USCA1 Opinion
March 10, 1993
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 92-1949
AMERICAN POLICYHOLDERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NYACOL PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_________________________
ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of the Court
corrected as follows:
issued on February
24, 1993,
On page 16, line 25
insert semicolon after "579"
On page 18, line 15
change "support" to "supports"
is
February 24, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The First Circuit
_________________________
No. 92-1949
AMERICAN POLICYHOLDERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NYACOL PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
_____________
_________________________
Jennifer S.D. Roberts, with whom Rackemann,
Sawyer &
_______________________
______________________
Brewster, P.C. was on brief, for appellant.
______________
Catherine M. Flanagan, Attorney, Department of Justice,
______________________
Environment & Natural Resources Division, with whom Vicki A.
_________
O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and David C. Shilton,
_______
________________
Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources Division, were on
brief,
for
Julie
Belaga,
Regional
Administrator,
U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, appellee.
_________________________
February 24, 1993
_________________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
_____________
This appeal, which arises out of
an insurance company's efforts to secure a binding declaration of
its
rights
poses
an
and responsibilities
intriguing
statute, 28 U.S.C.
only
in her
question:
under
an
does
the
1442(a)(1), permit a
representative
federal district court?
insurance contract,
"officer
removal"
federal official, sued
capacity, to
remove
an action
Because we think that the
to
statute does
not confer such a right, and because there is no other cognizable
basis
for
federal
jurisdiction,
district court with instructions
we return
the
case
to
that it be remitted to
the
a state
forum.
I
I
From
occupied
During
until
a thirty-five
these six
Eventually,
the
(EPA)
the
and
Protection (DEP)
source
1917
1977,
acre
decades,
plot
United States
discovered
of
dye-houses
Massachusetts.
impregnated the
Department
site.
Protection Agency
of
and
processes.
In
Environmental
documented
its
early 1982, EPA
(Nyacol), a producer of colloidal
of the site,
responsible
Ashland,
the pollution
notified Nyacol Products, Inc.
potentially
in
Environmental
Massachusetts
a portion
succession
toxic wastes
in the dye manufacturing
silicas at
party
that it considered
(PRP)
under
the
Nyacol a
Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C.
9601-9626, 9651-9662, 9671-9675.1
____________________
1EPA also branded two of Nyacol's officers, Robert Lurie and
Thomas L. O'Connor, as PRPs.
Lurie and O'Connor are named as
defendants in the instant suit. For ease in reference, we refer
3
Pursuant to Massachusetts law,
equivalent
insurer's
to
law
suits
for
duty to defend, see
___
the
which deems PRP notices
purpose
of
Hazen Paper Co.
_______________
triggering
an
v. United States
_____________
Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Mass. 1990), Nyacol called
________________
upon
its
insurance
Policyholders
carrier,
American
Insurance Company (American), to defend it against
EPA's claims and
to indemnify
it for loss,
other expense related thereto.
the company's
plaintiff-appellant
defense under
costs, damages,
American provisionally undertook
its general
liability policy.
December of 1991, American brought suit in a Massachusetts
court seeking a declaration
that it had no obligation
or recompense its insureds.
as parties
defendant,
Julie Belaga,
in her
DEP.
Invoking
the
In addition to naming
American
joined
capacity as EPA'S
and Daniel S. Greenbaum,
two
removal
In
state
to defend
the insureds
other
defendants:
Regional Administrator,
in his capacity as Commissioner
officer
or
statute,
28
of the
U.S.C.
1442(a)(1),Belaga transferredthe actionto federaldistrict court.2
____________________
to the company and the individual defendants, collectively, as
"Nyacol" or "the insureds." We note, moreover, that although
EPA, invoking a theory of successor liability, notified these
three defendants that they might be liable for EPA's response
costs (past and future), as well as for cleanup costs, EPA has
not yet sued to compel payment of these expenses or otherwise to
enforce its claimed rights.
2The officer removal statute provides in pertinent part:
A civil action or criminal prosecution
commenced in a State court against any of the
following persons may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending:
4
On
declaration
February
of
20, 1992,
rights
in
DEP agreed
American's lawsuit
judgment resolves insurance coverage
against Belaga and the
insureds.
court granted Belaga's motion to
against
EPA
be bound
insofar
as
by a
the
issues.
