226 U.S.

491
33 S.Ct. 148
57 L.Ed. 314

ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v.
E. H. CRONINGER.
No. 18.
Argued March 13, 1912.

Ordered for reargument before full bench April 8, 1912.

Reargued October 23, 1912.
Decided January 6, 1913.
This was an action in the circuit court of Kenton county, Kentucky,
against the express company, to recover the full market value of a small
package containing a diamond ring which was delivered by the plaintiff
below to the express company at its office in Cincinnati, Ohio, consigned
to J. W. Clendenning at Augusta, Georgia. The package was never
delivered.
The express company made defense by answer. The plaintiff demurred to
the answer as not containing a defense, which demurrer was sustained.
The company declined to further plead, whereupon the circuit court gave
judgment for the sum of $137.52, being the full value of the ring and
interest. A writ of error was sued out from this court to the circuit court of
Kenton county, that being the highest court of the state in which a
decision could be had.
The answer and accompanying exhibit were in substance as follows: That
the defendant was an express company engaged in interstate commerce
within the provisions of the act of Congress of June 29, 1906 [34 Stat. at
L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288]; that in
obedience to that act it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission schedules showing its rates and charges from Cincinnati to
Augusta, Georgia, which schedules showed that its rates and charges,
when the value of the property to be carried was in excess of $50, were

graduated reasonably, according to the value, and that the lawful rate upon
the package of the plaintiff from Cincinnati to Augusta was 25 cents if the
value was $50 or less, and was 55 cents if its value was $125.
It is averred that the plaintiff knew that the charges upon the package
shipped were based upon the value of the shipment, and that it (the
defendant) required that the value should be declared by the shipper, and
that if he did not disclose and declare the value when he delivered the
shipment to it at Cincinnati for transportation to Augusta, the rate charged
would be based upon a valuation of $50. It is then alleged that the package
so delivered was sealed, and that defendant did not know the contents or
value, and that if it had, it would not have received it for carriage for less
than the lawful published rate of 55 cents. The receipt or bill of lading
issued shows no value, but contains a stipulation in these words:
'In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is
regulated by the value thereof, and is based upon a valuation of not
exceeding $50 unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that
the value of said property is not more than $50, unless a greater value is
stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable in any event for
more than the value so stated, nor for more than $50 if no value is stated
herein.' Messrs. Lawrence Maxwell and Joseph S. Graydon for plaintiff in
error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 494-497 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. John Randolph Schindel and Morison R. Waite for defendant in
error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 497-499 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Lurton, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the
opinion of the court:

The answer relies upon the act of Congress of June 29, 1906 [34 Stat. at L. 584,
chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288], being an act to amend the
interstate commerce act of 1887 [24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104], as the only
regulation applicable to an interstate shipment; and avers that the limitation of
value, declared in its bill of lading, was valid and obligatory under that act. This
defense was denied. This constitutes the Federal question and gives this court
jurisdiction.
Under the law of Kentucky this contract, limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the

Under the law of Kentucky this contract, limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the
agreed or declared value, was invalid, and the shipper was entitled to recover
the actual value, 'unless,' as said in Adams Exp. Co. v. Walker, 119 Ky. 121, 67
L.R.A. 412, 83 S. W. 106, and affirmed in Southern Exp. Co. v. Fox & Logan,
131 Ky. 257, 133 Am. St. Rep. 241, 115 S. W. 184, 117 S. W. 270, 'sufficient
facts are shown, independently of the special contract, to avoid the contract for
fraud, or to create an estoppel at common law.'

The question upon which the case must turn is whether the operation and effect
of the contract for an interstate shipment, as shown by the receipt or bill of
lading, is governed by the local law of the state, or by the acts of Congress
regulating interstate commerce.

That the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among the

states and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts
between the shipper and the carrier of an interstate shipment by defining the
liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage to such property, needs
neither argument nor citation of authority.

