecting upon previous experience. The
information flow in such a SMS is presented in
Figure 1.

DEVELOPMENT
OF
SAFETY MEASURES

IMPLEMENTATION

PROCESSING

DATA
COLLECTION

THE
VESSEL
Figure 1 Flow of information in a safety management system
(Source: Adapted from Kjelln, 2000)

As shown in Figure 1, the SMS contains several

sub systems. First, a system of reporting and
collection of experience data from the vessel itself
is required. This is followed by a system of data
processing, i.e. summarization and analysis in
order to reveal causal factors and perform trend
analysis, which forms the basis for the
development of safety measures. One critical
system requirement is the reliability and accuracy
of input data, i.e. near miss and accidents reports.
As long as the input is reliable, the overall system
presupposes the possibility of developing efficient
measures, in order to control operational safety
(Kjelln, 2000). Another critical factor is how the
organization reconciles commercial pressures and
safety concerns. Safe performance and safety
management require resources in the form of
personnel, money and time. At the same time the
organization need to make profits and to be able to
compete. Safety versus efficiency may be difficult
to balance, and are often experienced as conflicting
goals (Rasmussen, 1997).
3 METHODOLOGY
A multi-method approach combining surveys and
case studies, including field studies and interviews,
is adopted. The survey aims to indicate the
interrelated patterns of the sailors perceptions of
and attitudes towards the SMS. The quantitative
results aim to give a more thorough understanding
of the overall situation, underlying processes and
the seafarers experiences with the SMS.
3.1 Case studies
Two tanker companies were studied in late 2007
and early 2008. In order to ensure the companies'
anonymity, company and vessel specific
information is retained. In both companies the
HSQ manager and Crewing Manager have been
interviewed. In one company the SMS data system
was examined. In the other company all available
statistics, experience feedback from reported cases

and safety bulletins available for the vessel were

examined. Two field studies have been carried out
on one vessel in each company.
3.2 Survey
A total of 987 questionnaires were distributed to 44
randomly selected vessels, of which 41 vessels
returned a total of 768 completed questionnaires.
This gives a vessel response rate of 93% and an
individual response rate of 78 %. All vessels were
flying a flag listed on the Paris MOU white or grey
list. This survey forms part of a major safety
culture survey carried out in 2006, performed with
a validated instrument (Oltedal, Engen, 2008).
In addition, 297 respondents have given written
comments. The written comments from the survey
are categorized in three groups as they relate to (1)
the crews' reporting practices, (2) procedures and
guidelines and (3) the crews' perceptions of the
balance between safety and efficiency (Rasmussen,
1997).
3.3 Statistical analysis
All statistical analysis is performed using SPSS
version 16.0. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
with Varimax rotation and Pairwise deletion is
carried out in order to examine the survey items'
interrelationship, and in terms of their common
underlying dimension. The extracted rotated
component matrix with factor structure and
loadings is presented. The loading represents the
correlation between the variable and the extracted
factor(s), with estimates ranging from 0 to 1.00.
Items that load strongest on a given factor are
considered to be most like the factor, and thus the
underlying latent dimension. (Hair 1998, Pett,
Lackey & Sullivan, 2003).
Descriptive statistics for each item, including
percentage frequency distribution, mean and
standard deviation are presented.
4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The results are presented in sections as they relate
to the SMS; (1) crews' reporting practices, (2)
analysis and follow up by shore side, (3)
procedures and checklists, and (4) perceived
balance between commercial pressures and safety
concerns. Results relating to data analysis and
follow up by shore side are derived from
qualitative data only. Each section is brought to a
close with a discussion of the presented data and
results, where qualitative data is used as a
framework for interpretation.

5 REPORTING PRACTICES ON BOARD

5.1 Qualitative results
Both companies from the case study have similar
formal reporting procedures. Reports on near
misses and incidents may be directed towards the
reporters closest superior, or directly to the
captain using a standard reporting formula. Reports
may also be placed anonymously in a mail box,
which is placed on the vessels. All reports are then
registered in the computer system by a designated
officer. When registered, the report is approved by
the captain before it is passed on to the shore side
for follow up.
In the questionnaire, 41 respondents commented
their reasons for not reporting, which have been
categorized in following four sub groups; system
related (n=11), blame related (n=10), (3) ship
management related (n=9) and others (n=11),
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Reasons for not reporting survey comments
11 resp: The reporting system itself is too complicated,
time consuming and paper producing.
10 resp: Experience that ship management and/or
company are after finding someone to blame.
9 resp: Related to ship management, i.e. management
altering report, captain not passing report to shore.
11 resp: Not possible to categorize, include personal
attitude, responsibility, and practice depending on
vessel/company specific conditions.

5.2 Quantitative results from survey

Survey questions related to reporting practices are
presented in Table 2, together with question
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n).
Table 2: Reporting practices - survey questions
Ref
R1: Do close calls get reported in writing?
R2: Do minor incidents get reported in writing?
R3: Do you receive constructive feedback from the
company on the conditions you report?
R4: Are reports of undesirable incidents ever
fixed up to cover mistakes?
R5: When an undesirable incident has occurred,
people are more preoccupied with placing blame
than finding the cause of the incident.
R6: Reporting is important to prevent the recurrence
of accidents or incidents.

n
671
694
639
642
733
730

Explanation for interrelationship between survey

questions: Reporting practices (R1, R2 & R4) are
assumed to improve if the crew gets feedback from
the report follow up (R3), and when the
importance of reporting and its role in safety
management is comprehended (R6). A blame

policy (R5) is supposed to reduce reporting (R1 &

R2) and increase the probability of a cover up of
own mistakes (R4) (Reason, 2001). A blame policy
is when people are blamed for an unwanted
situation rather than the situational circumstances.
Descriptive statistics related to reporting
practices are presented in Table 3, with scale
information and coding of response alternatives
given below.
Table 3: Reporting practices descriptive statistic
1
2
3
4
5
Ref (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Mean Std
R1 2.5
8.8
25.0
42.2
21.5
3.7
0.98
R2 4.0
8.6
22.8
38.9
25.6
3.7
1.06
R3 14.9
11.3
21.9
31.8
20.2
3.3
1.31
R4 46.9
17.6
22.8
9.7
4.0
2.1
1.19
R5 18.4
43.4
12.4
22.2
3.5
2.5
1.13
R6 0.7
0.8
2.9
44.2
51.4
4.5
0.66
R1 through R4: 1=very seldom/never, 2=seldom,
3=sometime, 4=often and 5=very often/always.
R5 and R6: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not sure,
4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.

The respondents were also asked to list their

reasons for not reporting incidents. Each
respondent could mark up to three of eleven pre
specified alternatives, or write any other reason if
not listed. The three major reasons are listed in
Table 4.
Table 4: Reasons for not reporting an incident from survey
Response
(%)
The incident did not have any serious consequence .
30.3
There could be negative reactions from my co-workers. 29.8
I am afraid that the information will be used against me. 22.8

The factor structure matrix and loadings are

presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Reporting practices - factor structure and loadings
Ref
Fac. 1 Fac. 2
R1 Do close calls get reported in writing? .875
-.185
R2 Do minor incidents get reported in
writing?
.837
-.178
R3 Do you receive constructive feedback
from the company on the conditions
you report?
.652
.029
R4 Are reports of undesirable incidents
ever fixed up to cover mistakes?
.052
.812
R5 When an undesirable incident has
occurred, people are more preoccupied
with placing blame than finding the
cause of the incident.
-.098 .790
R6 Reporting is important to prevent the
recurrence of accidents or incidents. .174
-.409
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item
was placed.

5.3 Section discussion

The factor structure matrix indicates two
underlying reporting dimensions. One reflecting
desired reporting practices (factor 1) and one
reflecting undesired reporting practices (factor 2).
Factor 1 indicates interrelationship between the
tendency to report and the feedback given on the
report from the shore side (Table 5), which
indicates that improved feedback also increases
reporting frequency. The descriptive statistics point
to a situation of substantial underreporting. A total
of 36.3% of the respondents state that they never or
only sometimes report close calls, and 35.4% that
they never or only sometimes report minor
incidents. In addition, feedback given on reports
seems to be inadequate, as 48.1% stated that they
never or only sometimes received constructive
feedback (R1, R2 & R3, Table 3). The qualitative
data also confirm that feedback is perceived to be
inadequate, too general and delayed. However, the
most frequent reason given for not reporting is that
the incident did not have any serious
consequences, ticked of by 30.3% of the
respondents (Table 4). This suggests that the crew
do not understand the purpose of reporting less
serious incidents in order do prevent the more
serious ones. The crew at the vessels visited also
had major problems explaining the definition of
close call and near miss.
Factor 2 indicates interrelationship between the
tendency to alter the reports to cover up own
mistakes and a blame-policy (Table 5). A total of
36.5% of the respondents admit to sometimes,
often or always fixing up the reports, and 25.7%
perceive that a blame culture is present (R4 & R5,
Table 3). However, the tendency to alter reports is
counteracted by the crews' understanding of
reporting as a preventive measure, pointed out by
item R6s negative loading (factor 2, Table 5). As
few as 1.5% of the respondents disagree about the
statement of whether reporting is important to
prevent recurrence of accidents or incidents (R6,
Table 3.) This suggests that greater improvement
in the SMS can be achieved abandoning a blamepolicy. This is supported by the fact that both the
second and third most frequent reason for not
reporting is related to blame; fear of negative
reactions from co workers and that information
may be used against them (Table 4). When it
comes to negative reaction from co workers, ship
management and the captain, the information
retrieved from field studies suggest large variation
from vessel to vessel, and most crew regard the
captain as the one setting the standard on board.
Although both companies acknowledged having
captains who possess less leadership skills, and
who do not practice the official company policy,
they are both reluctant to evaluate their captains.

