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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13662
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-00097-RWS

GARY VALENTINE,
Plaintiff,
LAURA VALENTINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF JOEL ROBINSON,
in his individual and official capacities,
DEPUTY ANDRA BUSH,
in her individual and official capacities,
INVESTIGATOR FAYE SPAULDING,
in her individual and official capacities,
and INVESTIGATOR LISA CARR,
in her individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees,

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DEPUTY IAN GEIMAN,

in his individual and official capacities,
Defendant.

________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 30, 2015)

Before JORDAN, BLACK, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Laura Valentine appeals the district courts grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants Deputy Andra Bush, Investigator Faye Spaulding,
and Investigator Lisa Farlow1 in Plaintiffs civil action under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, in their individual capacities, asserting
federal claims for false arrest and for conspiracy. 2 The district court granted

At the time of these events, Lisa Farlow was known as Lisa Carr.

The amended complaint also included claims on behalf of Plaintiffs husband, a claim for
unlawful detention and confinement, and claims against Sheriff Joel Robinson, Deputy Sheriff
2

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Defendants motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
This case arises out of a custody dispute over Plaintiffs then-five-year-old
granddaughter, Iris. Iriss parents, William (Plaintiffs son) and Chrisalena, had
separated and filed for divorce. At the time of these events, in May 2008, Iris and
William were living with Plaintiff in Georgia; and Chrisalena was living in Texas.
On 26 May, Chrisalena and her lawyer showed Deputy Bush an order from a
Texas court which purportedly granted Chrisalena custody of Iris. 3 Chrisalenas
lawyer also told Deputy Bush that there had been a history of violence between
William and Chrisalena.
Based on this information, Deputy Bush accompanied Chrisalena to
Plaintiffs home, told Plaintiff about the Texas court custody order, and asked
whether William and Iris were at the house. Plaintiff told Deputy Bush that
William and Iris had gone camping in Tennessee and that William had no cell
phone with him.

Ian Geiman, and against all Defendants in their official capacity. None of these claims are
before us on appeal.
3

Plaintiff argues extensively that the Texas court custody order was undomesticated and, thus,
unenforceable in Georgia.
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The next day, Deputy Bush visited Iriss school and confirmed that Iris was
absent again. When Deputy Bush told Chrisalena that William and Iris had still
not returned from their camping trip, Chrisalena became upset and expressed
concern about Iriss safety and about the possibility that William had run away
with Iris. Chrisalena told Deputy Bush that, after she and William first separated,
William took Iris from Texas to Georgia and refused to return her. Chrisalena also
told Deputy Bush that William used illegal drugs and was involved in a satanic cult
that valued the sacrifice of children and of a childs virginity.
When Deputy Bush returned to Plaintiffs home, Plaintiff told Deputy Bush
that Plaintiff still had not spoken to William. Plaintiff then allowed Deputy Bush
to look inside Williams room, where Deputy Bush saw several satanic pictures
and books and a schedule for a nearby satanic conference.
At that point, Deputy Bush contacted park rangers for the campground
where William and Iris had supposedly gone camping. After conducting a search,
the park rangers reported to Deputy Bush that they had been unable to locate
William or Iris.
Meanwhile, another officer learned that Plaintiffs ten-year-old daughter,
McKenzie, had told school counselors that Iris had not gone camping and, instead,
was staying with a woman named Amanda. School officials also reported to
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Investigator Farlow that McKenzie (who has an autism spectrum disorder) was
capable of interacting with people and was known to be truthful.
After learning from Plaintiff that McKenzie was at a friends house, Deputy
Bush and Investigator Farlow went to the friends house to speak with McKenzie.
When Investigator Farlow asked McKenzie about Iriss location, McKenzie
replied, My mom doesnt want anybody to know. McKenzie also told
Defendants that Plaintiff did not want Chrisalena to have custody of Iris, that
Plaintiff had told McKenzie not to tell anyone where Iris was, and that William had
called Plaintiff the last two nights. Based on her conversation with McKenzie,
Investigator Farlow concluded that Plaintiff knew where Iris was, had lied to
Defendants about Iriss whereabouts, and had instructed McKenzie to lie to
Defendants. When Plaintiff arrived at the friends house, Defendants arrested her
for obstruction.
We review de novo a district courts grant of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, drawing all inferences and viewing all of the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266,
272 (11th Cir. 2013).
Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). A
defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense must first show that she was
engaged in a discretionary function when she performed the complained-of act.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2004). The burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is unentitled to qualified immunity.
Id. at 1264.
As an initial matter, Defendants were engaged in a discretionary function
when they arrested Plaintiff. A government employee engages in a discretionary
function when she (1) performs a legitimate job-related function (2) in an
authorized manner. Id. at 1265. [T]o pass the first step of the discretionary
function test for qualified immunity, the defendant must have been performing a
function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen with
his legitimate job description. Id. at 1266 (emphasis in original). Here, the
general act of arresting a suspect is clearly part of Defendants job-related powers
and responsibilities. 4 See id. (noting that, in an excessive force case, there can be

