467 U.S.

229
104 S.Ct. 2321
81 L.Ed.2d 186

HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY et al.

v.
Frank E. MIDKIFF et al. PORTLOCK COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION (Maunalua Beach) et al. v. Frank E.
MIDKIFF et al. KAHALA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al. v. Frank E. MIDKIFF et al.
Nos. 83-141, 83-236 and 83-283.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 26, 1984.
Decided May 30, 1984.

Syllabus
To reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly
traceable to the early high chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands, the Hawaii
Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act) which created a
land condemnation scheme whereby title in real property is taken from
lessors and transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of
land ownership. Under the Act, lessees living on single-family residential
lots within tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to ask appellant
Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they
live. When appropriate applications by lessees are filed, the Act authorizes
HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether the State's acquisition
of the tract will "effectuate the public purposes" of the Act. If HHA
determines that these public purposes will be served, it is authorized to
designate some or all of the lots in the tract for acquisition. It then
acquires, at prices set by a condemnation trial or by negotiation between
lessors and lessees, the former fee owners' "right, title, and interest" in the
land, and may then sell the land titles to the applicant lessees. After HHA
had held a public hearing on the proposed acquisition of appellees' lands
and had found that such acquisition would effectuate the Act's public
purposes, it directed appellees to negotiate with certain lessees concerning

the sale of the designated properties. When these negotiations failed, HHA
ordered appellees to submit to compulsory arbitration as provided by the
Act. Rather than comply with this order, appellees filed suit in Federal
District Court, asking that the Act be declared unconstitutional and that its
enforcement be enjoined. The court temporarily restrained the State from
proceeding against appellees' estates, but subsequently, while holding the
compulsory arbitration and compensation formulae provisions of the Act
unconstitutional, refused to issue a preliminary injunction and ultimately
granted partial summary judgment to HHA and private appellants who
had intervened, holding the remainder of the Act constitutional under the
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment. After deciding that the District Court
had properly not abstained from exercising its jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the Act violates the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Held:
1. The District Court was not required to abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction. Pp. 236-239.
(a) Abstention under Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61
S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971, is unnecessary. Pullman abstention is limited to
uncertain questions of state law, and here there is no uncertain question of
state law, since the Act unambiguously provides that the power to
condemn is "for a public use and purpose." Thus, the question,
uncomplicated by ambiguous language, is whether the Act on its face is
unconstitutional. Pp. 236-237.
(b) Nor is abstention required under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91
S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669. Younger abstention is required only when
state-court proceedings are initiated before any proceedings of substance
on the merits have occurred in federal court. Here, state judicial
proceedings had not been initiated at the time proceedings of substance
took place in the District Court, the District Court having issued a
preliminary injunction before HHA filed its first state eminent domain suit
in state court. And the fact that HHA's administrative proceedings
occurred before the federal suit was filed did not require abstention, since
the Act clearly states that those proceedings are not part of, or are not
themselves, a judicial proceeding. Pp. 237-239.
2. The Act does not violate the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 239-244.

(a) That requirement is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police

powers. This Court will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's
judgment as to what constitutes "public use" unless the use is palpably
without reasonable foundation. Where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a compensated
taking is not prohibited by the Public Use Clause. Here, regulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's
police powers, and redistribution of fees simple to reduce such evils is a
rational exercise of the eminent domain power. Pp. 239-243.
(b) The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn
that taking as having only a private purpose. Government does not itself
have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's
purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public
Use Clause. And the fact that a state legislature, and not Congress, made
the public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less
appropriate. Pp. 243-244.
702 F.2d 788 (CA9 1983), reversed and remanded.
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent

part, that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." These cases present the question whether the Public Use
Clause of that Amendment, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the State of Hawaii from taking, with just
compensation, title in real property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in
order to reduce the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State. We
conclude that it does not.

2* A.
3

The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from

the western Pacific. These settlers developed an economy around a feudal land
tenure system in which one island high chief, the ali'i nui, controlled the land
and assigned it for development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then
reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs, who would administer the land
and govern the farmers and other tenants working it. All land was held at the
will of the ali'i nui and eventually had to be returned to his trust. There was no
private ownership of land. See generally Brief for Office of Hawaiian Affairs as

Amicus Curiae 3-5.

