184 U.S.

258
22 S.Ct. 463
46 L.Ed. 528

CLEMENT STUDEBAKER, Plff. in Err.,

v.
JOHN PERRY, as Receiver of the National Bank of Kansas
City.
No. 122.
Argued January 17, 20, 1902.
Decided February 24, 1902.

On November 9, 1899, in the circuit court of the United States for the
northern distract of Illinois, John Perry, as receiver of the National Bank
of Kansas City, brought an action against Clement Studebaker, to recover
an assessment made by the Comptroller of the Currency on stock held by
the defendant in said bank.
The declaration set forth the incorporation of the National Bank of Kansas
City; the ownership by the defendant of 189 shares of its capital stock of
the par value of $100 each; the insolvency of the bank; an assessment by
the Comptroller of the Currency on February 11, 1896, of 16 per cent on
the stock; the payment by the defendant of said assessment; a finding by
the Comptroller of the Currency on February 25, 1899, that the first
assessment was insufficient, and the necessity of an additional assessment
of 7 per cent; the levy of said second assessment; the direction by the
Comptroller to the receiver to collect it, and the refusal of the defendant to
pay.
A demurrer was filed raising the question of the sufficiency in law of the
declaration. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant electing to
stand by his demurrer, judgment was rendered for the amount of second
assessment upon the stock owned by the defendant. A writ of error was
allowed, and the cause was taken to the circuit court of appeals of the
seventh circuit, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. 43
C. C. A. 69, 102 Fed. 947. The case was then brought to this court by a
writ of error duly allowed.

Mr. Hugh C. Ward for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. George W. Wall, Francis F. Oldham, Walter W. Rass, and M. J.
Kirkman for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court:

The single question for our determination is whether the Comptroller of the
Currency, acting under the national banking laws, can validly make more than
one assessment upon the shareholders of an insolvent national banking
association.

It is not denied by the plaintiff in error that the first assessment, which he
voluntarily paid, was insufficient to pay the debts and liabilities of the bank, but
his contention is that the Comptroller of the Currency exhausted his power to
levy assessments upon the shareholders of stock in an insolvent national bank
by a single exercise of that power. He advances two arguments in support of his
contention: First, that the individual liability of national bank shareholders is
contractual, and that hence only one assessment and suit to enforce the same is
authorized by law; and, second, that by a course of practice for many years the
Comptrollers of the Currency, charged with the execution of the laws,
construed them to authorize but one assessment, and that such construction is
now conclusive upon the courts.

Those portions of the statutes which are involved in this controversy are found
in 5151 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in the following terms:

'The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held

individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all
contracts, debts, and engagements of such association to the extent of the
amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount
invested in such shares, except that shareholders of any banking association
now existing under state laws, having not less that five millions of dollars of
capital actually paid in and a surplus of twenty per centum on hand, both to be
determined by the Comptroller of the Currency, shall be liable only to the
amount invested in their shares. . . .'
And in 5234 in the following terms:

'On becoming satisfied, as specified in sections 5226 and 5227, that any

association has refused to pay its circulating notes as therein mentioned, and is
in default, the Comptroller of the Currency may forthwith appoint a receiver
and require of him such bond and security as he deems proper. Such receiver,
under the direction of the Comptroller, shall take possession of the books,
records, and assets of every description of such association, collect all debts,
dues, and claims belonging to it, and upon the order of a court of record of
competent jurisdiction may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and, on
a like order, may sell all the real and personal property of such association, on
such terms as the court shall direct; and may, if necessary to pay the debts of
such association, enforce the individual liability of the stockholders. Such
receiver shall pay over all money so made to the Treasurer of the United States,
subject to the order of the Comptroller, and also make report to the Comptroller
of all his acts and proceedings.'
And 5236, as follows:
6

'From time to time, after full provision has first been made for refunding to the
United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such association, the
Comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by
such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or
adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the
assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on
all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the proceeds,
if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association, or their legal
representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held.'