Another hindrance towards reporting is the

reporting system itself, which is perceived to be
too complicated and time consuming (Table 1). A
common understanding on the vessels is that the
SMS is a paper producing system which requires
constantly increasing administrative work, without
having a proportionate effect on safety. The field
studies
have
revealed
situations
where
administrative tasks have been carried out at the
expense of time spent focusing on practical work
and operational challenges.
6 ANALYSIS AND FOLLOW UP BY SHORE
SIDE
6.1 Qualitative results
Both companies stated that they operate a noblame policy, but did acknowledge that the noblame policy did not always get through to the
crew. In their experience, the no-blame policy is
put in to practice differently on the various vessels,
and that this may depart from their official policy.
However, when going through the reports, it is
noted that report analysis most often stopped with
the crew as a cause, with explanations as lack of
safety awareness and bad attitude. Situations
involving known technical mal functioning and
unfortunate situational circumstances such as bad
weather have also been explained by human error
as root cause. Safety is monitored with the use of
metrics such as lost-time injuries, sick leaves and
number of reports, all metrics that may be traced
back to the individual.
6.2 Section discussion
The case studies indicate that the companies apply
a person model in their follow up. A person model
views people as free agents capable of choosing
between safe and unsafe behavior, and therefore
unsafe behavior is seen as voluntary actions and as
a cause. In an alternative organizational model,
human error is seen more as a consequence than a
cause, induced by latent conditions in the system at
large (Reason, 2001). There are several draw backs
with the person model. First, when human error is
seen as a cause, the crew may perceive this as
placing blame. As mentioned in section 5, a
blaming policy is suggested to aggravate the
reporting practices on board. A second drawback is
related to developments of safety measures. In the
person model, when human error is seen as a
cause, safety measures tend to attempt to control
human behavior by, inter alia, procedures and
checklists. And when the real cause is to be found
elsewhere in the organization, the measures may
have limited effect. When measures have little or

no effect upon the error producing factors, error

continue being involved in incidents and accidents.
This situation may develop to a vicious blame
cycle, where in the next situation crew get even
more blame as they have already been warned
(Reason, 2001).
7 PROCEDURES AND CHECKLISTS
7.1 Qualitative results
Within the tanker sector there is an extensive use
of procedures and checklists. It is custom that crew
have to deal with procedures and checklists from
own company, charterer, customer and oil
installation. Of which all are different but at the
same time standardized to fit all.
Officers at both vessels do regard procedures
and check lists as valuable for safety reasons
within certain limits. Procedures and checklists are
also seen as problematic as there are too many of
them, too detailed and too standardized. The crew
experience that less standardization and a
possibility to accommodate procedures and
checklist in accordance to the ship specific
situation would improve safety more. Problems
with completing checklists and following
procedures are mostly experienced during hectic
operation, such as calling at and leaving port.
In the questionnaire, 62 respondents made
written comments related to procedures and check
lists. The comments have been categorized into
following three sub groupings; (1) procedure
quality (n=33), (2) commercial pressure (n=11)
and (3) others (n=18). The results are summarized
in Table 6.
Table 6 procedures and checklists survey comments
33 resp: Procedures and checklists are not applicable and
do not reflect the situation on board: too detailed,
too many, and look like they have been developed
by people with no sea going experience.
11 resp: Procedures are being breached due to commercial
pressure.
18 resp: Other, i.e. the relevance of training and work
specific situations.

7.2 Statistical results from survey

Survey questions related to the perception of
procedures are presented in Table 7, with question
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n).

Table 7: Procedures - survey questions

Ref
P1 The procedures are helpful in my work.
P2 I have received good training in the company's
procedures.
P3 We have the opportunity to influence and form
the procedures.
P4 I feel that it is difficult to know which procedures
are applicable.
P5 The procedures are difficult to understand or are
poorly written.

n
755
757
739
750
751

Explanation for interrelationship between

survey questions: Good procedures are supposed to
be helpful in the work (P1). It is assumed that
procedures are more easily put into operational
practice if the user has received training in how to
understand and apply the procedures, and the
safety role they play (P2). They are also assumed
to be more workable if they reflect the reality of
the working process. That is ensured through
involving the crew in the development of
procedures, and by paying attention to crews'
experience (P3). If these factors (P2 & P3) are not
present, the procedural system may be perceived as
confusing and difficult to relate to (P4 & P5)
(Reason, 2001).
Descriptive statistics related to reporting
practices are presented in Table 8, with scale
information and coding of response alternatives
beneath.
Table 8: Procedures descriptive statistics
1
2
3
4
5
Ref (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Mean
P1 0.9
1.2
4.9
52.5
40.5
4.3
P2 1.1
2.9
6.1
55.9
34.1
4.3
P3 3.4
13.4
16.2
53.5
13.5
3.6
P4 15.6
45.7
16.5
19.3
2.8
2.5
P5 16.6
54.2
12.9
15.2
2.1
2.3
P1 through P5: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3
sure, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.

Std
0.70
0.76
0.99
1.06
0.99
= not

The respondents were also asked to list their

reasons for not following procedures. Each
respondent could mark up to three of seven pre
specified options, or write any other reason if not
listed. The three most frequent reasons are listed in
Table 9.
Table 9: Reasons for not following procedures

The work will be done faster.

The procedures do not work as intended.
There are too many procedures.

Response
(%)
47.3
44.4
36.8

Factor analysis also included item R5 When an

undesirable incident has occurred, people are
more preoccupied with placing blame than finding
the cause of the incident Our hypothesis is that
organizations inclined to focus at the human as a
cause, as in a person model (Reason, 2001), are
also more inclined to react by adding more
procedures, which may result in a procedural
system difficult to relate to (P4 & P5, Table 7).
Factor structure matrix and loadings are presented
in Table 10.
Table 10: Procedures factor structure and loadings
Ref
Fac. 1 Fac. 2
P4 I feel that it is difficult to know which
procedures are applicable.
.815
-.060
P5 The procedures are difficult to
understand or are poorly written.
.806
-.165
R5 When an undesirable incident has
occurred, people are more preoccupied
with placing blame than finding the
cause of the incident.
.560
-.054
P1 The procedures are helpful in my
work.
-.147 .776
P2 I have received good training in the
company's procedures.
-.206 .739
P3 We have the opportunity to influence
and form the procedures.
.041
.685
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item
was placed.

7.3 Section discussion

The factor structure matrix indicates two
underlying dimensions related to procedures. One
is reflecting poor procedures (factor 1) and one
reflecting helpful procedures (factor 2).
Factor 1 indicates an interrelationship between
the use of a person model in follow up (R5) and
how easily the procedural system is comprehended
(P4 & P5, Table 10). In all, 25.7% perceive blame
as more important than finding the cause of an
incident (R5, Table 3), 22.1% find it difficult to
know which procedures are applicable and 17.3%
finds them difficult to understand or to be poorly
written (P4 & P5, Table 8).
On the other hand, factor 2 indicates that
procedures are perceived as helpful when training
is provided and the users get involved in the
development process (P1, P2 & P3, Table 10).
Although 93% of the respondents regard
procedures as helpful (P1, Table 8), qualitative
information suggests the situation to be more
nuanced. In the survey, 33 respondents commented
that the procedures and checklists are not
applicable and do not reflect the situation on board.
Moreover, they are felt to be too detailed, too
numerous, and look like they were developed by
people with no sea going experience (Table 6).
Also, two of three major reasons given for not

following procedures are that the procedures do

not work as intended and that there are too many of
them, stated by 44.4% and 36.8% respectively
(Table 9). This is considered as another drawback
related to the person model, anexity-avoidance.
Anexity-avoidance describes an organization
which has discovered a technique to reduce risk,
and who repeat it over and over again regardless of
its effectiveness, like constantly adding yet another
procedure in response to unwanted incidents
(Reason, 2001). With regard to procedure
development, the crews should, as professionals,
be involved in the process, and their experience
taken seriously. However, both companies are
using multinational contract employee crew, which
may make involvement difficult. Contract
employment may cause more crew instability, and
when crewing is outsourced the company is more
disconnected to, inter alia, training and skills
upgrading programs. The field study reveals that
mostly top officers are involved in procedural
development. Procedures and checklists are
experienced as being more difficult to follow
during hectic operations such as loading,
discharging and entering port, and are, in these
situations, also most often deviated from. Also,
ship inspections on behalf of flag states, port states,
and classification societies and so on, take place at
port and increase the crew's workload. On average,
each tanker is inspected 11 times per year. A total
of 50 hours is allocated for these inspections
however this does not include preparation time
(Knapp, Franses, 2006). It is known that some
vessels may experience up to 40 inspections per
year from their customers alone (Guest, 2008).
However, the top reason for not following
procedures is to do the work faster, stated by
47.3% of the respondents (Table 9), which brings
us to the next section: the balance between
commercial pressures and safety concerns.
8 BALANCE BETWEEN COMMERCIAL
PRESSURES AND SAFETY CONCERNS
8.1 Qualitative results
Both companies stated their main priority as safety.
However at sea, the sailors often experienced
commercial pressure and efficiency to be the shore
sides priority. This experience is supported by real
situations with direct pressure from shore. Most
comments related to efficiency pressure are also
related to the on board manning level.
In the questionnaire, 118 respondents have
commented on these issues. The comments have
been divided into following sub groups; crewing
level (n=33), demand for efficiency (n=35), rest

hours (n=30) and others (n=10). The results are

summarized in Table 11.
Table 11 Balance between commercial pressures and safety
concerns survey comments
33 resp: The number of crewmembers is too low compared
to work tasks, which are constantly increasing in
quantity especially administrative.
35 resp: High demand for efficiency and time pressure,
especially when calling for and leaving port.
30 resp: Rest hours are not followed, mostly due to low
crewing level and high work load.
10 resp: Not possible to categorize. Comments as sorry, I
am tired and I fell asleep on the watch.

