INFORMATION TO USERS This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction, The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the Upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4, The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. University Microfilms 300 North Zeed Road ‘Ann Arbor, Michigan 48308 ‘A Xerox Education Company72-32,306 KUPETZ, Steven Jeffrey, 1944- NON-DUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF KASHMIR TSM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRATYABHIJNA SCHOOL. University of Minnesota, Ph.D., 1972 Religion University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.THE NUN-DUALISTIC PRILOSCRRY GF KASHMIR SATUISM : AB ARAL S GF ThE PRATYABHIIRA SCHOLL A THESIS SUBMITIED TO The FACULTY GF THE GRADUATE SCHOLL GF THE UNIVERSITY CF MINNESOTA by Steven Jeffrey supetz IW PARTIAL FULFILLMENT CF ThE REQUIREMENTS FOR TRE DEGREE OF OUCTOR GF PHILOSOPHY July 1972PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education CompanyACKNOWL EDGRmURNTS AcknowLedgenents mst be made to those people to whom I owe an unpaysble debt of gratitude for their help in the preparatim of this paper: Karl Potter of the University of Washington, with vhom I studied Vedinta md tho was instrumental in the formulation of this paper's approach to Pratyabhijiia and Vedanta; Usharbudh Arya of the University of Minn:vota, who introduced me to Kashmir Ssivism, those encour agement and cbid~ ing interest in this work gave me much support and who granted invalucble advice in all questims connected vith its Guy Welbon of the University of Minnesota, who provided the impetus for the transformation of scattered research notes into a dissertation, and who patiently and painstakingly guided me through the various ; drafts and revisions of this paper. And finally, to David White of Macalester College aid Richard Mather of the University of Minnesota, who both provided a number of helpful suggestions after reading the manuscript.AK as8 IP IPy Irv KSTS KE PO PH PS PTu sD Ta 1s up. up.6 vp ii ABBREVIATIONS Agharak@rika-s of Agi Sega Brahmasitrabnagya of Sarkare TSvarapratyabni jRSkSrikS-s of Utpale iSvarepratyabhi jNdvimargini of Abhinava Isvarapratyabhi jigvivgtivimargini of Abhinava Kashmir Series of Texts and Stucies MEqgtikyakarikaohagva cf Safkera Paficeuaél of vinySranya Pratyabhi jAdhpoayam of Kgemard ja Paramarthasdra of Abhinava ParStrinSikdvivarapa of Abhinave Sivagysti of Somananca Tantriloka of Abhinava TantrasSra of Abhinava Upanigads Upanigaubndgye of Sankara Vakyapadl ya of whartrnariaii conraNts ACKROWLEDGMINTS oe ee ee ee eee ee OE ABBREVIATIONS fe ee eee ee eee ee ee ee ee GE INTRODUCTION 6. eee eee eee ee eee ee eee 1 History of Saivism in Kashmir, Pratyabhi ja as the philosophical branch of Kashnir Saivism. Inadequacies of carlier Pratyabhi ja studies; the need for study of individual philosophers of the school, Differences between Utpala and his successor Abhinava (the two most important Pratyabhi jhavadins) have been ignored. Abhi- nava's divergences from the theories of Utpala make p) vious assessments of PratyabhijRa as a single school invelid, and they call for a revaluation of Pratyabhijia's position vis-d-vis Safkara's Advaita Vedinta. PART I = Background material and presuppositions of Pratyathi ji& philosophy. Chapter I. BACKGROUND 2 eee ee ee eee eee eee eee Three branches of Kashmir Saivism: Agama, Spanda and Pratyabhijila. Major Pratyabhijia authors and texts, Relevance of previous Pratyabhijha studies to the issues im this study. ‘TI. PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PRATYABHTUNA 2... e406 2 Basic precepts and terminology of Pratyabhijfia. Concent of ‘the Supreme. Outline of the categries of manifestation: perfect-imperfect and the lower order. The problem of explaining bondage sithin the franework of the categories. The difficulty of evaluating Pratyabhijiia's theory of causation with respect to parinamavada (theory that the effect is a real transformati@ of cause) and vivartavada (effect as an illusory manifestation).iv PART IZ - Differences between the philosophies of Utpala and Abhinava, all of which involve instances where Abhinava adopts theories similar to those found in ‘Advaita Vedanta and very mch different from those of Utpala. Chapter Page TIL. ABHINAVA'S REFLACTIONISN. . 2 eee eee ee ee be? Utpala argues that everything is equally real end uses the analogy of water ever remaining the sane whether still or in waves, just as the Supreme ever remains the same even in becoming the manifest world. Utpala denounces the use of reflectionist analogies to describe world manifestations, Abhinava uses reflectionist analogies (mirror-images, etc.) to dis~ ‘inguish the appearances of the world ("mere reflec- tions") from the reality of the Supreme as the sub~ stratun of world reflections. IV, SUPERIMPOSITION 2. ee ee ee ee eee ee ee Utpala describes the multiplicity of the world as real and as directly identifiable with the Suprene. Abhinava says that multiplicity is imaginary and illucory. Abhinava supports a theory of reciprocal superimposition, whereby world-objects are erron- eously thougit to be different from the Self, and the Self, in tirn, is thought to be identical with the Limited objects of manifestati cn. LMVELS OF REALITY AND SUBLATION 2 eee eee ee Ob Utpala refutes the notion of sublation; he refuses to admit that the reality of the Suoreme is any aifforent from the reality of the manifest world, or that the highest reality denies and contradicts everydg-reality. Abhinava distinguishes between three levels of reality (highest reality, everyday- reality, and illusion), with the everyday-vor being sublatable by the highest reality, just as illusion is sublatable by the everyday-vor ld. Abhinava's use of sublation is evident in his theory of error.PaRT IIT ~ An analysis of the differences between Utpala a Abhinava , comparing their philosophies to that of Sankara. Chapter Page VI. viz. vin. Ik. VEDANTA AND PRATYABHIUNE 2... eee ee ee eee TT Relates material of Part II to previous assessnents by scholars of Pratyabhijiid as "realistic" and Vedanta as “illusicnistic.” Neither Utpala, Abhinava nor Safikera are subjective idedists. By oversimplify- ing the views of Pratyabhijia and Vedinta, scholars have failed to take into account the striking siniler- ity between certain of Abhinava's theories and those of Sahkara's, and the corresponding points of diver~ gence between Abhinava and Utpela. IS ABHINAVA A CRYPIO-VEDINTIN? 6... ee. e0- 6 89 Despite Abhinava's use of many Vedantin thecries, he is not a crypto-Vedantin, i.e, a Pratyabhijhevadin in nane only, Abhinava himself sharply distinguishes his own philosophy from that of Safikara, Abhinava believes world manifestation to be part of the essen- tial nature of the Suprene. Safkara insists upon the completely unqualified purity of consciousness. PARINAMA AND VIVARTA soe ee eee ee ee ee eo 1h Abhinava's theories are explained in tems of the development of Prajyabhijfia philosophy out cf the tenets of Kashmir Saiva monism, Vidyaranya's Pacadasi is referred to in order to help understend That development es a shift from a parinéne to a vivarta theory of causation. G, Shastri's analysis of Bhartyhari's Grammarian philosophy shows tlet the pattem of development from parinama to vivarta is not merely a historical one, and thab Abhina divergence from the theories of Utpala is a logical reaction to basic problems in his predecessor's philosophy. Gmtls S650 00 Gan000do000n000 13) Abhinava's philosophy as compared first with that of Utpala, and then with that of Safkara. Although he incorporates elements of Vedinta epistemology and metaphysics into his philosophy, Abhinava's affinities with Utpala are more significant than his differences, The non-cua listic philosophy of Abhinava provides a distinct alternative to Advaita Vedmnta.vi Page THE TATIVAS oe eee eee eee eee ee 136 A chart of the Kashmir Saiva categories of manifestation. SIVAIRSTE 6 eee ee ee eee ee ee ee LT Text ad translation of excerpts from chapter four of Sondnanda's treatise ad Utpala's comrentary « APPENDIX C. PARAMIRTHASERA 6. eee ee ee eee ee UNG A comparison of Abhinava's Paranfrthasara and Tdi Sega's treatise of the sane name. Abhinava bases his ow work on Adi Sega's earlier one. In some respects Adi Sega's treatise may te seen as an early Vedanta texts as such it provides a point of contact between Abhinava end the Vedanta tradition. Hbhirava emphasizes the yivartavada and illusionisn of Adi Sega's work, which slows the integral importance of Vedanta theories to Abhinava's philosophy. NOTES oe eee eee eee ee eee ee ee eee ee 10 SLBLIOGRAPHY Seer ee ew rece eee w see 196‘INTRODUCTION According to Indian tradition there are six basic sys- tems of Hindu philosophy: Nyaya, Vaigegika, Yoga, S: ikhya, = . . el ‘2 end Vedanta. These six systems or dargana~d (literally, views") all developed from the ideas of the Vedas end Upanigads, which they accent as supreme scriptural authority. Most surveys of Indian philosophy present variously organized summaries of these six "orthodox" schools, along with separate treatments of the Buddhist and Jain philosophies. No account of the philosophical systens of India may be considered con- plete, however, without a discussion of the Pratyabhijf® branch of Kashmir Saivisn. Saivism is the general term for all those schools vhich are based on the scriptural authority of the Saiva Igana-s, rather than the Vedas and Upanigads. gama (Sanskrit gam + 3, to come) means that which has "come own" from preceptor to student through the ages. These Saiva scriptures generally consist of dialogues betwen Siva and his consort Parvati, personifications of Suprene Being and Supreme Power.” Little is known of the historical development of these works, or of their relationship with the earliest forms of Saiva wrship, which has been dated (on the basis of very scanty evidence, one might add) as fer back as the pre-Aryan Indus Valley civiliza- tion (ca. 2500 B.C.). "Amongst the many revelations that aMohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none is per~ haps more remarkable tha the discovery that Saivism takes its place as the mst meient living faith in the world.#” Kashmir has long teen a center of Saiva beliefs. Accord~ ing to the Nilamata Puraa (ca. 6-74) - A.D,), there existed in Keshmir "from the dawn of history" a polytheistic religion which included the worship of aboriginal deities such as birds and serpants and ghosts, the liga of Siva, various Vedic md Purinic deities, and even of the Budiha as an incarnation of Vigqus"” rt is certain that Buddhion ves well established in Kashmir by the time of Agoka (272-232 B.C.), if not earlier. §siva worship probably antedated the entrance of Buddhisn, and Hinduism of a Saiva character co-existed with Buddhism as the cominant religions of Kashmir through the following thousand years. The eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era wit~ nessed a religious upheaval in Kashnir, which resulted in the waning of Buddhism and the energence (or, as Saivas believe, the "re-cnergence") of Saivism as the predominant religion of the area, Kashmir at that time represented the mecting ground of a wide variety of religious currents then flourishing in India. Drawing upon the prevailing ideas of Buddhists, Vaiyakaranas (Granmarians), Neiyayikas (Logicians), Safkhyas and Vedantins, as well as its om Agama heritage, a Sai « philosophy of pure monism was developed in the valley of Kashmir.2 Kashnir Sai vism is distinguished by its pure monism—its belief in Siva as the one sole principle of reality--from the dualistic and the dualistic-cum-non-dualistic outlooks of other Seiva systems. According to Saiva tradition, the teachings or S&stra-s which issued from the divine mouths of the Deity origin- ally consisted of 64 systems, representing as many different as- pects of thought. Most of these S3stras disappeared with the growing influence of the present Kali age. Then Siva, taking pity on the spiritual darkness of the world, appeared on Kailasa Mountain and commanded the sage Durvasas to spread in the world again the knowledge of these teachings. Dur isas created by the power of his mind three sons to teach men the Saiva doctrine 6 in its three aspects of diversity, diversity-in-unity and unity 1 The doctrine of diversity (bheda) or duality (dvaita) teaches that there are many principles which consti tute the essence of all things. This doctrine is today associated with the Saiva Siddhinta systen, which is prevalent in South India. Saiva Siddhinta believes in three eternally distinct categories: ‘the individial soul (pagu), the world (pla) and the Tord (pati). The Sanskrit terms for these categories are derived from the allegory of a beast, its fetters and its owner. The doctrine of diversity~in-unity (bhedabheda) or dualisn-cum-non-dvalin (dvait&dvaita) teaches a diversity of principles from one point of view, ani4 a non-diversity from another. The Vira Saiva school maintains this doctrine, and it contends that Siva and Sakti are respectively and separately sat and git: the static and the dynamic, the transcendent and the immanent, the impersonal and personal aspects of reality. + The doctrine of unity (abheda) or non-du.Lisn (advaita) represents the philosophy of Kashmir Saivism, vinich expounds the essential identity of all that appears as many. Within Kashmir Saivism, the Pratyabhijlia branch may be regarded as the philosophy proper of the school, Other Kashnir Saiva writings deal extensively with yogic and tantric method- ology and present the monistic Saiva position as doctrines of faith with little concern for philosophical reasonings. Pratyabbijiid philosophy provides constructive argunents in support of the school's beliefs ani critical refutations of other systems, both vedic and non-vedic. The PratyabhijXa branch of Kashnir Saivism is naned after the school's theory of "recognition" of the Self. Though the term had been used earlier by Buddhists,’ the Kashmir Saiva idea of pratyabhijfia is presented for the first time by Somfnanda and his disciple, Utpala (ca. 9th cent. A.D.). Somfnanda's Siva~ Grgti marks the beginnings of speculative philosophy in Kashnir Saivism, In it he defines pratyabhijha as the realization of5 the imnanence of Supreme Reality (Siva) in this world consisting of multiple objects, sentient and insentient. This realization occurs by means of the perception and dire; + experience (desta) of one of reality's aspects and the simultaneous remembrance (snaraya) of its other aspects.” The process of recognition is illustrated by a chaming analogy: Suppose that the passion of love is aroused in a young lady by mere hearing of the excellences of a hero and that she-— intensely desiring day and night to see him and with her heart completely out of control~-sends messengers, writes love-letters, and has her already slim body made slinner still by pangs of separation. Now the hero unexpectedly turns up in response to her entreaties and stands before her. But she is not able to apprehend clearly his distinctive great qualities and consequently to her he is nothing more than m ordinary man... But when she distinctly cognizes those exccllences in him, through a word from the messenger or recognition of a char- acteristic, her heart inmediately blooms fully like a wonder- ful bud. And in consequence of repeated enjoyment of union, she experiences the rest of the heart in other forms also. In a like manner, all the characteristics of Siva are Co ——_——————————— Suprene Self, They remain hidden from awareness owing to the veiling power of the individual self, Thus the system holds that the means to realization of reality is not knowledge of the unlmown, but recognition of that viich is already known=- namely, that "I am Siva, the omnipotent and omniscient fora Sonnada ami Utpala believe Self-recognition to be the meas and the end to attainnent of perfection. They approach this spiritual goal as one which des not require any of the6 rituals of yogic practices or the Agamas, Utpala describes the systen as "a new and easy path.” tn contrast to the various methods (upSya~s) prescribed in the ancient Saiva texts, : Pratyabhijh® is anuplya-ndrgaé-a path which needs no performances of any kind. Unfortunately, very few of the writings of these earliest Pratyabhijhavadins are extant, Toy the system is mainly known through the works of their famous disciple, Abhinava Gupta (ca. 950-1015 A.D.). Abhinava's extensive treatises on Pratyabhijia philosophy far outnumber his works on poetics. Nevertheless, Abhinava's pre-eminent position in the field of poctics has long been ackno-ledged, while his contributions to speculative philosophy have ac. as yet been fully appreciated. Pratyabhijhi has come to the attention of modern scholars only in comparatively recent tines. Biihler, in reporting on his search for Sanskrit manuscripts in 1877, provided the im- petus for Pratyabhijila study with his discovery of a numter of manuscripts belonging to the school. the first Western trans- lation of a Pratyabhijhi text did not appear until 1905, with sara.” In the Barnett!s presentation of Abhinava's Paraniir' same year the editing of Kashmir Saiva literature was begun by ‘the Kashmir Research Department in Srinagar, and almost 100 volumes of the Kashnir Series of Texts and Studies have sime been published. This includes almost all the major Pratyabhi, works for which satisfactory manuscripts are available, and agreat many of these texts are now found in translatian. Pratyabhijiia scholarship, though, is still at a very early stage of development. Not only have published Pratyabhijna texts been only partially translated, but those texts and trens~ lations have, for the most part, been ignored by students of Indian philosophy. Too often previa studies have treated Pratyabhijha merely in the general context of Kashnir Saivism as a whole; they have failed to distinguish the metaphysics of Pratyabhijha from the religious doctrines and yogic methodology common to all of Kashnir Saivism. Any separation of Pratyabhijid philo~ sophy from the yogic and tatric thowghts which form the back- ground and basis of Kashnir monisn is, to a certain extent, artificial~all Pratyabhijiié teachers discuss at great length the yogic and tantric methods to realization of Self. However, such a separat nis necessary if we are to obtain an assess~ nent of Pratyabhiji as an integral systen of speculative philosophy which may be compared to the better-known Indian systems of thought. By far the most femous Indian system is Safkara's non- talistic (advaita) school of Vedinta. Although there is an oft-cited maxim anong students of Indian thought that Indian philosophy ard religion are inseparable, in discussing Sahkera's theories scholers hare quite clearly dissociated his metaphysics and epistenology from the yogic and devotional material foundin his witings.’© gafkarats philosophy has been subject to intensive scrutiny over the past 100 years, by Indians and Westerners alike, It has been universally acclaimed as the quintessence of philosophical Hinduism and as the highest form of Indian Idealism, Pratyabhijfi, by way of contrast, has been disnissed in most accounts of Indim philosophy as a "popular," "theistic" ar "ninar religious® system.’ Since Advaita Vedinta has becone the standard of philo- sophical Hinduism to which all other systems are to be con- pared, it is not surprising that Bihler did in fact compare Pratyabhijfd to Advaita Vedanta in the first presentation of ‘the Kashmiri school to the Western world, Buhler noted in his report that the Pratyabhijiia system "appears to be pure idedl~ ism and an application of Saikaracarya's principles to the Saiva philosophy.""8 Later scholers have followed Bihler's lead and have described Pratyabhijia as "approaching Sahkara's idealism," "goatly influenced by Saikera's Vedantic doctrines," and "definitely influenced by Sohkara."7t There ere a number of basic premises comron to both Pratyabhijiia and Advaita Vedanta, including: 1. The Suprene as undivided consciousness, there being no separate material cause of the wrld. Identity of limited self (jiva) and Supreme Self (@tman), not jiva as a part of or dependent upon Btman.Bondage being the jiva's non-recognition of his own true nature, and Imowledge (jfna) being the path to liberation rather than devotion (bhakti). At the same time, there is one major point of difference whereby scholars have distinguished the tw systems. Pratyabhijha, it is said, contends that the wrld is a real extension of the freedom (svatantrya) of Siva-consciousness. This is contrasted with the Advaita Vedgnta notion that the wrld is an illusory manifestation (vivarta) which is superimposed upon the qualiti- Jess Brahman, This letter point represents a significant area of dis~ agreement between the two schools, The unreality or mere pheno- menality of the manifest world is perhaps the most character- istic notion of Advaita Vedinta (and one which has often been improperly applied to Indien philosophy as a whole). If Pratyabhijha agrees with Sahkara as to the existence of one un- differentiated principle of conscicusness, how can it disagree with Sahkara as to the illusory nature of the manifest world? Or, if Pratyabhijfié truly professes non-duality, then how em the wrld of diverse objects and subject-object differentiation be considered real? Pratyabhijfid studies have contented then- selves with listing points of similarity such as the above, along with this one major point of difference between the two schools, without explaining how such an alignnent of views is pcssible. Furthermore, that Sahkara!s nfluence" may be used as an explana10 tion of similarities between the two schools is a hypothesis as yet unproven; it is based only on the earlier date of Sahkara (he is generally thought to have lived at chovt the eighth cen- tury A.D., or aout a century before Sontnanda), the greater fane of the Vedinta system, and on a very doubtful legend of Seikara hinself having traveled to Kashnir. I began the research for this dissertation with a view towards a general analysis of Pratyabhijfid philosophy ad a sb- sequnt comparison with Advaita Vedanta, Surprisingly, the assumed honogeneity of the Pratyabni ji system was sharply brought into question by Abhinava's numerous divergences from the theories of his predecessors, Sondnanda and Utpala. These divergences are serious enough to cast doubt upon the value of any generalizations which treat Pratvabhijii® as a single school. What is required is a specification of Pratyabhijiia research into consideration of differences anong members of the school. Modem scholars now acknowledge the fact that Advaita Vedanta is not a monolithic system but consists of a fascinating variety of important and individualistic philosophers .°? Such disparate Advaita Vedantins as Vacaspati Migra, Prakaéatman nd Suregvara, all base their views on the authority and writings of Schkara, Abhinava's doninant status in Pratyabhi jha parallels Safkara's position in Advaita Vedanta. The scope and complexity of Pratyabhijfié as developed by Abhinava makes it, like Safikarats Advaita, Mable to a wide variety of interpretann tions. Had there been a more active succession of philosophers to approach Abhinava's work criticelly, then there probably would have arisen within Pratyabhijiid the same diversity of views found in Advaita Vedanta. Previas studies of Pratyabhijit have failed to recognize the complexity of the system. Accepting Abhinava's ostensible role as faithful comnentator on his predecessor's works, differ~ ences of opinion within the Kashmiri school have teen generally ignored snd always minimized. Abhinava adopts a nunber of theories which are prominent also in the philosophy of gafkara: reflectionism, superimposition, distinction between levels of reality, and subletion. There has been no attempt made to iso- late these theories common to both Abhinava and Safikara. Conse~ quently, there has been no discussion of the problems gaerated by this material of abhinava's—naely, that it conflicts with: positions taken in the earlier works of Soménanda and Utpala, 2. other portions of Abhinava's own works, and 3. the generally accepted synopsis of the school as "realistic," rathe than illusionistic in the manner of Sahkara's Vedanta. Part I of this study (chapters 1,2) will begin by survey~ ing Kashmir Saiva literature and identifying Pratyubhijhi's place within that literature. It then introduces some of the precepts and terminology of Pratyabhijiia, including the system's1 categories of manifestation (tattva~s), To a large extent the school does adopt the common language of Indian philosophy; it retains, though, much terminology which is unique to Kashnir Saivism and which often proves am obstacle in conparing Prat- yabhijiia to other Indian systems of thought. Part II (chapters 3-5) will be directed to an exposition of differences between Sondnanda ad Utpala’s views and those of Abhinava. Since nost of our understanding of Som&nanda's single extant work, Sivadrsti, is based upon Utpala's commen- tary on it, no effort will be made to distinguish betwen the views of these two Pratyabhijiidvadins. Thus, Abhinava will be contrasted with Utpala alone, even when Sivadmsti is being con- sidered. Although other divergences between Abhinava ad Utpala cauld be shom, the particular areas of contrast selected all deal with instances where Abhinava adopts an Advaita Vedanta-like stance that is nowhere found in the Pratyabhijia treatises which preceded him, Utpala and Abhinava will be seen to conflict on such basic questions as whether the world is a real manifestation or illusory superimposition, whether there is but the one reality of Siva-consciousness or distinct levels of reality. ‘The implications of Abhinava's departure from the philo- sophical tradition of his predecessors will be explored in Part III (chapters 6-9). Any assessment of Abhinava which des not vake into account his illusionistic theories is clearly invalid.At the same tine, Abhinava hinself clearly dissociates his philosophy from that of Advaita Vedinta, Differences between Abhinava and Utpala will be approached in terns of a develop= ment. from the Stikhya theory that the effect is a real trans- formation of the cause (parinfnavada) to the Vedinta theory that the effect is merely an illusory manifestation of an un- changing cause (vivartavada), The far more significant differ- ences between Abhinava and Satikara will be seen to sten from the fomer's reluctance to deseribe Suprane Consciousness as "completely pure and unqualified"--a notion which is central to Advaita Vedanta philosophy. With respect to his use of the metaphysics and episteno- logy of illusionism, Abbinava appears to be in accord with Sefikara. Abhinava remains within the Kashmir gaiva traditim, though, insofar as he relates the world-process to, and identi- fies the wrld-process with Supreme Consciousness, It is this unique synthesis of Kashmir Saiva beliefs concerning the equal reality of everything and Advaita Vedinte techniques demon= strating the mere conditional reality of the world which makes Abhinava's philosophy so intriguing and, very often, so puzzling. Reserved for the appendix are these itens: ‘A. A chart of the Kashnir Saiva categories of manifesta tion. B, Text and translation excerpts from Somfnanda's Siva- drgti with Utpala's commentary on it.C. An examination of a possible instance of Vedanta his- torical influence upon Pratyabhi jfid. Abhinava's Paranarthasara is based on an earlier treatise of the same nane by Adi Sega, Other Pratyabhijild studies have interpreted Adi dega's text as espousing Siikhya dualism which Abhinava rewrites to suit the non-dualism of Pratyabhiji. Kai Sega's work, though, is more properly seen as an early Vedinta text and as a case of pre-Safikara Vedanta influence upon Abhinava. Studies such as the present one are necessarily prelimi- nary to other equally importat ones. For example: A particu- larly fertile, end as yet explored, field for research is the interaction of Buddhim and Pratyabhijila. Study of Pratyabhijfia's Hgana sources is needed in order to achieve a better understand- ing of the non-Yedic currents of thought which may well have provided the inspiration for many of the ideas of the Upanigads and Buddhism, It might also be shown that many modern philo- sophers, in proclaiming the contemporary relevance of Advaita Vednta philosophy, have re~interpreted Sahkara's position along lines remarkebly similar to Abhinava's. It is hoped that the present stuiy, by clarifying some of the misapprehensias which have clouded previous Pratyabhijfid scholarship, may serve as a starting point for research of these and other problems.PART I CHAPTER I BACKGROUND Kas! r Saivism or Trika Kashnir Saivism is known outside Kashmir as trika (Literally, "three-fold"), a name for which various explana~ tions are offered. The name is often derived from the divicion of Kashmir Saiva Literature into three broad catepries: Agama, Spanda and Pratyabhi jit i Since the Hgamas are thought to be eternally existent, there can be no origin to them, but only their appearance or disappearance at the divine will, In accordance with the Indian penchant for attributing great antiquity to a system, there exist a great many qunerations of the Agamas' transmission ‘through long successicns of preceptors. Saiva tradition holds that the Agamas once emsisted of 900,000 verses, all of which were known only to Siva, The greater part of this Agama lore was lost as it was handed down fron one divine being to another, and then from one generation of human seers to the next. Kashmir Saivites usually refer to sixty-four texts, all of which are called tantra-s, as the snall portion of the original scriptural heritage allotted to our present age, the Kali-yuga. Ly16 Most of these sixty-four Tatras are knom to us today only through references in later Kashnir Saiva texts. The few Sciva Tantra texts which are extant seen to be incomplete and of fairly late composition (ca. 8th centuries A.D.). These Tantras are primarily expositions of Saiva mythology ad theo- logy. They also deal with yogic and ritualistic matters, wich are couched in the "aysterious language” (sandh or sandhya-bigz) of tantraisn—Ma whole system of elaborately worked-out ciphers, which the inconmnicability of yogico- a tantric experiences does not suffice to explain."? With res- pect to their metaphysics, these Saiva scriptures are, for the nost part, dialistic or pluralistic. Certain ones of monist tendencies are especially venerated in Kashnir Sgiviem: the Svacchanda, Rudray’nala, VijAdnabhairava and Malinivijaya Tantras. These sone Tmtras, though, are shared by all Siva schools and have been adopted to serve the purposes of Saiva Siddhanta and Vira Saivism as well. The Sivasiitra-s are by far the most important Rgama of Kashnir Saivism. Though their historical appearance may be definitely linked to the time of Vasugupta, the earliest known teacher of Kashmir Saivism (ca. early 9th cent. A.D.), they we nevertheless regarded as Agana, since their authorship is ascribed to Siva Himself, In one version of the story, the Sitra-s were revealed to Vasugupta in a drean. In another ver- sion, Vasugupta is told by Siva to climb the Mahadeva nountainWw in Kashmir, where the Sitra~s vere found engraved on a rock in old Testanent-fashion.! vnatever their inspiration my have been, the Siitra-s mark the beginning of the resurgence of Saivisn in Kashmir. Both in language and inten’ the Sivasiitra~s represent a continuation of the Agama tradition. The work is primarily meant to be a guideline to practices (sd¢hana~s) which will en- able the aspirant (sidhala) to achieve enlightennent, md its sevanty-nine short aphorisms are organized according to the different methods (upfya-s) of yogic concentration.” In its un= conpromisingly monistic stance, however, the Slitra-s depart from the dualist doctrines of the earlier Jgamas. Although the rave do rot contain a metaphysical system as sich, they em= phasize that the Suprene Self is unitary consciousness®--the single principle waich presupposes and constitutes all mowledge and experience. The second divisim of Kashmir Saiva literature, Spanda, begins with Kallata, the pupil of Vasugupta and author of the Spmdakarikd-s. ‘The Kirildi-s are naned after the Kasinir theory that the freedom (svatentrya) of unitary conscicusness constantly creates and dissolves, reveals and comeals itself through pulsa~ tion (spanda) or vibration (ghixmana). The Spandakirild-s form a commentary on Vasugupta's Sivasiitra-s and elaborate upon the doctrines contained therein, without giving metaphysical argu ments in their support.16 ‘The Spandakérikd-s explain spanda as being the essential nature of Siva, as the indestructible principle whereby the des- tractibie wrld of objects is brought into play.” The universe is described in the form of mantra-s, which enanate from reality and becone the means through vhich yoga practitioners achieve realization of the spanda principle.’ The work outlines pro- gressive stages of the yogin's progress towards enlightenment and his attainnent of various powers (siddhi-s) vhich stand in the way of superior meditation, ‘The SpandakérikG-s end with praise of the power of the guru and with a description of the bliss attending those who reach the suprene state of spanda. Just as in the Sivasiitra-s, many of the doctrines of the KarikG-s are concealed from the non-initiate, the language it~ self being a mental exercise, an integral part of the sadhana. At the sane time that the Pratyabhijfia branch of Kashnir Saivism was being developed by Somfnanda, Utpala md Abhinsva, other Kashmir $sivites continued the Spanda tradition of Kallata. ALL Later Spanda texts are commentaries on the SpandalGrit-s, and they elaborate upon the yogic and tantric methods of Kallatats work. Major Spanda commentaries, dating from the 9th to 11th centuries A.D., include: The Vivyti by Ramalantha, the Pradipixa by Utpala Vaignava (different than Somanandats disciple, Utpala), and Kgemar&ja's Spandasandoha and SpadanirnayaPratyabhi ja Authors and Texts The Pratyabhijna division of Kashmir Saiva literature begins with the Sivadrsti of Somananda, who is called Kashmir Seivion's "originator of reasoning.” Soninanda lived at approximately the sane time as Kallata (the end of the 9th cent. A.D.) and may also have been a pupil of Vasugupta. Somlnanda hinself traces his ancestry back to Durvasas, the sage who was chosen by Siva to be the propagator of Saiva doctrines. Sonfnanda provides logical arguments in support of the metaphysical suppositions of Kashmir monism; in ding so, he distinctly refers to and criticizes other schools of thought , such as Saikiya, Vedanta, the Grannarians and Budihism. In Sivadysti the obscure synto lism of the Aganas is replaced by the devices of metaphysics. Knowledge is espoused as a goal which is realizable outside the framework of mystical yogic practices and which is transmittible outside the traditional student-pre~ ceptor relationship. Agama md Spanda literature are limited in their netaphysics to a few simple monistic pronouncenents y which serve as a prelude to discussions of the experiential as- pects of Siva-consciousness. While the arguments of Sonlinanda's work very often seem unclear, its language is philosophical, rather than mystical, and its orientation is more speculative than experiential. Sivadesti was comnented upon by Utpala, Sondnanda's direct disciple. Unfortunately, Utpala's commentary has cone1 20 down tous only in the form of a single manuscript, which does not go beyond the first half of the fourth chapter. Without the help of a commentary, the reading of SDts last three chapters is an extrenely difficult undert acing. Utpala reformulated the contents of Sivadrsti's 307 verses into the 190 verses of his Isvara-pratyabhijWa@rika-s, after which the system becane known outside Kashmir. IPK is usually regarded as the main treatise of the Pratyabhijiia system. Utpalats shorter and mre lucid work met with much greater suc- cess than did Somfnanda's Sivadnsti, at least insofar as we can judge on the basis of the greater nunber of IPK manuscripts found throughout India.” Utpala is also the aithor of a brief commentary on his ow IPK and of three short treatises called Siddnitrayi. In his works he systemizes the argunents of Sonfinanda end, in the process, demonstrates much more philoso- phical acumen in his refutation of other schools of thought. Apart from some devotional hymns ascribed to then, these are the only extent works of Somnanda and Utpala. Even these provide a unique and outstanding contribution to Indian philo- sophy. But it is doubtful that the Pratyabhijiia system would have been Imown to the world were it not for Abhinava Gupta. Abhinava is separated from Sominanda by one master, Lakgnaga Gupta, none of whose works are extant, Abhinava gives the dates of composition for many of his works, which show that the period of his literary activity extended from about 990-1015! 2 A.D, ALL Sanskrit scholars are familiar with Abhinava's works on poetics; very few know that he was as great a philosopher as a literary critic, and that in Kashmiri tradition he is regarded more as a saint than a philosopher. A multitude of Kashmiri legends attests to Abhinava's lengthy periods of asceticism, his perfection of various yogic practices and his miraculous powers; even Abhinava's immediate disciples looked upon him as Siva in- n carnate. K. C, Pandey has gathered together many of these legends, often presenting them as historical fact, in his mamoth (10us-page) tribute to Abhinava's genius. In a manner not a~ typical of either Pandey's work or the legends, he summarizes the life of Abhinava as follows: He tried innumerable experiments personally to ascertain the truth of what he had heard about spiritual matters, and unchallengeable is, therefore, the correctness and pre~ cision of his conclusions. Great was his spiritual power and his contenporaries had occasions to see its greatness in deeds. Clear was his head, powerful his nenory, marvel- ous his intellectual capacity, wonderful his command over the Language, shrewd his eye to see the real nature of a thing from different angles of vision .. . and gloricus was the last scene of his earthly existence when like Tennyson's legendary King arthur, he parted from his followers never to be seen again 12 Pandey lists no less than forty-four known works of L Aohinava,”? of which these are the ones mst important to Pratyabhijiia philosophy: Isvara~pratyabhi jWa—vimarsini and isvara-pratyabhi jiia-vivrti-vimargini (IPV) and (IPVV)=-Two con- nentaries on Utpala's Iévara-pratyabhijil-kiriki-s. IPV, the shorter of the two (1aghvi vimaréind), kas been translated elong22 with Utpala's Karika-s by Pandey. These treatises are Abhinavats best-known philosophical works, and they present a comprehensive treatment of Pratyabhijiia. Tantraloka (TA)—A vast compendium of Saiva thought, con- sisting of thirty-seven long chapters which have been published in twelve volumes by KSTS. Both ritualistic and philosophic matters are discussed, and there is an exhaustive treatment of iganie materials. Tantrasara (TS)--A small prose summary of TA, translated into Italian by Gnoli. Paranarthasara (PS)--This 100-verse work is based on Adi Sega's text of the sane nane (see the Appendix) and has been translated into English by Barnett and into French by Silburn. Malin -vi jaya-varttike (MV)--an exposition of parts of the Malini-vijaya-tantra, Only a portion of this treatise has, been found, and the available portion contains a refutation of variais theories of the Naiyayikas. PardtriidisG-vivarapa (PIV)—A commentary on the Pardtriagikd, which is part of the Rudrayamala-tantra. It presents the Saiva conception of the Grammarian sctool. A shorter commentary or Wmtti (PIVV) which summarizes the longer one has been translated by Gnoli. Bhagavadgi tartha-saheraha (BOS)-~This is not a verse-by- verse commentary, but a discussion of the subject matter of the Gita, whose Kashmiri rescension differs not greatly from the ey standard text.The specific contributions of Abhinava to Pratyabhij philosophy—the material introduced by him which is origins] and not merely a clarification or anplification of Sominenda and Utpala's views~-will be discussed below in Part IT (chapters 3-5). The system may be said to have completed its development under Abhinava, since later teachers of the school made little in the way of original contributims to Pratyabhijha thought, devoting thenselves mainly to exegeses of Abhinava's vast corpus of works. Kgenarja, the pupil of Abhinava, wrote some connentaries interpreting the Spandakariki-s from a Pratyabhijiii viewpoint. He is also the author of Pratyabhijfa-nedayam (PH), a summary of Kashnir Sais ism which has been translated by both Kurt Leidecker and Jaideva Singh. PH is a very readable and concise work, with mst of the text consisting of Kgemaraja's prose commentary — on his own verses, and it is often cited in Pratyabhijiia studies. However, Kgemaraja does not discuss the arguments supporting Pratyabhijia theories, and the work is dedicated to "those un- developed minds who have not made great effort in difficult togic texter and hence are unable to study the vorks of Utpala and Abhinava in the original. Among other post-Abhinava Pratyabhijhiavadins there is Yogaraja, who cane next after Kgemaraja and who wrote a conmen- tary on Paramarthasfra; jayaratha (ca. 1200 A.D.), author of the Viveka commentary on Tantra@loka; and Bhiskara, ei ghteenth-cen-2h tury author of the Bhaskari commentary on igvara-pratyabhi jha- s an invalueble aid in understanding Abhinava's vimarsini, which 16 difficult text. Here is a summary of major Pratyabhijia authors ad texts: Mane Date Works Somananda ca. end 9th cent. A.D. Sivadrsti (SD) Utpala ca. end of 9th, beginning of 10th cent. A.D. Igvara-pratyebhi jia- ianes CR) ‘Ygeea on IPK (IPKV) comm. on SD Siddhitrayi Abhinava Gupta ca. 960-1015 A.D. ISvara-pratyabhijha- vinargint and Tévara rabyabhijha-viveed — vimargint (PV and _ TBVV, two comms. on IPK) Tantr&loka (TA) and its Summary, lantrasara (TS) | Parandrthasara (PS) Paratringsi ka-vivaraga PIV) and its vrtti (rv) Malinivijeya-varttika ls Bhagavadgitartha- Sahgraha (BGS) Kgemaraja pupil of Abhinava Pratyabhi jfia—hrdayam (PH) Yogaraja pupil of Kgemaraja Comm. on PS Jayaratha ca. th cent. A.D. Comm, on TA Bhaskara ca, 18th cent. A.D, Comm, on IPV25 Pratyab! Stu es ‘The first important study relating to Pratyabhijna is J.C, Chatterji's Kashmir Saivism (191). Chatterji presents the main doctrines of the non-dualistic system of Kashmir, “yithout," he adnits, "entering into an exposition of the reason- ings which can be adduced in their support." ost of the book consists of a discussion of the thirty-six categories of world nanifestatims (tattva-s). Although these categories form an important part of Kashnir Saivism's Agama heritage and will be discussed in the next chapter, they play only a minor role in the philosophical speculations unique to the Pratyabhijiia branch. Chatterji acknowledges that Pratyabhijiia ad Spanda are separate branches of Kashmir Saivion.” pat since he avoids a presentation of the arguments of Pratyabhijla in his work, it is not of direct concern to the issues of this dissertation. K. C, Pandoy's Abhinava Gupta (1936) has already been mentioned above. The work contains the most complete listing md summary available of Kashmir Saiva texts and an extensive analysis of other Saiva systems as compared to Kasimir Saivism. Throughout the book, Pandey makes no philosophical distinction betieen the works of Sondnanda, Utpala and Abhinava and those of Kashmir Saivism as a whole: It is, therefore, not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel. ‘This, however, ces not mean that he did not contribute anything to the Realistic Idealism of Kashmir. The fact, on the contrary, is that the philo~ sophical systen of Kashnir, with Abhinava's contribution to. it left out of consideration, loses most of its importance.??26 Although Pandey's historical and philosophical malyses must be approached with a critical eye, he does provide an abundance of valuable background material—particularly in reference to the inflvence of Agama doctrines on the formulation of Pratyabhi jna theories. For our purposes here, by fa the mst important Pratyabhijild study to date is The Doctrine of Recognition by R. K. Kaw (1967). It is an attempt at a comprehensive survey of the philosophical content of Pratysbhijiia apart from the theolo- gical doctrims of the school. Kaw traces the origins of Pratyabhijia theories to the Vedic hymis, the Upanigads and the Buddhist swces. Although he clearly distinguishes Pratyabhijna from the Agana and Spanda branches of the school, Kaw is of little assistance in delineating differences between Abhinava and Utpale. Abhinava, says Kaw, "faithfully follows the original | doctrines of Utpala throughout and did not attempt to add any new theory of his own.n”? Kaw compares Pratyabhijiié with other Indian and Western philosophical systems. Most frequently it is Advaita Vedanta which catches his attention. The two systems are not fundanen= tally different, according to Kaw, but the "concrete monism of Pratyabhijfa is primarily realistic and thus opposed-to the illusicnism of Safikarats "absolute idealism": World objects as manifestations or Sbhasarsin the Pratyabhijha system are real in nature, whereas those in Sahkara's system are fictitious and illusive (dreamlike) and hence unreal,2127 Specialists in the study of Vedanta would doubtless ob= dect that Kaw's assessment of the school is simplistic. The incompleteness and inadequacies of Kaw's wrk as it bears on the issues discussed below will be sem in Part III. Suffice it to note that his comparisons of Pratyabhijha and Advaita Vedénta are based on sericus misrepresentations of both systems. I am contending that generalizations concerning Prat= yabhijiia leave mich to be desired. Before documenting this, I have some gencralizations of my own to present in the next chap- ter. Basic precepts and terminology common to all Pratyabhijia works will be introduced, and some relevant concepts of Indian philosophy will be presented as a context in which to @ proach Pratyabhiji theories.CHAPTER IT PRESUPPOSLTIONS OF PRATYABHTJNE The Supreme Siva, Paramagiva, Paranegvara and Mehegvara are only @ few of the nanes denoting the Suprene in Pratyabhijia. These terns are used interchangeably, ad Siva, like the Brahman of Vedinta, is a non-sectarian designation of the principle of consciousness. Unfortunately for Pratyabhij8a, the name Siva, with its masculine associations, is Linked to the dalist notions of theology and mythology. As the name will be often used below, it mst be renenbered that in Pratyabhijfa Siva refers to the principle of supreme consciousness, and rot to a male deity. In accordance with tradition, we will sonetines retain the masculine pronoun in referring to the Supreme. That Svprene Principle is better indicated, though, by a neuter "it," and Pratyabhijnavadins ofte use such impersonal designations as givatvam/'Sivanese"),atman, (the Self) , or caitanyan, (cons snes). $iva is specifically referred to in his transcendent as- pect as Mhe fomless all-mrpassing" (nixMorti-vi évottinna)™ or "the unsurpassed” (anuttara),” consisting of the absolute unity of consciousness lone (cidripaxdtva).” anuttara, although discussed at great length by other Saiva systens,! is given ccant attention by PratyathijRavadins. Since the transcendent 2829 is beyond all worldly relations and concepts, it is inexplicable: there, all talk of object ceases . . . all words £ai1.09 Most of Pratyabhijf&'s discussion of the Suprene is directed to its immanent aspect as the all-forming Self of the world (sarvakrti. wiévanaya).° The world-Self, vigvamaya, is in turn defined as pracafavinarsa.! By prakaga (literally, "Light") is meant the self-luninous shining of Siva-consciausness, con~ pared to a mirror which shines independent of my external feet Vimarga (from the root mgs: to touch, feel) is used in a wide range of contexts; it encompasses the freedom (svatentrya) and power (Sakti) which constitute the distinctive capacity of the Self to know itself and to control that which it contains within. According to Pratyabhijna, these two proper- ties of consciousness are inevitably conjoined, vinarfa being ‘the very nature of the shining out of peaks.” Vinarga is said to be "independence? and "resting with- in oneself." gt the sane time, it is also said tobe "freedom with respect to withdraxing in ad spreading cut," "freedom 3, —nanely, "not resting Uy in joining, separating ani rejoining" within oneself alone Like an inert object, This paradoxical power of the Supreme to both rest within itself and yet not rest within itself will be taken up at later points below; it is the basis of Pratyabhijha's contention the unitary Siva- consciousness gives rise to the world of multiplicity without resorting to a separate material cause and without any change in its essential nature.‘ 30 ‘The potentiality of conscicus expression, represented by vinarfa, becomes actualized in world-nanifestations and wrld- experience. Kashmir Saivism classifies the manifestations (Bbhisa-s) of Siva into thirty-six tattva-s, which are the funda- mental categories in the evolution of Siva-conscicusness. The highest or subtlest of these is Sivatattva; the lowest or gross- est is the earth. This doctrine of tattvas is, of course, not unique to Kashmir Saivism, as it incorporates the twenty-five categories of Séikhya. Other Saiva systems, with only slight alterations, also enunerate the sane thirty-six catemries. Perfect-Inperfect Agama texts begin with two separate categories, Sivatattva and gaktitattva, emphasizing Siva's dual nature of knowledge and action (jfiana and seriyay 16 digna is mere consciousness (cinmatra)-— the passive consciousness of prakaga. Kriy is the means vherety ” Siva appears as the countless manifestations of the light of con~ sciousness; it is the active consciousness of simarga.?? Utpala ad Abhinava present these two categories as a single category, givatattva, in which Saktitattva is also included, Utpala sep- arates givatattva, which is ever-present, from the other cate- gories that cone into being only during world manifestation.” Abhinava even more clearly associates givatattva with the trans- cendent by saying that it is really not a manifestati, even 1 though traditionally taught to be 90.”—— ae The next tattva, logically, but not temporally subse~ ee is sadafiva. This first manifestation of the internal a1 aspect af Self as "I" is called "perfect I-ness," or paratahanta, to distingyish it from the personal ego (ahahkdra) of the Limited self, Sadagivatattva is the state of self-realisation as being or force, the beginning of the will (iechd) which pre~ cedes Imowledge and activity. The experience "I-an-this" (ahen~ Adai-vimarga) predominates as the Self closes within (ninego ‘ntap) .° ‘The world of experience, even as pure ideatian, is unclear (asphata)”? at this stage, Like the extrenely dim outline of a picture in the artist's mind. Knowledge prevails in igvaratattva, which is the fourth category in Kashnir Saivism and the second principle of actual manifestation. The Self here makes a survey of, and identifica~ tion with, that which constitutes the state of experience. Siva . 0 unfolds out (bakir-unnega), and the experience is of "this (ddameanaf-vinar a)" with the "this" being the more dominant element. Both the experiencer ad experienced are clear (sphuta)”? in igvaratattva, but they are rot distinct from one another. The "this" is not yet distinguished as separate from the "I." The subsequent experience of sadvidyatattva, also called Suddhavidyatattva, is of "I am I-—this is this” (aham-aham~ idam~i dar wvinerga) °° The two sides of experience are equally weighted like the two pas of an evenly held balance. The "this"1 32 is distinguished from the "I" in sadvidya, but both still refer to the sme thing (samanadhikara), and the experience is of zy 2 imarga). In the lower cate~ diversity in unity (bhedabheds gories the "I" quite distinctly refers to the limited subject and the "this" to the limited object. The three tattvas of sadaSiva, Ivara and sadvidya to- gether form the stages of ideal universal experience. Becmse there is in them no Limitation with respect to the powers of Siva-conscicusness, Chatterji refers to these three catepries by their Egana title ao "The Pure nd Perfect Order (Suaahdchven).” Utpala and Abhinava, though, do not regard these tattvas as either pure or perfect. The very ppearance of "I" in sad&Siva constitutes the initial manifestation of imperfection. An "I," perfect though it may be, is experienced as such only by way of contrast with that which ds non-I or non-Self.’? the ditferintiation of con~ sciousness in sadagiva, etc., foreshadows the further differen tistions and limitations of the lower (apara) order of tattvas whieh follow.°> Siva-consci cusness must be recognized in its fullest and highest (para) sense as an all-inclusive unity. Thus, Utpala says of these tattvas: In the two categories /Sedadiva and ifvera/ the objects are not only in the state of imperfection, becaise they shine as not-Self: but they are also in the state of perfection because they are covered by I-consciousness, i.e., because they shine as identical with the self. Fer, the Sadviaya, which is common to the categories of the SadaSiva and the Iivara, is the "perfect-imperfect state ."3l -IFK 3.1.5, trans. Pandey 8Be The Lower Order The thirty-one remaining Saiva categories make up the in- ‘ a 2 pure path (aguddhadhvan) or path of naya (néySdhvan).°” the first tattva of this impure path is may’ itself. ‘that which obscures, obstructs, conceals and deludes."™"9 Along with its five sheaths (kalicuka~s), each of which is a separate category, maya narrows the powers of the Suprene Self to the limited or contracted (seftkucita) povers of the lower order. The experiencers of the nay-world have no true knowledge of Self and are conscious only of diversity. Limited selves are each differentiated from every- thing else”! ty the collective action of aiya's five sheaths: 1. keld—limited authorship and efficacy, 2. vidyd--limited Imoviledge, 3. r&ga--desire, incompleteness, 4. kala-—limitation of time, . 5. nlyatd—Linitation of space and causality» The first effects of niaya and its sheaths appear in the categories of puruga and prakyti., These two tattvas respectively encompass all the subjective and objective experiences of the néya~wrld. They are Limited (in efficacy, knowledge, etc.) representations of the "I" and "this" of sadvidyatattva, and they are mutually exclusive in a sense that ves impossible in spaceless and timeless sadvidya. The subjective aspect of world experience, puruga, develops as: intellect, ego, mind, the five powers of ccnse-perception and the five capacities of action.— 3h ‘The objective aspect, prakrti, appears as the five subtle ele~ ments, and then the five gross ones. Puruga and prakrti, together with these twenty-thre: other categories, form the total twenty-five tattves of the Saikhya systen. The twenty-three categories, beginning with in- telligence nd ending with earth, are not only common to both Sfkhya and Kashnir Saivism, but are defined by the two schools in essentially the same manner. Sifikhya, however, begins its evolutionary schene with the radical opposition of puruga and prakrti as universal spirit and nis ever universal catsal agent, between which no real unic possible. Incontrast, Kashmir Saivism views puruga and prakr not as universals, but as the constantly prodiced streams of subject and cbject whose intermeshed matrices form the loci of individual subjective and objective expericnces. Many summaries of Pratyabhijiid discuss the school alnost exclusively within the framewrk of the categories of manif esta- ion. But the tattva system is part of Pratyabhijiia's Agana heritage, ani it is mot of central importance to the arguments of school. Very little of Pratyabhijita's discussion of world manifestation and the resulting Limitations of consciousness makes use of the terminology of the tattvas. Utpala, for example, 6 nentions then only briefly in IPK°° at the very end of the work in a chapter (Zgamadhikdra) which is rather like an appendix of Agama lore.35 In both Agama and Spanda literature, the tattvas are com~ prehensively analyzed as descriptions of the descending macrocosn and ascending microcosm. The sane route taken by the Suprene in its assumption of multiplicity and Limitation is taken in the opposite direction by the aspirant in his ascent to realization of Self. In practice, yogic and tantric methods probably pro~ vided the first descriptions of these states of experience, which were then ascribed in reverse order to the manifestation of the Supreme. The close associations of this step-ladder theory of consciousness with yogic methodology "may be one reason why the tattvas play a much less inportant role in the metaphysical reasoning of Pratyabhijia than in the practical theology of Agama and Spanda. Bondage ‘There is amther possible reason for Pratyabhijia's rela- ~ tively minimal use of the tattva scheme--nanely, the difficulty of explaining how the jiva attains release (mokga) from the bondage (bandha) of méy&, when maya is an ontological catemry of the Suprene. If it is assumed that the tattvas represent real limitations of power braight about by the will of the Supreme, then the jiva becores tightly swathed in the sheaths of absolute maya and very much bound in the form of jiva-hood. So mich 50, in fect, that the jiva himself can do little to alter his condition of bondage.36 ‘This appears to be the assumption of Kgemaraja in Pratyabhijidhrdayam, a treatise which is devoted mainly to an exposition of the tattves and to a corresponding sunnary of Saiva yoga. In trying to show that the jiva is identical with the Supreme, Kgenaraja sqys of world-Limitation: Contraction also, on close consideration, consists of con- sciousness only, since it is manifested only as of the nature of consciousness. Otherwise (i.e., in the absence of its being manifested, and it can be manifested only when it ig of the nature of conscicusness), it becomes mere nothing.38 = PH, p. k5, tras. J. Singh Kgemaraja seems to argue not only for the identity of linited and Supreme Self, but also the identity of tondage ad the Supreme. But if the limitations themselves are real mani- festations of Siva-consciousness and bondage is a real product of Siva's evolution, then the jivats delusions with respect to his Limitations are not at all of his own making. This presents serious problens to Pratyabhijha as a metaphysical system which ~ does not regard yogic. end tantric practices or God's grace as necessary prerequisites to realization. Utpala and Abbinava generally avoid the problens incunbent upon treating nescience as an ontological category. They both regard the Limitations of the jiva as the result of subjective ignorance, ices, a false judgnent or misapprehension on the part of the jiva, Utpala declares liberation and bondage and the difference between the two to be merely a matter of understand- ing—Liberation being the realization of the non-nultiplicity of Siva ami bondage being a lack of any such realization. Mokga37 9 and bandha, he says, are not really contradictory.” Abhinava similarly says that bondage is a state of mind or matter of view. point which is brougst atout by dualistic perception. The cause ho. of sorld-bondage is man's imagining himself to be bound. Pratyabhijfia's conception of bondage as a false judgment: on the part of the jiva very naturally raises the question. a what sense is the jiva's perception of the wrld as differentiated into isolated subjects and objects actually false? The Safikhya school presumes the radical opposition of a mutually exclusive absolute subject and absolute object. Saiikhya thus finds it difficult to explain the basic unity of our everyday experiences, via., the possibility of even fictitious interaction between limited subjects and objects. In contrast, Pratyabhijia begins with the radical unity of Siva-consciousness. Pratyabhijfia must then show the essential relatedness of limited subject to Limited object and, in turn, the relatedness of the entire mani- fest world of multiplicity to the unitary absolute of conscious- ness. Cause and Effect In trying to explain how, given the unity of Siva, a variety of manifestations arises," sphinava says thet niyati, the causal law that an effect has as its cause something of its own nature, does not apply to world creation, which is not Limited to time end space, universal and particular:38 Siva's great artistry /fehSkalS7 is such that he paints the world-picture on no surface /abhittau/. . . like a yogin, without any material cause, the Conscious Self shines forth as the collection of objects through His Will Giech’] alae. - IPV II, p. 150, trans. , Pandey Seikara, when forced to discuss world creation (as he so often is in the Brahma-siitra-bhagya), agrees that it is beyond ordinary causal law. Safkara also uses the example of creation through special yogic power, contending that it is not a rule (ekanta) that what is seen to be a particular capa~ bility (sdmarthya) in one being is found in as”? te surther adds his own supporting evidence as well: +. . just as a crane conceives without insemination, or just 25 an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement. ~ BSB 2.1.25, trans. Apte. The purpose of Abhinava's and Sshkara's remarks is to show that consciousness itself is capable of world manifesta tion, without need of a separate material cause. The concept of spontaneous creative activity, or effect as a natural out- growth of cause, is also found in Saikhya's treatment of the evolution of praketi, which is both causal agent and materal cmse in one. Pratyabhijila clearly shares Safkhya md Advaita Vedinta's classification as satkiryavada—the view that the effect (\Grya) pre-exists in the case and that the cause of itself is sufficient for production of the effect, without acy need for a multiplicity of conditis or a causal aggregate.om Asatkaryavida, the theory that the effect is not pre- existent in the cause, is held by the Nyaya school anong others. If the effect is not distinct from the cause, ask the Naiydyikas, then how may we distinguish the two as cause and effect? Furthermore, each specific effect is seen to have a specific set of causes necessary for its production. Naiyayikes illus- trate this with the example of a cloth To make cloth, one first needs threads (the "inherence-cause") and contact between the threads (the "non-inherence cause"). A number of instrumen- tal cases are also required—including general instrumental causes, such as time and space, and the specific ones, such as a spinning wheel and