473 U.S.

159
105 S.Ct. 3099
87 L.Ed.2d 114

KENTUCKY, dba Bureau of State Police, Petitioner

v.
James E. GRAHAM et al.
No. 84-849.
Argued April 16, 1985.
Decided June 28, 1985.

Syllabus
Respondents were arrested following the warrantless raid of a house in
Kentucky by local and state police officers who were seeking a murder
suspect. Claiming a deprivation of federal rights allegedly resulting from
the police's use of excessive force and other constitutional violations
accompanying the raid, respondents filed suit in Federal District Court
under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking money damages. Among the
named defendants were the Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police,
"individually and as Commissioner," and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, which was sued only for attorney's fees should respondents
eventually prevail. The District Court, relying on the Eleventh
Amendment, dismissed the Commonwealth as a party. On the second day
of trial, the case was settled in favor of respondents, who then moved that
the Commonwealth pay their costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1988, which provides that in any action to enforce 1983, the
court may allow "the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." The District Court granted the motion, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held: Section 1988 does not allow attorney's fees to be recovered from a
governmental entity when a plaintiff sues governmental employees only in
their personal capacities and prevails; accordingly, since this case was
necessarily litigated as a personal-capacity and not as an official-capacity
action, it was error to award fees against the Commonwealth. Pp. 163-171.
(a) While 1988 does not define the parties who must bear the costs, the

logical place to look for recovery of fees is to the losing party. Liability on
the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand. Where a defendant
has not been prevailed against, either because of legal immunity or on the
merits, 1988 does not authorize a fee award against that defendant. Pp.
163-165.
(b) Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government officer for actions he takes under color of state law, whereas
official-capacity suits against an officer are generally treated as suits
against the governmental entity of which the officer is an agent. With this
distinction in mind, it is clear that a suit against a government officer in
his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon
the governmental entity. Pp. 165-168.
(c) To hold that fees can be recovered from a governmental entity
following victory in a personal-capacity action against government
officials would be inconsistent with the rule that the entity cannot be made
liable on the merits under 1983 on a respondeat superior basis. Nothing
in 1988's history suggests that fee liability was intended to be imposed
on that basis. Section 1988 simply does not create fee liability where
merits liability is nonexistent. P. 168.
(d) Although the State Police Commissioner was named as a defendant in
both his "individual" and "official" capacities and the Commonwealth was
named as a defendant for the limited purpose of a fee award, there can be
no doubt, given Eleventh Amendment doctrine, that the action did not
seek to impose monetary liability on the Commonwealth. Absent waiver
by a State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars
a damages action against a State in federal court, a bar that remains in
effect when state officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.
Accordingly, an official-capacity damages action could not have been
maintained against the Commissioner in federal court. Respondents
cannot seek damages from the Commonwealth simply by suing
Commonwealth officials in their official capacity, nor did respondents'
action on the merits become a suit against the Commonwealth by simply
naming it as a defendant on the limited issue of fee liability. Pp. 168-170.
(e) Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522, did not
alter the basic philosophy of 1988 that fees and merits liability run
together, nor did it hold or suggest that fees are available from a
governmental entity simply because a government official has been
prevailed against in his or her personal capacity. Pp. 170-171.

742 F.2d 1455, (CA 6 1984), reversed.

George M. Geoghegan, Jr., for petitioner.
Jack M. Lowery, Jr., Louisville, Ky., for respondents.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether 42 U.S.C. 1988 allows attorney's fees to be

recovered from a governmental entity when a plaintiff sues governmental
employees only in their personal capacities and prevails.

* On November 7, 1979, a Kentucky state trooper was murdered. Suspicion

quickly focused on Clyde Graham, whose step-mother's car was found near the
site of the slaying and whose driver's license and billfold were discovered in
nearby bushes. That evening, 30 to 40 city, county, and state police officers
converged on the house of Graham's father in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.
Without a warrant, the police entered the home twice and eventually arrested
all the occupants, who are the six respondents here. Graham was not among
them.1 According to respondents, they were severely beaten, terrorized,
illegally searched, and falsely arrested. Kenneth Brandenburgh, the
Commissioner of the State Police and the highest ranking law enforcement
officer in Kentucky, allegedly was directly involved in carrying out at least one
of the raids. An investigation by the Kentucky Attorney General's office later
concluded that the police had used excessive force and that a "complete
breakdown" in police discipline had created an "uncontrolled" situation. App. to
Brief for Respondents 21-22.