8.2 Quantitative results from survey

Survey questions related to crews perception of
their priority of safety versus efficiency are
presented in Table 12, together with question
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n).
Table 12 Balance between commercial pressures and
concerns - survey questions
Ref
SE1 The management doesnt care how we do our
work as long as the work gets done.
SE2 I am confident that my company always
prioritizes the crews safety.
SE3 The on-shore top management in my company
prioritizes safety before economy.
SE4 I experience that safety is more a faade than a
real priority area.
SE5 Do you ever feel forced to continue your work
even if safety may be threatened?
SE6 Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety
first in your daily work?
SE7 The number of crewmembers is not sufficient
to ensure safety on board.

safety
n
736
754
756
736
745
761
744

Explanation for interrelationship between survey

questions: The priority of safety versus efficiency
is supposed to be communicated from the
organization's top management (SE3) down to the
lower levels of the organization (SE2), which are,
ideally, aligned (Reason, 2001). However,
deviation from official policies and goals may be
experienced (SE1, SE4). The level of stress
experienced is interrelated with crewing level.
Crewing constitutes a major part of operational
expenditures, and how safety is prioritized may be
reflected in the on board crewing level (SE7),
which again influences the crew's opportunity to
prioritize safety in their daily work (SE5, SE6).
Descriptive statistics related to the priority of
safety versus efficiency are presented in Table 13,
with scale information and coding of item answers.

Table 13 Balance between commercial pressures and safety

concerns - descriptive results
1
2
3
4
5
Ref (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Mean Std
SE1 27.9
46.5
12.6
9.1
3.9
2.2
1.05
SE2 0.9
2.0
6.5
45.0
45.6
4.3
0.76
SE3 2.0
5.3
8.5
47.8
36.5
4.1
0.91
SE4 19.7
35.7
9.0
26.8
8.8
2.7
1.29
SE5 43.5
24.2
26.8
3.6
2.5
2.0
1.01
SE6 0.3
0.7
4.5
31.9
62.7
4.6
0.64
SE7 20.6
35.2
16.8
21.0
6.5
2.6
1.21
SE1 through SE4 & SE7: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,
3 = not sure, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.
SE5 & SE6:1=very seldom/never, 2=seldom, 3=sometime,
4=often and 5=very often/always.

Factor structure matrix and loadings are

presented in Table 14.
Table 14 Balance between commercial pressures and safety
concerns factor structure and loadings
Ref
Fac. 1 Fac. 2
SE1 The management doesnt care how we
do our work as long as the work gets
done.
.690
-.308
SE7 The number of crewmembers is not
sufficient to ensure safety on board.
.676
-.093
SE5 Do you ever feel forced to continue
your work even if safety may be
threatened?
.647
-.169
SE4 I experience that safety is more a
faade than a real priority area.
.625
.035
SE2 I am confident that my company
always prioritizes the crews safety.
-.112 .819
SE3 The on-shore top management in my
company prioritizes safety before
economy.
-.081 .771
SE6 Do you have the possibility to prioritize
safety first in your daily work?
-.135 .583
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item
was placed.

8.3 Section discussion

The factor structure matrix indicates two
underlying dimensions related to the balance
between commercial pressure and safety concerns
(Table 14). One is reflecting when commercial
pressure and efficiency is perceived to be of
priority (factor 1) and the other when safety
concerns are of priority (factor 2).
Factor 1 indicates a relationship between the
perception that management does not care how
they work as long as it is done, and low crew level
(SE1 & SE7, Table 14). Shortage of crew when
compared to work load and demand for efficiency
is also the most commented issue at the survey
(Table 11). In all, 27.5% of the respondents
perceive the crewing level as too low to ensure
safety on board (SE7, Table 13). As seen in factor
1, the consequence is that 32.9% of the crew feel
forced to continue work even if safety is

threatened. Also, safety is perceived as a faade by

35.6% (SE5 & SE4, Table 13). When safety is seen
as a faade, we expect that safety management
related work is also mistrusted, which again may
affect the willingness to report.
On the other hand, factor 2 indicates that when
the top management in the company manages to
communicate safety as priority, the crew also
prioritizes safety in their daily work (SE2, SE3 &
SE6, Table 14). If safety is to be a priority, it is not
enough simply to have an official statement of
safety; it must be supported by actions. Such
actions should include providing the crew with
whatever manpower or equipment they deem
necessary to carry out their responsibilities safely;
emphasizing measures which are low cost will not
be sufficient.
9 CONCLUSION
Statistical analysis and qualitative data indicate
that SMS within the Norwegian tanker industry
have several deficiencies. Firstly, there is a
substantial under reporting of experience data from
the vessels. And reports that are placed may be
intentionally altered to not include a correct
description of the events. The situation may be
explained by the crews fear of negative
consequences, a complicated reporting system and
a lack of understanding of the overall safety
management system. When it comes to shore side's
follow up and data analysis, the findings indicate a
person orientated approach. This is resulting in
underlying latent causes not being revealed and
contributes to the perception of an organizational
blame policy. Moreover, when applying a person
oriented approach, measures developed tend to aim
at controlling human actions, often in form of
excess use of procedures and checklists.
Procedures and check lists are perceived by the
crew as being problematic to use in their daily
work. This may be explained by lack of crew
involvement in the development process, that
crews' experience not being taking seriously and
poor opportunities for local adjustments to each
vessel. This again may lead to more frequent and
deliberate breaching of procedures, which again
affects the willingness to report, as the system is
not understood in terms of its contribution to good
safety management. This is an undermining and
safety degrading vicious circle. To break out of
such a cycle, following four facts regarding human
nature and error should be recognized (Reason,
2001). Firstly, human actions are almost always
constrained by factors beyond an individuals
immediate control. Secondly, people cannot easily
avoid actions which they did not intend to perform
in the first place. Thirdly, error has multiple causes
including personal, task related, situational and

organizational. And finally, within a skilled,

experienced and largely well intentioned
workforce, situations are more amenable to
improvement than people. With reference to the
latter, the field studies revealed several episodes
where experience and good seamanship gave
solutions to situations that deviated from the
ordinary. Under such circumstances, with
experienced crew on board, an organizational
approach towards safety may be more appropriate.
Also, we suggest that employment conditions and
crew stability are influential factors. Trust, good
safety management and proper safety practices are
all things which evolve over time, as a result of
close interaction and experience feedback between
all organizational members. Safety as priority has
to be communicated with a united voice
throughout the organization, supported by
evidential actions. The crew needs to be provided
with the required recourses, and support if work is
delayed due to safety reasons. Each vessel, even
within the same fleet, is different with regard to
factors such as structural condition, crew
experience and competence. In such peculiar
situations, standardized measures may be
experienced as poorly fitted, and safety could be
managed more efficiently if crew were given the
opportunity of making local adjustments. Finally,
in a SMS, all of its parts are equally important and
mutually dependent. Amendments should pertain
to the system as a whole, and not be limited to
individual components.
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Rotterdam.
Oltedal, H.A. & Engen, O.A. 2008, Local management and
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Article4
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Tanker versus dry cargoThe
use of safety management systems within Norwegian dry cargo
shipping. In J.M. Ale, I.A. Papazoglou, & E. Zio (Eds.), Reliability,
Risk and Safety (pp. 2118-2125). London: Taylor & Francis Group.
This article is not available in UiS Brage due to copyright.

Article5
Oltedal, H. & McArthur, D. (2010). Reporting practices in merchant
shipping, and the identification of influencing factors. Safety Science,
49(2), 331-338.

Reporting practices in merchant shipping, and the

identification of influencing factors
H.E. Oltedal* & D.P. McArthur
Faculty of Technology, Business and Maritime Education, Stord/Haugesund
University College, N-5528 Haugesund, Norway

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to identify the factors determining the reporting
frequency of experience data e.g. incidents and accidents. The empirical setting is the
Norwegian controlled merchant fleet. Data were collected from a survey carried out in
2006, where 1,262 questionnaires were gathered from 76 vessels. The data were
subjected to explorative factor analysis, method of principal component and varimax
rotation. Seven factors, representing latent dimensions of safety culture, were
extracted. Internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha) and scale reliability were found to
be acceptable. The factor scores were used in an ordered logistic regression to
examine the factors relationships to reporting practices. The results show that
enhanced safety related training, a trusting and open relationship among the crew,
safety oriented ship management, performance of pro-active risk identification
activities and feedback on reported events all are significantly related to higher
reporting frequency. On the other hand, demand for efficiency and lack of attention to
safety from shore personnel, are significantly related to lower reporting frequency.
The results also show a significantly lower reporting frequency among those who
have worked with their local manager less than 1 year. Bulk and dry cargo vessels
also show significantly lower reporting frequency than those working on liquid bulk
carriers.
Keywords: Reporting practices; safety management; safety culture; ordered logistic
regression; shipping; seafaring

1 Introduction
Information about incidents, near-misses, operational failures and successes are
crucial when taking a proactive approach to safety. Such information is often
collected and processed into basic data for remedial actions through the use of a
formal safety management system, which constitutes a cornerstone of organizational
learning (Kjelln 2000, Reason 2001). Within the maritime industry, at the
international administrative level, guidelines for formal safety assessment systems
have already been developed. In these, identification of potential hazards is the first
step (International Maritime Organization 2007a). At company level, safety
management is regulated by the International Safety Management (ISM) code, which
requires shipping companies to have a system of reporting and collecting experience
data (International Maritime Organization 2002). Although various systems for safety
management do exist, safety management per se is not only a system property. It is
*