But it is equally well settled that until Congress has legislated upon the subject,
the liability of such a carrier, exercising its calling within a particular state,
although engaged in the business of interstate commerce, for loss or damage to
such property, may be regulated by the law of the state. Such regulations would
fall within that large class of regulations which it is competent for a state to
make in the absence of legislation by Congress, growing out of the territorial
jurisdiction of the state over such carriers, and its duty and power to safeguard
the general public against acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance committed
within its limits, although interstate commerce may be indirectly affected:
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8
Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628,
41 L. ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169
U. S. 133, 137, 42 L. ed. 688, 692, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Richmond & A. R.
Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 42 L. ed. 759, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 335; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. ed.
868, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48
L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. In the Solan Case, cited above, it was said of
such state legislation:

'They are not, in themselves, regulations of interstate commerce, although they

control, in some degree, the conduct and the liability of those engaged in such
commerce. So long as Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject,
they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a

rightful exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the relative rights
and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits.' In that case the
court upheld the validity of an Iowa statute which made void every 'contract,
receipt, rule, or regulation which shall exempt any railway from liability as a
common carrier, which would exist had no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation
been made or entered into.'
7

The contract there involved was for transportation of cattle with a drover in
charge, and the shipper had signed a contract limiting the liability to himself or
the drover to $500 for injury to the person of the drover. Proof was offered that
this limitation was the consideration of a reduced rate of transportation.

In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 487, 491, 48 L. ed. 268, 271,
273, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132, there was involved a bill of lading in all essentials
identical with the one here concerned, whereby it was stipulated that, in
consideration of a reduced rate of freight, the shipper should receive, in case of
negligent loss, the agreed value declared in the receipt. The shipment was made
in New York, where the stipulation was valid, to a point in Pennsylvania, where
such a limitation was invalid. The loss occurred in the latter state, and the
supreme court of the state upheld a judgment for the full value, declaring the
limitation invalid as forbidden by the public policy of that state. That case came
to this court upon the contention that the Pennsylvania court, in refusing to limit
the recovery to the valuation argeed upon, had denied to the railroad company
a right or privilege secured to it by the interstate commerce law. But this court,
as to that, said:

'It may be assumed that under the broad power conferred upon Congress over
interstate commerce, as defined in repeated decisions of this court, it would be
lawful for that body to make provision as to contracts for interstate carriage,
permitting the carrier to limit its liablity to a particular sum in consideration of
lower freight rates for transportation. But upon examination of the terms of the
law relied upon we fail to find any such provision therein. The sections of the
interstate commerce law relied upon by the learned counsel for plaintiff in error
(24 Stat. at L. 379, 382, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1284; 25
Stat. at L. 855, chap. 382, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1289) provide for
equal facilities to shippers for the interchange of traffic; for nondiscrimination
in freight rates; for keeping schedules of rates open to public inspection; for
posting the same in public places, with certain particulars as to charges, rules,
and regulations; for the publication of joint tariff rates for continuous
transportation over one or more lines, to be made public when directed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission; against advances in joint tariff rates except
after ten days' notice to the Commission; against reduction of joint tariff rates

except after three days' like notice; making it unlawful for any party to a joint
tariff to receive or demand a greater or less compensation for the transportation
of property between points as to which a joint tariff is made different than is
specified in the schedule filed with the Commission; giving remedies for the
enforcement of the foregoing provisions, and providing penalties for their
violation; making it unlawful to prevent continuous carriage, and providing that
no break of bulk, stoppage, or interruption by the carrier, unless made in good
faith, for some necessary purpose, without intention to evade the act, shall
prevent the carriage of freights from being treated as one continuous carriage
from the place of shipment to the place of destination.
10

'While, under these provisions, it may be said that Congress has made it
obligatory to provide proper facilities for interstate carriage of freight, and has
prevented carriers from obstructing continuous shipments on interstate lines,
we look in vainfor any regulation of the matter here in controversy. There is no
sanction of agreements of this character limiting liability to stipulated
valuations, and, until Congress shall legislate upon it, is there any valid
objection to the state enforcing its own regulations upon the subject, although it
may to this extent indirectly affect interstate commerce contracts of carriage?'

11

In view of the decisions of this court in the two cases last referred to, we shall
assume that this case is governed by them, unless the subsequent legislation of
Congress is such as to indicate a purpose to bring contracts for interstate
shipments under one uniform rule of law not subject to the varying policies and
legislation of particular states.

12

The original interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887, was extensively

amended by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S.
Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288). We may pass by many of the changes and
amendments made by the latter act as not decisive, and come at once to the far
more important amendment made in the 20th section,an amendment bearing
directly upon the carrier's liability or obligation under interestate contracts of
shipment, and generally referred to as the Carmack amendment. For
convenience of reference, it is set out in the margin

13

That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving

property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful
holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or
by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such
property may be delivered, or over whose line or lines such property may pass;
and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier,

railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed:

Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or
bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.
14

That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such

receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier,
railroad. or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury
shall have been sustained, the amount of such loss, damage, or injury, as it may
be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any
receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof.