The case proceeded
On May 12,
1992, the district
dismiss, reasoning that a
suit
her, in her official capacity, was really a suit against
and that,
since EPA
enforcement proceeding
justiciable
had never
sued
Nyacol or
against it, American could
controversy
judgment for Belaga,
other
to
with
EPA.
The
court
brought an
articulate no
entered
final
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and remanded all
___
parties and claims to
from the dismissal order.
the state court.
American appeals
II
II
While
company's
the
ability,
parties
vigorously
consistent
with
debate
Article
an
insurance
III's
case
or
controversy requirement, to join EPA in a coverage dispute before
EPA has brought
an enforcement action against the
insureds, our
discussion seeps into vastly different legal ground.
behind this
diversion lies
in
the Supreme
International Primate Protection League
__________________________________________
Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct.
_________________
implications
of
1700 (1991).
Primate Protection League
__________________________
The impetus
Court's opinion
v.
in
Administrators of
_________________
Concerned about
for
federal
the
court
____________________
(1) Any officer of the United States
or any agency thereof, or person acting under
him, for any act under color of such office .
. . .
28 U.S.C.
1442(a)(1) (1988).
5
jurisdiction, we requested supplemental
action
was
properly
removed
briefing on whether this
to federal
court.
Both
sides
responded that
removal was valid
under 28
U.S.C.
1442(a)(1)
because of Belaga's status as a federal officer.
Notwithstanding this accord, we must pursue the matter.
Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement.
See
___
Insurance Corp. of Ir.
______________________
694,
702
v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
_______________________
(1982); California
__________
(1972).
v. LaRue,
_____
Because a federal court is
409
U.S. 109,
113 n.3
under an unflagging duty to
ensure
that it has jurisdiction
over the subject
matter of the
cases
it proposes to adjudicate,
we are obliged
to address the
threshold matter even
though neither
propriety of
party
has
removal as a
raised a
question in
that
Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co.
___________________________________
(1884)
motion,
its
(stating
a federal
v. Swan,
____
See Mansfield,
___ __________
111 U.S.
appellate
court,
379, 382
on
its own
must "deny its own jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of
appellate
States,
that
regard.
in
power, that
all
cases
of all
where
other
such
courts of
the United
jurisdiction
does
not
affirmatively appear in the record").
A
A
The officer
quoted supra note
_____
remove
actions
unremovable.
(1969)
removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
2, is
to
designed to allow
federal
See Willingham
___ __________
(stating
federal officers,
that
court
v. Morgan,
______
the section
sued in
that
federal officers
to
would
be
395
covers
state court, "can
1442 (a)(1),
otherwise
U.S. 402,
all
cases in
raise a
406-07
which
colorable
defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law").3
Primate Protection League,
___________________________
reference to "any agency"
the
Supreme Court
held
that
of the United States contained
In
the
in the
officer removal statute did not stand alone, but constituted part
of a possessive phrase modifying the
noun "officer."
See 111 S.
___
Ct. at 1705.
Put another way, the statute is to be read as
second
appeared
"of"
disjunctive "or."
an "officer
in
the text
immediately
Hence, section 1442(a)(1)
of . .
. any agency
if a
following
the
permits removal by
[of the United
States]," and,
conversely, does not permit removal by the federal agency itself.
See id. at 1709.
___ ___
Although
clear
that EPA, as a federal agency,
federal
presents
the
Primate Protection League
__________________________
court
color
a variation on the
closely
whether,
under
related,
for purposes
makes it
crystal
cannot remove an action to
of section
1442(a)(1),
theme:
requires that we decide
it
this
but nonetheless
different,
of the
removal statute,
officer
case
question
of
a suit
brought against
an executive
of an
executive's official capacity,
______________________________
"officer,"
thereby permitting
agency, exclusively in the
___________________
constitutes
a suit
removal under
against
the statute,
suit against an "agency," thereby precluding such removal.
an
or a
It is
____________________
3This
is not
to say
that every case in which a federal
_____
officer is a defendant is removable. Rather, removal is limited
to
situations in
which
the
officer's removal
petition
demonstrates the existence of a federal defense.
See Mesa v.
