Ermita malate hotel vs mayor of manila v city mayor

Ichong vs Hernandez v Hernandez

p.12

Rubi vs Provincial board

p.32

US v Pompeya

p.72

Churchill vs Rafferty
People vs Pomar

p.2

p. 79
p.101

US v Toribio p.110
Calalang vs Williams

p.119

US v abendan p. 124
Cruz vs Youngberg p.127
Co Kiam vs city of manila p.131
Bastida vs city council of baguio
Dela cruz vs Judge paras p.140

p.135

Ermita malate hotel vs mayor of manila v city mayor p.2

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its
eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood
to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who
was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling

up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as
well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did
fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that
only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right
to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and
the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel
del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with
offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio
City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending
sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement
dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with
the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license
fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.
1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4,
1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines
of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence
to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does
"to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the
very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that
the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license
tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than
Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of
the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties
however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance,
or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such
a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form
or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need
for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to
an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for
motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels
being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the

settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of nonuseful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail
in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but
in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in
this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees
clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to
cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given
to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. 26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is
urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them
of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact,
that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular
mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case,
persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the
exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to

reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation
of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. 31 What may be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest
should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to
are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him
at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render
the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer
it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice
Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami
Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel,
Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace
Hotel, Hotel del Mar Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
1

U.S. V. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria
decision in Eboa v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
2

282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.

Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the police
power, true to its etymology is the power to shape policy. It defies legal definition; as a
response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula.
The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not fall back upon sterile claims;
its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the police power.
Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge
of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business'
and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the
items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes
appeal, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with
certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and
how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment.
Social development is a process of trial and error; in the making of policy the fullest possible
opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not
regulate, laissez faire not the individual must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a
Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
4

Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.

U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.

Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.

U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.

U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31,
1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
9

10

U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.

U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People vs.
Chan Hong, (1938) 65 Phil. 625.
11

12

U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.

13

U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.

Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May
31, 1961.
14

15

U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.

There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy
or the prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to
do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who
has always taken advantage of as he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and
accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not only
in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not
according to the case as it has been developed.
16

17

Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32- 33.

18

Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.

19

Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.

20

Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.

21

Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.

22

Cu Unjieng v. Postpone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.

Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227;
United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill. 19: Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark.
364; Merced County v. Fleming, Ill Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West
Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley y. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v.
City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New
Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep.,
8 ; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett 30 Ala. 461;
Craig v. Burnett 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L.
364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
23

98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl & Pac. Tea Co. v Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed.
1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 US 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L. Ed
579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9,
1966.
24

25

Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.

26

Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.

Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
27

Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242
U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
28

29

Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.

46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American
Supreme Court decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this
Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924),
261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300
U.S. 379.
30

Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940), 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring
opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
31

Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles
of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of
legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment because it also collides with the
principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteen is involved.
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition
of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility
may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of
speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette, (1942), 319
U.S. 624, at 639).
32

33

269 U.S. 385 (1926).

34

17 L. ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.

35

Roschen v. Ward (1929), 279 U. S. 337,339.

Ichong vs Hernandez
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of
fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien,
so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and
bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of

juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of
the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision
requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature
of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities;
and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is
the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most

essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where
the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field
and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220,
226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,

provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved.
If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question
that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they
do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions
and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents
and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety
of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He
ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets
and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice
or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell,
even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore,
from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or,
a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in
the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In
big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs,
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is
merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The
others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade,
as witness the following tables:

Assets

Year and
Retailers
Nationality

1941

No.Establishment
s

Pesos

Per cent
Distributio
n

Gross Sales

Pesos

Per cent
Distribution

Filipino ..
........

106,671 200,323,13
8

55.82 174,181,92
4

51.74

Chinese
...........

15,356 118,348,692

32.98 148,813,23
9

44.21

Others ..
..........

1,646 40,187,090

11.20 13,630,239

4.05

Filipino ..
........

111,107 208,658,94
6

65.05 279,583,33
3

57.03

Chinese
...........

13,774 106,156,21
8

33.56 205,701,13
4

41.96

1947
:

Others ..
.........

354

8,761,260

.49

4,927,168

1.01

1948 (Census
:
)

Filipino ..
........

113,631 213,342,26
4

67.30 467,161,66
7

60.51

Chinese
..........

12,087 93,155,459

29.38 294,894,22
7

38.20

Others ..

422 10,514,675

3.32

9,995,402

1.29

........

1949
:

Filipino ..
........

113,659 213,451,60
2

60.89 462,532,90
1

53.47

Chinese
..........

16,248 125,223,33
6

35.72 392,414,87
5

45.36

Others ..
........

486 12,056,365

3.39 10,078,364

1.17

Filipino ..
.......

119,352 224,053,62
0

61.09 466,058,05
2

53.07

Chinese
..........

17,429 134,325,30
3

36.60 404,481,38
4

46.06

1951
:

Others ..
........

347

8,614,025

2.31

7,645,327

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Item

Gross

87

Nationality

Assets
(Pesos)

Sales
(Pesos)

1941:

Filipino .............................................

1,878

1,633

Chinese ............................................
..

7,707

9,691

Others ..............................................
.

24,415

8,281

Filipino .............................................

1,878

2,516

Chinese ...........................................

7,707

14,934

Others ..............................................

24,749

13,919

1,878

4,111

1947:

1948:

(Census)

Filipino .............................................

Chinese ............................................
.

7,707

24,398

Others ..............................................

24,916

23,686

Filipino .............................................

1,878

4,069

Chinese ............................................
..

7,707

24,152

Others ..............................................

24,807

20,737

Filipino .............................................

1,877

3,905

Chinese ............................................
.

7,707

33,207

Others ..............................................
.

24,824

22,033

1949:

1951:

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the
known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and
supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted.
The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control
when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of
the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean
Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th
ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he
says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it
(the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No.
1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt
by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien
retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the
fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the
market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute,
that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national
economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an
article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does
not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from
their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of
truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply
and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater
or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed
by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority.
It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and
commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage
is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the
country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may
seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but
the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy
and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade
measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no
reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,
that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said
that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the
limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power
admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier
cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be
voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States.
In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United
States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from
foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said
decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons
vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other
nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to
the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared
his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It
may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for
the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this
judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not
to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was
based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life
as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115
(1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may
not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the
basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124
N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring
public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of
the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the
convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947),
a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and
because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them,
so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented
on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on
every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void
because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or

were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in
any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the
operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for
carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place,
was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no
reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and
that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a
law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do
not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they
come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far
as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These
limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances,
especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is
likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.
Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated
by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction
it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges
long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful
and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized.
This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him,
by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys

a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the
facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is
clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take
away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none
the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of
a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to
the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation
in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the
nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions
of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature
was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat
that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied
to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case,
attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs
of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that
there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page
41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc."
sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and
to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the
subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a
thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title
need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See.
4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general
term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have
been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid.
The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or
of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the

prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be
overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our
legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the

Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature;
they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act
passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not
preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or
provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them,
insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the
retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar
as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and
have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there
was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they
were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business until their
death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations,
associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines
to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June
1954) or until the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation,
whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence,
whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such
corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent
legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of
an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of
their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and
partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a
deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the
law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The
price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a
deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of
merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the
association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and
perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be

deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien
heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their
business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of
the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners
and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership
of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the
priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive
aliens and their heirs of such lands.4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the
retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for
they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

Footnotes
1

Section 76, Act No. 1459..

Section 1 (1), Article III, of the Constitution..

Ibid.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.

Rubi, et. al., v Provincial Board of Mindoro, 1919

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight
change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point
of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the
controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a
people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve
the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established
at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken
for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward
educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to
make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake
Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing
that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved
by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No.
2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a
site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes
in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of
the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that
all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the
Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than
December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary
measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act
No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the
sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos.
2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court
is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor.
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the
provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian
who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor,
pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for
a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special
provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No.
387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later
be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set
down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians,"
with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II
at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the
Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo,
on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical
law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to
the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been
endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to
the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five
hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an
our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot
profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities
which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this
resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the
viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such
forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not
presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be
not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed
in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with
in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance
thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities
of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one
league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with
those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY
HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the
places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that
they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them
and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY,
OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express
order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or
giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests
and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with,
otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE
"INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be
more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than
forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect
nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581.
At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid,
on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4,
Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome
nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid
the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and
vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their
salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon
the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and
that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law
within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly
honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses andhaciendas,
they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition
of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in
the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as
follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized
as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on
other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that
may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to
allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and
self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that
those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and
the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work
undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in
those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking
into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every
government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all
who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving
the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the

illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces
of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with
the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the
orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an
intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form
of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be
governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are
bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the
different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be
divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about
without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have
not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious
pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning
with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with
all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the
inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary
regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of
the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining
towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be
obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and
only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest;
and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach
of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed
force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they
shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which
shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers,
and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in
commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be
punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal
labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live
in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them
in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year,
and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the
same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether
they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized
honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase
or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten
years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are
governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge
of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages
offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing
their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one
another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their
actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and
cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against
the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed
with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term,
they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for
this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military
staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to
the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates
to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as

military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all
that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall
conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative
to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by
the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions
of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One
paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and
firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act
for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative
body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine
Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine
Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of

Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law,
was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law
establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government
Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No.
1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act
No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes
of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States
Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422,
445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces
of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis,
Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of
these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix
their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided,
That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon
township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements
of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is
further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order,
to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply
with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty
days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to
acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government,
and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that
law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of
Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be
organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered
three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township
shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same
is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of
procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth,
nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words
are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to
be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the
phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative
Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)

D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving
to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion,
and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration
of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain wellknown authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is
its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines
Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of
the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section
of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has
never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide
with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still
a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec.
2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce
the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for
so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian
tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third
Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous
government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated
by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253
charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to
non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a
tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who
surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following
language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage
of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province
without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold
also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low
order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a
second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon
to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted
much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official
addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government
Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the
Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who
have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are
not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases.
The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate
all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the
one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate
for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement
so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act
and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to
which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For
practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded
to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are
requested to govern yourself accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the
governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal
Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other
better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to
stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the
Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of
civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and
the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by
return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This
Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p.
214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of
cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean
not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula
tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula
tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are
subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized
condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or
profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent
on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either
as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a
Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian
tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew
of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was
not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews,
East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the
cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned.
Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a
condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns.
Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the
broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people
preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding
cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for
the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine
Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact
that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low
state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of nonChristian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned
...
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due
from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the
delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign
countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a
regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without
penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not
a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not
profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with
some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so
called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of nonChristian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since,
even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of
advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of
other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations
No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on
April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the
regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been
baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain nonChristian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he
commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the
provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same
authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the
person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both
he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the
provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions
place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions
of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have
its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of
the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam
in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which
later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act
No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of
uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law,
but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as
making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et
seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to
be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture
and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.

The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of
1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres
de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It
may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless
it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without
doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in
three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense today forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can
deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language
they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community
life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization
to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the
Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect
this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position
of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's
opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before
and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous
one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the
United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which
they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to
dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it,
a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty
or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General
Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it
has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered
was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit
the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico
to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding
their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of
the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the
Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally,
we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate
commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized
nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired,
and whether within or without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907],
204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221
U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N.
S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation,
it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to
the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S.,
577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of
Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged
to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted
the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own
exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus
engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were
arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of
the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca
tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the
limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government;
and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order
which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory,
and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian
Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy
the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the
court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating
trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether
such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not ,
need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the
exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal

judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the
United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department
of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate
white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so
long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a
"person" within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the
Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the
United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for
the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.

R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority
as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs
shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to
the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the
long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough
to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The
power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some
such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions
naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any
is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the
United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon
the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and
in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'nonChristians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the
Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious

equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and
Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued
meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold
that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization,
and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals
an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to
the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived
from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has
been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S.,
356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and
a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and
never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint
on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected
from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do
what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment
of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society
could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could
not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual
person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the
injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual
may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such

restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright
and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties
with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to
pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to
labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is
this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in
the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and
order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in
the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court,
since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite
a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers
in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due
process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power,
in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice,
must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process
of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in

its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force
in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is
to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that
among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884],
113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the
exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection,
and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by
the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security
for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the

Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If
legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure
of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao,
the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found
that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing
of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by
the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for
children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the
beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was
naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made
the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a
nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its
policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with
the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a
wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."
This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them
and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the
fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the nonChristian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions
in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still
given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in
organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus
bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect
them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being
impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the
country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian
people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster
by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral,
material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view
the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all
the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec.
3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in
the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making

depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was
termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation,
has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because
it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations
there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are
free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens,
with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just
as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag
upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro
must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is
no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring
and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of
liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will
going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege
that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty
in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization.
The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and
the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful
citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a
certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure
has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the
pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem
this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there
has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke
that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt,
nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are
being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and
permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being
educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from
them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured.
Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves.
There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places
under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this
people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They
move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space
where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the
government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public

lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is
necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving
and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as
people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and
follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live
together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from
the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other
similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy
of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are
given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the
contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law
intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always
exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a
redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no
particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary
should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to
the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the
very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen,
this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics
and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general

good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to
the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards
the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a
general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast
its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound
reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians
has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that
they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must
be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro
must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said,
for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature,
a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward noninterference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it
should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general
governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted
sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force
as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing,
opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the
Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants,"
dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our statutebook, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to which they are
applied. To this I would add that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes
is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always
have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of
connection with some civilized community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated
September 17, 1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard
of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the
class embraces with the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine
statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it
is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and
regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted
civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in
tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in
such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be
brought in contact with members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of particular
province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found to have
advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory
description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result
in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe,
had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify
them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain
a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such tribe, but a mode of life as would
not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands
with whom they are brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the writ
should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen
thousand Manguianes affected by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any
attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that
there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that degree of
civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a

real hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the
provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By
what proceeding known to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of
any province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a
head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of the nomadic tribes
whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose individual members have no
fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of
Mindoro.
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the practice in
the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been placed upon reservations;
but since non-Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to bind their
acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have the same force whether
the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon
analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom or action of children and persons
of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the
general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly
exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual are found to be of such a low grade
of civilization that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of
residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and necessarily paternal
attitude assume toward them by the Insular Government is well illustrated by the following provisions
found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). It shall be the
duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty
in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate
means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the moral, material, economic,
social and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and nonChristian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. There shall be maintained in the provincial
treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a special fund to be known as the
township and settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the
benefit of the townships and settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the
province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction of the courts
of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action of the administrative authorities
in the enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian" as
that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at this time.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I
cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a
hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled
to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice will not permit me to
let this decision go on record without expressing may strong dissent from the opinion of Justice
Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go
into the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human side of the
case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered
by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or
be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of
the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000
acres, on which about three hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos,
escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prision at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The Manguianes used out a writ
of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the majority opinion
which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by the
Department Secretary ordered the placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are
peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No.
547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for
of municipal government."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not including
smaller islands which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles
and a populations of 28, 361 of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This
appears to be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was less than
seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and by
Manguianes.