Corresponding author. Tel,: +47 20 70 26 44: +47 938 26 187

E-mail address: [email protected]

not sufficient simply to have a system for the collection of safety related data. The
system efficiency is determined by its human interrelationships (crew, shore
personnel, analysts and others). A fundamental pillar of safety management is that
information reported into the system is reliable and reflects the actual situation in
working operations. Thus, under-reporting of safety related events constitutes a major
threat to the efficiency and utility of a safety management system.
There is an extensive literature considering reporting practices and the factors
which influence these. Particular interest has been shown in high-risk sectors such as
civil aviation and nuclear power plants. Attention has also been given to road and rail
transportation, health care and oil & gas related activities. Although the importance of
reporting practices in determining the outcome of a safety management system has
been acknowledged in the literature, little attention has been given to the topic within
merchant shipping. This is somewhat surprising given that seafaring is regarded as a
high-risk occupation (Anderson 2003, Hansen, Pedersen 1996, Hvold 2005, Roberts,
Marlow 2005).
A few studies which examine merchant shipping have been retrieved by
searching through the Science Direct database for peer review publications. The
findings indicate a culture of under-reporting of safety information, which represents
a shortcoming in the their safety management (Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009, Oltedal
2010, International Maritime Organization 2007b, Ellis, Bloor,Michael,
Sampson,Helen 2010). An analysis of accident data from the Lloyd's Register
FairPlay (LRFP) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) for vessels
registered in Norway, suggests that only 30% of accidents experienced were reported
(Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009). Own research indicates that 36% of ship board tanker
crew never or only sometimes report near-misses or minor incidents (Oltedal 2010).
Within the dry cargo sector, around 40% state that they never or only sometime report
a minor incident or near-miss (Oltedal, Engen 2010). Differences in reporting
practices between dry cargo and tanker vessels are also suggested by others (Ellis,
Bloor,Michael, Sampson,Helen 2010).
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) expresses an awareness of the
under-reporting of safety information, and highlights that this must be improved
(International Maritime Organization 2007b).

1.1 Theoretical foundation

Although various safety management models exist (see (Kjelln 2000), of
fundamental importance in all of them is the collection of safety information from the
operational productions system, used with intention the intention of preventing future
accidents and other unwanted episodes. A model of a safety management system is
illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Safety management system (adapted from Kjellen 2000)
DATA

DISTRIBUTION

PROCESSING

DATA

DECISIONS

COLLECTON

PRODUCTION
SYSTEM

Figure 1 shows the flow of information in a safety management system. The

shaded areas represent the safety information system, that is, the part of the safety
management system which provides information needed for decisions and signalling
related to safety matters. Reporting and the collection of data on, for instance,
operational accident risk by means of self reported accidents, incidents and nearmisses is regarded as a critical function of the overall system. Information processing
and the development of remedial actions all depend on the reliability and accuracy of
the reported information (Kjelln 2000).
When it comes to the under-reporting of safety related events, Kjellen (2000)
uses behavioural theory to explain different propensities to report. Behavioural theory
is primarily used to explain why people deliberately violate safety rules. It focuses on
the consequences of behaviour and how these consequences affect peoples judgments
in relation to recurring situations, and their ingrained action patterns in these
situations. For instance, when performing an operation, people may have two action
alternatives to choose between: one which is considered safe and one considered
unsafe. Experience shows that people are inclined to choose the unsafe alternative
when this alternative provides a consequence regarded as positive, such as saving time
or other resources. When people in turn get positive feedback for their efficiency,
deliberately violating safety rules becomes a valuable skill, and over time a part of the
organizational culture. This safety-efficiency trade-off has also been noted by other
researchers, for example (Hollnagel 2009). The reporting of an incident or accident is
often a time consuming activity, and it is therefore reasonable to expect that demand
for efficiency will lead to less reporting, as well as an increase in situations that
should have been reported in the first place.
Another factor influencing people's propensity to report is how the
organization handles blame and punishment (Reason 2001). Reason (2001)
emphasises the importance of organizations developing a just culture. In a just culture,
there is an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged or even rewarded for
providing essential safety related information, but in which there is also a clear line
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. For example, if efficiency by unsafe
acts is knowingly accepted during normal operations, the operator should not be

blamed and punished when that very same action is a causal factor in an unwanted
event.
Feedback of the results to the reporter is considered a motivating factor, as the
individuals understand the relevance of reporting and see that is taken seriously.
However, feedback on reported events in the form of constantly developing new
procedures may also be perceived as blame, as it is signalling that the operator did
something wrong. Such a person oriented approach also has another drawback. When
searching for human error, the organization often does not look behind the operators
when looking for causal factors, which could be found elsewhere in the organization
such as, for instance, a pressure for efficiency.
Reporting practices, how the organization handles, blame, punishment and
feedback, and the general functionality of the organizations safety management, are
regarded as key elements in an organizations safety culture (Reason 2001).
Management characteristics and leadership, at all levels in the organization both
shore-side and ship-board, are regarded as major enablers and barriers with respect to
the development of an efficient safety culture (Maritime and Coastguard Agency
2004), and thus also an adequate reporting culture.

1.2 Previous research

The under-reporting of safety related information has been identified as a
problem in several industries. For example, it is suggested that up to 68% of all
workplace accidents and injuries are not captured in the national injury surveillance
systems, which were set up by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the United States
(US)(Rosenman et al. 2006). Others suggest that 81% of injuries experienced remain
unreported (Probst, Brubaker & Barsotti 2008). Within the health industry, barriers
against reporting include fear of reprisals, lack of confidentiality, time constraints and
lack of post-reporting feedback (Espin et al. 2007).
Although Psarros (2009) concludes that under-reporting constitutes a major
problem within the maritime industry, the reasons for non-reporting are not addressed
(Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009). Neil et al. (2010) suggest that under-reporting is more
frequent on general cargo vessels compared to others. However, these conclusions are
drawn based on differences in aggregate data in administrations, and not reporting
practices directly. Barriers against reporting are not reliably identified, however
differences in national / cultural risk perception have been suggested (Ellis,
Bloor,Michael, Sampson,Helen 2010).
A recent cross-industrial review indicates that a fear of blame and punishment
(legal, organizational or from co-workers) is the most commonly cited barrier to
reporting (van der Schaaf, Kanse 2004). The International Maritime Organization also
addresses fear of being thought blameworthy or of being disciplined, embarrassment,
fear of legal liability, and so on, as the main barriers towards reporting (International
Maritime Organization 2007b). Schaaf (2004) has also identified other common
barriers such as: a lack of follow-up, managerial issues such as no commitment or
distrust, time demands, a paper producing reporting system and a lack of
understanding of what constitutes a near-miss and incident. Own research indicates
that all of these factors are present within the shipping industry (Oltedal 2010).
Moreover, Schaaf (2004) reports that a 'macho' environment may discourage
reporting, and that injury in such environments is regarded as a part of the work.
Based on his review, Scaaf (2004) identifies four main categories of reporting
barriers: 1) fear of disciplinary action (as a result of a blame culture where those

who commit an error are punished) or of other peoples reactions (embarrassment); 2)

risk acceptance (incidents are part of the job, cannot be prevented, the macho
perspective); 3) useless (perceived attitudes of management taking no notice, not
likely to do anything about it) and 4) practical reasons (too time-consuming, too
difficult).

1.3 The objective of the paper.

It is evident that the under-reporting of safety information and risk, is a
problem within the merchant shipping industry, yet we have not been able to find any
research which empirically explores which factors affect the on-board reporting
practices. As stated earlier, a considerable amount of research has been undertaken
looking at reporting practices and the factors influencing it within other industries.
However, working within merchant shipping is in many ways different from shorebased activities. Life and work on board is a 24-hour-a-day activity, where the crew
has little opportunity to interact with the surrounding society. Most of the sailors are
contract employees, comprised of multiple nationalities, with a typical sailing period
of 9 months at a time. Also, due to its global nature, the industry is highly exposed to
competition. (Oltedal, Engen 2009). We have therefore identified a need for more
research on the factors influencing reporting practices in the setting of merchant
shipping.
The objectives of the study are:
1) To determine the structure of safety culture in Norwegian controlled merchant
shipping by liquid tankers and bulk carriers using exploratory factor analysis.
2) Explore the relationship between on board reporting practices and safety
culture factors.
3) Check for differences in reporting practices and familiarity with their local
manager.
4) Check for differences in reporting practices between type of vessel; liquid
tanker versus bulk / dry cargo carrier.

2 Method
2.1 Survey samples and administration
The survey forms part of a PhD-research project which explores the relationship
between ship-board safety culture and management on Norwegian controlled liquidand drybulk cargo vessels, with a second goal of looking for differences between the
two vessel classes.
The sample was randomly selected from the Norwegian Ship-owners
Associations list of members for 2005, and the sample was stratified with regard to
type of vessel (general cargo, bulk carrier, oil tanker, gas tanker and chemical tanker).
Initially, 150 vessels were selected, which constitutes about 15% of the population.
Following the initial selection, telephone calls were made to each company to ask for
their participation. Thirty one companies agreed to participate with 83 vessels. Forty
five companies with 67 vessels declined to participate. Reasons for not participating
included:

Being unable to contact the company despite repeated efforts (23 vessels, 16
companies).

The vessel was not owned by a Norwegian party, and therefore not defined as
Norwegian controlled (15 vessels, 8 companies).
Ship management was outsourced to a non Norwegian country, and therefore
not defined as Norwegian controlled (14 vessels, 8 companies).
The company refused to participate (12 vessels, 10 companies).
The remaining vessels were sold (3 vessels, 3 companies).