Alleging a deprivation of a number of federal rights, respondents filed suit in

Federal District Court.2 Their complaint sought only money damages and
named as defendants various local and state law enforcement officers, the city
of Elizabethtown, and Hardin County, Kentucky. Also made defendants were
Commissioner Brandenburgh, "individually and as Commissioner of the
Bureau of State Police," and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The
Commonwealth was sued, not for damages on the merits, but only for attorney's
fees should the plaintiffs eventually prevail.3 Shortly after the complaint was
filed, the District Court, relying on the Eleventh Amendment, dismissed the
Commonwealth as a party. Based on its Attorney General's report, the
Commonwealth refused to defend any of the individual defendants, including
Commissioner Brandenburgh, or to pay their litigation expenses.

On the second day of trial, the case was settled for $60,000. 4 The settlement

On the second day of trial, the case was settled for $60,000. 4 The settlement
agreement, embodied in a court order dismissing the case, barred respondents
from seeking attorney's fees from any of the individual defendants but
specifically preserved respondents' right to seek fees and court costs from the
Commonwealth. Respondents then moved, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, that
the Commonwealth pay their costs and attorney's fees. At a hearing on this
motion, the Commonwealth argued that the fee request had to be denied as a
matter of law, both because the Commonwealth had been dismissed as a party
and because the Eleventh Amendment, in any event, barred such an award.
Rejecting these arguments, the District Court ordered the Commonwealth to
pay $58,521 in fees and more than $6,000 in costs and expenses.5 In a short per
curiam opinion relying solely on this Court's decision in Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed. Graham v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1455 (1984).

We granted certiorari to address the proposition, rejected by at least two Courts

of Appeals,6 that fees can be recovered from a governmental entity when a
plaintiff prevails in a suit against government employees in their personal
capacities. 469 U.S. 1156, 105 S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed.2d 916 (1985). We now
reverse.

II
6

This case requires us to unravel once again the distinctions between personaland official-capacity suits, see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83
L.Ed.2d 878 (1985), this time in the context of fee awards under 42 U.S.C.
1988. The relevant portion of 1988, enacted as the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, provides:

"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,

1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs" (emphasis added).

If a plaintiff prevails in a suit covered by 1988, fees should be awarded as

costs "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." S.Rep.
No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 5908,
5911; see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
446 U.S. 719, 737, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). Section 1988
does not in so many words define the parties who must bear these costs.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the logical place to look for recovery of fees is to

the losing partythe party legally responsible for relief on the merits. That is
the party who must pay the costs of the litigation, see generally Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 54(d),7 and it is clearly the party who should also bear fee liability
under 1988.
9

We recognized as much in Supreme Court of Virginia, supra. There a threejudge District Court had found the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice
in his official capacity liable for promulgating, and refusing to amend, a State
Bar Code that violated the First Amendment. The District Court also awarded
fees against these defendants pursuant to 1988. We held that absolute
legislative immunity shielded these defendants for acts taken in their legislative
capacity. We then vacated the fee award, stating that we found nothing "in the
legislative history of the Act to suggest that Congress intended to permit an
award of attorney's fees to be premised on acts for which defendants would
enjoy absolute legislative immunity." 446 U.S., at 738, 100 S.Ct., at 1978. 8
Thus, liability on the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand; where
a defendant has not been prevailed against, either because of legal immunity or
on the merits, 1988 does not authorize a fee award against that defendant.9 Cf.
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543-544, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1981-1982, 80
L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (state judge liable for injunctive and declaratory relief
under 1983 also liable for fees under 1988).

10

Proper application of this principle in damages actions against public officials

requires careful adherence to the distinction between personal- and officialcapacity action suits.10 Because this distinction apparently continues to confuse
lawyers and confound lower courts, we attempt to define it more clearly
through concrete examples of the practical and doctrinal differences between
personal and official capacity actions.

11

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government

official for actions he takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686-1687, 40 L.Ed.2d 90
(1974). Official-capacity suits, in contrast, "generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent."
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). As long as the government
entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is,
in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.
Brandon, supra, 469 U.S., at 471-472, 105 S.Ct., at 878. It is not a suit against
the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an
award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed
only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a

damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government

entity itself.11
12

On the merits, to establish personal liability in a 1983 action, it is enough to

show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of
a federal right. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5
L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). More is required in an official-capacity action, however,
for a governmental entity is liable under 1983 only when the entity itself is a
" 'moving force' " behind the deprivation, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (quoting Monell, supra,
436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037); thus, in an official-capacity suit the entity's
"policy or custom" must have played a part in the violation of federal law.
Monell, supra; Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817-818, 105 S.Ct.
2427, 2433, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); id., at 827-828, 105 S.Ct., at 2437, 2438
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment).12 When it comes to defenses to
liability, an official in a personal-capacity action may, depending on his
position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as objectively
reasonable reliance on existing law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96
S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (absolute immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (same); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (qualified immunity);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (same).
In an official-capacity action, these defenses are unavailable. Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); see also
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985).13 The
only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of
sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the
Eleventh Amendment. While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the basic
distinction between personal- and official-capacity actions.14

