James R. Jackson, Individually and As Administrator of The Estate of Sandra A. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)
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Scribd Government DocsJames R. Jackson, Individually and As Administrator of The Estate of Sandra A. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)
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Scribd Government Docs465 U.S.
1049
104 S.Ct. 1325
79 L.Ed.2d 720
James R. JACKSON, Individually and as Administrator of the
Estate of Sandra A. Jackson, et al.
v.
CITY OF JOLIET et al
No. 83-853
Supreme Court of the United States
February 21, 1984
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice WHITE, with whom Justice REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.
Petitioners, representatives of the estates of individuals killed in a one-car
accident in Joliet, Illinois, filed complaints in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. 1983, contending that various county and city officials violated
decedents' constitutional rights by failing to save decedents from the burning
automobile. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that two minutes after the car
swerved off the road and burst into flames, one of the respondents, a police
officer, arrived on the scene and began directing traffic around the car. Firemen
were summoned, and the fire was extinguished; yet no efforts were made to
remove decedents from the car, nor was an ambulance called until some 45
minutes after the accident occurred. The complaint alleged that decedents were
still alive when the fire was doused and that had adequate rescue measures been
taken at the outset, decedents would have survived.
The District Court denied respondents' motion to dismiss the complaints for
failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, reversed, concluding that an attempt by state officers to assist at an
accident does not result in the deprivation of a constitutional right when the
attempt fails because of the negligence or gross negligence of the officers.
3
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that "[n]o problem so
perplexes the federal courts today as determining the outer bounds of section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983 . . . ." Section 1983 actions
have been brought in a variety of contexts by those injured as a result of a state
official's failure to exercise adequate care in carrying out his duties. Clark v.
Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (CA1 1983); Morrison v. Washington County, 700 F.2d 678
(CA11), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Hull
v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (CA5 1982); Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d
1252 (CA9 1982); Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 649
F.2d 134 (CA2 1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (CA2 1982), cert. denied
sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d
171 (1983). The results in these cases have not been entirely consistent. While
the Court of Appeals in the present case determined that the state's failure to
provide adequate rescue services was not actionable under 1983, other courts
have permitted relief under that section when a foster parent's abuse of his
foster child was permitted by the state agency's failure adequately to monitor
the foster care environment, Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
supra, and when a patient's death was allegedly caused by the manner in which
he was discharged by a state hospital, Morrison, supra. The inconsistent results
below are attributable, at least in part, to the lack of definitive guidelines for
determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a
constitutional tort. This Court should attempt to resolve this "perplexing" issue,
and this case provides us with an opportunity to do so. Accordingly, I would
grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