___ ____
California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
__________
7
to this inquiry that we now turn.4
B
B
Generally, a
suit against an officer
official capacity
constitutes
entity
officer heads.
which the
Graham, 473 U.S. 159
a suit
For
in the officer's
against the
example, in
(1985), the Court dwelt on
governmental
Kentucky v.
________
the distinction
______
between
suits against a person
official, capacity.
capacity
actions
in an individual,
The Court explained
"seek
to
as opposed to
that while individual-
impose personal
________
liability
upon
government official," id. at 165 (emphasis supplied), payable out
___
of personal assets,
see id. at 166,
___ ___
is, "in
all respects other
against
the
entity."
capacity suits
an action
an official-capacity action
than name, to
Id.
___
Phrased
be treated as
differently,
generally represent only another
against an entity
of which an
a suit
"official-
way of pleading
officer is an
agent."
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
______
____________________________________
n.55 (1978).
Thus, a string of Supreme Court cases holds that a
suit against a government officer in his or her official capacity
binds the agency
personally.
469
or other governmental
officer
See, e.g., Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; Brandon v. Holt,
___ ____ ______
_______
____
U.S. 464,
471
Commerce Corp.,
______________
deciding
entity, not the
whether
official-capacity
(1985); cf.
___
337 U.S.
a
or
suit
Larson
______
682, 687
against a
v. Domestic & Foreign
____________________
(1949) (explaining that,
government
individual-capacity
suit,
officer
"the
in
is an
crucial
____________________
4The officer removal statute was first enacted in its
present form in 1948.
Its legislative history is of no
significant assistance in respect to the inquiry at hand.
8
question is whether the relief sought . . . is relief against the
sovereign").
The
character
of
an
official-capacity suit
transformed simply because jurisdiction is in issue.
is
not
In Loeffler
________
v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988), a case in which the plaintiff sued
_____
the Postmaster General in
that acts of a
government officer in his official
always chargeable" as
and-be-sued clause.
U.S. 242, 249-50
an agency in
his official capacity, the Court
n.8; see also FHA
___ ____ ___
and
his official capacity was
that a
waiver of
v. Burr, 309
____
indistinguishable from a
immunity
necessarily waived the agency's
pondering
of a sue-
(1940) (holding that a suit against the head of
suit against the agency itself for purposes of
clause
capacity "are
acts of the agency for purposes
Id. at 563
___
held
jurisdictional
as to
immunity).
a sue-and-be-sued
the
agency head
Similarly, even when
and quasi-jurisdictional
issues, this
court has consistently accepted and applied the principle that an
official-capacity
suit
against a
equivalent
to a suit against
Fed. Credit
Union v. Neves,
government
the agency.
837 F.2d
officer
is fully
See, e.g., Northeast
___ ____ _________
531, 533 (1st
Cir. 1988)
__________________
("Where
. .
_____
claims are
made
against a
government official
acting purely in a representative role, the suit must be regarded
as one against the sovereign."); Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera
______________________
______
Rios,
____
813 F.2d
Eleventh
506, 516
Amendment
(1st Cir.
purposes,
an
1987) (observing
official-capacity
that, for
suit
is
"tantamount to a suit against the [governmental entity]").
We see no reason
to forsake the general rule
that a
suit against a government officer in his or her official capacity
is
suit
against
appropriateness of
the
agency
removal under 28
when
U.S.C.
considering
the
1442(a)(1).
The
theme of Primate Protection League, logically extended, serves an
_________________________
esemplastic purpose,
rational whole.
In
shaping the officer removal
statute into a
that case, the Supreme Court
explained that
when a suit for monetary damages is brought against an officer in
his or
her individual
capacity, the complicated
questions that
arise as to that officer's immunity support a protective grant of
removal jurisdiction.
See Primate Protection League, 111 S.
Ct.
___ _________________________
at 1708.
By contrast, agencies do
not need the prophylaxis
federal removal because determining an agency's immunity,
determining
an
individual's
immunity,
straightforward"
proposition.
Id.
___
favors
treatment
removal in
of
That
unlike
"sufficiently
rationale
official-capacity suits
the same manner as
all, because a suit
is
for
strongly
purposes
suits against the agency.
against an officer in her
cannot bind the officer personally,
of
of
After
official capacity
see, e.g., Brandon, 469 U.S.
___ ____ _______
at 471, no issues of immunity can possibly arise that differ from
those arising in a suit directly against the agency.