The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long before
Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu. They have made little or no
progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people,"
whom the Government of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like Dadalos do
not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the fundamental
one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759,
quoted in the majority opinion, are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that
accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered
necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the United
States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of
separate treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance
with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected form
intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were larger than the Islands of
Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the
Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded
exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are
entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the provincial
governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold
them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty
without due process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or
not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes, however
humble they may be and "bought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the SolicitorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peacefully, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in the
majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which is that

Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caiginsthereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring
and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of those people with the sort of
liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does
not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what
liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state
of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization.
The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the Manguianes
destroy the forest by making a caigin. What is a "caigin?" Simply this. These people move their
camp or place of abode frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear
the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller trees
and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires
never spread in the tropical undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within
the caigin are killed and crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on
due to superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted fertility, or
to a natural desire to move on.

Granting that the Manguianes do make caigins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them for
the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that they are
committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land for
incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." They have never been a
burden to the state and never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the
law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit
crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to
involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have been
accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation
from which they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad
to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding themselves and
their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and clothe them in return of
their services.?
It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to involuntary
personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be
persons who are willing to lend them money with which to buy food on the promise that they will
work for them. And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another law on the
statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be fined not more
than two hundred pesos or imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the
sentence expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will again go to jail,
and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not appear they
were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any hearing or
were allowed to make any defense. It seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by
the authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they are "non-Christian,"
and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination because
of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any
of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes are Moros,
Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others, about one millions souls all together.
Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The
have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor they have herds of cattle and horses and some few
of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low
in the scale of civilization, but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and
understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their homes
and herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior approval of the
department head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of
the section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that
there is no probability of the department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the fact
that he can do it and has done it in the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The
arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality is tested
and not the probability of doing harm.

It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary
body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its
institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people
have, the through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any
arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or
which singles out any particular individuals or class as the subject of hostile and
discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth
amendment and especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and
requires no further discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are
constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely
personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for its is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is,
indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or
body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public
judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill
of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of men."
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality.
No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive
any man of life, liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.
In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law,
but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to
take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of
a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in the Islands, I
should say that it would be a crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain
homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to
transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon
from their fields than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.

There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the
same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and
reconcentrated on a reservation in effect an open air jail then so may the Ifugaos, so may the
Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine
governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department, have the power under this law to
take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the court will grant
them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their
lives, may be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political
enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his
education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court
might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion, should
be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of my
country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so strongly to
my sympathy as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the
remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and
generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of the most
powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the one
side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of
ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to
pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other
side, we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application
with the determination of sending these people back to the country which is to them less
desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own native land. But I think it is creditable to the
heart and mind of the brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say
that he has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a
part so conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say
that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to freedom, they would
have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in their behalf were closed. no
examination or further thought would then have been necessary or expedient. But in a
country where liberty is regulated by law, something more satisfactory and enduring than
mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that
this case must be examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators
are entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some
treaty, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be
returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent of the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during the
session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified, praying
for the allowance of a writ ofhabeas corpus and their final discharged from custody
thereunder.

The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged
to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general
government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of
the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of
the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the distance
between the place where the writ was made returnable and the place where the relators
were confined being more than twenty miles, ten days were alloted in which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and detention is
therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the additional statement since
filed, is that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in some place within the
limits of the indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the
government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe
in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose
of being returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had withdrawn
and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to which they belonged; and upon
this point alone was there any testimony produced by either party hereto. The other matter
stated in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the questions
to be determined are purely questions of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe of
Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of the
Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the government
agreed to protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under
what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the Indian
Territory does not appear.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when determined,
will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the right of the government to arrest
and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian
Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can
do full justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so
much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it
as viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which,
though not specially invited, will be sure to follow.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation bill, and
in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the

removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with
consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of the
same, until two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by force or
otherwise does not appear. At all event, we find a portion of them, including the relators,
located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony seems to show, is where
the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five hundred
and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one
hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were
sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to
save himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band
of followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, to
use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers." He
also stated that he informed the agent of their final purpose to leave, never to return, and
that he and his followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with
the Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to
cut loose from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and
customs of a higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and
laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha
Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long
continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make them
self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus employed, that
they were arrested by order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the
Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or
necessity, of removing them by force from their own native plains and blood relations to a faroff country, in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception. The
land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and native
land was strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to
return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing
Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully
preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy procession
homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love home and native land, may
be heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle.
And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in
violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from
custody.
This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.
I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are
unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that
they have been denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents immediately to
liberate all of the petitioners.

US v Pompeya
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 6, 1915
G.R. No. L-10255
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellant.
Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellee.
Johnson, J.:
On the 1st day of June, 1914, the acting prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo presented the
following complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province: The undersigned fiscal charges
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, on the subject of patrol duty,
Executive Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code, in the following
manner:
That on or about March 20 of the current year, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Iloilo,
Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused did willfully, illegally, and criminally and without
justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed in violation of the law.
That for this violation the said accused was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Iloilo to a fine of
P2 and payment of the costs of the trial, from which judgment said accused appealed to the Court of
First Instance..
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned .Upon arraignment he presented the following
demurrer: The defendant, through his undersigned attorneys, demurs to the complaint filed in this
case on the ground that the acts charged therein do not constitute a crime..

In support of said demurrer, the defendant presented the following argument: The municipal
ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the
Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens..
Upon issues thus presented, the Honorable J. s .Powell, judge, on he 22nd day of August, 1914, after
hearing the arguments of the respective parties, sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of
said complaint and the cancellation of the bond theretofore given, with costs de oficio.
From the order sustaining the demurrer of the lower court, the prosecuting attorney appealed to this
court.
It appears from the demurrer that the defendant claims that the facts stated in the complaint are not
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In his argument in support of said demurrer it appears that
the real basis of said demurrer was the fact that the ordinance upon which said complaint was based
was unconstitutional, for the reason that it was contrary to the provisions of the Philippine Bill which
guarantees liberty to the citizens of the Philippine Islands.
In this court the only question argued by the Attorney-General is whether or not the ordinance upon
which said complaint was based (paragraph m of section 40 of the Municipal Code) which was
adopted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1309 is constitutional. Section 40 of Act No. 82
(the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal councils. Act No. 1309 amends said section
(section 40, paragraph m) which reads as follows: (m) With the approval of the provincial governor,
when a province or municipality is infested with ladrones or outlaws (the municipal council is
empowered):
1. To authorize the municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of the municipality,
between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one
month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to
act as patrols for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day in each week. The failure,
refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied man to render promptly the service thus required shall be
punishable by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than three
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall authorize the municipal president to require such service of officers or men of
the Army of Navy of the United States, civil employees of the United States Government, officers and
employees of the Insular Government, or the officers or servants of companies or individuals engaged
in the business of common carriers on sea or land, or priests, ministers of the gospel, physicians,
practicantes, druggists or practicantes de farmacia, actually engaged in business, or lawyers when
actually engaged in court proceedings..
Said Act No. 1309 contains some other provisions which are not important in the consideration of the
present case.

The question which we have to consider is whether or not the facts stated in the complaint are
sufficient to show (a) a cause of action under the said law; and (b) whether or not said law is in
violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed.
We deem it advisable to consider the second question first.
It becomes important to ascertain the real purpose of said Act (No. 1309) in order to know whether it
covers a subject upon which the United States Philippine Commission could legislate. A reading of said
Act discloses (1) that it is an amendment of the general law (Act No. 82) for the organization of
municipal government; (2) that it is amendment of section 40 of said Act No. 82, by adding thereto
paragraph m; (3) that said section 40 enumerates some of the powers conferred upon the municipal
council; (4) that said amendment confers upon the council additional powers. The amendment
empowers the municipal council, by ordinance, to authorize the president: (a) To require able-bodied
male residents of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], to assist, for a period not
exceeding five days in any month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and
suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one
day each week; (b) To require each householder to report certain facts, enumerated in said
amendment.
The specific purpose of said amendment is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], as well as each householder when so required by
the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the
locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service,
and who refuse to render the same.
Is there anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the
central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules
and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government? May not the people be called
upon, when necessary, to assist, in any reasonable way, to rid the state and each community thereof,
of disturbing elements? Do not individuals whose rights are protected by the Government, owe some
duty to such, in protecting it against lawbreakers, and the disturbers of the quiet and peace? Are the
sacred rights of the individual violated when he is called upon to render assistance for the protection
of his protector, the Government, whether it be the local or general government? Does the protection
of the individual, the home, and the family, in civilized communities, under established government,
depend solely and alone upon the individual? Does not the individual owe something to his neighbor, in
return for the protection which the law afford him against encroachment upon his rights, by those who
might be inclined so to do? To answer these questions in the negative would, we believe, admit that
the individual, in organized governments, in civilized society, where men are governed by law, does
not enjoy the protection afforded to the individual by men in their primitive relations.

If tradition may be relied upon, the primitive man, living in his tribal relations before the days of
constitutions and states, enjoyed the security and assurance of assistance from his fellows when his
quiet and peace were violated by malhechores. Even under the feudal system, a system of land
holdings by the Teutonic nations of Europe in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, the
feudal lord exercised the right to call upon all his vassals of a certain age to assist in the protection of
their individual and collective rights. (Book 2, Cooleys Blackstones Commentaries, 44; 3 Kents
Commentaries, 487; Hall, Middle Ages; Maine, Ancient Law; Guizot, history of Civilization; Stubbs
Constitutional History of England; Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 Dall .(U. S.), 419; DePeyster vs. Michael, 6
N. Y., 467.) Each vassal was obliged to render individual assistance in return for the protection
afforded by all.
The feudal system was carried in to Britain by William the Conqueror in the year 1085 with all of is
ancient customs and usages.
we find in the days of the hundreds, which meant a division of the state occupied by one hundred
free men, the individual was liable to render service for the protection of all. (Book 3, Cooleys
Blackstones Commentaries, 160, 245, 293, 411.) In these hundreds the individual hundredor, in
case of the commission of a crime within the county or by one of the hundredors, as against another
hundred, was obliged to join the hue and cry (hutesium et clamor) in the pursuit of the felon. This
purely customary ancient obligation was later made obligatory by statute. (Book 4, Cooleys
Blackstones Commentaries, 294; 3 Edward I., Chapter 9; 4 Edward I., Chapter 2; 13 Edward I.,
Chapters 1 and 4.).
Later the statute provided and directed: That from thenceforth every county shall be so well kept,
that, immediately upon robberies and feloniously committed, fresh suit shall be made from town
(pueblo) to town, and from county to county; and that hue and cry shall be raised upon the felons,
and they keep the town (pueblo) shall follow with hue and cry, with all the town (pueblo), and the
towns (pueblos) near; and so hue and cry shall be made from town (pueblo) to town, until they be
taken and delivered to the sheriff..
Said statue further provided that in case the hundred failed to join the hue and cry that it should
be liable for the damages done by the malhechores. Later, by statue (27th Elizabeth, chapter 13) it
was provided that no hue and cry would be sufficient unless it was made with both horsemen and
footmen. The hue and cry might be raised by a justice of the peace, or by any peace officer, or by
any private person who knew of the commission of the crime.
This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the posse comitatus (power of the
county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooleys Blackstones Commentaries, 343; Book 4, 122.) Under
this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with the maintenance of
peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the
law. For that purpose they might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them.