The proposition of the plaintiff in error, as expressed in the brief of his counsel,
is 'that 5234 simply authorizes the Comptroller to enforce the individual
liability of shareholders in a national bank, if necessary to pay the debts of such
bank; that the Comptroller is therefore plainly authorized to decide as to the
necessity of enforcing such liability and as to the time when the same is to be
enforced, and fix the amount to be collected; that there is to be a decision by the
Comptroller as to these matters, and then a demand or requisition by him,
followed by one suit, at law or in equity, as circumstances require; that it is this
decision, which is termed an assessment; that the Comptroller is nowhere
expressly authorized to enforce such liability by several decisions and suits; that
he is simply authorized to enforce the individual liability of national bank
stockholders according to law; and that there can be but one decision by the
Comptroller as to the time, necessity, and extent of enforcing this liability, and,
therefore, but one assessment, as the statute certainly does not authorize an
assessment which could not be enforced by suit.'

It is further urged, in behalf of the plaintiff in error, that as the liability of a

shareholder of an insolvent national bank for all contracts, debts, and
engagements of such association to the extent of the amount of his stock
therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such
shares, is contractual in its nature, it therefore follows that the general rule that
the plaintiff cannot split up a single and entire cause of action and make it the
subject of different suits applies.

We do not deem it necessary in the case before us to enter at length into the
discussion suggested. It is sufficient that, by entering into the relation of a
shareholder in a national banking association, the plaintiff in error subjected
himself to the obligation created by the statute, and the only question is
whether the Comptroller of the Currency has power to make and to enforce by
a suit at law more than one assessment upon the shareholders of an insolvent
national bank, if necessary to pay the debts thereof. The general purpose of the
statute undoubtedly was to confer upon the creditors of the bank a right to
resort to the individual liability of the shareholders to the extent, if necessary,
of the amount of their stock therein, and it would be a singular construction of
law that would empower the Comptroller, by making an inadequate assessment,
to relieve the shareholders, upon paying such assessment, from their entire
liability.

10

The logic of the plaintiff in error requires him to convince us that his voluntary
payment of one assessment, made when the Comptroller was imperfectly
acquainted with the amount of the bank's indebtedness, amounts to a
satisfaction in toto of his obligation. Such may be the true construction of the
statute; but, defeating, as it would in the case supposed, the main and obvious
purpose of the enactment, such a construction will only be made by a court
when compelled by the necessary meaning of the language. The
inconveniences that would be occasioned by the meaning proposed are so great
and obvious as to lead us to expect to find that a reasonable construction of the
law does not require us to adopt it.

11

If it be the duty of the Comptroller to give the creditors of an insolvent national

bank the remedy providing for the individual liability of the shareholders, and
if the law be that he can do so by one assessment only, then he must, no matter
what the condition of the bank may appear to be, make an assessment upon the
shareholders up to the entire amount of their liability. In many instances, the
value of the bank's assets might make it altogether probable that but a small
portion of the shareholders' contribution would be needed. To require payment
in full of money which might be held for years while the bank's affairs were

being wound up, and then be returned without interest, would certainly be a
hardship upon the shareholders. If, to avoid that hardship, the Comptroller
should postpone the assessment until he could fully inform himself of the
condition of the bank's affairs, in the time that might thus elapse, some of the
stockholders might become insolvent or remove their property from the reach
of legal proceedings, and thus a loss be thereon upon the creditors.
12

There is nothing in the language of the sections involved to compel us to adopt

a view of the law which would result in such manifest inconveniences.

