Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540 (1912)
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Scribd Government DocsStandard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540 (1912)
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Scribd Government Docs225 U.S.
540
32 S.Ct. 784
56 L.Ed. 1197
STANDARD STOCK FOOD COMPANY, Appt.,
v.
H. R. WRIGHT, as State Food and Dairy Commissioner of
Iowa.
No. 222.
Argued April 24, 1912.
Decided June 10, 1912.
Messrs. F. H. Gaines, E. G. McGilton, Sidney W. Smith, and A. L. Hager
for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 541-543 intentionally omitted]
Mr. George Cosson, Attorney General of Iowa, and Mr. Henry E.
Sampson for appellee.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 543-547 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:
The Standard Stock Food Company, a Nebraska corporation, brought this suit
against the state food and dairy commissioner of Iowa to restrain the
enforcement of a statute of Iowa, effective July 4, 1907 (Code of Iowa,
Supplement 1907, 5077-a6-5077-a24), relating to the sale within the state of
'concentrated commercial feeding stuffs,' upon the ground that it was repugnant
to the interstate commerce clause ( 8, article 1), and to the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. Demurrer to the bill was sustained by the
circuit court and the complainant appeals.
It was alleged in the bill that the appellant's product was a 'condimental stock
food,' sold in Iowa and other states under the trade name of 'Standard Stock
Food;' that it was prepared pursuant to a secret formula of great value,
contained nothing deleterious of poisonous, and had 'condimental and tonic
properties and powers which aid animals in the digestion of food.' It was
further alleged that it was made in Nebraska and shipped into Iowa, where it
was sold in the original packages either by agents of the appellant or by dealers.
3
The act required that each package of the described articles should have affixed
thereto, in a conspicuous place on the outside, a printed statement giving certain
information. The substances of this requirement, with respect to its products, is
thus stated in the appellant's argument:
'The package or container of such products shall have printed on the outside
thereof:
'First. The number of net pounds of feeding stuffs in the package.
'Second. The name, brand, or trademark under which the article is sold.
'Third. The name and address of the manufacturer, importer, dealer, or agent.
'Fourth. The place of manufacture.
'Fifth. The name and percentage of any deleterious or poisonous ingredient or
ingredients.
10
'Sixth. The name and percentage of the diluent or diluents or bases.' (Sections
1, 2.)
11
The statute also contains the following provision ( 5):
12
'Before any manufacturer, importer, dealer, or agent shall offer or expose for
sale in this state any of the concentrated commercial feeding stuffs defined in
section three (3) of this act, he shall pay to the state food and dairy
commissioner an inspection fee of ten cents per ton for each ton of such
concentrated commercial feeding stuffs sold or offered for sale in the state of
Iowa, for use within this state; except that every manufacturer, importer, dealer,
or agent for any condimental, patented, proprietary, or trademarked stock or
poultry foods, or both, shall pay to the state food and dairy commissioner, on or
before the fifteenth day of July of each year, a license fee of one hundred
dollars ($100) in lieu of such inspection fee. Whenever the manufacturer or
importer of such foods shall have paid the fee herein required, no other person
or agent of such manufacturer or importer shall be required to pay such license
fee.'
13
The appellant challenges the constitutional validity of the statute in these two
particulars: (1) The requirement that the name and percentage of the diluent or
diluents or bases shall be stated, and (2) the exaction of the fee of $100.
14
1. With respect to the first question the case in its essential features is not to be
distinguished from that of Savage v. Jones, decided June 7, 1912 [225 U. S.
501, 56 L. ed. , 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715], and nothing need be added to what
was there said. It was competent for the state, in the exercise of its power to
prevent imposition upon the public, to require the disclosure to which objection
is made. The provision was not an unreasonable one and the effect upon
interstate commerce was incidental only. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S.
461, 39 L. ed. 223, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; Hennington
v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 317, 41 L. ed. 166, 173, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1086;
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 488; Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, 361, 43
L. ed. 191, 197, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver
& R. G. R. Co. 203 U. S. 38, 50, 51 L. ed. 78, 86, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Heath &
M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114;
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 254, 256, 52 L. ed. 778, 780, 781, 28 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 485, 14 Ann. Cas. 1101. Nor is there any conflict with the food and drugs
act of June 30, 1906, chap. 3915 (34 Stat. at L. 768, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp.
1911, p. 1354), Savage v. Jones supra.
15
2. The statute provides for inspection and analysis. Under 6, it is the duty of
the state food and dairy commissioner to 'cause to be made analyses of all
concentrated commercial feeding stuffs and agricultural seeds sold or offered
for sale in this state.' For this purpose, that officer is authorized 'in person or by
deputy, to take for analysis a sample from any lot or package of concentrated
commercial feeding stuffs in this state,' and further provision is made to assure
the representative character of the sample. The results of the analyses are to be
published from time to time in official bulletins. The state food and dairy
commissioner is required to enforce the statute, and to this end is authorized to
appoint, with the approval of the executive council, such analysts and chemists
as may be necessary to carry it into effect. Violation of any of the provisions of
the act is made a misdemeanor.
16
We are of opinion that the statute must be considered as an inspection law
which it was within the power of the state to enact, and that its fair import is
that the fees exacted by 5, above quoted, are for the purpose of meeting the
expenses of inspection. The bill alleges no facts warranting the conclusion that
the charge is unreasonable as compared with this expense. Patapsco Guano Co.
v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, 347, 354, 361, 43 L. ed. 191, 192, 194,
197, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R.
Co. 203 U. S. 38, 50, 51 L. ed. 78, 86, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Red 'C' Oil Mfg. Co.
v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380, 393, 56 L. ed. 240, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
152; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 56 L. ed. , 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715.
17
The payment of the sum of $100 in the case of 'condimental, patented,
proprietary, or trademarked stock or poultry foods' was required in lieu of the
inspection charge of 10 cents a ton, and was in effect a commutation of that
charge. The essential character of the exaction was not altered. If it be said that
this provision discriminates against one doing a small business, still the
appellant wholly fails to show that it is thereby injured and thus entitled to
complain. On the contrary, the bill alleges that the appellant 'sells to more than
eight hundred dealers in the state of Iowa, besides a very large number of
customers who buy direct from your orator or through its agents,' and that it
'has been enabled to sell in the state of Iowa during the past year and for a
number of years preceding a quantity of its goods in an amount exceeding
$40,000 per annum.'
18
The case in this aspect falls within the established rule that 'one who would
strike down a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must bring
himself by proper averments and showing within the class as to whom the act
thus attacked is unconstitutional. He must show that the alleged
unconstitutional feature of the law injures him, and so operates as to deprive
him of rights protected by the Federal Constitution.' Southern R. Co. v. King,
217 U. S. 524, 534, 54 L. ed. 868, 871, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. See also Tyler v.
Registration Ct. Judges, 179 U. S. 405, 45 L. ed. 252, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206;
Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 60, 47 L. ed. 70, 74, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20;
Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 48 L. ed. 1046, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706; New York
ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160, 51 L. ed. 415, 422, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 188, 9 Ann. Cas. 736; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 295, 56 L. ed.
, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286.
19
The Circuit Court was right in sustaining the demurrer.
20
Affirmed.
