United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.: No. 241, Docket 23458
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.: No. 241, Docket 23458
2d 531
Freedman & Unger, New York City (Abraham Unger, New York City, of
counsel), for appellant Lebron.
Abraham M. Dubno, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant Jose A. Otero Otero.
Conrad J. Lynn, New York City, for other appellants.
J. Edward Lumbard, U.S. Atty., New York City (Milton R. Wessel,
George S. Leisure, Jr., Julio E. Nunez and Thomas M. Debevoise, Asst.
U.S. Attys., New York City, William S. Hundley, Sp. Asst. to the Atty.
Gen., of counsel), for appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, FRANK, Circuit Judge, and GALSTON,
District judge.
FRANK, Circuit Judge.
1. The appellants urge, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding of a conspiracy, that at most the evidence showed not one
continuing conspiracy but multiple conspiracies improperly (and prejudicially)
joined in the indictment, and that the prosecution failed to link each defendant
We think the above evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find a single
continuous conspiracy operating at least from September 1950 to May 1954, the
period covered by the indictment. We also think that the government has
successfully linked each of the appellants with the conspiracy. Evidence from
which the jury might have so concluded is set forth in the footnote.1
But here such proof is lacking. Sorrell, the informer, testified that he attended a
meeting of the New York Junta or Board of the Party on June 14, 1954, at
which Mr. Lynn was present. But Sorrell had no recollection that at that
meeting anything was said concerning the defense of the defendants. Ruth
Reynolds a defense witness, testified as follows as to that meeting at which
none of the defendants was present:
'Q. Were you present at an apartment at 660 Riverside Drive at the end of May
of beginning of June of this year at which Sorrell was present? A. I was present
at a meeting there, he was present on the evening of June 14.
10
11
'Q. If you know, will you tell me what that meeting was concerned with and
11
who was there? A. It was a meeting called for some of the Nationalists to
discuss the case in Washington and this conspiracy charge, the trial, present
trial deals with, to discuss with attorney Mr. Lynn plans in relation to the
ending of the case that was being tried in Washington at that moment and with
this conspiracy charge, and I was present there as-- I was at that time employed
by you as an investigator and I was present for that reason.
12
'You were present, Antonio Arrera was present; Lydia Collazo was present;
Esteban Anna Marie Quinones was present; I think Lolita Torresola was there.
13
'Q. Is Miss Lydia Collazo the daughter of Rosa Collazo, the defendant in this
action? A. Yes, sir.
14
'Q. That's all. In addition to the plans for defense, was the matter of funds for
the defense also discussed at that meeting? A. Yes, the meeting was concerned
with how funds were going to be raised for an adequate defense.'
15
The foregoing in no way discloses that defense counsel and any prospective
witness discussed what any of the witnesses would testify at the trial.
16
3. Several defendants urge that the trial judge erred in refusing to sever their
indictments from the others and, more particularly, from the indictment of the
four gunmen who fired upon the Congressmen. In part, the claim of error is
based on possible prejudice resulting from the reaction of jurors to so peculiarly
heinous a crime as that indiscriminate attack. In part, it is based on the theory
that the Congressional attack constitutes a separate conspiracy in which the
particular defendants urging this claim are not involved. As noted earlier, we
reject the theory that that attack was a separate conspiracy, and we agree with
the trial judge that evidence of that attack was admissible against all of the
defendants. The grant of a severance is within the discretion of the trial judge,
and, where the charge against all the defendants may be proved by the same
evidence and results from the same series of acts, an upper court will not
interfere with that discretion. United States v. Cohen, 2 Cir., 124 F.2d 164. We
think the trial judge here did not 'abuse' his discretion.
17
4. Surprise and prejudice are claimed in the judge's denial of motions for bills
of particulars. The indictment, however, was sufficiently specific to apprise
defendants of the nature of the charge against them and to permit them to
prepare adequately for trial. The defendants in the various questions included in
their bills of particulars were, in effect, making an effort to obtain from the
government a statement of its evidence, including the names of the informants.
