60 U.S.

126
19 How. 126
15 L.Ed. 528

ROMELIUS L. BAKER AND JACOB HENRICI, TRUSTEES

OF THE
HARMONY SOCIETY OF BEAVER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, AND
OTHERS, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOSHUA NACHTRIEB.
December Term, 1856

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
western district of Pennsylvania, sitting as a court of equity.
It was a bill filed by Nachtrieb, under the circumstances mentioned in the
opinion of the court.
The Circuit Court, after having referred the case to a master to state an
account, decreed that the trustees should pay to Nachtrieb the sum of
$3,890; from which decree the trustees appealed to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Stanberry and Mr. Loomis for the appellants, and by
Mr. Stanton for the appellee.
Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, who describes himself as a member in the common and jointstock association for mutual benefit and advantage, and for the mutual
acquisition and enjoyment of property, called the 'Harmony Society,' filed a bill
in the Circuit Court against the appellants, as the trustees and managers of its
business and estate. The object of the bill is to obtain for the plaintiff a decree
for an account of the share to which he is entitled in the property of the society,
or compensation for his labor and service during the time he was a member.

In 1819 he became associated with George Rapp and others, in the Harmony

Society in Indiana, and remained with them there, or at Economy, in Beaver

county, Pennsylvania, till 1846. He devoted his time, skill, attention, and care,
during that period, to the increase of the wealth and the promotion of the
interest of the society.
3

These facts are admitted in the pleadings of either party.

The bill avers, that in 1846, the plaintiff being then forty-eight years old, and
worn out with years and labor for said association, was wrongfully and unjustly
excluded from it, and deprived of any share in its property, benefits, or
advantages, by the combination and covin of George Rapp and his associates;
that at the time of his exclusion he was entitled to a large sum of money, which
those persons unjustly and illegally appropriated to their own use; that George
Rapp was the leader and trustee of the association, invested with the title to its
property; and that, since his death, the defendants have acquired the control and
management of its business and affairs, and the possession of its effects. The
plaintiff calls for the production of the articles of association, which from time
to time have regulated this society, and prays for an account and distribution of
its property, or a compensation for his labor.

The defendants produce a series of articles, by which the association has been
governed since its organization in 1805.

They admit, that from small beginnings the society have become independent in
their circumstances, being the owners of lands ample for the supply of their
subsistence, warm and comfortable houses for the members, and engines and
machinery to diminish and cheapen their labors. They affirm that the plaintiff
participated in all the individual, social, and religious benefits which were
enjoyed by his fellows, under their contract, until he became possessed by a
spirit of discontent and disaffection, a short time before his membership
terminated. They deny that the plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from the
association, or deprived of a share or participation in the property and effects,
by the combination or covin of George Rapp and his associates; but assert, that
voluntarily, and of his own accord, he separated himself from the society. They
deny that he had a title to any compensation for labor and service while he was
a member, other than that which was expended for his support, maintenance,
and instruction, and that which he derived during the time from the spiritual and
social advantages he enjoyed. To support this averment, they epitomize the
history of the Harmony Society, and the agreements, which, from time to time,
have been the basis of its organization.

The society was composed at first of Germans, who emigrated to the United

The society was composed at first of Germans, who emigrated to the United
States in 1805, under the leadership of George Rapp. The members were
associated and combined by the common belief that the government of the
patriarchal age, united to the community of property, adopted in the days of the
Apostles, would conduce to promote their temporal and eternal happiness. The
founders of the society surrendered all their property to the association, for the
common benefit. The society was settled originally in Pennsylvania, was
removed in 1814 and 1815 to Indiana, and again in 1825 to Economy, in
Pennsylvania.

The organic law of the society, in regard to their property, is contained in two
sections of the articles of association, adopted in 1827 by the associates, of
whom the plaintiff was one. They are as follows: 'All the property of the
society, real, personal, and mixed, in law or equity, and howsoever contributed
and acquired, shall be deemed, now and forever, joint and indivisible stock;
each individual is to be considered to have finally and irrevocably parted with
all his former contributions, whether in land, goods, money, or labor, and the
same rule shall apply to all future contributions, whatever they may be.

'Should any individual withdraw from the society, or depart this life, neither he,
in the one case, nor his representatives, in the latter, shall be entitled to demand
an account of said contributions, whether in land, goods, money, or labor; or to
claim anything from the society as matter of right. But it shall be left altogether
to the discretion of the superintendent to decide whether any, and, if any, what
allowance shall be made to such member, or his representatives, as a donation.'

