United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
2d 133
46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,064, 57 USLW 2014,
3 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 699
I.
2
The drug testing policy which the Township police officers challenge is
embodied in a document entitled Drug Testing Program of the Township of
Washington, adopted in November, 1986 and revised February 25, 1987. The
police officers' lawsuit was filed, however, on September 8, 1986, in response
to a memorandum from the Mayor of the Township to all department heads and
municipal employees announcing that the Township would begin a mandatory
drug testing program. That announcement, dated August 5, 1986, was
apparently made in response to the call on August 4, 1986 by President Ronald
Reagan for every level of government to take steps to assure a drug free work
place. The August 5, 1986 announcement contained no details of the proposed
plan. Nevertheless the complaint alleged that "no guidelines for the protection
of police employee's privacy were announced nor was there announced a
method of assuring that said test would accurately reflect the presence of
controlled dangerous substances in an employee's system." Complaint, Count I,
p 4. The proposed program was alleged to violate the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Injunctive relief and
damages were requested solely on behalf of Township police officers.
The plaintiffs sought pendente lite relief, but since the complaint was obviously
premature an ex parte temporary restraining order was dissolved and a
preliminary injunction was denied. Thereafter the Township formulated and
revised the drug testing program. The plaintiffs then stipulated that they now
challenge the revised plan as unconstitutional in only three respects:A. Those
aspects which require random mandatory testing of employees represented by
Plaintiff [police officers];
4 Those aspects which would require testing as part of any pre-textual physical
B.
examination, i.e., any physical examination which is not a bona fide medical
examination given in the ordinary course of business and as a matter of the
Township's policy for its police officers;
5 Those aspects which would require testing of all employees in mass form as
C.
within the dispositive facts of Capua v. City of Plainfield [643 F.Supp. 1507
(D.N.J.1986) ].
6
Stipulation dated May 18, 1987. Thus the plaintiffs withdrew any challenge to
the plan on the basis of lack of assurance of privacy, or lack of assurance of
accuracy.1
The plan calls for both testing on reasonable suspicion and random testing. The
effect of the stipulation is to withdraw any challenge to the requirement of drug
testing based on reasonable suspicion. The plan also requires all employees to
undergo an annual medical examination, which includes urinalysis. The effect
of the stipulation is to challenge the annual medical examination requirement
for police officers only to the extent that it is a pretext for obtaining body fluids
for drug testing. The reference in the stipulation to Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F.Supp. 1507 (D.N.J.1986), is to the holding in that case that a universal
mass urinalysis of fire department employees of the City of Plainfield was
unconstitutional.2 The stipulation also excludes any challenge to the plan as
applied to applicants for jobs as policemen. Thus the area of dispute was by
stipulation narrowed to two questions: (1) whether a police department may
require that police officers submit to random selection for urinalysis which will
detect drug use; and (2) whether a police department may require that all police
officers submit to an annual urinalysis which will detect drug use.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court,
relying solely on the Fourth Amendment, answered both questions negatively
and granted the plaintiffs a summary judgment, enjoining Washington
Township "from requiring police officers to submit samples of their urine to be
tested for the presence of illegal drugs, except when there exists an
individualized, reasonable suspicion based on objective facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that a particular police officer has engaged in the
use of illegal drugs."
II.
9
1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 577, 93 L.Ed.2d 580 (1986).
That case upheld, against a Fourth Amendment search and seizure challenge,
requirement that jockeys employed in the New Jersey horse racing industry
submit to universal daily breathalyzer and random urinalysis testing.
Recognizing that both the universal breathalyzer test and random urinalysis
involved seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we held that
in a highly regulated industry such as horse racing the administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied. That
exception applied because the state had a strong interest in conducting an
unannounced search, and because pervasive regulation in the industry reduced
justifiable expectations of privacy. 795 F.2d at 1142. Because the Racing
Commission's discretion was sufficiently circumscribed by the universal
breathalyzer and random selection urinalysis requirements, we rejected the
contention that the searches in question involved the exercise of standardless
discretion. Id. at 1143.
10
11
The district court opined, and we agree, that "[t]he need to ensure that the
Township's police are drug-free is an important one. Important public safety
concerns are associated with a police officer's duties." Despite the recognition
of this strong public interest, however, the district court concluded that police
officers had expectations of privacy which mandated that urinalysis be required
only upon individualized reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use. Our review of
this legal conclusion is plenary.
