Legal Appeal: Canady's Conviction
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-13912
MAY 25, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00297-JDW-TGW-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MELVIN CANADY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 25, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Melvin Canady appeals his conviction for distribution of cocaine
base under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. 2. On appeal,
Canady argues that his statements concerning prior drug transactions should have
been suppressed because (1) he had not been informed of his Miranda1 rights prior
to making the statements in question; (2) the statements were not admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because they had not been independently
corroborated; and (3) the statements were excludable pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. Further, Canady argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction.
We review a district courts denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard, reviewing the district courts findings of fact for clear error, and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.
2007). When considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, we construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Id. We have stressed that
a trial courts credibility determination is conclusive on the appellate court unless
the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony. Odili v. United States
Parole Commn, 474 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, we give due weight to a trial courts finding that an officer is
credible. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
2
(1996).
Here, Canady alleges that the post-arrest statements in question were given
before Master Detective Belvin Sanchez informed Canady of his Miranda rights.
In contrast, Sanchez testified that he informed Canady of his Miranda rights
before Canady made the statements in question, that Canady knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights, and that Canady never invoked his right to an
attorney or to remain silent. The district court found that Sanchezs testimony on
the timing of the Miranda rights was credible and that, therefore, there was no
reason to suppress the statements under Miranda. Canady has not established that
the district court relied on testimony that was improbable under any standard,
much less exceedingly improbable. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
did not err by crediting the testimony of a police officer over Canadys testimony
about the timing of the Miranda warning.
Second, Canady alleges that his statements were not admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because his statements were not independently
corroborated, and therefore, they alone cannot establish that he committed the
prior drug transactions. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a prior bad act can be
admitted as proof of, inter alia, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or
accident. Where a defendant enters a not guilty plea, he places his intent directly in
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issue. United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). To be
admissible under Rule 404(b), there is a three-prong test: (1) the evidence must be
relevant to an issue other than the defendants character; (2) there must be
sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not
be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, as established in Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007).
To meet the first prong of this test, the prior bad act must require the same
intent as the crime for which the defendant is indicted. United States v. Dickerson,
248 F.3d 1036, 1047 (11th Cir. 2001). This prong is met where the state of mind
required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is the same. Edouard, 485 F.3d at
1345.
Under the second prong, there must be sufficient evidence for a jury to
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the
extrinsic act that the government alleges. United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d
1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983) ([T]his requires only that the jury could find that the
defendant committed the offense.). A defendants own admission to the acts,
even if mere puffery, is sufficient to meet the second prong of this test. United
States v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498, 1502 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Edwards, 696
F.2d at 1280).
The third prong requires the court to conduct the Federal Rule of Evidence
403 inquiry based upon the circumstances of the extrinsic offense. Edouard,
485 F.3d at 1345 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We view the
disputed evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its
probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact. Edouard, 485 F.3d
at 1344 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 404(b), similarity
between the prior bad act and the charged conduct will make the other offense
highly probative of the defendants intent in the charged offense. United States v.
Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the risk of undue
prejudice can be reduced by an appropriate limiting jury instruction. Id.
Here, the first prong is met because the prior bad acts and the charged act
are the same distribution of crack cocaine. See United States v. Cardenas, 895
F.2d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence relating to prior drug
dealings is highly probative of a defendants intent to distribute a controlled
substance). Under the second prong, Canadys statements are sufficient for a jury
5
to find that he committed the prior bad acts by a preponderance of the evidence.
Despite Canadys argument that corroborating evidence is needed for his own
statements to be admitted under this rule, we have held otherwise. See, e.g.,
Chilcote, 724 F.2d at 1502 n.2; Edwards, 696 F.2d at 1280. Canadys statements
are therefore sufficient for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Canady committed the prior bad acts, even without further corroboration.
Last, the admission of the evidence would not result in unfair prejudice to
the defendant. The statements at issue here are highly probative of Canadys
intent because they establish that Canady had distributed crack cocaine in the past
in order to gain income. Furthermore, the district court mitigated any unfair
prejudice to Canady by instructing the jury not to consider the statements for any
reason other than to establish Canadys knowledge and/or intent and that he did
not act because of a mistake or accident. See United States v. Almanzar, 634 F.3d
1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2011) (We presume that jurors follow the instructions
given by the district court.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 316 (2011). In light of the
probative value of the statements and the courts limiting instruction, the danger of
unfair prejudice here does not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
Therefore, we conclude from the record that the district court did not err by
refusing to suppress Canadys statements about prior drug transactions.
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Furthermore, Canady argues that the evidence presented below is
insufficient to support his conviction. We review the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction de novo. United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284
(11th Cir. 2009). To determine if sufficient evidence exists to support an
appellants conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and decide whether a reasonable fact finder could have reached a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Herrera, 931
F.2d 761, 762 (11th Cir.1991). Furthermore, [a] jurys verdict cannot be
overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. When the
government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere
speculation, must support the conviction. United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d 811,
814 (11th Cir. 2008).
To establish that the defendant aided and abetted someone, the government
must prove: (1) the substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) an act by
the defendant contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant
intended to aid in the commission of the substantive crime. United States v.
DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 238 (11th Cir. 1997). To establish the offense of
distribution of cocaine base the government must establish: (1) knowledge,
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(2) possession, and (3) intent to distribute. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d
1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, the government has established the knowing and intentional
distribution of cocaine by presenting evidence that Canady knowingly possessed
crack cocaine, and that he transferred the drugs to a co-conspirator, who then gave
the drugs to two undercover police officers. Canady aided and abetted his coconspirator, Carlos Green, by (1) driving Green to meet the undercover detectives,
(2) transferring a substance from a bag to Green, (3) consulting with Green about
the price and amount of the crack cocaine, and (4) personally telling the detectives
that he did not have any more crack cocaine when they asked Green for more.
Additionally, Canadys own statements where he admitted to buying and reselling
crack cocaine in order to generate income on numerous occasions in the past are
evidence of his intent. Because the evidence must be construed in favor of the
jurys verdict, we conclude that this evidence is sufficient to prove that Canady
aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine base, and we affirm his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