weaver. Asatkryavada tends to mltiply ‘tthe nunber of conditions and entities entering into a causal relation. On the other hand, the general tendency of satkaryavada is to unify the ultimate stuff in the universe. Sifikhya's particular version of satkaryavade is called parinmavada--the theory that the effect is an actual trans~ formation (paringna) of the cause. The example most often given to illustrate parinSmavada is the transformation of milk into curds. Milk, according to Saikhya, is the cause of curds, which is the effect. Liquid milk is merely transformed into solid cards, ani itis the same material which appears in the two different states. The effect is not only already pre-existent in the cause, but the effect is made of the very sane stuff as ‘the cause.Lo Advaita Vedanta's differing version of satkiryavada is named vivarta According to Advaita, effects are not trans- fornatis of caises, but are illusory appearances (vivarta-s). ‘The familiar metaphor used by Sahkara is that of the rope and the snake. When misperceived, a rope may appear to a viewer as a snake. The rope does not really became a snake, of course, and the snake is only a transitory superimposition (adhyasa). When the rope is correctly perceived as such, it serves to deny or sublate (badhitum) the snake. Similarly, Safikara contends, the appearances of the may’-world are to be distinguished from the reality of the underlying substratum of Brahman, Kaw refers to Pratyabhijia's theory of manifestation as ‘Abhasavada. Kaw says that Bhasavda "maintains the pariniic theory with sone modification. ye further says, "Parindnavada is systematically rejected by the Pratyabhijid school, while vivartavida is accepted in a sligntiy altered form! the first difficulty in determining which of the two models, paripina or vivarta, most closely approximates the position of Pratyabhijfid lies in the assumption of the existence of a single Pratyabhi ja position. In the writings of Utpala, world mani- festation is sometimes presented in the parinana mamer es Siva transforming Himself into the maya-vorld. In the writings of Abhinava, the méya-world of appearances is distinguished from reality (bhasa from a: a) in very vivartavada-like terms. After having examined the specifics of Utapala's and Abhinava'sun differing theories of manifestation, we will return to the prob- Jen of classifying them with respect to parindmavada and vivartavada.PAR? IL CHAPTER TID ABHINAVA'S REFLACTIGNISH Utpala: Water, Water Everywhere Somtnanda and Utpala, in Sivadrsti and commentary, devote most of their efforts to demonstrating that the manifest world is identical with the unitary Supreme. This basic thene of SD can be traced back to such Upmigad sayings as atmd eva id: 1 sarvan, "the Self is everything" (literally, "all of this" Perhaps even more famous, though, are the Upanigad sayings which 2 atuest to the Self's being "none of this" (neti neti). The latter sentinents have no place in SD which begins with the pre- mise that Siva is everything and argues that everything is really Siva md equally real: All objects, from ParamaSiva to a pot, becaise of their identity with perfect consciousness, are indistinguishably of the nature of Siva.3 “SD 1.48 conn. Utpala provides various metaphors to describe the mani- festation of the differentiated everyday-world: the yogin md his creations, gold being formed into different omaments or utensils, md water appearing as either still or turbulent. In each of these cases, Utpala contends, there is no modification (vikara) in the essential nature of the cause or substratum. When the yogin creates, he neither divides nor changes hinselz. Gold never changes and is no different whether fashioned into a spitoon or a crom.” Water is also never divided or destroyed, he43 being the sane water whether still or in waves. According to Utpaia, Siva brings about the manifest world in a similar manner, without being destroyed or divided and without any change in his essential natures’ Nothing could appear if it were devoid of power (agakta), says Utpala, and everything which appears is identical with the Light of consciousness and experienced through the poxer of con- sciousness. Vimarga is not only the chief power of the Supreme Self, but it is the freedom of vimerSa which constitutes the sentiency (caitanyan) comon to all selves.” Utpala contrasts the active nature of Siva-conscicusness (prekaSavimarga) with the Vedanta view that consciousness is totally passive or, in Pratyabhijiia terms, prakaga aes Freedom is the very nature of the lights of consciousness. For, otherwise, though reflection of the external objects ve falling upon it, yet it could be no better than insen= tient crystal, etc.7 - IPK 1.5.11, trans. Pandey The crystal to which Utpala refers is part of the faniliar Indian metaphor that poses a pure, colorless crystal which ta&es on the color of juxtaposed objects, e.g-, appears as if red when placed in front of a red flower. A related metaphor is that of the moon reflected in a pool of water, The moon's reflection appears to move when a stone is throm in the pool, but the noon itself remains maffected, In both cases there is the appearance of a reflection whose nature (red and mving, respectively) differs from the mture of the real cbject (colorless ad unmoving).Lb Sefkara uses reflectionist metaphors such as these to illustrate his distinction between the reality of the qualitiless sub- stratum, Brohnan, and the appearance of diversification and multiplicity in the everyday-world. The implications of Saftkara's use of these metaphors and their relationship with vivartavada will be seen below.” In chapter six of SD (which has no commentary) a long list of erroneous theories is presented without refutatim. Included in the list are the views of the "foolish" Vedantins who believe that Brahman projects itself as a reflection in creation, or that the world is an illusion (bhranti) and not real (na a n satyaripatva). Utpala clearly believes that the Supreme in no way manifests itself as a reflectim ad that the world is very much real. The conscious Self des not increase by means such as reflec- tions. Nor is the manifestation of its nature an illusion.12" = SD 1.17, conn. Utpala objects to reflectionist theories on the grounds that they fail to take into account the active aspect of con- scicusness—nanely, svatantrya or vimarfa. He also claims that any comparison of the manifest world to a reflection is tanta- mount to declaring the world to be unreal or illusory, In refut~ ing a prima facie view that the Supreme becomes divided by its connection with many bodies like reflections in a crystal, Utpala replies that those reflectims are unreal (asatva). B ‘That vhich is unreal, he adds, has no fom and serves no purpose.45 Avhinava: Mirror Images Abhinava, like Utpala, never diverges from the non-dual~ ism basic to PratyabhijR's theory of the unitary reality of Siva-consciousness. Unexpectedly, though, Abhinava explains world manifestations (Zbhasa-s) by means of the very same reflec~ tionist theories which Utpala categorically rejects. Abhinava not only treats Siva's manifestations as reflections, but be further distinguishes the Supreme as the substratum of reflec~ tions from the reflections themselves. Bven though Sivatattva is a unity, its absolute freedom 1} shows itself as a multiplicity of fom, like reflectims. “IPV II, p. 191, trans. Pandey Different reflectionist metaphors are found in Abbinava's works. In Parandrthas@ra_ the appearance of diversity in the world is compared to reflections in a pure crystal: As the limpid crystal assimes the semblatce of divers colors, | 50 likewise the Lord assumes the semblance of gods, men, cattle and trees. =-PS 6, trons. Barnett Utpala, as has alrealy been seen, associates the crystal with the Vedinta view of passive consciousness and denounces crystal ~ reflections as being unreal and useless. Another example of reflectionisn in PS is that of the moon shining in water: As in moving water, the moon's image noves and in still water is still, so it is with the Self, the Great lord, in series of bodies, orgms and worlds. == PS 7, trans. Barnett46 ‘The appearance of the moon's reflection moving in the water is, of course, far different fran water's appearing as moving when turbulent, Utpala compares the Self to water as the reality of the world of waves. Water is used in Abhinava's remarks above as a passive mdium of reflection, like the crystal» Abhinava's favorite reflectionist metaphor is that of the clear mirror which assumes various forms in reflecting diff- erent objects: When reflected in a mirror, the various objects of a town or village are free of distinctions; yet they also appear as distinct from me anotter and from tie mirror as well. In the sane way, this universe which procedes from the absolutely pure consciousness of Bhairava /another nane for Siva/, even though void of distinction, appears as | muiwally distinct objects and also as distinct from that consciousness .l PS 12-13 ‘The confusing proliferation of distinctions which Abhinava includes in his mirror-analogy contrasts sharply with the simple unity of Utpala's "water is water." To understand the analogy one must imagine a mirror in which various objects | are reflected. In his lengthy IPV presentation of reflection~ ism, Abhinava gives a mountain and an elephant as examples of objects reflected. Consequently, one must imagine a very large mirror, wich tales the forms of mountains and elephants with- out its own nature being affected (akhandita-svabhava): ‘The mirrorness /Garpapata/ of the mirror, even when it appears in varius forms is not concealed, because even then there is the thought, "this mirror is clea"... . It is de only to the glory of purity that there is the mixing up with various abhisa-s and still there is one~ ness. PV Il, p. 177-8, trans. Pandey.ua Abhinava thus claims that there is both the oneness (ekat&) of unbroken mirrorness and the diversity (sambheda) of mountain-nanifestations and elephant-manifesta tions in the same thing, the mirror, at the sane time, This aspect of Abhinava's mirror analogy, the relaticnship between the mirror and its re- flections, is similar in form to the crystal metaphor presented earlier, In the juxtaposition of the erystal and the flowr, though, the inherent colorlessness of the crystal (comparable to a qualitiless substratum) is contrasted with its appearance as red, If Abhinava's analogy is based on the ever-present unity of mirrorness, then it doesn't depend on my "glory of purity" (nimalata-mahatmya). In fact, mirrorness is less likely to be concealed if there is the thought, "this is a dirty mirror ," simultaneous with the appearance of the mirror as var- ious forms « ‘The second distinction found in PS 12-13 is between the real (yastu) momtain ani its reflection. The mountain-Abhisa we perceive in the mirror cannot be the mountain itself, since the mountain does not leave its place and enter the mirror. And since both the reflected and the reflection may be seen at once when the mirror is placed near the mountain, we are not perceiving the mountain itself as the object of perception through the rays of the eyes being tumed back from the mirror to the mountain. ‘The relationship between mountain and moun- tain-reflection is the sane as that found in the metaphor of the moon and its reflection in the water. In both cases we48 perceive multiplicity (object and object-reflection) when there is only one real object. ‘The third and final distinction incorporated into Abhinava's mirror-analogy is the appearance of objects as mitually distinct, one from another (anyonysh vibhaktan), e.g.) mountains as different from elephants. According to Abhinava, our perceiv- ing various different objects in one single perception is another example of the relationship between unity and multiplicity. How- ever, Abhinava fails to explain how the mirror analogy serves to demonstrate the unitary aspect of the relationship between moun= tain and elephant. ven though the mountain-reflection and the elephant-reflection are substantially similar, both being reflec tions and reflections in the same mirror, one perceives them as different from each other as reflections ina mirror just as in the everyday-world, A limitationist metaphor (i.e., space eircun= scribed by mountain-spaces and elephant-spaces) would serve i Abhinava's purposes better in demonstrating the actual unity of apparently distinet objects. Abhinava summarizes the meaning of his reflectimist dis- tinctions in Tantrasara. In chapter four of TS he declares the whole world (bhavajAta) to be mere reflection (pratibimbanatra) and defines pratibimba as follows: Pratibimba is defined as that which appears as multiplicity, de~ panda on( literally, mixing with) another, and devoid of power.16 —TS, ps 10‘ i ug The rest of the passage gives as examples of pratibimba, not only the reflection of a face in a mirror, but all sensory exper- jences—including flavor in the taste-buds, smell in the nose, and the feel of love-making in the organ of pleasure. All these, says Abhinava, are not independent (na mukhya)s they are attri- butes (guya-s) which cease to exist in the absence of the sub- stance or thing (gupin) that provides the impetus for the causal FY chiin to which they belong.” Utpala contended that nothing could appear if it were devoid of power (agakta), Abhinava here claims that the entire manifest world is powerless and thus "merely" a reflection. In his remarks above Abhinava does not specifically equate, as does Utpala, powerlessness with unreality. He does, however, distin- guish the reality of supreme power as the substratum of reflec- tions from the powerlessness of the manifest reflections them- selves. ‘That Abhinavats reflectionism leads to a wrld-view very much different from Utpala's may be seen in IPX 1.7.1) md Abhinava's commentary on it. Thus, experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or Smpure, depend on the omnipresent Lord, in whom all the objective manifestations, so very different from one an- other, are reflected.J6 “ --IFK 1.7.1h, trans. Pandey Pandey interprets Utpala's k s connentary. Actually, Utpala's verse makes no mention of reflec~ tion, but it says instead that the experiences of the everyday world are embedded or inlaid (khacita) in the Supreme. The purity50 or impurity of objective experience refers back to the previous kari st (IPK 1.7.11+13) discussion of empirical error nd illu- sion. Utpala's verse would be better translated as follows: veryday-reality, whether pure or impure, is expericnced in the Lord, in whom is embedded all the diverse manifestations of objectivity. Reflectionism only enters with Abhinava's conmentary, which reads: Practical life is experienced as resting on the omnipresent Lord, who is beyond temporal and spacial limitations and who is affected Aiparakta/, without undergoing a charge in his essential nature, by objects, such as blue and pleasure, etc., which are extrencly different from one another, i.e+, whose very life is diversity, because they are the creations of Miya, and which are very mich like shadows /pratibinbakal- and, therefore, have m existence independently of Him. = IPV I, p. 313, trans. Pandey Abhinava's reflectionist theories demonstrate a lack of any real change in the substratum much more clearly than Utpala's water and gold illustrations. The colorless crystal and the relatively stationary moon in the sky can be easily distin- guished as different from their respective appearances as red amd moving in the water. Such a distinction is indeed part of our everyday-experienme. Jn sone ways, e.f+; 48 10, water does always renain water; otherwise we wold be even unable to recognize it as vater in its various changing states. In no obvicus manner, ‘though, can water be construed as distinct from the various forms which it assumes, and Utpala makes no attempt to do so. Utpalats claim that water remains unchanged is not based on any separationsu of water as such from yaves as such; it is based on the all- inclusiveness of the unity of water which is consistently and constantly present even amidst the changes of waves. While Utpala and Abhinava each view the Supreme as being both innanent and transcendent, the former would enphasize the immanence of the Supreme, and the latter its transcendence, Abhinava never implies that the world is "outside" Sivas his reflectinist metaphors stress the reflecticn's dependence on that vhich is reflected. At the same tine, though, Abhinava is suggesting that Siva, as the substratum of reflections, is something mre than, sonething other than the manifest world. After further differences between the two Pratyabhijiavddins are presented, Utpalats notion of the all~inclusiveness of reality--i.e., everything real and equally real~-vill be even nore directly contrasted with Abhinava's distinctions between reality and appearance.CHAPTER IV SUPERIMPOSITION Utpala: Direct Identity Utpela never treats limited consciousness as anything other than supreme consciousness which is seen from a different viewpoint. ‘The Limited perceiver who perceives everything from the viewpoint of multiplicity, i.e., objects as if they were separate from supreme consciousness and from each other, is ob~ viously not perceiving the world as Utpala thinks it really is. He characterizes the limited perceptions of the everyday-vorld as determinate (vikalpa), and thus different from the indeter= minate (avikalpa) nature of supreme consciousness: The universal I-consciousness, though it is the very light of consciousness and is embodied in the transcendental speech, is not determinacy, becaise determinacy is certain- ty, vhich implies tw.t -- IPK 1.6.1, trams. Pandey In saying that everyday-perceptions are "certain" or "definite" (nigcaya), Utpala is not referring to the credibility of those perceptias. If that were the case, then the Supreme would be uncertain or indefinite in the sense of open to doubt. The certainty to which Utpala alludes is the clarity or precise- ness” found when one thing is distinguished from another. ALL determinate perceptions, says Utpdla, are based on differmtia~ tion (apohana), as when one distinguishes that which is a jar from that whieh is not a jar, or a cloth, No such distinctions are possible with respect to supreme consciousness, though, 5253 since prakaga is indeterminate amd incapable of being contrasted with sonething not of its own nature (apraldiéa). There is the possibility of appearance (at the sane place) of both jar and not-jar, which are essentially different. from each other, But there is nothing which has similarity with the Light of consciousness and which, though diff erent from it, yet shines. ~ IPK 1.6.2, trans. Pandey ‘The appearance of a variety of Limited objects is ex- plained by UtpaJa as due to the Suprene's powers of knowledge Z, z 3 (jhaneSekti) and differentiation (apohanagakti).” The power of knowledge functions in making objects manifest externally in the fom of perceptions which, in their real nature, exist with- in the Self. From the Self, Limited objects of perception are projected outward in a concrete form. The power of differen- tiation is the power of the Self by which one object is manifested as aiff ent from any other object, e.g.) a jar from a mon-jar- This process of differentiatim through negation is a necessary prerequisite to all vikalpa perceptions: ‘The certainty about "this" that the subject, in whom both "this" and "not-this" shine, feels, because he rejects @pohantt7 not-this, is spoken of as the determinate cogni- Sion "this is a jar". . . Determinacy owes its being to, the auireness of another thing which is of opposite nature. TPK 1.6.3+5, trans, Pandey As already noted, Utpala denies that differentiation and determinacy apply to the Supreme Self. Just as the unity of water is unaffected by its appearance as waves, he contends that the Suprene ever renains avikalpa despite the determinacy of the everyday-world. and just as waves are nothing but water, Utpala also argues that all worldly perceptions are but manifestationsBy of the will of suprene consciousness and are essentially identi- cal with supreme consciousness: And thus conscionsness of the object, i.e., the conscicus~ ness which shines affected by a succession of variety of objects, is nothing but the great Lord, the Subject, who is essentially the eternal ad unchanging light of conscious~ ness. — IPK 1.7.1, trans. Pandey Like Utpala, Safikara also declares the world to be vikalpa. Safkara, though, uses the word as an expression of the illusory nature of the world, In Advaita Vedinta differentiation is regarded as resulting from superimposition (adhyasa, adhyzropa), which is "the unreal assumption about the attributes of one thing as being the attributes of some other thing," "the 3 notion of "that! in something 'not-that.'"