Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,603 in Re William E. BRAYSHAW, Debtor. H. Christopher CLARK, Trustee-Appellant, v. William E. BRAYSHAW, Debtor-Appellee
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Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,603
In re William E. BRAYSHAW, Debtor.
H. Christopher CLARK, Trustee-Appellant,
v.
William E. BRAYSHAW, Debtor-Appellee.
No. 90-1061.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 31, 1990.
Paul G. Quinn, Denver, Colo., for trustee-appellant.
Paul D. Rubner and Larry A. Sigman of Rubner & Kutner, Denver, Colo.,
for debtor-appellee.
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
H. Christopher Clark, the trustee in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding,
appeals the district court's order that reversed an extension of time the
bankruptcy court granted the trustee to file objections to exemptions claimed by
the debtor, William E. Brayshaw.1 110 B.R. 935.
Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition on May 10, 1989, claiming exempt
property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(l). Under that section, property
claimed as exempt automatically becomes exempt unless a party objects.
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b) provides that objections must be filed within thirty
days after the meeting of creditors, "unless, within such period, further time is
granted by the court." The trustee here filed a motion to extend the time for
objections within the thirty-day period, actually on the thirtieth day after the
creditor's meeting, and the bankruptcy court granted the motion after its
expiration. The district court granted the debtor leave to take an interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a) and reversed the bankruptcy court's
extension order.
3
There are two issues on this appeal: (1) whether the district court's order is an
appealable final order; and (2) whether the bankruptcy court had power to grant
a motion to extend time for objections under Rule 4003(b) after expiration of
the designated thirty-day time period, provided the motion was filed within the
period.
* We have jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases only over final orders of district
courts when they have exercised appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. Sec.
158(d); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380,
386 (10th Cir.1990). "Grant or denial of a claimed exemption is a final
appealable order from a bankruptcy proceeding." Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re
Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1985) (citing White v. White (In re White),
727 F.2d 884, 885-86 (9th Cir.1984)). Although the bankruptcy court order
extending the time for objections did not finally dispose of the status of the
debtor's exemptions, the district court's reversal of that order had the effect of
granting the debtor's claimed exemptions and, therefore, is a final appealable
order.
II
5
Rule 4003(b) provides that "[t]he trustee ... may file objections to the list of
property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting
of creditors ... unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court."
(Emphasis added). Rule 9006(b) allows enlargement of time periods, but
specifically provides that "[t]he court may enlarge the time for taking action
under Rule[ ] ... 4003(b) ... only to the extent stated in [that] rule[ ]."
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). The Rules are quite clear on their face, we believe,
that a bankruptcy court can extend the period for objections to exemptions only
by acting within the original time period. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy p
4003.04, at 4003-10 (L. King 15th ed. 1990). There simply is no room in the
wording for construing Rule 4003(b) or Rule 9006(b) to permit granting an
extension of time to file objections outside the original thirty-day time limit. We
recognize that this may cause problems for many bankruptcy courts with
crowded dockets or when the motion has been filed, as here, on the last day.
But that is a matter for the drafters of the bankruptcy rules, who appear to have
thought precise time limitations were important in the situation presented here.
We hold that the bankruptcy court was without power to grant the trustee's
motion for an extension once the original period expired.
AFFIRMED.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument
