Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943)
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Scribd Government DocsEmil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs318 U.S.
515
63 S.Ct. 687
87 L.Ed. 954
In re JOHN M. RUSSELL, Inc. EMIL
v.
HANLEY.
No. 551.
Argued Feb. 12, 1943.
Decided March 15, 1943.
Mr. David Haar, of New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. John P. McGrath, of Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
John M. Russell, Inc., was the owner of an apartment house in New York. On
August 13, 1940, a foreclosure suit by a third mortgagee was filed. On August
17, 1940, the state court appointed respondent receiver of the rents and profits
of the apartment house. On August 31, 1940, an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy was filed against John M. Russell, Inc., of which petitioner was
subsequently appointed as trustee. Respondent collected the rents from the
premises from the time of his appointment in August, 1940, to and including
August, 1941. While that foreclosure suit was pending, mechanics liens,
subordinate to the third mortgage, were foreclosed, a sale was had, and the
property purchased by Apartment Investing Corporation. That was in February,
1941. Judgment in the mortgage foreclosure suit was entered in June, 1941, and
on August 13, 1941, before the sale was held, the judgment was paid and
satisfied by Apartment Investing Corporation. Thereafter, respondent presented
his accounts to the state court for settlement. Petitioner applied to the
bankruptcy court for an order directing respondent to file his account in that
court. While that motion was pending, the motion in the state court came on for
a hearing. Petitioner appeared and filed his objections to respondent's accounts.
His objections were overruled,1 the accounts approved, and respondent
discharged by the state court. Thereafter the bankruptcy court denied
petitioner's motion. D.C., 43 F.Supp. 128. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed by a divided vote. 2 Cir., 130 F.2d 369. We granted the petition for a
writ of certiorari because of the importance of the problem in the administration
of the Bankruptcy Act. 317 U.S. 621, 63 S.Ct. 436, 87 L.Ed. -.
2
Petitioner contends that 2, sub. a[21] and 69, sub. d make it obligatory on
the respondent as a non-bankruptcy receiver to account to the bankruptcy court.
These provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are new. They were added in 1938 by
the Chandler Act. 52 Stat. 840, 11 U.S.C. 11(a)(21), 109d, 11 U.S.C.A.
11, sub. a(21) 109, sub. d. Sec. 2, sub. a(21), gives to the bankruptcy court the
power in straight bankruptcy proceedings to require 'receivers or trustees
appointed in proceedings not under this Act (title)' within four months of
bankruptcy (1) 'to deliver the property in their possession or under their control
to the receiver or trustee appointed under this Act (title)', and (2) 'to account to
the court for the disposition by them of the property' of the bankrupt.2 Sec. 69,
sub. d makes a 'receiver or trustee, not appointed under this Act (title), of any of
the property' of the bankrupt 'accountable' to the bankruptcy court for 'any
action taken by him subsequent to the filing of such bankruptcy petition.'3
These sections are in part declaratory of the law as it existed prior to the
Chandler Act, 11 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq. Thus 2, sub. a(21), plainly includes the
case where a lien against the debtor's property was acquired by some legal or
equitable proceeding within four months of bankruptcy. Prior to 1938 such
liens did not survive bankruptcy (Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 322, 51 S.Ct.
465, 467, 75 L.Ed. 1060); and bankruptcy superseded the proceedings out of
which they arose. Remington, Bankruptcy (4th ed.) 2067-2071. But the
accountability of the non-bankruptcy receiver or trustee presented some
difficulties prior to the Chandler Act. When bankruptcy superseded the prior
proceedings, all disbursements subsequent thereto were, of course, subject to
the exclusive control of the bankruptcy court. In re Diamond's Estate, 6 Cir.,
259 F. 70; Moore v. Scott, 9 Cir., 55 F.2d 863; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v.
Karatz, 262 U.S. 640, 642, 43 S.Ct. 641, 642, 67 L.Ed. 1151; Gross v. Irving
Trust Co., 289 U.S. 342, 53 S.Ct. 605, 77 L.Ed. 1243, 90 A.L.R. 1215. While
such disbursements were generally subject to the summary power of the
bankruptcy court (Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U.S. 470, 55 S.Ct. 260, 79 L.Ed.
599), an accounting for disbursements made prior to bankruptcy required a
plenary suit. Loveless v. Southern Grocer Co., 5 Cir., 159 F. 415; 1 Collier,
Bankruptcy (14th ed.) pp. 320-321. And see Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U.S. 46,
41 S.Ct. 415, 65 L.Ed. 823; In re Jack Stolkin, Inc., 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 829. Sec. 2,
sub. a(21) by substituting a summary proceeding was designed to eliminate the
delay and cost of a plenary suit and to provide a more effective control over
prior disbursements. See H.Rep.No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 20;
Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, pp. 16-17.