? In the familiar example of the rope and the snake, the attributes of the snake are Superimposed upon the rope, the result being that the rope is thought to be capable of moving, biting, ete. According to Saikara, there is a similar reciprocal superimposition of the qualities of the manifest wrld or non-self (diversity, change, etc.) onto the Supreme Self, and also of the qualities of the Suprene Self (unity, eternality, ete.) onto the non-self. The rope, the one real thing, is imagined /Kalpita7 to be such unreal things as a snake, a streak of water, etc. . . Similarly, the Self is imagined to be such multi- farious unreal things as breath, etc., which do not exist. = MKB 2.33, trans, Ganbhirananda Utpala repeatedly attacks the Vedinta position that diversification is an illusion and that the diverse objects of 6 the world are unreal.” iva is found in the form of multiplicity55 through his willpower, he says, and even that multiplicity is of the nature of Siva Paramagiva is of the nature of diversity and is not separate from the diverse things of the world, Because it is his nature to establish himself as the diverse things of the world, this world, even in all its diversity, is real.| = SD 1.49 comm. In chapter three of SD the theory that the wrld is a real form (kigpta) of Siva is contrasted with the Vedanta theory that the world is imaginary (kalpand): Something is imaginary, in the realm of fancy, when it is thought to be of a certain form and actually isn't of any such form. Since Siva hinself /saksat/ is actually gil of thic world and, in reality, all of this world is Siva, then there can be nothing imaginary about this weld. = SD 3.83 comm. In support of his renarks above Utpala retums to his gold~ metaphor. Declaring the world to be illusory, he argues, is the same es saying that gold is real only when melted in a crucible 10 and is imaginary when in the forn of various ornanents. If this were indeed Saikara's position--gold being real and golé rings unreal--then it would deserve the abrupt refuta= tion accorded it by Utpala. However, Sahkara uses the gold- metaphor in a very different manner: A rucaka (a kind of golden utensil) and a svastika (another kind of golden utensil) are not the self of each other (are not identical); they are identical only as gold... . It is only after the nature of the diverse effects such as nam, etc., qua effects is destroyed, that it is possible to accept them as being of the nature of Brahman. - BSB h.l.1h, trans. Apte Sakkara's theory of superimposition is clearly opposed to Utpalats position, Utpala seems to believe that various gold56 ornaments are identical as such; at least he never denies the reality of their respectively distinct forms. The mamifesta- tions of the everyday-world are identical with supreme conscious- ness, be clains, even in their distinctive forms as mutually iso- lated subjects and objects a7 gatnougn Utpala asserts that deter- ninacy is not applicable to suprene consciousness, the objects of determinate perception are themselves regarded as identical with the Supreme. If everything in the world shines (prakagate) ‘through the light of consciousness, argues Utpala, then the nature of the everyday-world cannot be contrary to the nature the Suprene--there is no perceiving "that" in something "not-that." Although never made explicit, there is an implicit super~ impositia of sorts found in Utpala's theories. It is based on the false attribution of the determinate nature of the everyday world to the indeterminate Sujrene--as in thinking that water becomes divided when waves appear. The waves in Utpalats mcta~ phor are identical with water, even though differentiated md changing. But if one were to fail to perceive the continuity and unity of water md were to attribute the changing nature of waves to unchanging water, then this would constitute an erron- eous attribution. This is the viewoint of multiplicity (onedapratl ti) witch Utpala equates with bondage and which is somerhat analogous to the superimposition of non-Self on Self. Utpala thus both defends the unitary Suprene against charges that it is affected by the diversity of the everyday-l ST world and, at the same time, defends the everyday-world against theories which declare it to be illusory. In other words, he refutes the ultimay of differentiations made within the frane~ work of limited perceptions, but he supports the ultimate real- ity of those differentiated perceptions, which are identical with the Supreme. It is unclear whether Utpala contends that we perceive the world from the viewpoint of multiplicity because we are tound, or whether bondage is the result of such a views point. Whichever may be the case, the remedy propounded by him 4s direct and simple: release is merely the viewpoint of non~ differentiation (sbhedapratiti). Abhinava: Imagired Multiplicity While Utpala vigorously attacks Vedanta theories that the diversity of the world is imaginary or unreal, Abhinava des eribes the determinate world in those very terns. "The Self . renains non-dual," says Abhinava, "even when imegined (parikelpita) to be endowed with power." In commenting on IPK 1.3.75 Abbinava explains that the power of differentiation, apohanaSakti, is that which eaises one thing to be mamifest as separate fron mother, such as one consciousness from another or one object of knowledge from another. This is in accord with Utpala's theor- ies, tut Abhinava's further remarks concerning the power of differentiation are not. Division is not really possible, and thus it is called "mere appearance" /avabhasanatran/.t4° = IPV I, p. 110.58 Since there is no real possibility of division, the appear~ ance of diversity (or the msking of unity) is declared by Abhinava to be illusory: And the case of obscuration of that pure consciousness is that poer which is called maya. It is the freedom to bring about the obscuration of unity, which is of the nature of illwsion /ohranti7, - IPV I, p. 29, trans. Pandey If the diversity of the world is an illusim, then the multiple subjects and objects of the everyday-world camot be identical with the Suprene in my direct sense. Utpala alloved no alternatives in evaluating the perceptions of the manifest world, arguing that whatever appears must be of the nature of ak3éa, since there is nothing similar to praka@éa ani yet different from it. Abhinava, at obvious variance with Utpala, contends that the limited manifestations of the maya-world are neither identical with nor different from the lig:t of suprene consciousness: The object of cognition is not outside the light of sub- ject, otherwise it would not be manifest. But this object also is to be admitted as separate from the Light. For otherwise, how can it be called the object? . . . If they fedjects7 be non-different fron the true light, how can fhe mutual differences among them be possible? - IPV I, p. 148, trans. Pandey Utpla explains differentiation within the light of con= sciousness by means of the Suprene!s power of differentiation which sets the stage for determinate perceptions. Abhinava adds anew step in the formulation of determinate perceptions. With- in the Limited sphere of the maya-world, Abhinava argues, there59 is the possibility of perceiving many different objects at any given time or place. One perceives, for exanple, sense~in- pressians of a jar on the floor. By the superimposition (sandropa) and subsequent negation (nigedsha) of the possibility of non-Jjar, there results the determinate cognition, "this isa jars Therefore, there being the possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth (at the place where jar is present) there is room for superimposition. When there is superimposition of a thing of a different nature (on jar) then alone there is room for the power of differentiation to function in refut~ ing what is superimposed. ‘Therefore the ascertainnent "this | is a jar" has the distinctive feature of determinacy, which depends upon the operation of differentiation. ~ IPV I, p. 239, trans, Pandey. Abhinava!s use of superinposition is unprecedented in the writ ings of Utpala, where neither sandropa nor any of its Sanskrit equivalents is found, Although the superimposition of jar and nen=jer differs from the Vedanta example of rope and snake, it also is m illusory superimposition. For if division is not 1 really possible and if determinateness is illusory, then super- imposition is the error wich results in illusion. As will be seen immediately below, Abhinava also discusses superimposi- tion in a more specifically Advaita Vedanta mamer. Utpala contended that bondage lay in adopting the view~ point of multiplicity and failing to realize the unity of Siva- consciousness. In alluding to the illusory nature of multi- plicity, Abhinava also is confirming the unitary reality of the Suprene, In Abhinava's scheme, however, the erronecusness of thenfyZ-yorld does not consist only of the viewpoint of mlti- plicity; there is also a false unification of Self and non- self, vhereby the limited self thinks itself identical with that which is non-sel! And the obscuration of the real nature of consciousness con~ sists in wrongly considering body, etc., which are still of the nature of object and, therefore, different from the sub- ject, to be the subject without any reason for it. ~ IPV I, p. 2h9, trans. Pandey, p. 90 The power of may& reveals itself when the not-self, such as the intellect and body, are identified with the Self. . . How are these things not~sel £? All of these are in reality essentially consciousness aloe, ‘but they are manifested as non-consciousness through maya . . the identification is made, they are assuned to be identi- cal with the principle of consciousness, even while they are inert and limited by the five kaficukas /the sheaths of maya/. . . Thus the experiencer /pranatr/ hinself becomes as the meya, the limited object of percestion. = IPV IT, pp. 201-207, trans. Pandey Abhinava is expounding superimposition in the explicitly Advaita Vedanta manner as the notion of something "that" in not-that." Furthermore, Abhinava supports both aspects of Saflkara's reciprocal superimposition and distinguishes two differ- ent types of errors. The first type is the superimposition of non-self on Self—tdcing that which is really consciousness and 1 cognizing it as different fromthe Self, as limited and inert. The second superimposition is of Self on no: solf—~fal.sely identifying those limited objects as identical with the Self. Utpala at least tacitly concurs with the notion of superinposi- tion of non-self on Self, since his theories center upon our b perceiving diversity where tiere is really mly unity of Self.61 But the superimposition of Self on non-self ecnstitutes 2 defile- nent of a different sort, i.e., false identification rather than a false distinction, which is not acknowledged by Utpale. The jiva's perception of Self as identical with the bodily adjuncts and limited objects of the everyday-world denands a remedy akin to distinguishing Self from non-self, realizing the differences between Self as Atman and limited objects as anatman, From the viewpoint of world manifestation, this is a secondary manifestation; from the perspective of the sidhaka or aspirant, this is the first error that must be overcome. Abhinava makes this point eminently clear in Paranirthasarat It is blindness when there arises the error that modes of being, waich are non-different from the Self as Shining Consciousness, are thought to be non-self. = PS 30, trans. Bamett This deseribes the first kind of superimposition, non-self on 16 Self. Similar statements are often made by Utpala. But Abhinava further says+ It is darkness from darlmess, a great pustule upon a boil, when that which is not the Self, such as body and breath, is imagined to be the Self.1/ ~ PS 3, trans, Barnett This is the second type of superimposition, Self on non-self, where the limited subject identifies with the limited object of perception. Abhinava doesn't hesitate to refer to these limited manifesta tions as aatman, as sufficiently different fron the Self so that any identification with them in their limited forms would te erroneous. Utpala ignores this secondary superimposi-62 tion even in his treatment of everyday-perception, and he always supports the identity of limited manifestations aud the Supreme. Abhinava agrees that the ultimate identity of both limited sub- ject nd limited object is supreme consciousness, but he pre~ sents the first step of realising the Self in very Vedinta-like tems as one of distinction, not unification: Having first overthrown the semblance /avabhana/ of Self hood in what is not-self, the Suprene Siva shatters the delusion /Dhranti/ that sees not-self in Self. - FS 39, trans. Barnett Thus, while there is no explicit exposition of superim- position im the writings of Utpala, a distinctly Advaita Vedanta presentation of the topic is found in Abhinavats works. Utpala contends that the diverse manifestations of the world are directly identical with the light of supreme conscicus- ness. Abhinava argues that they cannot be completely or directly identical ith the Supreme because of their determinatenes:. Finally, Utpala implicitly acknowledges only the superimposition of non-self on Self, viz., the false differentiation of Self and non-self, Abhinava discusses two types of superimpositions-- which respectively entail not only the false differentiation of Self md non-self, but also the false identification of Self with non-self.CHAPTER V LEVELS OF REALITY AND SUBLATION Utpala's Refutation of Sublation We have already seen that Utpala extends the reality of ‘the Suprene even to the limited manifestations of miltiplicity. Bverything, from ParamaSiva to a pot, is equally possessed of full consciousness (piirpa cit), All distinctions and gradations of reality, says Utpala, are caused by Sraddhi--a word which nay be translated "faith" or "belief" or, as does Coli, mhunan opinion.” nat are the distinctions to which Utpala is roferring? In a general sense they are all the various ways in which the label "reality" is affixed to some perceptions and denied to others--the distinctions between real-world and dream- world, real water and mirage, ete, Utpala also specifically refers to the distinctions between reality and appearance found in Sahkara!s theories. According to Suhkara, reality is divided into three levels: param’rtha--highest reality, vyavaliara--everyday-real- ity, and pratibhasa-~illusion. The highest reality is the abso~ lute unity of Brahmm alone. Conditional reality or appearance consists of everyday-reality, which is ordinary perceptions of objects such as pots, and illusion, which is hallucination and erroneous sense=perception and the like. These three categries of experience are all existent, sat, in contrast with those 636h things which are unreal, asat, and which can never be objects of experience, e.g., hare-horns and sons of barren women. Within the realm of the existent, illusion is sublatable by everyday-reality, md everyday-reality, in turn, is sublat- able by Breiman, Sublation (badha) is the counter-process of superimposition. For example, the superimposed snake is said to be sublated when it is revealed to be nothing other then a rope. The process of sublation involves: + contradiction: the incompatibility of two cogni- tions, "this is a snake" and "this is a rope der al: rejection of the cognition, "this is a snake .” «revaluation: replacement of the old cognition "this is a shake" with the new me, "this is not a snake wat is a rope. In the same way that the snake is sublated by the rope, the whole real-unreal course of everyday-life (sarva-satyanrtavyava- bara), says Safkara, is siblated by the knowledge of Brahman.” Of course, Utpala has little tolerance for any ordering of reality into levels, He deals with the Advaita Vedanta dis- tinction between reality and appearance in clapter four of Sivacrst: to md directed against a variety of schools, their main thrust Although the arguments of the chapter are applicable is toward a refutation of the Vedanta theory of sublation. In attacking the notin of badha, it is not the revaluative aspect65 of sublation to which Utpala objects; he himself contends that our perceptions of the everyday-world are constantly changing and urges us to revaluate our perceptions by replacing the view- point of diversity with the viewpoint of non-diversity. It is ‘the contradiction and denial aspects of sublation which clash with Utpala's theory of the all-inclusiveness of reality, since Utpala wishes to avoid any rejection of the everyday world as unreal. Earlier Kashmir Saiva works, both Agana and Spanda, make no direct mention of the paravartha-vyavahara-pratibisa divi- sions of reality. Utpala accepts these divisions for the sake of argunent only to declare then meaningless in distinguishing reality from non-reality or greater reality from lesser reality. Bverything is endowed with power, begins Utpala in his conmen- tary on chapter four of SD, and everything is of the fom of conscicusness (cidripata), real (vastu) and a forn of Siva (Sivaripatva). Even inert objects, such as rocks or trees, are manifestations of consciousness (cidvyakti) aid shine as the indivisible light of consciousness (prakasabheda); thus they are not orly real, sat, but of the highest reality (parandrtha- sat), as well, At this point in the text an objector intervenes and asks: If everything is equally and undeniably real, how may one dis~ tinguish between proper (samyak) and false (mithya) knowledge? Would not the perception of a pot and the perception of a rope~— snake be indistinguishably real if everything were of the nature of Sivaz Utpala replies that the distinctions made between illu- sion and reality are not themselves based on reality but on the functioning of the everyday -world, whose uncertain and unstable nature precludes its acting as a criterion of reality. As proof of the uncertain nature of the everyday-world, three exanples are provided. Utpala cites the case of a king who passes off false coins in his border territories. The coins are false, i.e., not made of gold, yet becaise of the king's sanction they serve in everyday-affairs as real money and are regarded as such? ‘The conditional nature of the everyday-wrld is also demnstraed by the effects of poison, which will kill one person but cause no harm to anotter who is protected by the hymn of Garaga, the mythical bird who is the destroyer of enakes.° the everyday “world consists of mere pleasure (Shladandtraka); if one is thirsty, one's thirst may be quenched by dreau-water as well ag real water, the effects of both being a satisfaction which is proven by one's own consciousness.’ Bach of the above examples is very different in nature, but they all are used by Utpala to demonstrate the arbitrariness of distinc ons between everyday-reality and illusion, They also lead to an even more serious objection than that previously presented. For if this world is of the highest reality and, at the same tim, of suchoT uncertain mture, reality itself is reduced to being just as uncertain as the everyday-trld.” In otter words, if everything is of equal reality, then illusion may be of the highest real- ity, but the highest reality can be no more real than rope-snakes. Utpala answers this objection at great length. All mani- festations of consciousness, incluling shell-silver and hare- horns, represent the undeniable reality of Siva, The everyday~ world is real, he says, because it is a manifestation of con= sciousness, not because of its conventional designation as nreal” of because it is capable of sublating illusion.” Utpala's arguments aginst sublation are summarized in the. eppendix; they revolve around the undeniable reality of all experience ami his contention that "an object which is experienced does not become otheridse 1° Bveryday-real and illusory objects d not contradict either the hignest reality or each other; there is simply the perception of objects in different forms at different tines. With regard to the illusory shell-siJversthere is the percep= tion of a precious metal, silver, which is followed by percep= tion of a piece of shell. There has been a change in determinate perceptions (vikalpa-s), one perception replacing another, but there is no contradiction between the two perceptims. Nor is any denial of the earlier perception of silver possible at the time of the later perception of shell, For example, ons per- ceives a pot at me monent and a piece of cloth at a later68 moment, yet we don't say that the cloth serves to deny the pot. Milk changes into curds, but there is no contradiction in the process and milk is not sublated by curds. Different mnifes- tations occur at different tines, ad there is no possibi lity of a later manifestation denying or contradicting an earlier un one. Utpala thus arrives at the audacious conclusion that “everything is real, nothing is false," that the reality of the everyday-world is no less than the reality of Siva md no more than the reality of shell-silver. It would seen that Utpala's defense of the unsublatable reality of all world-ex- perience actually ignores the experience of sublation. Iden- tifying world-nanifestations with the indivisible light of con- sciousness in itself serves to supersede, if not sublate, the uncertainty and conflict of the everyday-world. But Utpala reasons, quite correctly, that if a distinction is allowed be- tween the reality of the everyday-world and the reality of an illusion, there are even stronger grounds for distinguishing the highest reality of Siva from the appearence of the limited world as awhole. His position with respect to sublation and levels of reality is necessarily extreme, for allowing reality to be aything but undivided and all-pervasive is a most extrene error from the viewpoint of the equal reality of everything.69 Abhinavats Distinction Between Levels of Reality Utpala draws no distinction at all between the reality of objects as such and the reality of their underlying substratum. This distinction between levels of reality is the basis of t! Advaita Vedinta premise that all experience is real until show to be otherwise. The lesson of the rope sublating the snake is not that the miya-world is fictitious or non-existant. Although Gehikara does sometimes declare world-nanifestations to be un- real, he often and more precisely refers to everyday-reality ad illusion as canditionally real--that is, real only until the conditions necessary for sublation are obtained: Prior to the attainment of knowledge of Brahman, all worldly experiences are real /connentator: because they are not, sublated/, just as drean experiences prior to awakening. = BSB 2.1.14 Abhinava formulates the same distinction between the experience of the object as such as the sublating experience of « reality. The mltiplicity of the object-world, he says, is mt of the highest reaitys! the conditional existence of an ob= ject directly correlates with its being experienced as non-sub- lated: As long as a thing is experienced as non-subleted, to that extent, it exists.15 - IPI, p. li. There is even no need for a commentators interjection of "be~ cause they are not sublated" (badhabh’vat), as in the BSB cita- tion ov, to qualify the reality of everyday-objects.70 In another IPV passage Abhinava seens to apply the term patandrtha to world manifestations in a manner quite compatible with the views of Utpalas at least the interpretation rendered by Pandey gives that impression: In this wrld whatever enters into consciausness is a mere manifestation of the Self, the Ultimate Reality to be defined later. Amongst the nanifest, the causal relation, such as exists between the means and the end and so ony is also real, becaase all this is a fact of consciousness, and the reslity of what enters into consciousness cannot be denied. 1 - IPV I, p. 9, trans. Pandey Pandey has "transcreated," rather than translated this passage to a point, if not beyond recognition, well beyond the bounds of good judgment, The above does serve as a fair sunmary of Utpala's position. But it falls far short of being either an accurate representation of Abhinava's views in general or of this‘ IPV passage in particular, To begin, the translation conflicts with other of Abhinavals statements to the effect that the objects of the everyday-wrld are not of the highest reality and are mt, as such, identical with the Suprene. Pandey's translation implies that the causally related objects of the mavifest world are thanselves of the highest reality. This sharply opposes the im- plications of "as long as a thing is exyerienced as sublated. . . ~mnanely, that the objects are merely conditionally real and sub- ject to later sublation. Rather than assume that the relation- ships of the world are regarded as mere manifestation, prathamatra, in the first line, and then as the highest reality, paranartha,7 in the second line, a far less strained interpretation might make use of the natural opposition of the two terns. In the very next lines of IPV Abhinava refers to the in- nunerable divisions of the manifest world--sentient and insen- dent, creator ani created, knower and known-~as the forms of ordinary life (LokavyavehSrariipa) which are to be established es of the nature of maya.1” abhinava obviously regards sonething's being of the natwe of mya as very different from being of the highest reality. M. R. Shastri, the editor of the text, com- rents on this section of IPY by saying, "Otherwise, if every- thing were of the highest reality of prokaSa, there could be no division of 'this cause! and 'this effect. I would then re-translate the second line of the original IBV passage to enphasize Abhinava's belief that the mere "show- cbjects" are not real as such, but are based on the reality of rak@éa, which serves as the substratum of all manifestations: « + « But even those objects of the manifest world which partake of causal relation, such as ends and neans, have as their basis the undeniable light of consciousness, and, in that sense, as prakéSa, they are of the highest reality. ‘The reason for exanining this passage in detail is to show that a close reading of Abhinava reveals his separation of wyavahara and parandirtha into two distinct levels of reality: nya-manifestations and the real background of prakiga. Although this does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature of the relationship between the two levels, it focuses upon then12 as dependancy-related in the manner of Vedanta superinsosition ad sublation, and not identi ty-related as in the theories of Utpala. The Suprene in Abhinava's scheme does not become the menifest world in any real sense, but is instead the substratum of world-nenifestations. "The imnanence of the Lord," says Avhinava, "is through his sustaining vorld-reflections."” Also it must be remembered that Abhinava rot only asserts that the manifestations of the world are mere reflections, but he further specifies that those reflections are not identical with the Self, md he often calls them i2lusor: For all that /the manifest world/ being essentially a manifestation of may&, the principle of obscuration, and, therefore, unilluninative like darkness, cenmt be a meas to knowledge of the pure light, which is beyond maya, and therefore is the opposite of mamifestation. - IPV II, p. 7, trans. Pandey Although there is no snake in the rope, it caises a terror ending in death. Truly the great power of illusion cannot be easily pierced. Similarly, dharma, adharma, heaven,hell, birth, death, pleasure, sorrow, caste and stages of life--even though non existant in the Self, appear because of the power of illu- sion.20 = PS 28-29 The above lines from ParandrthasSra are remarkably simi— Jar, both in metaphor and intent, to passages in the writings of ze 2h Schkara.’" This is the only instance I have been able to find where Abhinave uses the rope-snake analogy. Although the analogy fits admirably into many of his renarks, it was perhaps too ob- viously linked with Vedanta thought for use by a Saivite, which makes even its single appearance here all the more extraordinary.2B ‘As shown in Appendix ¢ , much of Abhinavals Parandrtha~ sira ig but a rewording or even literal borrowing from Adi Sega's earlier text of the sane nane. Abhinava doesn't even change "Brahman" to "Siva" in the following verses, which stand as a clear expression of the distinction tetween the absolute reality of the Supreme and the illusoriness of world appearances: This is Brehman, the supreme, pure, still, undifferentiated, equal, complete, deathless, real, that is merged in the Power of Essential Light. On the other hand, the object of desire or knowledge or action, which is not experienced as Essential Light, is only a sky-flower. = PS l3-khy trans. Barnett Abhinavats Theory of Error Abhinavals distinctions between levels of reality ad his use of sublaticn are found in the exposition of his theory of error. This discussion of error takes place as a commentary on Utpala's Kerik 2.3.13, The shell-silver example is already faniliar, md the perception of two moons refers to sensory error caused by double-vision: Bven when there is consciousness of silver at the sight of mother-of-pearl, there is no silver in the mother-of-pearl, because there is no agreement (between the iwo cognitions) in respect of their spatial limitation. In the case of wtwo moons! also, it is a particular point, in the heavenly vault that shines differently /anyathe/.?? “IPK 2.3.13, trans. Pandey ‘The word anyathd means "elsewhere," as well as "differently." Considering the karild's reference to spatial limitation (upZdhideSa), error becomes a matter of the false juxtaposition of the elements of a cognition which may be independently realTh e.ge, "silveriness" md "shell." It seers that Utpala is sup- porting the NaiyZyika theory of error (anyathakhyati), which contends that errors are of misplaccnent and mistining.”? In Sivadygti Utpala supported no particular thecry of error md, in fat, attacked the very noticn of erroneous per- ception. He contended there that judgments of the sort, "this is shell in space," made at timey, cannot serve to deny the validity of the earlier judgment, "this is silver in space," nade at time. Inconsistent as this Krk seens to be ith SD, Abhinava's commentary a it goes even further, in that Abhinsva ultimately denies even the independant reality of the elements of erroneous cognition. Abhinava refers to his theory of error (bhrantitattva) as error of incompleteness or imperfection (aplirnckhyati). He lists as alternative theories conceming the nature of error, without mentioning who held them or how they differ fran his om: the asatkhyati of the Buddhists, viparitaknyati of Bhatta Mimafisé, and anirvacaniyakhyati of Advaita Vedinta.” Although obviously aware that anyathakhy&ti. represents the Ny8ya theory of error, Abhinava doesn't acknowledge the use of anyath3 in the KGrikd. He perhs didn't want to admit that Utpala was presenting the Logicians' view of error, or he may have intended to emphasize the difference tetween it md his ow theory of apirnakhyati.B The mechanics of apfirpakhyaté, refer back to an earlier IFV discussion of subject and object.” The empirical world is there described as an objective wave of abhlsa-s which is Joined to individual subject waves in a degree and manner corres~ ponding to the taste, purpose and intellectual capacity of the subject. Accordingly, because of greed or near-sightedness or whatever, scneone walking down the beach cognizes silver where there is only shell. That space Bessy which is the limiting condition /ipadhi7 of here is silver" is (later found to be) the snell-spae which shines withthe lustre of silver. - IFV IT, p. lik, trans. Pandey At the time of perception there is no error about the various separate Bhbisa-s, such as "this" or “silven" or even the con nection between them, since they are directly experienced as vimarga. Erroneousness arises only with the later vimarga, "this is not silver—hard, heavy, ete.," which sublates (bzthate) « the earlier one, From Abhinava's brief exposition on error, it seems that the limited perceiver could never avoid error of an apirnakhyati sort. Perfect (pirpa) knowledge, not possibly subject to later contradiction or amendment, would demand omniscience on the part of the perceiver--nanely, his perceiving all the properties of any object at the same time, In the text a like-minded ob- Jector intervenes: Objector: But knowledge of the shell is also incomplete. Then is all the world an illusion?76 Abhinava: Horray! Your eyes are finally opening. All of the mayZ-wrld is an illusion, and this lover jllusion is like a dream in a dream, a pustule on a oil. 2 ~ IPV IT, p- 116 ‘The incontestable finality of the above needs little com- rent. bhinava's response is indisputably that of an Advaita Vedantin. Whereas Utpala declared vyavahara and pratibhasa to be indistinguishably real, Abhinava here says that they are dis~ tinct and sublatable levels of illusory appearance.Part, IIT VEDINTA AND PRATYABHTUNA Chapter VI Having examined the basic differences in the theories of Utpala and Abhinava, we will now proceed to a brief critique of sone general evaluations of Pratyebhi ji made by others. As already noted, the issues of Part IT of this dissertation have not teen taken into consideration in previous assessnents of Pratyebhi jfi's position relative to other schools of philosophy. The theories of Pratyabhijiié as a whole have teen var- dously called a form of "realistic idealism"? "monistic ideal ~ isnt idealistic monisn"? and "concrete monism.i while Pratyabhijiia is surely monistie and, by any reasmable defini- ti of the word, also idealistic, the supposed realistic nature of Pratyebhijili's tieories warrants closer consideration. Without entering into a discussion of the Western philosophical systems associated with the tern, it will be readily agreed that Pratyabhijfa is "idealistic," since it defines reality as spirit~ ual and the world as a form of consciousness. There being no separate material cause to the world according to Utpala and Abhinava, their philosophies are also "monistic"=-that is, believ- ing in one suprene principle alone and without a second (advaita). caea 78 However, the "realism" of Pratyabhijiig, if it may be called so at all, is quite different from the realism of dialist Saikhya, which is based on the modification of material energy or pralyti, and also from the atomistic theory of realism held by pluralist Nyaya-Vaisegika. 4 Pamiey contrasts what he considers to be Pratyabhijfia's synthesie of realism and idealism, i.e, "realistic ideglism," to the "pure idealistic monism of Advaita Vedanta which declares the world to be mere iMlusion."” Using different terns to the sane effect, Kaw distinguishes Pratyabhijiia's "concrete mon- ism" from the absolute idealisn™ of Safikara: Sehkaracarya's view with regard to the existence of object is quite contrary to that of the Pratyabhijha system. Ae~ cording to his system the only reality is subject and the existence of the object is fictitious. This view supposes the subject and object to be opposed to each other as are darkness and light. . . . The approach of Pratyabhi jf philosophers to the problem of object (non-ego) is realis- tic. In their vjew the world with all animate and inaninate « objects is real. Kay's renarks may be shown to misconstrue the positions of both Vedinta and Pratyabhijfia, His contention of a basic Giff orence between the fictitious object-vorld of Safkara and the realiom of Pratyabhijhd completely ignores the illusionistic stream of Abhinava's thinking. Kaw also seriusly oversimplifies the illusionism of Sahkara and the realism of Utpala. Schkara: Subject -Object Sahkara's position with respect to the reality of objects9 is itself a synthesis of realistic ani idealistic view. Kats assessment of Sahkara is possibly justified if one limits one- self to the passages in the Mindikyakirikabhasya vhich exphati- cally assert the falsity of objective experience. "Objectivity (apgyatva) ," Safikara there contends, "is indistinguishably false in both the dream ad waking states." This is dianetrically opposed to passages in the Brahnastt~ rabhagya there Schkara states that external objects camot be non-existent becaise they are perceived (upalabdha), and that which is perceived cannot be non-existent. He refutes a sub- jectivist (vijftnavadin) argument that objects, although perceived as if external (bahirvat), are still unreal: Why say ‘as if! external? No one says that Vishpunitra appears ‘25 if" the son of a barren worn. = BSB 2.2.28, trans. Apte Sahkera continues in this most thoroughly realist vein, arguing that objects of the waking state cannot be the same as drean- objects becaise they are dissimilar, differcnt in tle ir essen- The actual distinction between remenbrance or memory {snpti7 in a dream and pcre@tio or experience /upalabdhi7 In a waking condition which is of the nature of separation from or contact with a thing is directly experionced by a person himself, when he says, for instance, "I remember my dear son but am not able to see him. But I do wish tose hin." ~ BSB 2.2.29, trans. Apte ‘The above analogy and others of a similar realist type (swh as real water quenching thirst versus a mirage) are put to harsh attack in MKB. ‘The negative dialectic of Safkara's80 ajétivida (literally, the theory that "nothing is born") opposes subject-object differentiation even within an idealistic frane- work. The argunents used by the subjective idealists (vijiignavédin-s) to deny the reality of external ebjects (MKB 4.25+27) meet with Safkara's approval, but the subjective ideal- ists' own position is in tw refuted: We also approve the view of the subjective idealists that consciousness appears as a jar even though there is no such jer ebc., therefore it also stands to reason that conscicus- hess appears to be born even though there is no such thing as birth. . . therefore those idealists who sce the birth of conscicisness as momentariness, sorrow, non-self, etce, (are claiming to) see by means of that very cit, that which is of the nature of cit and cannot be seen. They see the tracks of birds in the sky itself and are thus even more axdacioas than the other dualists — MKB 1.28, trans. Ganbhirananda Although these remarks ostensibly concur with Kaw!s description of the object as "fictitious" in Vedinta, they represent an attack upon the ultimate reality of perseiving subject as well as perceiving object. From the highest standpoint, mental states” or ideas have to be as unreal as any other constituent of the world, Neither the extemal object (bahirdrsya) or object of consciousness (ciddrgya)-~in fact, no object (dysya) or "seeing at all in any ordinary sense-~is ultimately real. The differences between idealists and realists, however, are based precisely on that which we see in the everyday-world, As has already been shown, Safikara does recognize and deal with the Limitation and differentiation of the miyd-world, allowing that it is conditionally real until sublated by the knowledge81 of Brahman, His idealism should not be considered "subjective", Like that of the Buddhist Vijfignavadin in the East or Bishop Berkeley in the West, since it is the Limitation of subject-cbject dual~ ity which is to be denied and transcended by the highest reality. Kau's misleading interpretation of Safkara is similar to a statement by Radhakrishnan, who says, “Safkara declares thet subject ad object are opposed Like Light and darkness."® Radhakrishnan, though, also states: Safikara approehes the problen /of everyday experience? from the subjective and objective sides which do not Ulti- mately diverge. . . . In ordinary usage we regard mental. states as subjective and physical states as objective, But from the metephysical point of view both onjers of phenomena, mental md material, are equally objective.? Utpala and Abhinava: Subject-Object The "realistic approach to cbject" which Kaw ascribes to Pratyabhi ji is not even found in the theories of Utpala, who also contends that the subjective and objective sides of exper= dence do not diverge. Utpala denies any subject-object differ- ence, and not clearly or merely in the sense of ultimate iden- tity, contending that both orders of phenomena are equally sub~ jective. Without drawing any distinction between everyday- reality and highest reality, he tries to show a necessary iden tity of jiva-self and object, i.e., perceiver and pot, and of both, in turn, with supreme consciousness. If the pot wre really material or really external, he argues, then it could not be experienced in consciousness—that is, not be experienced at a1,?