Consistency
interpretation.
is
judgment
of
statutory
Primate Protection League demands,
_________________________
go on to hold that a
administrator
touchstone
If we were to hold that a suit nominally against
EPA is not removable, as
then
the
in her
suit nominally against EPA's regional
official capacity
binding on the EPA
but
suit that
seeks a
is nonetheless removable, we would
10
spawn a
glaring interpretive inconsistency and,
in the bargain,
impugn
the Primate
_______
juridical interest
Court's reasoning.
that exists
Given
the identity
of
between a government
agency and
its executive officer when the latter is sued only in
his or her
official capacity, the
action under
that
fact that
the officer removal statute
an official-capacity
initiating
the agency may
removal
defendant is
thereunder.5
not remove
an
compels the conclusion
likewise
See
___
disabled from
generally
_________
Primate
_______
Protection League, 111 S. Ct. at 1708 (explaining that access to
__________________
removal
under
section
1442(a)(1)
does
not
turn
on
a "mere
technicality").
C
C
Our conclusion is
fortified by Judge
Posner's opinion
in Western Secs. Co. v. Derwinski, 937 F.2d 1276 (7th Cir. 1991).
_________________
_________
____________________
5Ordinarily, the question of whether a complaint names an
officer in a personal, as opposed to an official, capacity
requires little more than a glance at the pleadings.
If,
however, a federal official, reasonably believing himself or
herself to be sued individually, attempts to remove under section
1442(a)(1), any
dispute as to the
officer's status will
necessarily be resolved by a federal court in the context of
assaying its own jurisdiction.
See 14A Charles A. Wright et.
___
al., Federal
Practice and
Procedure
3730,
at 499-500
___________________________________
(explaining that a defendant wishing to remove need only file a
notice of removal, with the result that the propriety of removal,
if challenged at all, will "be tested later in the federal court
by a motion to remand"). Thus, our holding that an officer sued
in an official capacity may not remove the action in order to
obtain a federal forum for resolution of the underlying merits
will in no way deprive the officer of access to a federal forum
for determination of whether the suit is in fact an action
against him or her personally.
By the same token, if an officer
is sued in both individual and official capacities, we see no bar
to removal under section 1442(a)(1).
See El Gran Video Club
___ ___________________
Corp. v. E.T.D., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 151, 155 & n.3 (D.P.R. 1991)
_____
____________
(observing that federal courts have removal jurisdiction over all
pendent claims that are not "separate and independent").
11
There, the Seventh Circuit, acting sua sponte, refused to allow a
___ ______
federal administrator sued in his
action to federal court
that,
in
against
the
under section 1442(a)(1).
aftermath
federal
Acknowledging
of Primate Protection League,
___________________________
agencies
1442(a)(1), see id. at
___ ___
official capacity to remove an
cannot
be
removed
under
1278, Judge Posner wrote that
is nominally against the Administrator,
against
his
considered
Thus, the
in
official
to be against the
capacity
dismissal for want
would be required.
We
agree
such
government itself."
court concluded that, absent an
jurisdiction,
and
section
"while the
suit in this case
him
suits
it is
suits
are
Id. at 1279.
___
alternative basis for
of subject matter jurisdiction
See id.6
___ ___
with
the
Seventh
Circuit
that
Primate
_______
Protection League,
_________________
officer
sued
solely in
remove a suit
1442(a)(1).
from
logically extended,
his or
to federal court
In the case
the tree:
official capacity
American's
her
mandates that a
federal
official capacity
may not
under the aegis
of 28 U.S.C.
before us, this holding
draws the sap
suit, brought against
Belaga in her
and seeking no relief
is in reality a suit against the agency.
against her personally,
It
necessarily follows
that, because EPA itself could not have removed this action under
section
1442, see Primate Protection League, 111 S. Ct. at 1708,
___ _________________________
Belaga's
attempt to
remove under
the same
statutory provision
must fail.
____________________
6In Derwinski the court retained jurisdiction because the
_________
plaintiff's action arose under federal law. See Derwinski, 937
___ _________
F.2d at 1280; see also 28 U.S.C.
1331, 1441 (1988).
___ ____
12
III
III
Notwithstanding
that
this
action was
infelicitously
removed
under
steadfastly
28
U.S.C.
disclaim
jurisdiction,7 we
court
1442(a)(1)
any
and
independent
basis
inquire whether any other
jurisdiction
mention 28 U.S.C.
exists.
1441
suit that originally
that the
for
parties
federal
toehold for federal
Belaga's notice
of
removal
did
a statute which permits removal of any
could have been brought in
federal court.8
See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
___ ____ ________________________________
________
804, 808 (1986).
compel us
action
to
falls
jurisdiction.
Thus, principles of equity, as well as the law,
explore whether
within
the
American's
federal
declaratory
district
court's
judgment
original
We proceed to run that gauntlet.
A
A
____________________
7The parties' appellate filings ground removal jurisdiction
solely in the officer removal statute.
In answer to our express
inquiry anent jurisdiction, Belaga replied that the United
States, on her behalf, removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1442(a)(1) and contended that such removal was proper. American
averred that, apart from the officer removal statute, it was "not
aware of any other basis for federal jurisdiction."
Nyacol, by
electing not to participate in this appeal, has effectively
consented to the appropriateness of a state forum.
8The statute provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act
of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is
pending.
28 U.S.C.
1441(a) (1988).
13
In this instance, the presence of original jurisdiction
hinges
is,
upon the existence vel
___
non of a
___
the existence of an action
laws,
or treaties
(1988).
meaning
of
"arising under the Constitution,
the United
of section 1331 if a
28
U.S.C.
1331
federal cause of action appears on
complaint.
Bank in Meridian,
__________________
299
Nashville R.R.
_______________
Mottley, 211
_______
of
jurisdiction
v.
U.S.
determining
in
the
109,
and focuses
See Gully v.
___ _____
113
U.S.
(1936);
149,
existence
declaratory
Supreme Court directs
complaint
States."
Ordinarily, a claim arises under federal law within the
the face of a well-pleaded
purposes
federal question,9 that
judgment
our attention
it instead
of
152
Louisville &
_____________
(1908).
federal
law that
For
question
action, however,
away from the
on the
First Nat'l
___________
face of
the
the
creates the
underlying cause of action:
Where
the complaint
in an
action for
declaratory judgment seeks in essence to
assert
a
defense to
an
impending or
threatened state court action, it is the
character of the threatened action, and not
of the defense, which will determine whether
there is federal-question jurisdiction . . .
.
Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
______________________
___________
see
___
also Franchise Tax Bd. v.
____ ___________________
237, 248 (1952);
Construction Laborers Vacation
_______________________________
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 15-16 & n.14 (1983).
_____
Here, American's declaratory judgment action represents
a mounted offensive on two related fronts:
the suit
is not only
____________________
9The parties to the lawsuit are not of totally diverse
citizenship and, apart from
the possibility of a federal
question, there is no other arguable foundation for federal
jurisdiction.
14
an attempt to preempt impending actions by the insureds (seeking,
presumably, to secure a
harm
and to secure indemnification with
damages, and
attempt
expense associated
to foreclose
reach insurance
under CERCLA.
Thus,
contract, the
various
respect to loss, costs,
therewith), but
governmental
proceeds to satisfy
visualized, are in the
of
defense against charges of environmental
it is also
authorities from
to
as-yet-unrealized judgments
the underlying causes of
action, howsoever
nature of claims to enforce
adjudication of which will
policy provisions
trying
an
an insurance
require interpretation
and contract
terms.
suit is
customarily deemed to arise under the law that gives birth to the
cause of action.
See American Well Works Co.
___ _______________________
v. Layne & Bowler
______________
Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
___
Applying that approach, this case
is
therefore,
based
law.10
Co.,
___
solely
upon,
and,
arises
under,
state
See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins.
___ ________________
_________________________________
962
state law
F.2d 77,
to
97-98 (1st
interpret
Cir. 1992)
pollution
(divining applicable
exclusion
clause
in
an
insurance policy); A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 933
________________
_____________________
F.2d 66,
70-74 (1st Cir. 1991)
(same); Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co.,
____
_______________
____________________
10We note in passing that, were American to assert that
CERCLA preempts state insurance actions, such an assertion, while
mentioning
federal law, would
be insufficient
to confer
jurisdiction because federal law would come into play only as a
defense.
