467 U.S.

1
104 S.Ct. 2187
81 L.Ed.2d 1

KIRBY FOREST INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner

v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 82-1994.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 22, 1984.
Decided May 21, 1984.

Syllabus
Petitioner manufacturer of forest products owns substantial timberland in
Texas. On August 21, 1978, after negotiations to acquire over 2,000 acres
of this land for a national preserve had broken down, the United States
filed a "straight-condemnation" complaint under 40 U.S.C. 257. Shortly
thereafter, the United States filed a notice of lis pendens, notifying the
public of the institution of the proceeding. The District Court referred the
matter to a special commission to ascertain the compensation due
petitioner. Trial before the commission began on March 6, 1979, and after
hearing competing testimony as to the fair market value of the land, the
commission entered a report recommending compensation in the amount
of $2,331,202. The District Court entered judgment awarding petitioner
compensation for that amount, plus 6% interest for the period from the
date the complaint was filed to the date the Government deposited the
adjudicated value of the land with the court. On March 26, 1982, the
United States deposited the amount of the judgment in the District Court's
registry, and, on that same date, acquired title to the land. The Court of
Appeals reversed the award of interest to petitioner, holding that the date
of the taking should be deemed the date on which the compensation
award was paid and that hence no interest was due on that award. The
court also ruled that the commission inadequately explained its valuation
of the land, and accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for
further findings regarding the value.

Held:
1. The taking of petitioner's land occurred on March 26, 1982, and
because the award was paid on that date, no interest was due thereon. Pp.
9-16.
(a) That the date of taking in "straight-condemnation" proceedings must
be deemed the date on which the United States tenders payment to the
landowner is amply supported by this Court's prior decisions and by
indications of congressional intent derived from the structure of the
pertinent statutory scheme and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A. Rule
71A(i) permits the United States to dismiss a condemnation suit at any
time before compensation has been determined and paid, unless the
United States has previously acquired title or taken possession. The
Government's capacity in this fashion to withdraw from the proceeding
would be difficult to explain if a taking were effectuated prior to tendering
of payment. And the option given to the Government in 40 U.S.C. 258a
of peremptorily appropriating land prior to final judgment would have
been superfluous if a taking occurred upon the filing of a complaint in a
257 suit. Pp. 11-13.
(b) Prior to payment of the condemnation award in this case, there was no
interference with petitioner's property interests severe enough to give rise
to a taking entitling petitioner to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. Until title passed to the United States, petitioner was free to
make whatever use of its property it pleased. The Government never
forbade petitioner to cut trees on the land or develop it in some other way.
Nor did the Government abridge petitioner's right to sell the land. While
the initiation of condemnation proceedings, publicized by the lis pendens
notice, may have reduced the selling price of the land, impairment of the
market value of property incident to otherwise legitimate governmental
action ordinarily does not result in a taking, and did not do so here. Pp. 1316.
2. Petitioner's constitutional entitlement to the value of its land on the date
of the taking can be accommodated by allowing petitioner, on remand, to
present evidence pertaining to change in the market value of the property
during the substantial delay between the date of valuation and the date the
Government tendered payment. Other condemnees who find themselves in
petitioner's position may avail themselves of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), which empowers a district court, upon motion of a party,
to withdraw or amend a final judgment for "any . . . reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." Pp. 16-19.

696 F.2d 351 (CA 5 1983), affirmed.

Joe G. Roady, Houston, Tex., for petitioner.
Harriet S. Shapiro, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title 40 U.S.C. 257, in conjunction with Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, prescribes a procedure pursuant to which the United States
may appropriate privately owned land by eminent domain. The central issue in
this case is whether the manner in which the value of the land is determined
and paid to its owner under that procedure comports with the requirement,
embodied in the Fifth Amendment, that private property not be taken for public
use without just compensation.

2* A.
3

The United States customarily employs one of three methods when it

appropriates private land for a public purpose. The most frequently used is the
so-called "straight-condemnation" procedure prescribed in 40 U.S.C. 257.
Under that statute, an "officer of the Government" who is "authorized to
procure real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public
uses"1 makes an application to the Attorney General who, within 30 days, must
initiate condemnation proceedings. The form of those proceedings is governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A.2 In brief, Rule 71A requires the filing
in federal district court of a "complaint in condemnation," identifying the
property and the interest therein that the United States wishes to take, followed
by a trial before a jury, judge, or specially appointed commissionof the
question of how much compensation is due the owner of the land. The practical
effect of final judgment on the issue of just compensation is to give the
Government an option to buy the property at the adjudicated price. Danforth v.
United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939). If the
Government wishes to exercise that option, it tenders payment to the private
owner, whereupon title and right to possession vest in the United States. If the
Government decides not to exercise its option, it can move for dismissal of the
condemnation action. Ibid.; see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 71A(i)(3).

A more expeditious procedure is prescribed by 40 U.S.C. 258a. 3 That statute

empowers the Government, "at any time before judgment" in a condemnation
suit, to file "a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law
to acquire the lands [in question], declaring that said lands are thereby taken for

the use of the United States." The Government is obliged, at the time of the
filing, to deposit in the court, "to the use of the persons entitled thereto," an
amount of money equal to the estimated value of the land.4 Title and right to
possession thereupon vest immediately in the United States. In subsequent
judicial proceedings, the exact value of the land (on the date the declaration of
taking was filed) is determined, and the owner is awarded the difference (if
any) between the adjudicated value of the land and the amount already received
by the owner, plus interest on that difference.
5

Finally, Congress occasionally exercises the power of eminent domain directly.

For example, when Congress thinks that a tract of land that it wishes to
preserve inviolate is threatened with imminent alteration, it sometimes enacts a
statute appropriating the property immediately by "legislative taking" and
setting up a special procedure for ascertaining, after the appropriation, the
compensation due to the owners.5

In addition to these three statutory methods, the United States is capable of

acquiring privately owned land summarily, by physically entering into
possession and ousting the owner. E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S.
745, 747-749, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 1384-1385, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947). In such a case,
the owner has a right to bring an "inverse condemnation" suit to recover the
value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the Government. United States
v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21-22, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 1044, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958).6

The Government's selection amongst and implementation of these various

methods of acquiring property is governed, to some extent, by the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. 4601 et seq. That statute enjoins federal agencies, inter alia, to attempt
to acquire property by negotiation rather than condemnation, and whenever
possible not to take land by physical appropriation. 4651(1), (4), (8). In
addition, the statute requires a court with jurisdiction over a condemnation
action that is dismissed or abandoned by the Government to award the
landowner an amount that will reimburse him for "his reasonable costs,
disbursements, and expenses" incurred in contesting the suit. 4654(a).7 The
statute does not, however, regulate decisions by the Government whether to
employ the "straight-condemnation" procedure prescribed in 257 or the
"declaration of taking" procedure embodied in 258a.

B
8

Petitioner, a manufacturer of forest products, owns substantial tracts of

timberland in Texas. This case arises out of a protracted effort by the United

States to appropriate 2,175.86 acres of that land.

9

In the mid-1960's, several studies were made of the desirability of establishing a

national park or preserve to protect an area of relatively untrammeled
wilderness in eastern Texas. One of those studies, conducted in 1967 by the
National Park Service, recommended the creation of a 35,500-acre Big Thicket
National Park. The Texas Forestry Association, of which petitioner is a
member, endorsed that proposal and declared a voluntary moratorium on
logging in the designated area. Since 1967, petitioner has observed that
moratorium and has not cut any trees on its property lying within the area
demarked by the Park Service.8