13

In Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. ed. 476, some aspects of the question
were considered. Mr. Justice Swayne said:

14

'The receiver is the instrument of the Comptroller. He is appointed by the

Comptroller, and the power of appointment carries with it the power of
removal. It is for the Comptroller to decide when it is necessary to institute
proceedings against the stockholders to enforce their personal liability, and
whether the whole or a part, and, if only a part, how much, shall be collected.
These questions are referred to his judgment and discretion, and his
determination is conclusive. The stockholders cannot controvert it. It is not to
be questioned in the litigation that may ensue. He may make it at such time as
he may deem proper and upon such data as shall be satisfactory to him. This
action on his part is indispensable whenever the personal liability of the
stockholders is sought to be enforced, and must precede the institution of suit
by the receiver. The fact must be distinctly averred in all such cases, and if put
in issue must be proved.

15

'The liability of the stockholders is several and not joint. The limit of their
liability is the par of the stock held by each one. Where the whole amount is
sought to be recovered, the proceeding must be at law. Where less is required,
the proceeding may be in equity, and in such case an interlocutory decree may
be taken for contribution and the case may stand over for the further action of
the courtif such action should subsequently prove to be necessaryuntil the
full amount of the liability is exhausted. It would be attended with injurious
consequences to forbid action against the stockholders until the precise amount
necessary to be collected shall be formally ascertained. This would greatly
protract the final settlement, and might be attended with large losses by
insolvency and otherwise in the intervening time. The amount must depend in
part upon the solvency of the debtors and the validity of the claims. Time will
be consumed in the application of these tests, and the result in many cases
cannot be foreseen. The same remarks apply to the enforced collections from
the stockholders. A speedy adjustment is necessary to the efficiency and utility

of the law; the interests of the creditors require it, and it was the obvious policy
and purpose of Congress to give it. If too much be collected, it is provided by
the statute that any surplus which may remain after satisfying all demands
against the association shall be paid over to the stockholders. It is better they
should pay more than may prove to be needed than that the evils of delay
should be encountered.'
16

These observations clearly imply that the Comptroller, in the exercise of his
discretion, may levy successive assessments as they may appear to be
necessary. If the power can be exercised only once no reason is apparent why
equity should have jurisdiction for the collection of an assessment less than 100
per cent. If the stockholders' liability is fixed once for all by the first
assessment of the Comptroller, the legal remedy for the collection of a 10 per
cent assessment is as full, adequate, and complete as it is for the collection of
the 100 per cent assessment. The reason why, when the assessment is for the
100 per cent, the proceeding must be at law, and when for a less amount it may
be in equity, is obvious. When the full amount is assessed there can be but one
suit against each stockholder. He is suable for his full liability at once, and
there is no reason for equitable jurisdiction. If a partial assessment is made,
there may be other assessments, when the receiver has liberty to sue at law for
even a partial assessment, though equity has concurrent jurisdiction to prevent a
multiplicity of suits.

17

Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 168, was the case of a suit at law by the
receiver of a national banking association to enforce the individual liability of a
shareholder. It was there contended that the defendant was bound to contribute
ratably, and that the proper amount could be ascertained only in equity; that the
defendant was bound to contribute ratably a large sum; that this sum was not
stated in the declaration, and hence what would be ratable and proper did not
appear; that the obligation of the defendant was to pay into the hands of the
Comptroller of the Currency a ratable portion of the debts of the association
proved before him, and that the declaration did not show that any debts had
been so proved; and that the declaration demanded a larger sum than the
defendant is required by the statute to pay, and also an additional sum by way
of interest. But it was held by this court that 'in regard to the first three of these
objections it is sufficient to say that Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. ed.
476, is conclusive against them. It is there said that the amount to be paid rests
in the judgment and discretion of the Comptroller; that his determination
cannot be controverted by the stockholders in suits against them, and that, when
the order is to collect the full amount of the par of the stock, the suit must be at
law. It is unnecessary to reproduce the reasoning of the court in support of these
propositions. The sum to be paid being liquidated, and due and payable when

the Comptroller's order was made, it follows that the amount bears interest
from the date of the order.'
18

In United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, 26 L. ed. 216, an attempt was made to
enforce a deficiency; caused by the insolvency of some of the shareholders of
an insolvent national bank, against solvent shareholders, but it was held that the
liability of the shareholders was several, and was not affected by the failure of
any other shareholder to pay the amount assessed against him, and it was said
by this court that, 'although assessments made by the Comptroller under the
circumstances of the first assessment in this case, and all other assessments,
successive or otherwise, not exceeding the par value of all the stock of the
bank, are conclusive upon the stockholders.'

