Anita Lucero v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, 1, 62 F.3d 1428, 10th Cir. (1995)
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Scribd Government DocsAnita Lucero v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, 1, 62 F.3d 1428, 10th Cir. (1995)
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Scribd Government Docs62 F.
3d 1428
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
Anita LUCERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 95-2036.
(D.C. No. 93-410 JB/LFG)
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 10, 1995.
Before TACHA, LOGAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT2
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) denied Anita
Lucero's application for Social Security disability benefits. The district court
affirmed the denial of benefits, and claimant now appeals. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm.
I. Background
3
Claimant Anita Lucero fractured her right ankle in 1990. Following surgery to
repair the ankle, the ankle remained unstable. Nevertheless, claimant elected
not to have further surgery because she was participating in a weight loss
program. On October 8, 1991, plaintiff's ankle was described as healed.
4
Claimant later filed for benefits from the Secretary. An administrative law
judge (the ALJ) found that claimant was unable to work from August 8, 1990,
through October 7, 1991. The ALJ also found, however, that claimant's ankle
had medically improved as of October 8, 1991. Accordingly, the ALJ ruled that
claimant was not disabled after October 8, 1991. The appeals council denied
claimant's request for review of the ALJ's decision. Claimant then asked for
judicial review in federal court. The district court affirmed the Secretary's
decision.
II. Discussion
5
On appeal of the Secretary's decision, we limit our review to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the Secretary applied the correct legal standards. See Andrade v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir.1993). Substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.' " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
To determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, "we must meticulously examine the record. However, we may
neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our discretion for that of the
Secretary." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir.1992).
An individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if
his impairments are so severe that "he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A). In examining a claimant's allegation of
disability, the Secretary evaluates that individual's condition using a five-step
process. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988).
In this case, claimant challenges the ALJ's determination that she was no longer
disabled after October 7, 1991. Claimant contends that her ankle impairment,
combined with her obesity, precluded a finding of medical improvement. She
claims that her condition was equivalent to 20 C.F.R. 404, pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1, sec. 10.10 (now codified at id. sec. 9.09).
It is undisputed that claimant meets the obesity requirement of section 10.10.
But the Secretary claims that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's
determination that the section's other requirement--"a history of pain and
limitation of motion ... associated with x-ray evidence of arthritis--is not met.
After October 8, 1991, there was no evidence of arthritis, or equivalent
findings, in the x-rays of claimant's injured ankle. Claimant's doctor stated that
the ankle was "satisfactory." Accordingly, the ALJ's ruling is supported by
substantial evidence.
9
Next, claimant contends that the Secretary erred in finding that a combination
of her impairments was not disabling. We disagree. We believe that there is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings. As noted earlier, no
physician claimed that claimant was disabled after October 8, 1991.
10
The Secretary's decision that claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
11
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social
Security. Pub.L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 (1994). Pursuant to Fed. R.App.
P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in
this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in
the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the
appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470