10

After seven years of desultory consideration of the matter, Congress rejected

the Park Service proposal and enacted legislation creating a much larger Big
Thicket National Preserve. Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub.L. 93-439, 88 Stat. 1254,
16 U.S.C. 698 et seq. The statute directed the Secretary of the Interior to
acquire the land within the boundaries of the Preserve. 16 U.S.C. 698(c). The
Senate Report made clear that, though the Secretary had the authority to
acquire individual tracts by declaration of taking, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 258a,
such a peremptory procedure should be employed only when necessary to
protect a parcel from destruction. S.Rep. No. 93-875, p. 5 (1974). It was
understood that, in the absence of such an emergency, the Secretary would
purchase the land using the straight-condemnation method prescribed in 40
U.S.C. 257.9

11

The Government initially attempted to acquire the acreage owned by petitioner

through a negotiated purchase. On August 21, 1978, after those negotiations
had broken down, the United States filed a complaint in condemnation in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Shortly thereafter, the
Government filed a notice of lis pendens, notifying the public of the institution
of the condemnation proceeding. The District Court referred the matter to a
special commission to ascertain the compensation due petitioner.

12

Trial before the commission began on March 6, 1979. On that day, the parties
stipulated that "today is the date of taking." After hearing competing testimony
pertaining to the fair market value of petitioner's land, the commission entered a
report recommending compensation in the amount of $2,331,202.

13

Both parties filed objections to the report in the District Court. On August 13,
1981, after holding a hearing to consider those objections, the District Court
entered judgment awarding petitioner compensation in the amount

recommended by the commission, plus interest at a rate of six per-cent for the
period from August 21, 1978 (the date the complaint had been filed), to the
date the Government deposited the adjudicated value of the land with the court.
United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 520 F.Supp. 75, 81 (1981). The court
justified its award of interest on the ground that the institution of condemnation
proceedings had "effectively denied [petitioner] economically viable use and
enjoyment of its property" and therefore had constituted a taking. Id., at 80.10
On March 26, 1982, the United States deposited the total amount of the
judgment in the registry of the District Court. On the same date, the
Government acquired title to the land.
14

Both parties appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
unanimously ruled that the commission's report failed to meet the standards
enunciated in United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 84 S.Ct. 639, 11 L.Ed.2d
629 (1964), and remanded the case for further findings regarding the value of
petitioner's land. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d 351, 358
(1983). More importantly for present purposes, the Court of Appeals, by a vote
of two to one, reversed the District Court's award of interest to petitioner.
Reasoning that "the mere commencement of straight condemnation
proceedings, where the government does not enter into possession . . ., does not
constitute a taking," id., at 355, the court held that, in this case, the date of the
taking should be deemed the date on which the compensation award was
paid. 11 Consequently, no interest was due on that award.12

15

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the date on

which the taking, in a "straight-condemnation" proceeding, should be deemed
to occur and the constitutional obligation of the United States to pay interest on
the adjudicated value of the property.13 464 U.S. 913, 104 S.Ct. 271, 78
L.Ed.2d 253 (1983). We now affirm.

II
16

The United States has the authority to take private property for public use by
eminent domain, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371, 23 L.Ed. 449, 451
(1876), but is obliged by the Fifth Amendment to provide "just compensation"
to the owner thereof. "Just compensation," we have held, means in most cases
the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. United
States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-513, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 18571858, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979).14 "Under this standard, the owner is entitled to
receive 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller' at the time of
the taking." Id., at 511, 99 S.Ct., at 1857 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369, 374, 63 S.Ct. 276, 280, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943)).15

17

If the Government pays the owner before or at the time the property is taken,
no interest is due on the award. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S., at 284,
60 S.Ct., at 236. Such a mode of compensation is not constitutionally
mandated; the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the Government to take land
and pay for it later. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400-403, 16 S.Ct. 43, 48-50,
43 L.Ed. 188 (1895). But if disbursement of the award is delayed, the owner is
entitled to interest thereon sufficient to ensure that he is placed in as good a
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment had coincided
with the appropriation. Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344, 47 S.Ct.
611, 612, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1927); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923).16

18

From the foregoing it should be apparent that identification of the time a taking
of a tract of land occurs is crucial to determination of the amount of
compensation to which the owner is constitutionally entitled. The Government
contends that, in straight-condemnation proceedings like that at issue here, the
date of taking must be deemed the date the United States tenders payment to
the owner of the land. The Government's position is amply supported by prior
decisions by this Court and by indications of Congressional intent derivable
from the structure of the pertinent statutory scheme and the governing
procedural rule.