Does 2, sub. a[21] go further and apply to a case where a receiver is
appointed within four months of bankruptcy as an incident to enforcement of a
mortgage lien whose validity is not challenged? Prior to the Chandler Act such
proceedings were not superseded by bankruptcy. They survived bankruptcy, the
interest of the estate in them being protected by the intervention of the
bankruptcy trustee. Straton v. New, supra, 283 U.S. at pages 326, 327, 51 S.Ct.
at pages 468, 469, 75 L.Ed. 1060, and cases cited. Under the earlier Act it made
no difference whether such a proceeding was instituted prior to or within the
four months period. Where the lien survived bankruptcy, prior proceedings to
enforce it would not be enjoined by the bankruptcy court. 1 Collier, op. cit., pp.
306309; Straton v. New, supra, 283 U.S. at page 326, 51 S.Ct. at page 468,
75 L.Ed. 1060, note 6. Sec. 2, sub. a(21), read literally would call for a
different result in that foreclosure receivers would have to turn over to the
bankruptcy court all the property in their possession or under their control, and
account to it. In this case, since the receiver was only a receiver for rents and
profits it would mean that the foreclosure would go on apace in the state court
while the funds collected by the receiver would be turned over to the
bankruptcy court for administration. The argument advanced in support of that
view is that with such power the bankruptcy court could better protect the
interests of the estate in the foreclosure proceeding.
But we do not think that that was part of the purpose of 2, sub. a(21). As we
have stated, the main purpose of 2, sub. a(21) was to give the bankruptcy
court control over disbursements made in non-bankruptcy proceedings prior to
the filing of the petition. The House Judiciary Committee in its report stated:
'There is no logical reason why the bankruptcy court could not supervise these
expenditures, since all of the previous proceedings are nullified by the petition
in bankruptcy followed by an adjudication. The principle is the same as that
involved in section 60, sub. d of the act where it is provided that fees paid to
the attorney for the debtor prior to bankruptcy and in contemplation thereof are
subject to review by the bankruptcy court.' H.Rep.No. 1409, supra, p. 20. That
is as plain an indication as could be made that 2, sub. a(21) was designed to
define the powers of the bankruptcy court only where bankruptcy superseded
the prior proceedings.4 The language of 2, sub. a(21) squares with that
express declaration. When Congress wrote the four months proviso into 2,
sub. a(21) it was not writing on a clean slate. The presence of that proviso
suggests the type of problem with which Congress was dealing. Straton v. New,
supra, indicates the importance of that period in a determination of what liens
did not survive bankruptcy and when bankruptcy proceedings superseded prior
proceedings. The 1938 Act, like its predecessor, makes the four month period
part of the critical test for determining what liens do not survive bankruptcy.
One example is to be found in 67, sub. a(1), 11 U.S.C.A. 107, sub. a(1),
which provides that liens 'obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, or other
legal or equitable process or proceedings within four months' of bankruptcy are
null and void on certain conditions. That section illustrates the relevancy of the
four month period to this type of problem. If 2, sub. a(21), is read to extend
the power of the bankruptcy court to the present situation,5 the four month
period will have acquired a new significance in bankruptcy law. We cannot
help but think that if Congress had set out to make such a major change, some
clear and unambiguous indication of that purpose would appear. But we can
find none. Moreover, such an interpretation would lead in many cases to a
division of authority between state and federal courts. Thus in this case the state
court would remain in charge of the foreclosure; the bankruptcy court would
have exclusive control over the receiver's receipts. An interpretation which
leads to a division of authority so fraught with conflict will not be readily
implied.
5
It is argued, however, that the provision in 2, sub. a(21), concerning
proceedings under chapters X and XII, 11 U.S.C.A. 501 et seq., 801 et seq.,
indicates a purpose to include the type of receiver we have here. It seems clear
that such a foreclosure receiver is included within 2, sub. a(21) where
proceedings under Ch. X have supervened. But the fact that a foreclosure
receiver is included for one purpose does not necessarily mean that he is
included for another. Plans of reorganization under Ch. X may ( 216) and
commonly do affect the rights of mortgagees. Hence 148 provides that an
order approving a petition under Ch. X operates to stay a pending mortgage
foreclosure or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the debtor's property. 6
And 256 and 257 provide that the trustee (or debtor) acquires all rights in,
and the right to immediate possession of, the property of the debtor under the
control of a receiver or trustee appointed in a prior proceeding in any federal or
state court. That is to say, a Ch. X proceeding supersedes a pending mortgage
foreclosure. We thus find 2, sub. a(21), performing the same function when
applied to Ch. X proceedings7 as it does when applied to ordinary bankruptcy.
