402 U.S.

535
91 S.Ct. 1586
29 L.Ed.2d 90

Paul J. BELL, Jr., Petitioner,

v.
R. H. BURSON, Director, Georgia Department of Public
Safety.
No. 5586.
Argued March 23, 1971.
Decided May 24, 1971.

Syllabus
Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which provides that
the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motorist
involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts security for the
amount of damages claimed by an aggrieved party and which excludes
any consideration of fault or responsibility for the accident at a presuspension hearing held violative of procedural due process. Before
Georgia, whose statutory scheme significantly involves the issue of
liability, may deprive an individual of his license and registration, it must
provide a procedure for determining the question whether there is a
reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result
of the accident. Pp. 539 543.
121 Ga.App. 418, 174 S.E.2d 235, reversed and remanded.
Elizabeth R. Rindskopf, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner, pro hac vice, by
special leave of Court.
Dorothy T. Beasley, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that the motor
vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an

accident shall be suspended unless he posts security to cover the amount of

damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the accident.1 The
administrative hearing conducted prior to the suspension excludes consideration
of the motorist's fault or liability for the accident. The Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the State's statutory scheme, in
failing before suspending the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question of
his fault or liability, denied him due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment: the court held that "Fault' or 'innocence' are completely irrelevant
factors.' 121 Ga.App. 418, 420, 174 S.E.2d 235, 236 (1970). The Georgia
Supreme Court denied review. App. 27. We granted certiorari. 400 U.S. 963,
91 S.Ct. 376, 27 L.Ed.2d 383 (1970). We reverse.
2

Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel by car to cover

three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday afternoon, November 24, 1968,
petitioner was involved in an accident when five-year-old Sherry Capes rode
her bicycle into the side of his automobile. The child's parents filed an accident
report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety indicating
that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed
damages of $5,000. Petitioner was thereafter informed by the Director that
unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the
accident he must file a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a
notarized release from liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility,2 or
suffer the suspension of his driver's license and vehicle registration. App. 9.
Petitioner requested an administrative hearing before the Director asserting that
he was not liable as the accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he
would be severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a
suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled but the Director informed
petitioner that '(t)he only evidence that the Department can accept and consider
is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident; (b) has
petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c) does
petitioner come within any of the exceptions of the Law.' App. 11.3 At the
administrative hearing the Director rejected petitioner's proffer of evidence on
liability, ascertained that petitioner was not within any of the statutory
exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days to comply with the security
requirements or suffer suspension. Petitioner then exercised his statutory right
to an appeal de novo in the Superior Court. Ga.Code Ann. 92A602 (1958).
At that hearing, the court permitted petitioner to present his evidence on
liability, and, although the claimants were neither parties nor witnesses, found
petitioner free from fault. As a result, the Superior Court ordered 'that the
petitioner's driver's license not be suspended * * * (until) suit is filed against
petitioner for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries sustained by
the child * * *.' App. 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of

Appeals in overruling petitioner's constitutional contention.

3

If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry
liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our
cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 54
S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S.
352, 52 S.Ct. 595, 76 L.Ed. 1155 (1932); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47
S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927). It does not follow, however, that the
amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all motorists,
but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security
under penalty of loss of the licenses. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926). Once licenses are
issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential
in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). This is but an application of the general
proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate
an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege.'
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)
(disqualification for unemployment compensation); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956) (discharge
from public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2
L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (denial of a tax exemption); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra
(withdrawal of welfare benefits). See also Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373,
385386, 28 S.Ct. 708, 713714, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908); Goldsmith v. United
States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 46 S.Ct. 215, 70 L.Ed. 494 (1926);
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624
(1941).

We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which must be
afforded the licensee on the question of his fault or liability for the accident.4 A
procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily
satisfy procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to
determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge. Compare
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at 270271, 90 S.Ct., at 10211022, with
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the
licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the

question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between

the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provisions
before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the
licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will
be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a
reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered
against the licensee.
5

The State argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the suspension of his
licenses is outweighed by countervailing governmental interests and therefore
that this procedural due process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases
where there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against a
licensee, Georgia's interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an
unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the State's fault-oriented
scheme, a justification for denying the process due its citizens. Nor is
additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand
the constitutional requirement. "While the problem of additional expense must
be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary
standards of due process." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at 261, 90 S.Ct., at
1017, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893, 901 (SDNY 1968).

