Kentucky Child Labor Amendment Case
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Scribd Government DocsKentucky Child Labor Amendment Case
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Scribd Government Docs307 U.S.
474
59 S.Ct. 992
83 L.Ed. 1407
CHANDLER, Governor of Commonwealth of Kentucky, et al.
v.
WISE et al.
No. 14.
Reargued April 18, 1939.
Decided June 5, 1939.
Mr. J. W. Jones, of Lexington, Ky., for petitioners.
Mr. Robert H. Jackson, Sol. Gen., for the United States, as amicus curiae,
by special leave of Court.
Messrs. Oldham Clarke and Lafon Allen, both of Louisville, Ky., for
respondents.
[Argument of Counsel from page 475 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
In January, 1937, the legislature of Kentucky adopted a resolution purporting to
ratify the constitutional amendment proposed by the Congress in 1924 and
known as the 'Child Labor Amendment'.1
Respondents, citizens, taxpayers and voters in Kentucky brought this suit in the
state court to restrain the Governor of the Commonwealth and the officers of
the General Assembly from sending certified copies of the resolution to the
Secretary of State of the United States and the presiding officers of the Senate
and House of Representatives, and for a judgment declaring the action of the
General Assembly to be illegal and void. The complaint stated that in 1926 the
proposed amendment had been rejected by the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth and also by more than a majority of the legislatures of the
States, and that the General Assembly could not thereafter legally reconsider
and adopt the amendment; and, further, that its action was not taken within a
reasonable time after the amendment was proposed.
3
Upon the filing of the petition, a restraining order was granted and summons
was issued. On the same day, but before the Governor was actually served with
a copy of the restraining order or summons, he forwarded by mail a certified
copy of the resolution to the Secretary of State. It is not claimed that the
Governor then knew of the pendency of the proceeding.
Plaintiffs then filed an amended petition setting forth the action taken by the
Governor and sought a mandatory injunction to require him to notify the
Secretary of State of the pendency of the suit and that the notice which he had
sent was void and should be disregarded. That action was not taken. Defendants
filed a general demurrer which was sustained in the Circuit Court but its
judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 270 Ky. 1, 108 S.W.2d 1024.
The court gave opportunity on the remand to the Circuit Court, with directions
to overrule the demurrer, for such further proceedings as were not inconsistent
with its views. Upon that remand the defendants declined to plead further and
judgment was entered in accordance with the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The judgment so entered set forth (1) that an actual controversy existed
between the parties, that the plaintiffs had the right to maintain the suit and the
court had jurisdiction; (2) that the resolution of the legislature purporting to
ratify the proposed amendment was void, not having been ratified according to
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States; (3) that the notice given
by the Governor to the Secretary of State was of no effect; (4) that the clerk of
the court should give official notice to the Department of State that the
resolution purporting to ratify the amendment was invalid, that it had not been
ratified according to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and
that the notice given by the Governor was of no effect. The clerk was further
directed to send a duly authenticated copy of the judgment to the Secretary of
State by registered mail.
On appeal, that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We granted
certiorari. 303 U.S. 634, 58 S.Ct. 831, 82 L.Ed. 1095.
We think that, while the state court had jurisdiction in limine, the writ of
certiorari should be dismissed upon the ground that after the Governor of
Kentucky had forwarded the certification of the ratification of the amendment
to the Secretary of State of the United States there was no longer a controversy
susceptible of judicial determination.
Dismissed.
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS and Mr. Justice BUTLER think that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky should be affirmed on the authority of
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 41 S.Ct. 510, 65 L.Ed. 994, and for the reasons
stated in the dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct.
972, 83 L.Ed. -, decided this day.
10
Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.
11
For the reasons stated in concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. -, we do not believe that State or Federal courts
have any jurisdiction to interfere with the amending process.
12
We therefore concur in the dismissal.
43 Stat. 670.