The population was redefined, and vessels managed from a non-Norwegian

country were not considered Norwegian controlled.
On an international basis, the various flag states performances are assessed on
standards of safety, environment and social performance and are maintained and enforced
by flag states, in full compliance with international maritime regulations. Based on their
performance, the flag states are then categorized into three sub groupings; the white list
(good performance), the grey list (mediocre performance) and the black list (poor
performance) (MARISEC 2008). It turned out that companies operating vessels flying
a black listed flag declined to participate in the study. Thus, the sample is
representative only for vessels flying a white and grey listed flag.
The results of the study were based on self-completed questionnaire data. In total,
1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tankers and bulk carriers. 76 vessels from
29 companies returned a total of 1,262 forms, which gives an individual response rate
of 80.2 %, a vessel response rate of 91.5 % and a company response rate of 93.5%.
Each vessel received a package with individual questionnaires and a sealable return
envelope. On each vessel, the safety delegate received instructions regarding
administration, purpose and anonymity. Vessels not returning any questionnaires were
reminded up to four times. The survey was administrated during the spring/summer of
2006.

2.2 Questionnaire development

The questionnaire was developed by Studio Apertura (2004) (a constituent centre of
The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in collaboration with
the Norwegian DNV and the research institution SINTEF (2003)) as a part of a
programme for research in risk and safety in transport (RISIT) founded by The
Research Council of Norway. The main part of the questionnaire was made up of 10
sections representing the following dimensions of safety culture: top managements
safety priorities, local management, procedures and guidelines, interaction, work
situation, competence, responsibility and sanctions, working environment, learning
from incidents, and description of the organization. All these constructs were
measured on five point Likert scales ranging from `strongly disagree to `strongly
agree, or from `very seldom/never to `very often/always.
Hvold and Nesset (2009) discuss the issue of language and response style. They
proceed using only an English and Norwegian version of their questionnaire. McCrae
(2001) studied Norwegians and Filipinos who completed questionnaires both in their
own language (Norwegian/Tagalog) as well as in English. He found no significant
differences in the mean responses. However, in a cross-national study, Harzing (2005)
found that English language versions tended to be more homogenized, potentially
obscuring cross-national differences.
Given that forcing the respondents to answer in the official working language of
English could potentially bias the results, the questionnaire was also made available in
Norwegian, Polish and Tagalog. This covered the main languages in use on-board. In

addition, during the fieldwork it became obvious that there was significant variation in
the English-language abilities of the crew. This provides further support for the
approach adopted here. All participants were issued with questionnaires in their own
national language and English. They were free to choose which version to return.

2.3 Demographics
Questionnaires were returned from 40 liquid bulk carriers (liquid tanker) and 36 dry
bulk carriers (dry cargo). 63% of the respondents were employed on a liquid tanker
and 37% at a dry cargo vessel. The sample was male dominated (92.5% of the
respondents). 22 nationalities were represented. The majority from the Philippines
(65.5%), followed by Norway (9.2%), Poland (8.1%) and Russia (5.5%). Just over
56% of respondents were under the age of 40.

3 Results
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v.16.0 and STATA v.
10.1 were used for the data analysis.

3.1 Dependent variable: Reporting frequency

The dependent variable, reporting frequency, was measured by the item: Do
minor incidents get reported in writing. A total of 13% stated 'never or seldom
report' (N=164), 20.7% stated that they sometimes did report (N=261), 31.8% that
they often reported N=401) and 23.5% that they always reported minor incidents. The
remaining 11.1% were missing (N=140).

3.2 Factor analysis

All 1262 responses were submitted to explorative principal component factor
analysis with Varimax rotation, in order to identify the latent underlying dimensions
of safety culture. The data were deemed appropriate for analysis, according to the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling value of .858, and significant Barletts test.
Factors were extracted based on the following three analytical criteria: (1) Pairwise
deletion, (2) Eigen value more than 1.0 and (3) factor loading more than 0.50. Items
that failed to attain minimum loading of 0.5, or which loaded significantly on more
than one factor, were omitted. This resulted in the extraction of 7 factors, explaining
71.305% of the total variance.
This was followed by a scale-reliability test. Each factor was evaluated based
on the following three criteria: (1) Cronbachs Alpha coefficient > 0.70 (2) item-total
correlation > 0.40, (3) inter-item correlation > 0.30, <0.80. However, these cut-off
points are rules of thumb, and no clear consensus with regard to where the cut-off
points exist (Hair 1998, Field 2005, Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). Each item's
theoretical significance was also taken into account.
Factor correlations analysis was carried out to evaluate the construct validity,
which concerns the theoretical relationship between the factors. (Hair 1998, Field
2005). All extracted factors were found to be a valid and reliable representation of the
underlying safety culture construct.
Each factor's explained variance, Cronbarchs Alpha value, inter-item range
and item total range are presented in Table 1. Extracted factor structure, item
description and loadings are presented in Table 2. Loadings in bold indicate the factor
on to which the item was placed.

Table 1
Factor scale reliability test, number of items and explained variance
Factor
N
Explained
Cronbachs
Inter-item
ID
items
variance
Alpha
range
F1
4
30.621
.914
.651 - .806
F2
4
10.102
.825
.453 - .680
F3
3
7.917
.867
.647 - .710
F4
3
7.296
.819
.527 - .741
F5
3
5.612
.790
.440 - .767
F6
4
5.391
.669
.262 - .405
F7
2
4.366
.852
.743 - .743

Table 2
Seven factor rotated solution with factor loadings, and explained variance
F1
F2
F3
I have received the training that is necessary in
.165
.111
.856
order to handle critical or hazardous situations.
I have received the education that is necessary
.152
.117
.855
in order to handle critical or hazardous
situations.
I have received the education that is necessary
.246
.063
.849
in order to work safely.
I have received the training that is necessary in
.270
.097
.813
order to work safely.
We receive sufficient safety-related information .191
.137
.749
when we sign on / start a new sailing period.
We receive sufficient safety-related information .239
.151
.746
when we start a new watch.
We solve problems and conflicts in a good
.232
.143
.745
manner.
The working environment on board is
.157
.124
.730
characterized by openness and dialog.
Does your closest superior follow up to ensure
.115
.142
.848
that all work on board is done in a safe manner?
Is your closest superior a good role model when .093
.212
.821
it comes to attending to his own and others'
safety?
Is your closest superior clear in his engagement .141
.163
.817
to ensuring his co-workers' safety?
Do you carry out a "Safe Job Analysis"/"Risk
.130
.131
.136
Analysis" before high-risk operations?
Do you carry out a safety evaluation before new .185
.151
.169
working methods, tools, or routines are
introduced?
Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety
.190
.288
.202
first in your daily work?
Do you receive constructive feedback from the
.087
.063
.103
company on the conditions you report?
Do you receive constructive feedback from the
.078
.041
.152
captain on the conditions you report?
Do you get information from
.066
.089
-.020
incidents/accidents on other vessels?
In my company, they are more preoccupied
-.089
-.021
-.098
with the statistics than the human consequences
of an incident.
Reporting in itself take too much time.
-.115
-.078
-.059
I experience that safety work is more a facade
.070
-.104
-.063
than a real priority area.
When an undesirable incident has occurred,
-.085
-.249
-.204

Item-total
range
.781 - .821
.604 - .673
.731 - .779
.564 - .733
.470 - .732
.410 - .527
.743 - .743

F4
.163

F5
.053

F6
-.015

F7
-.055

.168

.078

-.034

-.070

.103

.089

-.096

-.031

.087

.082

-.102

-.037

.153

.042

-.138

-.039

.139

.106

-.097

-.016

.173

.016

-.080

-.098

.087

.091

-.120

-.127

.193

.105

-.120

-.080

.104

.079

-.139

-.059

.182

.072

-.140

-.076

.871

.048

-.063

-.075

.840

.115

-.108

-.036

.622

.112

-.051

-.101

.029

.883

-.089

-.041

.056

.875

-.022

-.077

.120

.684

-.101

-.022

-.030

-.154

.784

.091

-.177
.024

.031
-.110

.709
.606

.029
.222

-.027

-.016

.560

.193

people are more preoccupied with placing

blame than finding the cause of the incident.
Due to the captain's demand for efficiency we
sometimes have to violate procedures.
Due to the company's demand for efficiency we
sometimes have to violate procedures.

-.093

-.134

-.130

-.039

-.091

.228

.878

-.066

-.093

-.059

-.146

-.052

.253

.865

The 7 extracted factors in Table 2, representing the on board safety culture, were
labelled as followed (label in italic):
Factor 1; competence, reflecting the crews' perception of their own training and
education, in order to work safely and handle critical and hazardous situations.
Factor 2; interpersonal, reflecting the relationship amongst the crew, problem solving
abilities, form of communication and sharing of safety information.
Factor 3; management, reflecting the crews perception of their closest manager as a
role model, engagement and interest in ensuring safety in work operations.
Factor 4; work practices, reflecting performance of proactive activities as safe job
analysis and hazard identification, and how safety is prioritised in daily operations.
Factor 5; feedback, reflecting feedback given to crew on reported safety information,
and experience reports from other vessels.
Factor 6; shore orientation, reflecting the shore-side part of organisations' attitude
towards and prioritising of safety.
Factor 7; efficiency, reflecting the relationship between perceived demand for
efficiency and safe working practices.

