501 U.S.

419
111 S.Ct. 2376
115 L.Ed.2d 379

HOUSTON LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitioners,

v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, et al. LEAGUE OF
UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., Petitioners, v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, et al.
Nos. 90-813, 90-974.
Argued April 22, 1991.
Decided June 20, 1991.

Syllabus
Texas district courts are the State's trial courts of general jurisdiction.
Their judges are elected from electoral districts consisting of one or more
entire counties. The number of judges in each district varies, but each is
elected by voters in the district in which he or she sits, pursuant to an atlarge, district-wide scheme, and must be a resident of that district.
Although several judicial candidates in the same district may be running in
the same election, each runs for a separately numbered position. In the
primary, the winner must receive a majority of votes, but in the general
election the candidate with the highest number of votes for a particular
numbered position is elected. Petitioners in No. 90-974, local chapters of
the League of United Latin American Citizensan organization
composed of Mexican-American and African-American Texas residents
and others filed suit in the District Court against respondents, the State
Attorney General and other officials, alleging that the electoral scheme in
10 counties diluted the voting strength of African-American and Hispanic
voters in violation of, inter alia, 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Petitioners in No. 90-813 the Houston Lawyers' Association, an
organization of African-American attorneys registered to vote in one of
the 10 counties, and othersintervened in support of the original
plaintiffs. The District Court ruled in petitioners' favor and granted interim
relief for the 1990 election. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
judicial elections are not covered by 2. A separate opinion concurring in
the judgment agreed that elections for single-member offices, such as the

district judgeships, are exempt from 2. According to that opinion, a

district court judge, unlike an appellate judge who acts as a member of a
collegial body, is a single-office holder who has jurisdiction that is
coextensive with the geographic area from which he or she is elected and
has authority to render final decisions independently of other judges
serving in the same area or on the same court. The concurrence concluded
that exemption from 2 of elections for district judges is justified, given
the State's compelling interest in linking jurisdiction and elective base for
judges acting alone, and given the risk that attempting to break that
linkage might lessen minority influence by making only a few judges
principally accountable to the minority electorate rather than making all of
them partly accountable to minority voters.
Held: The Act's coverage encompasses the election of executive officers
and trial judges whose responsibilities are exercised independently in an
area coextensive with the districts from which they are elected. Once a
State decides to elect its trial judges, those elections must be conducted in
compliance with the Act, since judicial elections are not categorically
excluded from coverage. Chisom v. Roemer, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2371, -- L.Ed.2d ----. The state interest expressed in the concurring opinion
below does not justify excluding single-member offices from 2's
coverage. Rather, it is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts in
determining whether, based on the "totality of circumstances," a vote
dilution violation has occurred or may be remedied. Pp. 425-428.
914 F.2d 620 (CA5 1990), reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
KENNEDY, J., joined.
Julius L. Chambers, for the petitioners.
Renea Hicks, Austin, Tex., for the respondents.
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Chisom v. Roemer, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2371, --- L.Ed.2d ----, we held that
judicial elections, and, more specifically, elections of justices of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, are covered by 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79
Stat. 437, as amended in 1982, 42 U.S.C. 1973. In this case we consider

whether the statute also applies to the election of trial judges in Texas. We hold
that it does.
2

* Petitioners in No. 90-974 are local chapters of the League of United Latin
American Citizens, a statewide organization composed of both MexicanAmerican and African-American residents of the State of Texas, and various
individuals. They brought this action against the Attorney General of Texas and
other officials (respondents) to challenge the existing at-large, countywide
method of electing state district judges. Although the original challenge
encompassed the entire State, and relied on both constitutional and statutory
grounds, the issues were later narrowed to include only a statutory challenge to
the voting methods in just 10 counties.** Petitioners in No. 90-813 are the
Houston Lawyers' Association, an organization of African-American attorneys
who are registered voters in Harris County, and certain individuals; they are
intervenors, supporting the position of the original plaintiffs. Because all of the
petitioners have the same interest in the threshold issue of statutory
construction that is now before us, we shall refer to them collectively as
"petitioners."

Texas district courts are the State's trial courts of general jurisdiction. Electoral
districts for Texas district judges consist of one or more entire counties. Eight
of the districts included in this case include a single county; the other district
includes two counties. The number of district judges in each district at issue
varies from the 59 that sit in the Harris County district to the 3 that sit in the
Midland County district. Each judge is elected by the voters in the district in
which he or she sits pursuant to an at-large, district-wide electoral scheme, and
must be a resident of that district. Although several judicial candidates in the
same district may be running in the same election, each runs for a separately
numbered position. Thus, for example, if there are 25 vacancies in the Harris
County district in a particular year, there are 25 district-wide races for 25
separately numbered positions. In the primary elections, the winner must
receive a majority of votes, but in the general election the candidate with the
highest number of votes for a particular numbered position is elected.