This power is called posse comitatus (power of the county). This was a right well recognized at
common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts
simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town (pueblo)
may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace
and order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state. Is there anything in the organic or
statutory law prohibiting the United States Philippine Commission from adopting the provisions
contained in said Act No. 1309?
While the statement has its exceptions, we believe, generally speaking, that the United States
Commission, and now the Philippine Legislature, may legislate and adopt laws upon all subjects not
expressly prohibited by the Organic Law (Act of congress of July 1, 1902) or expressly reserved to
Congress. Congress did not attempt to say to the Philippine Legislature what laws it might adopt.
Congress contended itself by expressly indicating what laws the Legislature should not adopt, with the
requirement that all laws adopted should be reported to it, and with the implied reservation of the
right to nullify such laws as might not meet with its approval.
Considering the Organic Act (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) as the real constitution of the United
States Government in the Philippine Islands, and its inhibitions upon the power of the Legislature, we
believe an analogy may be drawn relating to the difference between the Constitution of the United
States and the constitution of the different States, with reference to what laws may be adopted by the
different States. While the statement needs much explanation, the general rule is that Congress has
authority to legislate only upon the questions expressly stated in the Constitution of the United States,
while the state legislature may legislate upon all questions, not expressly conferred upon Congress,
nor prohibited in its constitution. In other words, an examination of the Constitution of the United
States discloses the subject matter upon which Congress may legislate, while examination of the
constitutions of the different States must be made for the purpose of ascertaining upon what subjects
the state legislature can not legislate. Stating the rule in another way the Constitution of the United
States permits Congress to legislate upon the following subjects; the constitutions of the States
prohibit the state legislature from legislating upon the following subjects. Generally, then, the
legislature of a State any adopt laws upon any question not expressly delegated to Congress by the
Constitution of the United States or prohibited by the constitution of the particular State.
We think that is the rule which should be applied to the Philippine Legislature. The Philippine
Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the people of the Philippine Islands which
has not been delegated to Congress or expressly prohibited by said Organic Act. (Gaspar vs. Molina, 5
Phil. Rep., 197; U.S., vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7.)
The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of
the state (U.S .vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104.) Police power of the state has been variously
defined. It has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot
be limited; (License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.), 483). The power vested in the legislature to make such laws

as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects. (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush.
(Mass.), 53, 85). The power to govern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state. (Thorpe
vs. Rutland, etc., Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149.) The authority to establish such rules and regulations for the
conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public interest. (People vs. Budd., 117 N.Y., 1, 14;
U.S., vs. Ling Su Fan, supra.) Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws, defines
police power as the defenses, regulations, and domestic order of the country, whereby the
inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general
behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. (4 Blackstones Co., 162.)
The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by
which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but
also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the
rights of others. The police power of the state includes not only the public health and safety, but also
the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the publics best best interest. It so
extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide
each specific case on its merits. (Harding vs. People, 32 L.R.A., 445.)
The police power of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating private business, even
to the extent of the destruction of the property of private persons, when the use of such property
became a nuisance to the public health and convenience. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wal (U.S.), 36
Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S., 678; Walling vs. People, 166
U.S., 446; U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104.)
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring
the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said
Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected
thereby.
With reference to the first question presented by the appeal, relating to the sufficiency of the
complaint, it will be noted that Act No. 1309 authorized the municipal governments to establish
ordinances requiring (a) all able bodied male residents, between the the ages of 18 and 55 [50], and
(b) all householders, under certain conditions, to do certain things.
It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon persons,
imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) The person called upon to render such services must
be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55
[50], and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons.

It will not contended that a nonresident of the municipality would be liable for his refusal to obey the
call of the president; neither can it be logically contended that one under the age of 18 or over the age
of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey the command of the president.
Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be called upon at the mere
whim or caprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient
in the mind of a reasonable man, before the president can call upon the the persons for the service
mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all persons. The law does not apply to every
condition. The law applies to special persons and special conditions.
A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must show
that the person charged belongs to the class of persons to which the law is applicable. For example,
under the Opium Law, certain persons are punishable criminally for having opium in their possession.
All possessors of opium are not liable under the law. A complaint, therefore, charging a person with
the possession of opium, without alleging that he did not belong to the class which are permitted to
possess it, would be objectionable under a demurrer, because all persons are not liable. The complaint
must show that the one charged wit the possession of the opium was not one of the persons who
might legally possess opium. Suppose, for another example, that there was a law providing that all
persons who performed manual labor on Sunday should be punished, with a provision that if such
labor should be performed out of necessity, the person performing it would not be liable. In such a
case, in the complaint, in order to show a good cause of action , it would be necessary to allege that
the labor was not performed under necessity. In other words, the complaint, in order to be free from
objection raised by a demurrer, must show that the person accused of the crime, in the absence of
proof, is punishable under the law. One who performed labor under necessity would not be liable. The
complaints, in the foregoing examples, in the absence of an allegation which showed that the party
accused did not belong to the exempted class, would not be good. In the absence of such negations,
the courts would be unable to impose the penalty of the law, because, perchance, the defendant might
belong to the exempt class. The complaint, in a criminal case, must state every fact necessary to
make out an offense. (U.S. vs. Cook, 17 Wall. (U.S.), 168.) The complaint must show, on its face that,
if the facts alleged are true, an offense has been committed. It must state explicitly and directly every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute an offense. If the statute exempts certain persons, or
classes of persons, from liability, then the complaint should show that the person charged does not
belong to that class.
Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to
impose the punishment provided for by law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a
male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18
years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the
municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Churchill vs Rafferty 1915

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 21, 1915
G.R. No. L-10572
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.
Trent, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his
deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax
mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and
from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the
sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees
the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction
granted soon after the commencement of this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the
power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that
relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring
power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the
ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections
of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the
use of an injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy
for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby
precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be constitutional. The two sections,
then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of

any tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question whether the
remedy by injunction is exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and
history of the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive
remedy, as distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been
consummated. No injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and
when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139 and 140, take away
the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the
same ordinary remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General, on
behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which prohibits
such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are
unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for
the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property without due
process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them
by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902.
In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question because
the section, in speaking of a tax, means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained
of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained
by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes
imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S., 189.) And,
furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is
unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There
must be a further showing that there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well
recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud
upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy
at law. This is the settled law in the United States, even in the absence of statutory enactments such
as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547; Indiana Mfg. Co.
vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. vs.
Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.
S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140, unless the
same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the
constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as
a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the
interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great
deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even
reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment,

beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a

provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, the
case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must
be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of
the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a
legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve
the doubt in favor of its validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and cases cited therein.)
It is also the settled law in the United States that due process of law does not always require, in
respect to the Government, the same process that is required between citizens, though it generally
implies and includes regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well
settled course of judicial proceedings. The case with which we are dealing is in point. A citizens
property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken, by the government in payment
of its taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this country, as well as in the United States,
the officer charged with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of
delinquent taxpayers without applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law
authorizing this procedure never has been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The
Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This must necessarily be the
course, because it is upon taxation that the Government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on
its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of
the taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No government could
exist if every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This principle of public
policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases such as the one under consideration.
With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any merit in the two
propositions insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: That
no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law.
The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in substance in the
Constitution of the United States and in that of ever state in the Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867, provides that: No
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court.
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: No court shall have authority to grant an
injunction to restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax.
A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit
the restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly and

definitely held that the provisions of section 3224 do not violate the due process of law and equal
protection of the law clauses in the Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that section 139
violates those same provisions in the Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the United States has
so held, cannot be doubted.
In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an income tax levied by
an act of Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (157
U.S., 429) the court, through Mr. Justice Miller, said: If there existed in the courts, state or National,
any general power of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident
to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary.
(Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall., 108.) While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is
allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the General Government has
wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition
precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed. In the internal
revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal
has been tried; and, if brought after this, it must be within six months after the decision on the
appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the government consents to litigate the
lawfulness of the original tax. It is not a hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a right
on any condition. If the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the money,
he must do it.
Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: That there might be no
misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it was expressly enacted, in 1867, that no suit
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court. (Rev, Stat., sec. 3224.) And though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the
United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any
case, interfere with the process of collecting taxes on which the government depends for its continued
existence. It is a wise policy. It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the experience of
ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by summary and stringent means against a
reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this successfully, other instrumentalities and other
modes of procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice.
And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: The remedy of a suit to recover back
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The
remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the
current of decisions in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct view
of the law.
In the consideration of the plaintiffs second proposition, we will attempt to show (1) that the
Philippine courts never have had, since the American occupation, the power to restrain by injunction
the collection of any tax imposed by the Insular Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2)

that assuming that our courts had or have such power, this power has not been diminished or curtailed
by sections 139 and 140.
We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon the American occupation
of the Philippine, there was found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system was continued in
force by the military authorities, with but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge of
the subject. The principal sources of revenue under the Spanish regime were derived from customs
receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and
the sale of the public domain. The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income tax of
some 5 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits and on
the income of owners of improved city property. The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax.
The cedula tax was a graduated tax, ranging from nothing up to P37.50. The revenue derived from the
sale of the public domain was not considered a tax. The American authorities at once abolished the
cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula twenty centavos, an
amount which was supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax was
abolished by Act No. 223, effective September 6, 1901.
The Municipal Code (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No. 83), both enacted in 1901,
authorize municipal councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The
Municipal Code did not apply to the city of Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183),
effective August 30, 1901; Under this charter the Municipal Board of Manila is authorized and
empowered to impose taxes upon real estate and, like municipal councils, to license and regulate
certain occupations. Customs matters were completely reorganized by Act No. 355, effective at the
port of Manila on February 7, 1902, and at other ports in the Philippine Islands the day after the
receipt of a certified copy of the Act. The Internal Revenue Law of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all
existing laws, ordinances, etc., imposing taxes upon the persons, objects, or occupations taxed under
that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the Spanish regime were eliminated,
but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1, 1905. This Internal Revenue Law did not
take away from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the Municipal Board of the city of Manila the
power to impose taxes upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was repealed by
Act No. 2339, an act revising and consolidating the laws relative to internal revenue.
Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax
assessed under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against
him, . . . .
This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial
boards. The inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793,
effective October 12, 1907. Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a
condition precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers. Section 52 of Act No. 1189
provides That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining the collection of any

taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who claims that
he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by
the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been illegally
collected.
Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same prohibition and
remedy. The result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing
taxes or imposts enacted by the legislative body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to
entertain any suit assailing the validity of any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have been
paid under protest. The only taxes which have not been brought within the express inhibition were
those included in that part of the old Spanish system which completely disappeared on or before
January 1, 1905, and possibly the old customs duties which disappeared in February, 1902.
Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
2. In all civil actions which involve the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .
7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction,
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and
districts, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1, 1901, which deals
with the subject of injunctions, are sections 162 to 172, inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of
two kinds; preliminary and final. The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of
the action and before final judgment, and the latter at the termination of the trial as the relief or part
of the relief prayed for (sec. 162). Any judge of the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction
in any action pending in that court or in any Court of First Instance. A preliminary injunction may also
be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance in actions pending in his district in which he has
original jurisdiction (sec. 163). But such injunctions may be granted only when the complaint shows
facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded (sec. 166), and before a final or permanent
injunction can be granted, it must appear upon the trial of the action that the plaintiff is entitled to
have commission or continuance of the acts complained of perpetually restrained (sec. 171). These
provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First Instance of what are known as injunction suits,
the sole object of which is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction. They also authorize the granting
of injunctions as aiders in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep.,
273), an injunction to be A special remedy adopted in that code (Act 190) from American practice,
and originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to
those cases where there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,which will not be granted
while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material
and irreparable injury will be done,which cannot be compensated in damages . . .

By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136, supra, and the provisions of the various subsequent Acts
heretofore mentioned, the Insular Government has consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the
validity of any original tax or impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil
actions after the taxes or exactions shall have been paid. But it is said that paragraph 2 confers
original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance to hear and determine all civil actions which involve
the validity of any tax, impost or assessment, and that if the all-inclusive words all and any be
given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action wherein that question is involved can arise
over which such courts do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This is true.
But the term civil actions had its well defined meaning at the time the paragraph was enacted. The
same legislative body which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901, had, just a few months prior to
that time, defined the only kind of action in which the legality of any tax imposed by it might be
assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and sec. 17, Act No. 83, enacted February 6,
1901.) That kind of action being payment of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to recover and
no other, there can be no doubt that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all such actions.
The subsequent legislation on the same subject shows clearly that the Commission, in enacting
paragraph 2, supra, did not intend to change or modify in any way section 84 of Act No. 82 and
section 17 of Act No. 83, but, on the contrary, it was intended that civil actions, mentioned in said
paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so far as testing the legality of taxes were concerned,
only those of the kind and character provided for in the two sections above mentioned. It is also urged
that the power to restrain by injunction the collection of taxes or imposts is conferred upon Courts of
First Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph does empower those courts to
grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their districts, provided
always, that the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded. Injunction suits,
such as the one at bar, are civil actions, but of a special or extraordinary character. It cannot be said
that the Commission intended to give a broader or different meaning to the word action, used in
Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in connection with injunctions, than it gave to the same word
found in paragraph 2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The Insular Government, in exercising the
power conferred upon it by the Congress of the United States, has declared that the citizens and
residents of this country shall pay certain specified taxes and imposts. The power to tax necessarily
carries with it the power to collect the taxes. This being true, the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the Government may fix the conditions upon which it will consent to litigate the
validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)
We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No. 136, construed in the
light of the prior and subsequent legislation to which we have referred, and the legislative and judicial
history of the same subject in the United States with which the Commission was familiar, do not
empower Courts of firs Instance to interfere by injunction with the collection of the taxes in question in
this case.
If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the Commission did intend to
confer the power upon the courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that