3.3 Ordered logistic regression

The dependent variable reporting frequency has an ordinal nature, with 4
possible outcomes (1=never/seldom, 2=sometimes, 3=often and, 4=always). It is
possible to handle such data in a number of ways. Ordinary least squares is seldom
appropriate for such data since it requires a continuous dependant variable. To convert
our dependant variable to a continuous variable would require an assumption about
the distance between each of the categories. Rather than impose such an assumption,
we choose an alternative technique: the ordered logistic regression model.
The ordered logit regression model can be seen as an extension of standard
logistic regression. Standard logistic regression utilises a dichotomous dependant
variable. For a polytomous variable, this can be extended to a multinomial logit
model. However, this neglects the fact that the variables are ordinal, and assumes that
they are simply nominal. The ordinal logistic regression model utilises this important
information. In the model, m-1 equation are simultaneously estimated, where m is the
number of categories of the dependant variable. The equations are formed by pooling
the data i.e. category 1 versus categories 2,3 and 4, categories 1 and 2 versus
categories 3 and 4 and then categories 1, 2 and 3 versus category 4.
The assumption made is that the effect of the independent variables on the
dependant variable is independent of the category. This assumption may be referred to

as the proportional-odds assumption or the parallel regressions assumption. Like any

assumption, it is not always met in practice. It can be tested by estimating a
generalised ordered logit regression (which does not impose coefficient equality
across the equations) and comparing it to the ordered logit regression using a
likelihood ration test. We performed this test and obtained a p-value of 0.036. This
indicates that at the 5% level of significance, the assumption of parallel regressions is
not met.
There are a number of options available at this stage. We can assume that the
failure of the assumption is due to sampling variability and proceed with the standard
logistic regression. We could also move to a multinomial logit and disregard the
ordinal nature of the data. However, more insight can be gained by proceeding with
the generalised logistic regression. This model allows the parameter estimates to vary
by category. However, it may be the case that the parallel regression assumption is
violated only with some of the included regressors. It is possible to test for this by
imposing equality restrictions across equations on parameter estimates and testing the
validity of these constraints using a Wald test. If there are good reasons, a priori, to
select such constraints then these can be tested. Otherwise, a stepwise regression
approach can be used to test which variables violate the assumption. In our case, there
was no reason to suspect that some variables were more likely than others to violate
the assumption. For this reason, we chose the stepwise approach. The resulting model
is far more parsimonious than the unconstrained generalised logistic regression. The
results are presented in Table 3.

Table 4
Results from the constrained generalised ordered logistic regression analysis with factor scores (FAC).
Odds ratios are presented.

Beta
FAC1 Competence
FAC2 Interpersonal
FAC3 Management
FAC4 Work practices
FAC5 Feedback
FAC6 Shore orientation
FAC7 Efficiency
Vessel (Tank=1)
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1)

Odds Ratio
1.4949
1.1971
1.5573
1.3319
1.8090
0.6094
0.7581
0.5328
2.9817

Std. Err.
0.1387
0.1095
0.1489
0.1262
0.2943
0.0594
0.0942
0.3104
0.3215

z
4.33
1.97
4.63
3.02
3.64
-5.08
-2.94
-2.03
3.40

P>|z|
0.0000
0.0490
0.0000
0.0020
0.0000
0.0000
0.0030
0.0430
0.0010

Deviations from Proportionality 2

FAC5 Feedback
Vessel (Tank=1)
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1)

1.4424
0.8117
0.9719

0.1578
0.2967
0.3092

2.32
-0.70
-0.09

0.0200
0.4820
0.9260

Deviations from Proportionality 3

FAC5 Feedback
Vessel (Tank=1)
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1)

1.6840
1.6483
0.4595

0.2202
0.3701
0.3915

2.37
1.35
-1.99

0.0180
0.1770
0.0470

Constants
CONS1

1.6840

0.2792

6.05

0.0000

CONS2
CONS3

1.6483
0.4595

0.2153
0.2634

0.89
-6.54

0.3750
0.0000

n = 473
Pseudo

= 0.1561
154.99

p-value=0.0000

The results are presented as a set of 'base' coefficients and then deviations
from proportionality. These deviations are calculated by taking the ratio of
coefficients between equations (since the model is presented using odds ratios). For
example, the parameters given under the heading "Deviations from Proportionality 2"
are obtained by dividing equation 1 by equation 2. So, for example, the odds ratio for
category 3 for the variable 'Vessel' can be calculated as 1.6483*0.5328=0.8782.
Parameters which are constrained to be equal across equations are not shown.
The results from the model are in line with expectations. The odds ratios are in
the expected order of magnitude and are jointly significant. The factors competence,
interpersonal, management, work practices and feedbacks all increase the odds of
being in a higher category of the reporting frequency measure. The two factors
reflecting shore orientation and efficiency significantly decrease the odds of being in a
higher category of the reporting frequency measure. Crews on tanker vessels are more
likely to have a lower reporting frequency than those on bulk vessels. Crews who
have been working with their closest manager for more than one year tend to report
more often.
The three variables which did not meet the parallel regressions assumption
were FAC5 Feedback, Vessel and Management. This means that the effect of these
variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable.

3.4 Validity and limitations

There is a possibility that some of the relationships reported in this section are subject
to the common method bias (Campell and Fiske, 1959). This results from the fact that
the data come from a common source. For example, a common scale to the different
questions. Potential statistical remedies have been suggested. Spector (2006) is
sceptical of the merits of such approaches. He argues that given that it is not possible
to know the existence or extent of any possible bias, treating it could in fact introduce
more bias than existed in the first instance. He recommends using a multi-method
strategy so that results do not only rely on the results of one questionnaire. In this
research, case studies, interviews, participatory and field studies have been used to
validate the data. The results have also been presented to people working within the
industry who have expressed that they believe the results to give an accurate
representation of the true situation.

4 Discussion
The results suggest that there is a positive association between the respondents
perception of their local managers leadership skills and reporting frequency
(p>0.001, odds ratio=1.5573). A leadership style where the manager is perceived as a
good role model ensures and follows up that all work on board is done in a safe

manner, were positively related to increased reporting frequency. This relationship is

also supported by other research. Perception of management, as
management/leadership style, commitment and visibility, is the most commonly
measured dimension in safety research in general (Flin et al. 2000). Within the
maritime sector, research initiated by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in the
United Kingdom, identified various core leadership qualities as being necessary for
effective safety leadership (Maritime and Coastguard Agency 2004). Shipboard, it
was found that these qualities were primarily geared towards the captain as a key
leader for safety, however also for lower ranks with leadership responsibilities.
However, perceived gaps between desirable leadership qualities and what is currently
being exhibited were also identified. With reference to the explosion and sinking of
the chemical tanker Bow Mariner (United States Coast Guard 2005), poor
leadership skills were on the agenda of the IMO (International Maritime Organization
31 October 2007).
The results also suggest increased reporting frequency for those who have
worked with their closest superior/manager for one year or more. This leadershipfamiliarity variable did not meet the parallel assumptions, and thus it is indicated that
the effect is dependent on the category. Apparently the effect of being familiar with
your superior is larger when moving from the category never or seldom to
sometimes report (P>0.001, odds ratio=2.9817), and the effect decrease slightly
when moving to the higher categories of sometimes to often, and often to
always. Leadership and management do have various facets, and may be seen as
being both social and cognitive in nature. Social skills include things such as team
building, consideration of others, conflict resolution etc. We would suggest that such
social skills are of particular importance within this maritime setting. Work at sea may
be characterized as a total institution, as defined by (Goffman 1968), where both work
and leisure time happen at the same time, with few and limited possibilities to interact
with the surrounding world. In such settings, leadership and management style
influences work and social life in a more all-embracing manner, including the
interpersonal relationship among crew members. Although the research regarding
managements importance for safety within the off-shore shipping industry is scarce,
research from other industries has established a relationship between management,
leadership and safety related matters (Geldart et al. 2010, Wu, Chen & Li 2008,
Vredenburgh 2002, Zohar 1980), thus management does not only have a direct effect
upon safety and reporting practices, but also an indirect effect by influencing the other
factors in the model, further discussed below.
The results also indicate that the interpersonal relationship among the crew
influences reporting practices (odds ratio: 1.1971, P> 0.0490). With regard to
reporting practices, interpersonal relationships relate to, inter alia, the degree of trust
and open communication amongst the crewmembers. Reason (2001) regards a trusting
relationship as a key factor in getting individuals to report their own mistakes and
experiences. Interpersonal relationships amongst crew, in practice, also reflects to
which degree the crew shares safety related information when changing shifts, and
more informal processes of sharing safety related information during operations. For
both subordinated and superior and managerial positions, additional challenges may
arise in relation to multinational-crew and unstable crewing with low stability within
teams. When signing on a new ship, new crew will be unfamiliar with the ship
managements and closest superiors management style as well as fellow
crewmembers and the on-board working climate. The seafarers require time to
familiarize and adjust to the new situation. For instance, if the ship management on