19

Germanica Nat. Bank v. Case, 131 U. S. 144, Appx., and 23 L. ed. 961, was a
case where the Comptroller had levied an assessment for an amount on each
shareholder, not sufficient to justify an appeal from the circuit court of the
United States, and where a motion to dismiss the appeal was made in this court,
but the motion was denied, Chief Justice Waite saying: 'If the decree asked and
obtained in this cause had been confined to an order for the payment of the 70
per cent upon the amount of the stock held by the appellants respectively,
which the Comptroller of the Currency has already instructed the receiver to
collect, the objection taken by the appellee to our jurisdiction might have been
good; but the decree as given goes further, and after providing for the 70 per
cent, adjudges that each of the appellants shall be liable to further contribution
as stockholders until a sufficient sum is realized to pay the debts of the bank,
and that the bill be retained until it shall be centain that no further contribution
will be required. This fixes the liability of each of these appellants to contribute
in this suit to the extent of the nominal amount of his stock if necessary, and as
the bill alleges that at least 25 per cent more will be required, it is apparent that
the 'matter in dispute' is not alone the amount already decreed, but a sum in
addition that may amount to 30 per cent of the stock, and is now expected to
reach 25 per cent. Their liability generally as stockholders to make
contributions has been fully established. That can never again be contested in
this suit except under this appeal. For the purposes of jurisdiction, we may
consider that as in dispute which would be settled by the decree if it had not
been appealed from.' The right of the Comptroller to levy a further assessment
was thereby plainly implied.

20

Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684, 41 L. ed. 598, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, was a
late case, in which the power of the Comptroller to determine the necessity and
amount of an assessment upon the shareholders was challenged on
constitutional grounds, but it was held, in the language of Mr. Justice White:

'All these alleged errors may be reduced to the single contention that under the
national banking law the Comptroller of the Currency is without power to
appoint a receiver to a defaulting or insolvent national bank, or to call for a
ratable assessment upon the stockholders of such bank without a previous
judicial ascertainment of the necessity for the appointment of the receiver and
of the existence of the liabilities of the bank; and that the lodgment of authority
in the Comptroller, empowering him either to appoint a receiver or to make a
ratable call upon the stockholders, is tantamount to vesting that officer with
judicial power, in violation of the Constitution. All of these contentions have
been long since settled, and are not open to further discussion. Kennedy v.
Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. ed. 476; Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 674, 24 L. ed. 168;
United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 423, 26 L. ed. 216.'
21

The precise question raised in the present case has several times been argued
and determined in the lower Federal courts. In Aldrich v. Yates, 95 Fed. 78, the
question was thus stated and answered by District Judge Evans in the circuit
court for the district of Kentucky: 'The question, then, remains, Has the
Comptroller of the Currency the power to make a second assessment in any
event? The ultimate liability of the shareholder in such cases is for the full
amount of the par value of the stock, . . . under the statutory conditions, if they
are found by the Comptroller to exist. A mistake of that officer in making an
estimate of the amount of a needed assessment cannot be held to release the
shareholder from the full statutory liability. A mistake of such a character
would be natural, if not inevitable, in many instances, in view of the uncertain
value of assets; and the indisposition, in the first instance, to make an
assessment unnecessarily large may well excuse its not being done, when there
is certainly no statutory provision, prohibiting, in terms or by necessary
implication, further assessments, if the necessity exists. In practice, second
assessments have frequently been made. The court is of opinion that such a
course is within the power of the Comptroller, in the exercise of his duty to see
that the liability of the stockholder is sufficiently enforced to pay the debts of
the bank, and that practice has been recognized as proper by the Supreme
Court. United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, 26 L. ed. 216.'

