Haw Pia vs China Banking Corp.
1. YES. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the
G.R. No. L-554 April 9, 1948
international law, to order the liquidation of the China Banking
Facts:
Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan as
Plaintiff-appellants indebtedness to the defendant-appellee China
liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such
Banking Corporation in the sum of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in
liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of the bank
current account payable on demand together with its interests, has
appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets which required the
been completely paid, on different occasions to the defendant Bank
liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank. The
China Banking Corporation through the defendant Bank of Taiwan,
sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories
Ltd., that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as
is authorized expressly by the United States Army and Navy Manual
liquidator of the China Banking Corporation. The trial court held
of Military Government and Civil Affairs F.M. 2710 OPNAV 50-E-3.
that, as there was no evidence presented to show that the
defendant Bank had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept
2. YES. It having been shown above that the Japanese Military
the payment of the plaintiffs debt to the said defendant, and said
Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets or funds
Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was
of the China Banking Corporation, and for that purpose to liquidate
not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business
it by collecting the debts due to said bank from its debtors, and
of
not
paying its creditors, and therefore to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as
extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant
liquidator with the consequent authority to make the collection, it
under Article 1162 of the Civil Code.
follows evidently that the payments by the debtors to the Bank of
the
China
Banking
Corporation,
the
payment
has
Taiwan of their debts to the China Banking Corporation have
Issues:
extinguished their obligation to the latter. Said payments were
1. Whether or not the Japanese Military Administration had
made to a person, the Bank of Taiwan, authorized to receive them
authority to order the liquidation or winding up of the business of
in the name of the bank creditor under article 1162, of the Civil
defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation, and to appoint the
Code. Because it is evident the words a person authorized to
Bank of Taiwan liquidator authorized as such to accept the payment
receive it, as used therein, means not only a person authorized by
by the plaintiff-appellant to said defendant-appellee; and
the same creditor, but also a person authorized by law to do so,
such as guardian, executor or administrator of estate of a
2. Whether or not such payment by the plaintiff-appellant has
deceased,
and
assignee
or
liquidator
of
partnership
or
extinguished her obligation to said defendant-appellee.
corporation, as well as any other who may be authorized to do so
by law (Manresa, Civil Code, 4th ed. p. 254. The fact that the
Ruling:
money with which that debts have been paid were Japanese war
notes does not affect the validity of the payments. The power of
the military governments established in occupied enemy territory
to issue military currency in the exercise of their governmental
power is based, not only on the occupants general power to
maintain law and order recognized in article 43 of the Hague
merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is
good and valid since it was within the power and competence of
the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of
political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to
be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence
which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion
must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
Regulations (Feilchenfeld of Belligerent Occupation, paragraph 6),
but on military necessity as shown by the history of the use of
money or currency in wars.
PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 285
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was
sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No.
65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court
of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan
and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the
constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be
valid from the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since
the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely
from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is
Yamashita vs. Styer
G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in
the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the
American military commission for war crimes.
2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen.
Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused
as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the
military tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction
Held:
YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with
an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any
appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under
his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws
of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with
personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such
measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague
Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention
No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.
3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought
for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a
discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure
and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not
life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in
the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain
from trying the petitioner.
Filipinas Cia de Seguros v. Christern Huenfeld & Co. - Enemy
Corporation
Facts:
> Oct. 1, 1941, Domestic Corp Christern, after payment of the
premium, obtained from Filipinas, fire policy no. 29333 for P100T
covering merchandise contained in a building located in Binondo.
> On Feb. 27, 1942, during the Jap occupation, the building and
the insured merchandise were burned. Christern submitted to
Filipinas its claim.
> Salvaged goods were sold and the total loss of Christern was
P92T.
> Filipinas denied liability on the ground that Christern was an
enemy corporation and cannot be insured.
Issue:
Whether or not Filipinas is liable to Christern, Huenfeld & Co.
Held:
NO.
Majority of the stockholders of Christern were German subjects.
This being so, SC ruled that said corporation became an enemy
corporation upon the war between the US and Germany. The Phil
Insurance Law in Sec. 8 provides that anyone except a public
enemy may be insured. It stands to reason that an insurance policy
ceases to be allowable as soon as an insured becomes a public
enemy.
The purpose of the war is to cripple the power ad exhaust the
resources of the enemy, and it is inconsistent that one country
should destroy its enemy property and repay in insurance the value
of what has been so destroyed, or that it should in such manner
increase the resources of the enemy or render it aid.
All individuals who compose the belligerent powers, exist as to
each other, in a state of utter exclusion and are public enemies.
Christern having become an enemy corporation on Dec. 10. 1941,
the insurance policy issued in his favor on Oct. 1, 1941 by Filipinas
had ceased to be valid and enforceable, and since the insured
goods were burned after Dec. 10, 1941, and during the war,
Christern was NOT entitled to any indemnity under said policy from
Filipinas.
Elementary rules of justice require that the premium paid by
Christern for the period covered by the policy from Dec. 10, 1941
should be returned by Filipinas.