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13-14; Nashoba
___ __________________
_______
Communications, Inc. v. Town of Danvers, 893 F.2d 435, 440 (1st
____________________
________________
Cir. 1990); see also Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 957
___ ____ _______________
____________________
F.2d 826, 830 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411
_____ ______
(1992). We except, of course, the rare case, discussed infra p.
_____
15-16, where federal law so completely displaces state causes of
action in a particular area that all such claims are "necessarily
federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
__________________________
______
U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
15
916
F.2d 731, 734-35 (1st
Cir. 1990) (similar);
In re Acushnet
______________
River & New Bedford Harbor, 725 F. Supp. 1264, 1278-81 (D. Mass.
___________________________
1989)
(certifying various
interpretation
of
an
questions
insurance
regarding the
policy
to
the
substantive
Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in order to determine an insurer's duty to
cover cleanup
costs), aff'd in
_____ __
part and rev'd in
____ ___ _____ __
grounds sub nom. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
_______ ___ ____ _________________________
part on other
____ __ _____
Belleville Indus.,
__________________
Inc., 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 969
____
_____ ______
(1992); see also
___ ____
F.2d 826, 828
Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp.,
________________
_____________________
(11th Cir.) (holding
that an insured's
957
potential
suit to recover insurance proceeds for its liability under CERCLA
arises
under
"the
applicable
state
law
governing
the
interpretation of insurance contracts"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
_____ ______
411 (1992).
Federal
jurisdiction cannot take root in
this arid
soil.11
B
B
In
step.
an abundance
There may
of
exist unusual
caution, we
take one
circumstances wherein
additional
a state-
created cause of action can be deemed to arise under federal law.
For
example, when
a plaintiff's
state-created right
to relief
____________________
11We note that CERCLA itself does not provide a direct cause
action against a responsible party's liability insurer. See
___
Port Allen Marine Servs., Inc. v. Chotin, 765 F. Supp. 887, 889
_______________________________
______
(M.D. La. 1991) (dismissing claims brought directly against
carrier because CERCLA "does not create a direct right of action
against [PRP's] insurers"); cf. 42 U.S.C.
9608(c) (allowing
___
direct action against guarantors in limited circumstances). It
is, therefore, abundantly clear that American's declaratory
judgment complaint anticipates future coercive actions that not
only will be entirely governed by state law, but also will be
initiated only through state-created mechanisms.
of
16
"necessarily depends
federal
law,"
on resolution of a
Franchise Tax Bd., 463
__________________
parallel "federal
cause of
substantial question of
U.S.
at 28,
or
action completely pre-empts
when a
a state
cause of action," id. at 24, the suit is considered a creature of
___
federal law.
The
We test these waters.
latter proposition
summarily dismissed.
federal
(complete preemption)
can be
Structurally, CERCLA provides "no parallel
cause of action
for the recovery
___ ___ ________
for CERCLA-created liability."
of insurance proceeds
__ _________ ________
Hudson, 957 F.2d at 830.
Rather,
___ ______________ _________
its
provisions,
______
read objectively,
wherein CERCLA-driven suits to
be brought under state
law.
choreograph
pas de
___ __
deux
____
collect insurance proceeds are to
See,
___
e.g., 42 U.S.C.
____
9607(e)(1)
(preserving "any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify
a
party" for CERCLA
liability).
We
turn, then,
to the former
proposition (necessary dependence on a federal-law question).
Conceivably, American might argue that a suit to compel
it
to defend and/or indemnify
created by
its insureds is
state law, necessarily
However, such an argument
one that, though
turns on federal
amounts to a call for
common law.
the application
of a uniform federal rule of decision to govern interpretation of
an
insurance
liability.
We
policy's
of
decline to heed
precedent
pointing
authority
for
in
the
coverage
that call in
opposite
treating insurance
cases as peculiarly
appeals.
scope
17
CERCLA
the face of
direction.
coverage questions
matters of state law
See, e.g., Northbrook,
___ ____ __________
vis-a-vis
The
solid
massed
in CERCLA
pervades the courts of
962 F.2d at
79; Northern Ins.
_____________
Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir.