22

In Aldrich v. Campbell, 38 C. C. A. 347, 97 Fed. 663, it was held by the circuit

court of appeals for the ninth circuit that the action of the Comptroller of the
Currency in ordering an assessment against the stockholders of an insolvent
national bank, whether a first assessment or one subsequently made, is a
determination of the necessity for such assessment, which is conclusive on the
stockholders, and cannot be questioned by them in any litigation which may
ensue, either at law or in equity.

23

In De Weese v. Smith, 97 Fed. 309, it was held by the circuit court that a
judgment against a shareholder of an insolvent national bank on a first
assessment was a bar to a second suit brought to recover a later assessment, but
this judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit,
in De Weese v. Smith, 45 C. C. A. 408, 106 Fed. 438. And, as already stated,
the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit held in the case now before
us that it was discretionary with the Comptroller to make one or more
assessments (Studebaker v. Perry, 43 C. C. A. 69, 102 Fed. 947), Woods,
Circuit Judge, saying:

24

'The dominant purpose of the parts of the statute touching this question is that
the shareholders of an insolvent national bank shall be liable for its debts 'to the
extent of the amount of their stock therein,' and rules of construction are not to
be invoked in a way to defeat that purpose. Under the direction, of the
Comptroller the receiver is authorized to enforce the shareholder's liability; but
the power to enforce does not include a power to cut off or limit and by no
proper application of general rules of construction can the statute be so read as
to permit the failure of its main design.'

25

The cases cited by the plaintiff in error wherein courts of high authority have
held that, where some particular act involving judicial discretion is to be
performed by an executive officer, the power is exhausted by its single
exercise, are not applicable to cases like the present, where the law merely
provides that the shareholder shall pay what may be necessary to meet the debts
and obligations of the bank. How much that is may not be ascertained at once,
but as it is important that the settlement shall progress without delay, it is a
reasonable construction of the statute that, while it is just and for his benefit
that the stockholder be called on for no more than seems to be necessary, so it
is just to the creditor that further calls may be made when necessary. This is a
case were the power to assess belongs exclusively to the Comptroller, and the
power to enforce the assessment belongs to the courts, and the construction
contended for on behalf of the plaintiff in error confuses the remedy provided
for by this statute of the United States with the ordinary remedy for the
enforcement of statutory liability of stockholders by the courts.

26

It is finally argued on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the doctrine of

contemporaneous and practical construction put upon a statute by executive
officers is applicable. It is said that former comptrollers of the currency held, in
several instances, that the power to assess under the national banking law was
exhausted by a single exercise; that subsequent comptrollers ought not to have
departed from that construction; and it is urged that this court should, by its

decision in this case, set aside the construction at present prevailing and restore
the former one.
27

The doctrine invoked is a useful one, but its application should be restricted to
cases in which the construction involved is really one of doubt and where those
to be affected have relied on the practical construction, and rights have accrued
by reason of such reliance. The rule is well expressed in Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed. p. 69:

28

'If the question involved is really one of doubt the force of their [officers']
judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may result from
disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale in the judicial mind. Where,
however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, we think the same rule
obtains here as in other cases, that the court should confine its attention to the
law, and not allow intrinsic circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the
language is plain. To allow force to a practical construction in such a case
would be to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident purpose of the
lawmakers.'

29

That the language of the statute under consideration is plain and its construction
free from doubt are sufficiently shown by the decisions of the courts heretofore
cited; and it would be absurd to claim that the plaintiff in error bought his stock
in a national banking association with a right to rely on the contingency that the
Comptroller might inadvertently or mistakenly make an insufficient assessment
should the bank become insolvent.

30

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.