19

In Danforth v. United States, supra, we were called upon to determine the date
on which the Government, in an exercise of its eminent domain power under
the Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534, as amended, 33 U.S.C.
702a et seq., appropriated the petitioner's property. We held that, "[u]nless a
taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a statutory provision . . ., we
are of the view that the taking in a condemnation suit under this statute takes
place upon the payment of the money award by the condemnor." 308 U.S., at
284, 60 S.Ct., at 236. 17 In response to the contention that such a procedure was
unfair, we observed, " '[t]he owner is protected by the rule that title does not
pass until compensation has been ascertained and paid. . . .' " Id., at 284-285, 60
S.Ct., at 236-237 (quoting Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 581, 587, 43 S.Ct. 442, 444, 67 L.Ed. 809 (1923)).

20

That all straight-condemnation proceedings under 257 should operate in the

fashion described in Danforth is strongly suggested by the structure of Rule
71A, which now governs the administration of the statute. Rule 71A(i) permits
the United States to dismiss a condemnation suit at any time before
"compensation has been determined and paid," unless the Government
previously has "acquired the title or a lesser interest . . . or taken possession." 18
The Government's capacity to withdraw from the proceeding in this fashion

would be difficult to explain if a taking were effectuated prior to tendering of

payment.
21

Finally, Congress' understanding that a taking does not occur until the
termination of condemnation proceedings brought under 257 is reflected in its
adoption of 258a for the purpose of affording the Government the option of
peremptorily appropriating land prior to final judgment, thereby permitting
immediate occupancy and improvement of the property.19 Such an option
would have been superfluous if, as petitioner contends, a taking occurred upon
the filing of the complaint in a 257 suit.20

22

Petitioner's principal objection to the position advocated by the Government is

that such a reading of 257 and Rule 71A is precluded by the Fifth
Amendment. Petitioner contends that, at least when the subject of a straightcondemnation proceeding is unimproved land, the owner is effectively
deprived of all of the significant interests associated with ownership long before
the Government tenders payment. The filing of a complaint in condemnation
and a notice of lis pendens, petitioner contends, has the effect of preventing the
owner of unimproved land thereafter from making any profitable use of it, or of
selling it to another private party. At the same time, the owner remains liable
for property taxes.21 Such a thoroughgoing abrogation of the owner's rights,
petitioner submits, surely constitutes a taking as soon as the abrogation is
effective, regardless of when the land is officially appropriated under the terms
of the statute.

23

If petitioner's depiction of the impairment of its beneficial interests during the

pendency of the condemnation suit were accurate, we would find its
constitutional argument compelling. We have frequently recognized that a
radical curtailment of a landowner's freedom to make use of or ability to derive
income from his land may give rise to a taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, even if the Government has not physically intruded upon the
premises or acquired a legal interest in the property. Thus, we have
acknowledged that a taking would be effected by a zoning ordinance that
deprived "an owner of economically viable use of his land." Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). And we have
suggested that, under some circumstances, a land-use regulation that severely
interfered with an owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations" might
precipitate a taking. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The principle that
underlies this doctrine is that, while most burdens consequent upon government
action undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners
as concomitants of " 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized

community,' "22 some are so substantial and unforeseeable, and can so easily be
identified and redistributed, that "justice and fairness" require that they be borne
by the public as a whole.23 These considerations are as applicable to the
problem of determining when in a condemnation proceeding the taking occurs
as they are to the problem of ascertaining whether a taking has been effected by
a putative exercise of the police power.
24