15

This amendment came under consideration in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.

Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. ed. 167, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 164; but the opinion and judgment was confined to that provision of the
act which made the initial carrier liable for a loss upon the line of a connecting
carrier, the property having been received under a bill of lading which confined
the liability of the initial carrier to loss occurring upon its own line.

16

The significant and dominating features of that amendment are these:

17

First. It affirmatively requires the initial carrier to issue 'a receipt or bill of
lading therefor,' when it receives 'property for transportation from a point in one
state to a point in another.'

18

Second. Such initial carrier is made 'liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it.'

19

Third. It is also made liable for any loss, damage, or injury to such property
caused by 'any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which
such property may be delivered, or over whose line or lines such property may
pass.'

20

Fourth. It affirmatively declares that 'no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation

shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from
the liability hereby imposed.'

21

Prior to that amendment, the rule of carriers' liability, for an interstate shipment
of property, as enforced in both Federal and state courts, was either that of the
general common law, as declared by this court and enforced in the Federal
courts throughout the United States (Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S.

331, 28 L. ed. 717, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151), or that determined by the supposed
public policy of a particular state (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S.
477, 4, L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132), or that prescribed by statute law of a
particular state (Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed.
688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289).
22

Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability was possible until Congress

should deal with the subject. The situation was well depicted by the supreme
court of Georgia in Southern P. Co. v. Crenshaw Bros. 5 Ga. App. 675, 63 S. E.
865, where that court said:

23

'Some states allow carriers to exempt themselves from all or a part of the
common-law liability by rule, regulation, or contract; others did not. The
Federal courts sitting in the various states were following the local rule, a
carrier being held liable in one court when, under the same state of facts, he
would be exempt from liability in another. Hence this branch of interstate
commerce was being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and judicial
holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a business
that extended beyond the confines of his own state, or a carrier whose lines
were extensive, to know, without considerable investigation and trouble, and
even then oftentimes with but little certainty, what would be the carrier's actual
responsibility as to goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to
another. The congressional action has made an end to this diversity, for the
national law is paramount and supersedes all state laws as to the rights and
liabilities and exemptions created by such transactions. This was doubtless the
purpose of the law; and this purpose will be effectuated, and not impaired or
destroyed, by the state courts' obeying and enforcing the provisions of the
Federal statute where applicable to the fact in such cases as shall come before
them.'

24

That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of a particular
state upon the same subject results from its general character. It embraces the
subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue,
and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract. Almost
every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational
doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and
supersede all state regulation with reference to it. Only the silence of Congress
authorized the exercise of the police power of the state upon the subject of such
contracts. But when Congress acted in such a way as to manifest a purpose to
exercise its conceded authority, the regulating power of the state ceased to
exist. Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 56 L. ed. 237, 32 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 160; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 257, 32 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 140; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
169.
25

To hold that the liability therein declared may be increased or diminished by

local regulation or local views of public policy will either make the provision
less than supreme, or indicate that Congress has not shown a purpose to take
possession of the subject. The first would be unthinkable, and the latter would
be to revert to the uncertainties and diversities of rulings which led to the
amendment. The duty to issue a bill of lading, and the liability thereby
assumed, are covered in full; and though there is no reference to the effect upon
state regulation, it is evident that Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and
relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been
theretofore subject.

26

What is the liability imposed upon the carrier? It is a liability to any holder of
the bill of lading which the primary carrier is required to issue 'for any loss,
damage, or injury to such property caused by it,' or by any connecting carrier to
whom the goods are delivered. The suggestion that an absolute liability exists
for every loss, damage, or injury, from any and every cause, would be to make
such a carrier an absolute insurer, and liable for unavoidable loss or damage,
though due to uncontrollable forces. That this was the intent of Congress is not
conceivable. To give such emphasis to the words, 'any loss or damage,' would
be to ignore the qualifying words, 'caused by it.' The liability thus imposed is
limited to 'any loss, injury, or damage caused by it or a succeeding carrier to
whom the property may be delivered;' and plainly implies a liability for some
default in its common-law duty as a common carrier.

27

But it has been argued that the nonexclusive character of this regulation is
manifested by the proviso of the section, and that state legislation upon the
same subject is not superseded, and that the holder of any such bill of lading
may resort to any right of action against such a carrier, conferred by existing
state law. This view is untenable. It would result in the nullification of the
regulation of a national subject, and operate to maintain the confusion of the
diverse regulation which it was the purpose of Congress to put an end to.