10

The defendants, admitting, as we have seen, that the plaintiff, until 1846, was a
contented member of the association, answer and say, that during that year he
became disaffected; used violent threats against the associates; made repeated
declarations of his intentions to leave the society, and in that year fulfilled his
design by a voluntary withdrawal and separation from the society, receiving at
the same time from George Rapp two hundred dollars as a donation. They
exhibit, as a part of the answer, a writing, signed by the plaintiff, to the
following effect:

11

'To-day I have withdrawn myself from the Harmony Society, and ceased to be a
member thereof; I have also received of George Rapp two hundred dollars as a
donation, agreeably to contract.

12

JOSHUA NACHTRIEB.

13

'ECONOMY, June 18, 1846.'

14

This statement of the pleadings shows that no issue was made in them upon the
merit of the doctrines, social or religious, which form the basis of this
association; nor any question in reference to the religious instruction and
ministration, or the domestic economy or physical discipline which their leader
and the other managers have adopted and enforced. Nor do they suggest any
inquiry into the condition of the members, and whether they have experienced
hardship, oppression, or undue mortification, from the ambition, avarice, or
fanaticism, of their guides and administrators.

15

The bill depends on the averments, that the plaintiff approved the constitution
of the society; submitted to its government; obeyed its regulations, and prized
the advantage of being a member. The burden of his complaint is, that he was
wrongfully, and without any fault or consent on his part, deprived of his station
through the combination of the leader and his assistants. And the defendants
concede that the plaintiff the plaintiff claims for himself; they concede that the
plaintiff was an approved and blameless member of the association, and was
entitled to whatever its constitution and order provided for the temporal good
or the eternal felicity of the members, and assert that he enjoyed them until he
became disaffected and repining, and finally surrendered to a spirit of
discontent, which moved him to abandon his condition and privileges. As an
evidence of this, they produce a writing, signed by him, in which he
acknowledges a voluntary secession from the society, and claims that the case
has arisen to authorize him to make an appeal to the bounty of the
superintendent, and that the superintendent has answered that appeal by a
donation. The value of this writing is now to be considered. The power of the
superintendent to substract from the otherwise 'joint and indivisible stock' of
the society a portion for the individual use of a seceding member, depends upon
the concession that the member has withdrawn voluntarily. He cannot supply
one who is the victim of covin or combination. The evidence shows that the
mind of the plaintiff, in June, 1846, was disquieted in consequence of his
connection with the association, and that he contemplated a change in his
condition; that he made inquires upon the expediency of a removal from
Economy, and made some preparations for his departure; that the leader of the
society, suspecting his discontent, and discovering some deviation by him from
the rules of the society, rebuked him with harshness, and menaced him with a
sentence of expulsion. Some of the witnesses testify to such a sentence, while
the testimony of others reduces the expressions to an admonition and menace.
But two days after the occurrence of the last of these scenes, and before any
removal had taken place, the writing in the record was executed by him,
embodying his decision to leave the society, and to accept the bounty the
constitution permitted the superintendent to bestow. This writing would have
much probative force, if we were simply to treat it as an admission of the

statements it contains, when considered in connection with other evidence in

the record. But, we think, this writing is something more than an admission,
and stands in a different light from an ordinary receipt. The writing must be
treated as the contract of dissolution, between the plaintiff and the society, of
their mutual obligations and engagements to each other. No evidence of prior
declarations or antecedent conduct is admissible to contradict or to vary it.
16

It was prepared to preserve the remembrance of what the parties had prescribed
to themselves to do, and expresses their intention in their own langauge; and
that such was its object, is corroborated by the fact that for three years there is
no evidence of a contrary sentiment. Treating this writing as an instrument of
evidence of this class, it is clear that the bill has not made a case in which its
validity can be impeached. To enable the plaintiff to show that the rule of the
leader, (Rapp,) instead of being patriarchal, was austere, oppressive, or
tyrannical; his discipline vexatious and cruel; his instructions fanatical, and,
upon occasions, impious; his system repugnant to public order, and the
domestic happiness of its members; his management of their revenues and
estate rapacious, selfish, or dishonest; and that the condition of his subjects was
servile, ignorant, and degraded, so that none of them were responsible for their
contracts or engagements to him, from a defect of capacity and freedom, as has
been attempted by him in the testimony collected in this cause, it was a
necessary prerequisite that his bill should have been so framed as to exhibit
such aspects of the internal arrangements and social and religious economy of
the association. This was not done; and for this cause the evidence cannot be
considered. The authorities cited from the decisions of this court are decisive.
Very v. Very, 13 How., 361, 345; Patton v. Taylor, 7 How., 157; Crockett v.
Lee, 7 Wheat., 525.

17

Decree reversed. Bill dismissed.