However, we do not find, prior to the payment of the condemnation award in

this case, in interference with petitioner's property interests severe enough to
give rise to a taking under the foregoing theory. Until title passed to the United
States, petitioner was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property. The
Government never forbade petitioner to cut the trees on the land or to develop
the tract in some other way. Indeed, petitioner is unable to point to any
statutory provision that would have authorized the Government to restrict
petitioner's usage of the property prior to payment of the award.24

25

Nor did the Government abridge petitioner's right to sell the land if it wished. It
is certainly possible, as petitioner contends, that the initiation of condemnation
proceedings, publicized by the filing of a notice of lis pendens, reduced the
price that the land would have fetched, but impairment of the market value of
real property incident to otherwise legitimate government action ordinarily does
not result in a taking. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S., at 263, n. 9,
100 S.Ct., at 2143, n. 9; Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S., at 285, 60 S.Ct., at
236-237; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed.
303 (1926). At least in the absence of an interference with an owner's legal right
to dispose of his land,25 even a substantial reduction of the attractiveness of the
property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment.

26

It is true that any effort by petitioner to develop the land probably would have
prompted the Government to exercise its authority, under 40 U.S.C. 258a, to
file a declaration of taking and thereby peremptorily to appropriate the tract in
order to protect it from alteration. But the likelihood that the United States
would have responded in that fashion to an attempt by petitioner to make
productive use of the land weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's position,
because it suggests that petitioner had the option, at any time, to precipitate an
immediate taking of the land and to obtain compensation therefor as of that
date, merely by informing the Government of its intention to cut down the
trees.

27

We conclude, in sum, that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that its interests
were impaired in any constitutionally significant way before the Government

tendered payment and acquired title in the usual course. 26 Accordingly, we

approve the finding of the Court of Appeals that the taking of petitioner's land
occurred on March 26, 1982. Because the award was paid on that date, no
interest was due thereon.
III
28

The foregoing conclusion does not dispose of this case. We still must determine
whether the award itself satisfied the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. As
indicated above, petitioner is constitutionally entitled to the fair market value of
its property on the date of the taking. See supra, at 10. Petitioner points out that
$2,331,202 represents the commission's best estimate of the value of the land
on March 6, 1979. To the extent that that figure is less than the value of the
land on March 26, 1982, the date of the taking, petitioner contends, it has been
denied just compensation.

29

The Government attempts to meet this objection by emphasizing the pragmatic

constraints on determination of the value of real property. The Government
contends that it is imperative that the trier of fact in a condemnation action be
given a fixed date as of which the value of the land is to be assessed. At the
time of trial, no one knows when the United States will exercise its option to
purchase the property, so adoption of the date of payment as the date of
valuation is infeasible. Moreover, prediction of the value of land at a future
time is notoriously difficult. Under these circumstances, courts and
commissions understandably have adopted the convention of using the date of
the commencement of the trial as the date of the valuation.

30

The Government's argument provides a plausible explanation for the valuation

procedure used in this case and other cases, but it does not meet petitioner's
constitutional claim. However reasonable it may be to designate the date of trial
as the date of valuation, if the result of that approach is to provide the owner
substantially less than the fair market value of his property on the date the
United States tenders payment, it violates the Fifth Amendment.

31

We are left with the problem of prescribing a solution to this difficulty.