this power or jurisdiction has been taken away by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all
agree that an injunction will not issue in any case if there is an adequate remedy at law. The very
nature of the writ itself prevents its issuance under such circumstances. Legislation forbidding the
issuing of injunctions in such cases is unnecessary. So the only question to be here determined is
whether the remedy provided for in section 140 of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the writs which
form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued. If this is the correct view, the authority to
issue injunctions will not have been taken away by section 139, but rendered inoperative only by
reason of an adequate remedy having been made available.
The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning (Act No. 82) that
payment under protest and suit to recover is an adequate remedy to test the legality of any tax or
impost, and that this remedy is exclusive. Can we say that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not
exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in the case at bar are the first, in so far as we are aware, to question
either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this remedy. We will refer to a few cases in the United States
where statutes similar to sections 139 and 140 have been construed and applied.
In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in Nashville, Tennessee,
stating that his real and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the
amount of $132.60; that he tendered to the collector this amount in funds receivable by law for such
purposes; and that the collector refused to receive the same. He prayed for an alternative writ of
mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in payment for such taxes, or to show cause to
the contrary. To this petition the collector, in his answer, set up the defense that the petitioners suit
was expressly prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed in
1873. The petition was dismissed and the relief prayed for refused. An appeal to the supreme court of
the State resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court. The case was then carried to
the Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U. S., 69), where the judgment was
again affirmed.
The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that cases, read as follows:
1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection of revenue due the State,
shall institute any proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to
be due by said officer from any citizen, the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if
he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or clause of the Constitution of
the State, pay the same under protest; and, upon his making said payment, the officer or collector
shall pay such revenue into the State Treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the
Comptroller that the same was paid under protest; and the party paying said revenue may, at any
time within thirty days after making said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said officer
having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. And the same may be tried in any court having
the jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and, if it be determined that the same was wrongfully
collected, as not being due from said party to the State, for any reason going to the merits of the

same, then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was wrongfully paid and
ought to be refunded; and thereupon the Comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, which shall
be paid in preference to other claims on the Treasury.
2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect
revenue illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the law,
the same being other or different funds than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to
pay, than that above provided; and no writ for the prevention of the collection of any revenue claimed,
or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in anywise issue, either injunction, supersedeas,
prohibition, or any other writ or process whatever; but in all cases in which, for any reason, any
person shall claim that the tax so collected was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy for said
party shall be as above provided, and in no other manner.
In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee Legislature, as above set forth,
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case just cited, said: This remedy is simple and
effective. A suit at law to recover money unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less
complicated than a proceeding by mandamus. In revenue cases, whether arising upon its (United
States) Internal Revenue Laws or those providing for the collection of duties upon foreign imports, it
(United States) adopts the rule prescribed by the State of Tennessee. It requires the contestant to pay
the amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him power to sue the collector, and in such suit to
test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh in this. It is a wise and reasonable
precaution for the security of the Government.
Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax from the company which he represented. The
defense was that sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This
case also reached the Supreme Court of the United States. (Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U. 591.) In
speaking of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, the court said: This Act
has been sanctioned and applied by the Courts of Tennessee. (Nashville vs. Smith, 86 Tenn., 213;
Louisville & N. R. Co. vs. State, 8 Heisk., 663, 804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act of
Congress forbidding suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes under the
Internal Revenue Laws, in respect to which this court held that the remedy by suit to recover back the
tax after payment, provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs. Marks, of this character has
been called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident employment of the writ of
injunction in arresting the collection of the public revenue; and, even in its absence, the strong arm of
the court of chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that court is
grounded upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction.
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said: It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and

2 of the Act of 1873, supra) is unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by
certiorari, guaranteed by the organic law.
By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is provided that: The judges
or justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall have power in all civil cases to issue writs of
certiorari, to remove any cause, or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction
into such court of law, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the State constitution.
In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of
certain taxes for the year 1886. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy
by injunction had been taken away by section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as follows:
No injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this Act.
It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1885 were
unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with article 6, sec. 8, of the Constitution, which provides
that: The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted
in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law. They shall also have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other writs necessary to carry into effect
their orders, judgments, and decrees.
Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: I have no doubt that the Legislature has the
constitutional authority, where it has provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law to
recover back taxes illegally assessed and collected, to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain
their collection.
Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: That the Supreme Court and the Courts of
First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands,
subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure.
It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine Government the power to
change the practice and method of procedure. If sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this
must always be done, are nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it would seem that the
Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting them. Conceding for the moment
that the duly authorized procedure for the determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or
assessment was by injunction suits and that this method was available to aggrieved taxpayers prior to
the passage of Act No. 2339, may the Legislature change this method of procedure? That the
Legislature has the power to do this, there can be no doubt, provided some other adequate remedy is
substituted in lieu thereof. In speaking of the modes of enforcing rights created by contracts, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: The rule seems to be that

in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract the Legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with
conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right.
In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the obligation of the
contract contained in the charter of the Bank of Tennessee, which contract was entered into with the
State in 1838. It was claimed that this was done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the
way of its enforcement, thereby so impairing the remedies as practically to render the obligation of no
value. In disposing of this contention, the court said: If we assume that prior to 1873 the relator had
authority to prosecute his claim against the State by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that year
the further use of that form was prohibited to him, the question remains. whether an effectual remedy
was left to him or provided for him. We think the regulation of the statute gave him an abundant
means of enforcing such right as he possessed. It provided that he might pay his claim to the collector
under protest, giving notice thereof to the Comptroller of the Treasury; that at any time within thirty
days thereafter he might sue the officer making the collection; that the case should be tried by any
court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the court should certify
that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the Comptroller should thereupon
issue his warrant therefor, which should be paid in preference to other claim on the Treasury.
But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to
pay the taxes assessed against them and that if the law is enforced, they will be compelled to suspend
business. This point may be best answered by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs. Sexton (32
Mich., 406), wherein Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: But if this consideration is sufficient
to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every controversy
where money is demanded may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a
dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as to collect from
him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have
never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a money demand as falling within that
category.
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432, enacted December 23,
1914, effective January 1, 1915, by imposing increased and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was
amended, were ratified by the Congress of the United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition
manifested against the taxes imposed by Acts Nos. 2339 and 2432 is a matter of local history. A great
many business men thought the taxes thus imposed were too high. If the collection of the new taxes
on signs, signboards, and billboards may be restrained, we see no well-founded reason why
injunctions cannot be granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other
increased taxes. The fact that this may be done, shows the wisdom of the Legislature in denying the
use of the writ of injunction to restrain the collection of any tax imposed by the Acts. When this was
done, an equitable remedy was made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.

The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction, this
court, on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b)
of section 100 of Act No. 2339, imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on the
merits of a controversy ought to be declined when the court is powerless to give the relief demanded.
But it is claimed that this case is, in many particulars, exceptional. It is true that it has been argued
on the merits, and there is no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona fide
controversy. The legal points involved in the merits have been presented with force, clearness, and
great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. If the law assailed were still in force, we would feel
that an opinion on its validity would be justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on
January 1, 1915, we think it advisable to proceed no further with this branch of the case.
The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the object of which is to
enjoin the Collector of Internal Revenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs
located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in
question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general
welfare of the community, or of any persons. The defendant denies these allegations in his answer
and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls,
he decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the sight, and is otherwise a
nuisance. The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that the billboards were quite a distance from the
road and that they were strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no
advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community. The
defendant presented no testimony upon this point. In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the
parties, the plaintiffs admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight.
The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read: If after due
investigation the Collector of Internal Revenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard
displayed or exposed to public view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by
summary order direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or billboard, and if same is not removed
within ten days after he has issued such order he my himself cause its removal, and the sign,
signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the Government, and the owner thereof charged
with the expenses of the removal so effected. When the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered to be
removed as herein provided shall not comply with the provisions of the general regulations of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be allowed for any portion of a year for which
the tax may have been paid. Otherwise, the Collector of Internal Revenue may in his discretion make
a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for which the taxes were paid.
An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Finance
and Justice whose decision thereon shall be final.
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: The question which the case presents under
this head for determination, resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs

displayed or exposed to public view, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the
public interest?
And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: We contend that that portion of section 100 of
Act No. 2339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if
objectionable to the sight, is unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is limited to the question
whether the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government; for all property is held subject to that power.
As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which go to the power of the
state to authorize administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and
businesses are, under certain circumstances, statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure
prescribed for this purpose is due process of law, are foreign to the issue here presented.
There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature
which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes
with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act
is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it
should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper
in the premises for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States
Supreme Court states the rule thus: If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute,
then we may declare this one void because in excess of the legislative power of this state; but if it
could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference, within the scope of the
legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge.
This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127 U.S., 678) oleomargarine case. (See also Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S.,
518.) While the state may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a
large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interest of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests; yet, its
determination in these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
courts. (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U.S., 133.) Can it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and
billboards, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, are not with the category of things which
interfere with the public safety, welfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the reach of the police
power of the Philippine Government?

The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power are
only interesting as illustrating its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to points
heretofore deemed entirely within the field of private liberty and property rights. Blackstones
definition of the police power was as follows: The due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. (Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)
Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state to regulate unwholesome
trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses. Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts
defined it as follows: The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53.)
In the case of Butchers Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co.
(111 U.S., 746), it was suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative
concern of which the legislature cannot divest itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75
Wash., 581, where these definitions are collated.)
In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: The police power of the State, so far, has
not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or
state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort,
convenience and morals of the community, which do not violate any of the provisions of the organic
law. (Quoted with approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139.)
In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: The police power of the state is
difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the
good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does
not encroach on a like power vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution, or
does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has been expressly held that the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power
by the state.
In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: It [the police power] has for its
object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and
collectively with a view to bring about he greatest good of the greatest number.Courts have
consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of
this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand
correction.

In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: Police power is the name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the
right and duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense,
demands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to
insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a high complex
character requires. (As quoted with approval in Stettler vs. OHara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S.
[1911], 575: It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.
This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several courts. (Cunningham vs.
Northwestern Imp. Co. [1911], 44 Mont., 180; State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581;
McDavid vs. Bank of Bay Minette [Ala., 1915], 69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va.,
1915], 86 S.E., 139; State vs. Philipps [Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)
It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: It is much easier to perceive and
realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe
limits to its exercise. In Stone vs. Mississippi (101 U.S., 814), it was said: Many attempts have been
made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success. It is always
easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the power, than to
give an abstract definition of the power itself, which will be in all respects accurate.
Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police power.
Manifestly, definitions which fail to anticipate cases properly within the scope of the police power are
deficient. It is necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine
whether the cases as they come up are within that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the United
States is that government should interfere with individual effort only to the extent necessary to
preserve a healthy social and economic condition of the country. State interference with the use of
private property may be exercised in three ways. First, through the power of taxation, second,
through the power of eminent domain, and third, through the police power. Buy the first method it is
assumed that the individual receives the equivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he
receives from the government as such. By the second method he receives the market value of the
property taken from him. But under the third method the benefits he derived are only such as may
arise from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and is often referred to as
damnum absque injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa., 141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage Co., 182
Ind., 36.) There was a time when state interference with the use of private property under the guise of
the police power was practically confined to the suppression of common nuisances. At the present day,
however, industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations of capital to
profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating
to industrial workers wages and conditions of labor. Not only this but the universal use of mechanical

contrivances by producers and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human life and
limb in the production and distribution of consumption goods. To the extent that these businesses
affect not only the public health, safety, and morals, but also the general social and economic life of
the nation, it has been and will continue to be necessary for the state to interfere by regulation. By so
doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered with in no small degree and in
ways that would have been considered entirely unnecessary in years gone by. The regulation of rates
charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in industrial
establishments have only a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals, but do
bear directly upon social and economic conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to feel that
his industry will bring a fair return; to see that his work shall be done under conditions that will not
either immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial inflation of prices of the things
which are necessary for his physical well being are matters which the individual is no longer capable of
attending to himself. It is within the province of the police power to render assistance to the people to
the extent that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws providing for the regulation
of wages and hours of labor of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co. vs. Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring
payment of employees of railroads and other industrial concerns in legal tender and requiring salaries
to be paid semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U.S., 685); providing a maximum number of
hours of labor for women (Miller vs. Wilson, U.S. Sup. Ct. [Feb. 23, 1915], Adv. Opns., p. 342);
prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs. Beauchamp, 231 U.S., 320); restricting the hours of labor
in public laundries (In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of labor in industrial establishment
generally (State vs. Bunting, 71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing Laws (State vs. Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151
Pac., 473; People vs. C. Klinck Packing Co. [N.Y., 1915], 108 N. E., 278; Hiller vs. State [Md., 1914],
92 Atl., 842; State vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs. Richter, 257 Ill., 578, 580; State
vs. Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781); have all been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
Again, workmens compensation laws have been quite generally upheld. These statutes discard the
common law theory that employers are not liable for industrial accidents and make them responsible
for all accidents resulting from trade risks, it being considered that such accidents are a legitimate
charge against production and that the employer by controlling the prices of his product may shift the
burden to the community. Laws requiring state banks to join in establishing a depositors guarantee
fund have also been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S.,
104), and Assaria State Bank vs. Dolley (219 U.S., 121).
Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in thickly
populated districts. Barring livery stables from such locations was approved of in Reinman vs. Little
Rock (U.S. Sup. Ct. [Apr. 5, 1915], U.S. Adv. Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was recently
upheld (People vs. Ericsson, 263 Ill., 368), which prohibited the location of garages within two
hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any block used exclusively for residential
purposes, unless the consent of the majority of the property owners be obtained. Such statutes as
these are usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. But we apprehend that in
point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do with
his physical comfort and convenience and not a little to do with his peace of mind. Without entering

into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being
as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to his
contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as both
together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Mans esthetic feelings are
constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been made in
theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success of which
depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving picture shows could
not possible without the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards and
other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then, should
the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of mans senses as
readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smells?
The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great
industrial age through which the world is now passing. Millions are spent each year in this manner to
guide the consumer to the articles which he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to
advertising success. Billboard advertising, as it is now conducted, is a comparatively recent form of
advertising. It is conducted out of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the
strategic locations of the boards, which obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are most
likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveler
because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a particular kind of breakfast food, or underwear,
the coming of a circus, an incomparable soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all the ills to
which the flesh is heir, etc. It is quite natural for people to protest against this indiscriminate and
wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen upon their hours of
leisure and relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if this form of
advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets and highways into
veritable canyons through which the world must travel in going to work or in search of outdoor
pleasure.
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does
upon the use of the channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of private
property, who so vigorously objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should require the
advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of the property
instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would die a natural death if this were done, and its real
dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the
public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of
the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of
billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of
the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.
We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any more
than we would say that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more sightly