Petitioners challenged the at-large, district-wide electoral scheme as diluting

the voting strength of African American and Hispanic voters. They cited the
example of Harris County, which has a population that is 20% African
American but has only 3 of 59 district judges that are African American. The
petitioners alleged that alternative electoral schemes using electoral subdistricts
or modified at-large structures could remedy the dilution of minority votes in
district judge elections.

Following a one-week trial, the District Court ruled in favor of petitioners on

their statutory vote dilution claim. It concluded that petitioners had sustained
their burden of proving that under the totality of the circumstances "as a result
of the challenged at large system [they] do not have an equal opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice,"
App. to Pet. for Cert., 290a-291a; 300a-301a. Although the District Court made
no findings about the appropriate remedy for the proven violation, it urged the
state legislature to select and approve an alternative district judge election
scheme. The District Court also announced that it would entertain motions to
enjoin future district judge elections pending the remedy phase of the litigation,
should the legislature fail to adopt an alternative election scheme. When the
state legislature failed to act, the District Court granted interim relief (to be
used solely for the 1990 election of district judges in the nine districts) that
included the creation of electoral subdistricts and a prohibition against the use
of partisan elections for district judges. Respondents appealed.

A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District
Court, 902 F.2d 293 (1990), and petitioners' motion for rehearing en banc was
granted, 902 F.2d 322 (1990). The en banc majority held that the results test in
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982, is inapplicable to
judicial elections. See 914 F.2d 620 (1990). In essence, the majority concluded
that Congress' reference to the voters' opportunity to elect "representatives" of
their choice evidenced a deliberate decision to exclude the election of judges
from scrutiny under the newly enacted test. For reasons stated in our opinion in
Chisom, --- U.S., at ----, 111 S.Ct., at ----, we reject that conclusion.

In a separate opinion, portions of which were joined by five other judges, Judge
Higginbotham expressed his disagreement with the majority's conclusion that
judges are not "representatives" within the meaning of the Act, but concurred in
the judgment of reversal. His opinion relied on a distinction between state
appellate judges and trial judges. Whereas the justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court have statewide jurisdiction, even though they are elected by
voters in separate districts, and act as members of a collegial body, the Texas
trial judge has jurisdiction that is coextensive with the geographic area from
which he or she is elected and has the sole authority to render final decisions.
Judge Higginbotham's opinion characterized trial judges "as single-office
holders instead of members of a multi-member body," 914 F.2d, at 649
(concurring opinion), because each exercises his or her authority independently
of the other judges serving in the same area or on the same court. Given the
State's "compelling interest in linking jurisdiction and elective base for judges
acting alone," id., at 651, and the risk that "attempting to break the linkage of
jurisdiction and elective base . . . may well lessen minority influence instead of

increase it," id., at 649, by making only a few district court judges principally
accountable to the minority electorate rather than making all of the district's
judges partly accountable to minority voters, he concluded that elections for
single-member offices, including elections for Texas district court judgeships,
are exempt from vote dilution challenges under 2.
8

Chief Judge Clark, while agreeing with the judgment of reversal on grounds
"expressly limited to the facts of the present case," 914 F.2d at 631 (concurring
opinion), disagreed with the analysis in both the majority and the concurring
opinion. He expressed the opinion that "it is equally wrong to say that section 2
covers all judicial elections as it is to say it covers none," id., at 633 (emphasis
in original). Characterizing Judge Higginbotham's "function-of-the-office
analysis" as "identical in concept to the majority view," ibid., Chief Judge
Clark would have held that whenever an officeholder's jurisdiction and the area
of residence of his or her electorate coincide, no vote dilution claims may be
brought against at-large schemes for electing the officeholder, regardless of
whether the "function" of the officeholder is to act alone or as a member of a
collegial body.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Johnson argued that the Act applies to all judicial
elections:

10

"Several truths are self-evident from the clear language of the statute that had
heretofore opened the electoral process to people of all colors. The Voting
Rights Act focuses on the voter, not the elected official. The Act was intended
to prohibit racial discrimination in all voting, the sole inquiry being whether the
political processes are equally open to all persons, no matter their race or color.
The Act is concerned only with the intent of persons of 'race or color' in casting
a ballot; it has no interest in the function of the person holding the office." Id.,
at 652 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).