4

Beginning in the early 1800's, Hawaiian leaders and American settlers

repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom among the crown, the
chiefs, and the common people. These efforts proved largely unsuccessful,
however, and the land remained in the hands of a few. In the mid-1960's, after
extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that, while the State and
Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% was
in the hands of only 72 private landowners. See Brief for the Hou Hawaiians
and Maui Loa, Chief of the Hou Hawaiians, as Amici Curiae 32. The
legislature further found that 18 landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or
more, owned more than 40% of this land and that on Oahu, the most urbanized
of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. Id., at 3233. The legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was
responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land
prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.

To redress these problems, the legislature decided to compel the large

landowners to break up their estates. The legislature considered requiring large
landowners to sell lands which they were leasing to homeowners. However, the
landowners strongly resisted this scheme, pointing out the significant federal
tax liabilities they would incur. Indeed, the landowners claimed that the federal
tax laws were the primary reason they previously had chosen to lease, and not
sell, their lands. Therefore, to accommodate the needs of both lessors and
lessees, the Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act),
Haw.Rev.Stat., ch. 516, which created a mechanism for condemning residential
tracts and for transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing
lessees. By condemning the land in question, the Hawaii Legislature intended
to make the land sales involuntary, thereby making the federal tax
consequences less severe while still facilitating the redistribution of fees
simple. See Brief for Appellants in Nos. 83-141 and 83-283, pp. 3-4, and nn. 68.

Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on single-family

residential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled
to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which
they live. Haw.Rev.Stat. 516-1(2), (11), 516-22 (1977). When 25 eligible
tenants,1 or tenants on half the lots in the tract, whichever is less, file
appropriate applications, the Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to
determine whether acquisition by the State of all or part of the tract will
"effectuate the public purposes" of the Act. 516-22. If HHA finds that these
public purposes will be served, it is authorized to designate some or all of the

lots in the tract for acquisition. It then acquires, at prices set either by
condemnation trial or by negotiation between lessors and lessees,2 the former
fee owners' full "right, title, and interest" in the land. 516-25.
7

After compensation has been set, HHA may sell the land titles to tenants who
have applied for fee simple ownership. HHA is authorized to lend these tenants
up to 90% of the purchase price, and it may condition final transfer on a right of
first refusal for the first 10 years following sale. 516-30, 516-34, 516-35. If
HHA does not sell the lot to the tenant residing there, it may lease the lot or sell
it to someone else, provided that public notice has been given. 516-28.
However, HHA may not sell to any one purchaser, or lease to any one tenant,
more than one lot, and it may not operate for profit. 516-28, 516-32. In
practice, funds to satisfy the condemnation awards have been supplied entirely
by lessees. See App. 164. While the Act authorizes HHA to issue bonds and
appropriate funds for acquisition, no bonds have issued and HHA has not
supplied any funds for condemned lots. See ibid.

B
8

In April 1977, HHA held a public hearing concerning the proposed acquisition
of some of appellees' lands. HHA made the statutorily required finding that
acquisition of appellees' lands would effectuate the public purposes of the Act.
Then, in October 1978, it directed appellees to negotiate with certain lessees
concerning the sale of the designated properties. Those negotiations failed, and
HHA subsequently ordered appellees to submit to compulsory arbitration.

Rather than comply with the compulsory arbitration order, appellees filed suit,
in February 1979, in United States District Court, asking that the Act be
declared unconstitutional and that its enforcement be enjoined. The District
Court temporarily restrained the State from proceeding against appellees'
estates. Three months later, while declaring the compulsory arbitration and
compensation formulae provisions of the Act unconstitutional,3 the District
Court refused preliminarily to enjoin appellants from conducting the statutory
designation and condemnation proceedings. Finally, in December 1979, it
granted partial summary judgment to appellants, holding the remaining portion
of the Act constitutional under the Public Use Clause. See 483 F.Supp. 62
(Haw.1979). The District Court found that the Act's goals were within the
bounds of the State's police powers and that the means the legislature had
chosen to serve those goals were not arbitrary, capricious, or selected in bad
faith.

10

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 702 F.2d 788 (CA9 1983).

First, the Court of Appeals decided that the District Court had permissibly
chosen not to abstain from the exercise of its jurisdiction. Then, the Court of
Appeals determined that the Act could not pass the requisite judicial scrutiny of
the Public Use Clause. It found that the transfers contemplated by the Act were
unlike those of takings previously held to constitute "public uses" by this Court.
The court further determined that the public purposes offered by the Hawaii
Legislature were not deserving of judicial deference. The court concluded that
the Act was simply "a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take
the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and
benefit." Id., at 798. One judge dissented.
11

On applications of HHA and certain private appellants who had intervened

below, this Court noted probable jurisdiction. 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 334, 78
L.Ed.2d 304 (1983). We now reverse.

