United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Louis H. Aikens, 453 U.S. 902 (1981)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Louis H. Aikens, 453 U.S. 902 (1981)
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Scribd Government Docs453 U.S.
902
101 S.Ct. 3135
69 L.Ed.2d 989
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS
v.
Louis H. AIKENS
No. 80- 1737
Supreme Court of the United States
June 29, 1981
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment, 642 F.2d 514,
is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101
S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
At the behest of the Government, the Court today summarily vacates a
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
remands the case to that court for reconsideration in light of our decision earlier
this Term in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101
S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Because I regard this disposition as wholly
inappropriate and unnecessary, I dissent.
Respondent Aikens is a retired Negro employee of the United States Postal
Service. He filed this suit alleging that the Postal Service Board of Governors,
petitioner here, had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq., by discriminating against him because of his race with
respect to the awarding of promotions and work details. The District Court, in
dismissing the action, concluded that respondent had failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because he had not shown "that he was as qualified
or more qualified than the individuals who were promoted." The Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the District Court's ruling was "[p]lainly . . .
a misstatement of applicable law." 206 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 114, 642 F.2d 514,
519 (1980). The panel noted that even the petitioner had conceded that the
District Court had mischaracterized the showing necessary to establish a prima
facie case under Title VII. Ibid. The court concluded that this Court's
controlling decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), required that a Title VII plaintiff, as part of
his prima facie case, show only that "he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants." Id., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at 1824 1 .
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings under the appropriate standard.
3
The petitioner, ignoring its earlier concession of error by the District Court,
now asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the
ground that it is "inconsistent" with this Court's decision in Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. While the majority without explanation
today accepts this suggestion, I find it untenable. Simply put, our decision in
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs has almost nothing to do with the issue
raised in this case. That decision involved "[t]he narrow question . . . whether,
after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the [employer] to persuade the court by a preponderance of the
evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged
employment action existed." 450 U.S., at 250, 101 S.Ct., at 1092 (emphasis
added). The exclusive focus of the case was on the sort of showing a Title VII
defendant must make to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. The dispute
here, in contrast, involves only the threshold issue whether a Title VII plaintiff,
in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, must show that he
was qualified for the sought-after position or, as the District Court ruled and the
petitioner now suggests, that he was as qualified as, or more qualified than, the
person selected by the employer. In resolving this entirely different question,
the Court of Appeals correctly turned to our decision in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, supra, and concluded that the decision of the District Court was
"plainly at odds" with the express language of that decision.
This conclusion, in my view, is unassailable. McDonnell Douglas requires a
Title VII plaintiff as part of his prima facie case to show that he "was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants," 411 U.S., at 802, 93
S.Ct., at 1824. Nothing in that decision or subsequent ones by this Court
supports the District Court's view, now embraced by the petitioner, that the
plaintiff at this threshold stage must also show that he was as qualified as, or
more qualified than, the selected applicant. Indeed, our decision in Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs expressly reaffirmed the McDonnell Douglas formulation
of the prima facie case, 450 U.S., at 253-254, n.6, 101 S.Ct., at 1094, n.6, and
specifically noted that the respondent in that case had established this segment
of the prima facie case by simply showing that she was "a qualified woman
who sought an available position." Ibid. See also Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957
(1978).
5
In asserting that our decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs may have
altered the McDonnell Douglas test of a prima facie case, the petitioner relies
on the statement in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs that a prima facie case is
established when an applicant is "rejected under circumstances which give rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 450 U.S., at 253, 101 S.Ct., at
1094. In the promotion context, the petitioner asserts, such an inference of
unlawful conduct does not arise simply because a qualified applicant is rejected
for a job. Other persons may have also applied for the promotion, and the
rejection of the applicant may merely indicate that a more qualified applicant
was selected. Thus, in the petitioner's view, the unsuccessful applicant for a
promotion must disprove this possibility in order to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.
The petitioner's view represents one potential way to structure the burdens of
proof in a Title VII case,2 but it has never been embraced by this Court. If the
Court now feels that the issue requires re-examination, it should grant the
petition for certiorari and hear oral argument in the case. Instead, the Court
remands without opinion to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of
ambiguous dictum in an opinion dealing with an entirely distinct issue. I am at a
loss to understand this disposition, as I suspect the Court of Appeals will be.
Perhaps it reflects the pressures of the end of the Term, or an excessive
deference to the views of the Solicitor General, or a desire for an easy,
temporary solution to a potentially troublesome issue. But these reasons simply
cannot justify today's disposition, which rather than clarifying the law,
needlessly obscures it. Such action is contrary to our judicial duty, and I
therefore dissent.
Opinion on remand, 665 F.2d 1057.
As set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a Title VII plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination when he shows
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications." 411 U.S., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at 1824. There is no
dispute in this case that the other elements of a Title VII prima facie case are
satisfied. As the Court of Appeals observed:
"On the record in this case, it is clear that Aikens met the first, third and fourth
elements of the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas: he is a black man; he
sought promotion to higher level positions that became available; and white
Post Office employees received the positions." 206 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 112,
642 F.2d 514, 517 (1980).
Thus, the only issue raised here is the nature of the second requirement of a
prima facie case: that the complainant "was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants." McDonnell Douglas supra, at 802, 93 S.Ct.,
at 1824.
2
In my view, the fact that the chosen employee was more qualified than other
qualified applicants for the job is the sort of justification that the employer is
entitled to use to rebut the prima facie case. An applicant who has satisfied the
objective qualifications established by the employer for promotion may have
no way of knowing what additional considerations the employer relied on in
selecting a particular person among the pool of qualified applicants. This
information is uniquely within the control of the employer, and thus it places an
unfair burden on the plaintiff to require him, as part of his prima facie case, to
guess what additional considerations the employer might have relied on and to
prove that even under these considerations he was at least as qualified as the
selected applicant.