Petitioner suggests that we mandate an award of interest, at least for the period
from the date of valuation to the date of the taking, as a rough proxy for the
increase in the value of the land during that period. We decline the invitation.
Change in the market value of particular tracts of land over time bears only a
tenuous relationship to the market rate of interest. Some parcels appreciate at
rates far in excess of the interest rate; others decline in value.27 Thus, to require
the Government to pay interest on the basis proposed by petitioner would only

sometimes improve the fit between the value of condemned land on the date of
its appropriation and the amount paid to the owner of such land.
32

Solution of the problem highlighted by petitioner requires, not a rule

compelling payment of interest by the Government, but rather a procedure for
modifying a condemnation award when there is a substantial delay between the
date of valuation and the date the judgment is paid, during which time the
value of the land changes materially. In the case before us, such a procedure is
readily available. In view of the inadequacy of the commission's explanation
for its valuation of petitioner's land, the Court of Appeals remanded for
reconsideration of the value of the property. On remand, the District Court can
easily adduce evidence pertaining to alternation in the value of petitioner's tract
between March 6, 1979, and March 26, 1982.28 In our view, such a
reassessment is both necessary and sufficient to provide petitioner just
compensation.

33

In other cases, such an option may not be available. However, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contain a procedural device that could do tolerable
service in this cause. Rule 60(b) empowers a federal court, upon motion of a
party, to withdraw or amend a final order for "any . . . reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." This provision seems to us expansive
enough to encompass a motion, by the owner of condemned land, to amend a
condemnation award. The evidence adduced in consideration of such a motion
would be very limited. The parties would not be permitted to question the
adjudicated value of the tract as of the date of its original valuation; they would
be limited to the presentation of evidence and arguments on the issue of how
the market value of the property altered between that date and the date on
which the judgment was paid by the Government. So focused, the
consideration of such a motion would be expeditious and relatively inexpensive
for the parties involved.29 Further refinement of this procedural option we leave
to the courts called upon to administer it.30

IV
34

For the reasons set forth above, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no
interest was due on the condemnation award paid to petitioner. Petitioner's
meritorious contention that it is constitutionally entitled to the value of its land
on the date of the taking, not on the date of the valuation, can be
accommodated by allowing petitioner, on remand, to present evidence
pertaining to change in the market value of the tract during the period between
those two dates. On the understanding that petitioner will be afforded that
opportunity, the judgment is

35

Affirmed.

Such authorization generally is derived from some independent statute that

vests the officer with the power of eminent domain but does not prescribe the
manner in which that power should be exercised. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 404c11.

Suits under 257 originally were required to "conform, as near as may be, to
the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like
causes in the courts of record of the State" in which the suits were instituted.
Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, 2, 25 Stat. 357. The adoption in 1951 of Rule
71A capped an effort to establish a uniform set of procedures governing all
federal condemnation actions. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 71A,
Original Report, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 644.

Section 258a was enacted in 1931, for the principal purpose of enabling the
United States, when it wished, peremptorily to appropriate property on which
public buildings were to be constructed, making it possible for the Government
to begin improving the land, thereby stimulating employment during the Great
Depression. See H.R.Rep. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930).

The owner is entitled to prompt distribution of the deposited funds. 40 U.S.C.

258a; Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 71A(j).

See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 79c(b) (vesting in the United States "all right, title, and
interest" in the land encompassed by the Redwood National Park as of the date
of the enactment of the statute).

Such a suit is "inverse" because it is brought by the affected owner, not by the
condemnor. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130,
63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980). The owner's right to bring such a suit derives from "
'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to
condemnation. . . .' " Ibid. (quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 25.41 (3d
rev. ed. 1972)).

We have held that the last-mentioned provision for the reimbursement of costs
is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional entitlement. United States v.
Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204, 99 S.Ct. 1066, 1067, 59 L.Ed.2d 257 (1979)
(per curiam).

Testimony at trial by one of petitioner's officers suggested that, regardless of

the existence of the moratorium, petitioner would not have cut any trees on that

land, which it had held as a "reserve logging area" since the 1950's. Brief for
United States 8, citing 1 Tr. 52. For the purpose of our decision, we place no
weight on that testimony; we assume that petitioner voluntarily forwent an
opportunity to make profitable use of its land.
9

The House bill had contained a provision appropriating the land by a legislative
taking. H.R.11546, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1973). The Senate rejected this
method on the ground that it was unnecessary to protect the land and would be
unduly expensive. S.Rep. No. 93-875, pp. 5-6 (1974) U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1974, p. 5554. The House acceded to the Senate's position.

