Chicago, M. & St. PR Co. v. United States, 104 U.S. 687 (1882)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsChicago, M. & St. PR Co. v. United States, 104 U.S. 687 (1882)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs104 U.S.
687
104 U.S. 687
26 L.Ed. 893
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY
COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES.
UNITED STATES
v.
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY
COMPANY.
October Term, 1881
APPEALS from the Court of Claims.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
The Solicitor-General for the United States.
Mr. John W. Cary, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court.
The action in the Court of Claims was brought by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and
St. Paul Railway Company to recover compensation withheld by the
Postmaster-General, claimed to be due upon a written contract for mail service,
entered into July 1, 1875, for the period of four years.
The amount in controversy had been retained by the Postmaster-General as a
reduction of the ten per cent on the previous rates, under the provision in the act
of July 12, 1876, c. 179, and of the further reduction of twenty per cent on the
remainder, under the thirteenth section of that act, it being insisted that the
company's road had been constructed, in whole or in part, by the aid of a grant
of public lands by Congress.
The Court of Claims found that the company had not been aided in the
construction of its road by a land grant, and that it was, therefore, not subject to
the deduction from its compensation made on that account. From that part of
the judgment the United States appealed.
It also found that the Postmaster-General was entitled to make the deduction of
ten per cent From that part of the judgment the company appealed.
This case is covered by the decision in Chicago & Northwestern Railway
Company v. United States (supra, p. 680), where it is held that the deduction
under that section could not be made against a company whose road had been
the subject of a land grant, when the service had been rendered during the term
of a written contract for four years, which had not terminated when the act took
effect.
The question in the present case, therefore, whether the railroad of the
company was or was not the subject of a land grant becomes immaterial;
although were it otherwise we should have no hesitation in affirming the
finding of the Court of Claims upon that point, for the reasons set forth in its
opinion.
Upon the question of the ten per cent deduction, the Court of Claims held that
the act of July 12, 1876, operated as a notice that the service would be
discontinued under the old rates, and would be continued, if at all, under the
new rates; and that, as the claimants continued to render the service under the
new law without dissent or protest, it was to be presumed that they acquiesced
in its provisions and accepted the change which it made in their contract.
We are unable to agree with this view, for the reasons already stated. That act
was not intended to apply to the case of contracts previously made for a term of
years, not expired when it took effect.
The judgment of the Court of Claims must, therefore, be reversed, and the
cause remanded with instructions to render a judgment in favor of the claimants
for the full amount of their claim; and it is
10
So ordered.