13

With this distinction in mind, it is clear that a suit against a government official
in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the
governmental entity. A victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against
the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that employs him.
Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action is asserted against the entity itself, the
entity is not even a party to a personal-capacity lawsuit and has no opportunity
to present a defense. That a plaintiff has prevailed against one party does not
entitle him to fees from another party, let alone from a nonparty. Cf. Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Yet that would
be the result were we to hold that fees can be recovered from a governmental
entity following victory in a personal-capacity action against government
officials.

B
14

Such a result also would be inconsistent with the statement in Monell, supra,
that a municipality cannot be made liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on a
respondeat superior basis. Nothing in the history of 1988, a statute designed
to make effective the remedies created in 1983 and similar statutes, suggests
that fee liability, unlike merits liability, was intended to be imposed on a
respondeat superior basis. On the contrary, just as Congress rejected making
1983 a "mutual insurance" scheme, 436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037,
Congress sought to avoid making 1988 a " 'relief fund for lawyers.' "
Hensley, supra, at 446, 103 S.Ct., at 1946 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) (quoting
122 Cong.Rec. 33314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)). Section 1988 does
not guarantee that lawyers will recover fees anytime their clients sue a
government official in his personal capacity, with the governmental entity as
ultimate insurer. Instead, fee liability runs with merits liability; if federal law
does not make the government substantively liable on a respondeat superior
basis, the government similarly is not liable for fees on that basis under 1988.
Section 1988 simply does not create fee liability where merits liability is nonexistent.

III
15

We conclude that this case was necessarily litigated as a personal-capacity

action and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in awarding fees against
the Commonwealth of Kentucky.15 In asserting the contrary, respondents point
out that the complaint expressly named Commissioner Brandenburgh in both
his "individual" and "official" capacities and that the Commonwealth of
Kentucky was named as a defendant for the limited purposes of a fee award.
Nonetheless, given Eleventh Amendment doctrine, there can be no doubt that
this damages action did not seek to impose monetary liability on the
Commonwealth.16

16

The Court has held that, absent waiver by the State or valid congressional
override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in
federal court.17 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,
323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). This bar remains in
effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity. Cory
v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2328, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662
(1974). That is so because, as discussed above, "a judgment against a public
servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents.
. . ." Brandon, supra, 469 U.S., at 471, 105 S.Ct., at 878. 18

17

Given this understanding of the law, an official-capacity action for damages

could not have been maintained against Commissioner Brandenburgh in federal
court.19 Although respondents fail to acknowledge this point, they freely
concede that money damages were never sought from the Commonwealth and
could not have been awarded against it;20 respondents cannot reach this same
end simply by suing State officials in their official capacity. Nor did
respondents' action on the merits become a suit against Kentucky when the
Commonwealth was named a defendant on the limited issue of fee liability.
There is no cause of action against a defendant for fees absent that defendant's
liability for relief on the merits. See supra, at ----. Naming the Commonwealth
for fees did not create, out of whole cloth, the cause of action on the merits
necessary to support this fee request. Thus, no claim for merits relief capable of
being asserted in federal court was asserted against the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. In the absence of such a claim, the fee award against the
Commonwealth must be reversed.

IV
18

Despite the Court of Appeals' contrary view, the result we reach today is fully
consistent with Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522
(1978). Hutto holds only that, when a State in a 1983 action has been
prevailed against for relief on the merits, either because the State was a proper
party defendant or because state officials properly were sued in their official
capacity, fees may also be available from the State under 1988. Hutto does
not alter the basic philosophy of 1988, namely, that fee and merits liability
run together. As a result, Hutto neither holds nor suggests that fees are available
from a governmental entity simply because a government official has been
prevailed against in his or her personal capacity.

19

Respondents vigorously protest that this holding will "effectively destro[y]"

1988 in cases such as this one. Brief for Respondents 19. This fear is
overstated. Fees are unavailable only where a governmental entity cannot be
held liable on the merits; today we simply apply the fee-shifting provisions of
1988 against a pre-existing background of substantive liability rules.

V
20

Only in an official-capacity action is a plaintiff who prevails entitled to look for

relief, both on the merits and for fees, to the governmental entity. Because the
Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions required this case to be litigated as a
personal-capacity action, the award of fees against the Commonwealth of
Kentucky must be reversed.

21

It is so ordered.

Clyde Graham was killed by a Kentucky state trooper a month later at a motel
in Illinois.