28

What this court said of the 22d section of this act of 1887 in the case of Texas
& P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 350, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1075, is applicable to this contention. It was claimed
that that section continued in force all rights and remedies under the common
law or other statutes. But this court said of that contention what must be said of
the proviso in the 20th section, that it was evidently only intended to continue

in existence such other rights or remedies for the redress of some specific
wrong or injury, whether given by the interstate commerce act, or by state
statute, or common law, not inconsistent with the rules and regulations
prescribed by the provisions of this act. Again, it was said of the same clause,
in the same case, that it could not in reason be construed as continuing in a
shipper a commonlaw right the existence of which would be inconsistent with
the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be said to destroy itself.
29

To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of any such bill of lading
any right or remedy which he may have had under existing Federal law at the
time of his action gives to it a more rational interpretation than one which
would preserve rights and remedies under existing state laws, for the latter view
would cause the proviso to destroy the act itself. One illustration would be a
right to a remedy against a succeeding carrier, in preference to proceeding
against the primary carrier, for a loss or damage incurred upon the line of the
former. The liability of such succeeding carrier in the route would be that
imposed by this statute, and for which the first carrier might have been made
liable.

30

We come now to the question of the validity of the provision in the receipt or
bill of lading limiting liability to the agreed value of $50, as shown therein.
This limiting clause is in these words:

31

'In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is
regulated by the value thereof, and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding
$50 unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said
property is not more than $50, unless a greater value is stated herein, and that
the company shall not be liable in any event for more than the value so stated,
nor for more than $50 if no value is stated herein.'

32

The answer states that the schedules which the express company had filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission showed rates based upon valuations; and
that the lawful and established rate for such a shipment as that made by the
plaintiff from Cincinnati to Augusta, having a value not in excess of $50, was
25 cents, while for the same package, if its value had been declared to be $125,
the amount for which the plaintiff sues as the actual value, the lawful charge,
according to the rate filed and published, would have been 55 cents. It is further
averred that the package was sealed, and its contents and actual value unknown
to the defendant's agent.

33

That no inquiry was made as to the actual value is not vital to the fairness of the

agreement in this case. The receipt which was accepted showed that the charge
made was based upon a valuation of $50 unless a greater value should be stated
therein. The knowledge of the shipper that the rate was based upon the value is
to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published
schedules filed with the Commission. That presumption is strengthened by the
fact that across the top of this bill of lading there was this statement in bold
type: 'This company's charge is based upon the value of the property, which
must be declared by the shipper.'
34

That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for his own
negligence or that of his servants is elementary. York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois C. R.
Co. 3 Wall. 107, 18 L. ed. 170; New York C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall.
357, 21 L. ed. 627; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co. 93 U. S. 174, 23 L.
ed. 872; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S. 331, 338, 28 L. ed. 717, 720, 5
Sup. Ct. Rep. 151. The rule of the common law did not limit his liability to loss
and damage due to his own negligence, or that of his servants. That rule went
beyond this, and he was liable for any loss or damage which resulted from
human agency, or any cause not the act of God or the public enemy. But the
rigor of this liability might be modified through any fair, reasonable, and just
agreement with the shipper which did not include exemption against the
negligence of the carrier or his servants. The inherent right to receive a
compensation commensurate with the risk involved the right to protect himself
from fraud and imposition by reasonable rules and regulations, and the right to
agree upon a rate proportionate to the value of the property transported.

35

It has therefore become an established rule of the common law, as declared by

this court in many cases, that such a carrier may, by a fair, open, just, and
reasonable agreement, limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in case of loss
or damage to an agreed value, made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of
two or more rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk. York Mfg.
Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 3 Wall. 107, 18 L. ed. 170; New York C. R. Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. ed. 627; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S.
331, 338, 28 L. ed. 717, 720, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie &
W. Transp. Co. 117 U. S. 312, 322, 29 L. ed. 873, 878, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1176;
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (The Montana) 129 U. S. 397,
442, 32 L. ed. 788, 792, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v.
Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 619, 37 L. ed. 292, 305, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444; Primrose v.
Western U. Teleg. Co. 154 U. S. 1, 15, 38 L. ed. 883, 889, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.
1098; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 135, 42 L. ed. 688,
690, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Calderon v. Atlas S. S. Co. 170 U. S. 272, 278, 42
L. ed. 1033, 1035, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191
U. S. 477, 485, 48 L. ed. 268, 271, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132.