than piles of rubbish or an open sewer. But all these businesses are offensive to the senses under
certain conditions.
It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is
no safe standard of legislation in this direction. We answer in the language of the Supreme Court in
Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S., 104), and which has already been adopted by several state
courts (see supra), that the prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion demands such
legislation. The agitation against the unrestrained development of the billboard business has produced
results in nearly all the countries of Europe. (Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many drastic
ordinances and state laws have been passed in the United States seeking to make the business
amenable to regulation. But their regulation in the United states is hampered by what we conceive an
unwarranted restriction upon the scope of the police power by the courts. If the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and
convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such
territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not
minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing
sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive to the sight.
We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs. Richmond (226 U.S., 137),
where a municipal ordinance establishing a building line to which property owners must conform was
held unconstitutional. As we have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private
property as it is a use of the public thoroughfares. It derives its value to the power solely because the
posters are exposed to the public gaze. It may well be that the state may not require private property
owners to conform to a building line, but may prescribe the conditions under which they shall make
use of the adjoining streets and highways. Nor is the law in question to be held invalid as denying
equal protection of the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs. Taylor (234 U.S., 224), it was said: It is more
pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are
differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil,
and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up
and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court
can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear.
But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest courts of a number
of the states in the American Union upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes
which are prompted and inspired by esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the
promotion and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public
safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to constitutional
provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. Or, in other words, the police power cannot
interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view, rest
their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation

to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of
the state. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs,
signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well recognized principle
to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed
upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.
TRENT, J.:
Counsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of Ex parte Young (209 U.S., 123); and say that
they are of the opinion that this case is the absolutely determinative of the question of jurisdiction in
injunctions of this kind. We did not refer to this case in our former opinion because we were satisfied
that the reasoning of the case is not applicable to section 100 (b), 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339. The
principles announced in the Young case are stated as follows: It may therefore be said that when the
penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the
company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is
the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws
which deeply affect its rights.
It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a
statute at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself to the penalties
for disobedience provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not an accurate statement of the
case. Ordinarily a law creating offenses in the nature of misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject
over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event. In these case, however, of the
establishment of certain rates without any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily depends upon
whether they are high enough to permit at least some return upon the investment (how much it is not
now necessary to state), and an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. If it
turns out that the rates are too low for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a
party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a question (no prior hearing having
ever been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer imprisonment and pay
fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent
any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and
therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case where the validity of the acts depends
upon the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated
and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject requiring no such
investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.

An examination of the sections of our Internal Revenue Law and of the circumstances under which and
the purposes for which they were enacted, will show that, unlike the statutes under consideration in
the above cited case, their enactment involved no attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent
dissatisfied taxpayers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation; no effort to
prevent any inquiry as to their validity. While section 139 does prevent the testing of the validity of
subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction suits instituted for the purpose of restraining the collection
of internal revenue taxes, section 140 provides a complete remedy for that purpose. And furthermore,
the validity of subsection (b) does not depend upon the existence of a fact which can be determined
only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character, but the jurisdiction of the
Legislature over the subject with which the subsection deals is complete in any event. The judgment
of the court in the Young case rests upon the proposition that the aggrieved parties had no adequate
remedy at law.
Neither did we overlook the case of General Oil Co. vs. Crain (209 U.S., 211), decided the same day
and citing Ex parte Young, supra. In that case the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation, with its
principal place of business in Memphis, Tennessee. It was engaged in the manufacture and sale of coal
oil, etc. Its wells and plant were located in Pennsylvania and Ohio. Memphis was not only its place of
business, at which place it sold oil to the residents of Tennessee, but also a distributing point to which
oils were shipped from Pennsylvania and Ohio and unloaded into various tanks for the purpose of
being forwarded to the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi customers. Notwithstanding the fact that
the company separated its oils, which were designated to meet the requirements of the orders from
those States, from the oils for sale in Tennessee, the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the
Act of the Tennessee Legislature, approved April 21, 1899, to inspect all the oils unlocated in Memphis,
whether for sale in that State or not, and charge and collect for such inspection a regular fee of
twenty-five cents per barrel. The company, being advised that the defendant had no such right,
instituted this action in the inferior States court for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, upon the
grounds stated in the bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its oils. Upon trial, the preliminary
injunction which had been granted at the commencement of the action, was continued in force. Upon
appeal, the supreme court of the State of Tennessee decided that the suit was one against the State
and reversed the judgment of the Chancellor. In the Supreme Court of the United States, where the
case was reviewed upon a writ of error, the contentions of the parties were stated by the court as
follows: It is contended by defendant in error that this court is without jurisdiction because no matter
sought to be litigated by plaintiff in error was determined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The
court simply held, it is paid, that, under the laws of the State, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit for any purpose. And it is insisted hat this holding involved no Federal question, but only the
powers and jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Tennessee, in respect to which the Supreme Court
of Tennessee is the final arbiter.
Opposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that whether a suit is one against a State cannot
depend upon the declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe suit, and that
the Supreme Court recognized that the statute aded nothing to the axiomatic principle that the State,

as a sovereign, is not subject to suit save by its own consent.And it is hence insisted that the court by
dismissing the bill gave effect to the law which was attacked. It is further insisted that the bill
undoubtedly present rights under the Constitution of the United States and conditions which entitle
plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection of such rights, and that a statute of the State which
operates to deny such rights, or such relief, `is itself in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.
That statute of Tennessee, which the supreme court of that State construed and held to be prohibitory
of the suit, was an act passed February 28, 1873, which provides: That no court in the State of
Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have, any power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit
against the State, or any officer acting by the authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its
treasury, funds or property; and all such suits now pending, or hereafter brought, shall be dismissed
as to the State, or such officer, on motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the State, or counsel
employed by the State.
The Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing many cases, said: Necessarily, to give
adequate protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid state
laws, as determining the character of the suit against state officers. And the suit at bar illustrates the
necessity. If a suit against state officer is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is contended in the case at bar
that it may be, without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to
prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation. It being then the
right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a constitutional right, whether by its
terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is manifest that a decision which denies such protection
gives effect to the law, and the decision is reviewable by this court.
The court then proceeded to consider whether the law of 1899 would, if administered against the oils
in question, violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils
were not in movement through the States, that they had reached the destination of their first
shipment, and were held there, not in necessary delay at means of transportation but for the business
purposes and profit of the company, and resting its judgment upon the taxing power of the State,
affirmed the decree of the supreme court of the State of Tennessee.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction because the suit was one against the State, which was prohibited by the Tennessee
Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction of the controversy for the
reasons above quoted and sustained the Act of 1899 as a revenue law.
The case of Tennessee vs. Sneed (96 U.S., 69), and Shelton vs. Platt (139 U.S., 591), relied upon in
our former opinion, were not cited in General Oil Co. vs. Crain, supra, because the questions
presented and the statutes under consideration were entirely different. The Act approved March 31,

1873, expressly prohibits the courts from restraining the collection of any tax, leaving the dissatisfied
taxpayer to his exclusive remedy payment under protest and suit to recover while the Act
approved February 28, 1873, prohibits suits against the State.
In upholding the statute which authorizes the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole
ground that they are offensive to the sight, we recognized the fact that we are not in harmony with
various state courts in the American Union. We have just examined the decision of the Supreme Court
of the State of Illinois in the recent case (October [December], 1914) of Thomas Cusack Co. vs. City
of Chicago (267 Ill., 344), wherein the court upheld the validity of a municipal ordinances, which reads
as follows: 707. Frontage consents required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any block on any public street in which one-half of
the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first
obtaining the consent, in writing, of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a
majority of the frontage of the property, on both sides of the street, in the block in which such billboard or sign-board is to be erected, constructed or located. Such written consent shall be filed with
the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or location
of such bill-board or sign-board.
The evidence which the Illinois court relied upon was the danger of fires, the fact that billboards
promote the commission of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inadequate
police protection furnished to residential districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the
other of the other objections are valid. If the billboard industry does, in fact, promote such municipal
evils to noticeable extent, it seems a curious inconsistency that a majority of the property owners on a
given block may legalize the business. However, the decision is undoubtedly a considerable advance
over the views taken by other high courts in the United States and distinguishes several Illinois
decisions. It is an advance because it permits the suppression of billboards where they are
undesirable. The ordinance which the court approved will no doubt cause the virtual suppression of the
business in the residential districts. Hence, it is recognized that under certain circumstances billboards
may be suppressed as an unlawful use of private property. Logically, it would seem that the premise of
fact relied upon is not very solid. Objections to the billboard upon police, sanitary, and moral grounds
have been, as pointed out by counsel for Churchill and Tait, duly considered by numerous high courts
in the United States, and, with one exception, have been rejected as without foundation. The
exception is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which advances practically the same line of reasoning as
has the Illinois court in this recent case. (St. Louis Gunning Advt. Co. vs. City of St. Louis, 137 S. W.,
929.) In fact, the Illinois court, in Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture Training School (249 Ill.,
436), distinguished in the recent case, said: There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or
safety of the public in structures that are properly erected for advertising purposes.
If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it
would seem that the ordinance above quoted would have to be sustained upon the very grounds which
we have advanced in sustaining our own statute.

It might be well to note that billboard legislation in the United States is attempting to eradicate a
business which has already been firmly established. This business was allowed to expand unchecked
until its very extent called attention to its objectionable features. In the Philippine Islands such
legislation has almost anticipated the business, which is not yet of such proportions that it can be said
to be fairly established. It may be that the courts in the United States have committed themselves to
a course of decisions with respect to billboard advertising, the full consequences of which were not
perceived for the reason that the development of the business has been so recent that the
objectionable features of it did not present themselves clearly to the courts nor to the people. We, in
this country, have the benefit of the experience of the people of the United States and may make our
legislation preventive rather than corrective. There are in this country, moreover, on every hand in
those districts where Spanish civilization has held sway for so many centuries, examples of
architecture now belonging to a past age, and which are attractive not only to the residents of the
country but to visitors. If the billboard industry is permitted without constraint or control to hide these
historic sites from the passerby, the country will be less attractive to the tourist and the people will
suffer a district economic loss.
The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.

People vs Pomar, 1924

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
November 3, 1924
G.R. No. L-22008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO POMAR, defendant-appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
Johnson, J.:
The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of
Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.
It appears from the record that on the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City
of Manila presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of
section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint
alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of August, 1923, and sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela,
a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly
authorized to transact business in said city, and having, during the year 1923, in his employ and
service as cigar-maker in said factory, a woman by the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted
vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by reason of her pregnancy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos
(P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days
before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took place on the 12th day of August,
1923, despite and over the demands made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do
so.

To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute
an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial
all of the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the provisions of said Act No.
3071, upon which the complaint was based were illegal, unconstitutional and void.
Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant, the
Honorable C. A. Imperial, judge, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the
complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of
said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error: That
the court erred in overruling the demurrer; in convicting him of the crime charged in the information;
and in not declaring section 13 of Act No. 3071, unconstitutional:
Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is as follows:
Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant,
thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the
employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to
pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.
Section 15 of the same Act is as follows:
Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of
not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred and fifty, or by imprisonment for not less than ten
days nor more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the case of firms or corporations, the presidents, directors or managers thereof or, in their default,
the persons acting in their stead, shall be criminally responsible for each violation of the provisions of
this Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
factory, shop or place of labor of any description, and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The question presented
for decision by the appeal is whether said Act has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state.
In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in fact,
within said power, it becomes necessary first, to determine what that power is, its limits and scope.
Literally hundreds of decisions have been promulgated in which definitions of the police power have

been attempted. An examination of all of said decisions will show that the definitions are generally
limited to particular cases and examples, which are as varied as they are numerous.
By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing civilization, the term police power
has never been, and we do not believe can be, clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. One
hundred years ago, for example, it is doubtful whether the most eminent jurist, or court, or legislature
would have for a moment thought that, by any possibility, a law providing for the destruction of a
building in which alcoholic liquors were sold, was within a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
power. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.) The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with a desire on the part of the masses and of the
government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within
the police power of the state many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. In
a republican form of government public sentiment wields a tremendous influence upon what the state
may or may not do, for the protection of the health and public morals of the people. Yet, neither public
sentiment, nor a desire to ameliorate the public morals of the people of the state will justify the
promulgation of a law which contravenes the express provisions of the fundamental law of the people
the constitutional of the state.
A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law and the particular
facts to which it is to be applied. The many definitions which have been given by the highest courts
may be examined, however, for the purpose of giving us a compass or guide to assist us in arriving at
a correct conclusion in the particular case before us. Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest
expounders of the common law, defines the police power as the due regulation and domestic order of
the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound
to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners,
and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. (4 Blackstones
Commentaries, 162.)
Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, gives us the following definition: Police is
in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its business
may be distributed into eight distinct branches: (1) Police for the prevention of offenses; (2) police for
the prevention of calamities; (3) police for the prevention of endemic diseased; (4) police of charity;
(5) police of interior communications; (6) police of public amusements; (7) police for recent
intelligence; (8) police for registration.
Mr. Justice Cooley, perhaps the greatest expounder of the American Constitution, says: The police
power is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same. . . . (Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, p. 830.)