the seafarers previous vessel were blame oriented, this seafarer will most likely sign
join the new vessel with this latest experience in mind, and be cautious about
reporting their own mistakes for fear of being blamed or sanctioned. In time, the
seafarer will learn how the management is oriented on that particular vessel. The
problem is even more pronounced when the seafarer is constantly changing vessel,
with new management each sailing period, and thus has to go through this
familiarization process each time. The management style is known to vary within the
sector, and poor shipboard management and leadership is identified in other research
(Oltedal, Engen 2009, Knudsen 2003).
The results indicate a positive relationship between competence and reporting
frequency (odds ratio: 1.4949, P> 0.0000). Competence is among the top five most
commonly measured themes within safety research (Flin et al. 2000), and refers to the
perception of own skills and ability to handle critical and hazardous situations, and
their ability to perform their work in a safe manner. In our analysis, competence is
comprised of two sub facets, formal education and training. Minimum training
requirements are covered by international conventions and regulations developed by
the IMO, where parts are required to be performed on-board. For example, it is
required that every crew member participates in at least one abandon ship and one fire
drill every month. Also that these drills, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there
were an actual emergency (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(1974), International Maritime Organization 2009). On-board, the captain and ship
management are ultimately responsible for how such drills, and other on-board
training arrangements, are carried out. Experience from the field shows that in this
area there are large variations. On some vessels, if performed, the drills are arranged
as mustering, while others are arranged for realism. Variation in on-board training
efficiency may be a result of various situations such as a lack of time due to demand
for efficiency. The results indicate a negative relationship between demand for
efficiency and reporting practices (odds ratio: 0.7581, P> 0.0030). Demand for
efficiency, caused by inter alia commercial pressure, has been one of the most
frequent reasons for violations of procedures and checklists (Oltedal 2010), as well as
an important influencing factor for collisions and groundings (MacRae 2009).
However, with regard to competence, we suggest that one significant cause
could be that the minimum requirements for leadership and managerial skills stated in
the international conventions and regulations are inadequate (also noted by IMO in
(International Maritime Organization 31 October 2007)). It is therefore up to each
maritime educational establishment to decide to what degree managerial and
leadership should be covered, or to each shipping company with regard to the
provision of further education. Insufficient managerial and leadership skills could also
result in time pressure and demand for efficiency through inadequate planning and
resource management.
We also suggest that the same relationships exist with regard to the factor concerning
proactive work practices (leadership, managerial skills, time available and
competence interrelationship). Work practices refers to the degree to which the crew
perform proactive activities like safe job analyses and safety analysis before risk
activities, and to which degree they have the opportunity to prioritize safety in their
daily work. Such activities increase the chances of revealing potentially dangerous
situations, and thus increases the amount of reportable safety information (Kjelln
2000)
The results indicate that proactive work practices have a positive relationship with
reporting frequency (odds ratio: 1.3319, P> 0.0020).

Feedback on reported events is held to stimulate organizational learning, and

thus better premises for safety improvements, by, inter alia, sharing of experience of
near misses and incidents, as guidelines for corrective actions as well as being a
motivator for increased reporting (Reason 2001). A positive relationship between
reporting frequency and feedback is also shown in our data (odds ratio: 1.8090, P>
0.0000). However, the relationship did deviate from proportionality meaning that the
effect of feedback is dependent on the category of the dependant variable reporting
frequency. Thus, the effect from feedback is larger when moving between the higher
categories sometimes to often, and often to always, than when mowing
between the lower categories never or seldom to sometimes Treatment of nonconformance and development or remedial actions is normally done by shore
personnel. To what degree seafaring personnel are involved in these processes varies
within companies. Shipboard feedback is given by the captain and/or shipboard
management, who in turn receive the information from the shore side of the company.
Thus the quality of feedback given is not only dependent upon theship management,
but also the shore sides orientation towards safety. This relationship between
shipboard reporting practices and shore-side safety orientation is also indicated by the
results (odds ratio: 0.6094, P> 0.0000). When the shore sides safety effort is
perceived as a facade and person orientated, it is reflected in lower reporting
frequency.
Finally, it is indicated that the reporting frequency is lower on dry cargo
vessels than on tanker vessels. The relationship deviates from proportionality,
meaning that the effect of type of vessel is larger when moving between the higher
categories often to always, than when mowing between the lower categories
never or seldom to sometimes. Differences between the liquid and dry cargo
sector are further discussed in Oltedal and Engen (2010).

5 Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future

research
This article has studied the factors which influence the frequency of reporting of
experience data such as data on accidents/incidents. The previous research outlined in
the paper has shown that underreporting is a significant problem within the merchant
shipping industry. Underreporting undermines the foundations on which any safety
management system is constructed. If accidents/incidents are not reported then past
mistakes cannot be learned from and the probability of future accidents/incidents
cannot be reduced. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper is important since
it not only identifies the significance of potentially influential factors, but also
quantifies the relative strength of these factors. This allows a better targeting of
budgetary resources to improve safety.
In particular,the objective of this article was to assess the relationship between
reporting practices and dimensions of safety culture, management and vessel in the
Norwegian controlled shipping industry. The results indicated that high competence, a
good and open interpersonal relationship among the crew, a safety oriented
management, execution of proactive work practices and feedback upon reported
events all increase reporting frequency. The two dimensions reflecting when shore
orientation downgrade safety and when efficiency is given importance decreases
reporting frequency. The three variables which did not meet the parallel regressions

assumption were FAC5 Feedback, Vessel and Management. This means that the
effect of these variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable.
Crews who have been working with their closest manager for more than one year tend
to report more often.
However, none of the identified factors should be addressed in isolation from
each other. As the discussion made clear, they are all important and mutually
dependent. It would therefore be of further interest to explore the internal
relationships between the identified dimensions of safety culture, for example with
structural equation modelling and/or path-analysis.
The data are representative of vessels flying a white and grey flag only, as
those registered under a black listed flag did not want to participate. As participation
was voluntary on the behalf of the company, we assume that those participating do, in
general, emphasise safety in their operations, and the development of a sound
reporting culture. However, it would be of further interest to address potential
differences between flag of registration and safety.
It would also be of interest to further explore the difference with regard to type
of vessel. The differences in reporting frequency could be a result of other variables
related to type of vessel, as for example customer specific

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Article6
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Appendix1:Surveyquestionnaireandletterof
introduction

Dear crew member

In this survey I want to assess how safety is handled on Norwegian-controlled bulk cargo and tanker
vessels and how the crew onboard perceive safety. This is part of my PhD work, which is aimed at
improving our understanding of how various safety-related circumstances work in practice. The results
of the survey will help your shipping company make safety-related decisions, enabling your safety to be
better ensured.
All information that is obtained through the survey is anonymous. It will not be possible to trace any
answers to individuals, shipping companies or vessels. My research has been financed by
Stord/Haugesund University College and I am therefore acting independently of all shipping companies,
public authorities and other organisations and interests. As a PhD student and researcher, my work will
be carried out in line with Norwegian guidelines for research ethics, which among other things protect
your right to be anonymous. Only I will handle the completed forms or have other access to the data.
To optimise the quality of the survey, it is important that as many people as possible complete the form.
It will take about 30 minutes to complete the form. It is also important that the questions are answered as
frankly as possible. When you have completed the form, place it in the enclosed envelope, seal the
envelope and deliver it directly to the vessels safety delegate or the chosen contact person onboard for
this survey.
-

As regards the answering of the questions on the form itself, please relate your answers to the
circumstances onboard this particular vessel.
As regards comments concerning questions and suggestions for improvements, you can relate
these to the experience you have of the sector in general.

This type of survey is very common in Norway. Both Norwegian companies and authorities want the
safety of employees to be given the highest priority. From similar surveys we have learned that safetyrelated matters often do not function as intended, and that the reason can be traced back to weaknesses
linked to the company's management or other organisational factors. Some of the questions may be
difficult to answer, but the aim is not to place the blame on individuals. We know for example that
procedures can be broken without the blame resting on the individual who breaks the procedure but on
other levels within an organisation. In such cases I want to identify the organisational reasons for
breakdowns in procedure. Possible reasons here include insufficient involvement in the development of
procedures, the existence of too many procedures or the adoption of dangerous procedures.
Participation in and completion of the questionnaire is voluntary. If you choose not to take part in the
survey, please fill in the enclosed green sheet and return it in the same way as the questionnaire.
If you have any questions concerning the survey, you can contact me, Helle Oltedal, on telephone no.
(+47) 93 82 61 87 or (+47) 52 70 26 44.
Thank you for taking the time to fill in the questionnaire!

Yours sincerely,
Helle Oltedal,
Stord/Haugesund University College

Safety Culture Survey

Please indicate your answer by crossing off a box for each question like this: _. Mark wrong answers
like this: J Where it is not possible to select an answer, please provide an alternative in the space
provided for other or fill inn.
PLEASE WRITE ALL COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS IN ENGLISH

1. Background Information
A Gender:

Female

B Job position/title

Captain
Electrician

C Vessel class/cargo

Bulk
Chemical

D Age

Male

Mate

Catering

Engineer

Apprentice

Shuttle tanker

AB /Seaman

Combined

Oiltanker

31-40 years

41-50 years

Under 31 years

E Nationality

Other (Fill in):_________________

Gas 4 General Cargo

Other (Fill in)_______________

Norwegian

Polish

Filipino

0-2 year(s)

3-5 years

6-10 years

51-60 years 4

Over 60 years 5

Other (Fill in):______________

F How long have you

been working within
shipping?

G
H

11-20 years 4

Over 20 years 5

How long have you been working for this shipping company?Fill in:____________

All in all, how long have you been working at this vessel?

Fill in:____________

I Which kind of employment contract do you have?

Permanent employee

9 months duration

6 months duration

3 months duration
Other (Fill in):

How long is your ordinary work /sailing schedule at the ship? (for contract (Fill in)__________________
workers this will often be the same as the contract duration)

K How long do you usually stay at home or on shore between each work /

(Fill in)__________________

sailing period?

L Do you normally work at the same vessel at every work / sailing period?
Very seldom /never
Sometime
Very often / always

MHow is your ordinary watch system, without overtime?(for example

Dayman, or 4-8-4 meaning 4 hours work 8 hours off 4 hours work)

(Fill in)__________________

English version 65

2. Top Managements Safety Priorities

Only select one answer per question

A The on-shore top management in my company

prioritizes safety before economy.

B I experience conflicting requirements from my

company and the captain.

C I experience that safety work is more a facade than a

real priority area.

D I am familiar with the companys safety goal.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

Comments and suggestions:

3. Local Management
Please state your evaluation of your closest superiors attitude toward safety. If you are the
captain, relate the questions to the closest on-shore manager.
A All in all, for how long have you been working with your closest superior?(Fill inn) ___________________________
Only select one answer per question

B Is your closest superior clear in his engagement to

ensuring his co-workers safety?

C Does your closest superior follow up to ensure that

all work on board is done in a safe manner?

