United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
3d 1055
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Fred Andrew Anderson, III, brought this action alleging a variety of
civil rights and state tort law claims in thirteen causes of action against
defendants. The claims stem from a family dispute that occurred at the home of
plaintiff's father and stepmother, defendant Hannalore Anderson, in September
1990. The City of Aurora police were called and arrived to help resolve the
dispute.
4
Defendants City of Aurora and its police officers Bickett and Sauerwein moved
for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims and later moved
for summary judgment on the remainder of plaintiff's claims. Defendant
Hannalore Anderson also filed a motion for summary judgment. (Defendants
Michael Harris and Bridgette Harris apparently had never been served and were
dismissed.) At a hearing on these motions, the district court granted summary
judgment in an oral order in favor of all defendants on all claims except for
plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.1983 claim against Sauerwein based on the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Several days later the court issued a written order
finding Sauerwein entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity and
dismissing the case. Plaintiff then filed this appeal alleging that the district
court erred by (1) granting summary judgment and qualified immunity to
Sauerwein on plaintiff's constitutional claims; (2) granting summary judgment
to Bickett, Sauerwein, and Hannalore Anderson on plaintiff's conspiracy and
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims; and (3) granting summary
judgment to the City of Aurora on plaintiff's 1983 claim.
In its August 18, 1993 written order, the district court addressed only plaintiff's
claim that Sauerwein subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure. The
court first correctly determined that plaintiff's claim was cognizable only under
the Fourth Amendment and therefore did not address it under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). The court then
determined that Sauerwein did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
It concluded first that the encounter primarily involved only police questioning
that did not rise to the level of a seizure. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382,
2386 (1991). It also concluded that Sauerwein's grabbing plaintiff and briefly
patting him down was not excessive force and did not rise to a constitutional
violation. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Because
plaintiff failed to show a violation of the law, the district court also found
Sauerwein entitled to qualified immunity.
Our standard of review is de novo. Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1026
(10th Cir.1992). We have fully considered plaintiff's arguments and reviewed
the record on appeal, and we agree with the district court that, construing the
alleged facts in plaintiff's favor, Sauerwein's actions did not rise to the level of a
Fourth Amendment violation. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977)(constitution not concerned with "de minimus level of imposition").
Even assuming that Sauerwein's grabbing and frisking plaintiff amounted to a
seizure, we cannot say that under the facts as alleged by plaintiff, Sauerwein's
actions were not objectively reasonable, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, entitling
him to qualified immunity in any event, see Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d
774, 780-82 (10th Cir.1993).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is
AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's request for oral argument is DENIED. Defendants'
motion to strike appellant's opening brief and/or dismiss appeal and request for
attorney fees are DENIED.
**
Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, United States District Court for
the District of Kansas, sitting by designation
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470