°82 Much like Sahkara in MKB, Utpala denies the reality, or rather the netaphysicel significance, of the distinction between dream end waking states. Also similar to ajativaia is the manner in which Utpala examines everyday-distinctions (the distine= tions which are at the core of any traditional realist position) from the viewpoint of non-differentiation. Shells, shell-silver and hare-horns are all said to be equally representative of wwavahtra, which, be: nty and incouclusive= ness, provides no grounds for determining reality or even estab- lishing metaphysical prioritics. In explaining the reduction of a manifestation of con= scicusness (cid&bhasa) to the state of inertness (jadya), Utpale defines that inertness in terms of the object's dependence on the perceiver or exporient (pranatr). dJadabhitandn pratigthd Jivadésray. ‘The being of the Insentient depends entirely on the Sentient, = IPK 1.1.4, transl. Pandey A problem arises in trying to establish whether jivet means: 1, jiva, the limited perceiver of the mas world, or 2. Para- magiva or suprene consciousness, as Pondey's capitdlized "Sen= tient" seems to imply. The tw alternatives may be illustrated as follows: 1 SUPREME 2 SUR BIE Jiva — Object Jiva == Object The first schene illustrates subjective idealism, which does not even represent Safkara's position, much less Utpdla's83 or Abhinava's, Despite a certain amount of ambiguity in the writings of Utpala, he and Abhinava end Sahkara all subscribe 4o the second schene, In Abhi rats case, this is clearly seen in his IPY discussion of subject and object. Abhinava describes the cosmic thought process as a journey. ‘The experience of the Supreme (paramarSa) is the resting point of the joumey, the culminating point which alone is of the highest reality. Limited subjects and objects and perceptions ("I" md "blue" amd "I see blue") are only middle points in the joumey, which both begins and ends in the "Per- fect I” (parahanta) of Paranedvara. Unlike Utpala, Abhinava clearly distingui s the transcendent "I" of the Suprene from the Limited "I" of the everyday-world. Both of them, though, oppose any ultimate distinction between subject and object. In neither Pratyabhijfa nor Vedanta are the objects of the every~ day-world to be interpreted as projections of the limited jiva~ self. Safkara: World Experience Sahkara's explanation of world-experience is not based on any opposition of subject and object, but instead on the distinction between the highest reality of Brchman and the con tional reality of world appearances. The jiva is the product of limiting conditions (upadhi-s) which are brought sbout by ignorance (avidya). In some instaces the Brahmasitra-s on8h which Sshkara conmmnts present the jiva as being different fron wa, the atnm. Safkara dismisses any such notions and says: The difference between_the embodied jiva and the Inner Controller /antaryamin7 is not real /na paramarthike/ tut dve to the Timiting conditions of case and effect estab- lished through ignorance. ~ BSB 1.2.20, trans. Apte ‘An analogy is given of the "two-fold carpenter (takgob- hayath2) who is unhappy when he uses tools at work but becomes happy and at ease when he leaves his tools and work behind to go hone. The jiva similarly possesses a two-fold nature: The jiva-self becomes an agent only as it requires orgns- of-sense such as the mind, etc., for all its activities, but is not an agent so far as itself is concerned /atmand akarty/. = BSB 2.3.10, trans. Apte The limited nature (anutva) of the jiva arises from his taking on the essence of the «alities of the limiting conditions, and the Self thus becomes non-pervasive and non-omniscient. The Jiva's limitedness, though, is only in a figurative or secondary sense, since "in the highest reality, the jiva is all-pervasive and infinite. And even as the limitedness of the jiva mst not be taken literally, so also with jiva-dtman unity. In Advaita Vedinta the identity of Limited self and supreme Self camot be obtained to the degree that the jiva is a product of superimposi- tion; Ztman is not identical wth jiva as Saiikara sometimes identifies Ztman and jiva in the very sane terms as Brahman and world, treating the jive just as he does the illusory world, The two-fold nature of the world-oxperient, who is both limited and unlimited and both jiva and tman, parallels85 the nature of objective experience vhich is neither entirely real nor entirely unreal and is indescribatle (anirvacmlya) as either real or unreal: Tt should be understood that this jiva-self is merely a false appearance, i.e., reflection of the ilighest Self, similar to the reflection of the sun in water. It is neither the Highest Self actually /na sa eva saksat/, nor is it quite a different entity altogether. ~ BSB 2.3.50, trans. Ganbhirananda Sahkara's remarks above may bec ontrasted with Utpala's view that the mmifest world is actually and directly Siva Him- 4 1s self (saksat fiva eva sarvan),” They do not, however, substan- tiate Kav's contention that there is no place for "practical life” in Saikara's system of Vedinta. Kaw interprets Sohkara's refer- ences to the maya-world as false and illusory to mean that the Worldeillusion disappears in a cloud of sublation like an ele~ phant which suddenly vaiishes in a magician's disappearing act: While in Advaita the manifestations are unreal appearances caused by @ror, those in Pratyabhi jiid are real facts of experience. Thg experiences of the fomer constitute the very nature of Siva and do not cease after being 'recog~ nized,' vhereas, in the latter, these are wrong perceptions or illusion (bhranti.) and must therefore cease after the Imowledge of the real background is achieved.16 We will later return to the distinction betwen realizing the world is illusory, i.e. realicing that the snake is really a rope, and recognizing the world to really be diva.”’ But even in MKB, vhich contains Sahkara's most radical ajativada theories, every illusion is said to be based on reality. ‘The snake has the rope a its grounding in reality, and all the illusions of the world find their substratum in the non-dual, non-changing Brahman.86 Even when the illusion is destroyed, the non-illusory sub= stratun continues to exist by the very fact of its being non-illusory. No illusion can be perceived that is without a substratum, = MKB 2.32-33, trans. Canbhirananda It is unclear exactly why Kaw believes that the wrld is any less a "fact of experience" for Saikara thm for the Saivites. It will be remembered that Safkara denied that objects are exper- ienced "as if" external and said thst external objects are not non-existent becaise they are directly experienced. The sake is seen as a mal, with all its fright-causing potential; it is not experienced "as if" a snake or as the illusory superimposi ~ 18 tion of a snake. ‘The Advaita principle of the self-validity of all know- ledge (svatab-prnépyavada) presumes that all knowledze is intri sically valid and true.!? 412 worldly experiances, even dreans, are reel on their om level until stown to be otherwise.” Utpala also says that knowledge is self-proven (jfanah svatab-siahan)™",* but in Utpala’s case, though, knowledge is unsublatable and proven to be ultimately real, Safikara does regard all worldly knowledge as sublatable, and he seeks its sublation. However, Sehkara does not at all man to say that the world, even if false, is experiiced as false by the limited subject. Abhinava and Utpala: World Bxperience Despite Kaw's oversimplification of Sahkara's illusion ism, the Advaitin's distinction between reality and appearence is firmly opposed to Utpala's doctrine thet everything is equally87 ! real. Surprisingly enough, Kaw!s distinction between illusion- ign and realism roughly approximates the differences between Aohinava and Utpala, rather than Vedanta and Pratyabiii JHE. Like Sahkara, Abhinava uses reflectionist metaphors to | describe the relationship between the Suprene and world manifes- tations. He also presents theories of superimposition and subla~ tion, Abhinavals remerks concerning Hmited objects being not different from nor the sane as prekda may be seen a5 an anirva~ | caniya formation similar to Sefikarats, That Abhinava distin- | guishes reality from appearmce cannot be dubted; one need only note his references to the world as illusory and to enpirical error as a pustule on a boil." Abhinava, in fact, is as Likely as Schkara tobe interpreted as supposing the everyday-world to i ve fictitious. ‘As already noted, if Utpela is a realist et all, he is a very strange sort of one. His conclusion is indeed that every- . thing is real, yet his approach to the object-world is anything wut realistic. In his approach to the wrid, though, Utpala tolerates no mention of illusion and squashes all distinctions between reality ond appearance. His argunents are directed against Vedinta, but they are equally plicable to the theories of Abhinavas ! Anticipating Kaw, Utpala oversimplifies, if not misin~ terprets, the position of Advaita Vedinta when attacking the . views of the Brahnavadins.°* Thus the differences between88 Utpala!s brand of realism and Abhinavats and Safikarats illusion~ ism may not be so completely irreconcilable as night be gathered by the longth and vehenence of Utpala's arguments against illusion- ism, But the similarities betweer passages of Abhinava's works and the theories of Safkara are certainly striking, as are the corresponding points of divergence between Abhinava and Utpala.CHAPTER VII IS ABHINAVA A GRYPTO-VSJANTING From the material presented thus far, it mignt easily be assumed that Abhinava's sympathies lie wholeheartedly with Advaita Vedanta and that his theories represent m attempt to reconstrue Utpala's position in a Veda ‘tin Light. The question of Abhinava's being a crypto-Vedintin--i.e., a Pratyabhijhivadin in name only-~is a serious one. 4n affirmative msver to the question wuld deny Abhinava credit for any significant degree of originality in his thinking; it would also place Abhinavals philosophy in complete opposition to the Pratyathijia tradition to which he belongs. But in order for Abhinava to be regarded as a crypto- Vedantin, it must be shown that he accepts the Vedinta view of suprene consciousness as completely unqualified, and not just the Ve ta view of the world as illusory. Abhinava does not do that. There are many statements by Abhinava which are typically Kashmir Saivite and in complete agreement with the theories of Utpala, that show significant differences between his philosophy and that of Ssfkara. And in discussing the causal relationship between supreme consciousness and manifestatian, Abhinava even directly refutes the philosophy of Sahkara. 8990 Abhinava's Arguments Against Vedanta In IPK 2.4.19 Utpala denies that the Saiikhya prakpti can be a causal agent. In his commentary, Abhinava defines the agent of an act of transformation (parinana) as "characterized by free- dom to assume multifarious changes which are constantly taking place," and thus being differentiated (bhinna) through the differ- ent forms which arise and non-differentiated (abhinna) through the oneness of its nature. The prakrti of Saitkhya cannot be a causal agent, becaise it is inert, a unitary substance, an objec tive thing indicated as "this" and an object of knowledge. But both unity and difference are found in that which does not fall to the state of being the object of knowledge, but, which, because it is of the nature of light of conscious= ness, has only one essential characteristic, namely, "Cit, and which is pure /svacchan/.? - IPV II, p. 177, trans. Pandey The word svaccham means "clear" as well as "pure," and this passage serves as an introductim to a discourse on re= . flectionism. It is difficult to understand how the (ne is mmi~ fested as many if not by entering the object-state, and Abhinavals subsequent analogy involves such objects as mirrors and movn~ tains. Moreover, the confusion, inherent in possessing contradic tory natures, such as diversity aid non-diversity, is not resolved at all by ascribing them to a sentient subject rather than an in- ert object. The unitary Supreme, without any change in its own nature (akhanditasyabhiiva) is said to be the cause of the world of multiplicity which is ever non-different fran its own naturei 91 (sad& svatmaripa). Abhinava recognizes the difficulty in con- ceiving of aich a proposition, and he explains that the freo~ dan of Kahegvara is such that He indeed "des that which is very difficult to do. Although the cause of wrld manifestations must be sen- | tient and not inert, Abhinava adds that not just any definition of consciousness will meet the specifications of causality. Siva can be possessed of diverse characteristics (blue and yellow) i and even contradictory ones (blue and not-blue), but the Yedintin's Brahman has no definable characteristics whatsoever. It is the purity (guddhatva) of Brahnan--its lack of freedom—to | which Abbinava objects in his depreciatory references to tle Vedantin theory of consciousness. If it were pure and unqualified /nirvigesa7 consciousness i then it could not be the cause “f determinate shining be~ cause itis the same in regard to yellow, etc. - IPV I, p. 197, trans. Pandey Cit without svatantevam, though, Like the consciaisness [ijhina/ caTied Brahman, is incapable of entering into multiple forms. = IPV II, p. 180, trans. Pandey It would seen that Abhinava himself is trying to do “that which is very difficult" in proposing that the Suprene is the cmsal agent of the object world and, at the sane tine, that the Supreme never cbindons the meness of its reality. Sahkara can very appropriately object, "One half the hen is cooked while : the other half is laying eggs. the Advaitin agrees that Brahman is incapable of manifesting itself as mltiple fom. But any such propensity on the part of the Supreme is wholly92 unacceptable to Sahkara, since Brahman is to be realized as uni- tary consciousness, and not as object or multiplicity. In the Brabnasbtrabhigya an objector takes a stand similar to that of Abhineva cbove. In his response to this objection gafikara refuses to attribute wurld-manifestations to the powr of the Suprene, and he explains then as die to the ignorance of the limited selves: Objector: Brahman is equipped with_various powers and = _ propensities for creating effects /anekagaktipravpttiyuktan/, so that its oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily and equally true .. . just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves, etc., it is mmifold. Sofikara: Tne unity of Brehman is the only one and the highest truth... its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false~ignorace /nmithyajfianavijrmbhitan/. For if both were to be true, how could a person Observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said to bank on falsehood? = BSB 2.1.1h, trans. Apte Sofkara is acing, then, in what sense is the jiva deluded, ig- | norant of his being Gtwan? If the maya-wrld is itself a mani- festation of the pover of the Supreme, then how does the jiva realize the unitary reality of the Transcendent Suprene, or vhat purpose would he have in even striving to do so? ‘The argument may be continued by presenting the only section in IFY which contains @ lengthy confrontation between Abhinava and Safkara. Abhinava's remarks are not prompted by anything said by Utpala, since the Kiril makes no mention of Vedintins.93 Brahnavadin: The sentiont cidrilpa Self is really one, ani all this multiplicity> Is due to the trouble of Naya or avidya. Abhinava: Then you cannot explain 'to whom does this Avidya belong?! It cannot be the characteristic of the Brahman, because He is simply pure ansciousness /vidyail ripa/, and in reality /vastutah/ there is no linited soul, Ste, to whom this may belong. - IPV II, p. 179, trans. Pandey ‘The question is a difficult one for an Advaitin to answer and poses one of the basic problens about Advaita theory, In the text the Brahmavadin is given no chance to reply. If pressed to provide a brief answer, one might say that maya "belongs" to Brahman in terms of ontological dependency; Safkara's refusal to allow the ry’-world any independent reality implies its de- pendence upon Brahman. Avidya, as an epistemological concept or false judgnert, belongs to the jiva~although not "in reality," if that means in the highest reality (paranarthikam). But little of Sahkara's philosophy can be understood if Limited to the categories of real and unreal, i.e., Brahman md hare-homs. Utpala ignores this in attacking the Vedintins for 6 their declaring the wrld unreal. Abhinava, though, also con~ siders Safikara's anin ‘ya formulation, i.e., the world not being describable as either real or unreal: If you /the Bratmavadin/ say that Avidyd is inexplicable [enirvacya7, we cannot understand to whom is it so? If You say that the idea present in your mind when you say it is indescribable is that it camot be expisined with reasons; I wuld say, whab can be the reasoning which dis- regerds our experince and what strange improbability (of existence) can there be of one that is shining /bh&sana ~ IV II, p. 180, trans. Pandey af?oh | It ig well worth noting that in Advaita Vedinta it is Brahman- consciousness that "shines" as self-manifest, and the object- world meely "appears"; the root bhis may be used in both ways. This is a distinction ich Abhinava himself draws in calling 7 the wrld "mere manifestation" (Sblasanatra), yet Abhinava here Gefends the undeniable reality of world-experience in a manner quite similar to that of Utpala. If you say that the Brahman is Sat and shines indeterminately as a unity, that this multiplicity is due only to the act of determination /vikelpa/, then to whom des the act of determination belong? If you say, "to the Brahman," then He becones associated with Avidy& (and ceases to be onni~ scient). For there is in reality no other (to whom Avidya may belong). ~ IPV IT, p. 180, trans. Pandey ‘The same question again, though one wonders how Abhinava persists at it. For if there be any ignorance in the world at all ~ and there certainly is according to Abhinava, then that ignorance is of necessity nost intinately asmcicted with Siva. But un- i | like Sehkara, Abhinava lays no claim to the Supremets being abso- lutely unqualified. Abhinava concludes his arguments against Vedanta by say~ ing that the appearance of consciousness as mltiplicity is only possible if there is freedom characterized by capacity for action (kartytvalakgana svatantrya). Utpala also contrasted the actin nature of Siva-consciousne ss (prakéga: imarga) to the passive nature of Brahman-consciousness, prakasa devoid of vimarge. Kgenaraja's sumvary of the difference between Vedanta end L Pratyabhijfid can then apply to both Utpala and Abhinava:95 The word svatantra denotes supreme power as of the essence of ecnscious! 3 and distinguishes it as different from Vedanta .? = PH, p. 38 Schkara: Unquslli fied Brehman Sohkara denies that any qualities (vigega-s) at all may be attributed to the qualitiless (nirvidega) Brahman. The crea- tive aspects of Brahman are regarded in Advaita Vedanta as accidental (tata: na) properties which are distinct from the essential (svarfipa) definition of the soprene.” the nost com mon definition of Brahman is being-consciousness-bliss (sat-cit~ Handa). Sat represents the ontological principle, the unsublatatle existential substratum of all subjects and objects. Pure sub= jectivity of avareness, the pure witness aspect of consciousness, is denoted by cit. Safikara equates being and consciousness and says that there is no mutual exclusion of one from the other. Brahman is to be realized as one who exists /asti itd upa- labdhavya/. . . Brehman cannot be only Being and not Con- Scicusiess, though, for how could He then be taught to be the Self of the conscious jiva? ~ BSB 3.2.21, trans. Apte But Bremen must not be thought of as an agent (kartr) involved in the activities of the everyday-vorld. Even the jiva, in his true nature as Ztmm, is not an oe In Saftkara's views ascribing agency to consciousness is equatable with contending that the Suprene ie subject to the duality md limitations of the ever way-world.96 Inanda, bliss, is the third member of the sat-cit~ananda triad. The fullness of Brahnan's bliss in Advaita is the inner~ 4 3 @irected and self-contained repose of Sénti, “never overflowing and always rest: ig within the Self, Even if Gnanda is to be viewed as sonething positive, not mere absence of sorrow, Sahkara warns against its being confused with the specific characteristic of happiness (sukhalakgana-visega), which is only imagined on the quatititess (nizvidegs) Self." Sankara also says that the Brahman vhich is of the nature of bliss must be 2 lover-order Brahman, since qualification (vigega) implies modification (wikara), and "even the tiniest bit of qualification should not te resorted toot! ALL positive characteri.zations of Brahman ultimately serve only to affirm qualities which are denicls of their oppo- cites. the best Advaita characterization of the Suprene is that it is not-this, not-this (neti, neti)” This via negatina safeguards the Brahman from the limitations inherent in prodica+ tim; it also establishes the Brehman's essential unrelatedness to any other form of oe Kohinava: Attributes of Siva-Consciousness Abhineva describes Siva-consciousness such that much move than a tiny bit of qualification seens to adhere to th: Highest Self. While Sahkara specifically denies that the Self is a . 