II
11

We granted certiorari in these cases, 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 775, 112 L.Ed.2d
838 (1991), and in Chisom v. Roemer, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2371, --- L.Ed.2d ---, for the limited purpose of considering the scope of the coverage of 2. As
we have held in Chisom, the Act does not categorically exclude judicial
elections from its coverage. The term "representatives" is not a word of
limitation. Nor can the protection of minority voters' unitary right to an equal
opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice" be bifurcated into two kinds of claims in judicial elections, one
covered and the other beyond the reach of the Act. Ante, at ----. It is equally

clear, in our opinion, that the coverage of the Act encompasses the election of
executive officers and trial judges whose responsibilities are exercised
independently in an area coextensive with the districts from which they are
elected. If a State decides to elect its trial judges, as Texas did in 1861, those
elections must be conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
12

We deliberately avoid any evaluation of the merits of the concerns expressed in

Judge Higginbotham's concurring opinion because we believe they are matters
that are relevant either to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances that
must be considered in an application of the results test embodied in 2, as
amended, or to a consideration of possible remedies in the event a violation is
proved, but not to the threshold question of the Act's coverage. Even if we
assume, arguendo, that the State's interest in electing judges on a district-wide
basis may preclude a remedy that involves redrawing boundaries or subdividing
districts, or may even preclude a finding that vote dilution has occurred under
the "totality of the circumstances" in a particular case, that interest does not
justify excluding elections for single-member offices from the coverage of the
2 results test. Rather, such a state interest is a factor to be considered by the
court in evaluating whether the evidence in a particular case supports a finding
of a vote dilution violation in an election for a single-member office.

13

Thus we disagree with respondents that the "single-member office" theory

automatically exempts certain elections from the coverage of 2. Rather, we
believe that the State's interest in maintaining an electoral systemin this case,
Texas' interest in maintaining the link between a district judge's jurisdiction and
the area of residency of his or her votersis a legitimate factor to be considered
by courts among the "totality of circumstances" in determining whether a 2
violation has occurred. A State's justification for its electoral system is a proper
factor for the courts to assess in a racial vote dilution inquiry, and the Fifth
Circuit has expressly approved the use of this particular factor in the balance of
considerations. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (CA5 1973),
aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96
S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976). Because the State's interest in maintaining
an at-large, district-wide electoral scheme for single-member offices is merely
one factor to be considered in evaluating the "totality of circumstances," that
interest does not automatically, and in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote
dilution.

14

Two examples will explain why the "single-member office" theory, even if
accepted, cannot suffice to place an election for a single-member officeholder
entirely beyond the coverage of 2 of the Act. First, if a particular practice or
procedure, such as closing the polls at noon, results in an abridgment of a racial

minority's opportunity to vote and to elect representatives of their choice, the

Act would unquestionably apply to restrict such practices, regardless of
whether the election was for a single-member officeholder or not. Exempting
elections for single-member offices from the reach of 2 altogether can
therefore not be supported. As we stated earlier, this statute does not separate
vote dilution challenges from other challenges brought under the amended 2.
See ante, at ----.
15

Second, if the boundaries of the electoral districtand perhaps of its

neighboring district as wellwere shaped in "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure" such as that found in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 81 S.Ct.
125, 126, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), and if the effect of the configuration were to
produce an unnatural distribution of the voting power of different racial groups,
an inquiry into the totality of circumstances would at least arguably be required
to determine whether or not the results test was violated. Placing elections for
single-member offices entirely beyond the scope of coverage of 2 would
preclude such an inquiry, even if the State's interest in maintaining the
"uncouth" electoral system was trivial or illusory and even if any resulting
impairment of a minority group's voting strength could be remedied without
significantly impairing the State's interest in electing judges on a district-wide
basis.

16

Because the results test in 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to claims of vote
dilution in judicial elections, see Chisom, --- U.S., at ----, 111 S.Ct., at ----, and
because the concerns expressed by Judge Higginbotham in distinguishing
elections of Texas district court judges from elections of supreme court justices
relate to the question whether a vote dilution violation may be found or
remedied rather than whether such a challenge may be brought, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

17

It is so ordered.

18

Justice SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice KENNEDY
join, dissenting.

19

For the reasons stated in my opinion in Chisom v. Roemer, --- U.S. ----, 111
S.Ct. 2371, --- L.Ed.2d ----, I would not apply 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
vote dilution claims in judicial elections, and would therefore affirm the
judgment below.

**

The counties at issue are: Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis, Jefferson,
Lubbock, Crosby, Ector, and Midland.