10

The District Court did not expressly rule upon petitioner's contention that the
stipulation entered into by the parties on the opening day of trial established the
date of the taking. But, by awarding interest as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, the court implicitly rejected petitioner's submission on that issue.

11

The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the parties' stipulation
regarding the "date of taking" was not controlling, see n. 10, supra. After
reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals determined that the stipulation
pertained only to the date as of which the land was to be valued, not the date on
which the Government was deemed to have appropriated the land. 696 F.2d, at
356. We see no reason to question that determination.

12

Judge Jolly dissented on this issue, arguing that the owner of unimproved land
subject to condemnation proceedings under 40 U.S.C. 257 is entitled to
interest on the award at least for the period beginning with entry of judgment
by the district court, because during that period the owner is "shackled from
making economically viable use of his property." 696 F.2d, at 358-359.

13

In two cases, panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have rejected
the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in this case, holding that, when the
United States condemns unimproved property using the method prescribed in
40 U.S.C. 257, it must award interest to the owner for some period prior to
the date the award is paid and title passes. United States v. 15.65 Acres of
Land, 689 F.2d 1329 (1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Marin Ridgeland Co. v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 1435, 75 L.Ed.2d 793 (1983); United
States v. 156.81 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d 336, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086, 103
S.Ct. 569, 74 L.Ed.2d 931 (1982). Similar confusion exists in the District
Courts. See, e.g., United States v. 59.29 Acres of Land, 495 F.Supp. 212
(EDTex.1980) (date of taking is date of announcement of the award by the
commission).

14

Other measures of "just compensation" are employed only "when market value
[is] too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest

injustice to owner or public. . . ." United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,

339 U.S. 121, 123, 70 S.Ct. 547, 549, 94 L.Ed. 707 (1950).
15

We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard fails fully to

indemnify the owner for his loss. Particularly when property has some special
value to its owner because of its adaptability to his particular use, the fairmarket-value measure does not make the owner whole. United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-512, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 1857-1858, 60 L.Ed.2d
435 (1979). We are willing to tolerate such occasional inequity because of the
difficulty of assessing the value an individual places upon a particular piece of
property and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule
governing the measure of "just compensation." Ibid.
None of the discussion in this opinion is intended to modify either the manner
in which the fair-market-value standard is interpreted and applied or the test for
determining when the fair-market-value standard must be supplanted by other
formulae, see n. 14, supra. In particular, we express no view on the question of
how the value of land condemned under 40 U.S.C. 257 should be assessed
when activities of the Government during the pendency of the condemnation
proceedings have so altered the condition of the property as to reduce the price
it could fetch on the open market on the date of the taking.

16

The last-mentioned principle underlies the provision in 40 U.S.C. 258a for

the payment of interest on any difference between the estimated value of land
appropriated through a declaration of taking and its subsequently adjudicated
actual value as of that date. See supra, at 5. The principle also underlies several
decisions by Courts of Appeals, holding that the six percent rate of interest
prescribed by 258a is not a ceiling on the amount that can and must be paid
by the Government. See, e.g., United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d
800, 812, and n. 18 (CA5 1983) (en banc). The United States has acquiesced in
those decisions. Brief for United States 14, n. 13.

17

Petitioner's contention that our decision in Danforth pertained only to takings

effected pursuant to the Flood Control Act is unpersuasive. Though the Flood
Control Act contained a provision (analogous to 40 U.S.C. 258a) empowering
the United States to appropriate land expeditiously by filing a special petition
and depositing an estimated award, ch. 569, 4, 45 Stat. 536 (incorporating by
reference 5 of the River and Harbor Act of 1918, ch. 155, 40 Stat. 911), when
the Government appropriated the land at issue in Danforth, it apparently did not
invoke its special statutory authority but instead took the property in the usual
fashion as authorized by 40 U.S.C. 257. The holding of the case is thus on
point.

