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Postma v. Teamsters: Appeal Dismissal

The document is a court case from 1964 in which Peter Postma appeals the dismissal of his complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not subject to sanctions under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 that barred those convicted of crimes like extortion from union offices. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Postma's prior conviction for conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion was covered by the reference to "extortion" in the 1959 law. Additionally, applying the law to a previous conviction did not violate the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder or ex post facto laws based on a prior Supreme Court decision.

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228 views2 pages

Postma v. Teamsters: Appeal Dismissal

The document is a court case from 1964 in which Peter Postma appeals the dismissal of his complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not subject to sanctions under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 that barred those convicted of crimes like extortion from union offices. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding that Postma's prior conviction for conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion was covered by the reference to "extortion" in the 1959 law. Additionally, applying the law to a previous conviction did not violate the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder or ex post facto laws based on a prior Supreme Court decision.

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337 F.

2d 609

Peter POSTMA, Plaintiff-Appellant,


v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL 294,
Defendants-Appellees, and Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney
General of the United States, Intervening Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87, Docket 28991.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.


Argued Oct. 19, 1964.
Decided Oct. 21, 1964.

Benjamin Ungerman, Albany, N.Y. (Ungerman, Greenberg & Harris,


Albany, N.Y.), for plaintiff-appellant.
Morton Hollander, Washington, D.C. (John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Justin J. Mahoney, U.S. Atty., Richard S. Salzman, Attorney, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.), for appellee, Attorney General of the
United States.
Dominick Tocci, Albany, N.Y., for appellee, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, etc.
Before FRIENDLY, KAUFMAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Postma, who was indicted and convicted, in 1956, for 'conspiring * * * to


obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce * * * by extortion' from trucking
companies in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, see United States v.
Postma, 242 F.2d 488 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922, 77 S.Ct. 1380, 1
L.Ed.2d 1436 (1957), appeals from the dismissal of his complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment that he was not subject to the sanctions of 504(a) of the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 504(a),


which temporarily bars from certain union offices a person convicted of various
crimes including 'extortion' or conspiracy to commit the same. He contends that
the reference to 'extortion' in 504(a) was not broad enough to include the
offense for conspiring to engage in which he had been convicted, and, if that
issue be decided against him, that application of the 1959 statute to a previous
conviction would violate the constitutional prohibition, Art. I, 9, of bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws.
2

1, 2$ On the issue of statutory construction we have little to add to the opinion


of Judge Brennan, D.C., 229 F.Supp. 655. The time has long since passed when
platitudes as to 'plain meaning' or strictures as to the strict construction of penal
statutes can procure judicial refusal to reach a result sufficiently indicated by
the legislature's words. We were told long ago to 'free our minds from the
notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and
conventional rule * * *,' Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. Union Supply
Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55, 30 S.Ct. 15, 16, 54 L.Ed. 87 (1909). It would be sheer
perversity for a court to say that when Congress used the term 'extortion' in 504
(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, it was
referring only to violations of state criminal laws against extortion and did not
include violations of the Hobbs Act-- almost certainly the 'extortion' statute best
known to federal legislators-- because, due to limitations on federal power, that
offense is defined as obstruction of interstate commerce extortion is simply one
of the prohibited means.

DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960),
is dispositive of the constitutional argument. Appellant attempts to distinguish
that decision on the basis that the Waterfront Commission Act there in question
did not in terms prohibit previously convicted felons from holding union office
but made it illegal to collect dues for any labor organization of which they were
officers or agents. But, as practicality obviously demanded, the Court treated
the Act as one 'disqualifying all convicted felons from union office.' 363 U.S. at
157-160, 80 S.Ct. at 1153.

Affirmed.

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