We conclude that the Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in reading the word
'receivers' distributively. Such a construction fits the statutory scheme as a
whole. The other interpretation results in a distortion which the language of 2,
sub. a(21), makes unnecessary and which its history does not warrant.
Little need be said about 69, sub. d. It must be read in connection with 2,
sub. a(21). The legislative history suggests that it, too, was designed to apply
only where bankruptcy superseded the prior proceedings. H.Rep.No. 1409,
supra, p. 12. As stated by the draftsman, 'It makes clear and certain the
exclusive and paramount jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over property
dealt with in a prior equity receivership or like proceeding which is superseded
by a bankruptcy proceeding.' Weinstein, op. cit., p. 154. And see 4 Collier, op.
cit., pp. 879-882.
7
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.
The court holding that all rights of the bankrupt in the real property were cut
off February 24, 1941; that on that day there was a deficit in the receiver's
account; and that the balance of rents had accrued subsequent to February 24,
1941.
Sec. 2, sub. a(21) sets forth as one of the enumerated powers of courts of
bankruptcy, the power to: 'Require receivers or trustees appointed in
proceedings not under this Act (title), assignees for the benefit of creditors, and
agents authorized to take possession of or to liquidate a person's property to
deliver the property in their possession or under their control to the receiver or
trustee appointed under this Act (title) or, where an arrangement or a plan under
this Act (title) has been confirmed and such property has not prior thereto been
delivered to a receiver or trustee appointed under this Act (title), to deliver such
property to the debtor or other person entitled to such property according to the
provisions of the arrangement or plan, and in all such cases to account to the
court for the disposition by them of the property of such bankrupt or debtor:
Provided, however,
That such delivery and accounting shall not be required, except in proceedings
under chapters 10 and 12 of this Act (title), if the receiver or trustee was
appointed, the assignment was made, or the agent was authorized more than
four months prior to the date of bankruptcy. Upon such accounting, the court
shall reexamine and determine the propriety and reasonableness of all
disbursements made out of such property by such receiver, trustee, assignee, or
agent, either to himself or to others, for services and expenses under such
receivership, trusteeship, assignment or agency, and shall, unless such
disbursements have been approved, upon notice to creditors and other parties in
interest, by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the proceeding under this
Act (title), surcharge such receiver, trustee, assignee, or agent the amount of
any disbursement determined by the court to have been improper or excessive.'
Sec. 69, sub. d provides: 'Upon the filing of a petition under this Act (title), a
receiver or trustee, not appointed under this Act (title), of any of the property of
a bankrupt shall be accountable to the bankruptcy court, in which the
proceeding under this Act (title) is pending, for any action taken by him
subsequent to the filing of such bankruptcy petition, and shall file in such
bankruptcy court a sworn schedule setting forth a summary of the property in
his charge and of the liabilities of the estate, both as of the time of and since his
appointment, and a sworn statement of his administration of the estate. Such
receiver or trustee, with knowledge of the filing of such bankruptcy proceeding,
shall not make any disbursements to take any action in the administration of
such property without first obtaining authorization therefor from the bankruptcy
court.'
4
We do not, of course, include that supersession which flows from the fact that
state insolvency laws are involved which are 'tantamount to bankruptcy.'
Straton v. New, supra, 283 U.S. at page 327, 51 S.Ct. at page 469, 75 L.Ed.
1060.
We do not reach the question, reserved in Duparquet H & M Co. v. Evans, 297
U.S. 216, 224, 56 S.Ct. 412, 416, 80 L.Ed. 591, whether the appointment of a
foreclosure receiver might be an act of bankruptcy under 3, sub. a(5), 11
U.S.C.A. 21, sub. a(5). See In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., D.C.,
14 F.Supp. 96. It was suggested in Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, 536, 23
S.Ct. 710, 711, 47 L.Ed. 1165, that bankruptcy superseded a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors made within the four months period
since the making of the assignment was an act of bankruptcy. Remington, op.
cit., 2071.
And unlike proceedings under 77B, 11 U.S.C.A. 207 (Duparquet H & M
Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 56 S.Ct. 412, 80 L.Ed. 591), a mortgage
foreclosure is adequate under certain conditions for a creditor's petition under
Ch. X. 131(4).
Similar considerations are applicable to real property arrangements under Ch.
XII. Secs. 406(1), 411, 416, 428.