12
The governing body of any municipality, by ordinance, may create and establish, as
13
15
b. Have, exercise, and discharge the functions, powers and duties of the force;
16
c. Prescribe the duties and assignments of all subordinates and other personnel;
17
d. Delegate such of his authority as he may deem necessary for the efficient
operation of the force to be exercised under his direction and supervision; and
18
19
20
21
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the appointment by the governing body
of committees or commissions to conduct investigations of the operation of the
police force, and the delegation to such committees or commissions of such
powers of inquiry as the governing body deems necessary or to conduct such
hearing or investigation authorized by law. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent the appropriate authority, or any executive or administrative officer
charged with the general administrative responsibilities within the municipality,
from examining at any time the operations of the police force or the
performance of any officer or member thereof. In addition, nothing herein
contained shall infringe on or limit the power or duty of the appropriate
authority to act to provide for the health, safety or welfare of the municipality
in an emergency situation through special emergency directives.
22
In one form or another the power to adopt regulations for the organization and
discipline of a police force has been conferred on New Jersey municipalities
since at least 1884. See, e.g., Hermann v. Town of Guttenberg, 86 N.J.L. 681,
94 A. 308 (1914). See also N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 40:48-1 (West Supp.1987)
(general and regulatory powers of municipalities).
23
25 keep order in all public places of this township; to prevent, restrain and suppress
to
any riot, row, disturbance, disorderly assembly or breach of the peace ..., to restrain
vagrants, mendicants and street bargainers; and to require any persons unnecessarily
congregated upon the sidewalks or corners of the street to disperse, and if they
refuse, to arrest them....
26
Section 19-5 also provides that members of the Police Department shall devote
full time and attention to the service of the Department, and although hours are
allotted for the performance of regular tours of duty, "officers are considered at
all times available for duty and must act promptly at any time their services are
required, except when on authorized leave or in the event of disability." The
ordinance cross-references to Department Rules and Regulations, the current
version of which was adopted by Resolution No. 105-1974. This 72 page
manual in a forward states:
28
Chapters 1 and 2 of the regulations set forth the organizational structure of the
Department, which in broad terms may be described as quasi-military. Chapter
3 sets forth General Rules and Regulations; Chapter 4, Personnel Regulations;
and Chapter 5, Disciplinary Regulations. Among the General Rules and
Regulations, those particularly relevant to the question whether police officers
may have lowered expectations of privacy because they have chosen to enter a
highly regulated industry include:
29
"3:1.1 Standard of Conduct. Members and employees shall conduct their private
and professional lives in such a manner as to avoid bringing the department into
disrepute.
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30
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31
32
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33
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34
35
36
"(D) Members and employees shall pay all just debts and legal liabilities
incurred by them.
37
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38
***
39
40
"3:1.28 Persons and Places of Bad Reputation. Member [sic] and employees
shall not frequent places of bad reputation, nor associate with persons of bad
reputation, except as may be required in the course of police duty.
41
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42
***
43
44
45
46
47
"(B) Members or employees of the department shall not drink any kind of
intoxicating beverage while on duty or take any drugs not duly prescribed and
necessary for health at any time.
48
49
"(D) No member of the department shall, at any time when in uniform, except
in the performance of duty, enter any place in which intoxicating liquor is
served.
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51
"(F) Members and employees shall not bring into or keep any intoxicating
liquor or drugs on department premises except when necessary in the
performance of a police task. Liquor or drugs brought into department premises
in the furtherance of a police task shall be properly identified and stored
according to department policy.
***
52
***
53
54
"3:2.5 Physical Fitness For Duty. Members shall maintain good physical
condition so that they can handle the strenuous physical contacts often required
of a law enforcement officer.
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56
"3:2.7 Smoking While On Duty. Members shall not smoke on duty while in
direct contact with the public nor when in uniform in public view, except that
smoking is permitted in public view at mealtimes and while patrolling in police
automobiles at which times it shall be as inconspicuous as possible.
***
57
***
58
59
60
"3:3.2 Manner of Dress On Duty. Normally members will wear the duty
uniform on a tour of duty; however, commanding officers may prescribe other
clothing as required by the nature of the duty which a particular member is
assigned. Employees will wear and maintain an employee uniform when so
directed by the Chief of Police.
61
62
"3:3.4 Wearing of Name Badge. A member, when in uniform, shall wear the
regulation name badge on his uniform shirt or dress jacket, whichever is
outermost, in accordance with department instructions.