1 substence with attributes (na dravyah dharmi), Abhinava ana~7 lyzes the relationship between unity and plurality in those very terms. IPK 1.5012 begins with the statcment that tle Self is con~ 20 mB ata eva caltanyan). Abhinava explains that scicusness caitenya stands for a word which indicates the attritutes of the Self (harna-vacaka-upalakgana) and that the Self is a substance possessed of attributes (dharmisvabhava-dravya). Dravya is defined as "that, resting in which, all objects shine." Don't te angry, tut . . . because the primary nature of the Seif is vinaréa .. . the Self is the primary substance, the substance, the substratum, resting in which @1 the Categories, elements, beings and worlds shine. - IFV I, ps 201, trans. Pandey Abhinava quite properly cautions us against becoming angry. For what he is saying is that everything in the wrld is an attribute of the Self, and that my word at all may be used to indicate the nature of the Self. Inanda is said by Abhinava to be the chief form (mukhyaih aed Hipan)** of the Suprene--not merely a lover order form of con- sciousness. Just as he does with yimarga, Abhinava defines Snanda as both: 1. the absolute unity, changelessnegs and self-containment of the Supreme (svatmavigranti)®*, and 93 2, freedom md supreme power (paramaisvarya) Abhinava makes many statonents based on this assumptia of free~ dom of consciousness which are quite in accord with the theories of Utpala. For exanpl98 Sivats freedom is that he assumes plurality from the state of unity, and fron plurality resumes his unitary stat -IPV I, p. 31, trans, Pandey There is m doubt about it that the Self, which is omni- potent, manifests itself. It is free inits manifestation, therefore there is no form in which it does not manifest itself. - IPV I, p. 36, trans. Pandey Abhinava's remarks may be construed as an elaboration uoon the notion that the Self is the substratum of all. This is not opposed to the theories of Sahkara, who believes that everything is grounded on the underlying reality of Brahman. However, Abhinava also seems to be saying that the world is a rea) attri- bute or mode of the Supreme and that multiplicity of mani festa- tion is part of the essential nature of the Suprene—not super- imposed through ignorance. Maya as the Power of the Suprene P, 7. Raju makes an interesting, although misleading, ob servation concerning the power of the Supreme in Pratyabhijhd and Vedanta. It svens that Raju thinks the answer to the question of Abhinavale being a crypto-Vedantin is yes. For in a reference to Sehkara's influence on non-vedic schools of thought, Raju says: ‘The followers of the Kashmir school of Saivism such as Vasugupta end Abhinava Gupta, who were definitely influ- enced by Sahkara, accepted his nm~dualism intact, with the proviso that miya, as the inconprehensible power of Brahman, vas real, ,And now and then, for argument!s sake, they even admitted Sahkara's position, thereby inplying that this kind of formulation is of secondary importance vinon ye accept the fact, thet, nEyE ts ‘Saktd of ultimate reality and is identical with i9 The paragraph is not easy to understand, ad thery are several problens with it. Unfortunately, Raju provides no sub~ shantiation of his renarke ad nentis Kashuir Saivism only briefly in passing. First, there is the assumption that Vasugupta was in- fIuenced by Schkara. This is probebly unproveble, since the Sivactitra-s of Vasugupta are presented as religious revelation and enphasize practical methodology rather then metaphysical speculation. ven if we ignore the mention of Vasugupta, Ke find a more fornideble problan in Raju's contention that differ- ences between Abhinava ad Schkara revolve around a real power=- iulusory power proviso. Finally, it is not at all obvicus that, as Raju seens to be saying, Abhinava and Sahkara share the pre~ mise of maya being the power of the suprene.”® Senkara uses the wrd nya in a variety of contexts-- not merely in the sense of the illusoriness of the phenonensl. world. He uses the wrd to iniicate: 1. The power or nature of the Suprene—The manifest world is non-indepardent (avyatsrateta)”® and non-diff erent (nenya)”™ tran Bohman, To the extent that Schkara addresses himself ab all to questions of world casality, his mon~dalism end adherence to satiGryavida’” attow for no ease other than Brahman. The illusory, dream-like quality of the wrld--This 4s to distinguish the reality of Brahman from the unreality200 29 (asatyatva) of world manifestations. The inviolable purity of the Supreme is free of any contanination by the limitations of the mayz-wrld. Referring to the illusory nature of the world serves to contrast the sublatable world of appearance and the unsublatatle reality of Brahman. 3. The inexplicability of the relationship between the Supreme and the world—Safikara demonstrates that the very ques~ tion of the relaticiship between Brahnen and the world is illegi- tinate and Ampossible of answer.°° & relationship implies to distinct things tobe related. From the bird's eye view of Brehnen-censciousness, the question of the nature of tie world and its relationship to Brahman does not even arise. ‘The ques- tion only arises fron the womi's eye view of limited conscicus- ness, where there is no pure Brahnan which requires to be re- lated to the wrld. The notion of the Supreme being endowed with power (Sakta) is essentially incompatible with the via negativa of Advaita, The first two of the above formulations (the power of the Suprene ad the i2usory world) are primarily used in a negative manner vy Sofkara respectively to demonstrate that the world is neither completely unreal nor completely real. The third formulation, myZ as anirvacanlya,incorporates the other two and is brought into greatest prominence by Saikara. The inexplicablencss of world phenomena is of overriding importance, since it means that all attempts at explaining the world or its relationship with Brahman are unsatisfactory.101 Each of these three meanings of maya is found in the theories of Abhinava. He uses the illusory nature of the world in much the sene manner as Sahkara does to demonstrate the dis- tinctions between levels of reality, between reality and appear- ance. As has already been noted, Abhinava's description of the manifest world as being neither identical to nor different from supreme consciousness is comparable to Safkara's anirvacniva formulation.?” However, Abhinava's use of suprene power as an ultimate and satisfying explanation of world manifestations dis~ tinguishes his position from Sahkara's. According to Safikara, the maya- wld and its relationship to the Supreme is indescribable, Abhinava would agree that world manifestations cannot be explained logically. But Abhinav a does not agree that the questi on of the relationship between Supreme and world is unansweratle. He aswers all such questions by referring to the power of the Suprero, In saying that "Siva does that which is very difficult to do," Abhinava acknowledges the paradoxical nature of Siva-consciousness , which both rests within itself and does not rest within itsdlf; at the sane time, he is also affirming the essential relatebility and relatedness of Siva and the maya-world. This point may be clarified by examining a passage of IEV which includes elenents of both Utpala's and Sahkara's theories:102 Vimarga, free consciousness, is all-powerful, identifies Gtself with others, denies itself, merges both into one, and denies both which have been merged into one.32 ~ IPV I p. 205, trans. Pandey Abhinava is here describing various levels of consciousness, from the Limited self to Supreme Self. In Abhinava's conception of the Supreme, unity and multiplicity are not merged into one another, nor do they stand apart from one another. "Identifies itself with others" and "denies itself” respectively represent the superimposition of Self on non-self and non-s<1f on Self. "Merging both into one” corresponds to Utpala's emphasis upon the unity of subject and object in their identity as non-differ- entiated prakaéa, But Abhinava also adds that the unity of con- sciousness involves a subordination (nyagbhiva)of the apparently distinct elenents of the manifest world; like Safikara, he por- treys the reality of a unity which transcends the mere appearance of multiplicity. On the other hand, all the above verbs~ identifies ," ‘denies ," "nerges"=-denote processes which apply to the active subjectivity of consciousness. According to Sahkara, the Suorens "is" (ig to be realized as existent) but does not do anything. Vimarga, the activity of consciousness, is the means whereby Abhinava associates unity with the objects of the maya world as they figure in consciousness joined together as one. Returning now to Raju's assessment of Abhinava and Sehkara, we find that it is at least partially correct: it is ; true that the illusoriness or reality of suprene power is103 secondary to the more basic question of whether the world-pro~ cess cm be at all regarded as part of the essential nature of the Supreme, But Raju contends that differences between Abhinava and Safkara can be easily resolved, by accepting one minor condition--nanely, the proviso that maya, as the incomprehensible power of Bremen, is real, Raju thus erron- cously assumes that Abhinava and Sankara are in agreement as to “the fact that maya is a Sakti of ultimate reality." Actually, the difference between illusory power ad real power should te used to differentiate Abhinavats position fron Utpalats, not from Safikara's. That Abhinava's philosophy differs from Utpala's--of that there can be no doubt. Equally certain is the fact that Abhinava is not "a Veddntin in disguise," subverting his predecessor's views. Central to both Utpalats and Abhinavats philosophy is the idea of power being part of the essential nature of the Suprane and also being the explanation of the relationship between the Supreme and the world, Such a notion is at most peripheral, and often antithetical to the theories of Safikara. Abhinava ascribes to consciousness a free~ dom of action which, as Kgemar! ja says, "distinguishes it as different from Vedanta," and which, as we have seen, is a dis~ tinction of major importance between Abminava and Sahkara.CHAPTER VII PARINEKA AND VIVARTA By presenting Abhinavats argunents against Vedinta, we have distinguished his position as different from Saitkarats as well. as Utpalats. In doing so, we have also found two diver- gent trends within Abhinava's philosophy: the first following the precedents of Pratyabhijia tradition with respect to the world being of the nature of supreme consciousness; the second following the via negativa of Advaita Vedanta in denying the ultimate reality of world manifestatims. One might sixply stop at this point, concluding that Abhinava joins the views of Utpala and Safkara, forming a new combination of Pratyabhi ja and Vedanta. But that would not help to explain the combination of theories which Abhinsva has seized upon, or to make any suse of his philosophy as a whole. here is what hes been called "a tendency to compronise!™ among Indian thinkers. India philosophers often find no disti- culty in adsorbing extraneous material into their ow systen. However, we have been seeing that Abkinava's philosophy makes Little sonse if it is viewed as merely a combination of Pratyabhijnd ani Vedinta elements, or as the philosophy of Utpala to which are attached certain of Safkara's theories. Aohinava's position is best understood by considering it as part of the development of Pratyabhijfa philosophy out of the basic oh,105 tenets of Kashnir Saiva monism—a development that will be des~ eribed below in terns of a shift fron a paringna to a vivarta theory of causaticn. There are two sourees which, although historically far removed fron each other and from Abhinava, provide interesting perspectives of Abhinava's position vis-A-vis Utpala and Sshkera, First we will turn to the Paficadaéi of Vidyaranya, a fourteenth contury Vedantin. Peficadagi is relevant to the issues at hand because, allowing for differences in terminology, one can extract fron the treatise theories quite in accord with the views of Utpala or Sahkara. Also, Vidydicpya outlines a compromise between paringravada and yivartavada which suggests that Abhinavats illu- sionism is not completely incompatible with the theories of Utpala. ‘The relationship between paringnavada and vi artevada will, then be further explored by referring to the Gramrarian philosophy of Bhartrhari (ca. 650 A.D.) and, mre specifically, to Gaurinath Shastrits contemporary analysis of Bhartrhari's philosophy. Shastri assesses Bhartphari's philosophy as being dominated by the very same difficulty as Utpdla's--nanely, a unitary and trans~ cendent Supreme which transfoms itself into an equally real mani- fest wrld, In his attempt to deal with the problem, Shastri denonstratcs that in any non-dualistic system there is @ logical tadency to distinguish between levels of reality. Shastri re~ és manner much as Abhinava interprets Bhartyhari ina docs with Utpala.106 VidyBrapya: A Combination of Utpala's and Sahara's Views 2 ‘The Paficadesi of Vidyaranya is a general manual of Advaita Vedanta, whose position in the schol is comparable to that of Pratyabhijtithrdayam in Kashmir Saivism, Just as Pratyabhijiihrdayam summarizes Rgama as well as Pratyabhijfid theories, Paicadasi is a general compendium of Advaita Vedanta, based not only on the writings of Safikara, which are then- selves liable to a wide variety of interpretations, but on a broad spectrum of Upanigadic philosophies also. Without any attempt at resolving the apparent incompatibility of the two viewpoints, Vidyiranya juxtaposes: 1. descriptions of may& as the creative force of Brahman, the world as a modification of Brahman, and 2. remarls more proper to an Advaita Vedintin on the superimposition and illusion of the maya-vorld, along with repeated references to the unqualified Brahman as pure witnessing consciousness (s’ksin). An example of tle first tendency is Vidyaranya's lengthy exposition on the mature of bliss (3nanda) as the creative tendency of Brahaman, as the idea, "Let me be and mt cease to SF ——C—C—C—C—=t—N#E Vidyranya describes the all-embracing projection of Brahman's u bliss” in terms similar to the vimarga of Pratyabhijiia: All beings are born of bliss ad live by it, and are finally reabsorbed into it, there is therefore no doubt that Brahman is bliss. - PD 11,13, trans. H. P. Shastri107 Vidyaranya also extols the wndrous powr of maya, which nani- fests the phenomenal world without in any wey affecting the real nature of the Supreme: How powerful mayd is. As fluidity is the nature of water, heat of fire and hardness of stone, so the making of the Impossible possible is the nature of maya.5 - PD 6.134-135, trans. H. P. Shastri Vidyarenya, mich mre so than Safikara, clearly contends that maya, whatever its ontological status, "belongs" to Brahnan, This may be seen in his use of the terms gaktinan and gakti, the powerful and the power.© ‘Through His maya (srandyeya), says Vidyarapya, the Supreme Self becomes the world, entering into it as Siva! And among his numerous citations from the Upanigeds, Vidyaranya even quotes the SvetaSvatara, which is notably theistic and dedicated to Siv: This maya, which rests unnanifest in the inmutable Brahman, subsequently undergoes many modifications., Maya is prakrti, ard the Supreme Lord is the ruler of maya, ~ PD 13.66, trans. H. P. Shastri on the other hand, Vidyaranya draws upon the writings of Seikara in describing mayaSakti and its products as anirvacaniya-- ———————— 10 tent nor non-existent. From the viewpoint of the ignorant, m&yZ is assumed to exist, for the illumined it is insignificant, and empirical reason establishes its indefinai lity. ~ PD 6,130, trans, H. P. Shastri Reflectionist metaphors (e.g., a face ina mirror, the sun in water) are used to iljustrate the differentiation of the Self into cidibhisa, which is the limited manifestation of maya. The108 a is said to be a changing and vanishing detail in the n magic show of the wrld. ‘The Witness /Sékginf itself is unchanginz, and one cones to realize the unreality of cidabhasa and its separateness from the Susreme. = PD 7.210, trans. H. P. Shastri The unchanging nature of Brehnan is used to demonstrate that the association cf Brahman with the world is unreal. Brahman ds said to be associationless (asahgacidvapuy) and incapable of 2 agency, because it is beyond time, space and causation. In surprising contrast to his descriptions of maya as wondrous power, VidySrajya sharply distinguishes the purity of Brahman- consciousness from the agency of the manifest world: Acourtesan suffering froma certein dirr . is ashamed to demonstrate her charms to a lever who is acquainted with her edition. Similarly cidabhfisa is ashamed to consider himself as the agent. ~ PD 7.238, trans. H. P. Shastri It is difficult to reconcile the divergent patterns of thought which are introduced in Paficadagi, Withim the writings of Saikara one can relegate his discussions of mya as the power of the Supreme to the level of a practical or popular truth, rather than the highest reality. In Paficadafii no such approach is possible, and the two streams of thought outlined above are randomly interspersed. Vidyaranya adopts positions which parallel those of both Utpala and Sahkara, but he never manages to Imtegrate effectively his theories into a cohesive and consistent philosophy. Abhinava, four centuries earlier than Vidyaranya, did mmaze to @ so. For Abhinava did more than109 just inelude and adopt Vedanta theories; he revonci led and syn- cretized then with Utpala's philosophy. Paripana and Viverta In his discussion of causation, Vidyarapys defines vivarta as the appearance of a different state (avasthintarabhdner Like the rope-make or a magic-show created by a ee is contrasted to parinima, where one thing is actually trans- formed (parinamita) into anotler, e.8+s milk into curds, clay into pot and gold into ring. | Vidyaragya goes on, however, to use the clay analogy to denonstrate vivarta The pot is produced fron clay by a Sakti... the pot is not different fron the clay because it has no separate existence . ., is not identical with the clay because it does not exist when the clay is in @ lump. Products such as the pot, though visible, are everchanging . . « subject to destruction . . . merely names . . + The Kmowhedge of the substratum, clay /or Brahnan/, destroys the idea of the reality of the pot /or world/, but not its appearance /abhasme/. ‘The eppearace of the pot is illusory /Vivartatvan/ be~ cause there is no abandonment of the nature of the clay. = PD 13.30-48, trans. H. P. Shastri Unlike milk irretrievably transformed into curds, wich is only paringma, Vidyaranya clains that the gold-ring and clay~ pot are illustrati fe of buth paringma and vivarta, since the sub- stratun is never changed and may be retrieved by smashing the pot or nelting the ring. But the dissolution of the effect back into its case also applies to the universal destruction (pralaya) of the Safikhya prakgti; it is indicative of the impermanence afno the wrld and not the unaffectedness of the substratum, Saitara, in fact, uses the gld-to-ring transfomation as ai example of Sara If the non-abandonnent of the substratum were the only criterion for admission to the school of vivartavada, Utpala's philosophy wuld certainly qualify. Utpala never even questions, let alone abandons, the unity of Siva-consciousness. However, these analogies of clay and gold are truly illustrative of artavada only to the extent that the pot and the ring are re- 1 garded as "merely nanes" Tg point which remains highly doubt- ful in the case of Utpala. Vidyaranya's classification of "both paringma and vivarta” nevertheless provides a convenient category in which to place Utpalats theory of causation. Such a placement can be but part- ly justified by not clearly espousing either parindmevada or vivartavida. It is also supported by the fact that Sivadrsti and the IP Karik@-s ae preceded in Kashnir Saivism by the parinina-Like tattva theory of evolution ani are followed by a theory of causation very much asin to vivartavda in the wit- ings of Abhinava. As noted earticr,”” the tattva system represents @ pari yma view of world evolution and ploys a major role in the Saiva Jiganas where the process of creation is so important. However, the catepries of manifestation are more suited to a dualistic systen such as Saiva Siddhinta than to the monism of Kashmirm Saivisn, If the Suprene itself actually evolves into the mai- fest world, then its independence and perfection are severely compromised. In Saiva Siddhinta, for example, it is said that Siva uses Sakti as a material cause and maya as an instrume:tal, cause; the result is that, although individual souls and the material wrld are pervaded by Siva, there is only inseparability and not oneness (ekatva)s Utpala insists upm absolute oneness end rejects rot only differences between atman md jiva, but all other grada~ tions of reality as well. Because of this, he denies the separate reality of every category of cosmic activity and makes only per= funetory use of the tattva system. Utpala nonetheless specifi- cally refers to the process of world manifestation as a trans- formation of supreme consciousness, i.e., the Suprene actually assumes the fora of multi pl ity in giving rise to the maya- world. Paramesvara fashims by Himself His own self in the form of diverse bjects.19 - sD h.h7 com. Multiplicity is the action which follows temporal sequence of the One Self, Thus the Self becomes a causal agent, through the process of transformation (parinanattaya) .” = IPK 2.4.18 An objector in SD asks if the parinana formulation means that Siva's oneness is non-existent shen He is manifested as multiplicity. Utpala replies that Siva's oneness ever remains, just as a hand romains a hand whether clenched in a fist or seen as outstretched fingers; there is no destruction (vin‘ifa) of