II
12

We begin with the question whether the District Court abused its discretion in
not abstaining from the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellants have
suggested as one alternative that perhaps abstention was required under the
standards announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61
S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct.
746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). We do not believe that abstention was required.

A.
13

In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra, this Court held that federal courts
should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law
must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be
decided. By abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid both unnecessary
adjudication of federal questions and "needless friction with state policies. . . ."
Id., 312 U.S., at 500, 61 S.Ct., at 645. However, federal courts need not abstain
on Pullman grounds when a state statute is not "fairly subject to an
interpretation which will render unnecessary" adjudication of the federal
constitutional question. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535, 85 S.Ct.
1177, 1182, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). Pullman abstention is limited to uncertain
questions of state law because "[a] bstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule." Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483
(1976).

14

In these cases there is no uncertain question of state law. The Act

unambiguously provides that "[t]he use of the power . . . to condemn . . . is for

a public use and purpose." Haw.Rev.Stat. 516-83(a)(12) (1977); see also
516-83(a)(10), (11), (13). There is no other provision of the Actor, for that
matter, of Hawaii lawwhich would suggest that 516-83(a)(12) does not
mean exactly what it says. Since "the naked question, uncomplicated by
[ambiguous language], is whether the Act on its face is unconstitutional,"
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 511, 27 L.Ed.2d
515 (1971), abstention from federal jurisdiction is not required.
15

The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals suggested that, perhaps, the state
courts could make resolution of the federal constitutional questions unnecessary
by their construction of the Act. See 702 F.2d, at 811-812. In the abstract, of
course, such possibilities always exist. But the relevant inquiry is not whether
there is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that state courts might render
adjudication of the federal question unnecessary. Rather, "[w]e have frequently
emphasized that abstention is not to be ordered unless the statute is of an
uncertain nature, and is obviously susceptible of a limiting construction."
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251, and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 391, 397, and n. 14,
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). These statutes are not of an uncertain nature and have
no reasonable limiting construction. Therefore, Pullman abstention is
unnecessary.4

B
16

The dissenting judge also suggested that abstention was required under the
standards articulated in Younger v. Harris, supra. Under Younger-abstention
doctrine, interests of comity and federalism counsel federal courts to abstain
from jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or could be presented in
ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests. See
Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432437, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521-2524, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger abstention is
required, however, only when state court proceedings are initiated "before any
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court."
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2291, 45 L.Ed.2d 223
(1975). In other cases, federal courts must normally fulfill their duty to
adjudicate federal questions properly brought before them.

17

In these cases state judicial proceedings had not been initiated at the time
proceedings of substance took place in federal court. Appellees filed their
federal court complaint in February 1979, asking for temporary and permanent
relief. The District Court temporarily restrained HHA from proceeding against
appellees' estates. At that time, no state judicial proceedings were in process.

Indeed, in June 1979, when the District Court granted, in part, appellees' motion
for a preliminary injunction, state court proceedings still had not been initiated.
Rather, HHA filed its first eminent domain lawsuit after the parties had begun
filing motions for summary judgment in the District Courtin September
1979. Whether issuance of the February temporary restraining order was a
substantial federal court action or not, issuance of the June preliminary
injunction certainly was. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929-931,
95 S.Ct. 2561, 2566-2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). A federal court action in
which a preliminary injunction is granted has proceeded well beyond the
"embryonic stage," id., at 929, 95 S.Ct., at 2566, and considerations of
economy, equity, and federalism counsel against Younger abstention at that
point.
18

The only extant proceedings at the state level prior to the September 1979
eminent domain lawsuit in state court were HHA's administrative hearings. But
the Act clearly states that these administrative proceedings are not part of, and
are not themselves, a judicial proceeding, for "mandatory arbitration shall be in
advance of and shall not constitute any part of any action in condemnation or
eminent domain." Haw.Rev.Stat. 516-51(b) (1976). Since Younger is not a
bar to federal court action when state judicial proceedings have not themselves
commenced, see Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Assn., supra, 457 U.S., at 433, 102 S.Ct., at 2522; Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112-113, 102 S.Ct. 177, 184-185,
70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981), abstention for HHA's administrative proceedings was
not required.