D Is your closest superior a good role model when it

comes to attending to his own and others safety?

E How often do you participate in meetings with your

closest superior where safety is a topic?

Very seldom Seldom Sometime

/never

willing to discuss safety-related conditions.

G My closest superior is not afraid of admitting his

own mistakes.

H My closest superior has too little confidence in his

co-workers.

My closest superior is supportive if safety is

prioritized in all situations

Very often
/always

Dont
know

Once a
week

Twice a
month

Once a
month

Once
every 2nd
month

Once
every 6
moths

Strongly
disagree

F My closest superior appreciates that the crew is

Often

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

More
seldom

Dont
know

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

4 Procedures and Guidelines

Only select one answer per question

A Due to the companys demand for efficiency we

sometimes have to violate procedures.

B Due to the captains demand for efficiency we

sometimes have to violate procedures.

C I have received good training in the companys

procedures.

D I feel that it is difficult to know which procedures

are applicable.

E The procedures are helpful in my work.

F The procedures are difficult to understand or are
poorly written.

G We have the opportunity to influence and form the

procedures.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

If you dont follow the procedures in a specific situation, what may be the reason? Please dont
mark more than three options.
A The work will be done faster.
1

B The rest of the crew does it.

C I feel pressured because I am overloaded with work.
D It improves the quality of my work.
E I am not familiar with the applicable procedures.
F The procedures do not work as intended.
G There are too many procedures.

H Others (please specify):

Comments and suggestions:

5. Interaction
In relation to following questions safety will be any issue or condition that you feel may threaten or
cause any injury or damage to yourself, your co-workers or the vessel.
Only select one answer per question

A Do you normally work with the same team members

Very seldom Seldom Sometime

/never

Often

Very often
/always

Dont
know

B Do you discuss safety issues with your co-workers?

C Do you ever feel forced to continue your work even

within your working area / working group?

if safety may be threatened?

English version 65

Only select one answer per question

D Does the crew get positive feedback when they raise

safety issues?

E Can you tell the captain to stop/time out if you

feel that safety is threatened?

F Can you say stop/time out to the company if you

feel that safety is threatened?

Very seldom Seldom Sometime

/never

Very often
/always

Dont
know

Strongly
disagree

G The working environment on board is characterized

Often

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

H We solve problems and conflicts in a good manner.

I We receive sufficient safety-related information

M If I ask for help I will appear incompetent.

N We usually speak up to a co-worker if we notice that

by openness and dialog.

when we start a new watch.

J We receive sufficient safety-related information

when we sign on / start a new sailing period.

K I am confident that my company always prioritizes

the crews safety.

L I am confident that the captain always prioritizes the

crews safety.

he is doing his work in a risky manner.

O We usually speak up to the ship management if we

notice that a co-worker is doing his work in a risky
manner.

P I stop work if I am not sure that safety is

satisfactorily ensured.

Q I feel appreciated by my co-workers.

R I feel appreciated by the ship management.
S My co-workers do their jobs in a way that makes me
feel safe.

T My co-workers can communicate effectively in

English.

U Different languages on board may represent a safety

risk.

V Different national cultures on board may represent a

safety risk.

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

6. Work Situation
Only select one answer per question

A Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety first

in your daily work?

B Do you carry out a Safe Job Analysis/Risk

Analysis before high-risk operations?

C Do you carry out a safety evaluation before new

working methods, tools, or routines are introduced?

D Have you experienced situations where you need to

expose your self to danger to get the work done?

E Do you take a time-out when unforeseen situations

occur?

F Do you use protective equipment in situations when

it is mandatory?

G Do you feel sufficiently rested to carry out your

tasks in a safe manner on your shift?

H Is the safety documentation you need readily

available?

I Is the safety documentation you need up to date?

J Is anyone ever intoxicated/drunk on board?

Very seldom Seldom Sometime

/never

Very often
/always

Dont
know

Strongly
disagree

K The number of crewmembers is not sufficient to

Often

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

MI miss feedback on the work I do.

N The on-board maintenance is sufficient to ensure

ensure safety on board.

L The management doesnt care how we do our work

as long as the work gets done.

safety.

O I am familiar with the on-board safety goals.

P I have to work much overtime to get the work done

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

7. Competence
Only select one answer per question

A I have received the training that is necessary in

order to work safely.

B I have received the education that is necessary in

order to work safely.

C I have received the training that is necessary in

order to handle critical or hazardous situations.

D I have received the education that is necessary in

order to handle critical or hazardous situations.

E New crew members get a thorough introduction to

safety-related issues.

F On our vessel we frequently carry out drills in safety

procedures.

G What we learn in courses is not relevant in practice.

H Some of my co-workers lack experience.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

Comments and suggestions:

8. Responsibility & Sanctions

Only select one answer per question

A In my day-to-day work there is no doubt about who

is responsible for the different tasks.

B When an undesirable incident has occurred, people

are more preoccupied with placing blame than
finding the cause of the incident.

C If I violate the safety regulations, there will be

negative consequences for me.

D Vague responsibilities on board contribute toward

creating hazardous situations.

E In my opinion, the consequences for violating the

companys safety regulations are fair.

F Responsibility for the safety of others is a

motivational factor in the performance of my work.

G I know which tasks I am responsible for if a critical

or hazardous situation should occur.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

9. Working Environment
Only select one answer per question

A I enjoy my job.
B I feel sure that I will not loose my job.
C I feel that the work we do on board is too little
appreciated by the company.
D This company is a good employer compared to
others.
E I have too little influence on my working situation.

F The working situation is less physically challenging

than 2 years ago.
G The working situation is less mentally challenging
than 2 years ago.
H The safety delegates have an important role in
ensuring safety at my work site.
I I feel certain that I will not be exposed to an injury/
accident at my work site.

Strongly
disagree

1
1

Disagree Not sure

2
2

3
3

Agree

Strongly
agree

4
4

5
5

Dont
know

6
6

Comments and suggestions:

10. Learning from Incidents

If accidents or severe incidents happen on board, I believe they happen because.
Do not select more than 3 alternatives.
A The crew has a large work load.
B The crew does not feel enough responsibility for their tasks.
C The crew lacks knowledge and experience in relation to the job they are doing.
D There is no tradition for speaking up when someone is working in a hazardous manner.
E There are too many interruptions in the work.
F Procedures/best practice is not followed.
G There are inadequate instructions for using technical equipment.
H There are mistakes or deficiencies in the procedures.
I There is bad maintenance.
J There is defective equipment.

10

K Others (please specify):

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

Only select one answer per question

A During the last 2 years, have you been involved in a serious

incident/accident?

B During the last 2 years, have any of your co-workers been

involved in a serious incident/accident?

Yes

No 

Yes

No I dont know

If yes, please comment the last incident / accident that happened:

C During the last 2 years, have you been involved in what

was almost a serious incident/accident?

D During the last 2 years, have any of your co-workers been

involved in what was almost a serious incident/accident?

Yes

No 

Yes

No I dont know

If yes, please comment the last episode that happened:

Only select one answer per question

E Do minor incidents get reported in writing?

F Do close calls get reported in writing?
G Are reports of undesirable incidents ever fixed up
to cover mistakes?

H Do you receive constructive feedback from the

company on the conditions you report?

I Do you receive constructive feedback from the

captain on the conditions you report?

J Do you get information from incidents/accidents on

other vessels?

Very seldom Seldom Sometime

/never

something has gone wrong.

L Reporting is important to prevent the recurrence of

accidents or incidents.

M Most of all, I report incidents because I have to.

N In my company, they are more preoccupied with the
statistics than the human consequences of an
incident.

O Reporting in itself take too much time.

Very often
/always

Dont
know

Strongly
disagree

K Here it is seldom improvements are made before

Often

Disagree Not sure

Agree

Strongly
agree

Dont
know

Comments and suggestions:

English version 65

Assume that you were involved in an incident. Would some of the following conditions stop you
from reporting the incident? Do not mark more than 3 alternatives.
A There is no tradition for reporting all incidents that happen.
1

B No improvements ever happen based on the reports.

C The incident didnt have any serious consequences.
D I am afraid that the information will be used against me.
E I am afraid that the information will be used again my co-

workers.

F This could cause the company to loose contracts.

I There could be negative reactions from my co-workers.

J I dont feel comfortable discussing my actions/mistakes.

K We have too much to do and dont have time to write reports.
L Mistakes I make dont concern anyone but me.
M I dont know how to report an incident.

10

N Other (please specify):

11

Comments and suggestions:

11. Description of the Organization

How would you describe this organization? Please provide your estimate based on the statements
below. Select only one box per statement.

The work is
characterized by
control in detail and
overall control.

It is important to
do what we are
told.

The work is
usually performed
on an individual
basis.

10

The work is
characterized by
flexibility and
democracy/influence.

10

It is important to
be creative and
original.

10

The work is usually

performed as a
team.

English version 65

12. Risk perception

How would you assess the risk involved with your work? Please provide your estimate based on
the statements below. Select only one box per statement..
A) All in all, how would you assess the safety in your working situation?
Very
bad

10

Very
good

B) All in all, how do feel that the level of safety has developed over the last two years?
It is
much
poorer

10

It is
much
better

C) All in all, how likely is it that you will have an accident on the vessel during the next 12
months?
Very
likely

10

Very
unlikely

D) All in all, how likely is it that any of the other crew members will have an accident on the vessel
during the next 12 months?
Very
likely

10

Very
unlikely

E) How safe do you feel when you consider the risk involved with your work on board?
Very
safe

10

Very
unsafe

F) How much do you worry when you consider the risk involved with your work on board?
Very
much

10

10

Very
little

English version 65

13. Suggestions for New Safety Actions or Other Comments

11

English version 65