United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
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Scribd Government Docs370 F.
2d 969
The BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Appellee,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW, AFL-CIO) and Local 1069,
Etc., Appellants.
No. 15722.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued June 16, 1966.
Decided January 19, 1967.
Alan R. Howe, Philadelphia, Pa. (Edward Davis, Philadelphia, Pa., on the
brief), for appellants.
Robert M. Landis, Philadelphia, Pa., (R. Neal Risley, Dechert, Price &
Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GANEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KIRKPATRICK,
District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
This is an action for damages under 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 as amended, 29 U.S. C.A. 185. The complaint alleges that the
defendant unions, their representatives and members, engaged in a strike and
work stoppage in violation of a no strike clause contained in a collective
bargaining agreement signed by the parties. The answer admits that certain
union members engaged in a strike and stoppage but denies the defendant's
liability for their alleged illegal activities. The matter came before the court
below on a motion of the defendant to dismiss the complaint, for summary
judgment, and, in the alternative, for a stay of the action pending arbitration.
The motion was denied and this appeal followed.
We are met at the outset with a question as to the appealability of the court's
denial of the motion for summary judgment. This denial was predicated on a
determination that the allegations of the complaint and the answers thereto
raised genuine issues as to material facts which could be resolved only on a trial
of the action. The denial was clearly not a final decision appealable under
1291 of Title 28 U.S.C.A. Switzerland Cheese, etc. v. E. Horne's Market, 385
U.S. 23, 87 S.Ct. 193, 17 L. Ed.2d 23 (Nov. 7, 1966); Hook v. Hook &
Ackerman, Inc., 213 F.2d 122, 128 (3rd Cir. 1954). The refusal of the court to
dismiss the complaint is similarly not appealable. The refusal of the court to
grant a stay of the action pending arbitration is appealable as an interlocutory
decision under 1292 of Title 28 U.S.C.A.
The only question for decision is whether the issues of the instant litigation
were referable to arbitration. Since the obligation to submit a controversy to
arbitration is wholly contractual, the answer depends upon the proper
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d
462 (1962). If the said issues were arbitrable under the terms and conditions of
the contract, the denial of a stay was improper.
We recognize at the outset that arbitration clauses, such as those usually
contained in labor-management contracts, should be so construed as to
effectuate congressional policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes. It was
held in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrier & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960): "An order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Despite this liberal rule of
construction a reluctant party may not be compelled to submit a controversy to
arbitration unless under a fair construction of the agreement he is bound to do
so. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra; Retail Clerks International
Association, etc. v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 341 F.2d 715, 719-720 (6th Cir.
1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 839, 86 S.Ct. 87, 15 L.Ed.2d 81; Kansas City
Luggage & Nov. Wkrs. U., etc. v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992,
994 (8th Cir. 1965). Absent a contractual obligation to the contrary, a reluctant
party is free to pursue any available legal remedy to redress its grievances. Ibid.
The contract before us provides for an elaborate procedure for the resolution of
employees' grievances. Article V-1, 1, defines a grievance as "difference
between the company and any employee concerning working conditions, or the
interpretation or application of any provision of this agreement." It then
prescribes a four step grievance procedure, the exhaustion of which is a
prerequisite to the submission of the dispute to arbitration. An aggrieved
employee, either personally or through his shop steward, must submit his
complaint initially to his area foreman under step 1. The disposition of the
grievance under step 1 is subject to review by designated representatives of
management on successive appeals by the shop steward, the area
committeemen and the chairman of the shop committee. Section 2 of the said
article provides that a disposition accepted by the union, or from which no
appeal has been taken * * *, shall be final and conclusive. * * * Article VI, 1,
provides that the only grievance which may be submitted to arbitration is one
"involving the interpretation or application of the provisions of the agreement
which has been processed through step four."
6
It is apparent from a reading of the contract that the grievance procedure is
employee oriented. The grievance procedure is available only to the employees
as "the exclusive remedy for the disposition of any claim, dispute or grievance
of any kind * * * Against the Company." (Emphasis supplied). Article VI, 7.
The only arbitrable grievances are those "involving the interpretation or
application of the provisions of [the] agreement which [have] been processed
through Step 4 of the grievance procedure," supra. The entire procedural
structure is designed to resolve only the employees' grievances against the
company. This seems obvious from a consideration of Article V-A (Grievance
Procedure) and Article VI (Arbitration) in their entirety.
It is our opinion that we have before us a case in which "it may be said with
positive assurance," as in Atkinson, supra, that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of a construction that the plaintiff was bound to arbitrate the issues
involved in its action for damages.
The defendants rely on Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery and Confectionery
Workers, etc., 370 U.S. 254, 82 S.Ct. 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 474. The decision of the
Court in the cited case was predicated on its construction of a collective
bargaining agreement which prescribed a comprehensive grievance procedure
available to both employees and employer and provided for compulsory
arbitration, at the request of either, of "all complaints, disputes or grievances
arising between [the parties] involving questions of interpretation or application
of any clause or matter covered by [the] contract or any act or conduct or
relation between the parties hereto, directly or indirectly." The contract before
us is much different; in its significant respects it is comparable to the agreement
considered by the Court in Atkinson, supra.