III
19

The majority of the Court of Appeals next determined that the Act violates the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On this
argument, however, we find ourselves in agreement with the dissenting judge in
the Court of Appeals.

A.
20

The starting point for our analysis of the Act's constitutionality is the Court's
decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). In
Berman, the Court held constitutional the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945. That Act provided both for the comprehensive use of the eminent
domain power to redevelop slum areas and for the possible sale or lease of the
condemned lands to private interests. In discussing whether the takings
authorized by that Act were for a "public use," id., at 31, 75 S.Ct., at 101, the

Court stated:
21

"We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for
each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of
legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes
neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the
District of Columbia . . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs. . . .
This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent
domain is involved. . . ." Id., at 32, 75 S.Ct., at 102 (citations omitted).

22

The Court explicitly recognized the breadth of the principle it was announcing,
noting:

23

"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent
domain is merely the means to the end. . . . Once the object is within the
authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for
Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private
enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the
project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman.
But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been established." Id., at 33, 75 S.Ct., at
102.

24

The "public use" requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a

sovereign's police powers.

25

There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's

judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain
power is equated with the police power. But the Court in Berman made clear
that it is "an extremely narrow" one. Id., at 32, 75 S.Ct., at 102. The Court in
Berman cited with approval the Court's decision in Old Dominion Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66, 46 S.Ct. 39, 40, 70 L.Ed. 162 (1925), which
held that deference to the legislature's "public use" determination is required
"until it is shown to involve an impossibility." The Berman Court also cited to
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552, 66 S.Ct. 715, 718, 90

L.Ed. 843 (1946), which emphasized that "[a]ny departure from this judicial
restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental
function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that
question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable
in other fields." In short, the Court has made clear that it will not substitute its
judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use "unless
the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." United States v.
Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680, 16 S.Ct. 427, 429, 40 L.Ed. 576
(1896).
26

To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that "one person's property
may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying
public purpose, even though compensation be paid." Thompson v. Consolidated
Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80, 57 S.Ct. 364, 376, 81 L.Ed. 510 (1937). See, e.g.,
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447, 50 S.Ct. 360, 362, 74 L.Ed. 950
(1930); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239,
251-252, 25 S.Ct. 251, 255-256, 49 L.Ed. 462 (1905); Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159, 17 S.Ct. 56, 63, 41 L.Ed. 369 (1896).
Thus, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 17 S.Ct. 130, 41
L.Ed. 489 (1896), where the "order in question was not, and was not claimed to
be, . . . a taking of private property for a public use under the right of eminent
domain," id., at 416, at 135 (emphasis added), the Court invalidated a
compensated taking of property for lack of a justifying public purpose. But
where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to
be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. See Berman v. Parker, supra; Rindge
Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L.Ed. 1186 (1923); Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); cf. Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Corp., supra (invalidating an uncompensated taking).

27

On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is

constitutional. The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the
original 13 Colonies did,5 to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of
a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs. The land oligopoly has, according
to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning
of the State's residential land market and forced thousands of individual
homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.
Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a
State's police powers. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978); Block v. Hirsh, supra; see also People of
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (CA1), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 772, 67 S.Ct. 190, 91 L.Ed. 664 (1946). We cannot disapprove of Hawaii's

exercise of this power.

28

Nor can we condemn as irrational the Act's approach to correcting the land
oligopoly problem. The Act presumes that when a sufficiently large number of
persons declare that they are willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices the
land market is malfunctioning. When such a malfunction is signalled, the Act
authorizes HHA to condemn lots in the relevant tract. The Act limits the
number of lots any one tenant can purchase and authorizes HHA to use public
funds to ensure that the market dilution goals will be achieved. This is a
comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting market
failure.

29

Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its
intended goals. But "whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives
is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . .
[state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote
its objective." Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 671-672, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2084-2085, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981); see
also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S.Ct.
715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112, 99 S.Ct.
939, 950, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). When the legislature's purpose is legitimate
and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates
over the wisdom of takingsno less than debates over the wisdom of other
kinds of socioeconomic legislationare not to be carried out in the federal
courts. Redistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market
determined by the state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a
rational exercise of the eminent domain power. Therefore, the Hawaii statute
must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use Clause.6

B
30

The Court of Appeals read our cases to stand for a much narrower proposition.
First, it read our "public use" cases, especially Berman, as requiring that
government possess and use property at some point during a taking. Since
Hawaiian lessees retain possession of the property for private use throughout
the condemnation process, the court found that the Act exacted takings for
private use. 702 F.2d, at 796-797. Second, it determined that these cases
involved only "the review of . . . congressional determination[s] that there was
a public use, not the review of . . . state legislative determination[s]." Id., at 798
(emphasis in original). Because state legislative determinations are involved in
the instant cases, the Court of Appeals decided that more rigorous judicial
scrutiny of the public use determinations was appropriate. The court concluded

that the Hawaii Legislature's professed purposes were mere "statutory

rationalizations." Ibid. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' analysis.

31

32

The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in
the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as
having only a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public. "It
is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . .
. directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a
public use." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S., at 707, 43 S.Ct., at 692. "
[W]hat in its immediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may . . . be raised
by its class or character to a public affair." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S., at 155, 41
S.Ct., at 459. As the unique way titles were held in Hawaii skewed the land
market, exercise of the power of eminent domain was justified. The Act
advances its purposes without the State's taking actual possession of the land.
In such cases, government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the
taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass
scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.
Similarly, the fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the
public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less
appropriate.7 Judicial deference is required because, in our system of
government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should
be advanced by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures are as
capable as Congress of making such determinations within their respective
spheres of authority. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S., at 32, 75 S.Ct., at 102.
Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons
for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that
the taking will serve a public use.

IV
33

The State of Hawaii has never denied that the Constitution forbids even a
compensated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to
confer a private benefit on a particular private party. A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve
no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void. But no purely
private taking is involved in these cases. The Hawaii Legislature enacted its
Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals but
to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii
a legitimate public purpose. Use of the condemnation power to achieve this
purpose is not irrational. Since we assume for purposes of these appeals that

the weighty demand of just compensation has been met, the requirements of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been satisfied. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand these cases for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
34

It is so ordered.

35

Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these

cases.

An eligible tenant is one who, among other things, owns a house on the lot, has
a bona fide intent to live on the lot or be a resident of the State, shows proof of
ability to pay for a fee interest in it, and does not own residential land
elsewhere nearby. Haw.Rev.Stat. 516-33(3), (4), (7) (1977).

See 516-56 (Supp.1983). In either case, compensation must equal the fair
market value of the owner's leased fee interest. 516-1(14). The adequacy of
compensation is not before us.

As originally enacted, lessor and lessee had to commence compulsory

arbitration if they could not agree on a price for the fee simple title. Statutory
formulae were provided for the determination of compensation. The District
Court declared both the compulsory arbitration provision and the compensation
formulae unconstitutional. No appeal was taken from these rulings, and the
Hawaii Legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide only for
mandatory negotiation and for advisory compensation formulae. These issues
are not before us.

The dissenting judge's suggestion that Pullman abstention was required because
interpretation of the State Constitution may have obviated resolution of the
federal constitutional question is equally faulty. Hawaii's Constitution has only
a parallel requirement that a taking be for a public use. See Haw. Const., Art. I,
20. The Court has previously determined that abstention is not required for
interpretation of parallel state constitutional provisions. See Examining Board
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2279, 49 L.Ed.2d 65
(1976); see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27
L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

After the American Revolution, the colonists in several States took steps to
eradicate the feudal incidents with which large proprietors had encumbered
land in the Colonies. See, e.g., Act of May 1779, 10 Henning's Statutes At

Large 64, ch. 13, 6 (1822) (Virginia statute); Divesting Act of 1779, 17751781 Pa. Acts 258, ch. 139 (1782) (Pennsylvania statute). Courts have never
doubted that such statutes served a public purpose. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 60-61, 22 S.Ct. 573, 574-575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902);
Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md. 242, 244-245, 16 A. 644, 645 (1889).
6

We similarly find no merit in appellees' Due Process and Contract Clause

arguments. The argument that due process prohibits allowing lessees to initiate
the taking process was essentially rejected by this Court in New Motor Vehicle
Board v. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 108-109, 99 S.Ct. 403, 411-412, 58 L.Ed.2d
361 (1978). Similarly, the Contract Clause has never been thought to protect
against the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19, and n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1516, and n. 16, 52
L.Ed.2d 92 (1977).

It is worth noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself contain an
independent "public use" requirement. Rather, that requirement is made
binding on the States only by incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Eminent
Domain Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979
(1897). It would be ironic to find that state legislation is subject to greater
scrutiny under the incorporated "public use" requirement than is congressional
legislation under the express mandate of the Fifth Amendment.