In the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53), we find a very
comprehensive definition of the police power of the state. In that case it appears that the colony of
Massachusetts in 1647 adopted an Act to preserve the harbor of Boston and to prevent encroachments
therein. The defendant unlawfully erected, built, and established in said harbor, and extended beyond
said lines and into and over the tide water of the Commonwealth a certain superstructure, obstruction
and encumbrance. Said Act provided a penalty for its violation of a fine of not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000 for every offense, and for the destruction of said buildings, or structures, or
obstructions as a public nuisance. Alger was arrested and placed on trial for violation of said Act. His
defense was that the Act of 1647 was illegal and void, because if permitted the destruction of private
property without compensation. Mr. Justice Shaw, speaking for the court in that said, said: We think it
is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal environment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property nor injurious to the rights of the community. All
property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide waters, is derived
directly or indirectly from the government and held subject to those general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall prevent
them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as
the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient. Mr. Justice Shaw further adds: . . . The power we allude to is rather
the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
This court has, in the case of Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser (24 Phil., 250), in discussing the
police power of the state, had occasion to say: . . . It is a well settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and civilized society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. All property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power is possessed with
plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people,
so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

Many other definitions have been given not only by the Supreme Court of the United States but by the
Supreme Court of every state of the Union. The foregoing definitions, however, cover the general field
of all of the definitions, found in jurisprudence. From all of the definitions we conclude that it is much
easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of the police power than to exactly mark its
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise by the legislative department of the government.
The most recent definition which has been called to our attention is that found in the case of Adkins
vs. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia (261 U. S., 525). In that case the controversy arose
in this way: A childrens hospital employed a number of women at various rates of wages, which were
entirely satisfactory to both the hospital and the employees. A hotel company employed a woman as
elevator operator at P35 per month and two meals a day under healthy and satisfactory conditions,
and she did not risk to lose her position as she could not earn so much anywhere else. Her wages
were less than the minimum fixed by a board created under a law for the purpose of fixing a minimum
wage for women and children, with a penalty providing a punishment for a failure or refusal to pay the
minimum wage fixed. The wage paid by the hotel company of P35 per month and two meals a day was
less than the minimum wage fixed by said board. By reason of the order of said board, the hotel
company, was about to discharge her, as it was unwilling to pay her more and could not give her
employment at that salary without risking the penalty of a fine and imprisonment under the law. She
brought action to enjoin the hotel company from discharging her upon the ground that the
enforcement of the Minimum Wage Act would deprive her of her employment and wages without due
process of law, and that she could not get as good a position anywhere else. The constitutionality of
the Act was squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that said Act was void on the ground that the right to
contract about ones own affairs was a part of the liberty of the individual under the constitution, and
that while there was no such thing as absolute freedom of contract, and it was necessary subject to a
great variety of restraints, yet none of the exceptional circumstances, which at times justify a
limitation upon ones right to contract for his own services, applied in the particular case.
In the course of the decision in that case (Adkins vs. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia,
261 U. S., 525), Mr. Justice Sutherland, after a statement of the fact and making reference to the
particular law, said:
The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional
interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the due process clause of
the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about ones affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court, and is no longer open to
question. Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally
speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the
result of private bargaining. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578; 591; Adair vs. United States, 208
U. S., 161; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)

xxxxxxxxx
The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of
the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is
capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously
leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a
loss. Within the limits of the minimum sum, he is precluded, under penalty of fine and imprisonment,
from adjusting compensation to the differing merits of his employees. It compels him to pay at least
the sum fixed in any event, because the employee needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value
from the employee. It (the law) therefore undertakes to solve but one-half of the problem. The other
half is the establishment of a corresponding standard of efficiency; and this forms no part of the policy
of the legislation, although in practice the former half without the latter must lead to ultimate failure,
in accordance with the inexorable law that no one can continue indefinitely to take out more than he
puts in without ultimately exhausting the supply. The law . . . takes no account of periods of distress
and business depression, or crippling losses, which may leave the employer himself without adequate
means of livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered,
it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person,
for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily
shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.
The failure of this state which, perhaps more than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is
that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no
casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do. The
declared basis, as already pointed out, is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous
circumstances that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence,
health and morals. . . . The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these arise outside
of the employment, are the same when there is no employment, and as great in one occupation as in
another. . . . In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of
selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer to buy food, he is morally entitled to
obtain the worth of his money, but he is not entitle to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays, he
is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs more; and the shopkeeper, having dealt
fairly and honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in any peculiar sense with the question of his
customers necessities. Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission power to determine the
quantity of food necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the
individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed maximum, it would undoubtedly fall
before the constitutional test. The fallacy of any argument in support of the validity of such a statute
would be quickly exposed. The argument in support of that now being considered is equally fallacious,
though the weakness of it may not be so plain. . . .
It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for
whose end freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of the individual to

do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the
common good, and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither
definite nor unalterable, may be made to move, within limits not well defined, with changing needs
and circumstances.
The late Mr. Justice Harlan, in the case of Adair vs. United States (208 U. S., 161, 174), said that the
right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as
the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor
from the person offering to sell. In all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality
of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land, under a constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Mr. Justice Pitney, in the case of Coppage vs. Kansas (235 U. S., 1, 14), speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United States, said: . . . Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property partaking of the nature of each is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of
property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other
services are exchange for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily
interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional
sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the
vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for
money.
The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts. In the case of
Gillespie vs. People (118 Ill., 176, 183-185) it was held that a statute making it unlawful to discharge
an employee because of his connection with any lawful labor organization, and providing a penalty
therefor, is void, since the right to terminate a contract, subject to liability to respond in a civil action
for an unwarranted termination, is within the protection of the state and Federal constitutions which
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The
court said in part: . . . One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor
can anyone be compelled to be employed against his will. The Act of 1893, now under consideration,
deprives the employer of the right to terminate his contract with his employee. The right to terminate
such a contract is guaranteed by the organic law of the state. The legislature is forbidden to deprive
the employer or employee of the exercise of that right. The legislature has no authority to pronounce
the performance of an innocent act criminal when the public health, safety, comfort or welfare is not
interfered with. The statute in question says that, if a man exercises his constitutional right to
terminate a contract with his employee, he shall, without a hearing, be punished as for the
commission of a crime.
xxxxxxxxx

Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to
contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts.
The legislature cannot prevent persons, who are sui juris, from laboring, or from making such
contracts as they may see fit to make relative to their own lawful labor; nor has it any power by penal
laws to prevent any person, with or without cause, from refusing to employ another or to terminate a
contract with him, subject only to the liability to respond in a civil action for an unwarranted refusal to
do that which has been agreed upon. Hence, we are of the opinion that this Act contravenes those
provisions of the state and Federal constitutions, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.
The statute in question is exactly analogous to the Minimum Wage Act referred to above. In section
13 it will be seen that no person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory shop, or place of
labor of any description, can make a contract with a woman without incurring the obligation, whatever
the contract of employment might be, unless he also promise to pay to such woman employed as a
laborer, who may become pregnant, her wages for thirty days before and thirty days after
confinement. In other words, said section creates a term or condition in every contract made by every
person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become
pregnant, and a failure to include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. Clearly,
therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory,
shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into
contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a
term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived
of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his
liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.
It is believed and confidently asserted that no case can be found, in civilized society and wellorganized governments, where individuals have been deprived of their property, under the police
power of the state, without compensation, except in cases where the property in question was used
for the purpose of violating some legally adopted, or constitutes a nuisance. Among such cases may
be mentioned: Apparatus used in counterfeiting the money of the state; firearms illegally possessed;
opium possessed in violation of law; apparatus used for gambling in violation of law; buildings and
property used for the purpose of violating laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors; and all cases in which the property itself has become a nuisance and dangerous and
detrimental to the public health, morals and general welfare of the state. In all of such cases, and in
many more which might be cited, the destruction of the property is permitted in the exercise of the
police power of the state. But it must first be established that such property was used as the
instrument for the violation of a valid existing law. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall., [U. S.], 36; Butchers Union, etc., Co. vs. Crescent City, etc., Co., 111 U. S.,
746 John Stuart Mill On Liberty, 28, 29.)

Without further attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of the police power, it
may safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation
of the public peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. But the state, when providing
by legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject
to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be
permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the execution of
the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their law the constitution. (Mugler vs. Kansas,
123 U. S., 623.)
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the
growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that
power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express
inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for
the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It
will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or
place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to
pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.
It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the
right to contract about ones affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the due
process of law clause of the constitution. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578, 591; New York Life
Ins. Co. vs. Dodge, 246 U. S., 357, 373, 374; Coppage vs. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1, 10, 14; Adair vs.
United States, 208 U. S., 161; Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S.; 45, 49; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S.,
412, 421.)
The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
(Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the
provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in
that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p. 238.)
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and
the defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

US v Toribio, 1910
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
January 26, 1910
G.R. No. 5060
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a
permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the
provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered
there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle
without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production
of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying
for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the
ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless
such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be
given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and
such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of
radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal
for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of
owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date
of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos,
Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition
contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle
for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not
being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to
cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to
the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase at the
municipal slaughterhouse may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word slaughtered and
the words killed for food in section 30, and the words slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption and the words killing for food in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase
at the municipal slaughterhouse may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words killed for

food and killing for food as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and
keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that
the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make
easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To
this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of
ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to
establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by
certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is
made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to
protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but
the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But
the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the
official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be
largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered,
and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a
municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the
slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals
without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed
records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it
will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the
brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion,
since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the
fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks
might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of
the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is
clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption
anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility
of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary
the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of
municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human
consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute
to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their
slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected;
and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the
construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well
as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes.
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured
in the event that the animal is not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes, is unconstitutional
and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which
provides that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domainwithout providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of
opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist,
Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, where the question involved was
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person,
including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,)
that the law in question is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of

the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community.
It may be conceded that the beneficial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute;
and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is
an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree
interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in
question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are
concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we
are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as
is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to
compensation, and that it is no more than a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property,
which the legislature had authority to impose.
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush. 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs.
Tewksbury(supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion,
in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . .
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power
vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is
rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of

property interests to a public use, and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use,
which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to
safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the
limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions
of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest in the exercise of the sovereign police
power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which reaches to every species
of property within the commonwealth.
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy,
eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals.
Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal
almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with
which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas
of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of
the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many
millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to
cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more
that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine
soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many provinces the
energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the
United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the
provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident
to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of
animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of
the work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields
and the transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the
Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official
reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals
which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the
Islands where the need for them was greatest.

At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications
of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree
successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase
and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the
laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those sections which suffered
most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to
five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted
prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until
the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the
crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the
enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other
personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that
the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome
provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their
slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding
and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food
were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion
that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter
for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper
exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the
State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply
of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and
records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the
material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages
of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law
under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a
civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease
or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to
adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and
penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of
rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon
necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by
the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
exercise of that power.

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S. 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in
the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything
essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by
summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has
been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise
endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the
slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of
interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsory vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with contagious
deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where
intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public
interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1.) To justify
the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class; and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a reasonably necessary limitation
on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt. 140), said (p. 149) that by
this general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect
right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles,
ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.

And Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be
exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in
number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public
authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where
the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where,
nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong
instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property
of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile
army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest
must yield to that necessity which knows no law. The establishment of limits within the denser
portions of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be
erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but
regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be
established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building
out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the
protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may
establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil
equally with other persons. Such regulations are only a just restraint of an injurious use of property,
which the legislature have authority to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances,
and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now
become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes
destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be
detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further
use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly
indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that
the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the
terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, a provision which itself is
adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the constitution of
most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Calalang vs Williams, 1940

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
MAXIMO CALALANG,
Petitioner,
-versusG.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of
Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
chanroblespublishingcompany
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in
its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director
of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of
Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval
of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of

Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as
a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places abovementioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well. chanroblespublishingcompany
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by
which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), The rule has nowhere been better
stated than in the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely:
The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. Co. vs. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1)
may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments
or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead,
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the necessity of the case. chanroblespublishingcompany
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads
by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such
roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures
within a reasonable distance from along the national roads.
Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of
traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. chanroblespublishingcompany
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and

Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing
the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): To
assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a
future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely
for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully
know. The proper distinction the court said was this: The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the
halls of legislation. (Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.
294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and
46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation
vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this
Court had occasion to observe that the principle of
separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent,
been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the

legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative

and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest. chanroblespublishingcompany
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the state. chanroblespublishingcompany
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of
were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of
liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation. chanroblespublishingcompany
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances.
As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238;
49 L. ed. 169), the right to exercise the police power is a continuing
one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become
a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to
the public good. And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was
observed that advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being
within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an
increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to
look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state,

have brought within the police power many questions for regulation
which formerly were not so considered. chanroblespublishingcompany
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained
of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. chanroblespublishingcompany
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
chanroblespublishingcompany
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed
for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur

US v Abendan, 1913
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
January 24, 1913
G.R. No. L-7830
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO ABENDAN, defendant-appellant.
P.E. del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 105 of
the city of Cebu, under a complaint charging, That on or about the 26th day of October of the present
year, the said accused was ordered by the department of sanitation, for the second time, to make
certain repairs and perform certain work which was of great necessity for the preservation of the
sanitary conditions of said house, but instead of doing as he was ordered, he illegally and criminally
refused to comply with the said order, issued for the second time to him by the Department of
Sanitation.
The work which the appellant was required to perform in his house in the city of Cebu by the order of
the department of sanitation, referred to in the complaint, was the following:
1. To put a ventilator in the closet in the upper part of the house and install a closet in the lower part of
the house.
2. To put a bell-trap in the kitchen in the lower part of the house.
3. To put a bell-trap in the kitchen in the upper part of the house.
William Pauly, the chief sanitary inspector of the city of Cebu, testified in substance as follows:

I remember that on or about the 26th day of October past, I inspected the house of the accused in
question, for the purpose of determining its sanitary condition. As a result of such inspection, I found
that the house was in an unsanitary condition. As a result, I issued an order requiring the accused to
put the house in a sanitary condition. The accused has complied with a part of the order, but has
neglected to comply with the other part. He has not put in a bell-trap as required by paragraph 2 of
said order, and he has not put in a bell-trap in the kitchen in the upper part of the house, as required
by paragraph 3. He has complied with the remainder. He has not complied with any part of the work
required to be done under paragraph 1 of said order. That is to say, he has not placed the ventilator in
the closet in the upper part of the house, nor has he installed a closet below. There are living in the
lower part of the house in question a Chinese tinner with his family and a Filipino silversmith with his
family. An American family lives in the upper part of the house. The Chinamans family consists of
three members, but there are some workmen who aid the Chinaman in his work; from two to six of
them remain in the tienda all day. I do not know the number of persons in the Filipino family, but the
silversmith has three or four workmen. There is no closet in the lower part of the house aside from that
which we ordered him to put in. Thus far he has not done the work which we ordered him to do.
The witness testified on cross-examination, in part, that he issued no other or subsequent order to the
accused, but he was sure that he had talked with him; that when the house was inspected by him he
found therein no dirt or excrement, nor did he find in any of his inspections that the persons who lived
in the house were in any way dirtying or committing nuisances on the lower floor. He also stated that
some kind of construction for the discharge of the water was necessary in this house, as it collected on
the floor and finally ran out upon the adjoining lots.
The failure to comply with the requirements of the order in question is admitted.
Article 6 of the municipal ordinances of Cebu, as amended by article 3 of Municipal Ordinance No. 111,
is as follows:
ART. 6. It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, or other person in possession and in control of any lot,
building, or place, declared to be in bad sanitary condition by the chief sanitary officer, or his
representative, to comply with any order duly issued in accordance with the provisions of this
ordinance, requiring repairs, improvements, alterations, or necessary construction, or to put the place
designated in sanitary condition within the time specified in said order, which time shall not exceed
sixty days, except by special permission of the sanitary officer of the district.
Paragraph (jj) of section 39 of the Municipal Code is as follows:
(jj) Make such ordinances and regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and such as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the

protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the
municipal council may prescribe under the provisions of paragraph (dd) of this section.
It appearing that the city of Cebu at the time this ordinance was enacted had full authority from the
Legislature to enact an ordinance upon the subject embraced within it, such ordinance is valid, unless
it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or
unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right.
Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of
such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable
exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid. (Le Feber vs. West Allis, 119 Wis., 608, 100 Am.
St. Rep., 917; Coal-Float vs. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind., 15; P.C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. vs. Crown Point, 146
Ind., 421, 35 L.R.A., 684.)
Although ordinances may not contravene a constitution or statute and may be within the scope of
charter powers, yet, if they seem to the court oppressive, unfair, partial, or discriminating, they are
declared unreasonable and void, whether this appear from their face or from proof aliunde. (Elliot,
Mun. Corp., 198-202; Lake View vs. Tate, 130 Ill., 247; Kip vs. Paterson, 26 N.J.L., 298; Ex parte
Frank, 52 Cal., 606; Toney vs. Macon, 119 Ga., 83; Carrollton vs. Bazzette, 159 Ill., 284; Mt. Vernon
Bank vs. Sarlls, 129 Ind., 201; State vs. Mahner, 43 La. Ann., 496; Red Star Steamship Co. vs. Jersey
City, 45 N.J.L., 246.)
The sole question raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that the
ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive.
The municipality of Cebu, as is seen from the quotation of the general municipal law, has the right to
enact ordinances relating to sanitation and the public health. The ordinance as set out above seems to
us to be an enactment clearly within the purview of the statute authorizing it, and, while very general
in its terms, it contains no provision which of itself is against the fundamental law or act of the
Legislature or is oppressive or unreasonable. Unreasonable persons may try to apply it in an
unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree or under unreasonable conditions, but in and of
itself the ordinance discloses none of the defects which have been alleged against it.
The evidence in the case, which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order
complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having introduced substantially no
proof in the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in that locality, or that he was
required to do a thing that the others had not been required to do, or that he had in any way been
discriminated against in the application of this ordinance to the facts of his case, or that its application
was oppressive or unreasonable in this particular instance.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
The court having found the ordinance in question to be an enactment clearly within the purview of the
statute authorizing it, and having found that said ordinance contains no provision against the
fundamental law or acts of the legislature, and is neither oppressive nor unreasonable; or, in other
words, the court having found the ordinance valid, I think that the appeal should be dismissed with
costs against the appellant, without determining whether or not the appellant has, as a matter of fact,
violated the provisions of said ordinance.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I think the appeal should have been dismissed and not affirmed.

Cruz vs Youngberg, 1931

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34674

October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee.
Jose Yulo for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance
of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the
Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported
by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No.
3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands.
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the
Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle
diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text
of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing
contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall
be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from
foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General,
with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition
entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among
foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.
SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief
demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of
the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this
court.
The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact
alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from
Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import,
bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The
Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had,
authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred
cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these
Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of
Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum:Provided, further, That all live
cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the
Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the
Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to
authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue
regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and
refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this
prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.
Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit
for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis
Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361;
23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind.,
204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes
unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen &
Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the
validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the
petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is
entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155
to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope
of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado,
187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of
Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine
Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the
time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court
to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the
measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited
therein.)
1awphil.net

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding
that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We
do not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati,
Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88)
said in such case:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3
of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation
of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law.
It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is
not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the
Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See
MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and
`amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition'
and `amendment.')"
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.

Co Kiam, et. al, vs City of Manila, 1955

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
February 28, 1955
G.R. No. L-6762
CO KIAM and LEE BAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of all meat dealers selling outside
public markets, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, THE MAYOR, and THE CHIEF OF POLICE, defendants-appellant.
FILOMENA BRIONES ET AL., intervenors-appellants.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for appellants.
, J.:
This is an action to annul Ordinance No. 3563 of the City of Manila, which was enacted in March, 1953,
to ban the sale of fresh meat outside of the city markets.
Plaintiffs are Chinese citizens doing business in the city, selling both fresh and refrigerated meat in
their stores out side the city markets. At the time the ordinance in question was enacted, there was
already an ordinance No. 3555 forbidding the sale of fresh meat around the city markets within
200 meters from the boundaries thereof, and, to comply with the ordinance, plaintiffs and their stores
located at more than that distance from any city market. But the new ordinance repeals that other
ordinance and prohibits the sale of fresh meat anywhere outside of the city markets, thus making it
illegal for plaintiffs to continue vending fresh meat in their aforementioned stores. Plaintiffs, therefore,
in behalf of themselves and of others similarly situated, brought the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to have the new ordinance declared null and void to enjoin its enforcement
and to compel the Mayor to issue licenses permitting them to continue selling meat under the terms of
the former ordinance .
Upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 3563, the city authorities resisted the action, and in this they
were joined by the intervenors who, as vendors of fresh meat in the city market stalls as members of
trade organizations advocating nationalization of the retail trade claim to have an interest in the

litigation. After hearing, the lower court rendered a decision declaring the ordinance in question null
and void, permanently enjoining its enforcement and commanding the Mayor to issue licenses to
plaintiffs to enable them to continue their business as vendors of fresh meat in the City of Manila
outside the distance of two hundred (200) meters from any public market. From this decision, the city
and the intervenors have appealed directly to this Court.
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale fresh meat outside of the city
public markets: Provided, That this Ordinance shall not apply to cold shortage meat imported from
foreign countries or from any province, town barrio or other place of the Philippines when such meat is
duly marked and accompanied by a certificate showing that the animals furnishing the meat have
been subject to an ante-mortem and post-mortem examination and found good for human
consumption by a veterinarian of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and when said cold storage meat has
been kept for not less than twenty days in any establishment duly quipped for cold storing meat and
other food products.
On behalf of the defendants the ordinance is sought to be justified as legitimate exercised of the police
power to meet the menace posed by the clandestine sale of meat from diseased animals. by confining
the sale of meat within the city public markets, inspection is facilitated and trafficking in meat that is
unfit for human consumption will be minimized if not totally suppressed. Very enlightening is the
following letter of the City Health Officer to the mayor:
His Honor, the Mayor Manila Sir:
In compliance with your instructions given in your memorandum of even date, I have the honor to
give hereunder comments on the sale of meat outside of public markets.
No animal shall be slaughtered for food without ante-mortem examination. (Art. 111, Sec. 4, Adm.
Order No. 9, Dept. of Agriculture and Commerce). It is unlawful to sell or offer for sale the meat of
animals not slaughtered in the City Slaughterhouse. (Ord. 3472). There are however, many
unscrupulous persons who, regardless of what happens to public violate these regulations by
slaughtering animals privately without the benefit of veterinary inspection and sell the meat thereof
clandestinely to the public. Very often the hot meat sold is unfit for human consumption. This
clandestine business therefore poses a grave and serious threat to the public health. It thrives, in spite
of the combined and unrelenting efforts of the Manila Police Department, the City Department of
Finance and this Department to curb and suppress it, because of the circumstance that fresh meat is
allowed to be sold anywhere in the city. The wide territory to be covered makes it extremely difficult
for the few meat inspectors of this Office, the fewer policemen assigned to meat apprehension and the
agents of the City Treasurer to combat this menace.

If the sale of fresh meat were allowed only is specified places such as in public markets (as Ordinance
No. 3563 would), it will be much easier to inspect and examine meat intended for human
consumption. The chances of the public buying and consuming diseased meat will be greatly
minimized if not totally eliminated. Public health will thereby be more thoroughly safeguarded and
protected.
On the other hand, as it is the case now, it is extremely difficult to examine and inspect all the meat
sold by numerous establishments and persons in widely scattered places in the city. Under this
circumstance, the chances are great for diseased and clandestine meat to find its way to the dining
tables of city residents.
In view of the foregoing, at least from the standpoint of public health, would be a sound regulatory
measure to allow the sale of fresh meat only in public markets. As already stated above, this will
facilitate meat inspection work with the result that the health of the people will be more properly
safeguarded, It will be easier to apprehend dealers on hot or clandestine meat.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) M. C. ICASIANO
City Health Officer
The City of Manila is expressly authorized by its charter (Republic Act 409) to establish, maintain and
regulate public markets and slaughterhouses and prohibit or permit the establishment or operation
thereof by private persons [section 18, paragraph (cc], It is also specifically empowered to regulate
the sale off meat [section 18, paragraph (1)]. and in addition, it has the authority in the excercise of
its police power under the general welfare clause [section 18, paragraph(kk)] to enact all ordinances
may it deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the property and
the promotion of the morality, peace, good, order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants.
In the case of People vs. Montil, 53 Phil. 580, this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the sale of pork outside of the public market. Again in the case of People vs. Sabarre, et
al., 65 Phil. 684, this Court also upheld a municipal ordinance which prohibits butchers and any other
person from selling meat in any place except in the public market. Similar ordinances have likewise
been declared valid in other jurisdictions. [St. Martinville vs. Bugas, 103 s. 761; Morano vs. The
Mayor, 2 La. 217; New Orleans vs. Faber, 105 La. 212, and Winsborro vs. Smart, 11 Rich. (S. C.)
551.] In the last case cited, it was held that under the power to make ordinances respecting markets,
health and good order of the town, a municipal corporation may by ordinance prohibit the sale of
butchers meat within the corporate limits except at the public market and that such an ordinance is
not in restrain of trade, but in regulation thereof, and does not violate the ordinary rights of the
citizen.

The trial court declared the ordinance in question void on the theory that a legitimate business like
that of selling fresh meat may be regulated but not entirely prohibited since the power to regulate
does not include the power to prohibit. But it is obvious that the ordinance does not prohibit the
business of vending fresh meat. What it does prohibit is the sale of that commodity outside of the
public markets. In other words, the ordinance merely localizes the sale of fresh meat, confining the
sale to the city public markets with a view to facilitating police inspection and supervision in the
interest of public health.
It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive
them to their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted. Plaintiffs may likewise sell other
commodities or engage in other gainful pursuits. and surely, the mere fact that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living can not
prevent the excercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the excercise of the police power
embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal excercise of
that power. (City of New Orleans vs. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.) .
We are not impressed by the plea that there are not enough facilities for the sale of fresh meat in the
public markets of Manila, appraised as we are that the city already has 14 markets and 17 talipapas
(temporary markets). Moreover, what would constitute sufficient facilities in regulation to the everchanging public need is more a matter for legislative determination. And considering that stalls in the
public markets produce revenue in the from of rents paid by their occupants, it is illogical to suppose
that the city government would not establish additional stalls should there be actual need for more.
Our conclusion is that the ordinance here in question is within the power of the City of Manila to enact.
The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed and plaintiffs complaint dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C.J. Pablo, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Bastida vs City Council of Baguio, 1929