The main thrust of Georgia's argument is that it need not provide a hearing on
liability because fault and liability are irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We
may assume that were this so, the prior administrative hearing presently
provided by the State would be 'appropriate to the nature of the case.' Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94
L.Ed. 865 (1950). But '(i)n reviewing state action in this area * * * we look to
substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional minimums
have been honored.' Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 106
107, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1182, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963) (concurring opinion). And
looking to the operation of the State's statutory scheme, it is clear that liability,
in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a
crucial role in the Safety Responsibility Act. If prior to suspension there is a
release from liability executed by the injured party, no suspension is worked by
the Act. Ga.Code Ann. 92A606 (1958). The same is true if prior to
suspension there is an adjudication of nonliability. Ibid. Even after suspension
has been declared, a release from liability or an adjudication of non-liability
will lift the suspension. Ga.Code Ann. 92A607 (Supp. 1970). Moreover,
other of the Act's exceptions are developed around liability-related concepts.
Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme. Since the statutory
scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination to
deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due

process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.

7

The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful,'

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62
(1965), and 'appropriate to the nature of the case.' Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S., at 313, 70 S.Ct., at 657. It is a proposition
which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes
consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the
nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.

Finally, we reject Georgia's argument that if it must afford the licensee an

inquiry into the question of liability that determination, unlike the
determination of the matters presently considered at the administratively
hearing, need not be made prior to the supension of the licenses. While '(m) any
controversies have raged about * * * the Due Process Clause,' ibid., it is
fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) 5 due
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that
here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective. Ibid. Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S., at 152156, 61 S.Ct., at 536538;
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme, before the State
may deprive petitioner of his driver's license and vehicle registration it must
provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a
reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of
the accident. We deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down
this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia
may decide merely to include consideration of the question at the
administrative hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a
consideration to the de novo judicial proceedings in the Superior Court.
Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for
damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its
present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force
in other States.6 Finally, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an
entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide: we hold only that
the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing
on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

10

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

11

Reversed and remanded.

12

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK, and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN
concur in the result.

Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga.Code Ann. 92A601 et seq.

(1958). In pertinent part the Act provides that anyone involved in an accident
must submit a report to the Director of Public Safety. Ga.Code Ann. 92A
604 (Supp. 1970). Within 30 days of the receipt of the report the Director 'shall
suspend the license and all registration certificates and all registration plates of
the operator and owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the
accident unless or until the operator or owner has previously furnished or
immediately furnishes security, sufficient * * * to satisfy any judgments for
damages or injuries resulting * * * and unless such operator or owner shall give
proof of financial responsibility for the future as is required in section 92A
615.1. * * *' Ga.Code Ann. 92A 605(a) (Supp. 1970). Section 92A615.1
(Supp. 1970) requires that 'such proof must be maintained for a one-year
period.' Section 92A 605(a) works no suspension, however, (1) if the owner or
operator had in effect at the time of the accident a liability insurance policy or
other bond, Ga.Code Ann. 92A605(c) (Supp. 1970); (2) if the owner or
operator qualifies as a self-insurer, ibid.; (3) if only the owner or operator was
injured, Ga.Code Ann. 92A606 (1958); (4) if the automobile was legally
parked at the time of the accident, ibid.; (5) if as to an owner, the automobile
was being operated without permission, ibid.; or (6) '(i)f prior to the date that
the Director would otherwise suspend license and registration * * * there shall
be filed with the Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who
would otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or been
finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged written
agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments. * *
*' Ibid.

Questions concerning the requirement of proof of future financial responsibility

are not before us. The State's brief, at 4, states: 'The one year period for proof
of financial responsibility has now expired, so (petitioner) would not be
required to file such proof, even if the Court of Appeals decision were
affirmed.'

Ga.Code Ann. 92A602 (1958) provides:

'The Director shall administer and enforce the provisions of this Chapter and
may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration and shall
provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the
Director under the provisions of this Chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter
of record and the decision as rendered by the Director shall be final unless the
aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to
enter an appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, by notice to
the Director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of
ordinary, except that the appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor
pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be
heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury at the first term. The
hearing on the appeal shall be de novo, however, such appeal shall not act as a
supersedeas of any orders or acts of the Director, nor shall the appellant be
allowed to operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any
suspension or revocation by the Director, while such appeal is pending. A
notice sent by registered mail shall be sufficient service on the Director that
such appeal has been entered.'
4

Petitioner stated at oral argument that while 'it would be possible to raise (an
equal protection argument) * * * we don't raise this point here.' Tr. of Oral Arg.
14.

See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030
(1947); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed.
1088 (1950).

The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans, public or joint

public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and assigned claims plans. See R.
Keeton & J. O'Connell, After Cars Crash (1967).