***
63
***
64
65
"3:3.8 Carrying Equipment Off Duty. When off duty, each member will carry
or have in his immediate possession, his badge, department revolver, or a pistol
or revolver of not less than .32 caliber as authorized by the department, and the
identification card. This rule shall not apply when members are engaged in
sports and activities of such a nature as to make it impractical.
66
***
67
***
68
69
70
"(A) Hair shall be evenly trimmed at all times while on duty. The hair shall at
no point extend downward over the shirt collar in normal posture.
71
"(B) Sideburns shall not extend below the bottom of the ear. The maximum
width at the bottom of the sideburns shall not exceed 1 3/4 inch.
72
1/2 inch beyond the corners of the mouth nor more than 1/4 inch below the
corners of the mouth. Remainder of the face shall be clean shaven.
73
74
***
75
***
76
77
78
"(A) Neither speak disparagingly of any race or minority group nor refer to
them in insolent or insulting terms of speech, whether prisoners or otherwise.
79
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80
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81
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83
"3:10.2 Impartial Attitude. All members, even though charged with vigorous
and unrelenting enforcement of the law, must remain completely impartial
toward all persons coming to the attention of the department. Violations of the
law are against the people of the state and not against the individual officer. All
citizens are guaranteed equal protection under law. Exhibiting partiality for or
against a person because of race, creed, or influence is conduct unbecoming an
officer. Similarly, unwarranted interference in the private business of others
***
85
*86* *"3:10.8 Commercial Testimonials. Members and employees shall not permit
their names or photographs to be used to endorse any product or service which is in
any way connected with law enforcement without the permission of the Chief of
Police. They shall not, without the permission of the Chief of Police, allow their
names or photographs to be used in any commercial testimonial which alludes to
their positions or employment with the department.
87
88
(H) He shall submit to and pass such written, oral, psychiatric, physiological, or
performance evaluation tests as are prescribed by the Chief of Police with the
approval of the Township Committee.
91
These statutes and regulations speak for themselves. They establish that the
police industry is probably the most highly regulated, with respect to
performance of its employees, of any industry in New Jersey. When compared
with the history of regulation held in Shoemaker to be sufficient for application
of the administrative search exception, the occupation of police officer is far
more intensely regulated. The Washington Township police officers are
members of quasi-military organizations, called upon for duty at all times,
armed at almost all times, and exercising the most awesome and dangerous
power that a democratic state possesses with respect to its residents--the power
to use lawful force to arrest and detain them. The need in a democratic society
for public confidence, respect and approbation of the public officials on whom
the state confers that awesome power is significantly greater than the state's
need to instill confidence in the integrity of the horse racing industry. The
plaintiffs' efforts to distinguish Shoemaker are unavailing. That case controls,
and requires the reversal of the summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs'
remaining arguments simply dispute the Shoemaker precedent. This panel is
not free, however, to disregard it.3
III.
92
The parties are in agreement that there are no material issues of disputed fact.
On the present record the Township is entitled to a judgment in its favor on the
plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. The district court did not address the
plaintiffs' contention that the plan also violated Article I, paragraphs 1, 2 and 7
of the New Jersey Constitution. We express no view on the question whether
the New Jersey Constitutional provisions on which the plaintiffs rely would
afford greater protection from random or universal mandatory urinalysis of
police officers than does the Fourth Amendment.4 The judgment appealed from
will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
The plan contains detailed safeguards for maintaining the privacy of the testing
and test results, and for assuring accuracy of the test results
The Capua court held (1) that the Plainfield plan contained no procedural
protection or confidentiality guarantees, and (2) that the fire department was not
a highly regulated industry. 643 F.Supp. at 1519, 1521. In this case the
Washington Township Plan is not challenged on the first Capua ground
Other courts have followed it. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179-80 (5th Cir.1987) (analogizing Customs Service
to highly regulated industry), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1072 (1988); McDonnell
v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir.1987) (correctional officers); Rushton
v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F.Supp. 1510, 1524-25 (D.Neb.1987)
(nuclear power plant employees). But see, e.g., Railway Labor Executive's
Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 585 (9th Cir.1988) (distinguishing Shoemaker
); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F.Supp. 726, 734-35
(S.D.Ga.1986) (distinguishing and criticizing Shoemaker ); Fraternal Order of
Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.Super. 461, 469, 524
A.2d 430, 434-35 (App.Div.1987) (distinguished Shoemaker, but did not reach
federal constitutional issue); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc.2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d
789, 798 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1986) (distinguishing Shoemaker ), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d
See Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216
N.J.Super. 461, 477, 524 A.2d 430, 438-39 (App.Div.1987)