19
6. As part of the voir dire examination, the prosecution handed to each potential
juror a list of organizations, and inquired whether the potential juror was a
member of any of them. The Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico was included in
this list. Appellants suggest that the list was actually the Attorney General's list
of subversive organizations, and that the defendants were prejudiced by the
jurors having learned, however, indirectly, that the Attorney General regards
the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party as subversive, and by whatever, prejudice
might result from the association of the Nationalist Party on a common list with
the Communist Party and the various groups regarded as Communist 'fronts'
and satellites. The government suggests that the list was not identified as the
Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, and, in any event, that
defendants waived their claim by failing timely to object. Although we do not
endorse the practice of handing mimeographed lists of subversive organizations
to potential jurors, the supervision of the voir dire is within the discretion of the
trial judge. United States v. Dennis, 2 Cir., 183 F.2d 201, 228, and we cannot
say that he abused his discretion in this case. All the information the
government sought was obtainable directly through questions to jurors as to
their organizational affiliations, United States v. Kertess, 2 Cir., 139 F.2d 923,
and short-cutting the process by using a mimeographed list is not so offensive
as to justify reversal. We suggest, however, that this practice be not again
employed.
20
22
9. Several defendants urge error in that the judge refused to permit them to
inspect 27 written reports submitted to the FBI by Raymond Sorrell, who had
been a secret FBI informant during the period in which he submitted the reports
in question, and who testified extensively at the trial against the defendants.
Judge Walsh, in he privacy of chambers, read each of the reports and
determined that they contained no material (a) inconsistent with Sorrell's
testimony, or (b) bearing on possible entrapment of defendants. On that basis he
refused to permit defendants. to examine the reports. Had the reports contained
material tending to impeach the witness' veracity, or to show entrapment, then
defendants would have been entitled to access to them. United States v.
Krulewitch, 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 76, 156 A.L.R. 337; United States v. Beekman, 2
Cir., 155 F.2d 580; United States v. Coplon, 2 Cir., 185 F.2d 629, 638-640, 28
A.L.R.2d 1041; United States v. Alper, 2 Cir., 156 F.2d 222, 226, but the judge
found no such material. These reports were ordered sealed and, in that manner,
were made part of the record for our scrutiny. We have read them and agree
with Judge Walsh's evaluation of them.
23
(1) Rosa Collazo: Liaison between party leaders in Puerto Rio and the New
York junta; treasurer of the New York junta and participant in its discussions
(2) Andres Figueroa Cordero: one of the group which fired upon the House of
Representatives; members of the New York junta and one of the participants in
its initiation ceremony.
(3) Julio Pinta Gandia: president of the New York junta, 1949; appointed
delegate for the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico to the United States, 1950;
gave orders to Chicago junta to obtain weapons for Congressional attack;
administered oath of membership in party; urged forcible resistance to arrest by
FBI.
(4) Dolores Lebron: one of the group which fired upon the House of
Representatives; secretary of the New York junta, 1953; general delegate for
the party to the United States replacing Gandia, 1954.
(5) Juan Bernardo Lebron: member of the New York junta; attended and
participated in discussions of planned acts of violence; told witness Sorrell, a
government informer posing as a party member, that he (Lebron) had a clip full
of bullets in Washington (during the Congressional shooting) which he had
thrown out of the car when he believed that the FBI was following him; told
witness Sotomayor, then a member of the party, that the party might soon call
on Sotomayor for a 'patriotic act' (party euphemism for 'act of violence') and
instructed Sotomayor in what to declare publicly should he survive the 'patriotic
act.'
(6) Armando Diaz Matos: treasurer of the Chicago junta, 1952; one of
triumvirate selected to direct Chicago operations after dissolution of the
Chicago junta; procurer of arms; participant in pistol practice.
(7) Juan Francisco Ortiz Medina: president of New York junta, 1953; receiver
of pistols from Chicago used for the attack upon Congress; home used as New
York party headquarters.
(8) Rafael Cancel Miranda: one of group who fired upon Congress; attended
New York junta meetings at which violence was discussed.
(9) Jose A. Otero Otero: attended New York junta meetings at which violence
was discussed; vice-president of New York junta, 1953; editor and publisher of
New York party newspaper; appointed Minister of Propaganda, 1954.
(10) Irvin Flores Rodriguez: one of group which fired upon Congress; elected
officer of New York junta.
(11) Carmelo Alvarez Roman: officer of juntas in new York and Puerto Rico;
his Puerto Rican farm used as training ground for weapons and for manufacture
of bombs and Molotov cocktails.
(12) Manuel Rabago Torres: bodyguard to Pedro Albizu Campos, identified as
the party's major leader; member of party organization in Puerto Rico and
attended meetings of Chicago junta.
2
As to the English practice, see Kenney, Criminal Law (15th ed. 1942) 563 note
3; Whitman, The Administration of the Criminal Law, 5 Lectures on Legal
Topics (1928) 421, 424-25, 427-28; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) Sec. 1850