Plaintiff argues that Defendants were not engaged in a discretionary function in part because
Defendants had no discretion to enforce an undomesticated, out-of-state court order. For
purposes of our discretionary function analysis, however, we look only to the general nature of
Defendants acts (here, the act of arresting a suspect), not to whether Defendants acts were, in
fact, lawful. See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1266. Moreover, Plaintiff appears to confuse the
question of whether Defendants were engaged in a discretionary function for purposes of
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no doubt that the police officer defendant was acting in his discretionary capacity
when he arrested plaintiff). And nothing evidences that Defendants carried out
Plaintiffs arrest in a way that exceeded the range of their discretion or in an
otherwise unauthorized manner.
The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that Defendants violated a federal
right and that the federal right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
offense. See id. at 1264. An arrest made with probable cause . . . constitutes an
absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest. Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d
1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996). An officer has probable cause to arrest if the facts
and circumstances within the officers knowledge, of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.
Id.
To receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have actual probable
cause, but only arguable probable cause. Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d
724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable
officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

qualified immunity with the entirely separate question of whether Defendants were acting within
their lawful authority for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for
obstruction under Georgia law.
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Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. Id.
Whether an officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause depends
on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern. Id. at 735.
Under Georgia law, a person commits misdemeanor obstruction of an officer
when he knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer
in the lawful discharge of his official duties. O.C.G.A. 16-10-24. To be guilty
of obstruction, a person need not have engaged in violence or forcible resistance.
See Pinchon v. State, 516 S.E.2d 537, 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Instead, the
Georgia courts have said that the obstruction element may be satisfied by conduct
such as [a]rgument, flight, stubborn abstinence, and lying. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude
that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction. First, when
Plaintiff was arrested, Defendants were engaged in the lawful discharge of their
duty to preserve public order, to maintain the peace, and to protect lives, persons,
property, health and morals. 5 See Harris v. State, 622 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005). For two days, Defendants attempted unsuccessfully to locate William
5

We reject Plaintiffs assertion that Defendants were not engaged in the lawful discharge of their
duties because they were attempting to enforce an undomesticated -- and, thus, unenforceable -custody order. The actual enforceability of the Texas court order has no bearing on the outcome
of this appeal. Nothing evidences that Defendants acted (either in investigating Iriss
whereabouts or in arresting Plaintiff) solely in reliance on the Texas court order or that
Defendants attempted to enforce that custody order. Instead, the record shows that Defendants
acted (based on all the facts and circumstances within their knowledge), to maintain the peace
and to ensure Iriss health and safety.
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and five-year-old Iris. Based on the information available to Defendants at the

time -- including that William and Iris had traveled out-of-state, that William could
not be reached by phone, that William and Iris could not be located at the
campground where they were supposed to be staying, that Iris had been absent
from school, that William had once before taken Iris and refused to return her to
her mother, and that William was involved with illegal drugs and satanic worship - Defendants concluded reasonably that Iris was in potential danger and that they
owed a duty to maintain the peace and to ensure Iriss health and safety.
A prudent officer possessing the same knowledge as Defendants could have
believed reasonably that Plaintiff lied to Defendants about Iriss true whereabouts
and, thus, obstructed Defendants efforts to carry out their official duties. See
Pinchon, 516 S.E.2d at 538. Ample evidence indicated that Plaintiff had been
untruthful with Defendants. William and Iris could not be found at the
campground where Plaintiff said they were. School attendance records
contradicted Plaintiffs contention that William frequently took Iris out of school to
go camping. Despite Plaintiffs insistence that she could not reach William,
Defendants had reasonably trustworthy information that Plaintiff had, in fact,
spoken with William at least twice in the past two days. And, based on
Defendants conversation with McKenzie, Defendants had reason to believe that
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Plaintiff did not want anyone to know about Iriss true location and had instructed
McKenzie not to tell.
Because we conclude that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
for misdemeanor obstruction, Plaintiffs false arrest claim fails as a matter of law. 6
See Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1525. As a result, because no underlying constitutional
violation has been shown, Plaintiffs conspiracy claim also fails. See Grider v.
City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (to state a section 1983
claim for conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the alleged
conspiracy resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.7

We reject Plaintiffs argument that the district court erred in not addressing whether arguable
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for interference with custody or for tampering with
evidence after the district court concluded that arguable probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff
for obstruction. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 (2004) (an officers subjective
reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts
provide probable cause); Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1090 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (an
officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he has probable cause to arrest the suspect for any
offense). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts -- for the first time on appeal -- to assert
a malicious prosecution claim against Defendants, we will not consider this claim. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004).
7

Because we have determined that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction and,
thus, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case, we necessarily conclude that
Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and violated no clearly established
constitutional right. Thus, even to the extent that a constitutional violation in fact occurred
(which we reject), Defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs claims
against them in their individual capacities for false arrest and for conspiracy. See Vinyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d at 1346 (government officials acting within the scope of their discretionary
authority are immune from individual civil liability if the officials conduct violates no clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.).
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AFFIRMED.

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