L. G. Herron v. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830, 10th Cir. (1956)
L. G. Herron v. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830, 10th Cir. (1956)
2d 830
L. G. HERRON, Appellant,
v.
CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW NATIONS, Appellees.
No. 5175.
Lloyd Story, Valliant, Okl., and Tom Finney, Tulsa, Okl., were on the
brief, for appellant.
W. F. Semple, Tulsa, Okl., and Lynn Adams, Oklahoma City, Okl., were
on the brief, for appellees.
Before BRATTON and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSON,
District Judge.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations or Tribes of Indians instituted this action
against L. G. Herron to quiet title to a tract of land in McCurtain County,
Oklahoma; to recover possession of the land; and to recover damages for the
wrongful withholding thereof from plaintiffs. The defendant denied title and
right of possession in plaintiffs; pleaded title in himself; and sought a decree
quieting his title.
The litigation stemmed from this factual genesis. The land in controversy is
known as Tract 269 and contains 247.66 acres. It is bounded on the north by
the south line of the south half of the southeast quarter of section 10, in
township 8 south, of range 22 east, and on the south by the Red River. In 1903,
the south half of the southeast quarter of section 10 was allotted pursuant to
plats based upon the Government survey of 1897; and the defendant owns such
land as successor in interest to the allottees. At the time of the survey, a slender
strip of unallotted land belonging to the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes and
containing approximately 13 acres lay between the south line of the allotted 80acre tract in section 10 and the river to the south. At the time of the issuance of
the patents to the 80-acre tract in section 10, the river had moved northward,
completely submerging the 13 acres of unallotted land; and the river then
constituted the southern limits of the allotted land in section 10. After the
issuance of the patents and prior to the institution of the action, the river
gradually moved toward the south, withdrawing from the point where the
unallotted land was situated; and the tract in controversy was builded up by
accretion.
3
The single contention urged for reversal of the judgment is that under the
crucial facts about which there is no controversy all of the land involved in the
action accreted to the 80-acre tract of allotted land owned by the appellant and
therefore the accreted land is his property. Whatever the rule may be
elsewhere, it is the law in Oklahoma that where because of inroads of a river
riparian land is lost by erosion or becoming submerged but through subsequent
change in the course of the river the water disappears and the land reappears,
and the boundaries are susceptible of being definitely identified, title to the
restored land is vested in the owner of the fee at the time the erosion or
submerging occurred. Hunzicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okl. 102, 17 P.2d 384; Mapes
v. Neustadt, 197 Okl. 585, 173 P.2d 442. The latter case was one involving
avulsion of a river, but the general rule applicable to cases involving erosion or
submerging of land was clearly recognized with unqualified approval.
Here the unallotted tract of approximately 13 acres was riparian. Due to inroads
of the river, the land became completely submerged. Thereafter the river
changed its course, the 13 acres of unallotted land was restored, and the
remainder of the land in controversy was builded by accretion. And by use of
recognized official maps and the making of a survey, the line between the 80acre tract of allotted land in Section 10 and the 13-acre tract of unallotted land
is easily susceptible of definite identity or establishment. Therefore, under the
law of Oklahoma, title to the tract in controversy, less the small strip, is vested
in the appellees. Hunzicker v. Kleeden, supra; Mapes v. Neustadt, supra.
6
Appellant relies entirely upon State of Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 42
S.Ct. 406, 66 L.Ed. 771. But each state determines for itself questions relating
to the loss of land by erosion, submerging, or avulsion, and questions
concerning the acquisition of land by accretion. Cf. Barney v. City of Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324, 337, 24 L.Ed. 224. In like manner, grants by the United States of
public lands bounded by stream, made without reservation or restriction, are to
be determined as to effect according to the law of the state in which the grant
lies; and that general rule has application to the disposal of tribal lands of
Indians under guardianship. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 10 Cir.,
156 F.2d 769, affirmed 331 U.S. 788, 67 S.Ct. 1346, 91 L.Ed. 1818.