United States v. Benitez-Longoria, 10th Cir. (1999)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Benitez-Longoria, 10th Cir. (1999)
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
SEP 2 1999
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAIME BENITEZ-LONGORIA,
No. 98-2318
(D. Ct. No. CR-97-442 LH)
(D.N. Mex.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Benitez-Longoria appeals his conviction of possession with intent
to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and aiding and abetting in violation
of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. 2. He argues that
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
sufficient evidence did not exist for a jury to find that he had actual or
constructive possession of the drugs found secreted in the battery of the car he
drove. We AFFIRM.
Defendant drove into a border patrol checkpoint near Las Cruces, New
Mexico on July 1, 1997. Despite both he and his passenger having the proper
immigration documents, United States Border Patrol Agent Pouliot described
defendant as extremely, extremely nervous, extremely. Agent Pouliot stated
that defendant avoided eye contact, continually revved the motor as if in a hurry,
and shook violently. Agent Pouliot asked who owned the vehicle he drove, and
defendant hesitated, according to Agent Pouliot, as if trying to think of what to
say. Agent Pouliot requested permission for a narcotic detecting canine to search
the vehicle, and Mr. Benitez-Longoria consented. The dog alerted to the front of
the vehicle, and a subsequent search uncovered 7.02 pounds of cocaine hidden in
the car battery.
Defendant asserts that the government introduced insufficient evidence to
prove that he knew he possessed the cocaine. He claims he did not know of the
cocaines presence. He emphasizes that he did not own nor have sole possession
of the car and that the cocaine was very well hidden. [I]n reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court must review the
record de novo and ask only whether, taking the evidence both direct and
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circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Voss , 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25
(10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also United
States v. Lazcano-Villalobos , 175 F.3d 838, 843 (10th Cir. 1999). We do not
use this evaluation as a chance to second-guess the jurys credibility
determinations, nor do we reassess the jurys conclusions about the weight of the
evidence presented.
United States v. Yoakum , 116 F.3d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
accord , Lazcano-
Villalobos , 175 F.3d at 843.
The government argues that it presented sufficient evidence from which a
jury could conclude that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine. A
person constructively possesses contraband when he or she knowingly holds
ownership, dominion or control over the object and premises where it is found.
Lazcano-Villalobos , 175 F.3d at 843; accord United States v. Valadez-Gallegos
162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). Exclusive possession of the premises
supports an inference of constructive possession. However, joint occupancy of a
premises cannot sustain such an inference.
Valadez-Gallegos , 162 F.3d at 1262;
see also Lazcano-Villalobos , 175 F.3d at 843. To prove constructive possession
where there is joint occupancy, the government must present direct or
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circumstantial evidence to show some connection or nexus individually linking
[defendant] to the contraband.
Lazcano-Villalobos , 175 F.3d at 843; accord
Valadez-Gallegos , 162 F.3d at 1262. While caution must be taken that the
conviction not be obtained by piling inference on inference, an inference of
constructive possession is reasonable if the conclusion flows from logical and
probabilistic reasoning. Thus, the government must present evidence supporting
at least a plausible inference [defendant] knew of the contraband.
Lazcano-
Villalobos , 175 F.3d at 843 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, ample evidence exists from which a jury could have found defendant
knew of the cocaine. Agent Pouliot testified that Benitez was extremely nervous
during routine questioning. Eventually, according to Agent Pouliot, his whole
body shook to such a degree that agents fifteen feet away observed his nervous
reaction. Agent Pouliot also testified that when he informed Mr. BenitezLongoria that he knew drugs were contained in the car, defendant yelled, Go
ahead and take it out, at the top of his lungs. When informed that the agents had
found the cocaine, defendant just dropped his head.
In addition to this evidence, Mr. Benitez-Longoria gave conflicting stories
at the time of the seizure and at trial as to who owned the vehicle, his travel
plans, and the reasons for the trip. Finally, the jury heard evidence that only three
months prior to the incident involved here, defendant had been arrested for
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possession with intent to distribute marijuana. In that case, officials found
marijuana hidden in a secret smuggling compartment of the car he was driving.
Defendant claimed in that case he had no knowledge of the hidden drugs. The
jury could properly use this evidence to support a finding of knowledge.
See id.
at 846.
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
sufficient evidence exists to support the jurys guilty verdict. The government
presented evidence supporting at least a probable inference that defendant knew
of the cocaine hidden in the battery. We AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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