Respondents asserted causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986,

and 1988, as well as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Complaint 13. Because the case was settled, there has been no
need below to separate out or distinguish any of these purported causes of
action. Before this Court, the parties briefed and argued the case as if it had
been brought simply as a 1983 action and we, accordingly, analyze it the
same way. Our discussion throughout is therefore not meant to express any
view on suits brought under any provision of federal law other than 1983.

The complaint states:

"Pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, d/b/a Bureau of State Police is liable for the payment of reasonable
attorney fees incurred in this action." Complaint 4(D).
According to respondents, "[p]aragraph 4(D) . . . states the sole basis for
including the Commonwealth as a named party." Brief for Respondents 14.

Five thousand dollars came from the city and $10,000 from the County. The
remaining $45,000 was to be paid by Commissioner Brandenburgh, both
personally and as agent for the "Kentucky State Police Legal Fund." The latter
was not a named defendant but presumably represented the interests of the
individual officers sued.

Petitioner did not appeal from the award of costs and expenses, and we
therefore have no occasion to consider the appropriateness of these portions of
the award.

Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (CA5 1982) (municipal officials); Morrison v.

Fox, 660 F.2d 87 (CA3 1981) (same). At least one Court of Appeals appears to
have reached the same result as that of the lower court in this case. See Glover
v. Alabama Department of Corrections, 753 F.2d 1569 (CA11 1985).

See 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 54.70[1],

p. 1301 (1985) ("Costs" are awarded "against the losing party and as an
incident of the judgment"); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure 2666, p. 173 (1983) (" 'Costs' refers to those charges

that one party has incurred and is permitted to have reimbursed by his opponent
as part of the judgment in the action").
8

We did hold that the court and its chief justice in his official capacity could be
enjoined from enforcing the State Bar Code and suggested that fees could be
recovered from these defendants in their enforcement roles. Because the fee
award had clearly been made against the defendants in their legislative roles,
however, the award had to be vacated and the case remanded for further
proceedings. That fees could be awarded against the Virginia Supreme Court
and its chief justice pursuant to an injunction against enforcement of the Code
further illustrates that fee liability is tied to liability on the merits.

The rules are somewhat different with respect to prevailing defendants.

Prevailing defendants generally are entitled to costs, see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
54(d), but are entitled to fees only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or
brought to harass or embarrass the defendant. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 429, n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, n. 2, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
We express no view as to the nature or degree of success necessary to make a
plaintiff a prevailing party. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570,
65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980).

10

Personal-capacity actions are sometimes referred to as individual-capacity

actions.

11

Should the official die pending final resolution of a personal-capacity action,

the plaintiff would have to pursue his action against the decedent's estate. In an
official-capacity action in federal court, death or replacement of the named
official will result in automatic substitution of the official's successor in office.
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 25(d)(1); Fed.Rule App.Proc. 43(c)(1); this Court's
Rule 40.3.

12

See Monell, 436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037 ("[A] local government may not
be sued under 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under 1983").

13

In addition, punitive damages are not available under 1983 from a

municipality, Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69
L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), but are available in a suit against an official personally, see
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).

14

There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local

government officials, for under Monell, supra, local government units can be
sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g.,
Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1
(1985) (decided with Tennessee v. Garner ) (damages action against
municipality). Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or
Congress has overridden it, however, a State cannot be sued directly in its own
name regardless of the relief sought. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct.
3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam ). Thus, implementation of state
policy or custom may be reached in federal court only because official-capacity
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
In many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued
personally, in their official capacity, or both. "The course of proceedings" in
such cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be
imposed. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d
878 (1985).

15

The city and county were sued directly as entities, but that aspect of the case is
not before us.

16

See also n. 3, supra.

17

The Court has held that 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59
L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Because this
action comes to us as if it arose solely under 1983, see n. 2, supra, we cannot
conclude that federal law authorized an official-capacity action for damages
against Commissioner Brandenburgh to be brought in federal court.
As to legislative waiver of immunity, petitioners assert that the Commonwealth
of Kentucky has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. This
contention is not disputed, and we therefore accept it for purposes of this case.

18

In an injunctive or declaratory action grounded on federal law, the State's

immunity can be overcome by naming state officials as defendants. See
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900,
79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Ex parte Young, supra. Monetary relief that is
"ancillary" to injunctive relief also is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S., at 667-668, 94 S.Ct., at 1357-1358.

19

No argument has been made that the Commonwealth waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by failing specifically to seek dismissal of that portion

of the damages action that named Commissioner Brandenburgh in his official

capacity. Nor is the Commonwealth alleged to have done so by allowing him to
enter the settlement agreement; the Commonwealth did not even have notice of
the settlement negotiations.
20

Brief for Respondents 17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.