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
September 19, 1929
G.R. No. 31801
F. BASTIDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO and E. J. HALSEMA, Mayor and Engineer of the City of
Baguio, respondents.
Guevara, Francisco & Recto for petitioner.
Jose R. Carlos for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original application presented in this court by the petitioner F. Bastida against the City
Council, Mayor and City Engineer of the City of Baguio, by which the petitioner seeks to compel the
respondent, the City Engineer of the City of Baguio, to issue a building permit to the petitioner and to
compel the City Council and Mayor of the same city, or either of them, to issue a license to the
petitioner to operate a cinematographic, or moving picture, establishment in the City of Baguio. The
cause is now before us for resolution upon demurrer submitted in behalf of the respondents.
It appears that the petitioner is the owner of lots 8 and 9, business section A, in the City of Baguio,
together with the wooden building erected thereon with the height of one story. About the end of
February, 1929, the petitioner became desirous of using said building for a skating rink, and he
applied to the respondent E. J. Halsema, Mayor and City Engineer of the City of Baguio, for a permit to
this effect. This application was denied on the ground that the location of the building was such that,
being in the commercial zone of the city, it should be two stories high, if intended to be used as a
skating rink. The petitioner thereupon determined to make alterations in the building by adding, at an
estimated cost of P65,000, two new stories, the first to be used for a skating rink and the two others
for a cinematograph and a boxing stadium. It is alleged in the petition that, at the time this
proceeding was begun, the alterations referred to had begun, and that the amount of P45,000 had
already been expanded thereon. While the alterations mentioned were in the course of progress the

petitioner obtained, so he asserts, from the representative of a cinematographic concern in the City of
Manila, an advantageous offer for the use of the second floor of the petitioners building, for the
purpose of the exhibition of cinematographic films, and the petitioner contemplated accepting said
offer, as he in fact would have done except for the matters hereinafter mentioned.
The petitioner alleges that shortly after the publicity had been given to his design of using the second
floor of the altered building for cinematographic representations, the City Council of the City of Baguio
adopted an ordinance, No. 332, amending the city ordinances relating to buildings in the City of
Baguio to the following effect:
Provided, further, That hereafter no building intended for theater, cinematograph projections, or circus,
either wholly or partially, shall be permitted to be constructed or being occupied within the City of
Baguio unless the same is constructed of reinforced concrete and steel throughout, at such height,
thickness and reinforcing as the City Engineer or the Director of Public Works, or both may approve.
Provided finally, That such building or buildings must be provided with a sufficient number of exit
doors but not less than six for the use of the public patronizing same in order to assure safety in case
of conflagrations or other accidents, such as fire, panic, earthquake, etc.
SEC. II. This Ordinance shall not affect permits already granted at the time of its passage.
It further appears that on May 6, 1929, the said City Council passed another ordinance, numbered
334, of which sections 1 and 2 read as follows:
SECTION I. No building shall be constructed within two meters from the adjacent lot lines, unless a
concrete fire wall approved by the City Engineer is constructed between the building and the adjoining
property and in which case no window openings in the wall should be provided.
SEC. II. No building already existing on or before the passage of this Ordinance shall be rebuilt or
reconstructed, except in accordance with the provision hereof.
On June 15, 1929, the petitioner, so it is alleged, made application to the respondent city engineer for
a building permit to add two floors to the aforesaid building, in accordance with plans submitted with
said application; and on June 17, 1929, the petitioner further applied to the respondent Mayor for a
license to conduct in said building a cinematograph and boxing stadium as soon as the alterations on
the building should be finished. In reply to his application for a building permit the respondent City
Engineer of Baguio, on June 18, 1929, returned to the petitioner the plans for the addition to his
building with the information that the same could not be approved, inasmuch as the plans were not in
conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid ordinances Nos. 332 and 334. The petition contains no
direct statement to the effect that his application for license to operate a cinematograph and a boxing
stadium had been denied, but the refusal of the Mayor to issue such license is inferable from other

allegations in the petition; and besides, inasmuch as the time for the use of the license had not yet
arrived, the point may perhaps be considered academic.
The vital question in this case is whether that portion of Ordinance No. 332 is valid, which requires
that buildings designed either wholly or partially, for theatrical performances, cinematographic
projections, or circuses, shall be built reinforced concrete and steel throughout and of such height,
thickness, and reinforcing as the City Engineer or Director of Public Works, or both may approved.
Other questions that might possibly be raised with respect to the proposed alterations intended by the
petitioner in the building mentioned, as, for instance, whether the conditions are such as to require a
concrete fire wall to separate the building from contiguous structures, and whether his plans provide
for the requisite number of exits, are not so presented that they could be decided in this case upon
demurrer, for the plans are not before us. But the other point, that is, as to the necessity of the of the
use of reinforced concrete and steel, is presented; and at this point suffices to determine the case, we
direct our intention to this point only.
It is alleged in the petition that there is at present but one cinematograph establishment operating in
the City of Baguio and that this is conducted by one Murphy in a wooden building located on the
Session Road. As Ordinance No. 332 exempts establishments operating under existing permits, it
results that, under the ordinance, Murphys establishments can continue to operate, at least during the
life of the existing permit. This circumstance is used by the petitioner as the basis of the allegation
that Ordinance No. 332 is partial and discriminatory. The ordinance mentioned is also attacked as
unreasonable, oppressive, and violative of private rights and of the freedom of trade.
Upon examining the provisions of law defining the powers of the City Council of Baguio, we find that
said councils, among other things, authorized by ordinance to make suitable provisions to insure the
public safety from conflagrations, storms and other public calamities; and it is further generally
authorized to make such ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as maybe necessary to
carry into effect and discharged the powers and duties conferred upon the council. (Adm. Code, sec.
2553, subsecs. k and ll.)
The Ordinance No. 334, of the City of Baguio, expressly recites that it made in the excercise of the
power conferred upon the council to ensure the public safety from conflagrations; and also there is no
preamble to Ordinance No. 332 containing a similar recital, it is obvious that said ordinance was
enacted with the same purpose in view.
The disastrous records of conflagrations, destructive to life on a large scale, that have occurred in
populous centers, suggest the wisdom of requirements that the building intended to house
cinematographic performances should be built of fireproof material; and we are of the opinion that
under the power granted to the City Council of Baguio by the provision above cited, that body had
ample power to enact the provision now under consideration.

The following passage taken from a standard encyclopedia treatise correctly reflects, we think, the
general doctrine of the American courts on the point now under consideration.
In the exercise of their police powers municipal corporations may enact such regulations as are
necessary for the prevention of, and protection from fires. And it is the duty of the municipal
corporations to do so. While some decisions consider or refer to this power as inherent in municipal
corporations, it, nevertheless, usually exist by reason of an express grant or a necessarily implied
statutory or constitutional delegation. The reasonable view is that, like other municipal power, it may
be applied. But the corporation cannot exceed the authority given or granted by statute or charter.
Fire municipal regulations must be reasonable and not arbitrary; but the courts will not declare such
regulations unreasonable, unless in clear cases of abuse. The power to prevent fire carries with it the
right to employ the most effective means to that end. In the exercise of the power the erection of use
of buildings for the purpose of a more or less dangerous character maybe prohibited. (43 C.J. pp. 368,
369.)
Again, in another elaborate treatise dealing with the power of the municipal authorities to regulate
theaters, it is said:
A municipal corporation may regulate theaters and places of amusement in regard to the methods of
construction, the seating and similar details with respect to the building, but it has been held that
under general power it cannot require theaters to pay for services of a city fireman required to be
present at each performance. (III McQuillin, Mun. Corp., sec. 950, p. 2082.)
The power conferred in this case by statute upon the City Council of Baguio to make suitable provision
to insure the public safety from fires and other public calamities pertains to the authority, called
police power, which contemplates the protection of the safety, health and morals of the community.
It is common place in the branch of legal science known as constitutional law that police power is of a
privileged nature, and even the ordinary constitutional guaranties are not to be interpreted as unduly
restrictive of such power. The industry of the attorneys in this case has not brought to our attention
any case in which the validity of an ordinance requiring fireproof material to be used in the
construction of theaters has been questioned, especially where the power to make adequate provision
for the safety of the community has been expressly conferred.
But it is insisted that the Ordinance No. 332 is invalid because of the fact that permits granted prior to
the passage of the ordinance should not be affected by it. This contention is untenable, for the reason
that the City Council of Baguio may have had a very good reason for exempting the single
cinematographic establishment which was running under permit when the ordinance was passed, and
we are not informed as to conditions relating to the location and construction of this place.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that existing permits have to be renewed from time to time, and
the fact that a single establishment is now running under license does not mean that it has been
permitted to continue forever. The ordinance, it seems to us, would have been still more questionable
if it had failed to make exception in favor of a single establishment which is now running under permit

and for which the license fee, if any is exacted, had already been paid for at the time the ordinance
was enacted.
Again, it is suggested that the ordinance requiring concrete construction for buildings of the character
of that now under consideration is unreasonable and discriminatory, because it is not made applicable
to all establishments, including churches, schools and hotels wherein people are accustomed to gather.
It takes but little knowledge of modern conditions to recognize, however, that the theater or
cinematograph establishment needs to be safeguarded by the use of proper material in construction
and the provision of adequate exits much more than other places of assembly, owing to the congestion
which often occurs in these laces and the inflammable nature of the material used in giving
performances. None of the criticisms made upon the validity of the ordinance are in our opinion well
founded.
In the demurrer to the complaint a question is made as to whether mandamus will lie in such a case
as this; and it is suggested that the power conferred by law upon the respondents in respect to the
issuing of building permits and licenses involves the excercise of discretion; from which it is inferable
that the plaintiffs remedy should be by writ of injunction and not by mandamus. We prefer to
pretermit this question and decide the case on the more fundamental question of merit , which has a
relation to the validity of the ordinance, or ordinances, set out in this opinion.
The petition, in our opinion, is not well founded and must be denied. So ordered, with costs against
the petitioner.
Avancea, C.J. Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Dela Cruz, et. al, vs Judge Paras, 1976

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41053 February 27, 1976
FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, as Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN
MIGUEL, respondents.
Victoriano R. Aldava for petitioners.
Manuel P. Pun for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
The prime issue presented to Us in this special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus, which
was certified by the Court of Appeals on July 15, 1975, involves the rule in determining whether an
order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory. Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, 1 the
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real
Estate" before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against private respondent Pablo San Miguel.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2624, sought the partition of Lot No. 4543 of the
Lolomboy Estate, which is a portion of original Lot No. 3237 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15369 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Traversing the complaint, respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted
exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543.
Subsequently, on March 19, 1964, the then trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the dismissal of the
case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for "apparent lack of interest in
the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants."
Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, docketed as Civil Case No. 4300-M of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, was instituted by the same Pedro San Miguel against private
respondent Pablo San Miguel. This time, the complaint prayed for the partition of Lot No. 4543
(covered by TCT No. T-15369, Bulacan) and Lot No. 3269 (covered by TCT No. T-15370, Bulacan).
In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed his answer, pleading therein the defense of res judicata. For him,

the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigate . d upon and resolved in the
previous Civil Case No. 2624. After preliminary hearing, the respondent Judge issued an order on
December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of
the principle of res judicata.
The case was ordered to proceed as regards Lot No. 3269, and on July 31, 1974, respondent Judge
rendered a decision ordering the parties "as CO-OWNERS to present to this Court within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, a PROJECT OF PARTITION, dividing Lot No. 3269 (Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15370, Bulacan) into two equal parts." Petitioners received a copy of this decision on
August 13,1974.
On September 12, 1974, petitioners interposed their appeal from this judgment of the trial court. On
said date, their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed.
On December 9, 1974, respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but
"insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long
became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and therefore any record on appeal thereon will
be useless, moot and academic ...
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a "Petition for certiorari
And/Or Mandamus" before the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1975, but the latter court elevated
the petition to Us upon discovering that only questions of law are raised.
It is readily discernible that the decisive question in this case is whether or not the order of the
respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M as regards Lot No.
4543, is final and appealable.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall
be subject to appeal." Interlocuootry or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an
action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the
other." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the mertis of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, if is final." 2 A court order is final character if it puts an end to
the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter threin disposed of, 3 such that no further
questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The term "final" judgment or
order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no
further questions or direction for future determination. 5 The order or judgment may validly refer to
the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch threof. "In the absence of a statutory
definition, a final judgment, order decree has been held to be ... one that finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is
reversed or set aside. 6 The central point to consider is, threfore, the effects of the order on the rights
of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional
and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7 The word "interlocutory"
refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides
some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 8

1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4300-M on
December 10, 1973, is a clear final and appealable order. The said order is a final disposition of the
whole controversy between the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No. 4543. It is absolute
and conclusive on all questions in regard thereto. 9 The trial court's order is not a mere narrow
acceptance of private respondent's plea of res judicata. It has more the far-ranging effect of
confirming private respondent's claim of exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, as previously
adjudicated in the prior Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the sole owner of
this specific lot; as a result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or his succesors-in-interest for
that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they claim is their rightful share thereto. 10 After the
issuance of this order, nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting
claims of the parties over the subject lot have already been resolved. As a matter of fact, the final
order of dismissal cannot even be assailed by certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners
herein have failed to undertake. 11 The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under litigation
and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the
final nature of the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent
branch of the case is reserved for future consideration . 12
2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, foreclosing the
relitigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the March 19, 1964 order of the then trial Judge, Ricardo C.
Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624, which involves the same lot, dismissing the case for lack of interest to
prosecute. This dismissal order of the said trial Judge has the effect and consequences of a
dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was neither
without prejudice nor based upon lack of jurisdiction. 13 It is worthy to note that the deceased Pedro
San Miguel interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the subject matter of
that Civil Case No. 2624 (Lot No. 4543) eleven years threafter, when he commensed Civil Case No.
4300-M, praying for the partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot No. 4543. This, the deceased Pedro San
Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this particular Lot No. 4543 must reach a terminal point. The
principle of estoppel by judgment, on of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the relitigation in another action of a specific question actually litigated and determined in a former
one. 14 The second casde, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the first case,
Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, thre is Identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action between the first case where the jdugment was rendered and the second
case which is sought to be barred as far as Lot No. 4543 is concerned. Likewise, the judgment in the
first case is a final one rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits. 15
3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee. This is, however, subject
to limitation s. Once the rights of a party-litigant have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, the party-litigant can no longer litigate the same again. 16 A right, question or fact
distinctly placed in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit
is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the
same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the firs suit
remains unmodified. 17 Public policy and sound practice jdemand that "at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law." 18Reipublicae ut
sit finis litium.

It results, thjrefore, that respondent Judge did not abusde his discetion when he issued the order of
December 9, 1974, approving petitioners' corrected record on appeal "insofar only as Lot 3269 is
concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL ... ."
ACCORDINGLY, the order of December 9, 1974, subject matter of this petition, issued by
respondent Judge in his Civil Case No. 4300-M, approving petitioners corrected record on appeal
with respect only to Lot 2369, is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz, Palma, JJ., concur.