18

After commencement of the valuation hearing, the Government may dismiss

the suit only pursuant to a stipulation with the owner, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
71A(i)(2), or with the approval of the district court, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 71A(i)
(3). The Rule does not suggest that a court order dismissing a suit has the effect
of nullifying a taking that has already occurred. Indeed, to the contrary, the
Rule forbids the district court to dismiss an action (without awarding just
compensation) if the Government has acquired any "interest" in the property.
Ibid.

19

See n. 3, supra.

20

It must be admitted that the adoption of 258a does not compel the conclusion
that Congress in 1931 understood that the taking in a 257 suit did not occur
until the date payment was tendered by the condemnor, because 258a by its
terms only empowers the Government to file a declaration of taking prior to
"judgment." The language of 258a is thus consistent with a congressional
understanding that the taking occurred upon entry of final judgment in a
straight-condemnation action. However, the fact that Congress did not
empower the Government to file a declaration of taking anytime prior to the
tender of payment does not undercut our construction of 257, because the
Government has no need of special authority to appropriate land after judgment
and before payment in a straight-condemnation suit; after entry of judgment,
the Government can acquire the land merely by paying the owner the
adjudicated value of the property.

21

Cf. United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d, at 1334 (arguing that the
initiation of a condemnation action leaves "[t]he owner of unimproved land . . .
with the liabilities which follow title but none of the benefits, save the right
ultimately to be paid for the taking").

22

Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67, 100 S.Ct. 318, 327, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422, 43 S.Ct. 158,
162, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

23

See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-262, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141-2142, 65
L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123-128, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659-2661, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978);
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d
1554 (1960); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S., at 413, 415416, 43 S.Ct., at 159-160; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1214-1224 (1967).

24

The question of the Government's authority to dictate to petitioner the manner

in which it could use the land is preeminently a question of law, not of fact.
Thus, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals erred
in not adhering to the strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) when
examining the District Court's finding that the Government denied petitioner
economically viable use of the land during the pendency of the suit.
25

We have no occasion here to determine whether abrogation of an owner's right

to sell real property, combined with a sufficiently substantial diminution of its
utility to the owner, would give rise to a taking. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, supra,
444 U.S., at 66-68, 100 S.Ct., at 327-328.

26

Had petitioner made such a showing, complex questions would have arisen
regarding the measure of "just compensation." We defer resolution of those
questions to a case in which they are fairly presented.

27

For example, it appears that the market value of timberland of the sort owned
by petitioner was much higher in March 1979 than in March 1982. See
Vardaman's Green Sheet, Index of Pine Sawtimber Stumpage and Timberland
Prices (Jan. 15, 1983), reprinted in App. to Brief for United States 1a.

28

Though the value of timberland of the kind contained in petitioner's tract seems
to have declined during this period, see n. 27, supra, petitioner contends that the
value of its parcel nevertheless increased because of the expansion of the
residential areas surrounding nearby Beaumont, Tex., and the susceptibility of
the parcel to rural subdivision or recreational usage. The District Court can and
should assess these contentions on remand.

29

The procedure would not be free, of course, but that fact may well have a
healthy effect in deterring frivolous pleas for relief from final judgments. That
he would be obliged to bear some litigation costs in contesting a Rule 60(b)
motion should dissuade a landowner from filing such a motion unless he had
good reason to believe that the value of his property changed materially
between valuation and payment.

30

We do not mean to suggest that the constitutional difficulty discussed in this

section can be solved only by affording a condemnee in petitioner's position an
opportunity to file a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 60(b). Either
Congress or a lower court might perceive a more easily administrable way of
ensuring that the compensation paid to the owner of condemned land does not
fall substantially below the fair market value of the property on the date of the
taking.