36

That such a carrier might fix his charges somewhat in proportion to the value of
the property is quite as reasonable and just as a rate measured by the character
of the shipment. The principle is that the charge should bear some reasonable
relation to the responsibility, and that the care to be exercised shall be in some
degree measured by the bulk, weight, character, and value of the property
carried.

37

Neither is it conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may

understate the value of his property for the purpose of reducing the rate, and
then recover a larger value in case of loss. Nor does a limitation based upon an
agreed value for the purpose of adjusting the rate conflict with any sound
principle of public policy. The reason for the legality of such agreements is
well stated in Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S. 331, 338, 28 L. ed. 717,
720, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151, where it is said:

38

'The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from liability for

negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the
measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in
that value for negligence. The compensation for carriage is based on that value.
The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater. The articles have
no greater value, for the purposes of the contract of transportation, between the
parties to that contract. The carrier must respond for negligence up to that
value. It is just and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered into, and
where there is no deceit practised on the shipper, should be upheld. There is no
violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would be unjust and
unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest principles of fair dealing
and of the freedom of contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a
shipper should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss,
and to repudiate it in case of loss.'

39

The statutory liability, aside from responsibility for the default of a connecting
carrier in the route, is not beyond the liability imposed by the common law, as
that body of law applicable to carriers has been interpreted by this court, as well
as many courts of the states. Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170, 175, 35
L.R.A.(N.S.) 971, 92 N. E. 218; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co. 205 Mass. 254,
259, 28 L.R.A.(N.S.) 293, 91 N. E. 325, 18 Ann. Cas. 351. The exemption
forbidden is, as stated in the case last cited, 'a statutory declaration that a
contract of exemption from liability for negligence is against public policy and
void.' This is no more than this court, as well as other courts administering the
same general common law, have many times declared. In the same case, just
such a stipulation as that here involved was upheld, the court saying:

40

'But such a contract as we are considering in this case is not an exemption from
liability for negligence in the management of property, within the meaning of
the statute. It is a contract as to what the property is, in reference to its value.
The purpose of it is not to change the nature of the undertaking of the common
carrier, or limit his obligation in the care and management of that which is
intrusted to him. It is to describe and define the subject-matter of the contract,
so far as the parties care to define it, for the purpose of showing of what value
that is which comes into the carrier's possession, and for which he must account
in the performance of his duty as a carrier. It is not in any proper sense a
contract exempting him from liability for the loss, damage, or injury to the
property, as the shipper describes it in stating its value for the purpose of
determining for what the carrier shall be accountable upon his undertaking, and
what price the shipper shall pay for the service and for the risk of loss which
the carrier assumes.'

41

In Greenwald v. Barrett, cited above, the same conclusion was reached as to the
nature of the liability imposed and the purport of the exemption forbidden, the
court, among other things, saying:

42

'The language of the enactment does not disclose any intent to abrogate the
right of common carriers to regulate their charges for carriage by the value of
the goods, or to agree with the shipper upon a valuation of the property carried.
It has been the uniform practice of transportation companies in this country to
make their charges dependent upon the value of the property carried; and the
propriety of this practice and the legality of contracts signed by the shipper,
agreeing upon a valuation of the property, were distinctly upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S.
331, 341, 28 L. ed. 717, 721, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151.'

43

To the same effect are the cases of Travis v. Wells, F. & Co. 79 N. J. L. 83, 74
Atl. 444; Fielder v. Adams Exp. Co. 69 W. Va. 138, 71 S. E. 99; Larsen v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co. 38 Utah, 130, 110 Pac. 983. See also Atkinson v.
New York Transfer Co. 76 N. J. L. 608, 71 Atl. 278, as to the general rule.

44

That a carrier rate may be graduated by value, and that a stipulation limiting
recovery to an agreed value, made to adjust the rate, is recognized by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, see Re Released Rates, 13 Inters. Com. Rep.
550.

45

We therefore reach the conclusion that the provision of the act forbidding
exemptions from liability imposed by the act is not violated by the contract

here in question.
46

The demurrer to the answer of the defendant below should have been overruled.
For this reason the judgment is reversed, with direction to overrule the
demurrer, and for such further proceedings as are not inconsistent with this
opinion.