___
______________________
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
______________________
Triangle Indus., Inc.,
_____________________
1991);
957 F.2d 1153,
1157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 78 (1992); FL Aerospace
_____ ______
____________
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
______________________
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284
______
Dynamics Corp., 968
_______________
897 F.2d 214,
219 (6th Cir.),
(1990); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
_____________________
F.2d 707,
710 (8th Cir.
cert.
_____
v. General
_______
1992); Industrial
__________
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 935 F.2d 240,
__________________
____________________________
241 (11th
Cir. 1991).
Hazen Paper, 555
___________
Co.,
___
State
courts chime in tune.
N.E.2d at 579; Boeing Co. v.
__________
784 P.2d 507, 509
See, e.g.,
___ ____
Aetna Cas. & Sur.
_________________
(Wash. 1990); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v.
_______________________
American Home Assurance Co.,
_____________________________
542
N.E.2d
1048, 1050-51
(N.Y.
1989).
Case law aside, we
to
be the springboard
doubt that Congress intended CERCLA
for catapulting federal
has historically been a state-law preserve.
plain that
encroach
federal legislation
on
a state's
McCarran-Ferguson Act,
CERCLA
suggests
regimen.
of
suits
Indeed,
under
15 U.S.C.
of
law
interpreted to
insurance.
1012(b) (1988).
intended
CERCLA's text not only
state
Congress has made it
should rarely be
regulation
that Congress
courts into what
but
to
See,
___
e.g.,
____
Nothing in
deviate from
this
envisions the bringing
specifically
mandates
their
resolution in accordance with that law.
(stating
that
CERCLA's
See 42 U.S.C.
___
insurance subchapter
"shall
9672(a)
[not]
be
construed to affect . . . the law governing the interpretation of
insurance
contracts of
rebuts the claim
any State").
Thus,
CERCLA effectively
that its drafters intended to
transform state-
18
law insurance actions into actions arising under federal law.
We
analogous
think
that
the
to that which confronted
Prods., Inc.,
____________
833 F.2d 1
copyrighted work.
he argued that his
See id. at 2.
___ ___
at
hand
us in Royal
_____
(1st Cir. 1987).
sought to recover for breach of
brought
situation
is
closely
v. Leading Edge
____________
There, a
plaintiff
a royalty agreement related to a
In an effort to maintain federal jurisdiction,
case arose under the federal
We disagreed, pointing out
to enforce a royalty
copyright laws.
that when an action is
contract the action
arises out of
the contract and not under the copyright statute, even though the
contract concerns a copyright.
See id. at 4.
___ ___
By the same token,
an action brought to enforce the pollution-coverage provisions of
an
insurance policy
federal
under
arises
environmental law,
the
policy
out of
even though
will satisfy
Accord Hudson, 957 F.2d at 829-30.
______ ______
would
the
policy and
any
not
under
potential recovery
CERCLA-generated
liability.
In this case, as in Royal, it
_____
be wrong to arrogate unto the federal courts "jurisdiction
over what
is
essentially a
garden-variety
contract
dispute."
Royal, 833 F.2d at 5.
_____
In fine, because the insurance dispute which American's
declaratory judgment
law
and
federal
cannot be
question
action anticipates
said to
arise
jurisdiction
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
is a creature
under federal
and,
1441(a)
by
of state
law, original
extension,
removal
does not lie.
IV
IV
Since neither
section 1442 nor
section 1441
supports
19
the removal
of American's declaratory judgment
simply no serviceable
hung.
hook on which federal
We, therefore, go no further. Inasmuch
action, there is
jurisdiction can be
as the lower court
lacked subject
matter
jurisdiction, its
action against EPA is null.
order
dismissing
the
See Insurance Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S.
___ ______________________
at 701 ("The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon
that court's
having jurisdiction over . . . the subject matter .
We vacate
. .").
district court reinstate
party and
the dismissal order and
direct that the
Belaga, in her official
thereafter return the improvidently
capacity, as a
removed action to
the court from whence it emanated.12
Vacated and remanded with directions. No costs.
Vacated and remanded with directions. No costs.
_______________________________________________
____________________
12We take no view of Belaga's claims of sovereign immunity,
non-justiciability, unripeness and the like. We are similarly
noncommittal as to the effect, if any, of remand on the
stipulation entered into between American and DEP. Because the
federal courts lack jurisdiction, all such matters must be
presented to, and resolved by, the state courts.
20